Understanding the Context: e Military Coup

The Tatmadaw deceived the world in the 2010 general election, telling the world that Myanmar was transitioning into a democratic governance. The Tatmadaw-backed political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), won the most seats in the parliament through electoral fraud, and, the military general Thein Sein became president. Despite the electoral dispute, the international community nevertheless perceived the Tatmadaw-controlled election result as an initial step toward a transition to democracy. For example, US President Barack Obama welcomed Myanmar President Thein Sein to the White House in 2013, and the meeting marked the frst visit to the White House from a high ranking Myanmar ofcial in ffty years.4 The United States and the European Union eased many economic sanctions imposed during the military dictatorships as a supportive reaction to the Tatmadaw’s political transforming program.5 Foreign investment, development aids, and humanitarian aids fooded into the country to support the eforts toward democracy. The international community had been a good neighbor to Myanmar by helping the country’s economic and democratic development. Nevertheless, the international community underestimated the Tatmadaw’s greed for power.

The 2008 constitution and the USDP party are the two hands of Tatmadaw that sustain its frm control in politics. The 2008 constitution made by Tatmadaw has sustained the Tatmadaw’s military power. The constitution grants the Tatmadaw power to control the legislative and governmental bodies. For instance, the Tatmadaw occupies 25% of the seats in the two houses of parliament without an election and directly appoints the vice president and the ministers of defense, home afairs, and borders.6 Additionally, the constitution gives the commander-in-chief the authority to suspend parliament and acquire the state’s power in a national emergency.7 Thus, the “disciplined democracy” introduced by the Tatmadaw in 2010 is instead a political system that allows the Tatmadaw to maneuver its military power in the government.

4 Megan Slack, “President Obama Meets with President Thein Sein of Myanmar,” The White House, March 20, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ blog/2013/05/20/president-obama-meets-president-thein-sein-myanmar.

5 British Broadcasting Cooperation, “Reforms in Myanmar,” BBC, July 8, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16546688.

The USDP party is the shadow political institution of the Tatmadaw. It is common knowledge for the people of Myanmar that the Tatmadaw sustains its power in politics through the USDP party, mainly in the executive and legislative branches. However, after the 2010 general election, the USDP party has never defeated Aung San Suu Kyi and National League for Democracy (NLD) in electoral contests. The Suu Kyi-led NLD party won a majority seats out of 1,117 seats, while the USDP attained 115 seats in 2015 and 71 seats in the 2020 elections.8 The Tatmadaw took the Suu Kyi-led NLD party as a threat to its political power when the USDP party lost in two sequential elections. The Tatmadaw’s concern over their increasingly dwindling power compelled them to initiate a coup.

The Tatmadaw leader, Min Aung Hlaing snatched the state’s sovereignty from the legitimately elected government on February 1, 2021.9 The coup was carried out by arresting President U Myint Win, Suu Kyi, government ministers, NLD

6 Marwaan Macan Markar, “Myanmar: Is the Age of Military Juntas Over?” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 47, No. 18 (May 5, 2012), 16.

7 Markar, “Myanmar: Is the Age of Military Juntas Over?” 16.

8 Robert H. Taylor, “Myanmar in 2020: Aung San Suu Kyi Once More Triumphant,” Yusof Ishak Institute, Southeast Asian Afairs, (2021), 211.

9 Russel Goldman, “Myanmar’s Coup Explained,” The New York Time, February 1, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html leaders, and other anti-military politicians.10 The Tatmadaw has repeatedly justifed the coup by indicating that the November 2020 electoral fraud required them to step in to protect the people’s will and ensure a free and fair election.11

The Tatmadaw’s power refers to the strength of the Tatmadaw institution, its dominance in politics, its monopoly in economics, and its infuence in social structures. These four elements are the primary sources of the Tatmadaw’s military power. Each element is tightly interconnected like a spider’s web. Through the correlation of these elements, the Tatmadaw strengthens and sustains its military power.

General Aung San, the father of Suu Kyi, founded the Anti-British Burma Independence Army in 1942.12 One year later, in 1943, the Army was renamed the Burma National Army. In 1945, the Burma National Army fought against Japanese troops and helped liberate lower Burma from British colonists.13 After gaining independence, the Burma National Army, known as the Tatmadaw, reformed its institution as a Burmese ethnocentric army by eliminating non-Burmese ethnicities from high-ranking positions and deterring nonBurmese ethnicities and non-Buddhist military personnel from attaining leadership positions in the army. Another reform is its constant development of the military strength by upgrading their technology, equipment, combat skills, and size.

10 Ibid.

11 Iselin Frydenlund, Pum Za Mang, Phyo Wai, and Susan Hayward, “Religious Responses to the Military Coup in Myanmar,” The Review of Faith and International Afairs, Vol.19, no.3 (August 31, 2021), 78.

12 David I. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University, 2013), 38.

13 Ibid, 39.

Irrawaddy reporter Zaw Tu Seng estimates that the Tatmadaw currently has 350,000 military personnel.14 The size of the military members and their advanced military equipment, which surpasses ethnic armed-resistance groups, establishes the Tatmadaw as the most powerful armed institution in the country. Without external intervention, the growing military power has permeated politics, economics, and a society.

The coup was an entry point for the Tatmadaw to establish its military power in politics. Over the course of the last sixty-two years, Myanmar has experienced military coups four times, in 1958, 1962, 1990, and 2021. Mon Mon Myat is right in saying that Myanmar was mostly under authoritarian rule after the independence.15 When the Tatmadaw seized the country’s sovereignty, it took absolute control over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The Tatmadaw’s authoritative attitudes also refect the Burmese monarchy. Myat quotes Myanmar scholar Maung Maung Gyi in arguing that the Tatmadaw’s administrative practices were similar to the Burmese monarchal system in regards to arbitrary actions, the monopoly of power, and the use of violence.16 Although it appears as though the military leaders retain their power from the authoritative system, their power is intertwined and sustained through the sayar-tabae, which is similar in nature

14 Zaw Tu Seng, “Myanmar Military’s Superior Size Means Less When the People Are United Against it,” The Irrawaddy, August 20, 2021, https://www.irrawaddy. com/opinion/myanmar-militarys-superior-size-means-less-when-the-peopleare-united-against-it.html.

15 Mon Mon Myat, “Buddhist Morality in Myanmar: Religious Nationalism and Solidarity after the Coup,” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Afairs, March 15, 2021, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/buddhistmorality-in-myanmar-religious-nationalism-and-solidarity-after-the-coup.

16 Myat, “Buddhist Morality in Myanmar: Religious Nationalism and Solidarity after the Coup,” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Afairs, March 15, 2021, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/buddhist-morality-inmyanmar-religious-nationalism-and-solidarity-after-the-coup.

144 | Hkun Ja to patron-client relationships.17 In the context of the Tatmadaw hierarchy, the Burmese term sayar refers to a senior or highranking ofcer, while tabae refers to a junior or low-ranking staf.18 Through the sayar-tabae relationship, the military leaders sustain their infuence inside the military, and, the sayar-tabae relationship becomes a signifcant factor for validating its usurped power and sustaining it in politics.

The Tatmadaw abuses its political power to infuence economic policies that exclusively beneft the Tatmadaw institution and its inner circles. The Tatmadaw’s economic dominance in state industries became apparent after the 1988 coup. After the coup, unlike the coup in 1958 and 1962, the Tatmadaw privatized all of the industries of the states, abandoned socialist economic practices, and adopted a market economy. The Tatmadaw introduced foreign investment laws that protected foreign investors and invited foreign frms to explore oil, gas, and other natural resources.19 However, all foreign investment and cooperation were directed exclusively to the Tatmadaw-owned frms. Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) are two giant Tatmadaw-owned corporations that monopolize the state’s industries.20 Several sub-companies, in industries such as mining, banking, commodities, food supplies, electronic products, construction, logistics, cosmetics, entertainment, and service sectors, operate under the MEHL and MEC. Based on the fnding of Amnesty International, the Aljazeera news agency disclosed that the MEHL gave $18 billion US Dollar annually to the Tatmadaw. 21 According to Vithal Rajan, the Tatmadaw received about $2 billion US dollars from gas and oil sales to Thailand.22 Additionally, the Global Witness report claimed that the Tatmadaw profted $180 million US dollars in 2014 and $100 million US dollars in 2013 from selling jade.23

17 Win Win, “Looking Inside the Burmese Military,” Asian Survey, Vol.48, no.6 (November/December, 2008), 1020.

18 Win Win, “Looking Inside the Burmese Military,” 1,020.

19 Steinberg, Burma/ Myanmar, 86–87.

20 Joshua Cheetham, “Myanmar coup: The shadowy business empire funding Tatmadaw,” BBC News, March 9, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-56133766.

Although some income sources and the amount of the Tatmadaw’s income are known, it is hard to trace the exact amount of net income of Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw’s fnancial support comes from the state budget and its business frms, the MEHL and MEC. The state budget for the Tatmadaw has been disclosed to the public since 2012. The study on the Tatmadaw’s expenditure from 2012–2019 indicates that its spending amounts to 14% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).24 The government’s expenditure on education and on health is 1.5% and 0.5% respectively of the GDP.25 Major-General Myint Nwe, a deputy minister of defense, requested approval from parliament for a $2.22 billion military budget for the 2019–2020 fscal year.26 The military budgets before 2010 were even larger than recent ones. For example, the Tatmadaw spent $32 billion in 2005 and another $32 billion in 2004.27 The Tatmadaw’s expenditure has always taken an immense amount of the country’s total budget since its establishment.

21 Aljazeera, “Myanmar military gets billions from proftable business: Amnesty,” Aljazeera, September 20, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/10/ myanmar-military-gets-billions-from-proftable-business-amnesty.

22 Vithal Rajan, “Oil, Guns, and Rubies: A Burmese Tragedy,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 47 (November 24–30, 2007), 10.

23 Global Witness, Jade: Myanmar’s Big State Secret (London: Global Witness, 2015), 11.

24 Nan Lwin, “Myanmar Military Proposes Larger Budget for ‘Stronger’ Armed Forces,” The Irrawaddy, July 22, 2019, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/ myanmar-military-proposes-larger-budget-for-stronger-armed-forces.html.

25 Steinberg, Burma/ Myanmar, 97.

26 Nan Lwin, “Myanmar Military Proposes Larger Budget for ‘Stronger’ Armed Forces,” The Irrawaddy, July 22, 2019, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/ myanmar-military-proposes-larger-budget-for-stronger-armed-forces.html.

27 “World Bank Group Data,” Military Expenditure (current USD)- Myanmar, accessed December 7, 2021, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.

The MEHL and MEC have never revealed how much they funded the Tatmadaw. However, local and international news agencies estimate that the MEHL and MEC cooperations are the main stream of wealth for Tatmadaw. 28 The military leaders and personnel are all economically connected to the MEHL and MEC. Although the economic benefts may vary according to the military ranks, the truth is that the benefts go mostly to military families. The MEHL and MEC either give or sell their shares exclusively to military family members. Thus, most shareholders of the MEHL and MEC are military personnel. Further, Amnesty International’s fndings reveal that “MEHL is owned by 381,636 individual shareholders, who are all serving or retired military personnel, and 1,803 institutional shareholders, consisting of regional commands, divisions, battalions, troops, war veteran associations.29 Apparently, the senior ofcers receive more benefts. Min Aung Hlaing, the military coup leader, received a high percentage from the net profts of the business projects that collaborate with the MEHL and MEC.30 The leaked information also suggests that the Tatmadaw uses the MEHL and MEC shares as a mechanism for reward and punishment. Amnesty International found in their study that thirty-fve names of the military personnel were erased from the shareholder lists of the business frms as a punishment.31

XPND.CD?locations=MM.

28 Matt Davis and Anne Worthington, “Uncovering the shadowy business empire bankrolling Myanmar’s military generals,” American Broadcasting Company, July 28, 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-29/the-shadowy-business-empirepropping-up-myanmar-military-junta/100328162.

29 Aljazeera, “Myanmar military gets billions from proftable business: Amnesty,” Aljazeera, September 20, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/10/ myanmar-military-gets-billions-from-proftable-business-amnesty.

30 Justice for Myanmar, “Who Proft from a Coup? The Power and Greed of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing,” Justice for Myanmar, January 30, 2021, https://www. justiceformyanmar.org/stories/who-profts-from-a-coup-the-power-and-greedof-senior-general-min-aung-hlaing.

The Tatmadaw also portrays itself as a protector of Buddhist nationalism. The Tatmadaw has established its unequivocal role in the public domain by propagating the ideology of one nation and one religion. The propaganda is repeatedly echoed and dispersed through the Tatmadaw-owned media, Myawaddy TV, Myanmar Radio and Television, Thazin FM Radio, and Myanmar Alin Newspaper. The propaganda has infuenced most Buddhist Burmese to believe that the state and Buddhism must have a mutually benefcial relationship.32 The emergence of a Buddhist religious organization, MaBaTha, comprising Buddhist monks, nuns, and laypeople, reveals one of the results of the propaganda. The teachings of MaBaTha on Buddhism and Burmese nationalism are extreme, and its attitudes are aggressive toward non-Buddhist religions and non-Burmese ethnicities. MaBaTha also allies itself with the junta and advocates the Tatmadaw as a defender of Buddhist nationalism in public domains, while also blaming Suu Kyi’s government for neglecting Buddhist nationalism and endorsing religious pluralism. The Tatmadaw is a camoufaged string-puller behind MaBaTha. MaBaTha may not realize that the Tatmadaw is using her as one of the political tools to manipulate society and buy loyalty and support from Buddhists. The Tatmadaw will insist on dispersing the ideas of Buddhist nationalism in the community to sustain its political interest.

31 Joshua Cheetham, “Myanmar coup: The shadowy business empire funding Tatmadaw,” BBC News, March 9, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-56133766.

32 International Crisis Group, “Buddhist Nationalism in Myanmar and the Region,” Crisis Group Asia Report, September 5, 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/ resrep314465.