HSEQ
page 15
CREWING
page 28
MT in the Media
page 31
NewsLetter Content Manager’s Corner ......... 2 Health, Safety, Environment and Quality .................... 3 Vetting ......................... 18 Security......................... 23 Fleet group Management ............... 24 Regulatory .....................26 Crewing......................... 28 Procurement ............... 29 Technology & Innovation ................. 30 MT in the Media ........... 31 Congratulatory ............. 32 Out of the blue ............ 33 Appendices .................. 34
PORT INFO
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Manager’s Corner by Peter Hawkin Dear Colleagues, During the last sixteen months we have all experienced huge changes to our personal and professional lives. The impact of the COVID 19 pandemic has created challenges to seafarers that are unique, onboard and at home. It’s been mixed emotions for me. There has been pride in seeing how you have responded to these challenges and dismay at the lack of consistent support for seafarers from many nations. Your success in overcoming these challenges can be seen in our Management Review 2020 (available in ShipNet SMS library). This includes an exceptional safety record for the year, daily running costs within budgets and multiple dynamic fleet (S&P) operations achieved. Throughout the industry, including Maersk Tankers, there has been concerns of the longer-term impact of COVID 19 on seafarers. The UK MCA recently published Marine Information Note (MIN 656 M) outlining the issues and the consequences, particularly on personal well-being, safety, and performance. Being aware of these potential issues is the first step in being able to address them onboard and from shore management support. We have seen a rise in accidents and incidents during this year, where the causes have included leadership decisions onboard. In some cases, the focus has been on solving an issue as quickly as possible, but human nature includes taking short-cuts or complacency. To prevent this behaviour, we have formal safety tools to remind us to slow down and consider the potential consequences to our actions. These tools should be used properly, including task planning (toolbox talks), risk awareness (Risk Assessment and Take 5) and intervention (Stop Work Authority). Many of you are using these successfully every day.
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Consistent and effective use of these safety tools will help to ensure that people are constantly aware of what could go wrong. This chronic unease, which is the understanding of how quickly events can deteriorate causing injury and damage, is one element required to achieve the highest level of a safety culture onboard (Generative). Within the Marine Standards team we recognise that you are the creators of successful safety performance onboard and we are committed to supporting you. This includes promoting an effective learning culture, such as the incidents shared in this newsletter. This is achieved with an open reporting culture, where everyone trusts the processes. This trust is built with having a Just Culture. A Just Culture has two principles which apply to us all. First is the understanding that human error is inevitable, and systems need to be continuously improved to accommodate those errors. The second principle is that individuals are accountable for their actions if they knowingly violate safety procedures or policies. We have a head start on achieving the right culture, even in these uncertain pandemic times, our five core values must remain persistent: Constant Care, Humbleness, Uprightness, Our Employees and Our Name. If you have any questions or suggestions on improving marine operations or safety performance, please reach out to myself or your Marine Superintendent. Thank you.
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Health, Safety, Environment and Quality By Prasenjit Mohanta There was no recordable personal injury under LTI submitted Fleet Wide during April 2021. At the end of April 2021 MT safety performance (12 months rolling) was as follows:
LTIF TRCF
12 months rolling 0.49 LTI 0.83 TRC
7 12
LTIF TRCF
YTD April 2021 0.81 LTI 1.42 TRC
4 7
During April 2021 - External audits (ISM – 1 / ISPS – 0 / MLC - 4) were conducted on board our fleet vessels. Shore management vessel visits – as part of our commitment to visible leadership, we shall be publishing a list of vessels visited by shore management each month. Below virtual visits were undertaken during April 2021. Peter Hawkin
Henning Maersk
01-Apr
Rajeev Pratap Singh
Maersk Cayman
07-Apr
Datharam Puttheguthu
Maersk Erik
14-Apr
Rajeev Pratap Singh
Maersk Curacao
21-Apr
Umesh Shinde
Maersk Sara
26-Apr
Madhav Kamath
Harald Maersk
27-Apr
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Incidents INC-A5E-21-1
Maersk Cebu
02/04/2021
Incidents
AE No.2 Failure
INC-KP9-21-2
Maersk Cirrus
05/04/2021
Incidents
High backpressure loading Castellon
INC-O68-21-1
Maersk Trenton
05/04/2021
Incidents
Fuel Oil Leak - AE No3
INC-9KQ-21-1
Bro Alma
06/04/2021
Incidents
Sea Water cooling system pipe with crack
INC-4GQ-21-1
Bro Developer
10/04/2021
Incidents
Loss of power
INC-KQ2-21-1
Maersk Seafarer
17/04/2021
Incidents
LO leaking from ME exh valve
INC-046-21-2
Maersk Bering
20/04/2021
Incidents
Damage due to contact with fender
INC-198-21-2
Maersk Kate
20/04/2021
Incidents
ME FUEL PUMPS NO.2 AND NO.5, STUCK
INC-O30-21-1
Maersk Penguin
21/04/2021
Incidents
ME Failure
INC-4R4-21-2
Britta Maersk
22/04/2021
Incidents
ME Failure to start in Suez.
INC-KQ3-21-4
Maersk Stratus
24/04/2021
Incidents
ECGS exhaust fan no1. VFC failure
INC-KP6-21-1
Maersk Nimbus
24/04/2021
Incidents
Parting of Mooring Ropes-Algeciras 24 April 2021
ACC-KH5-21-2
Henry Maersk
26/04/2021
Accident
Knee injury
INC-A5C-21-1
Maersk Callao
28/04/2021
Incidents
Oil in Water around VOPAK Terminal Fujairah
ACC-2Q9-21-1
Maersk Beaufort
28/04/2021
Accident
MTM self injured on eyebrow on right eye
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
MAERSK CEBU – 02ND APRIL 2021 AE No.2 Failure Description/Sequence of events: 2nd April there was turbo charger failure on the AE No.2. Engine room was already on UMS, and AE No.2 was in service. Several alarms and ME slowdown due to failure of power from the running Generator (AE No.2) Turbo Charger Failure. AE No.3 automatically cut-in and started AE No.1 as well. Investigation: During investigation it was found that: Shaft of the Turbocharger broke while engine in service without prior indication. Underlaying / Root Cause: Auxiliary engine No.2 Turbocharger shaft failure. The generator was installed with new overhauled TC cartridge. Operation was satisfactory without any prior indication. Material failure. Recommendation: To blank the exhaust side of the turbocharger. The engine can be run only on limited load. Requisition for spare cartridge & spares as soon as possible. Presently only 2 Generators available for all operations. Thorough inspection of material while overhaul of critical & sensitive equipment. Technical comment: Broken rotors on turbo chargers are rare. Why it happened can't be said at this stage. MAN-ES is very interested in why and have requested the cartridge returned. Once I have a report from MAN-ES we might learn something. MAERSK CIRRUS – 05TH APRIL 2021 High Back Pressure Event Loading Castellon Description and sequence of events. On 05 April 2021, Shore Pump tripped on High Back Pressure and Maersk Cirrus requested the shore to Cease Loading Operations, and First Foots, due to product not being received into Cargo Tanks 3W and High Back Pressure being experienced on Loading Manifold and associated lines.
Loading was being Conducted ex No 5 Manifold Stb side, and via Common Crossover lineup, then directed to 1W, 3W and 5W via Drop Lines. All Line ups and Valves on this 1st Parcel line up had been Checked and Double Checked, by OOW and Chief Officer. Manual Valves on the system at the Manifold arrangement had also been checked and double checked for correct settings as per Chief Officers load plan. Immediate Investigation considered and Included Hydraulic Locking of Cargo System valve Control stand, which proved in good working order, Incorrect Valve Line Up and Human Error, which was not determined not to have occurred, Incorrect indication of the Valve Status panel on Cargo Mimic, which was found in good order and not to be possible root cause. Further investigation then centered upon and identified that there was little or No apparent resistance when operating the valve No CO 324 to the full closed position, as you would expect when the valve disc is coming up against the seal and seat of the Valve Internally. Gearing of the Valve CO 324 was Opened up and inspected. All was noted to be in apparent good order, gearing well established and connected, no damage to any element of the Gears. Adjustable stoppers in the gearbox which will prevent it from over traveling, were found in place and correct. No Obvious immediate defective component on the Gearing side. Gearing Boxed back up and subsequently when operating the valve Open and Closed with No loading in progress the resistance was felt when closing the Valve disc against the Seat arrangement. A Internal Test was conducted transferring Cargo from 1W Cargo Tanks to 3W Cargo Tanks, and flow was Observed coming into 3W Cargo Tanks. Investigation During this period of Incident Investigation, and cessation of loading, Shore Terminal had decided to progress the loading of Parcel No 2 over Parcel No 1, at the time of restart. Therefore, Parcel No 2 was commenced at 2106 Hrs LT on 05 April 2021, into 2W, 4W and 6W Cargo Tanks, completing at 2224 Hrs on 06 April 2021. At 2330 Hrs LT On 06 April 2021, loading of Parcel No 1 was recommenced into 1W, 3W and 5W Cargo Tanks, with No further issues of High Back pressure or incident, the loading Operation completing fully at 1742 Hrs LT on 07 April 2021.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Findings: Cargo Valve Control system was found in good working order with No defects at time of Incident. Cargo System line up had been confirmed set as per Chief Officers Cargo Plan. No Human Error determined in the setting of the line up for this 1st Parcel loading Operation. No fault determined on the Valve Mimic display on the Control system. No erroneous valve feedback. This leads to the conclusion as witnessed, of the Incorrect Operation of Valve CO 324. On conduct of Fault finding, it was determined that there was a lack of resistance when operating the Valve CO 324 to the Closed Position. Inspection of the Valve CO 324 Gear assembly, has not identified any defects or failed components, however after opening up and then subsequently boxing back up, Testing of the valve and its subsequent operation has confirmed its appropriate operation, over its full range from Full Open to full closed. The specific Valve and this Incident event will be closely monitored by the Vessel to ensure ongoing correct operation. Immediate cause Disconnect between the Valve Operating Gear Assembly and the Valve disc, meaning that when the valve was operated to the Open Position, the Valve disc did not follow accordingly. This has been determined as the only possible cause of the Over Pressure Incident and No flow to Cargo Tanks 3W as observed. Underlying and root cause: Component misalignment in Gearing assembly is only possible root cause. Recommendation: Deck Officer Team Meeting detailing the facts established behind the Incident, was held onboard Maersk Cirrus on 10 April 2021. All
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Team members addressed the need to be aware of and realize the potential for defective operation of Valves on the Cargo system and therefore the need to monitor pressures on the Cargo System continuously, with any Parameters reported or identified, outside, of expected settings to be acted upon and escalated immediately, with appropriate use of Emergency Shut downs where required. Lesson learnt Monitor future Operation of Valve CO 324 for continued operation as per Operator demand / Setting Checks made of all Other Line Master Valves and Crossover Valves and all found to be in good working Order Continue to apply the Good Tanker practice onboard Maersk Cirrus of Checks and Double Checks to confirm setup as per plan. Question any peculiarities in Valve Operation. Use all senses such as Touch / Feel and sound, such that if a valve is easier to operate, than it was on last use, is there something that is not quite right? Raise awareness, report and escalate and investigate. MAERSK TRENTON – 05TH APRIL 2021 Fuel Oil Leak - AE No3 Description and sequence of events. During night rounds of the Engine room it was found that the fuel pipe for the manometer in place of thread connection with pipe which not protected by cover damaged and fuel sprayed near the control pane and generator. Due to this reason, high-level alarm of the overflow tank was not received. A big amount of the fuel sprayed near the control panel and generator. Airflow from the ventilation system also proposed the distribution of the mist fuel. The Engine was immediately stopped, fuel valves were closed. In
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
addition, we tested high-level alarm of the overflow tank of AE #3 and found is in good working condition.
Underlying and root cause: One of the reasons for this failure is due to heavy vibrations on the Auxiliary engine, which tends to lead fracture in pipes. One more reason could be over tightening of nut which compressed the pipe end causing it give way with pressure pulses. i.e. compressed beyond its elastic state. Heavy vibrations on the Auxiliary engine. BRO ALMA – 06TH APRIL 2021 Sea Water cooling system pipe with crack
Immediate cause During the investigation for leakage, the pipe nut was tight and the ferrule went loose because of damage of the pipe at the fitting end. One of the reasons for this failure is due to heavy vibrations on the Auxiliary engine, which tends to lead fracture in pipes. One more reason could be over tightening of nut which compressed the pipe end causing it give way with pressure pulses. i.e. compressed beyond its elastic state. Diameter of the pipe to small and can not to be the reason for reducing the fuel pressure for alarm. In this place to sensor installed smoke and heat (for activation water sprinkler system). However, it was not smoke (luckily) it was spraying only. Manometer pipe needs to be modify.
Description and sequence of events. Vessel performing Voyage 21610, under loading operations alongside Rotterdam / Vopak Europoort 7e Petroleumhaven/Jetty 4 East. At 09:00 hrs Engine Room Sea Water outlet pipe from the main Sea Water cooling system pump identified with crack(water leak). Fire Pump was used for cooling one Auxiliary Engine and the vessel remains on its own power. Sea Water pipe identified with crack isolated. Vessel received permission from Port Authorities and Terminal to carry the Hot Work in Engine Room for SW pipe repairs. Terminal confirmed that the Hot Work can be carried out without stoppage of cargo loading operations. Hot Work commenced at 13:42 hrs and completed at 15:00 hrs LT (with checks after welding included). SW cooling system fully functional and in service.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Nevertheless, although the transfer line breaker tripped this should have caused only a black out on the ESB without a complete loss of power Therefore, further investigation was required in order to determine what was the reason of blackout on both MSB and ESB in the same time.
Immediate cause: Immediate cause of this incident was the cracked pipe. Underlying and Root cause: No signs of leak noticed before incident. No vibrations or additional causes / stress into the piping system. As per pictures attached, it looks like the material used for pipe manufacturing was not the best quality. It looks like piece of pipe material is missing Recommendations: As recommendation vessel to have spare pipe in ER because this is the part of the most important system on board without backup. BRO DEVELOPER – 10TH APRIL 2021 Loss of power Description and sequence of events. After completing Emergency Generator running test and Emergency Switchboard black out test while the breaker 9Q13 (Emergency 450V Feeder Panel) in the MSB was switched on the transfer line breaker on ESB tripped and the vessel experienced a complete loss of power. Immediate cause: Immediate cause of the incident was the malfunctioning of the transfer line breaker inside the ESB.
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Underlying and Root cause: After further investigations it was discovered that there were actually two underlying causes for the incident. Although 24V system is fed both from ESB and MSB, according indicator lamps both power supplies where on at the moment of the incident and no alarm was present on any of the charging units CHP2 and CHP3 the moment Emergency power supply was off due to malfunctioning of transfer line breaker the 24V system lost the power and was not able to take over the consumption. Even without 220V supply from main or emergency switchboards the 24V battery system should be capable of taking over the consumption therefore, battery had been measured and found to be anywhere between 5-10V except only one battery which was found to have 13V so the system was only able to supply 18-19V;each charging panel is supplying two sets of two batteries each, connected in series. The root cause of the incident is considered to be failure of the 24V battery system to take over 24V consumption and prevent Main Generator to stop when ESB transfer line breaker tripped. Since the batteries were still within the three years period between replacing and charging panels seem to be working properly(charging voltage 26V and no alarm present) the real root cause might be the poor quality of the batteries. Recommendations: At every loading/discharging port, all draining of the loading arm will be suggested to be done at shore side or at drip tray onboard. It will be depressurized to make sure there is no pressure trapped on the line.
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
HENRY MAERSK – 12TH APRIL 2021 Petty theft at berth Description and sequence of events. Petty theft while loading at MOT Terminal at Sandakan Port in Malaysia. On April 11, 2021 vessel arrived at MOT Terminal, Sandakan at 2330 Hrs LT with starboard side alongside with 4 headlines, 2 fwd. spring lines, 2 aft spring lines, 4 stern lines and port anchor lowered to 2 shackles in the water. Palm Oils in bulk was to be loaded at MOT terminal with a departure draft of 6.5m. On April 12, 2021 at 0348 Hrs LT one deck crew on cargo watch at ship’s manifold heard a sound from vessel’s forecastle. When he looked in that direction, he observed a stranger moving around on the forecastle and immediately called Officer on Watch (OOW) in the Cargo Control Room (CCR) and to raise alarm for intruders. OOW and duty AB rushed from the CCR to the forecastle and Chief Officer was in CCR, while the other crew were alerted to proceed, before the crew reached the F’cle area, the stranger/intruder jumped overboard and when they got to the location, they saw a small skiff sailing away from the port side of the vessel. A quick investigation of the forecastle was done, and it was noted that the padlock to the forward bosun store had been broken but no entry had been made as the thief had been interrupted, when he was observed by the crew. It was the sound of the padlock being broken that the crew member on the manifold had heard. The rod securing the plates blocking access through the anchor chain pipes was found removed but the plates were still closed. Upon further investigation of the forecastle it was noticed that vessel’s anchor bell was missing. Presumably stolen by the intruder. A complete ship inspection was conducted and all other doors, locks were found intact with nothing else missing/stolen. No unknown person was found onboard.
CSO was notified by phone and e-mail. Agents were also notified by phone and e-mail. Agent then informed PFSO and local police about the theft. The incident was reported in the required format to IFC Reporting by e-mail. Flag was notified. Findings: Coastguard patrol boat was observed regularly during
the daytime. At night it was not observed but that could be due to the darkness. From the facts it was evident that the intruder had tried to steal from vessel forward bosun store. However, duty watchkeeper’s observation and reaction by ship staff forced the intruder to escape without any further property loss to the ship. Locking pin on plates blocking access via port anchor chain found removed but plates were found still in position. Ship’s forward anchor bell missing. Presumably stolen by the intruder. Intruders managed to get onboard un-noticed but only for a short time before being detected by alert ship’s staff. 2 deck crew were constantly patrolling vessel’s main deck and forecastle. 1 crew member from engine room was constantly on watch on aft deck. One of the deck crew were inside CCR for instructions when the thief was detected. No loss of ship’s property except for anchor bell and broken pad lock. Intruder was detected when crew member at manifold heard him break the padlock to the forward bosun store. Poor illumination on the shoreside at the dolphins. Night vision binoculars, though provided to the vessel were not in use to check the vessel surroundings.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
The necessary precautions were already in place due to the high risk of theft in the area. This included the deck illumination, heightened security watch and securing of all lose equipment, except for the anchor bell which unfortunately had been missed out. Underlying and Root cause: Failure to Secure – All lose equipment had been secured inside vessel’s stores room and deck
houses, except for the anchor bell which had been missed out. Port and berthing facilities - Location of Berth Darkness in the waters and around jetty, particular dolphins provided good cover and escape to the thieves. Deck patrol reduced while one of the patrolling deck crew was inside CCR to received instructions. Port and berthing facilities - Location of Berth Darkness in the waters and around jetty, particular dolphins provided good cover and escape to the thieves. Inadequate Leadership and/or supervision – Inadequate work planning – One of the watchkeepers was called in for instructions without a reliever to take rounds. Inadequate tools and Equipment – Inadequate assessment of needs and risks - Although provided to the vessel the night vision binoculars were not used.
Corrective and preventive actions: Use of night vision goggles while scanning the seaside during darkness at berths with poor illumination on seaside.
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Safety meeting with whole crew to discuss the incident and preventive measures All superintendents have been informed to pass on the information to their vessels trading in the area on this incident. Incident will be shared with the fleet via the monthly MTTO Newsletter MAERSK SEAFARER – 17TH APRIL 2021 LO leaking from ME exh valve Description and sequence of events. A minor lubricating oil leak (estimated to 15-20 ltrs per day) was reported on the Main Engine exhaust valve Actuator of Unit No 4. The leak was contained (draining directly into sludge tank) and posed no threat to safety of personnel or vessel. The Incident was reported on 12 April 2021 at 2300 UTC / 13 April 2021 at 0800 LT. Position of the vessel at the time of incident being reported was 36o04N 130o43E, some 45 NM off S Korean coast. Vessels course and speed 072o / 12.5 kts. Under assessment with Vessel and MTTO it was decided to continue with passage to a safe location in Pacific Ocean, whereby stopping the Main Engine and dismantling the Exhaust Valve cover, could allow repair to be effected, whilst monitoring the Leakage and Main Engine Performance for any further degradation. Planning for the repair identified a stoppage time 16 April 2021 at 2200 UTC, where the vessel could be stopped and drift for the period of time required to affect the repair, in Safe location.
Findings: Seal / O Ring breakdown as per attached pictures.
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Assumed that Seal has been in Use since New Build Delivery May 2016 Running Hours on Main Engine 20,623 Hrs.
Share Incident report to Sister Vessels and Vessels with same Engine Type for awareness raising and Knowledge Sharing.
Immediate & Root cause: No reasons to believe breakdown of seal was caused by anything else than wear of equipment under normal operating conditions and parameters. Breakdown of seal, of which Engine Manufacturers have issued New Generation part - reference number being 5948494-1
MAERSK BERING – 20TH APRIL 2021
Corrective and Preventative Actions: Ring / Damaged Seal replaced and Normal Operating conditions reinstated. No Further loss of Containment. New Generation Seals onboard Maersk Seafarer, noting the Upgrade of seals by Engine Manufacturers. Monitor remaining Main Engine Units Conduct replacement of Seals to upgrade component, at First Opportunity or Dry Dock due September 2021.
Damage due to contact with fender Description and sequence of events. Vessel while approaching the locks at Incheon, with Sea Pilot on board had damage due to contact with the fender. Prior to arrival, we had the dock pilot joining the vessel by boat. Once Dock pilot was on board, tugs were made fast. 3 tugs, made fast by tugs line in following configuration: 2 tugs fore, port and stbd shoulder and one tug aft stbd quarter. The approaching speed was 1.4 knots which was further reduced as vessel was entering the locks to abt 0.8knts. Mooring plan in the locks was 2 headlines and 2 stern lines, one send to stbd and one send to port at each end. First lines were send from stbd side fore and aft. As vessel entered in the locks pilot ordered to run engine astern, dead slow astern. Vessel’s propeller effect caused to swing to stbd slowly. Once vessel have been stopped, she moved ahead 20 mtrs in order to have the ship at final position in the locks. Once all fast, Sea pilot disembarked. 5 min later master was informed that vessel have been damaged on the aft support pillars between upper deck and A deck.
Investigation As per preliminary investigation while vessel was navigating through the lock gates at Inchon on her
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
passage to the berth, she was moored alongside the lock walls. The fenders on the lock wall are positioned horizontally in fore and aft direction, and during the manoeuvre they rested exactly at the midpoint of the port side deck pillars. These deck pillars are strengthened to take load in a vertical direction and are not designed for taking a load in the horizontal direction. The athwartship load of the vessel was taken by these pillars when the vessel rested against the fenders. As the surface area at the point of contact was less, the horizontal load exceeded the permissible load resulting in the described indent. No other damage has been found. A letter of protest was issued highlighting the inadequate design of the dock fenders. After carrying out risk assessment, control measures have been implemented for using the area above and adjacent to the pillars.
To determine any additional lessons, we are in the process of conducting a remote Navigational VDR Review through
external consultant. MAERSK KATE – 20TH APRIL 2021 ME fuel pumps No 2 and No 5 got stuck
Underlying and Root cause: Inadequate design of the dock wall fenders. The fore and aft direction of the fenders coming to rest against the superstructure of the vessel at low water in the locks caused excessive pressure at concentrated points on the pillars. Corrective action: After the next voyage vessel is planned to be taken to a lay by berth where the entire indented section of the pillars including strengthening members will be renewed. The repairs will be certified by attending Classification Society surveyor. Preventive action: The inadequate design of fenders in relation with vessel’s superstructure will be highlighted to all vessels through Knowledge sharing in the monthly newsletter.
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Description and sequence of events. Prior arrival to Malta OPL vessel received from Agent in Malta information that within 12 NM off Malta coast we can only use LSFO 0.1 % M/M. Due to that requirement vessel needed to make sure that MEl will be on LSMGO on entering Malta territorial water. ME Fuel consumption change -over from VLSFO to LSMGO started on 19.04.21 at 13:10 hrs by gradually reducing the fuel temperature. On 19.04.21 at 14:30 hrs at 76.7 degrC, fuel oil valve was fully shut and d.o. valve was fully open. At this point all the steam tracing lines (f.o. booster unit and ME fuel pipes) were already shut. Booster unit steam was manually controlled to allow the temperature of the mixture between f.o. and d.o. to decrease with about one degr every 2 min until we reached 40 degr C and steam valve was fully shut. After change over of valves (f.o./d.o.) , fuel change over was considered completed at 19:42 hrs. During this time ME run constantly at Half Ahead for change-over period (until 20:00 hrs) and variable rpm ahead (dead slow/slow) during the night until morning arrival at RV psn. After EOSP ME was used hourly for very short time to control drifting position. On 20/04/2021 at 15:45LT ME RPM command on DSAH for reaching meeting
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
point with Surveyor service boat and at around 15:55 hrs ME RPM was increased to Slow, almost at the same time alarms from governor and exh gas deviation from units 2 and 5 sounded in ECR. On quick investigation it has been noted that 2 of the fuel injection pumps got stuck and ME was immediately stopped. The 2 pumps' plungers and barrels were replaced with spares available on board and ME started.
plunger and barrel which may explain the change in colour of the plunger; with plungers and barrels cleaned, the plungers are moving free and easy inside the barrels. Underlying and Root cause: Quality OR compatibility issue of VLSFO when in interaction with LSMGO leading to creation of sticky deposit of FO that prevents from correct operation of the entire system. Lab analysis of supplied VLSFO and LSMGO are being conducted only for their individual properties after bunkering and for provided single sample. Their interaction is not being taken into consideration on the lab tests and once used on one system on boardcreating unknown and unpredictable effect.
Findings: The removed plungers and barrels were investigated in workshop with the following findings: barrel on unit No2 was removed with the plunger stuck inside, the plunger from unit No5 removed prior barrel extraction, both barrels (from unit No2&5 were very difficult to extract from the Fuel Pump casing (stuck inside)) after successful removal of both barrels manual movement of the plungers inside them was not possible, after intensive cleaning the plunger from unit No2 was successfully removed before cleaning there were no visible scratches ; only some black hard deposits on the bottom part of the plunger and the colour also suggested kind of overheating also on the bottom. after cleaning some micro scratches were observed vertically but they were not a reason to worry; small pitting observed on the bottom part of the plunger where the black marks were before cleaning; also after the cleaning inside of the barrel it has been noted that there are areas of friction between
Recommendation: Increased awareness on fuel oil/Diesel oil lab test results and compatibility results. Compatibility test to be done onboard with fuels to be commingling even in small portions and for fuels to be changed over. VLSFO/Diesel. Increase awareness on fuel change over procedure and timings for the same. By analyzing the lab test result for the VLSFO From Amsterdam you will notice the compatibility score is 3 which should bring attention to commingling and this can be followed by operational issues. In addition the diesel test result from Barcelona shows low sulfur and together with the low viscosity on diesel this has potentially led to this incident. Based on the findings in the auto filter I would also state that VLSFO has styrene and DCPD which has not been found during the chemical screening in Lab. This will lead to a small layer on plunger which explains the change in color and when you change over to diesel and operation on diesel has been on for a while the small layer will come off and cause the plunger and barrel to seize or stick together with no movement. As Plunger and barrel has been cleaned in workshop they now move freely and I would say they can probably be mounted back and be able to run without any issues.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
MAERSK PENGUIN – 21ST APRIL 2021 Main Engine failure Description and sequence of events. During approaching port Coatzacoalcos/Pajaritos Terminal with Pilots on board M/E became inoperational. Sudden stop and not maintaining RPM. Entering port was aborted and vessel proceeding at anchor. Immediate cause: Relief valve fitted on the intermediate fuel accumulator is lifting prematurely and hence the fuel pressure is dropping from the rail to 200bars and engine is unable to maintain RPM. Underlying and Root cause: Age of the equipment. The maintenance on valve was not covered under PMS Sum up: Always have one spare onboard and include to Engine PMS.
Following has been made: Governor control panel was DE energised and restarted-same alarm appeared after few seconds. The next terminals have been checked for tightness: JM/5(ME Junction box), EGS 601/602/603/604(EGS Junction box on Engine), plug connection to governor(servomotor) checked for tightness and cleaned ,on completion of that we were able to start engine from Bridge. Recommendations The following checks to be carried out at safe anchorage or during port stay: EGS 2000 system to be set in self TEST mode to check for any abnormalities during test. All mechanical linkages between governor and fuel racks to be checked for free movement, additional grease to be applied. In case if some errors occurred during TEST mode, ELMT department to be contacted for further advise from maker Since we can not confirm that problem solved, bridge team instructed to give 2 hrs notice before departure. MAERSK STRATUS – 24TH APRIL 2021
BRITTA MAERSK – 22
ND
APRIL 2021
ME Failure to start in Suez. Description and sequence of events. When preparing to heave anchor before transiting Suez Canal , Main Engine repeatedly failed to start. At 0315 hrs vessel received call from Suez Port Control to heave up anchor until 3 shackles on deck. After preparations in accordance with Bridge Checklist Engine control was transferred to bridge at 0400 . When attempting to carry out ahead /astern manouvre the ME failed to start. Trouble shooting from Engine staff commenced. At 0440 Master reported to Suez Port Control the vessel presently was experiencing problems with ME. At 0455 vessel successfully managed to start ME - Ahead and astern manouvre was tested several times successfully. Suez Port Control informed and Pilot boarded at 0540 - No delay to operation. Underlying and Root cause:
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ECGS exhaust fan no1 VFC failure Description and sequence of events. On 24/04/2021 at H:02:00 00 duty engineer had shutdown alarm from EGCS . We ve check the system and found the VFC from the exhaust fan No 1 in alarm and the breaker tripped, furthermore the front display of the VFC was found blown out from the body of the convertor. We ve try to reset the alarm without any success. At 02:30 we ve change over from HSFO to LSMGO No3 Aux. Engine and Comp. Boiler in order to be in compliance with Annex VI Marpol. Immediate The EGCS shutdown and the vessel was out of Marpol Annex VI compliance. Underlying/Root cause:
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
We suspect that not enough cooling led to overheating the internal components.
Obtain weather forecasts, specifically with the swell conditions inside the Gibraltar bay Request terminal to assist with tug, if the swell conditions are reported to be even 1.0 to 1.5 mtrs.
Root cause: High air temperature and humidity in engine room's funnel.
HENRY MAERSK – 26TH APRIL 2021
MAERSK NIMBUS – 24
TH
Knee injury
APRIL 2021
Parting of Mooring Ropes-Algeciras Description and sequence of events. Vessel was alongside at CEPSA Terminal, Jetty 'B' Algeciras, Spain, discharging Jet-A1 from all cargo tanks. While berthing vessel had no problems with the moorings or weather conditions, except the wind, which was about 20 knots from the vessel's port quarter, not causing much of a concern. Vessel had completed the bulk discharge and was in the last leg of the discharging operations, ie stripping of the last cargo tank. Vessel experienced sudden and heavy roll due to the swell that had hit the vessel's beam, which resulted in the parting of 3 mooring ropes, 2 fwd springs & 1 aft spring, due to the excessive strain exerted on the mooring lines. The total loss of both fwd springs was about 25 mtrs from the eye & for the aft spring it was about 40 mtrs. The moorings were attended regularly and were maintained as per the terminal requirements. The additional contributing factor was also that, vessel had become lighter after the discharging, which in turn, rolled excessively on encountering the beam swell.
Description and sequence of events. One of the crew was sent to check sounding of WBT 6P, so he went to port deck house to get sounding tape. When he set his right foot on the step inside the deck house, the step broke off/fell down and he landed with his entire weight on the right leg in a twisting motion. He heard a popping sound from the knee and felt some pain and that it had no strength. After a few minutes he was able to stand up and make some stretching exercises and finding that the right knee was still not able to support him properly. Walking/humping on his left leg he managed to sound the ballast tank and then went to the CCR to call 2Off on the bridge to report his accident. Accident was reported to master who examined the knee. No bruises or swelling was visible so he was issued an elastic bandage to wrap around the knee and instructed go to his cabin and rest for the rest of the day. Immediate cause: Support for step inside port deck house weakened by rust to the point it broke when IP put his weight on the step.
Immediate cause: Unexpected Sudden Long swell encountered at berth and the same, hitting the vessel on the beam.. Root Cause: Failure to forecast the effects of swell even in a geographically fully protected port. Recommendations: On enquiring with the Pilot & loading master, they were quite aware of the prevalent winds but had never expected heavy swell reaching upto the berth at CEPSA Terminal.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Root cause: The support was hidden under the step so the deterioration was not visible and unfortunately not observed before it broke.
Action taken Hot work requested and step welded back in place 29.04.2021. MAERSK CALLAO – 28TH APRIL 2021 Oil in Water around VOPAK Terminal Fujairah Description and sequence of events. On 28 April 2021 at 1030 LT (0630 UTC) it was noticed that there was an oil slick / oily sheen in the water which had drifted from the sea side of the vessel and was now around VOPAK Berth #6 as well as around the vessel. The slick was also noted in vicinity of Berth #5 . The oil slick appears to have drifted in from the area of the SPM, but origin remains unknown. VOPAK Terminal were informed and the vessel was advised that the Port Authority was aware of the situation. An entry was made in the vessel Log Book to record this. Immediate cause: Oil slick in the port coming in contact with the vessel's hull. Source or type of oil unknown. Underlying and Root Cause: 1) Source of Oil in the harbor is unknown at this time as the Fujairah Port Authority have not communicated on this. According to P&I Surveyor this is common occurrence in the port.
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2) The occurrence was not reported to Shell casualty reporting as per CP due extent of the issue could not be determined. Shell SITME commercial ops was advised. P&I surveyor was denied access to the vessel.t. Root Cause: 1. Maersk Tankers cannot comment on the source of the oil in the port. The Fujairah Port authority has not contacted us since it was reported. 2. Environmental standards in the port. The Port Authority didn't express any concern over the oil slick. Ships crew did not witness anyone investigate or attempt recovery. The Port Authority stated through our agents they would not be responsible for any hull cleaning. Vopak Terminal doesn't provide any oil booms. The P&I Surveyor advised that this was not uncommon at Fujairah Port. 3. Terminal Restrictions prevented proper assessment. Despite masters request to have ships hull inspected, crew were forbidden to go on the jetty to conduct any inspection. Vessels P&I were denied permission to attend the vessel alongside the berth. Ships crew were trying to ascertain degree of hull fouling by looking over the side. 4. Commercial pressure. Had the vessel stopped cargo operations, terminal made it clear she would have to vacate the berth immediately. Charterers clearly communicated via brokers they would hold owners responsible for any delay. 5. Improper understanding of Shell Casualty reporting instructions by both vessel and Maersk tankers shore staff. MAERSK BEAUFORT – 28TH APRIL 2021 Injury on eyebrow near right eye Description and sequence of events. One of the crew got injured on eyebrow near the right eye during opening one nut on the ME water drain line on cylinder No. 3. Because of the tightening of the nut, and restricted access, IP moved with all body in front and he hit with the head on the metal part from the
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
ME structure and he causes a 1.5 cm cut on eyebrow on right eye. First Aid given to the IP.
Scenario 3 Ship commenced discharging Gasoline in Lagos, cargo dripping from connection between cargo hose and ship's manifold was observed. Terminal informed, discharging suspended, O-ring replaced with new one by terminal team. Valve on shore side was not opened while vessel commence discharging Gasoline. The build up in initial pressure was enough to start a small leak.
Immediate cause: Lack of situational awareness, He applied too much force on the spanner to open the nut. Investigation is on progress. Near misses and condition Scenario 1 During unmooring Operation (4+2+2) F & A , at Chittagong Port DOJ 6 Terminal, FWD station was advised to let go 2 Breast line and 1 Spring line and proceed FWD to Let go 3 head lines. While picking up 3 head lines it was found that head lines were stuck on the shore bollard, and shore personnel were unable to take out any of head lines properly (All 4 lines were on one single bollard ). In this case vessel had to slack a little the last head line in order to take out other 3 head lines from bollard. Because of difficulty and delay in letting go 3 head lines , bridge advised to let go all 4 head lines . While picking up all 4 head lines , the vessel was on only 1 spring rope FWD . Because of strong current in the river, vessel bow tend to come out from jetty and caused too much tension on the spring rope and then rope parted. Scenario2 Failure on the high pressure gauge for Provision Compressor No2. As it can be seen on attached picture, the gauge is discolored, and there is dust on the scale, making it impossible to determine the pressure.
Scenario 4 VDR Assessment, Obs #3 – Navigation Practices – Collision Avoidance) - Near Miss There were several maneuvers, over a period of 25 min, resulting in a near-miss with vessel Target. From OOW’s feedback it was understood that maneuvers were done to avoid fishing nets / small fishing vessel. The target came to close ranges such as 0.36/0.45 and converging and CPA less than 0.06/0.20. Bridge team altered course harder port towards the Target vessel. OOW did not call master ref masters standing orders CPA requirement and calling the master information details. Scenario 5 During the transit from Port Elizabeth to Lome, vessel has encountered at night, in VRA, a target without any navigation lights and without AIS on a head on situation. The ship took early actions by making a substantial course alteration to starboard and maintaining a safe distance to the unknown target. The target maintain her course of 180° and speed of 11.2 kts for all her period. The bridge team monitored the target at all time and made sure that will be no suspicious activities coming from the target. Once the target was visually sighted it was observed it was a tanker underway.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Vetting By Madhav Kamath SIRE: 24 SIRE inspections were conducted on the fleet during the month of Apr 2021 with a total of 82 observations, giving an average of 3.42 observations per inspection. M.T. Maersk Trenton was top performer with NIL observations in the BP SIRE inspection. Well done!! 10 vessels received VBIS award during the month. 1 Vetting rejection was recorded during the month.
SIRE Chapter statistics: Chapter
Apr 2021 Number of % of Total observations observations
Ch 1 - General Information Ch 2 - Certification and documentation Ch 3 - Crew Management Ch 4 - Navigation and Communications Ch 5 - Safety Management Ch 6 - Pollution Prevention Ch 7 - Maritime Security Ch 8 - Cargo and Ballast Systems Ch 9 Mooring Ch 10 - Engine and Steering Compartments Ch 11 - General Appearance and Condition Ch 12 - Ice Operations
0 4 2 5 13 5 2 8 12 14 16 0
12 months rolling Number of % of Total observations observations
0 5.0 2.5 6.2 16.0 6.2 2.5 9.9 14.8 17.2 19.8 0
0 81 39 56 113 35 7 95 87 118 89 7
SIRE Inspections ‐ Chapterwise statistics 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
Apr‐21
12 months rolling
A drop in SIRE performance from the previous month, especially in Chapters 6,9 and 11.
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0 11.1 5.4 7.7 15.5 4.8 1.0 13.1 12.0 16.2 12.2 1.0
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
MTTO Top 10 most repeated SIRE observations (12 months rolling): CHAPTER
QUESTION NO.
Ch 2 - Certification and documentation
2.4
Ch 10 - Engine and Steering Compartments
QUESTION
REPEAT COUNT & TREND
Does the Operator’s representative visit the vessel at least bi-annually?
29 ↓
10.32
Are the following, where applicable, all in good order and do they appear to be well maintained?
26 ↔
Ch 11 General Appearance and Condition
11.4
Is the general condition of service pipework satisfactory and is it free from significant corrosion and pitting and soft patches or other temporary repairs?
23 ↔
Ch 10 - Engine and Steering Compartments
10.7
22 ↑
Ch 2 - Certification and documentation
2.7
Does the operator subscribe to a fuel, lube, and hydraulic oil testing programme on a frequency in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations and are there procedures to act on these results? Is the vessel free of conditions of class or significant recommendations, memoranda, or notations?
Ch 11 General Appearance and Condition
11.1
Ch 3 - Crew Management
3.2
Ch 5 - Safety Management
5.29
Ch 9 - Mooring
9.26
If the vessel is equipped for mooring at single point moorings, does it meet the recommendations as applicable, contained in Mooring Equipment Guidelines?
15 ↔
Ch 3 - Crew Management
3.5
Does the officers’ matrix posted for the vessel on the SIRE website accurately reflect the information relating to the officers on board at the time of the inspection?
14 ↔
Is the general condition, visual appearance, and cleanliness of the hull satisfactory? Are the STCW and flag Administration’s regulations that control hours of work to minimise fatigue being followed and are all personnel maintaining hours of rest records in compliance with MLC or STCW requirements? Are lifeboats, including their equipment and launching mechanisms, in good order and have they been launched and manoeuvred in the water in accordance with SOLAS requirements?
19 ↔
18 ↑
15 ↔
15 ↑
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Vetting Hall of fame VBIS Prize winners, April 2021 Vessel
Inspecting company
Observation count
Maersk Sara Maersk Stratus Maersk Mississippi Maersk Trenton Maersk Katalin Maersk Magellan Henry Maersk Maersk Cebu Maersk Sandra Maersk Teesport
BP BP Preem BP Equinor MMS (ex Petronas) BIECO Lukoil ENOC Idemitsu
1 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 1 1
Lower Vetting Performers, April 2021 (>5 obs) Vessel Timberwolf Maersk Belfast Maersk Selma
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Inspecting company Shell CEPSA BP
Observation count 10 8 7
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Port State Control (PSC) 14 PSC inspections were conducted on the fleet during the month of April 2021 with a total of 9 deficiencies giving an average of 0.6 deficiency per inspection. 9 PSC inspections in the month were recorded with NIL deficiency. PSC statistics for 12-month rolling average stands at 1.93 deficiency per inspection. Excluding the Black Sea MOU, the 12-month rolling average stands at 0.58 deficiency per inspection. Deficiencies in the Black Sea MOU account for 77% of all deficiencies recorded in the last 12 months. 61% (86 out of a total of 140) PSC inspections were recorded with Nil deficiencies.
PSC Inspection results ‐ 12 month rolling
Zero deficiency ‐ 86 inspections 25% 1‐2 deficiency ‐ 19 inspections 14%
61% 3 or more deficiencies ‐ 35 inspections
PSC Chapter statistics 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Apr‐21
12 months rolling
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
What’s new: With the sunsetting of TRAMOS (ex-shore commercial operations system), VIMS and VIMS Mobile have been migrated from the TRAMOS platform to a new independent online web application. The new VIMS is available to all users (vessels and shore) at https://vims.maersktankers.com from 1 January 2021. Please note that the Master’s and Chief Engineer’s email has been set up for the Vessel Management login. Other Officers can access the VIMS using the bridge email login for “read-only” access. Should you have any challenges logging in, please reach out to your vessel’s HSSEQ & MO Superintendent. OCIMF is working on revamped SIRE 2.0 which is planned to be launched in 2022. More details shall be shared in the coming months.
Knowledge Sharing and Port Information in Appendix
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Security By Pradeep Balakrishnan Significant trends for the Risk Areas: The threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden / Horn of Africa area has much reduced however at times there are reports of suspicious approaches. No reported incident during the month. The conflict in Yemen has led to a direct increase in risk to merchant vessels in the area, especially those vessels calling at Saudi ports. Vessels to exercise caution while transiting Red sea south of Jizan (Saudi Arabia)-area closer to the coast. Increased migrant activities/ Search and Rescue operations off Libya is a major concern. 04 security incidents were reported in West Africa/Gulf of Guinea Maritime crime area during the month which shows a slight improvement. Vessels being guided on route planning basis recent incidents/ hot spots. Escort boat being arranged for Nigerian port approaches. Armed team being employed onbd during stay off Lome and Cotonou. Further update of alternate arrangement is still awaited from Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) post cessation of Lagos SAA patrol boat services on 27th January. As per un-confirmed reports, Nigerian navy is planning to implement earlier proposed ‘Deep Blue project’ which aims to provide security solutions within the Nigerian maritime domain to all vessels. As a temporary measure Nigerian navy armed team being employed onbd during Lagos anchorage stay.
Horn of Africa (Red Sea /Gulf of Aden /Arabian Sea): There was no report of piracy attack during the month. Hijacking
Approach
Attack
Nil
Nil
Nil
Gulf of Guinea/West Africa: There was no reported hijacking or kidnapping incidents. Hijacking
Kidnap/Ransom
Nil
Nil
Attack/ Robbery 04
Southeast Asia: 07 boarding incidents were reported in the area- 04 of them in Singapore straits. Attacks/ Boarding/ Armed Hijacking Robbery Nil 07 Major conflicts Areas in Appendix
Based on the current situation and the continued threat from pirates in the Gulf of Guinea, Danish National ISPS Coordination Authority has instructed Danish vessels to operate at ISPS Level 2 in the Gulf of Guinea.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Fleet Group Management - VLSFO Quality concerns & the precautions to be taken by Marius Lasca Since late 2020, there have been an increased number of reports on serious technical problems and mechanical damages encountered by several vessels, all due to troublesome VLSFO deliveries
Matters have been raised with the P&I club, which has hired-in a chemist expert to carry out the required fuel investigations. From the lab reports we have learned that these fuels are not as per ordered grade RMG380, as these fuels are engineered to meet the ISO requirements by blending-in FCC cycle oil and paraffinic stream, that presumably has a poor stability reserve and thus prone to quick ageing and the compatibility is poor too, making it very vulnerable to the previous grades leftovers in the tank. Therefore, the need to reduce or eliminate the mixing of bunkers from different deliveries is critical.
The problematic fuels were supplied in the Galveston (USA) and Rotterdam (NL) area by Golden Arrow, Peninsula Petroleum and Minerva Bunkering
On these occasions other than advisories issued by fuel testing laboratories there was no indication of any possible/further action to point on the source of the problems, but we, as vessel technical operators, cannot disassociate the massive problem with the potential safety and economic impact created by these fuels. Most frequent fallouts due to the poor-quality fuel Blocking and damages to fuel filters Blocking and excessive wear of fuel separators Sticking and excessive wear of fuel injection system Damage to engine piston rings and excessive wear on liners
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DO NOT mix bunker fuels from different deliveries Receive new fuels in empty, well stripped bunker tanks Consider opening the tanks for inspection/removing the ROB in the tanks Perform compatibility tests between fuels, even if segregation is applied Dissimilar characteristics may provide an early indication of possible incompatibility Apply “first -in first-out” fuel inventory principle.
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
In some of the cases it has not been possible to pursue legal action against the suppliers as the Time bar clause had expired and /or due attention was not paid to the sampling clause when collecting samples. To create awareness the Technical Circular 04-21_Bunker sampling and Testing was released.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Regulatory By Jai Kumar Alimchandani Non-compliance with regulations is not an option. This can result in expensive fines and penalties for the Company as well as possible prison sentences for staff at sea and ashore. When any vessel is in doubt regarding regulations or procedures, they shall contact relevant shore departments. If necessary, these concerns may be escalated through management levels. Whenever required, regulatory affairs will be consulted. To reiterate, Maersk Tankers has a zero-tolerance policy towards non-compliance. The below press release was issued by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern State of California on 20 April 2021. This press release can be found at https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/first-engineerinternational-commercial-cargo-tanker-convictedfalsifying-records-and Quote (Emphasis added) First Engineer Of International Commercial Cargo Tanker Convicted Of Falsifying Records And Obstructing Justice In Scheme To Dump Oily Bilge In International Waters Defendant found guilty of falsifying the vessel’s Oil Record Book and obstruction of Justice OAKLAND – A federal jury convicted Gilbert Fajardo Dela Cruz of aiding and abetting an environmental crime and obstruction of justice in connection with the intentional dumping in February of 2019 of oily bilge water from a commercial tanker, announced Acting United States Attorney Stephanie M. Hinds. The verdict follows a twoweek trial before the Honorable Jon S. Tigar, U.S. District Judge. “The crew members of the Zao Galaxy dumped oily bilge water into the ocean and then tried to cover up the environmental damage by submitting bogus paperwork to the United States Coast Guard. As First Assistant Engineer of an ocean-going commercial tankship, Gilbert Dela Cruz was charged with ensuring the crew would follow the rules, not try to circumvent them. This verdict will serve as a reminder that there are stiff penalties for those who try to violate federal and international rules designed to protect our precious natural resources from polluters.”
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In January of 2019, Dela Cruz, 38, a Philippine national, was the First Engineer of the M/T Zao Galaxy (Zao Galaxy), a 16,408 gross-ton, ocean-going oil tankship when it traveled from the Philippines to Richmond, Calif. The Zao Galaxy was operated by Dela Cruz’s employer, Unix Line PTE Ltd. (Unix), a Singapore-domiciled company. The Zao Galaxy, like all such large oil tanker vessels, generates “oily bilge water” when traveling. Typically, oily bilge water is collected, stored, and processed to separate the water from the oil and other wastes using a pollution prevention control device known as an Oil Water Separator and an oil-sensing device known as an Oil Content Meter. Only after passing through an Oily Water Separator that limits the amount of oil in water may oily bilge water be discharged overboard. On February 11, 2019, United States Coast Guard examiners boarded the Zao Galaxy while it was moored in Richmond to conduct an examination. During the examination, a crewmember passed a note to an examiner requesting a meeting after the inspection so that the crewmember could “tell something” about a “magic pipe” and “damage [to the] marine environment.” After the inspection and a follow-up investigation, Unix ultimately admitted that a ship officer directed crew members to discharge oily bilge water overboard, using a configuration of drums, flexible pipes, and flanges to bypass the vessel’s oil water separator. On February 26, 2020, the company admitted the discharges were done knowingly and that they were not recorded in the Zao Galaxy’s oil record book when it was presented to the U.S. Coast Guard during the vessel’s inspection. Unix pleaded guilty to one count of violating the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships. On March 20, 2020, Judge Tigar sentenced Unix to pay a fine of $1,650,000.00, placed Unix on probation for a period of four years, and ordered the company to implement a comprehensive Environmental Compliance Plan as a special condition of probation. Notwithstanding these admissions, Dela Cruz denied responsibility for the environmental crimes and went to trial. In finding Dela Cruz guilty, the jury concluded Dela Cruz aided and abetted a violation of the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships by causing the captain of the Zao Galaxy to maintain an inaccurate oil record book and that he also committed obstruction of justice.
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
According to the evidence presented at trial, in preparation for a Coast Guard inspection in Richmond, California, Dela Cruz ordered a lower level employee who worked as his assistant to dump oily waste from the ship’s engine room directly into the ocean using a “magic pipe.” Dela Cruz then worked to conceal the dumping by not recording the movement or discharge of oily waste in the ship’s oil record book, which he was responsible for. Dela Cruz ordered that certain pieces of equipment be repainted and the “magic pipe” be hidden to avoid Coast Guard detection. During the Coast Guard’s inspection, Dela Cruz told his assistant who had dumped the oily waste overboard not to throw him “under the bus” and that they needed to get their stories straight for the Coast Guard. A federal grand jury indicted Dela Cruz on October 24, 2019, charging him with one count of violating the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a); one count of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1519, and one count of obstruction of an agency proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505. The
jury found Dela Cruz guilty of all three counts. Dela Cruz faces a maximum of six years’ imprisonment and $250,000 for and three years of supervised release for the pollution count, 20 years’ imprisonment and $250,000 for the obstruction of justice count, and five years of imprisonment and $250,000 for the obstruction of the agency proceedings count. The court may also order an additional term of supervised release, restitution, and fines; however, any sentence following conviction would be imposed by the court only after consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the federal statute governing the imposition of a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Judge Tigar ordered Dela Cruz released on bond pending sentencing and scheduled the sentencing for June 11, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Katherine Lloyd-Lovett and Noah Stern are prosecuting the case with assistance from Kay Konopaske. The prosecution is the result of an investigation by the United States Coast Guard Investigative Service. Unquote
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Crewing by Shashank Jahagirdar Seagull eLearning system
While we would have been excited to meet our officers personally, the current situation has not allowed us to plan same since early 2020. As they say, show must go on and we must adapt to the “new normal” of being connected using various collaboration tools.
It has been constant endeavour to provide best training to our Seafarers and in this regard, MT decided to implement Seagull eLearning system. We received positive and encouraging feedback from our seafarers that Seagull training videos/CBTs are up to date and their administration website is user friendly Administration. This motivated us to plan a transition from Videotel to Seagull. In March 2020, Crew training department along with Vessel IT dispatched NAS (Network Attached Storage device) kit to all the vessels. The process was delayed due to Pandemic situation and we had a logistic setback. However, the team continued to follow up and finally completed installing seagull on all vessels by February 2021. This hardware (NAS) would support Seagull as the new eLearning modules/device onboard for seafarers’ training and it also provides an extra backup storage capacity for vessels. With the increase in ship’s server capacity where Seagull is loaded, it would mean that crew could access Seagull videos/CBTs from any computer on the vessel, unlike Videotel which was a standalone unit.
In April 2021, we successfully concluded our 2nd virtual seminar. We carried out the seminar over 3 days (4 hours per day increase by ½ an hour compared to 1st Virtual seminar) to have more opportunities to engage with our officers and interesting discussion on various scenarios. We were pleased to see a good turnout of 70 senior officers for the virtual seminar. Our shore technical team was equally excited to share and exchange views with our officers. Participation of shore team reached up to 35 for some presentations.
Earlier in the past, where Videotel courses could only be accessed on board, Seagull has provided the flexibility and compatibility to access the Online module whilst at home. Many seafarers could not complete the training due to hectic vessel schedule, back to back operations. This feature in Seagull allows seafarers to complete eLearning as per their convenience in the comfort of their homes. Seminar 2021 We witnessed lot of engagement from our seafarers who kept the sessions interactive. The shore team had planned for quizzes just to keep the engagement level high apart from running through various presentations and answering to their questions. Overall, it was a successful event and we would like to thank all our officers who took time out to attend the seminar and share their views with us. Our team will continue to keep our officers updated on next seminar details and we look forward to having more participation and engagement.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Procurement PPE Shopping – Purchase Orders directly from vessel to supplier by Frederik Pind Dear colleagues We continuously work to simplify the procurement ordering processes and minimize the time spent from request to received. That is why we are happy to announce that we have introduced a new process which allows crew members to place Purchase Orders directly with suppliers without the involvement of Buyers or Superintendents. Vessels can now order PPE directly from suppliers through the Onboard Shopping functionality in ShipNet. In practical terms, this means that new requisitions raised with Order Type “PPE Shopping” with a total order value below $4,200 will automatically be sent to our two pre-selected Suppliers, ICM or Weenas, the same day the requisition is submitted by the crew. With this new process, the vessel crew will going forward co-own the PPE budget together with Superintendents, since only orders above a total value of $4200 will go for the Superintendent’s approval. Consequently, the crew is requested to stay extra vigilant on the development of their PPE spend going forward. This new functionality is enabled by Robotic Process Automation (RPA) and will reduce the process time significantly, while freeing up work for all parties involved. We are eager to hear about your experiences in using this new way of ordering PPE, as we will continue to add other types of categories to this new process. All Captains and Chief Engineers will receive a step by step guide describing how to use the PPE Shopping functionality. In addition, please find below some general Q/A for further clarity. Questions and answers Q: Will my PPE Shopping requisitions never go to the superintendent for budget approval? A: Only requisitions with a total order amount above $4200 will go to the superintendent for approval. Requisitions raised with a total order amount below $4200 will go straight from the vessel to the vendor.
Q: Will a Buyer review the order before it is sent to the Supplier? A: Only requisitions with a total order amount above $4200 will go to the Buyer for review. Requisitions raised with a total order amount below $4200 will go straight from the vessel to the vendor. Q: Which suppliers are used for PPE Shopping? A: Our two standard PPE suppliers, ICM (Rotterdam) and Weenas (Singapore). Q: Why can’t I add non-PPE items in the PPE Shopping requisition? Can I choose items beyond the catalogue and what happens if I do? A: The PPE Shopping order type has been designed so only PPE articles are connected to it, thereby ensuring consolidation of orders. Q: Who receives the order confirmation from the supplier? A: The order confirmation from the supplier will still be received by the responsible Buyer (purchasingmtcph/purchasingmtsin). Q: How do I keep track of my PPE budget? A: You can still keep track of your budget through the Supply Chain Vessel Report in Power BI. Q: How does the order get delivered? A: Your order will be delivered to the warehouse in Rotterdam or Singapore (depending on the location chosen) and included in your next stores shipment. Q: When I submit a requisition, when will it be sent to the supplier? A: If all order lines has a pre-fixed price in the catalogue, the Purchase Order will be sent to the supplier within max 8 hours. If one or more order doesn’t have a pre-fixed price in the catalogue, the unpriced lines will be sent for quotation to the supplier first. Q: Does this only work for PPE? A: Yes. PPE is the first Order Type to be enrolled in Onboard Shopping, but more is planned to follow. Q: Who can I contact if I have any further questions? A: For questions related to Onboard Shopping, please reach out to Xenia Primero Delos Santos, Category Manager in Procurement. For question related to RPA and Robotics in general, please reach out to Morten Andersen, Project Manager for the initiative.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Technology & Innovation EEOI - how we measure our CO2 Reduction
by Steen Sander Jacobsen Understanding EEOI – Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator EEOI depends upon: Total fuel consumed during the period which depends upon the operation profile, vessel efficiency, size of vessel – the lesser the better. The weight of cargo carried, the more the better. Laden voyage distance, the more the better Ballast voyage distance, the lesser the better For April 2021, with a EEOI of 12.75 for the Fleet, we stand at 28.9% CO2 reduction compared to our 2008 baseline. EEOI report is calculated for a 12 monthly rolling data. Its measured monthly and the recent developments can be summarised as follows: Segment
EEOI March 2021
% Change
EEOI April 2021
Fleet
12.94
-1.5 %
12.75
Intermediate
30.89
0.3 %
30.99
Handy
17.96
-1.6 %
17.67
MR
11.63
1.7 %
11.83
-5.3 %
7.81
LR2 8.25 ** negative change indicates reduction compared to last month
We note that Handy and LR2 segments have improved and contribute towards a better Fleet EEOI compared to the almost flat Intermediate and poor performing MR segments. Key highlights are: 1. Tonne-mile for LR segment has gone up by 4.5% whereas the consumption has decreased by 1.1%. This has lowered the EEOI by 5.3% 2. Tonne-mile for Handy has increased by 4.1% with a rise in fuel consumption by 2.46%. EEOI has reduced by 1.6%. 3. MR has a dip in both, consumption (1.4%) and tonne-mile (3%) which leads to an increase in EEOI by 1.7% compared to last month. 4. Intermediate vessels have performed poorer compared to last month, rise in EEOI by 0.3%. Watch out this space next month for more on EEOI and how it’s different from Annual Efficiency Ratio (AER).
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
MT in the Media by Ketan Rane Elisabeth Maersk seen at Concepción bay at Chile.
Elisabeth Maersk seen at Concepción bay at Chile
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Congratulatory by Shashank Jahagirdar Seafarers’ safety is our priority. We value our seafarers as they contribute towards the company vision and play a very vital role in our success story. It gives us immense pleasure to see many of our seafarers being associated with us for so many years and have witnessed this company transform from a traditional ownership setup to one of the leading clients serving company. We would like to congratulate our officers who have completed 10 years of service with MaerskTankers Sr No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
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First Names Rakowiecki Kozhevnikov Raychev Nielsen Gonzales Ismail Culea Ciju Frasineanu Alexandru Florea Titov Grebennikov Novoseltsev Usanin Sergiu Dyomin
These numbers only assure us that we have support of our dynamic ship team who are willing tocontribute to this journey and make it a memorableone for all. It is possible that there could be omission of some name in the below list due recent data migration to Compas system. In such cases, we request you to send an email to onkar.bhosale@maersktankers.com with your name, Crew ID & anniversary details. Thank you!
Last Name Marek Stanislaw Andriy Georgi Valentinov Henrik Grønlund Frøsig Jose Jerson Fulgar Bahader Octavian Dorin Denis Daniel Florin Anton Dmitrii Roman Oleg Costache Oleksandr
Rank 2/E E/E C/O 3/E 2/O CPT C/O C/O C/O C/E C/E C/O 2/O C/E 2/E CPT C/E
Years Completed in MT 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Out of the blue We strongly encourage reader’s sharing of best practices, feedback, suggestions, and constructive criticism from our fleet. This section was formerly known as
‘Reader’s Corner’, however it remained underutilized.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Appendix Security Major Conflict Areas GULF OF OMAN/ ARABIAN GULF: Vessels to continue with precautions in view of ongoing conflict in Arabian Gulf/ Gulf of Oman. On 13th April 2021, an Israeli owned car carrier reported an approach 18 miles offshore Fujairah, UAE. According to reports, no evidence to suggest that the vessel was attacked. Danish flag vessels maintaining security level 2 for the Strait of Hormuz and the northern part of the Gulf of Oman as per Danish authorities’ instructions dated 31st January 2020 which has been extended till 01st July 2021. LIBYA: Intermittent clashes between Government of National Accord (GNA)-allied militias and the Libyan National Army (LNA) take place at some areas. An interim Government of National Unity (GU) led by Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah, is implementing UN-backed mandate, which includes preparing for parliamentary elections due in December 2021. Over the reporting period, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved a resolution to send a 60-member observer mission to Libya to track and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire. Recently GU has held various high-level meetings with Russian, Turkish, and Egyptian officials, all of whom are accused of continuing to finance and arm warring factions in the country. There was a noticeable increase in offshore migrant activity. This includes over 1,000 migrants rescued and returned to Libya by the Libyan Coast Guard. The NGO vessel impounded by Italian authorities in March remains under administrative detention. Merchant vessels remain at risk of being called upon to assist in SAR operations. Merchant vessels undertaking SAR operations face severe delays, for calling ports with migrants onboard including refusal to enter European destinations, due to COVID-19 concerns. Also, there are various legal, regulatory and security concerns associated- including physical safety concerns to crew associated with migrant behaviour onboard.
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Maersk Tanker vessels may be permitted to call some Libyan ports - basis evaluation of latest security reports and legal clearance. Also, Owner’s approval required due to safety concerns and probable delays if involved in migrant’s SAR. Service of remote security consultant being utilized during vessel’s stay in Libyan waters. YEMEN: The conflict situation continues. A Saudi-led coalition of Arab countries, backed by Western states, continues its military intervention in a bid to restore control of the country to internationally recognized President/ Government. All vessels attempting to enter Yemeni ports will face postponements and multiple inspections causing delays. In view of combined maritime threats, including possible mines, vessels are advised to use the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) and to avoid proximity to the western and southern Yemenis shore while transiting Red sea. Over the reporting period, tensions continued to escalate between Southern Transitional Council (STC) and officials loyal to President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. The STC accused the government of failing to adhere to the November 2019 Riyadh Agreement. The plan of cease fire/ withdrawal of forces from Hodeidah City (basis UN-brokered Stockholm Agreement Dec’18), getting delayed continually. Clashes keep taking place in close proximity to Hodeidah port which can damage vessels/port infrastructure, and delay port operations. The security threat rating in the port of Hodeidah continues to be ‘Extreme’ and port call is on ban for MT vessels. Maersk Tanker vessels may be allowed to call other Yemenis ports, on case to case basis depending on the prevailing situation and by arranging advisory service.
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Appendix Vetting - Knowledge Sharing By Naveen Kumar Inspection Date: Between 01 April 2021 and 30 April 2021 5. Safety Management
SIRE VIQ-7 Medium Risk Observations 2. Certification and Documentation 2.10 Are the Engine Room (Part I) and Cargo (Part II) Oil Record Books (ORBs) correctly completed, free of any pollution incidents, violations and are slop/waste oil disposal certificates provided? Inspector Observations: A missed-out entry for 28 March 2021 in the Oil Record Book Part II(Cargo) was made incorrectly. In the entry made for 28 March 2021, date of actual entry was not included. Owners Comments: Draining of cargo from manifolds to ROT was completed after loading on the 28th Apr 2021; the entry was missed out by the PIC, who realized his error and inserted this in the ORB on the 30th Apr after an entry was made for pressure testing of cargo lines. The PIC had made the entry in a manner that he felt was the correct way to insert ‘entries pertaining to an earlier missed operational entry’, however, this was not in compliance with IMO guidance as provided in MEPC 736. Correct entry was made in ORB, in line with the guidance provided within MEPC 736. The Master held a meeting with officers responsible for making entries in ORBs (Part 1 and Part 2), it has been highlighted that entries in the ORB should be recorded without delay. Contents of MEPC 736 and ORB 'How To' were discussed. The importance of correct recording and MARPOL compliance were re-iterated. 3. Crew Management 3.8 Does the operator have measures in place to prevent Drug and Alcohol abuse in accordance with OCIMF guidance? Inspector Observations: The unannounced alcohol test was not carried out within 48 hours after delivery of the vessel as required by the operator's procedure.
5.9 Are the officers and ratings aware of the requirements of the ISGOTT Ship/Shore Safety Check List (SSSCL) and are the provisions of the check list being complied with? Inspector Observations: Non self-extinguishing type (open type) ashtray was in use in the smoking room. 6. Pollution Prevention 6.18 Are specific warning notices posted to safeguard against the accidental opening of the overboard discharge valve from the oily water separator? Inspector Observations: The overboard valve of the oily water separator was kept opened and padlocked. This was rectified immediately upon pointing out. 7. Maritime Security 7.15 Are the crew aware of the company policy on the control of physical access to all shipboard IT/OT systems? Inspector Observations: The USB ports of vulnerable equipment such as ECDIS and Radar etc were not protected by any blocking device or similar means. 9. Mooring 9.28 Are emergency towing arrangements readily available for deployment at both ends of the vessel? Inspector Observations: The aft towing arrangement was wrongly pre-rigged when the pick-up gear and towing pennant were connected directly without passing externally by the strong closed chocked fairlead.
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10. Engine and Steering Compartments 10.17 Are engineers aware of the operation of the machinery space liquid fuel system remote closing valves, and are the closing devices regularly tested and in good order? Inspector Observations: The wire operated quick closing valve of the emergency generator fuel oil tank was incorrectly positioned, and the valve could not be operable when tested due to reason above. This was rectified during the inspection. 10.20 Are purifier rooms and fuel and lubricating oil handling areas ventilated and clean? Inspector Observations: Vessel's purifier room was ventilated by the starboard forward engine room supply fan which had failed prior to the inspection. Ventilation in the purifier room was insufficient at the time of the inspection with steam and fumes from purifier sludge tanks noticeable in the purifier room. 11. General Appearance and Condition 11.5 Are pipe stands, clamps, supports and expansion arrangements satisfactory? Inspector Observations: Pipe supporting arrangements, brackets, "U" clamps and small fittings in way of main deck were in poor condition with several brackets completely wasted.
Inspector Observations: Cargo tank overfill alarm for 2S, 3S and 4P was inoperative, a risk assessment was in place and as per ship staff item to be overhauled upon completion of cargo operations. 8.28 Does the P/V breaker appear to be in good order? Inspector Observations: Underside of PV breaker was corroded with extensive rust scale. 9. Mooring 9.11 On split drum winches are all the lines made fast with no more than one layer on each tension side of the drum? Inspector Observations: Some of the split drum mooring winches (02 nos. F&A) had approx. 2 to 3 turns on the tension drums whilst minimum 5-6 turns required as per vessel's Line Management Plan ( part - G, maker's guidelines). 10. Engine and Steering Compartments 10.25 Are gauge glass closing devices on oil tanks of a self-closing, fail-safe type and not inhibited? Inspector Observations: The gauge glasses of emergency generator fuel oil tank and steering gear oil storage tank were kept opened by the locking device fitted to themselves. This was rectified during the inspection.
Low Risk Observations 5. Safety Management 5.26 Is gas welding and burning equipment in good order and spare oxygen and acetylene cylinders stored apart in a well-ventilated location outside of the accommodation and engine room? Inspector Observations: No evidence when last Oxy/Acy regulator for the workshop station and Acy for the deck station had been renewed in the last 5 years. Vessel was provided with new spares however unable to fit due to incorrect flashback arrestor as informed by ship staff. 8. Cargo and Ballast Systems – Petroleum 8.14 Are the cargo tank high level and overfill alarms in good order and is there recorded evidence of regular testing?
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10.7 Does the operator subscribe to a fuel, lube and hydraulic oil testing Programme on a frequency in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations and are there procedures to act on these results? Inspector Observations: The samples of 5 HPP diesel engines were rated as 'Critical (red status)' due to low viscosity, and there had been no rectification action taken yet as the maker recommended to change the oil after 500 running hours. Owners Comments The highlighted Diesel engines are lubricated with a mixture of lube oil and silicon-based oil, due to the blend the oil shows low viscosity. Maker’s guidance is in place and was shared with the inspector, wherein it is stated that the blend is required for the protection of the engine
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
and piping & that the oil can be safely utilized for 500 Hrs, the ship is a new build delivered 11 days prior to the inspection and the running hours for all the engines is significantly below the value as stated in the guidance. We appreciate the inspector’s opinion, however, feel that this observation is based on subjective interpretation of requirements. 11. General Appearance and Condition 11.10 Is the general condition of electrical equipment, including conduits and wiring, satisfactory? Inspector Observations: During the rounds on deck, electrical switch for operating the light in the deck store located on the upper deck starboard side was found missing.
CDI – CHEMICAL 8TH EDITION 7.1.23 Company procedures and permits are in use and adequately/appropriately completed for: Pressure testing of piping and hoses Inspector Observations: Checked the pressure testing records for random pipeline systems and found that the cargo lines test done on 17/12/20 did not include the duration of the test. As per the master, this SMS procedure was being updated by the office at the time. 8.2.2 Where applicable, crew members were observed wearing the appropriate clothing and / or safety equipment Inspector Observations: During the past two years the vessel has been traded with Annex I cargoes only. Most of these cargoes are toxic and flammable as per the SDS checked with the chief officer onboard however in the cargo instructions plans there was no mention of the cargo being toxic or the use of specific PPE. The company matrix for oil and chemical cargoes recommends the use of PPE for this type of cargoes.
TERMINAL / SAFETY / OTHER Inspector Observations: Sire Ref.2.8 Vessel was not enrolled in a Classification Society Condition Assessment Programme (CAP). Vessel delivered on 08 December 2005. The garbage containers were found in poor conditions. At least 4 units with their lids built in heavy steel had all their hinges failed and broken, not doing a proper closing and being unsafe for handling. Vessel was fitted with insulation monitoring devices, for the service of 440V and for the case of 220V the set value was 1.5Mohm for both well below the standards of the industry. In the case of the 440V the design limitation of the device only permit get the 3Mohm value. In two auxiliary’s engine (number 1 and 2) the insulation lagging of the turbocharger were detached, hanging and unclamped. During the inspection engine department started to work to improve the area by provisional action which should be done with more consistence. PSC Ref 16.105 Access control to ship Convention Ref A/7.2.2 & 3 Boarding Officer not identified by ID as per MSC/Circ. 1156.
PORT STATE EDITION (2018)
CONTROL
(2018)
1ST
02108 Electric equipment in general Inspector Observation: 1. No1,2 and 3 HFO purifiers-cable entrance to motor terminal junction box defective. 2. Explosion-proof light in battery room found with terminal blocks defective.
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Port Information Ship’s Whistle By Capt Satish Singh Great voyages start here – View from Bridge porthole THE PORT OF INCHEON The Port of Incheon located on the midwestern coast of the Korean Peninsula an international gateway. Korea's second largest trade port has contributed greatly to the development of national economy and industries. It is an artificial port with lock gate facilities, enabling large ships to enter and always depart by overcoming the difference between the ebb and flow tide up to 10m. The lock-gate takes pride in being the largest in Asia, allowing up to 50,000 DWT ships to enter and exit.
Incheon Lock Gate
Contact damage to Superstructure
Manoeuvring and positioning the vessel inside lock gate is a highly skilled job and, involves high risk for contact damage to vessel hull. The lock gate dock in Incheon port are fitted with Horizontal rubber fender instead of standard vertical ones. The Inadequate design of these dock wall fenders possesses a risk to the vessels with low freeboard, where the horizontal fenders protruding out can come in contact with superstructure pillars of the vessel or ship’s rail at low water , unlike vessel hull these superstructure pillars are strengthened to take load in vertical direction only and are not designed for any lateral force. In addition, following factors shall be considered during pre-berthing appraisal and discussed in Pre berthing/Unberthing meetings.
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Vessel freeboard with relation to dock draft, level of rise/fall in lock. Fenders critical point of contact to vessel hull Requirement of additional portable fendering to be discussed with Pilot Details, condition, and type of fender at berth/Lock gate Tugs position, capacity, and manoeuvrability Mooring team appraised of risk and actions required Regular tendering of mooring inside lock gate to keep vessel on centreline during pumping in /out of docks.
April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Health and Wellbeing Anxiety Disorder By Capt. Satish Singh Introduction Mental Health is an integral and essential part of our health. The World Health Organization (WHO) constitutes that; Health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. The feeling of anxiety is familiar for many of us when we encounter stressful situations like a navigating a ship through HRA or having to attend an important client meeting. When a person continues to feel fearful in every situation, he or she may be suffering from an anxiety disorder. If you are a fan of the Marvel Cinematic Universe, you may have watched the film, Iron Man 3. Throughout the movie, the main character, Tony Stark (Iron Man) experiences recurrent panic attacks: sudden, intense, debilitating moments that cause him significant distress. Tony Stark was suffering from an anxiety disorder. Anxiety disorders refer to a group of mental disorders characterized by feelings of anxiety and fear. The ITF/Seafarers’ Trust and Yale University conducted a seafarer survey of injury, illness, and mental health risk factors in international seafarers. The report states 17% of seafarers completing a generalized anxiety disorder questionnaire were defined as seafarers with anxiety. According to WHO 2015, the total estimated number of people living with anxiety disorders in the world is 264 million. Characteristics of anxiety Anxiety can be experienced in many ways. Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is defined as a chronic state of anxiety due to excessive worrying, and it lasts for 6 months or more. For many of us, the common areas of worry can be related to family, money, or work. In a Panic Disorder, anxiety begins unexpectantly and may not be connected to a specific stimulus. Feelings of breathlessness, pounding heart and losing self – control are some of the characteristics experienced in a Panic Disorder. Intense and irrational fear of a situation that may not be potentially dangerous arouses Phobias in any person. An inexperience navigator may be afraid of working independently or make decisions while on the watch. Often, the stimulus carries a suggestion of danger.
People who suffer from Social Anxiety Disorder (Social Phobia)avoid the task of specific actions in view of other people as they fear being embarrassed or judged. Examples of Social Anxiety Disorder include public speaking, conducting training or even raising a concern during a meeting. One of the effects of Social Anxiety Disorder is, it forces people into a narrow channel whereby it hinders with their career and/or social life. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders (OCD) is characterized by persistent and intrusive thoughts known as obsession and repeated actions that are performed in reaction to the habits. There may be a colleague who repeatedly wash his/ her hands due to the obsession of hygiene, and this may even affect their relationship with their colleagues. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a severe psychological reaction whereby a person experiences intense fear and helplessness. PTSD is a form of anxiety that is caused by an external stressor or event, and it is incredibly debilitating. A colleague may experience a similar reaction based on his/her experience in an ill-fated event if incidents in the past. Risk factors Some risk factors can increase the probability for someone to suffer from anxiety. The factors are: •
Comorbidities: People with more than one illness or disease occurring at the same time
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Genetics: Blood-related family member with a history of anxiety disorder
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Environmental: Someone who has experienced traumatic events like losing someone important or facing family problems like violence, alcoholism, and sexual abuse.
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Personality: Traits like shyness in social situations, oversensitive to criticism, fixation on details and moral rigidness are severe enough to personality disorder
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Loneliness: Getting disconnected from the world for a prolonged period can lead to anxiety disorders.
Symptoms of anxiety • Increased Heart Rate • Shortness of Breath • Restlessness • Distress • Sweating • Excessive Worrying • Numbness or Tingling Sensation • Trouble Concentrating • Difficulty Falling Asleep • Dry Mouth
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April 2021 MTTO Newsletter
Treatment •
•
Counselling: Health care professional helps to develop coping strategies to address issues such as stress management orinterpersonal problems that may trigger anxiety. Psychotherapy: It is a long-term follow-up and targets a broader range of issues such as behavior management. The goal of psychotherapy is to help the patient regulate their emotions, manage stress, understand behavior patterns that affect their interpersonal relationships.
•
Complementary and Alternative therapy: Stress management such as progressive relaxation, guided imagery, biofeedback, self-hypnosis, and deep-breathing exercises can help to reduce anxiety.
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Medications: Prescribed anti-depressant or sedative medication to manage anxiety.
Employee Assistance Program Details: If on an International manned vessel seek confidential assistance from EAP provider International Seafarers’ Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN). Helpline Number: +44 203 926 5959 Live
Reference: Tanja Jovanovic, What is Anxiety?, https://anxiety.org/what-is-anxiety#anxiety-and-physical-health
Prevention In the shipping industry, there are many challenges such as new regulations, labor disputes, security threats, job cuts, rising costs and lack of employees. Furthermore, with the current COVID-19, it causes additional turmoil to the entire world. These impacts many individuals and may lead to anxiety issues. Therefore, it is crucial to look after yourself and to look out for one another onboard and ashore. There are ways prevent from getting anxiety. Stay healthy by developing a healthy lifestyle. Avoid alcohol and recreational drugs. Quit smoking and minimize caffeinated drinks as nicotine and caffeine alleviate anxiety. Use stress management & relaxation techniques and lastly, seek help early. Suppose you or someone needs professional and specialized assistance at any time. May it be a mental health issue, a problem at work, family concerns, a request for general information or simply need to talk to someone, a helpline is available through the EmployeeAssistance Program (EAP). The EAP is a free and confidential helpline available to call 24/7, 365 days a year.
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World Health Organization, Depression and Other Common Mental Disorders, Global Health Estimates, https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/ handle/10665/254610/WHOMSD-MER-2017.2-eng.pdf