Russian Influence in Southern Europe

Anton Bendarzsevszkij

In the last years, alarm bells have started to ring among Western organisations: Russia is gaining influence in Southern Europe—mostly in the Balkans—challenging European values, leading massive disinformation campaigns, and destabilising the political situation in the countries in question. These worries are partly true: in the last fifteen years, Russia has tightened its grip on the region, successfully infiltrating the Balkans through large-scale investments and the energy sector and by using the toolkit of soft power and political ties. On the other hand, Russia has faced a series of failures in Southern Europe in the last years: recent NATO enlargements and the ongoing Eurointegration process in the region significantly reduced its room for manoeuvre. Moscow cannot compete with the European Union (EU) and NATO in terms of financial opportunities and security, while the Balkans, especially, are a ground of high competition among regional and great powers. Thus, the main strategies of Russia currently consist of preventing the further expansion of NATO and slowing down the region’s accession to the European Union.

Traditionally, Russia maintains good relations with Italy; still, in Southern Europe, the main area of Russia’s interests is the Balkans. It is an important region, based on numerous strategic, geopolitical, cultural, and economic reasons. Strategically, it connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean region, while its geopolitical importance consists of its access to the Adriatic Sea (the Soviet Union once had an access to this arm of the Mediterranean Sea through a military port in Albania, but it was lost in the 1960s). It is also a meeting point between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Recently, the region has also been playing a role as the transit area of trade and energy flows, a characteristic which becomes more important than ever due to the increasing role of the Gulf states and the global project of China, called the Belt and Road initiative. For Moscow, the Balkans also have a cultural and ethnic role because of the historical ties between Russia and the region and also because of the large Slavic population living there and the influence the Orthodox Church has on most of their countries.

The stakes are high for reasons of defence: in the last years, the expansion of the NATO has accelerated, and, now, there are only two countries left in the region which are not (yet) part of the military block: Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter: Bosnia). In the meantime, Russia tries hard to prevent, or at least to slow down, the expansion of the block.

The Balkans are also a problematic region: the issues of migration flows, drug trafficking, and organised crime cause headaches not only for Russia but even more for the European Union. Russia would probably be happy to have the area as a buffer zone, and, currently, it is de facto operating as such for the EU, as well.

However, we can also conclude that Russia plays only a secondary role in Southern Europe, trying to keep (and, if possible, to improve) its positions on the energy market, and in some other sectors of the local economy, by building on the cultural and religious ties of the past and by slowing down the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans. For Russia, the region is also secondary, coming after the post-Soviet countries. Its room for manoeuvre in Southern Europe is limited, and the region can mostly be considered as an arena of Russian power projection.

In the Balkans, Serbia can be considered the main outpost of Russian positions, from where it embarks on expansion in the region. Belgrade

has been called a “key partner” in South East Europe by Russian leaders several times.1 Russia is generally viewed as favourable in the Balkans, as the region has not had any negative historical experience with the country. This is a solid base for Moscow, which it tries to exploit. To reach its goals, Russia has been using a mix of financial incentives and investments, the influence of its media outlets, and an arsenal of soft power.

Serbia and Russia have signed a free trade agreement in 2000, which was “upgraded” to include the other four countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2019. Thus, Serbia is currently the only country in Europe which has full access to the markets of the EEU under favourable conditions. Since 2008, the two countries have mutually introduced a visa-free travel regime. Serbia is also the biggest importer of Russian military equipment in the Balkans and maintains strong military cooperation with Moscow. Since 2015, Serbia has been taking part in the annual Russian military exercise called Slavic Brotherhood together with Belarus. Last year, however, the country cancelled its participation due to strong pressure from the European Union.2

In 2016, Russia and Serbia signed a military–technical assistance agreement, and, in October 2020, Belgrade announced that it would open the local office of the Russian Ministry of Defence, which had been unprecedented in the region.3 The Serbian–Russian defence cooperation is easy to explain: the Balkan country’s population generally has negative attitudes to NATO, following the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and, due to the issue concerning Kosovo’s status,

Map of the Orthodox Church in Europe based on censuses between 2009 and 2020

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which, even today, remains a sensitive political question. Russia opposed both the bombing and the separation of Kosovo, and, currently, Moscow is perceived as the only global player which can guarantee Serbia’s security.

It is also true for securing energy supplies. In 2008, the Russian state-owned Gazprom Neft purchased over 56% of the shares of the biggest Serbian oil and gas company, Naftna Industrija Srbije, for USD 450 million,4 and it is in Russian ownership even today. Gazprom Neft has actively been expanding in the region, building and buying gas stations and storage facilities, gaining drilling and exploratory rights, and opening representative offices in Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia. In 2007, Russian Zarubezhneft also purchased the two oil refineries of Bosnia, located in the cities of Brod and Modriča.5

Russia is currently present in many key sectors of the Balkans: their energy sector, as mentioned above, financial sector (through Volksbank operating in the region and acquired by Sberbank in 2012), metallurgy, infrastructure, and real estate—in Montenegro, e.g., onethird of the country’s GDP comes from Russian investments in real estate.6 In 2013, Serbia received a USD 800 million Russian credit for expanding its railway infrastructure,7 while Russian investments in Republica Srpska made Russia the fifth-largest investor in Bosnia.8

In some cases, Moscow has shown its teeth: a group of Russian Cossacks appeared in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska in 2014, just a few days before an important election, making a close parallel with the Russian forces’ appearing in Crimea in February 2014. The other example is the unsuccessful coup in Montenegro in 2016, which involved Serbian and Russian nationals and was probably organised by the Russian foreign military intelligence agency, GRU.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, Russia has gradually returned to the Balkans, expanding its influence through elements of soft power. This strategy was based on cultural ties, Russian NGOs, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the activities of Russian business magnates.

As part of the Russian soft-power toolbox, the Russkiy Mir Foundation was established in 2007 in order to promote the Russian language worldwide, especially in the post-Soviet countries and in Moscow’s zone of influence. In Serbia and Montenegro, the organisation began to popularise the Russian language, and new cultural centres were opened in Novi Sad, Serbia, at Belgrade University, and at the University of Montenegro.9 Russia sponsored the renovation of local monuments, while Russian NGOs organised a series of conferences and events in the Balkans, such as the Balkan Dialogue conference convened by the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund. Russian companies operating in these countries also sponsor local schools, football teams, and other sports associations.

In 2012, the Russian–Serbian Humanitarian Center was opened in Niš, with the task of offering humanitarian aid and help in case there are natural disasters or fire and of supporting regional activities in removing explosives left behind after the NATO bombings. The centre also operates in the broader region outside Serbian borders.10

It is also important to note the influence of Russian business magnates, such as Ivan Savvidis (who has significant relations with the Greek right wing) or Konstantin Malofeev. The latter businessman promotes pan-Orthodox ideologies through its think tank, named Katehon and the Tsargrad TV. He is currently under EU sanctions, and he was also supposedly involved in planning the 2016 coup in Montenegro.11

Russia is considered to be the leading source of misinformation in the region: in December 2020, NATO accused Russia of running a malignant, anti-EU and anti-NATO disinformation campaign in the Balkans, mostly in Serbia, Bosnia, and Montenegro, which demonised the US and NATO and presented the EU as weak and divided.12 The misinformation was spread through Russian media (mainly the news agency called Sputnik), the Russian Orthodox Church, and Russian business magnates.13

Moscow’s narrative about the Balkans shared by Russian media outlets and experts can be summarised as follows: The United States and the West left huge destruction in the region after their intervention. Russia helped the restoration with its investments (mainly in Serbia and Republika Srpska). Slavs living in the Balkans are “Russian brothers,” tied to Moscow with their deep cultural, ethnic, and religious roots. Moscow also emphasised that, although European integration seemed the only viable option for these countries up until 2008, it has not any more been unequivocal since the global economic crisis. Therefore, as the Russian narrative goes on, these countries should think about other alternatives and consider joining the Eurasian Economic Union, launched by Russia in 2015.

These narratives are sown into fertile ground: many can feel that their economic situation has not improved in the last decades after the devastating war and Western countries left people out in the cold. Russia, however, is now giving them a hand in exchange for their loyalty. Russian news agencies, in many cases, provide their content to these countries for free, which gives a huge incentive for the local media outlets to use content provided by Moscow.

Research done by the National Endowment for Democracy found that Russia had used the toolset of disinformation to influence important political decisions in the region.14 In 2018, for example, Macedonia agreed to change its name in order to proceed with its NATO and EU accession blocked by Greece. National referendum was called for 30 September 2018 to support the decision, and the time preceding the referendum was marked by a massive boycott campaign supported by Macedonian opposition groups and Russian sources. A large amount of new Facebook pages and Twitter accounts emerged to support the boycott against the referendum. They distributed false information about the West, spreading rumours about police violence, connecting NATO with fascists, portraying German chancellor Angela Merkel with a Hitler-style moustache, and claiming that all the former are the moral enemies of the Orthodox Christian Slavic people.15 As a result, only 37% of the population participated in the referendum. Nevertheless, the Macedonian parliament voted for the name change in February 2019.

The situation looks paradoxical: while Russia is generally interested in stabilising the region and stopping drug trafficking and organised crime, regional instability can also slow the Balkans’ Euro-Atlantic integration and divide political actors, which help Moscow keep its influence.

Italy is a different story. The country is one of Russia’s closest partners in Europe, as claimed by the Kremlin. Currently, Italy remains among the country’s top trading partners, and it is the second-biggest importer of Russian gas. Besides, the two countries have a very long relationship. During the Cold War, Italy managed to maintain pragmatic economic relations with the Soviet Union, supplying it with Western technology (the Russian car Zhiguli was made under the license by Italian Fiat, granted in 1966). In 1969, Italy became the first Western country to sign a long-term contract for natural gas with the Soviet Union.

In 1994, Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s prime minister at the time, suggested inviting Russia to G7 meetings—this format, thus, later evolved into G8. Berlusconi returned to power between 2001 and 2006 and 2008 and 2011 while he also became a close friend to Russian president Vladimir Putin. Berlusconi was often called “Putin’s ambassador” in Europe, mediating between the West and

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Russia even after the two politicians’ relations started to deteriorate.

Before the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, Italy was Russia’s third-largest trade partner in the European Union, and fourth-largest worldwide, generating USD 53.9 billion trade flow in 201316. However, mutual trade decreased by 35% in 2014 after European sanctions against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions, while the number of Russian tourists coming to Italy reduced by 50% after 2015. Because of these figures, Italy has become the main advocate against European sanctions in the last years. In the meantime, Vladimir Putin visited the country in 2015 and 2019, and former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi even went to the occupied Crimea in 2015 (being the only high-ranking European politician to visit Crimea after the Russian annexation). At the same time, with 22.1 billion cubic metres of gas purchased from Gazprom in 2019, Italy remains the second-biggest importer of Russian natural gas in the world.17

The COVID-19 pandemic gave another boost to Russian geopolitical efforts. While the European Union and the US were busy seeing to their own problems, Moscow offered immediate support: Russian military medicals were sent to help Italy, while the country provided medical equipment, masks, and sanitisers to Italy and the Balkans.

After the August 2020 approval of the Russian Sputnik V vaccine against COVID-19, Russian soft power marked by vaccine diplomacy reached new levels. Serbia was the fourth country that approved the Russian vaccine in December 2020 and started vaccination with Sputnik V already on 5 January 2021. Other Balkan countries followed suit: the Russian vaccine was officially approved in Republika Srpska (Bosnia) in February 2021, in Montenegro in February 2021, and in North Macedonia in March 2021. Italy announced its plans to produce Sputnik V from summer 2021,18 while, on 5 April, Serbia signed a deal with Russia to start the production of the vaccine already in May 2021.19

Despite Moscow’s efforts in the last two decades to extend, or at least maintain, influence in Southern Europe, especially in the Balkans, the Russians failed in many ways. Their influence has been shrinking, and, even if Moscow may have slowed down the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region a bit, it could not prevent it. At the same time, there is a major power rivalry in the region, and Russia has been losing ground not only to the EU or the US but to China, Turkey, and the Gulf states as well. Soft-power efforts by Moscow have not produced significant results either: opinion polls conducted in the Balkans about foreign relations

at the beginning of 2020 show that Russia is losing everywhere except for Serbia.

One of the reasons of its failure in the Balkans is to be found in its too direct and tough actions— disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining central power, support for local forces opposing the respected countries’ EU accession might have gained some popularity among local population but alienated the region’s political elites. The allegedly Russian-backed coup attempt in Montenegro in 2016 was a case when alarm bells particularly started to ring among local political elites.

The occupation of Crimea in 2014 and the support of pro-Russian separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine marked another failure of Moscow’s geopolitical efforts. Before 2014, many leaders in the Balkans had tried to carefully balance between Russia and the West, but Moscow’s actions in Ukraine made it practically impossible.20

The Orthodox Church, one of the main backbones of Russia in the Balkans, has also suffered a major failure in the region: in October 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted autocephaly (independence) to the Eastern Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Moscow heavily criticised the decision, attacking the patriarchate. Orthodox Churches in the Balkans were caught in the middle, but, in the long run, this split will weaken the positions of the Russian Orthodox Church in the region.

Energy has been the primary toolkit of Moscow in Europe, but Russia has also faced fiascos in

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this field: the South Stream project backed by Russia which was met with strong resistance from the EU was finally cancelled in 2014. The Turkish Stream, intended to replace the South Stream, was completed in 2020, but it faces competition now, mainly from the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which was also commissioned in 2020 and brings natural gas to Southern Europe from Azerbaijan, and from the LNG terminal on the island of Krk, Croatia, which started operation in January 2021.21 The latter will feed Qatari gas to the Croatian network, which is connected with Italian, Slovenian, Hungarian, Serbian, and Montenegrin networks.22

Strategically, if Russia’s goal in the Balkans was to prevent NATO enlargement, it also failed: Albania and Croatia entered the organisation in 2009, Montenegro joined in 2017, and North Macedonia in March 2020, which has so far been the last member admitted. There are only two countries in Southern Europe which are not part of NATO now: Bosnia and Serbia.

In September 2020, President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić travelled to Washington to sign the agreements on economic normalisation with Kosovo. The deal was needed for the country to proceed on its road to European integration, but it also puts Moscow in a difficult situation: when Serbia joins the European Union (and that moment is getting closer and closer), the freetrade and visa-free agreements between the countries will be gone, just as their close military cooperation. As a result, Russia will lose its closest ally in the region, and it cannot prevent that from happening. At the same time, Serbia is improving its relations with the US and trying to balance between Russia and the West. In 2016, NATO forces were also granted diplomatic immunity and freedom of movement, something which has long been requested by the Russian humanitarian forces in Niš but has never been granted.23

1 Ксения Кириллова: Снижается ли влияние России на Балканах? Rahvusvaheline Kaitseuuringute Keskus. 5 February 2021. <https://bit.ly/3wBNnij > 2 Slavic Brotherhood Joint Drills Overshadowed by a Crisis. Warsaw Institute. 15 September 2020. <https://bit. ly/2RI5dla > 3 Россия зайдет на Балканы по-сербски. Сергей Лавров отправляется в балканское турне. Коммерсантъ. 26 October 2020. <https://bit.ly/3bTYOtO > 4 Paul Stronski–Annie Himes: Russia’s Game in the Balkans. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 6 February 2020. <https://bit.ly/2RNGueY > 5 Stronski–Himes. 6 Данила Гальперович: Вмешательство России на Балканах: стратегия и тактика. Голос Америки. 23 January 2020. <https://bit.ly/3hWTvh3 > 7 Мария Максакова: Возвращение России на Балканы. Обозреватель–Observer. 2014/9. 50–63. 8 Stronski–Himes. 9 Дмитрий Сурков: Мягкая сила России на Балканах. Rethinking Russia. 18 November 2016. <https://bit. ly/3mAoG24 > 10 Кириллова. 11 Stronski–Himes. 12 НАТО обвинило РФ в дезинформационных кампаниях на Балканах. Интерфакс. 21 December 2020. <https://bit. ly/3iaLDJ9 > 13 Samuel Woolley–Katie Joseff: Demand for Deceit. How the Way We Think Drives Disinformation. National Endowment for Democracy. 8 January 2020. <https://bit.ly/3fRQqw3 > 14 Woolley–Joseff. 15 Woolley–Joseff. 16 Data from Federal State Statistics Service of Russia (ROSSTAT). 17 Статистика поставок. Динамика реализации газа в Европу. Газпром экспорт. <https://bit.ly/3i2qeSc > Accessed: 8 April 2021. 18 COVID vaccine: Italy to be first EU country to make Russian Sputnik V jab. Euronews. 9 March 2021. <https://bit. ly/3fRonwN > 19 Serbia signs contract to produce Russian Sputnik V vaccine. N1. 5 April 2021. <https://bit.ly/3c0AvKF > 20 Stronski–Himes. 21 First Croatian LNG terminal officially inaugurated in Krk island. European Commission. 29 January 2021. <https://bit. ly/2SJleHC > 22 Krk LNG Terminal. Global Energy Monitor Wiki <https://bit. ly/3pduu2U > Accessed: 14 April 2021. 23 Dusica Tomovic–Sasa Dragoljo: Serbia Finds Juggling NATO and Russia a Struggle. BalkanInsight. 14 March 2016. <https://bit.ly/3p3v3fB >