Filipino patience running out over China’s latest incursion

their concern in light of this inyour-face kind of aggression and intimidation being demonstrated by China, among them the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark, calling out China for its dangerous and provocative actions.

Canada described China’s actions as “coercive” and a “violation of international law and contrary to the maintenance of regional peace and stability, and the rules-based international order,” while both Germany and Denmark also called on China to abide by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 Arbitral Award by the Permanent Court of Arbitration which is “legal and binding.”

A friend from the diplomatic corps told me that China’s actions are “getting more and more unconscionable and provocative,” even preposterously accusing the U.S. of orchestrating the arbitral case. Absolutely not true – it was China’s aggression that precipitated our decision to file the case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration that invalidated China’s expansive maritime claims, including its ridiculous nine-dash-line with absolutely no basis whatsoever in international law.

Filipinos were extremely pleased when President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. summoned the Chinese ambassador over this latest incident involving a Chinese Coast Guard vessel. From what I am told, the President was cordial, but at the same time was very firm and clear in expressing his serious concern over the “increasing frequency of action by China against the Philippine Coast Guard and Filipino fishermen in their bancas.”

Filipino fishermen have long been suffering from the intimidation and restrictive actions employed by Chinese vessels which are depriving them of their livelihood, with reports that they were being threatened or their fishing gear confiscated. Numerous protests have also been filed over the illegal fishing activities of Chinese vessels in disputed territories in the South China Sea, with other claimant nations like Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia complaining about Chinese fishing fleets encroaching on their maritime territories.

In fact, there are calls for the European Union to impose sanctions on Chinese fishing vessels over alleged illegal fishing activities. An independent study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) last December on the “Role and impact of China on world fisheries and aquaculture” showed that the large number of Chinese distant water fleets that go dark by using techniques like turning off their identification system, increase the possibility of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing infractions.

According to the study, “One of the most important environmental consequences of the Chinese fishing fleet on the EU’s distantwater fishing activities is the depletion of fisheries stocks, which is associated with environmental degradation and results in reduced resource availability for all actors involved.”

During the visit of U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris to the fishing community of Tagburos in Palawan last November, she spoke about the risk that fishing communities face “when foreign vessels enter Philippine waters and illegally deplete the fishing stock; when they harass and intimidate local fishers; when they pollute the ocean and destroy the marine ecosystem.” If one can recall, over 200 Chinese fishing vessels were seen at Julian Felipe Reef (Whitsun Reef) in March 2021 with reports that they have been anchored in the area since December 2020, raising fears of “possible overfishing and destruction of the marine environment, as well as risks to safety of navigation” in the West Philippine Sea.

Given these numerous incidents in the past, no one can really blame Filipinos for the continued and increasing anger at and distrust of China. This latest incident has also prompted many enlightened legislators to consider working together with other countries aside from the United States to maintain maritime peace and security in the region.

Certainly, we cannot and must not “drop the ball” on this one like what happened in 2012 when we “lost” the Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal.

I have often said – Filipinos are a patient people, and while everybody wants a peaceful resolution to all these incidents that have been repeatedly happening over the years, it is clear to all of us that “what is ours is ours,” period. We are not claiming anything outside of what is clearly within our territorial waters. As President Marcos had said: “We have no conflict with China; the issue we have is that China is claiming territory that belongs to us.” (Philstar.com) * * * The opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints of the Asian Journal, its management, editorial board and staff.

* * * babeseyeview@gmail.com

Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy: A quiet revolution?

host of traditional allies.

ONLY Nixon could go to China!” There goes one of the most famous proverbs in highstakes geopolitics, which, quite ironically, can be traced back to Hollywood, namely the 1991 film “Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country.” The logic behind the supposed “old Vulcan proverb” is pretty straightforward: Any unexpected foreign policy turnabout is most feasible under leaders with robust domestic standing.

As a relatively hawkish Republican, U.S. President Richard Nixon’s outreach toward Maoist China in the early 1970s was less vulnerable to domestic criticism than, say, by a more dovish Democratic counterpart, who would have easily been accused of “appeasement.” In many ways, a similar dynamic is shaping the ongoing transformation in Philippine foreign policy under President Marcos Jr., yet with opposite implications for China.

To be clear, I fervently believe that a Leni Robredo or, say, Panfilo Lacson administration would have certainly taken a patriotic and strategic approach to China.

Yet, one can’t deny that Mr. Marcos is overseeing a seemingly seamless transformation in our foreign policy by discarding his predecessor’s pro-China antics in favor of a more assertive stance in the West Philippine Sea as well as more robust defense cooperation with traditional allies.

And given Mr. Marcos’ large electoral mandate, high approval ratings, and the relegation of the House of Duterte to a “junior partner” status, the dramatic shift in our foreign policy is likely more sustainable and real than many Marcos critics acknowledge. Not long ago, many confidently predicted that the current president would end up consolidating the pro-Beijing direction of Rodrigo Duterte. For instance, one reputable international news outlet published an op-ed piece entitled, “Bongbong Marcos will move the Philippines closer to China” shortly before Mr. Marcos’ expected election victory. Over the succeeding months, a whole host of news agencies and experts speculated on how China would supposedly benefit from a fully acquiescent Philippines under a Marcos-Duterte regime. In fairness, one can’t blame these observers for jumping to conclusions, since Mr. Marcos himself repeatedly backed Duterte’s China policy throughout the 2022 presidential elections. But just as I questioned the

“debt trap” thesis in the past, correctly predicting that there won’t be much of Chinese infrastructure investments in the Philippines, to begin with (See, for instance, “Duterte’s Chinese Chimera,” 4/16/18), I also penned a whole series of articles last year, which (correctly) predicted a potential major policy shift under Mr. Marcos.

In fact, shortly before his assumption of power, I penned a piece for another publication, where I forecasted “Marcos Jr. will likely adopt calibrated assertiveness towards China while welcoming pragmatic cooperation on the economic front.” By early October, I forecasted an expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (Edca) deal, which would give the Pentagon access to a whole host of bases close to Taiwan’s southern shores in another article.

To be clear, this piece is not about flaunting one’s scientific “predictive” capacity, but rather about the art of scenariobuilding. As I argued in a piece in early-2022, three factors would shape a Marcos Jr. presidency: “(i) margin of victory and, accordingly, a potentially newfound sense of personal destiny, (ii) factional politics and personalistic jostling within the ruling regime, and (iii) external pressure/encouragement from international partners, especially Washington and Beijing…” (“Marcos Jr. presidency: Three possible scenarios,” 3/22/22).

Mr. Marcos not only secured an empathic electoral victory, but he is also atop a dominant coalition, which has broadly marginalized pro-China players.

Meanwhile, Mr. Marcos has been actively courted not only by Washington, but also by Tokyo, London, Brussels, and a whole

Meanwhile, Mr. Marcos’ trip to Beijing last month produced zero breakthroughs on either the West Philippine Sea disputes or a whole host of unfulfilled infrastructure investment projects. Like many experts, Beijing (incorrectly) viewed Mr. Marcos as Duterte’s strategic clone.

Barely a year into office, a self-assured Mr. Marcos has revitalized defense relations with Western powers while standing up to bullying by Eastern powers. In a bizarre twist of events, it took a Marcos to correct Duterte’s foreign policy excesses sans any major backlash at home.

* * * The opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints of the Asian Journal, its management, editorial board and staff.

* * * rheydarian@inquirer.com.ph