7.2 Necessary measures and open issues

The aim of strategic autonomy does not translate either to a separation from transatlantic security or to an excessive military build-up for the purposes of deterrence and defence. The aim is rather to secure Europe’s capacity to act and shape Europe independently into the future and the capacity to safeguard security within the European Union and define own foreign and security policy priorities and decisions, and to implement these in cooperation with third parties or, if necessary, alone. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine shows that there is a substantial need to catch up on this front. Germany and the EU have been lulled into a false sense of security for too long and have entered into dependencies that are now severely restraining the EU’s ability to shape its own destiny and take action and is therefore diametrically opposed to strategic autonomy.

7.2 Necessary measures and open issues

A ‘new era’ must see a reduction of these dependencies as a top priority. This will necessitate both the political will and adequate institutional structures as well as own technological capabilities – both military and civilian. These form the necessary basis from which to reduce critical dependencies and instead create the preconditions to help shape the global landscape. Technological development and innovation must take centre stage in the debate on how to structure the autonomy of the EU in its security and defence policy.

National and allied defence

To reach strategic autonomy, key technologies and production capabilities relevant to defence need to be available and controlled within Europe as far as possible. In order to achieve this, economic and industrial policy will have to be closely tied to European security interests, particularly in the defence technology sector. It will be necessary to cover the whole breadth of technologies in the dimensions of land, air, sea/underwater and space, cyberspace and information.

Following the logic of equipment efficiency, interoperability, the effects of scale and division of costs, this will require the individual European countries to join forces on a closer basis. Brussels only provides the framework for this and sets incentives. The implementation of these incentives stands or falls with the member states. It is their individual interests, strategies and capabilities that are decisive, it is these that have to be balanced and aligned to one another. In contrast to the European Commission, the ‘lead nations’ such as Germany and France have the political weight to impose the leadership, user and participant roles in a fair and balanced way. They must use this weight to adapt the European funding tools to these efforts (and not the other way around). Cooperation projects also need a primary comparison of the requirements with the respective tool, followed by project-specific synchronisation of the planning and procurement processes.

The war and the support provided to the Ukrainian army has shown how diverse the defence technology within Europe is and what an obstacle this can be. The number of different weapon systems needs to be reduced urgently, and this can only be achieved through targeted European armaments cooperation. On the basis of NATO and EDA capability planning, Europe needs to reach agreement especially on which large weapons systems to procure over the next few decades. Crucial to this process will be a clearly regulated division of responsibilities and structuring of individual project areas in accordance with the available industrial expertise, as shown by the European euro drone project. The respective lead nation must exercise both the political and industrial leadership. At the same time, European programmes and instruments such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) must not lose sight of the objective of promoting international competitiveness, efficiency and innovation of the

(European) defence industry: the measures must have a targeted impact and avoid duplicating structures.

To arrive at a national – and globally competitive – German security and defence industry in the framework of European cooperation, we must first, anchor into German political and public awareness the understanding that the security and defence industry makes an essential and fundamental contribution to national resilience, public security and the defence capability of the country and its allies. Without the security and defence industry, we will not be able to preserve the foundation for living freely and sustainably in our country. This extensive understanding of security means second that consistent measures must be taken to ensure the security of supply and the access to financing of the German security and defence industry. This will require the close cooperation between public bodies and defence companies. A third important aspect is to have comparable market access rules to enable a level playing field at the European level. This is all the more important given that in other European countries defence companies are subsidised through state participation or public contracts and receive targeted support in exports. Given that the success of European armament cooperation projects is always also based on the opportunity of a joint export to partner nations it is important to establish common European regulations rather than national solutions. A fourth crucial factor on the way to autonomy will be how to deal with global economic interdependence in the context of conflicting geostrategic interests. We can only achieve strategic autonomy in cooperation with partners, and this includes partners that share our values, objectives and interests but also those with whom we have less in common. We therefore need to re-evaluate partnerships with countries that are neither in the EU nor in NATO.

Critical key technologies: space

To achieve autonomy, we need critical infrastructure in key areas with a military and civilian connection that is largely independent of external partners. This is particularly the case in the space sector. Space is a key to emerging digital technologies and data availability. As a fifth military dimension alongside land, sea, air and cyber, space is of paramount strategic importance. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has again shown how crucial the use of satellites and data and services generated by them are for military reconnaissance and operations. Deployments of the Bundeswehr abroad are no longer conceivable without the support of space systems. The targeted shooting down of an obsolete satellite with an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) by Russia in late 2021 and the Russian cyberattacks on the system of the US operator Viasat exposed the vulnerability of public and commercial infrastructures in space.

Alongside Russia, the United States and China have long recognised the military and political significance of space and have invested accordingly in their capabilities. Europe does not only play a subordinate role here, but the war in Ukraine has shown the extent of our dependency on other partners. Following the termination of all cooperation with Russia, Europe has temporarily lost its own access to space. If Russia choses to hack, destroy or shoot down European satellites, Europe will not be able to respond. We would not be able to launch replacement systems in the short or medium term. Europe’s critical infrastructure in space is therefore under direct threat.

It is absolutely essential that Europe’s responsive space capabilities are expanded so that small satellites can be equipped with payloads in the shortest possible time, be sent into Earth’s orbit and put into operation. This is the only way that we can strengthen the resilience of our space-supported infrastructure. As one of the leading space nations in Europe, Germany has a responsibility here at a European level as well. Our sovereign systems are also used by the military of EU member states and