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BDI-Position concerning aspects of the Revision of EU ETS1 (MSR1)

Page 1


Department

Energy, Transport and Environment

Date 08 July 2026

Page 1 of 7 Position BDI-Position

FederationofGermanIndustries (BDI)

German Lobbying Register Number

R000534

Address

Breite Straße 29 10178 Berlin

Postcode 11053 Berlin

Web www.bdi.eu

Phone

+493020281555

+493227921015

E-Mail J.Hein@bdi.eu e.eschrich@bdi.eu

Key Messages

1. ETS1 should remain the central market-based instrument for achieving climate neutrality beyond 2030. However, it must be recalibrated, as industrial competitiveness is under serious threat. Urgently needed investments are not materializing due to missing infrastructure and a lack of predictable policy frameworks.

2. Only a joint transformation effort across all sectors, despite their specific characteristics, can ultimately create CO₂ free or low carbon value chains. The ETS revision must therefore address the needs of both those who have already invested and those who still require support for the transformation due to a variety of reasons, particularly the lack of infrastructure. Any form of recalibration must further take into account the allowance demand of the energy sector.

3. The CO₂ price is determined by the cap, not by the allocation method. Areliablecarbon pricesignaldirectsinvestmentstoward lowcarbon and carbon free processes, provided the necessary framework conditions and prerequisites are in place.

4. CO₂ costs are primarily determined by the level of free allocation. Particularly where the prerequisites for transformation are lacking, CO₂ costs must be limited. For non-CBAM sectors and for products where CBAM does not yet provide effective protection against carbon leakage, the current level of free allocation should be maintained.

5. Liquidity in the ETS is a fundamental prerequisite. An "endgame" scenario, where no allowances enter the market after 2039, must be avoided. The linear reduction factor should be adjusted so that climate neutrality within ETS1 is achieved by 2050, in line with the EU Climate Law. BDI continues to support the EU wide application of ETS2 on 1 January 2028 and calls for effective carbon leakage protection for industrial processes under ETS2 as well.

6. The current Market Stability Reserve (MSR) cannot ensure a meaningful balance between supply and demand in a context of increasing allowance scarcity. Its rules must be revised to make it fit for the future.

7. In aviation, the scope of the ETS should be maintained and CORSIA strengthened to prevent further competitive distortions and retaliatory measures. Expanding SAF Allowances and introducing a Book & Claim system would support the scale up of sustainable aviation fuels.

What is the problem?

The competitive position of EU industry has deteriorated significantly in recent years, partly due to external factors. Without viable business cases, the enormous investments required for the transformation cannot be refinanced and therefore will not take place. Structural competitive disadvantages, high energy costs, excessive regulation, and continuously increasing requirements such as environmental conditionalities are putting production, investment, and employment at risk. In Germany alone, around 240,000 industrial jobs were lost between 2024 and 2025, equivalent to approximately 10,000 jobs per month.

At the same time, industries face very different transformation realities and are therefore progressing at different paces. In addition, cost pressure is increasing along entire value chains. Rising energy and CO₂ costs affect not only ETS regulated installations but are also passed on through intermediate products, logistics, anddownstream processing andmanufacturing stages. As a result, investment decisions are coming under pressure where companies have only limited and no immediate possibilities to switch to lower emission alternatives. These cascading cost effects must also be addressed to effectively prevent both carbon leakage and investment leakage. Simply increasing the cost of fossil or fossil-based applications does not create alternatives.

The EU must restore the overall competitiveness of its locational conditions by reducing energy costs, prioritizing climate infrastructure such as electricity, CO₂ and hydrogen networks, simplifying regulation, reducing bureaucracy, and at a minimum avoiding further regulatory burdens. ETS1 must be adapted to the needs of the 2030s. A key element is the strengthening of carbon leakage protection, as a level playing field with major global competitors remains unrealistic.

What is the common starting point for the ETS1 revision?

The EU's objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 remains unchanged. Carbon pricing, as a market-based and technology neutral climate policy instrument, should continue to be part of the climate policy toolbox, and the incentive effect of carbon prices within the EU ETS should be preserved. Investments already made or planned for the transformation must not be devalued.

At the same time, the burden arising from comparatively high CO₂ costs that international competitors are unlikely to face must be reduced. In 2025, more than 83% of global annual revenues from carbon allowances, amounting to nearly USD 80 billion per year, originated from the EU ETS1 and Germany's BEHG (ICAP Status Report 2026).

What is needed now?

The ETS1 revision must strengthen protection against carbon and investment leakage, preserve market liquidity, and provide long term investment certainty.

• A thorough impact assessment should demonstrate the consistent interaction of all system changes envisaged in the review, as well as the effective and efficient interaction of the ETS with other climate, energy, and industrial policy measures.

• The key prerequisites for industrial transformation and sustainable business models must be established, particularly access to internationally competitive energy and raw material prices, sufficient energy and CO₂ infrastructure, effective trade policy instruments to address global overcapacities, credible and effective carbon leakage protection, adequate CAPEX and OPEX support, and reduced bureaucracy. A reliable price signal directs investments toward decarbonization where the necessary technical and infrastructure conditions are in place. If these conditions are not met, the Emissions Trading System (ETS) imposes an additional cost burden on industrial companies competing in international markets, hindering investments or rendering them economically unviable

• Stabilize carbon leakage protection: For non-CBAM sectors and for products where CBAM does not yet provide effective protection against carbon leakage, the current system of free allocation should be maintained. To achieve this, the auctioning to free allocation ratio of 57:43 set out in Article 10(1) of the ETS Directive should be revised.The rules governing carbon leakage protection should further be designed in a way that eliminates the need for a cross sectoral correction factor. Furthermore, the portfolio of carbon leakage protection mechanisms should be expanded, and their effectiveness should be assessed regularly.

To enable targeted investments in Europe that can successfully compete for capital on a global scale, reliable and internationally competitive framework conditions, as well as competitive transformation requirements, are essential. Making free allocation conditional on additional requirements would run counter to the fundamental principle of the ETS, under which companies subject to emissions trading are free to determine for themselves how best to respond to the carbon price signal, thereby ensuring the most efficient outcome.

• Align the Linear Reduction Factor (LRF) with the 2050 climate neutrality target: The ETS must continue to channel investments into climate protection wherever technically and economically viable

solutions exist.Investments alreadymadeandthosecurrentlyplanned must not be undermined or devalued.

The linear reduction pathway should be adjusted to reflect effective climate action while at the same time ensuring that sufficient market liquidity remains available beyond 2040 to cover emissions that are difficult to abate. In this way, the ETS can contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 in line with the EU Climate Law.

The BDI continues to support the EU wide introduction of ETS2 on 1 January 2028 and calls for effective carbon leakage protection for industrial processes under ETS2 as well.

• Without increasing the cap, the Allocation Buffer under Article 10a(5a) of the ETS Directive (approximately 370 million EUAs) could be used to adjust the emissions reduction pathway. In doing so, itmustbeensuredthatnomarketdistortionsarise.TheEUinstitutions should therefore provide clarity as soon as possible regarding when and how these allowances will be released to the market. This should be done gradually and with sufficient notice to avoid market uncertainty and the associated risk of excessive volatility.

• CBAM is not yet functioning as intended. For CBAM sectors, the phase out schedule of free allocation should be reviewed and slowed down to reflect the considerable implementation challenges associated with CBAM.

The current treatment of indirect emissions should be maintained. In CBAM sectors where indirect emissions are not covered, indirect cost compensation should remain in place. Exports must not be disadvantaged byCBAM,and adurable long-term solution must befound.The inclusion of additional products in CBAM without the agreement of the affected sectors should be rejected.

• The proposal by the European Commission of 1 April 2026 to maintain the cap of 400 million allowances in the MSR should be overturned, meaning the invalidation clause should no longer be applied. It would be economically and fiscally unjustified to invalidate additional millions of EUAs only to potentially purchaseArticle 6 credits in order to maintain liquidity at a later stage.

• The existing MSR has successfully fulfilled its original purpose of removing surplus allowances, primarily those generated through CDMcredits, and should nolongerabsorbadditionalEUAs.Itsfuture role, operating principles, and control parameters should be fundamentally redefined.

• Auction revenues from ETS1 should be returned to ETS regulated entities to a much greater extent, while being used to support their transformation efforts.

• The scope of the EU ETS for aviation should remain permanently limited to flights within the European Economic Area to avoid additional competitive disadvantages, carbon leakage, and retaliatory measures by non-EU countries.

Extending the EU ETS to flights involving third countries would risk undermining the ICAO Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). The EU should therefore strengthen CORSIA, as its global design can contribute to climate protection worldwide and help create a level playing field in aviation.

The allowances currently available under the ETS to offset the additional costs of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF Allowances or “FEETS”) will not be sufficient and are expected to be exhausted by 2028 at the latest. The EU should pursue the extension already foreseen in the ETS Directive and remove both the volume cap and the time limit on SAFAllowances.

Current allocation rules benefit some airlines more than others. IntroducingaBook&Claimsystemisanessentialelementforscaling up sustainable aviation fuels.

• The inclusion of provisions in the EU Climate Law enabling the use of Article 6 credits has been welcomed. It should be ensured that sectors covered by ETS1 can benefit from the use of these international credits. High quality international credits should complement both the decarbonization of the EU economy and efforts to remove CO₂ within ETS1. One possible approach could be the introduction of international credits into the ETS1 through a centralized procurement mechanism.

Conclusion

The measures associated with the ETS1 revision should be proposed, negotiated, and implemented as quickly as possible and enter into force no later than the end of 2027. This would help preserve the competitiveness of ETS regulated industries throughout the transformation process.

Morebroadly,policymakersshouldpursueeveryopportunitytomovetoward a global level playing field, including through initiatives such as global carbon pricing, and ensure that all framework conditions in the EU, not only climate policy measures, are designed to attract investment.

The European Commission and Member States must cooperate much more closely and rapidly develop the cross-border climate infrastructure required

for the transformation, including electricity, CO₂, and hydrogen networks. These infrastructures are of paramount European interest.

Most importantly, market expectations must be stabilized quickly, and investment paralysis must be overcome. The attractiveness of the EU as an investmentlocationmustberestored.Regulatoryrulesshouldbesimplifiedand adapted so that plant operators can establish viable business cases that once again enable investment and innovation in Europe.

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