Constructing Social Reality

Constructing Social Reality

An Inquiry into the Normative Foundations of Social Change

Michael Karlberg

Michael Karlberg

Constructing Social Reality

An Inquiry into the Normative Foundations of Social Change

Constructing Social Reality: An Inquiry into the Normative Foundations of Social Change / Michael Karlberg, author

© 2020 by Association for Bahá’í Studies 34 Copernicus Street Ottawa, ON K1N 7K4 Canada http://bahai-studies.ca All rights reserved First edition, first printing Published June 2020 Print ISBN: 978-0-920904-32-9 Ebook ISBN Every effort has been made to acquire permission for copyright material used in this text, and to acknowledge all such indebtness accurately. Any errors and omissions called to the publisher’s attention will be corrected in future printings.

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Contents Table of Figures Preface Introduction Chapter 1: Reconciling Truth & Relativity Reality as Enabling and Constraining Perceptions of Truth Truths versus Truth Claims Relative Attunement to Truth Toward Increasing Attunement Relative Embodiment of Truth Toward Increasing Embodiment Chapter 2: Reconciling Knowledge & Power Conceptualizing Knowledge Conceptualizing Power Knowledge, Power, and Justice Chapter 3: Reconciling Science & Religion The Normative Discourse on Science The Normative Discourse on Religion Chapter 4: Bahá’í Discourse & Practice Fostering a Normative Discourse on Religion Fostering a Culture of Learning Fostering a Culture of Empowerment Chapter 5: Materialist Frames of Reference Physicalism Pragmatism Proceduralism Agonism Chapter 6: Looking Forward Some Ontological Implications Some Epistemological Implications Toward a Radical Constructive Program Conclusion Acknowledgements Notes Bibliography Index

vi vii 1 9 11 16 18 26 30 40 49 50 55 61 65 69 71 81 82 91 104 115 117 127 136 143 153 153 174 180 189 193 195 219 237

VII

Preface Thoughtful observers on all continents are beginning to recognize that the current social order is, in the words of Bahá’u’lláh, “lamentably defective.”1 Humanity cannot continue much longer on its present course. Transformative change has become an existential imperative.

At the 2016 conference of the Association for Bahá’í Studies in Montreal, Farzam Arbab pointed out the need for such change on three levels: the attitudes and behaviors that reflect the interior condition of our hearts and minds, the social structures and institutional arrangements that are external features of our social order, and the systems of knowledge upon which our social order has been constructed and from which many of our attitudes and behaviors derive. Regarding the last of these three levels, Arbab posed the question: Is it possible that the intellectual foundations of the present civilization—the ideas, the assumptions, the methods, and the assertions that underpin individual and collective thought—are entirely sound and yet, somehow, give rise to such a defective order? Could it just be that the wrong people have taken hold of sound knowledge and are applying it to create inadequate structures, processes, and behaviors? Should we not also look

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for fundamental defects in the knowledge system that defines today’s world?2 My first book, Beyond the Culture of Contest, offers a small contribution toward rethinking the intellectual foundations of Western civilization. In that book, I make a case for rethinking some of the deepest assumptions that have been promulgated in recent centuries regarding human nature, power, and social organization. I demonstrate how the prevailing culture of self-interested competition, which had been built on those assumptions, is unjust, unsustainable, and reflects an impoverished understanding of reality. I examine how the culture of contest is embodied not only in hearts and minds but in social structures and institutions. I look at provisional evidence suggesting humanity is indeed capable of transcending the culture of contest. I explore the paradox of trying to do this through processes of political contestation. What is needed, I argue, are radically non-adversarial approaches to transformative social change.

This current book builds on that earlier work by exploring how we might overcome three deeply ingrained habits of thought that make it difficult to envision such an approach to social change. More specifically, I attempt to reconcile three epistemological tensions that arise in the culture of contest that foster cynicism regarding the possibility of constructing a more peaceful, just, and mutually prosperous social order. These are tensions between truth and relativity, knowledge and power, science and religion. The perennial nature of these long-standing tensions in Western thought suggests there is a problem with the binary way truth and relativity, power and knowledge, science and religion all tend to be conceptualized. I therefore explore ways we can move beyond these binary conceptions to resolve these tensions. In the process, I offer another tentative contribution to the long-term work of laying the intellectual foundations for a new social order.

It should be noted at the outset that this book focuses primarily on overcoming problems and limitations that have arisen within the dominant Western intellectual tradition and that have, to varying degrees, been widely exported through several centuries of Western hegemony. This book does not attempt a global survey of non-Western intellectual traditions, nor of subaltern traditions within the West, and the rich intellectual resources that might be

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Introduction Humanity cannot continue its present course much longer. Over the past century, we’ve transformed the conditions of our existence, but we’ve not yet adapted to these new conditions. Existential threats such as global warming and nuclear conflict, crippling worldwide pandemics, and a host of acute social injustices and ecological disruptions, are awakening us to the need for profound social change.6 The complex, global, interconnected nature of these challenges is without historical precedent. We are entering territory for which we have no map. We don’t know how to live together on this contracting planet, and we must learn our way forward. In this sense, learning implies the purposeful and systematic generation of knowledge that is partly scientific and technological, but also—perhaps primarily— social. We need to generate knowledge about the new social reality we must construct, including how to construct it.

Knowledge of this kind has an intrinsically normative dimension. It is not merely descriptive or explanatory. It is also prescriptive. It is about how we ought to live together if we hope to adapt successfully to the new conditions of our existence. But what does it mean to generate knowledge with a normative dimension? Upon what foundations can such knowledge rest? Are all normative truth claims mere expressions of our subjective preferences, emotional states, or cultural sensibilities? In other words, are all normative claims merely relative?

Or is it rational to speak about foundational normative truths—foundational aspects of reality—upon which we can construct a viable social order? If so, how can knowledge about such truths and their application to the betterment of humanity be generated?

Questions about the normative dimensions of social existence reveal unresolved tensions implicit in how many people understand

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Constructing Social Reality

the relationship between truth and relativity. These questions also disclose unresolved tensions regarding the relationship between knowledge and power. In the latter regard, it is widely understood that power and privilege can shape the categories, concepts, and theories developed across the social sciences, including allegedly objective fields such as economics. Power and privilege can even shape the generation of knowledge in the applied natural sciences in domains such as medical, pharmaceutical, and agricultural research.

Indeed, the relationship between knowledge and power has been so extensively interrogated in these and other fields that it has led some to adopt the cynical view that all knowledge—or at least all knowledge about social reality—is a mere function of power, privilege, and social position.7 And yet, if we accept this cynical view, how can the generation of knowledge illumine a path toward a more peaceful, just, and prosperous social order? How can knowledge contribute to human progress at all if those who dominate its generation and dissemination occupy privileged social positions and are motivated by self-interested biases? Is knowledge merely a function of power? These questions take on profound significance at this historical juncture when we face existential global challenges.

In the face of the preceding questions about truth and relativity, and about knowledge and power, some people have adopted cynical or nihilistic world views that offer no route forward. Against this backdrop, the central thesis of this book is that foundational normative truths exist and human knowledge can, to some degree, become attuned to them.

Moreover, the generation of such knowledge and its application to the betterment of humanity need not be corrupted by power and privilege. It is possible, under the right conditions, to learn our way forward toward a more peaceful, just, and mutually prosperous social order. To do this, we need a framework that reconciles truth and relativity, as well as knowledge and power, in rational and constructive ways. This book suggests a logically coherent and empirically tenable way to do this that enables us to move beyond cynical and nihilistic modes of thought and practice.

Given that this book is being written for a wide audience, I have tried to minimize philosophical jargon. However, it is not possible to eliminate all specialized terminology without sacrificing efficiency and precision. Therefore, before proceeding, I want to comment on how and why I am using some specific terms that will appear throughout the book.

Introduction

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The first of these is the term normative. This term can be used in two ways. It is sometimes used descriptively to signify existing social norms, or the way things are within a given social context. For instance, we can make the empirical observation that in contemporary American society, it is still a norm that women tend to be paid less than men for the same work. Yet the term normative is also used prescriptively, to signify ideal social norms, or the way things ought to be within a given social context. For instance, we can make the normative statement that women ought to be paid the same as men for the same work.

Throughout this book, I use the term normative in the latter way.

I thus use the concept of normative truths to denote the existence of objective features or properties or governing principles of reality that underlie and inform the way things ought to be. Such truths need not be understood as comprehensive or detailed prescriptions for every aspect of social reality in every context. Rather, they can be understood as indeterminate laws, ideals, or principles that ought to inform the construction of diverse social phenomena in culturally and historically contingent ways—much like the laws or principles of physics inform the construction of diverse technologies. Bahá’ís often refer to such truths as spiritual principles and, at some points in this book, I will use the terms normative truths and spiritual principles in an interchangeable manner.

The existence of normative truths is thus an ontological premise in favor of which this book argues. Ontology is a branch of philosophy dealing with the nature of reality or the nature of existence.

Ontological premises are premises about the nature of reality or existence. Ontological foundationalism refers to the view that reality is characterized by foundational truths, or laws, or properties, or indelible features of existence that exist independently of whether human minds are aware of them and independently of the degree to which we comprehend them. In this sense, foundational truths are sometimes referred to as transcendent truths because they transcend human comprehension—they transcend all cultural or linguistic efforts to grasp or signify them. In philosophy, the view that foundational or transcendent truths exist independently of human comprehension is often called realism. And the view that normative truths exist independent of human thought is called normative realism (or value realism or moral realism).

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Chapter 1

Reconciling Truth & Relativity

The introduction to this book asserts that humanity needs to learn its way forward to adapt to conditions of heightened global interdependence, that this learning entails the generation and application of knowledge about emerging social phenomena, and that such knowledge has a normative dimension. Whether these assertions seem rational and compelling hinges, in part, on how we understand the relationship between truth and relativity. To appreciate why this seemingly abstract relationship is so relevant to the exigencies of this age, we can begin by thinking about some of its concrete implications. Two examples should suffice.

Consider, first, the issue of global warming or climate change. As climate science matures, it is becoming evident that the impacts of a warming climate, if the process is not quickly halted and ultimately reversed, will be devastating for many populations who bear the least responsibility for it and who can least afford to cope with it.9 As sea levels rise, hundreds of millions of people living on low-lying islands and coastal plains in some of the world’s poorest and least industrialized countries will be displaced. As glaciers disappear, hundreds of millions of small farmers who depend on glacial run-off will also be unable to irrigate their crops. As climate-sensitive terrestrial species experience drastic population declines or extinctions, millions more will be deprived of traditional foods and livelihoods.

And as pH-sensitive aquatic species experience drastic population declines or extinctions, further millions will be deprived of foods and livelihoods. Meanwhile, the world’s wealthiest populations from

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Constructing Social Reality

the most industrialized countries who bear the greatest responsibility for global warming will be in the best positions to adapt and survive.

What moral obligations, if any, should fall on the shoulders of privileged populations who are most responsible for these looming humanitarian crises? Are there any normative truths upon which such questions can be decided? Or are the answers to these questions merely relative to the values and interests of diverse stakeholders?

If we believe the latter, then all normative questions can be decided only by the exercise of power and privilege. If so, global warming is likely to reduce us to the crude dynamics of social Darwinism—the signs of which we can already see clearly in the world today.

Or consider the issue of human rights. The global discourse on human rights ultimately revolves around the issue of whether diverse cultural or religious traditions, along with assertions of unfettered national sovereignty, can be reconciled with the application of any universal standards of human rights. This issue raises challenging questions. For instance, do all children have the right to be free from exploitation? Do they have the right to an education? Do girls have the same rights as boys to develop their latent capacities through education and access to opportunity? Do all individuals have the right to freedom of conscience and belief so long as their beliefs are not harmful to others? Do peaceful minorities have the right to be free from discrimination or violent persecution? Do populations displaced by civil war or natural disasters have a right to resettle in new lands?

Do the poor have a right to health care? Or to food? Or to shelter?

If any of these rights exist, upon what normative foundations do they rest? What obligations might the nations of the world have that require them to safeguard or ensure such rights—within their own borders and beyond? Or are human rights mere social constructs that reflect the relative values and beliefs of specific cultures, religious traditions, nations, or social groups? And are global human rights frameworks merely attempts by powerful social groups or nations to impose their values and beliefs on others? If so, by what justification can marginalized social groups struggle to overcome oppression within the context of their own cultures, religious traditions, and nations? Do oppressed groups even have the right to struggle for change? If so, upon what normative foundation does this right rest?

Questions such as these are not merely academic. They are of profound practical concern. Billions of lives depend on how they

Reconciling Truth & Relativity

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are answered. Ultimately, the answers to such questions will depend on whether normative truths are “real” or not. Are some normative principles akin, in any way, to other principles that govern reality, such as the principles of physics? If so, might we learn to explore and apply such normative principles to the betterment of the human condition? Or are all normative truth claims merely relative to our subjective preferences, cultural values, or ideological predilections?

REALITY AS ENABLING AND CONSTRAINING PERCEPTIONS OF TRUTH As a first step in this inquiry, we need to consider what it means to perceive or “know” anything about “reality.” As the introductory chapter mentioned, epistemology is the branch of philosophy that explores this question. Associated with the field of epistemology has been a perennial tension over the basic question of whether we can ever know anything about foundational aspects of reality. Richard Rorty describes this as a tension between vertical and horizontal approaches to knowledge.10 Vertical approaches assume that through the right methods, human minds can come to know aspects of reality that exist independently of our mental and linguistic efforts to represent those aspects of reality. According to this approach, valid truth claims are envisioned, metaphorically, as having a vertical relationship with a foundational reality that underlies them. Viable bodies of knowledge are thus presumed to uncover the hidden workings of, and thus correspond to, basic features of existence.

Horizontal approaches to knowledge, on the other hand, assume that truth claims are nothing more than mental or linguistic constructs with no direct correspondence to foundational reality.

Internally coherent sets of truth claims are thus envisioned, metaphorically, as merely hanging together with each other in a horizontal manner, reflecting culturally and historically specific patterns of thought and language use. Such truth claims can serve practical, functional, or even ideological purposes, but they are always social constructs that have no grounding in a reality “out there” that is independent of human minds. Rather, such truth claims are considered “true” only insofar as they are consistent with a network of truth claims deemed viable within a particular tradition of inquiry.

End of this sample.

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