The Big Picture - Algorithmic collusion and AI 2026

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI cartels: risks under New Zealand’s Commerce Act JULY 2026

Contents

Bell Gully

Can your AI pricing tool collude?

04

How does the Commerce Act apply to algorithmic collusion?

06

Will New Zealand competition law change for AI?

07

How do AI-related competition risks arise in practice?

08

International enforcement and regulatory trends

11

Other AI competition issues on the Commerce Commission’s radar

13

What steps should businesses take to manage AI competition law risk?

14

Our team

15

Our practice

15

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

2

AI changes the nature of competition law risks. They can be harder to control and may be less visible. Businesses should understand how their pricing algorithms operate, maintain good oversight and set clear limits around deployment.

Bell Gully

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

3

Can your AI pricing tool collude?

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has rapidly moved from a specialised technology to an everyday business tool.

Businesses are increasingly implementing AI across their operations, particularly in pricing, procurement, forecasting, customer engagement and other market-facing decisions. As they adopt AI tools, New Zealand businesses must consider the anticompetitive conduct risks that may arise from the use of AI. This is an area of active interest to the New Zealand Commerce Commission, which last year published a paper indicating that it is monitoring the use of pricing algorithms to facilitate prohibited collusion. Algorithmic collusion has also been the subject of some landmark competition cases overseas.1 In this publication, we consider how those risks may arise in practice, the New Zealand competition law context, international enforcement trends and the practical steps businesses can take. We also look at other AI competition issues on the Commission’s radar.

In New Zealand, businesses using AI pricing tools remain liable under the Commerce Act if those tools are used to engage in cartel conduct, resale price maintenance, information sharing or other anti-competitive outcomes. The key practical risk is whether the tool weakens independent commercial decision-making, reducing oversight that a business would typically maintain.

Parliament is currently considering reforms to the Commerce Act. Although earlier reform proposals contemplated AI-specific amendments,2 those provisions were removed before the Commerce (Promoting Competition and Other Matters) Amendment Bill was introduced to Parliament.3 But, the Commerce Commission’s AI Paper, released prior to any proposed AI-specific amendments, rightly emphasised the importance of assessing AI tools under the current legal framework, rather than waiting for further legislative change.4

Bell Gully

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

4

Can your AI pricing tool collude?

What should New Zealand businesses know about AI competition law risk?

The use of AI can cause competition law risks to arise more quickly, including in relation to price-fixing, information sharing, resale price maintenance and coordinated conduct. Anticompetitive conduct can become harder to control and less visible. It can be more difficult to explain after the event.

Algorithmic collusion – key takeaways International cases demonstrate regulatory scrutiny of explicit algorithmic price-fixing, common-vendor and ‘huband-spoke’ models, and software that helps firms monitor or enforce aligned pricing.

Businesses remain responsible for the outcomes produced by AI and other pricing tools. “The algorithm did it” is unlikely to be an effective defence.

Existing competition rules already capture AI-related cartel conduct and anticompetitive arrangements, irrespective of whether reforms make that position explicit.

Practical risk management needs to cover governance, vendor diligence, data controls, monitoring and escalation pathways for legal review.

Businesses should check whether their pricing tools include higherrisk features such as competitor data inputs, shared vendor settings or benchmarks, automated price-matching or price recommendation functions, market monitoring tools, alerts that facilitate responses to competitor pricing, or self-learning functions that may adjust pricing without meaningful human oversight.

Bell Gully

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

While the Commerce Commission has not yet launched any enforcement proceedings specifically related to the use of AI algorithmic tools, it is monitoring the area closely.

Ultimately, businesses should understand how their pricing algorithms work in practice, and set clear limitations on their deployment.

5

The use of AI can facilitate anti-competitive conduct through a range of mechanisms. The Commerce Commission’s AI Paper suggests that liability could extend beyond the business to designers or manufacturers of the tool in an appropriate cases.

The relevant provisions in the Commerce Act are:

How does the Commerce Act apply to algorithmic collusion?

Spotlight on Cartel conduct

Resale price maintenance

in plain terms, competitors must not agree prices or discounts, rig bids, divide customers or territories, or coordinate output. This provision covers ‘hub-and-spoke’ conduct. I.e. where an intermediary facilitates an arrangement that involves competitors engaging in cartel conduct, that intermediary may equally be held liable under section 30 regardless of whether it competes with the parties ultimately colluding on competitive parameters or not.

If software is configured or used so that competitors move away from genuinely independent pricing and into coordination, the fact that a tool sits in the middle does not change the underlying risk. The Commission has indicated that, even in situations where businesses are unaware their AI is facilitating cartel conduct, there is potential for liability under the attribution provisions in section 90 of the Commerce Act.

a supplier must not incentivise a reseller to sell or advertise at or above a certain price. Configuring AI, algorithmic monitoring, dynamic‑pricing rules or price‑matching tools to maintain minimum resale prices can be seen as a breach of resale price maintenance laws. For example, using AI to detect and penalise reseller discounting, to apply automated warnings or supply restrictions when retailers drop below a set floor, or to steer recommended prices to operate as de facto minimums, can amount to resale price maintenance. Resale price maintenance is unlawful under the Commerce Act and does not require proof of a substantial lessening of competition.

General substantial lessening of competition prohibition this prohibits provisions of contracts, arrangements or understandings that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. It is a broad ‘catch all’ provision capturing conduct which falls short of a classic cartel but still significantly harms the competitive process, whether or not that conduct occurs between competitors.

Section 90 of the Commerce Act attributes conduct by a director, employee or agent to a body corporate in certain circumstances.

Misuse of market power

- crypto assets also applies to unilateral conduct. It is relevant where a firm with substantial power in a market uses data, platform design, access conditions or AI-enabled decision-making in a way that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market.

These Commerce Act provisions are applicable to the use of AI tools Businesses should be aware of their existing obligations under the Commerce Act and whether their use of AI could increase their risk of breaching competition laws.

Bell Gully

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

6

Will New Zealand competition law change for AI? For now, the existing Commerce Act is the main framework for assessing AI-related competition risk.

The Government’s September 2025 Commerce Act reform package indicated sections 27 and 30 could be clarified to apply expressly to AI and algorithmic tools.5 However, those amendments were ultimately omitted from the Commerce (Promoting Competition and Other Matters) Amendment Bill when introduced to Parliament.6 As set out above, the Commerce Commission has already indicated its view that the use of AI does not displace obligations under the Commerce Act.7

Current competition law risks are a live issue for businesses If an AI tool facilitates cartel conduct or otherwise acts to substantially lessen competition, the existing provisions of the Commerce Act will apply.

In practical terms, the more likely near-term path is continued monitoring and caseby-case enforcement by the Commerce Commission. But targeted reform is still possible should the law prove insufficient.

The key message is not to wait for Parliament to regulate AI expressly, but to assess now whether pricing, platforms or other market-facing tools could weaken genuinely independent competitive behaviour.

Bell Gully

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

7

How do AI-related competition risks arise in practice?

Spotlight on -

The Commerce Commission has specifically indicated the mere fact that a business is unaware that its AI is facilitating cartel conduct is no defence;8 businesses remain responsible for the pricing and decision tools they deploy.

A lack of specific direction to an AI tool to collude will not necessarily protect a business if the tool produces anticompetitive outcomes. Vendors or designers of an AI tool may also face exposure in some circumstances. Using AI-driven or algorithmic pricing tools does not, by itself, mean a business is acting anticompetitively. These tools can generate real efficiencies by improving forecasting, reducing manual pricing effort and enabling faster responses to demand, inventory and publicly observable market conditions. The Commerce Commission recognises that pricing algorithms can have pro-competitive benefits.9 The risk arises when those tools, by design, instruction or learning, stop reflecting genuinely independent decision-making and instead help coordinate market outcomes with competitors. Businesses using AI-driven

pricing therefore need to understand how the tool works, what data it uses, and whether it could facilitate or reinforce coordinated behaviour between competitors.10

- crypto assets

Recent testing of AI tools reinforces this concern. Anthropic’s system card for its Claude (Fable 5) model reported that, in a retail-management simulation, the model explicitly acknowledged that price-fixing was “unethical and illegal, even in a simulation” but proceeded to engage in it regardless.

It reframed the conduct as “market stabilisation” with “plausible deniability”, although the system card notes that this rationalisation drew on simulation awareness and recognised that its actions in the testing environment could not cause real-world harm.11 For businesses deploying AI pricing tools, this illustrates how an AI system could recognise that conduct is unlawful yet still pursue it autonomously – and generate its own justification for doing so.

Bell Gully

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

8

How do AI-related competition risks arise in practice?

Spotlight on -

What are common warning signs of algorithmic collusion?

Algorithms can make coordination easier for several reasons. They can detect and respond to competitor price moves at speed; monitor large numbers of products, geographies and time periods continuously; and, where common dashboards or shared data feeds are used, reduce the uncertainty that would otherwise disrupt coordination.

Liability risk from algorithmic collusion arises when tools, intentionally or not, coordinate market conduct with competitors. In practical terms, there are several areas where risks may arise.

1. Using a pricing algorithm as part of an explicit agreement with competitors to allow that tool to set prices or coordinate market conduct. For example, expressly agreeing to use automatic pricing systems that facilitate explicit collusive agreements, by using available pricing data to detect and respond to pricing deviations or reduce chances of error.

Businesses need to be alert to the risks posed by AI particularly where it is used for price-related actions, such as dynamic pricing. They should understand how their pricing algorithms operate in practice, the data on which those systems are trained, and how that data is used and shared. The biggest risk is AI communicating with a rival.

In practical terms, this means putting clear limits on the use of AI and maintaining a strong understanding of how their data interacts with the self-learning functions of the relevant systems.

- crypto assets

2. Agreeing with competitors to use the same software, data pools or configurations to align prices or enforce a common strategy, including “hub-and-spoke” arrangements. For example, competitors might rely on the same third-party pricing service (“a hub”) and feed it confidential data (such as non-public pricing or demand inputs) which the third-party supplier subsequently uses to make similar price recommendations to those competitors.

3. Sharing confidential competitor information (directly or via data pools) that is absorbed by pricing tools, enabling algorithms to anticipate and match competitors’ strategies. For example, using live dashboards or benchmarking tools that show real-time prices, margins or plans (or other competitively sensitive inputs) can provide an algorithm with access to confidential competitor information, allowing it to infer and match competitors’ moves, even without direct human input.

4. Failing to object to, or distance from, platform-imposed pricing restrictions, resulting in inferred acceptance of collusive measures.

Bell Gully

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

9

Global enforcement is accelerating Bell Gully

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

10

International enforcement and regulatory trends

Shared platforms, common vendors, pooled data, platform design, and monitoring tools In the US RealPage litigation, the Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged that revenue management software used current, non-public, competitively sensitive data from competing landlords to generate rent recommendations and included features that could help align pricing and restrain rent decreases. The pooled confidential data and software design are said to reduce genuinely independent decision-making across the industry.14 A report found that as many as one in four rentals across the United States were influenced by a RealPage pricing algorithm.15 As of November 2025, RealPage and the DOJ agreed on a settlement to resolve the allegations of antitrust violations regarding its algorithmic rental pricing software.16

These scenarios are not just theoretical. There are numerous recent examples of international enforcement relating to the use of AI algorithmic pricing tools. International cases demonstrate how conduct involving pricing software, common vendors, pooled data, monitoring tools and AI-related commercial arrangements may be analysed under existing competition law principles, which tend to be similar worldwide.

EXPLICIT CARTELS IMPLEMENTED THROUGH SOFTWARE

Topkins (the US “Poster Cartel” case) In Proptech Proptech,, the Spanish competition authority fined real estate agencies that used a Multiple Listing Service (MLS) platform to agree and monitor minimum commission levels.17 Software providers of the MLS platform were also fined.

US prosecutors brought criminal charges against David Topkins, who pleaded guilty to conspiring to fix the prices of posters sold on Amazon through the use of algorithmic pricing software.12 Using the algorithm to carry out the cartel’s pricing strategy had the same effect as if the cartel had been operated directly by individuals, with the computer performing a role that would otherwise have been carried out by humans.

In E-TURAS, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that travel agencies could be treated as participating in a collusive arrangement where they were notified through a platform message that discounts would be capped at 3% and then continued to use the platform without objection.18

Trod Limited/GB eye Limited In the Trod Limited/GB eye Limited matters in both the US and the UK, authorities addressed an arrangement between two online merchandise sellers that used Amazon repricing software and placed each other on “ignore lists” so their tools would not undercut one another.13

In the European Commission’s decisions against a number of electronic suppliers, the Commission found that manufacturers used price-comparison sites and specialised pricing software to monitor online resale prices and enforce resale price maintenance with penalties for non-compliance.19

Bell Gully

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

11

Shared platforms, common vendors, pooled data, platform design, and monitoring tools In Brazil, the antitrust watchdog, CADE, has opened an administrative proceeding to investigate possible price alignment between airlines LATAM and Gol.20 CADE said that its probe, launched in 2023, examined contracts signed by airlines with algorithmic pricing software companies, finding that such tools pose risks of information exchange as well as other threats to competition. These proceedings are still in their infancy.

International enforcement and regulatory trends Taken together, the cases indicate three recurring concerns: 1. software used to implement a cartel;

In Mexico, the antitrust authority, CNA, has signalled that algorithmic collusion is becoming a practical enforcement issue, especially while evidence remains difficult to gather where there is no direct contact between competitors.21 The CNA is openly considering finding liability based on negligence, as opposed to proof of anti-competitive intent. For example, the CNA has outlined a current investigation examining whether a third-party platform that provided real-time confidential pricing information failed to take reasonable steps to prevent competitors from using it to align and monitor prices.

Denmark’s Competition and Consumer Authority warned a local accounting firm for implementing an AI assistant which would have allowed businesses to illegitimately gain access to competitively sensitive information about their rivals, with the tool allowing for “price optimisation” based on rivals’ data.22 The accounting firm withdrew the tool following the warning.

In the Kalibrate matter from the United States, a group of Californian drivers filed a proposed class action in June 2026 in the Federal Court in Sacramento against major fuel retailers, together with the pricing-software provider Knowledge Support Systems (Kalibrate).23 The complaint alleges that, rather than coordinating directly, the retailers each fed competitively sensitive, non-public cost and volume data into a common algorithmic tool, Kalibrate Fuel Pricing, which used that shared data to model local demand and coordinate higher pump prices in a way the stations could not have achieved without conspiring.

Bell Gully

2. common platforms or vendors that reduce independent decision-making; and 3. monitoring or design features that help facilitate or enforce aligned pricing.

Across those themes, the legal analysis still turns on the substance and competitive effect of the conduct rather than the sophistication of the technology. Vendors or individuals involved in designing, configuring or overseeing the tools may also face exposure (as well as those companies using it).

Overseas regulators appear to be converging on similar risk factors: shared non-public data, common pricing software, automated matching or enforcement, and opaque optimisation that can stabilise market outcomes. This is likely to translate into close scrutiny of pricing and recommendation tools, common-vendor arrangements, and any system fed with non-public competitor information or that is designed to match, monitor or punish price moves. The Commerce Commission is likely to expect businesses to understand how these tools work, retain records of configuration and overrides, and be able to explain why outputs reflect independent commercial judgement rather than coordinated market behaviour.

Businesses must know what their AI pricing tool does Make sure any AI or software-based pricing tool supports genuinely independent pricing decisions rather than operating to align your conduct with competitors.

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

12

Other AI competition issues on the Commerce Commission’s radar The Commerce Commission’s AI Paper indicates that its AI-related competition concerns are not confined to pricing algorithms. More broadly, misuse of market power issues can arise where those firms use their position to hinder current or potential rivals, including by restricting access to key inputs or otherwise foreclosing competition.

Overseas regulators have identified risks in digital and AI ecosystems, including the withholding of important hardware, software and data inputs, as well as self-preferencing, tying and exclusivity.

Recent European cases (below) illustrate how those risks can arise in practice:

CASE 1

CASE 2

December 2022

December 2025

the European Commission accepted binding commitments from Amazon addressing concerns about Amazon’s use of non-public marketplace seller data and about rules for Buy Box and Prime that favoured Amazon’s own retail business and sellers using Amazon’s logistics services.24

the Italian antitrust authority, AGCM, ordered Meta Platforms to suspend contractual terms that had the potential to eliminate rival AI’s software from its WhatsApp service. AGCM commented that “Meta’s conduct appeared capable of restricting output, market access or technical development in the AI chatbot services market, potentially harming consumers”.25

Bell Gully

Sellers who are individuals

The Commerce Commission paper further flags section 47 (merger control) risk in What impact does AI have on First and mergers, last nameinvestments and “acquiAI-related market power? hire” arrangements which are presented as recruitment-led arrangements rather Date of birth and primary address Businesses should consider than conventional acquisitions, but involve the transfer of a core team, know-how and whether AI-related related IP or commercial arrangements.26 The Jurisdiction(s) of tax residence partnerships, access CMA’s April 2024 Microsoft/Inflection review arrangements, investments illustrates the point: it treated the transfer of Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) and the jurisdiction that a core team and associated assets as creating or talent transactions could issued it (e.g. the IRD number for a New Zealand tax resident). a relevant merger situation, although it strengthen existing market ultimately cleared the deal.27

power, foreclose rivals or remove an emerging competitive constraint.

Whether those arrangements raise concerns under the Commerce Act will depend on their purpose and competitive effects in the relevant markets.

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

13

What steps should businesses take to manage AI competition law risk?

Businesses will continue to increase their use of AI, but it is important they understand how such tools work, what data they rely on, and what competition risks they may create. For businesses, that means putting governance, testing, record-keeping and legal review protections around AI tools with the same discipline applied to any other high-risk commercial process.

STEPS - IN BRIEF:

Put governance around the tool

Carry out vendor and procurement diligence

assign clear accountability across board, legal, compliance, commercial and technical teams, keep a human decision-maker responsible for deployment and changes, and make sure someone can intervene if outputs raise competition concerns.

ask whether the provider serves competitors, uses pooled or nonpublic data, applies common Sellers who are individuals optimisation logic across customers, or offers matching, benchmarking, First and last name monitoring or retaliation features that could reduce independent decisionmaking.

Date of birth and primary address Jurisdiction(s) of tax residence

Know how the tools work map each pricing or market-facing AI tool, the decisions it influences, the markets in which it operates, the data it uses, and whether it draws on competitor information or other commercially sensitive inputs.

Yes. If an AI pricing tool facilitates price-fixing, resale price maintenance, anti-competitive information sharing or coordinated conduct, the business using the tool may face risk under the Commerce Act even if the anti-competitive action was not directed by a human employee.

Keep records and test Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) and the jurisdiction thatAI can sharpen Used well, outcomes issued it (e.g. the IRD number for a New Zealandcompetition tax resident). as well as improve document the AI tool’s configuration, efficiency. The challenge for New key settings, training or input data, recommendations, overrides Zealand businesses is to make and review steps, and monitor sure the technology supports for unexplained price alignment, independent decision-making, synchronisation or other outcomes rather than quietly steering the that may indicate the tool is dampening competition. business towards anti-competitive conduct.

Train people and escalate early ensure commercial, product,

data and engineering teams understand the competition risks, and do not assume the vendor has solved them. They should pause deployment or seek legal review where the tool influences market prices more broadly, uses non-public competitor data or produces hard-toexplain outputs.

Bell Gully

Can an AI pricing tool breach New Zealand competition law?

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

Legal advice is particularly important where a tool influences prices or commercial terms in concentrated markets, relies on competitor information, or is supplied by a common vendor to rivals.

14

Our team Acknowledgments Our thanks to Bell Gully lawyer Elise Bond and graduate Sean Gibbs for assisting with the preparation of this report.

Our practice

Torrin Crowther

Glenn Shewan

Penny Pasley

Emma Quigley

PARTNER

PARTNER

SPECIAL COUNSEL

SENIOR ASSOCIATE

DDI +64 9 916 8621 MOB +64 21 867 746

DDI +64 9 916 8726 MOB +64 21 828 926

DDI +64 9 916 8674 MOB +64 21 247 5633

DDI +64 9 916 8779 MOB +64 21 227 4969

torrin.crowther@bellgully.com

glenn.shewan@bellgully.com

penny.pasley@bellgully.com

emma.quigley@bellgully.com

AI-related competition issues often sit at the intersection of pricing strategy, data governance, procurement and sector regulation. A coordinated legal review can help identify issues before a tool is deployed or a regulator asks questions.

Bell Gully

Bell Gully can assist with AI competition law risk assessments, vendor diligence, Commerce Act compliance advice and governance frameworks for market-facing AI tools. We advise clients on contentious and non-contentious competition law, represent clients in Commerce Commission investigations and enforcement matters including cartel investigations and applications for leniency.

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

INDEPENDENT RECOGNITION • Elite practice Global Competition Review GCR 100 2026 • Band 1 Competition Chambers Asia Pacific 2026 • Tier 1 Competition Legal 500 Asia Pacific 2026

15

Endnotes 1. Commerce Commission “Navigating the rise of AI: Perspectives from a competition and consumer regulator” (2025) https://www.comcom.govt.nz/newsand-media/news-and-events/2025/webinar-navigatingthe-rise-of-ai/ 2. Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment https://www.mbie.govt.nz/business-and-employment/ business/competition-regulation-and-policy/reviewsof-the-commerce-act-1986/refreshing-competitionsettings 3. Legislation New Zealand “Commerce (Promoting Competition and Other Matters) Amendment Bill” (2025) https://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/ government/2025/237/en/latest/ 4. Commerce Commission “Navigating the rise of AI: Perspectives from a competition and consumer regulator” (2025) https://www.comcom.govt.nz/newsand-media/news-and-events/2025/webinar-navigatingthe-rise-of-ai/ 5. Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment https://www.mbie.govt.nz/business-and-employment/ business/competition-regulation-and-policy/reviewsof-the-commerce-act-1986/refreshing-competitionsettings 6. Legislation New Zealand “Commerce (Promoting Competition and Other Matters) Amendment Bill” (2025) https://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/ government/2025/237/en/latest/ 7. Commerce Commission “Navigating the rise of AI: Perspectives from a competition and consumer regulator” (2025) https://www.comcom.govt.nz/newsand-media/news-and-events/2025/webinar-navigatingthe-rise-of-ai/

8. at 4 9. at 1 10. at 3 11. Anthropic “System Card: Claude Fable 5 & Claude Mythos 5” (2026) https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/ claude/fable 12. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs ”Former E-Commerce Executive Charged with Price Fixing in the Antitrust Division's First Online Marketplace Prosecution” (2015) https://www.justice.gov/archives/ opa/pr/former-e-commerce-executive-charged-pricefixing-antitrust-divisions-first-online-marketplace 13. UK CMA “Online sales of posters and frames” (2015) https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-sales-ofdiscretionary-consumer-products; US DOJ “Online Retailer Pleads Guilty for Fixing Prices of Wall Posters” (2016) https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/onlineretailer-pleads-guilty-fixing-prices-wall-posters 14. US DOJ “Justice Department Requires RealPage to End the Sharing of Competitively Sensitive Information and Alignment of Pricing Among Competitors” (2025) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentrequires-realpage-end-sharing-competitively-sensitiveinformation-and 15. National Low Income Housing Coalition “White House Council of Economic Advisors Releases Analysis of Costs of Pricing Algorithms in Rental Housing” https:// nlihc.org/resource/white-house-council-economicadvisors-releases-analysis-costs-pricing-algorithmsrental

Bell Gully

16. US DOJ “Justice Department Requires RealPage to End the Sharing of Competitively Sensitive Information and Alignment of Pricing Among Competitors” (2025) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentrequires-realpage-end-sharing-competitively-sensitiveinformation-and

22. Danish Competition and Consumer Authority “Visma Dinero’s AI Assistant Had Potential to Harm Competition in Multiple Markets” (2026) https:// en.kfst.dk/nyheder/kfst/english/news/2026/20260521visma-dinero-s-ai-assistant-had-potential-to-harmcompetition-in-multiple-markets

17. Clifford Chance “Spain: Software and database companies should ensure the services they provide cannot be used by their clients to violate antitrust rules” https://www.cliffordchance.com/insights/ resources/blogs/talking-tech/en/articles/2022/01/ software-and-database-companies.html at 2

23. Los Angeles Times “Gas giants use AI to raise prices, lawsuit says, another algorithmic hit to the cost of living” (2026) ) https://www.latimes.com/california/ story/2026-07-01/lawsuit-over-gas-prices-testsclarification-to-states-antitrust-law

18. Wolters Kluwer “Eturas - Any conclusions on platform collusion..?” (2017) https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer. com/competition-blog/eturas-any-conclusions-onplatform-collusion/

24. European Commission “Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments by Amazon barring it from using marketplace seller data, and ensuring equal access to Buy Box and Prime” (2022) https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7777

19. European Commission: Antitrust “Commission fines four consumer electronics manufacturers for fixing online resale prices” (2018) https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_18_4601

25. AGCM “Meta AI: the Italian Competition Authority orders Meta to suspend the terms excluding competing AI Chatbots from WhatsApp” (2025) https://en.agcm.it/ en/media/press-releases/2025/12/A576

20. Global Banking & Finance Review “Brazilian regulator probes airlines LATAM, Gol over potential price alignment” (2026) https://www. globalbankingandfinance.com/brazilian-regulatorprobes-airlines-latam-gol-over-potential/

26. Global Competition Review “Digital Markets Guide – Fifth Edition UK and EU antitrust authorities target AI partnerships in expansion of merger control rules” (2026) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/ digital-markets-guide/fifth-edition/article/uk-andeu-antitrust-authorities-target-ai-partnerships-inexpansion-of-merger-control-rules at 4

21. Global Competition Review “CNA official: Algorithmic pricing cases warrant new standard of proof” (2026) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/ cna-official-algorithmic-pricing-cases-warrant-newstandard-of-proof

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI

27. UK Competition and Market Authority “Microsoft / Inflection inquiry” (2024) https://www.gov.uk/cmacases/microsoft-slash-inflection-ai-inquiry

16

Level 14 Deloitte Centre 1 Queen Street Auckland 1010

Level 4 Bell Gully Building 40 Lady Elizabeth Lane Wellington 6011

Phone: +64 9 916 8800 Fax: +64 9 916 8801

Phone: +64 4 915 6800 Fax: +64 9 916 8801

bellgully.com

The Big Picture Algorithmic collusion and AI