After UniTeam: A new opposition?

THE past week or two were particularly eventful for the Marcos-Duterte UniTeam axis.

Former President Rodrigo Duterte, who once again skipped his successor’s most important annual speech, dropped by Malacañang.

Far from a low-key meeting, a full ensemble of Duterte administration stalwarts were also in attendance, especially those who had accompanied the former president during a controversial trip to China.

True to his conflict-averse nature, President Marcos constantly played nice, dismissing any suggestion of schism or policy divisions with the former president. “As long as there will be someone who can help. I am sure that he will be able to tell us what happened during their conversation and see how that affects us,” Mr. Marcos said of his predecessor’s surprise visit to Beijing, which was apparently not coordinated with the Department of Foreign Affairs at all.

Mr. Marcos generously portrayed Duterte’s latest antics as a constructive form of backdoor diplomacy. He was fully attentive and seemingly deferential during his meeting with Duterte. Duterte reportedly “gave some good pieces of advice to President Marcos.” No details of the conversation were provided, but it’s easy to guess its core content: the former president, a most “special friend” of China, asking his successor to reconsider the expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (Edca) with the United States. The Duterte-Marcos meeting came not long after Vice President Sara Duterte was seen arm in arm with Speaker Martin Romualdez, both with beaming smiles, as they sent off Mr. Marcos to yet another foreign trip. The intended message of the abovementioned events is crystal clear. But upon closer examination, the Marcos administration has some fundamental policy differences with the Dutertes, most notably on the foreign policy front.

As Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro made it clear not long after the Marcos-Duterte meeting in Malacañang: “Edca, first and foremost, is Philippine base. … [I]t is our business what we do here just as long as it is for Philippine interest, and here, the United States and we converge in our intended use for this, and it is not any other countries’ business to question what we do here.”

Differences over foreign policy are just the tip of the iceberg, with Mr. Marcos also striking a different tone on a whole host of domestic issues that stood at the heart of the Dutertismo project. And this, dear reader, brings us to the topic of the opposition.

By all indications, the solidity of the UniTeam is directly proportional to the solidity of the opposition. But with the opposition in a relative state of hibernation, thus failing to pose any real danger to the status quo, factionalism has become the inevitable dynamic within the ruling coalition.

In fact, the opposition— both functionally and ideologically—has now been divided into three main groups. There is, of course, the “Never Marcos” camp, which has been busy highlighting all the obvious shortcomings and vulnerabilities of the incumbent, while conveniently overlooking the true roots of its own weaknesses and political marginalization.

And then, there is the “Never Duterte” camp, which has warmly welcomed Mr. Marcos’ sensible policy recalibrations, most notably the end of populist attacks on big businesses, the end of slavish kowtowing to the bully in the West Philippine Sea, and the drawdown of the violent drug war. Many members of this camp have either joined the administration as appointees/ advisers or serve as its

(unwitting) impresarios. Their ultimate goal is preventing the return of the Dutertes to Malacañang, and they see fiery Sen. Rafael “Raffy” Tulfo as a potential rallying point for the 2028 elections. There is a third camp, however. Slowly, but surely, a new opposition camp is crystalizing around a whole host of energetic and progressive leaders, especially at the local government level. Instead of partisanship, or obsession with virtue signaling or electoral appeal, the new opposition is drawing inspiration from the good governance track record of classically centrist political leaders such as Baguio City Mayor Benjamin Magalong.

In fact, the star leader from the country’s summer capital is set to launch a “mayors for good governance” movement later this month in tandem with Quezon City Mayor Josefina

The dangers of being nice

THE China Coast Guard attacked a Philippine Coast Guard vessel via water cannon on Saturday, August 5 within the Philippine exclusive economic zone, the latest in a string of provocations and aggressions. How did we get to this point in our diplomatic relations?

As always, I aim to provide a psychological or behavioral lens to national issues as my fellow columnists who are experts in law, political science, and diplomacy will do a much better job dissecting these aspects. What did strike me with this development is that, sadly, this is no longer surprising and somewhat to be expected given that we have been in the business of acquiescing to China ever since the previous administration.

We had the prime and historic opportunity when the arbitral ruling awarded in our favor over our maritime disputes against China (incidentally, we just celebrated the anniversary of this ruling on July 12). However, our executive government, at that time, had not made any steps toward enforcement of this ruling and had even assured China that they will not enforce this ruling. This started a particularly troubling dynamic with our aggressor that ultimately led them to double down on their claims in 2023. There is a rudimentary concept in psychology called the “foot-in-the-door” phenomenon. It describes how initially agreeing to small favors lead to agreeing to bigger favors, even if it is against one’s own interests. This is a classic strategy in sales and persuasion. One first asks for a favor so small and convenient that the person would have a hard time justifying a “no.” For example, asking for P5 would rarely garner a negative reaction. At this point, you already have your “foot” in the “door.” Then you could proceed to ask for bigger amounts. Perhaps another P10. Then a P20. Then P100. Then P500. According to this phenomenon, you are more likely to be successful at ultimately receiving P500 this way rather than asking for P500 outright. It is important to note that there is also a complementary strategy called “door-in-the-face” where you start with an outrageous ask (let’s say asking for P5,000) then negotiating down to P500, even though this was the amount you originally intended to ask for in the first place.

What has this got to do with diplomatic relations?

Diplomatic relations are all about negotiation. As such, tactics of persuasion are central. By acquiescing to small asks and favors that go against our national interests, we are setting ourselves up to being taken advantage of in bigger ways.

A big part of why such tactics work, in a way, is our value of wanting to be nice. As the Sondheim musical goes, “you’re not good, you’re not bad, you’re just nice.” By wanting to play nice with China, we have put our coast guards and fishermen at risk, a really bad thing to do. People often mistake niceness for either kindness or goodness but that is not the case. Niceness mostly concerns itself with being pleasant and not wishing to offend. The danger of this value is that sometimes we privilege not wanting to offend so much that we allow injustices to prevail. We avoid confrontation even when it’s necessary because we want to play nice. Niceness has its merits, but it should also have its limits. Niceness at the expense of protecting human and sovereign rights is unjust.

Niceness is also not kindness.

Kindness is not concerned with how others react to us but has a more intrinsic motivation. At its core, it is wanting to do something good for others. True kindness does not seek an audience and mostly prefer to be invisible. We don’t have to be petty or solely selfish in our diplomatic negotiations. We can choose to be kind through the willingness to negotiate. Merely giving in, however, for fear of offending the other party is not kindness but just kowtowing.

Niceness is fundamentally different from goodness. There are many ways to understand and practice goodness. In diplomatic relations, we have to prioritize the good of our people. We also have to prioritize the good of

“Joy” Belmonte and dozens of other progressive leaders. Should the three camps form an umbrella coalition in coming years, they will be a force to reckon with. (Inquirer.net) * * * The opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints of the Asian Journal, its management, editorial board and staff.

* * * rheydarian@inquirer.com.ph vulnerable groups and sectors, who need the protection of government. The ideal—but harder—path is where the solution is for the good of all. This is where niceness can jeopardize our goodness because niceness tends to prefer avoidance of unpleasant things, which usually steer us toward short-term solutions and sacrificing leverage in the long run.

Filipinos are known for being nice and hospitable. Yet we should not do that at the expense of our own interests. Being good and kind sometimes require taking firm—and unpleasant—stands for the welfare of our country. (Inquirer.net)

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The opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints of the Asian Journal, its management, editorial board and staff.

* * * aatuazon@up.edu.ph