Alex Barlow

Safety Culture and Cadets: assessing cadet values relating to safety and the impact of teaching and learning strategies on those attitudes

Alex Barlow

Abstract

Safety culture has been a staple of safety literature for around a quarter of a century and soft skills are an often-undervalued aspect of a technical field such as the merchant navy. This report set out to establish the attitudes of merchant navy cadets towards safety culture and to examine the impact teaching safety culture would have on those attitudes.

The investigation reviewed a wide range of literature on safety culture and teaching, learning and assessment strategies. Data collection was completed in the form of a rating-scale survey and focus groups on selected students who would study one of two educational packages that taught about safety culture using different strategies. A follow-up focus group sought to identify any shifts resulting from the educational package.

Whilst the initial sample size is too small to draw widely applicable conclusions, it was clear that there was development in the attitudes of some participants. There was also a range of design improvements that would aid data collection for a wider-reaching data collection approach that would have the opportunity to gather more widely applicable findings.

Background

Maritime Education and Training (MET) programmes must cover many areas of competency prescribe by the International Maritime Organization (IMO, 2010); this includes how to participate in and manage operations safely. The UK’s merchant navy officer training programme prescribed by the Merchant Navy Training Board (MNTB, 2017) utilises a combination of Higher Education (HE) and industry placement to fast-track cadets into jobs as officers. Experienced seafarers can utilise their experience, in combination with HE to become officers.

Safety culture for those with managerial responsibilities, such as those that merchant navy cadets are preparing for, can benefit from an appreciation of the role of people within complex systems – understanding how and why people get things wrong (Reason, 1990). This can form a foundation for understanding how to shape the shipboard safety culture. Understanding the role of humans in complex systems can help us to learn better lessons from accidents and near misses (Dekker, 2017). Understanding how organisational drift (Beerman & Ackroyd, 2006) can corrode safety over time (Anand, 2017) can equip students to take measures to ask the difficult questions that may make the difference between success and failure.

With that in mind, this action-research project had the aim of evaluating the effectiveness of various teaching

strategies at developing safety culture related attitudes in UK-based merchant navy cadets during their higher education programmes.

Literature Review

Definition of Safety Culture

Safety culture has become an important part of the global safety and corporate lexicon, spanning multiple industries over the past half-century including high profile incidents such as the Piper Alpha disaster of 1986 (Cullen, 1990), the Herald of Free Enterprise sinking of 1987 (Sheen, 1987) and the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 (INSAG, 1992).

Turner et al. (1989, p. 4) define safety culture as “the set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices that are concerned with minimising the exposure of employees, managers, customers and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or injurious”.

It has also been defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 1991) as the “characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, [safety issues] receive the attention warranted by their significance”. The UK’s Health and Safety Executive use the following definition:

“The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety management.” (Gadd & Collins, 2002, p. 6)

The literature review identified a range of factors impacting safety culture, many of which relate to senior management’s role in creating and maintaining a safety culture (a theme also found in Greenstreet Berman’s report to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) on safety culture (Brook-Carter & Leach, 2006)). The key factors from these reviews that related to the behaviours of workers directly involved in safety critical activities were as follows:

• Working Safely • Taking work-related risks • Communication about safety • Reporting near misses and accidents

Definitions Relating to Teaching and Learning

The research objective is to examine the ‘effectiveness’ of different teaching and learning strategies. The determination of an effective strategy, therefore, would, logically, precede and inform the selection of contrasting strategies.

Effectiveness A range of criteria were considered for how to define effectiveness, including consideration of the views of Ofsted, the UK Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) and the PSRB for the cadet programmes, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA).

However, as the topic was targeting the affective domain, it was considered that the effectiveness would need to be measuring a shift in attitudes, not simply knowledge. To that end, however, Exley (2004), in her study

on high school students with dyslexia, needed to find a way to determine subjects’ preferred learning styles – something that is not a simple knowledge test. To determine the preferred learning style, the researcher utilised an assessment style where students self-assessed the applicability of certain statements to their use of learning strategies with statements such as ‘usually’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘never’.

Strategies Vygotsky (1978 cited in McLeod, 2019) proposed that during earlier stages of development, children learn best in the presence of a ‘more knowledgeable other’ (MKO). Vygotsky proposed that the MKO might model behaviours to be replicated or provide instructions that would be interpreted and acted upon; in other words, interaction with others is educationally beneficial. The concept of scaffolding relates to the extent to which an educational activity is led by the instructor (McLeod, 2019).

Scaffolded learning could be contrasted to discovery learning, which is often used as a catch-all phrase for approaches such as problem-based-learning (Ozdem-Yilmaz & Bilican, 2020). Although scaffolded learning and discovery learning can be contrasted, they are not mutually exclusive and are complementary concepts.

Methodology

Procedure

The procedure is discussed in detail below but the overarching procedure for data collection was as follows: 1. Select the sample for the study and divide them into two subgroups 2. Survey the students quantitatively on their attitudes towards safety-culture values 3. Conduct a focus group with each subgroup of students to gain a more detailed understanding of their attitudes towards safety coming into the study 4. Deliver each group one of two variances of a lesson on safety culture 5. Conduct a second focus group with each subgroup of students to try and measure any difference in attitudes towards safety culture

Sample Selection

With this being an action-research project taking place within the author’s employment context at B&FC, this necessarily influenced the sample selection, with there being a restricted pool of candidates being available from which to sample.

The sample was therefore purposively selected using the following criteria: 1. Students studying at B&FC on a merchant navy officer training programme (in order to limit it to trainees) and available to timetable within the period of the data collection window. 2. Cohort constituted primarily of students with sea experience (primarily, but not exclusively because many cohorts have exceptional-case students that needed to return without experience due to the impact of COVID-19) 3. Students in a cohort of at least six, in order to ensure a given cohort had enough students to be able to be divided into sub-cohorts for comparison. Sample Subdivision

It was decided to leave the selection of students to random selection (students were placed in alphabetical order on a spreadsheet and allocated a random number by Excel and then ordered by the random number). As the students were from the same broad discipline of marine engineering (some being Marine Engineering

cadets and some being Electrical and Electronics Engineering cadets), this was felt to be more representative of how a cohort’s formation in the real world – potentially mixed ability, or potentially high/low performing in comparison to purposively dividing the students into subgroups.

Teaching and Learning Strategies

For ease of reference, the two strategies will be referred to as tutor-centric and student-centric.

In order to try and keep as many parameters as possible between the two classes constant whilst still measuring something that could be useful to know, it was decided to use the same broad approach to the lesson. The key parameter that was varied was the extent of scaffolding and lecturer input. Consequences of this decision are discussed later in the report.

Case Study Both variances of the lesson were based around a case study. The rationale for centring both around the same case study was that it would provide all students with the same base context for their learning experience. The case study was a pared-down, renamed version of the accident report into the enclosed space incident on board the tanker Hallam. This case was selected, as it has aspects that relate to the key concepts of safety culture that are being considered and provides opportunity for discussion relating to those concepts.

Extent of Scaffolding As noted in the literature review, one variable that could be modified would be the extent to which a lesson is scaffolded (the extent to which the instructor structures the lesson to model, or otherwise dictate, the intended lesson). In the case of the students that are under consideration, as they were selected based on the stage of their training to have some initial education and industrial experience, it was reasonable to anticipate that they would have a reasonable amount of educational and, potentially, career experience. They were not, though, expected to be specialised in the subject of safety culture. As such, it was determined that in both variances, there should be a clear framework given to the students for their learning.

Tutor-Centric Variance In the tutor-centric variance, the MKO was the lecturer – the lesson was structured so that at each stage of the lesson, the students would be interacting with the lecturer. The students first suggested what comprises safety culture and the lecturer collated these ideas and guided the addition of other elements as required. The lecturer then grouped up the ideas into the key concepts identified in the literature review. The students were then given time to individually read the case study and highlight aspects of the case study that related to the key concepts. The lecturer then had specific questions relating to the key concepts that related back to specific parts of the case study that would focus the students’ learning and suggested what values were important. These questions were more scaffolded that the questions given to those following the studentcentric variance. Finally, students reflected on their learning by suggesting what things they could see themselves doing when they went on board to apply what they had learned.

Student-Centric Variance In the student-centric variance, the MKOs were the students-as-peers, where they could combine their different prior experiences and knowledge to grasp different aspects of safety culture and explore with more of a ‘discovery learning’ approach to the topic. In this model, the lecturer’s role was mostly in the planning and then checking that the students were getting on with the work and to be available to answer any questions if called upon.

The students were divided into small groups of three or four and given the case study and some general

questions to discuss. This meant that rather than being told what to think by the lecturer, they would, in theory, develop the ‘right’ answers for themselves, based on the evidence presented in the case study. They would then write a short reflection on their learning from the case study and discussion, culminating in actions they could take on board. The action points from these individual reflections were reported back to the lecturer.

Survey As a key element of the study was to establish the safety culture-related attitudes of the students, it the first element of data collection was to conduct a short electronic survey. This survey comprised fully of self-evaluation rating-scale questions that were divided into four categories, aligned to the four key concepts.

Entry Focus Group The first focus group was designed in a manner that tried to not subvert the aims of the lesson by directly discussing the key concepts of safety culture. Rather, they were more indirect and designed to be aligned to, but not directly identifying, the key concepts. This was similar in style to the survey.

Field Notes During Teaching It is inevitable that there may be useful observations to be made during the conduct of teaching, which may be relevant for interpreting results in other parts of the study. The author kept a note of personal observations during the deliveries, and these are mentioned during analysis of the outcome of the study, where appropriate. These notes are, by their nature subjective, but they can provide useful context.

Second Focus Group In the second focus group, students would already be familiar with the key concepts of safety culture, and the lines of questioning could be less coy about the key topic areas of interest. The questions covered the same topic areas but not in directly the same format as in the first focus group.

Findings

Survey Results

The survey questions were broken into four key areas and can be considered individually, in blocks and comparison to each other.

Working Safely Safety rules, as well as individual judgement were both rated highly as important for safety. What is interesting, however, is that the universal agreement becomes more uncertain in the question on their role of safety advocacy – nearly 25% of the cohort were ambivalent to negative as to their responsibility. This could be viewed in light of both their junior position in the hierarchy, but also the safety messages that pervade many companies that safety is everybody’s responsibility and that everybody looks out for everybody else.

The final question of the section related to the interaction between individual professionalism and rules. This one could be expected to be more in the centre as this is less of a standard question with a “right or wrong” answer. 61% felt that rules were the most important. This, again, could be a reflection the students being relatively entry level; it could alternatively, reflect the priority that the industry as-a-whole places on rules and procedures through instruments such as the ISM Code.

Figure 1 Survey results relating to working safely from full cohort studied

Work Related Risk

Students seem to be quite exposed to pressure to cut corners for safety, with around 54% of students have been encouraged by a peer to work faster at the expense of safety, compared to 39% who hadn’t. 31% said they had been pressured by a superior to prioritise expediency, versus 46% had not. That the pressure the students report experiencing, on the face of it, seems to come from peers, ties into a phenomenon described by Dekker (2017), wherein bureaucratisation of the workplace creates conditions where teams of workers are keen to demonstrate themselves to be more capable than their ‘rivals’ and so take steps that guarantee that dominance. There is also ambiguity as to who the cadets consider as their peers and they may not see the pressure coming from higher up in the organisation as they are not directly pressured, themselves. Students do mostly seem to have due scepticism about the sufficiency of PPE; only around 24% were confident PPE would save them regardless of their carelessness.

Figure 2 Survey results relating to Work Related Risk

Communication

Whilst students were of a single mind that safety was important during safety briefings and they could explain a technical safety procedure from memory, they were essentially split down the middle as to whether they talk about safety outside of an official ‘safety meeting’ context and whether they would be able to confidently state their company’s safety policy to a surveyor. These rating poorly suggest that communication is not valued highly by this group. With these being engineering students, this could tie into Kalauz’s (2015) previous findings that those in technical fields underestimate the value of ‘soft skills’.

Figure 3 Survey results relating to Communication

Reporting on Safety An interesting observation that can be made from the final section is that cadets seemingly felt more empowered to report safety incidents or near misses than when they project themselves into the shoes of their future, qualified selves. This could reflect the latter questions being a bit more forceful that they would report any incident. Even then, it is interesting to note that, although a marginal difference, the students seemed more worried about reporting incidents they were involved in, compared to those they observed. This suggests that they may have absorbed a culture where they are afraid of having an incident reflect badly upon themselves.

Figure 4 Survey results relating to Reporting

Focus Groups

In the entry focus groups, there was much more of a freedom for students to answer in any way they choose, so the themes of the conversations were identified and those themes are be discussion of the potential meaning of those themes with regard to safety culture. Given that all the attitudes expressed are, by nature, self-declared and not empirically observed, these views should be viewed with caution. They can serve as a useful indicator of how the students might behave or aim to behave, it does not reflect any actual observed behaviours. Data was collected by a recording that was subsequently reviewed and themes transcribed.

Working Safely The questions on the response to a relieving officer being drunk show a diversity of opinion between the two groups, Group 1 being primarily focused of the safety threat and a secondary concern that there might be some mitigation or reporting the situation potentially causing friction on board. Group 2 gravitated more to the notion that ‘mountains’ needn’t be made out of ‘molehills’ and that the most expedient way to deal with

the situation would be to quietly send the drunk officer away and cover the watch. Likewise, when put in the shoes of the cadet, Group 1 gravitated more towards calling out the ‘blind eye’ being turned by the OOW; whereas Group 2 shied away from raising any concerns, feeling it wasn’t their place to get involved.

In the second question, which may have felt more technically oriented, both groups felt that it was a false economy to rush work. The difference was more in the tone of that view than the content – in Group 1 when it was suggested that there could be workarounds to allow the unreasonable pace to continue, that was quickly shut-down and not reopened; Group 2 on the other hand, whilst very clear that rushing was a false economy, seemed less sure about whether they would raise the matter as they were concerned that, as junior team members, their perception may be wrong.

Group 1 then can be said to have shown a slightly stronger tendency to follow safety procedures and advocate others to do so, Group 2 acknowledged the procedures but also felt a need to contextualise that amongst other concerns.

Work Related Risk In question 3, both groups had due scepticism for how safe a ship is – recognising that you cannot eliminate all hazards and individual risk-taking behaviour could undermine an otherwise ‘safe’ system. Group 2, however, went slightly further and drew out that people can get too casual, and this can amplify risk-taking behaviours.

In question 4, however, the groups took the question in slightly different directions making direct comparison difficult though discussion was nuanced in both cases. However, the general sense from Group 2 was that there needed to be serious risk of harm, whereas the general sense from Group 1 was to frame the matter in terms of ‘what would the company safety manager think?’

In comparison to Group 1, Group 2 seemed to show a slightly higher awareness of the risks present in the workplace, but also a slightly higher threshold of tolerance for accepting that risk.

Communication There was a marked difference in attitude towards communication on safety matters between the two groups. In question 5, it was clear that Group 2 felt that safety communication from outside the ship should be filtered through senior officers on board and that there was a mistrust that shoreside management could have any useful impact on safety. They did, however, feel that senior officers had a strong role in setting the tone for safety on board (whether that was restating company policy or using their own professionalism). Group 1, on the other hand, seemed to have a much more positive experience of managerial communication on safety matters, favourable recounting a variety of formal approaches to safety, including daily safety case studies, fleet safety-circulars and an open culture for discussing safety.

The groups were more aligned in question 6, agreeing that formal messaging may set the tone, but it is often the informal conversations about those messages that drive the point home – a discussion may start in a briefing, but then carry on informally. Informal conversations might also be the forum where uncertainties could be clarified. Group 1 did, however, have some concern that raising a safety concern informally could be seen as an attack, if the person took it the wrong way. Group 2 identified, favourably, that when the rule doesn’t fit the circumstance, it is the informal conversations about safety that give a positive outcome the best chance.

Reporting Group 1 generally put across the idea that incidents should be reported if they had caused serious harm or if they had preventative merit for other people or ships in the fleet. Group 1 felt this, despite some having

experiences that conflicted directly with this – one student reporting having been told ‘if you hurt yourself, don’t tell anyone’, when they joined a ship. Group 2 on the other hand felt that it should be reserved for the most serious incidents, such as fatalities.

As for barriers to reporting, both groups agreed that the concern of reputation harm for themselves, their colleagues and their ship/company would be a barrier to reporting, as well as interpersonal conflict on board if they were seen to have reported something too minor.

Lecturer’s Observations from Teaching

The students appeared to engage well across the board – some were more willing to jump in with questions and to appear on camera, but that has shown itself as a norm with online learning as much as with face-toface learning.

One observation with the students taught was that the author’s assumptions about what would constitute a base level of knowledge about what would constitute a safety culture and what was done on board to address those matters was perhaps overly optimistic.

Reflecting on the process of teaching the two lessons, the author noted that, in his experience, the more scaffolded lesson was slightly easier to design as the exploration of topics could be staged out better. The author also felt the more scaffolded lecturer was more engaging to teach – but was also mindful that this observation is probably reflective of it positioning the lecturer as the conduit and that, whilst that made him more aware of everything that was going on in the lesson, that didn’t mean that this would be the case for the students, and that in having to self-organise the task completion in the less scaffolded lesson (and not knowing the extent to which they would be questioned on what they had worked on), the students needed to centralise and organise the learning for themselves.

Exit Focus Group

The level of engagement with the second focus group was very poor in comparison to the first group. This is likely due to two main issues: first was scheduling – the session had to be scheduled on the afternoon after the students had a four hour online exam in the morning, in the middle of a heatwave.

The second issue was that, given the fairly short nature of the intervention and the short interval between focus groups and the intervention, the second focus group up to perhaps feeling repetitive and students may have been trying to not sound like they were just restating things they’d already said in the lesson or previous focus group.

The responses, such as we given can be compared to the first literature review thus:

Working Safely Group 1 remained strong advocates of the role rules play in safety. Group 2 advanced from being relatively dismissive of the role of rules to seeing them as a framework from which safety could be built, rather than something to be acknowledged but worked around. Both groups converged on feeling that it would be a good idea to check with a superior how much latitude was available to take a flexible approach to rules.

Work Related Risk Group 1 didn’t seem to exhibit much of a shift in their attitudes towards work-related risk. Group 2 on the other hand made a small shifted towards exercising critical judgement on work-related risk and not simply deferring to authority.

Communication As with previous two categories, Group 1 did not exhibit a marked shift in their answers related to communication. Group 2, on the other hand seemed to have developed a noticeably more positive attitude towards the role that ‘formal’ communications from the company on safety matters could have to play. Formerly, they had seen such communications as probably-irrelevant and a waste of time, being issued by people who didn’t understand the real job onboard; now, they saw this communication as setting the tone for safety and an important building block for such communication to take place more widely.

Reporting Neither group showed a marked shift in their attitudes towards reporting accidents and near misses - both groups continued to see it as something exceptional that was not really desirable but, reluctantly, necessary.

Conclusions

There are two main questions that this study set out to answer: 1. What are the attitudes of merchant navy cadets relating to safety culture? 2. What is the effectiveness of the teaching and learning strategies and are any strategies more effective than others?

With regard to the first of these questions, what can be seen is that there seems to be a very clear appreciation, at least on paper, of the importance of rules and procedures, alongside individual professionalism, although some did not show a tendency to want to apply ‘managerial’ rules.

There was likewise a range of attitudes towards work-related risk, but there was a general sense of confidence that they would only take on work they understood and would push back if they were instructed to do something they felt was dangerous.

With communication, the students showed a clear interest in talking about safety – for some the impression is that it might not come naturally, but they could see the value of discussing safety outside of safety briefings.

What the students did not rate so highly on was the benefits of reporting an incident. The general sense from the students was that they didn’t really see the value of reporting, even if they saw the value in reviewing the product of others’ reports.

With regard to the second aspect, the lecturers’ observations were that there seemed to be clear evidence of learning taking place, evidenced through the ‘lessons learned’ that both cohorts exhibited. There were also some notable shifts in Group 2 (who were exposed to the less scaffolded, student centric lesson), in that they seemed to become more attuned to certain aspects of safety culture and seemed more open to some of the behaviours that would be markers of safety culture. Group 1 did not especially advance against these markers but, seemed to be starting from a starting point that was further along the scale to begin with.

As has been alluded to already, however, flaws in the design of the study (the use of two focus groups not turning out to be the right way to acquire the data) limited the ability to fully and objectively address the second of those questions. What has been acquired, though, is the data on what was wrong with the design of the study so that recommendations can be made for further data collection in the future to more effectively answer the second question.

Likewise, since there was only one cohort studying each lesson, it is too soon to extrapolate to a broader

population with a high degree of confidence. However, both cohorts exhibited good engagement with each set of learning materials and Group 2 especially seemed to progress their attitudes after being made to work in the less scaffolded context, but more sampling with other cohorts would be necessary to take forward any actions from those observations.

Recommendations

With only one set of samples for comparison, it is too early to recommend using one strategy over the other. However, both strategies seem to have been, at least to a limited extent, effective so either could be used in the meantime.

In the focus groups, it was identified that the value of incident reporting is not highly rated by the students, even though it has been shown to be a good indicator of safety culture. There were also a range of attitudes experienced by the cadets on board regarding safety. There would be value in extending the study to other cohorts to get a broader picture of what prevailing attitudes towards safety cadets are exposed to during their placements, without reference to any placement provider so there is no sense of conflict of interest.

Methodological Improvements Recommended

Second Survey The first recommendation is to use surveys both before and after the study. The first survey highlighted some areas that students scored lower in, such as willingness to take work related risks. A second written survey could provide some interesting quantification of change in attitude resulting from the learning. This could be in the form of some suggested actions they might take on board that are similar in topic to the first questions, but more phrased in a more forward-looking, future tense format, compared to the more present-tense form used for the entry survey.

Having an exit survey would also be an opportunity for students to write down some of their learning and aspirations – the focus group data collection appeared to form part of their learning process (as discussed in the next paragraph), so having the written survey would give the students the opportunity build on the reflective elements of the lesson and would probably give a clearer impression of their proposed actions than the focus group.

Exit Focus Group The second recommendation is to remove the second focus group – given that the intervention was quite short, the amount of time in focus groups ended up being about the same duration as was spent (officially) learning. The students seemed to have run out of things to say about the topic by the time they attended the second focus group.

Learning Tool Design Aside from the data collection tools, the other methodological challenge presented was the aspect of pedagogy varied in the experiment. With the activities being broadly similar, but the degree of scaffolding and lecturer guidance being the main thing varied, it was difficult, given the less-than-enthusiastic second focus group, to have a clear picture of the difference between the two options.

One way to address this would be for the proposed exit survey to include some knowledge-retention questions. Whilst, as was stated in the methodology section of this report, the point of the learning was to shift attitudes and behaviours, as was noted in the author’s field notes, the foundational level of knowledge did not seem to be as high as anticipated, and so establishing the level of knowledge on the topic would

potentially be beneficial for understanding the effectiveness of the learning alongside their inclination towards action.

Selection Whilst, originally, it was decided to only select cohorts that could be subdivided for ‘internal’ comparison, based on the experience from conducting the survey, it seems that it would not be detrimental to increase the sample size by selecting smaller cohorts and picking one or other teaching style, provided that across the whole study, the number of cohorts studying with each lesson type was kept roughly equal. This, combined with enhanced surveys, would give a better chance of collecting sufficient data to make statistically significant conclusions.

Summary of Recommendations 1. Further survey the experiences of cadets with sea experience as part of understanding their attitudes towards safety 2. Quantify extent of seagoing experience 3. Quantify age of candidates 4. Sample further cohorts with revised form of the study a. Include smaller cohorts without subdivision b. Remove exit focus group c. Introduce exit survey d. Include knowledge-based questions in exit survey

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