Analyzing War Magazine | Jan/Feb 2021

January – February 2021

THE INDO-PACIFIC BEYOND THE PANDEMIC NOT QUITE OUT OF THE WOODS YET?

ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMED UNDERSTANDING OF INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY

C ON T E N T S

7 13 21 29 35 42

MORE WORK TO DO BETWEEN THE DRAGON AND EAGLE MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE PANDEMIC

THE BELT AND ROAD BEYOND THE PANDEMIC INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR:

NATALIE SAMBHI

EDITORIAL BOARD AND STAFF PUBLISHER SWi Analytics, LLC EDITOR Mark Payumo MANAGING EDITORS Diana Alarde-Jordan Jacob Morrell Bryner Las Rio Pacit LAYOUT EDITOR Jayrald Vasquez WEB EDITOR Philip Carpentero CONTRIBUTING WRITERS Carl Thayer Collin Koh Deo Onda Alvin Camba Don McLain Gill ANALYZING WAR MAGAZINE www.analyzingwar.org SUBSCRIBE Inside the magazine or issuu LETTERS TO THE EDITOR editor@analyzingwar.org

Photos on these pages via Wikimedia Commons: 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 26, 30, 33, 34, 39, 49, 50. All others via Shutterstock.

4 January – February 2021

is Emeritus Professor of Politics and Visiting Fellow, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra. He is also the Director of Thayer Consultancy, a small business registered in Australia in 2002 that provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients.

DEO ONDA is an Associate Professor at the Marine Science Institute of the University of the Philippines, Diliman. He is the founding Principal Investigator of the Microbial Oceanography Laboratory. His research expeditions have taken him to the Arctic Region, the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Philippine Sea. He obtained his interuniversity PhD in Oceanography from the Université Laval in Quebec, Canada and accomplished a post-doctoral work at the Alfred Wegener Institute-Hemholtz Center for Polar and Marine Research.

COLLIN KOH is Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies which is a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has research interests on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Southeast Asia. Collin has published several op-eds, policy and academic journal articles as well as chapters for edited volumes covering his research areas. He has also taught at Singapore Armed Forces professional military education and training courses.

ALVIN CAMBA is a Sociology PhD candidate at Johns Hopkins University and a nonresident fellow at the Stratbase ADR Institute in Manila and Paramadina Institute for Public Policy in Jakarta. He has presented his work at the World Bank, AidData, U.S. Embassy in Manila, and was interviewed by The Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, as well as consulted by Southeast Asian politicians and policymakers on China’s growing role in Southeast Asia.

DON MCLAIN GILL is an international affairs researcher based in the Philippines. He is currently pursuing the Master of Arts degree in International Studies at the University of the Philippines, Diliman. He has written extensively on regional geopolitics and Indian foreign policy for various publications and international peer-reviewed journals.

5 January – February 2021 Edition

CONTRIBUTORS

CARL THAYER

EDITOR’S NOTE In coming up with this edition’s theme, we took careful consideration whether the Indo-Pacific region will find itself still mired in challenges brought about by the pandemic, or it will be ready to turn the page and go back to business as usual. Granted that to err on the safe side might mean stating the obvious, it proved to be a complex task owing to opposing views that could readily put up a nuanced argument.

It is true that the region and the rest of the world are not out of the woods yet with a new coronavirus strain1 threatening to frustrate ten months of research to produce a vaccine and leading Sputnik V, CoronaVac, Pfizer, and Oxford-AstraZeneca to figure in an unprecedented race to vaccinate entire populations.

Beijing and the Kremlin, however, appear to be more keen to extend the competition toward the information space in the name of scientific supremacy—and perhaps ideological predominance—over the West in spite of Sinovac’s poor performance and lack of transparency in Brazil,2 and Moscow’s questionable claim to 1.5 million administered vaccinations in Russia.3 Yet, it is not surprising how unrestrictedly competitive these events unfold as one recalls in April of 2020 how China’s Liaoning carrier strike group took advantage of two inoperable U.S. aircraft carriers—the USS Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan—after the latter suffered mass COVID-19 infections among their crew. It had to fall on USS America, a smaller amphibious assault ship carrying F-35B Lighting II stealth fighters to hold the line in the East China Sea.4 The pandemic, it seems, is an opportunity, if not irrelevant, in a realist world.

1 2 3 4

Interestingly enough and when taken together, the analyses that are reflected here appear to surmise that the world has always been ready to move on as different futures are being considered—it’s only a question of “when.” Professor Thayer, for instance, uncovers the struggle to negotiate a durable Code of Conduct for the South China Sea while China is relentless in insisting that Southeast Asian states should not hold joint military exercises with countries from “outside the region,” a veiled reference to the United States.

Collin Koh reiterates the enduring Singaporean grand strategy of equidistance between Beijing and Washington where the coronavirus hardly holds sway.

Deo Onda appeals for us to shift our attention offshore toward the South China Sea basin and make better sense of the region’s stability via food security along with China’s aggressive marine science research efforts there. Alvin Camba reveals that the pandemic is just among the dependent variables relative to Beijing’s preference for strongmen. Don McLain Gill reflects on India’s unpleasant relations with Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, and how New Delhi’s vulnerabilities can be manifold that China could take advantage.

In the end, it boils down to man’s capacity to be resilient and that the future is just beyond the horizon that we cannot lose sight of. May this issue serve as a good starting point for 2021.

– Mark Payumo, Editor

Pfizer and Oxford-AstraZeneca are believed to be effective against the new “super strains.” See Brenda Goodman, “New COVID ‘Super Strains’ Could Disrupt Life Again,” WebMD, January 6, 2021, https:// www.webmd.com/lung/news/20210107/new-covid-super-strainscould-disrupt-life-again.

Samantha Pearson et al., “Chinese Covid-19 Vaccine Far Less Effective Than Initially Touted in Brazil,” The Wall Street Journal, last modified January 12, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-sinovac- covid-19-vaccine-is-50-4-in-late-stage-braziltrials-11610470581.

Jake Cordell, “Russia Says It Has Vaccinated 1.5M. Some Experts Think the Numbers Don’t Add Up,” The Moscow Times, last modified January 14, 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/01/14/ russia-says-it-has-vaccinated-15m-some-experts-think-thenumbers-dont-add-up-a72602.

Stars and Stripes by Caitlin Doornbos, “China Sends Aircraft Carrier near Japan, Taiwan as US Navy Struggles with Coronavirus,” Military.com, April 13, 2020, https://www.military.com/daily-news/ 2020/04/13/china-sends-aircraft-carrier-near-japan-taiwan-usnavy-struggles-coronavirus.html.

6 January – February 2021

MORE WORK TO DO

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CODE OF CONDUCT

N

Carl Thayer

egotiations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea between China and members of the Association

of Southeast East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been

underway for twenty-five years. On August 3, 2018 the foreign ministers representing the ten ASEAN member states and China announced agreement on a Single Draft of Code of

Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea Negotiating Text (SDNT).

This article comprises four parts: a brief background to COC

negotiations, an analysis of the SDNT, major issues that need to be resolved, and a conclusion.

7 January – February 2021

BACKGROUND

agree to work, on the basis of consensus,

The idea of a COC for the South China

Sea was first proposed by the Philippines in 1995 after China occupied Mischief

Reef and built structures on it. In March 2000, ASEAN and China exchanged

draft COCs with a view to consolidating the texts. Negotiations reached an

impasse after two years. ASEAN and China then opted for a non-binding

political statement entitled Declaration

on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). The parties reaffirmed “that

the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and

toward the eventual attainment of this objective.”1

In December 2004, senior officials from

China and ASEAN agreed on the Terms of Reference for a Joint ASEAN-China Working Group (JWG) to implement

the DOC.2 In August 2005, at the first meeting of the JWG DOC, ASEAN tabled a draft set of Guidelines to

Implement the DOC. China objected to a clause that ASEAN would hold prior

consultations among its members. Over the course of the next six years twentyone successive drafts of the Guidelines were exchanged. In July 2011, ASEAN

dropped its insistence

Aerial view of Mischief Reef in Spratly Islands.

on prior consultations and the Guidelines to Implement the DOC

were adopted.3 It then took another six years

of negotiations before China and ASEAN

members adopted the Agreement on

a Framework of the

Code of Conduct in

August 2017. A year later the agreement was reached on the SDNT.

8 January – February 2021

SINGLE DRAFT NEGOTIATING TEXT4 The SDNT is structured according to the 2017 Agreement on a Framework of the Code of Conduct into three parts – preambular provisions, general provisions and final clauses. Each of the three parts is a compilation of individual submissions

by China and eight ASEAN members.

Laos and Myanmar did not make submissions.

Part 2, General Provisions, is the heart of the SDNT. It enumerates three objectives: to establish rules and norms to guide the conduct of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and to ensure maritime safety and freedom of navigation and overflight.

The SDNT, however, is “not an instrument to settle territorial disputes or maritime delimitation issues.”

Part 2(c) is the most contentions section of the SDNT. For example, it includes an extended elaboration of four options on the duty to cooperate and promotion of practical maritime cooperation, followed by two sets of options on self-restraint/promotion of trust, and a detailed discussion on the prevention and

9 January – February 2021

management of incidents. The SDNT then includes a proposal by Vietnam to replace Part 2.c in its entirety with twenty-seven points prescribing what contracting states shall and shall not do.

There is general agreement among the parties that they should cooperate in protecting the marine environmental, marine scientific research, safety of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue, and combatting transnational crime (trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms). Indonesia proposed that illegal fishing be added to this list.

Significantly China’s proposal on

not hold joint military exercises with

the rider that cooperation is to be carried

unless the parties concerned are notified

cooperation on the marine economy adds out by the littoral states “and shall not be

conducted in cooperation with companies

countries from outside the region,

beforehand and express no objection.”

from countries outside the region.”

In Part 2(c) prevention of incidents,

Three options were proposed under

and Thailand called for compliance with

the heading Self-Restraint/Promotion of Trust and Confidence. Indonesia

suggested four measures: dialogues

between defense and military officials,

humane treatment of persons in distress,

voluntary notification of impending joint/ combined military exercises, and the

exchange of relevant information on a regular basis. Vietnam suggested that the contracting states provide sixty

days notification of “impending joint/

combined military exercise/drill” in the South China Sea.

China’s submission on military activities included the caveat “the Parties shall

Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Singapore the following international conventions and regulations: 1972 International

Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG), 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life

at Sea (SOLAS), 1979 International

Convention on Maritime Search and

Rescue (SAR), and 1988 Convention for

the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA).

Also, Cambodia, China, and Singapore suggested the adoption of safety and communication procedures set out in

the Western Pacific Naval Symposium’s

Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).

10 January – February 2021

MAJOR ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED There are four major issues that need to be resolved before a final COC can be adopted: dispute settlement, legal status, geographic scope, and role of third parties.

The SDNT does not contain any provisions for binding or compulsory dispute settlement. For example, Vietnam proposed that parties settle their disputes “through friendly negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation and other means as may be agreed by the disputing Contracting Parties.” Vietnam and Indonesia proposed as an alternate that disputes could be taken to the High Council of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation “at the consent of the concerned Parties.”

The SDNT does not include any reference to the COC as a treaty under international law. Vietnam proposed that the contracting states consent “to be bound by the present Code of Conduct…”

Vietnam also suggested that the COC “be subject to ratification in accordance with the respective internal procedure of the signatory States” and the instrument of ratification be deposited with the ASEAN Secretary General who “shall register” the COC pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

11 January – February 2021

The SDNT does not define the geographic scope of the South China Sea. Vietnam suggested that “the present Code of Conduct shall apply to all disputed features and overlapping maritime areas claimed under the 1982 UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] in the South China Sea.” Malaysia and Singapore separately proposed that a definition of the geographic scope may have to be included.

There is no reference in the SDNT about accession to the COC by third parties such as Japan, the United States, Australia, etc. As noted above, China seeks to exclude states “outside the region” from cooperation in developing the marine economy and military exercises.

China’s Turf: In veiled reference to the United States, Beijing wants it out of the South China Sea.

CONCLUSION When the SDNT was first made public, it was announced that it would go through three readings. The first reading was conducted in 2019. Chinese officials offered the view that the SDNT could be completed in three years, or the second half of 2021. The coronavirus pandemic prevented any face-to-face meetings of the ASEAN-China JWG DOC that were scheduled for 2020. As of this writing, the 2021 deadline seems increasingly unlikely and there does not appear to be a consensus on the final timeline.

While the SDNT contains many legal building blocks for drafting codes to

prevent incidents at sea they do not address frequent clashes involving civilian fishing boats and maritime law enforcement vessels.

In summary, much more detailed work needs to be done if the SDNT is to be effective in addressing incidents at sea.

As the Philippines noted in its submission, “the Parties shall adopt, at the appropriate levels of government, processes, guidelines and notification protocols to operationalize the Parties’ obligation to exercise self-restraint in the South China Sea and mechanisms at the appropriate levels to ensure their implementation…

These agreed processes, guidelines and protocols… shall be annexed to this Code.”

NOTES * 1 2

3 4

Emeritus Professor and Visiting Fellow, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

Point 10, “Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” November 4, 2002, http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm.

“ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Kuala Lumpur, 7 December 2004” and “Terms of Reference of the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” http://www.aseansec.org/16888.htm and http://www.aseansec. org/16885.htm.

Tran Truong Thuy, “Recent Developments in the South China Sea: From Declaration to Code of Conduct,” in The South China Sea: Towards a Region of Peace, Security and Cooperation, ed. Tran Truong Thuy (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2011), 104.

The Single Draft of Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) Negotiating Text has not been publicly released. The author was leaked a copy by a diplomatic source in July 2018.

12 January – February 2021

Between the DRAGON AND EAGLE SINGAPORE’S CONSISTENT QUEST FOR EQUIDISTANCE WITH BEIJING AND WASHINGTON

I

Collin Koh

t is often taken for granted that Singapore is a small island

lacking in strategic depth. However, it does after all occupy a

unique geostrategic position, sitting astride the confluence of

the Indian and Pacific Oceans, overlooking not just those strategic waterways bearing vital trade – especially energy supplies – such

as the Malacca Strait but also, a direct outlet into the South China

Sea; and the island does have a deep-sea port to boast about. Yet these advantages constitute both a boon and bane for Singapore.

13 January – February 2021

Commercial port in Singapore.

On the one hand, these advantages bring

Singapore, being so heavily dependent

trade that generates wealth and strategic

communications that guarantee seaborne

about massive amounts of seaborne

relevance for an island city-state that has a population of slightly below six million.

On the other hand, the very geostrategic location of Singapore means it invariably finds itself in the middle of the grand

on open access to the sea lines of

trade, with a Chinese ethnic majority

population, amongst various attributes,

finds itself not in any manner impervious to such challenges.

intrigues of geopolitical rivalries. After all,

Hence, the bid to maintain a peaceful

coveted prize in Imperial Japan’s lightning

survival and prosperity has become a

Singapore had been the ultimate, much campaign that fought southward the

length of the British Malayan peninsula back in December 1941.

In today’s context, conquest of whole foreign national territories on a scale

similar to that in the last world war may

have been passé. But threats to national security still manifest in the form of a

mixture of overt and covert techniques,

such as economic coercion and subversion.

neighborhood and guarantee national jealously-guarded adage for Singapore.

To accomplish these objectives, the

island has resorted to a proven set of basic foreign policy principles since independence in 1965: maintaining good neighborliness; emphasis on

multilateralism; promoting a sense of

community; asserting strategic relevance; and building deterrence and defense.1

These principles have served the country well throughout the decades.

14 January – February 2021

And these principles have underpinned Singapore’s approach to the extant great power rivalries throughout the Cold War unto this day. The United States remains seen as a dependable, primary security partner whom Singapore regards as an anchor of regional peace and stability.2 Since the end of the Cold War, the country seeks to navigate more assiduously between Washington and other rising regional powers – China and India in particular.

Singapore has played no small role in bringing these two Asian powers into the regional architecture, one that is characterized by institutions – chiefly with ASEAN as the chief priority – coexisting with the American hub-and-spoke system of alliances and security partnerships. With respect to China in particular, Singapore sought closer economic links. And having played a major role in bringing India into the ASEAN-centric architecture, Singapore hopes that inclusivity would contribute not only to regional peace and prosperity, but that the country can extract maximum economic and political benefits from these powers’ engagement of Southeast Asia.

It’s been a happy situation until two tumultuous developments: the growing assertiveness of China under Xi Jinping’s helm; and Donald Trump’s entry into the White House with his “America First” 15 January – February 2021

policy. The ensuing Sino-U.S. rivalry threatens not only the longstanding ASEAN-centric architecture, but also to unravel Singapore’s delicate approach in maintaining an equidistant balance between the two rivalling powers.3 Having been regarded as practically an ally in anything but in name, Singapore has been invariably pulled into the vortex of the spiralling tensions between Beijing and Washington.

In recent years, especially amidst the trade war and then technological tussle between China and the U.S., Singapore leaders’ advocacy for the two powers to reach an accommodation of sorts has been viewed with skepticism and wariness by some within the Trump Administration and the more conservative American think-tank circles who felt that Singapore has decided to slide more toward Beijing and could have abandoned its equidistant policy. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2019 was one such example.4

Marine Corps Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr. and Admiral Harry Harris Jr. at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2019.

The country has been criticized for staying

the country being an avid supporter of

such as those over the South China Sea

these incidents have cowed Singapore

mostly silent about Beijing’s excesses

disputes. After the arbitral award was

announced in July 2016, Singapore had been one of the first to take note of it, and thereby stressed upon all parties to adhere to rules-based approach in

managing and resolving the disputes. This provoked the ire of Beijing – it resulted in a verbal war involving Singapore’s envoy, and it plausibly also played a role behind Hong Kong’s detention of its armored

vehicles when it was en route from Taiwan back home.

And perhaps the most symbolic snub had

been Singapore’s non-invitation to China’s inaugural Belt and Road Forum, despite

the scheme.5 Critics may conclude that into silence if not outright submission.

However, this is a mistaken perception.

The lesson that Singapore might have

drawn from the above-mentioned debacle is that it doesn’t pay to engage in a

megaphone diplomacy. All Singapore

has to do is to continue to quietly work

behind the scenes to uphold those very basic foreign policy principles it has

sought to maintain. While it continues

to champion for China and the U.S. to

accommodate each other’s interests, and

that it continues to deepen economic links with Beijing, Singapore continues to see

Washington as an indispensable factor of regional peace and stability.

16 January – February 2021

It is on the defense and security front that Singapore has demonstrated continuity

instead of change. Unlike the symbolism

of such interactions with China, Singapore built on decades of security partnership

and military interoperability with the U.S. to deepen these links, and to reflect its

desire to keep Washington engaged in the To be sure, China isn’t satisfied with

region.

the current state of partnership with

In the first year of the Trump

because of its economic-dominant focus.

inaugural Exercise Pacific Griffin off the

Singapore, which it views as “imbalanced” It has sought to scale up defense and

security links to be commensurate with

the existing and growing economic ties.

To that end, the signing of the Agreement on Defense Exchanges and Security

Cooperation (ADESC) on May 2019 is one major achievement. But there’re clear 6

limitations to how far both militaries can

Administration, the two navies staged the coast of Guam, following the deployment of an air force contingent there for joint training. In September and December

2019, Singapore and the U.S. respectively renewed the 1990 MOU and inked a

new one that would establish a fourth RSAF fighter training detachment at

Andersen Air Force Base in Guam.7 The

go because of their different organizational latter instance is significant when seen in culture, doctrine, equipment, and training.

the context of much publicized, growing

American military technology is also one

American military hub out in the Pacific

Singapore’s desire for continued access to constraining factor.

17 January – February 2021

threat the PLA missile arsenal poses to this Ocean.8

This isn’t just confined to the military realm: While Singapore has been an avid supporter of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Singapore shares Washington’s advocacy (which is also consistent with ASEAN’s position) on sustainable infrastructure development; both signed the Framework to Strengthen Infrastructure Finance and Market Building Cooperation in October 2019.9 It is important to view this in the context of the Trump Administration’s criticism of BRI as Beijing’s vehicle for “debt trap diplomacy” or “predatory economics” which allegedly ensnared smaller and weaker sovereign nations.

Clearly, in view of Beijing’s apparent inclination toward an exclusive form of regionalism that ostensibly seeks to omit the U.S. from Asia, notwithstanding occasional disagreements with their

counterparts in the U.S., Singapore’s leadership remains convinced that American primacy in the region is essential, without which Singapore would have been far worse off economically, politically, and strategically.

But like its Southeast Asian neighbors, Singapore does not wish to entertain the thought of having to choose sides. Being caught in some sort of public bind by “surprises” from Washington may imperil the country’s quest to maintain equidistance with China and the U.S. The recent, very public proposal to stand up a U.S. Navy 1st Fleet with an Indo-Pacific focus that could potentially be based in Singapore,10 amongst other possible locations, is one such “surprise” that appears less than necessary. Such “surprises” carry the effect of reducing the room for Singapore to maneuver between China and the U.S. 18 January – February 2021

The entry of Biden Administration might

Singapore has rejected this option. It can

to continue practicing an equidistant

powers but not be aligned with any of

mean more breathing room for Singapore policy toward China and the U.S. It is

expected of the Biden Administration to emphasize America’s allies and security partners, and Singapore would without a doubt welcome such a prospect. It

works better for Singapore to properly demonstrate its commitment toward a

rules-based order through concrete policy initiatives than just offer hot air, and to show that maintaining this equidistant

policy remains viable in the long term. As veteran Singapore diplomat Tommy Koh noted succinctly:

A small country like Singapore basically

has two choices. It can decide to become an ally of one of the major powers.

19 January – February 2021

also decide to be close to all the major

them. Singapore has chosen this option

because we wish to remain independent and have maximum room for maneuvre.

The challenge is to be very skilful and avoid giving the impression to any of

the major powers that we are no longer

non-aligned. For example, we must avoid giving China the impression that we

are pro-U.S. and anti-China, and avoid

giving the U.S. the impression that we

are pro-China and anti-U.S. It is a delicate balancing act but it can be done.11

Hopefully, Washington can recognize Singapore’s persistent strategic

predicament and the vigorous effort it has been making come January 2021.

NOTES 1

Singapore has no single foreign policy document that outlines the country’s diplomatic approaches. But these principles have been broadly consistent throughout the decades in public speeches and statements made by Singapore’s political establishment. See for instance: Speech by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Minister for National Development and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, on “The Challenges to Small Nations’ Foreign Policies” at the Ministry of National Development (MND) Auditorium on Saturday, 29 July 1995 at 3.00PM, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore; Transcript of Remarks by Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan at the MFA Townhall on 17 July 2017: Diplomacy of Little Red Dot: Past and Present, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 17 July 2017.

2 See for instance, Speech by Minister for Finance Mr Heng Swee Keat at “U.S. Engagement in Asia: A Conversation with Minister Heng Swee Keat”, at The Brookings Institution, on 15 April 2019, Washington D.C., Ministry of Finance of Singapore, April 15, 2019.

3 Singaporean policy elites have elucidated those views in public. Read for example, Keynote Address by Singapore Emeritus Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Official Dinner of Chosun Ilbo’s 10th Asian Leadership Conference on 14 May 2019 at the Shilla Seoul, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, May 14, 2019; “The Latest: Singapore PM says China-US rivalry ‘awkward’,” Associated Press, November 15, 2018.

4 Keynote Address by Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the 18th Asian Security Summit: The Shangri-La Dialogue, organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 31, 2019.

5 People’s Daily Interview with PM Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister Office of Singapore, April 8, 2018.

6 “Singapore and China to Step Up Defence Cooperation through Enhanced Defence Interactions,” Ministry of Defence of Singapore, 29 May 2019.

7 “Singapore and the US Renew Memorandum of Understanding,” Ministry of Defence of Singapore, 24 September 2019; “Singapore and US Sign Agreement for Fighter Training Detachment in Guam,” Ministry of Defence of Singapore, 7 December 2019.

8 For instance, see: Lee Jeong-ho, “China releases footage of ‘Guam killer’ DF-26 ballistic missile in ‘clear message to the US’,” South China Morning Post, 28 January 2019; Bhavan Jaipragas, “Chinese missiles likely to cripple Asia-based US forces in event of conflict: report,” South China Morning Post, 18 August 2019.

9 “United States and Singapore Sign Infrastructure Finance and Market Building Cooperation Framework,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 16 October 2019.

10 Megan Eckstein, “SECNAV Braithwaite Calls for New U.S. 1st Fleet Near Indian, Pacific Oceans,” USNI Proceedings, 17, November 2020; “Reply to Queries on US SECNAV’s Calls for New US 1st Fleet Out of Singapore,” Ministry of Defence of Singapore, 18 November 2020.

11 Tommy Koh, “Chapter One: Singapore’s Foreign Policy: A Pioneer Diplomat’s Reflections,” in Gillian Koh (ed.), The Little Nation That Can: Singapore’s Foreign Relations and Diplomacy, Commentary, Vol. 26, The National University of Singapore Society (NUSS), pp. 18-19.

20 January – February 2021

MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA & IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE PANDEMIC Deo Florence L. Onda, Ph.D. 21 January – February 2021

O

n the 2nd quarter of 2020, while the rest of the world was battling the pandemic, China launched its two new scientific research stations and laboratories in the artificial islands in the Spratlys Island Group in the South China Sea.1 These are the Yongshu Station in Kagitingan Reef and Zhubi Station in Subi Reef under the newly established Integrated Research Center for Islands and Reefs of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (IRCIRCAS). In total, China is now operating three research stations in areas claimed by the Philippines, including the one in Meiji Reef (Panganiban) that was launched in 2018.2 These stations aim to “support interdisciplinary research of oceanographers and improve the in-situ observation and experimental capabilities on ecology, geology, environments, materials and marine energy utilization in the tropical marine environment.”3 While considered to be

important in the advancement of our understanding of the environments in the region, these recent moves by China can also be seen as a shift to a new phase of its systematic occupation and utilization of the resources in the disputed waters.

The recent scientific investments made

by China highlight its recognition on the importance of marine scientific research (MSR) as a form of “civilian activity” and a projection of power in advancing its cause in the South China Sea (SCS).

China clearly sees the benefits and the potential of the area beyond food and fuel resources, which the other claimant countries have just started to appreciate.

The research stations in the SCS, along with its new and state-of-the-art research fleet, will allow China to exploit biodiversity resources that are less controversial but have equally valuable applications such as in medicine and biotechnology.

22 January – February 2021

SCS AS A TREASURE TROVE FOR NEW DRUGS AND A FOOD BASKET The SCS and adjacent waters have been touted to have the world’s highest level of marine biodiversity. Many even argue that parts of it should be declared as Ecologically and Biologically Significant Areas (EBSA) following the Convention on Biological Diversity.4 This rich biodiversity translates into a well of untapped valuable reserves such as the marine genetic resources (MGR) it holds. The MGRs both within and especially those beyond national jurisdictions, however, are vulnerable to exploitation since there is still no 23 January – February 2021

binding international treaty to control for their access and benefit-sharing,5 as well as management and conservation. With this, whoever has the capacity to do MSR will be able to explore and exploit these MGRs. MGR research can result in the discovery of novel compounds and molecules that have biotechnological applications in medicine, industry, materials technology, drug development, and other endless possibilities. Such works are important especially with the emergence of new diseases and illnesses that may need new antibiotics or therapeutic approaches for cure.

There is a growing recognition on the role of biodiversity and a healthy ocean in making our communities more resilient to changes. This includes our ability to fight new and emerging diseases by learning from the defense and adaptive mechanisms developed by many marine organisms. Indeed, some of the treatments being tested for COVID-19 disease were derived and developed from molecules found in marine species. One example is M101,6 an oxygen carrier derived from the hemoglobin of a polychaete annelid or

marine worm.7 It has been demonstrated to increase oxygenation by binding more oxygen than human hemoglobin, a possible help for critical patients who are already dependent on respirators to combat hypoxemia.8 Another is Remdesivir, an antiviral that has been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration as one of the possible treatments for COVID-19 patients.9 It is a nucleoside analogue, which is a class of drugs that terminate gene replication and was originally derived from sea sponges.10 24 January – February 2021

These demonstrate the significance of marine diversity as a source of new information and innovation, allowing us humans to fight new diseases and become more resilient. However, without any legally binding treaty for benefit-sharing, these treasure trove of novel compounds and molecules such as those found in the SCS, will put more capable countries like China at the forefront of medical and biotechnological innovations. MSRs will further make such countries secure and prepared for any possible future scenarios even beyond the current pandemic.

Furthermore, the research bases in SCS will let China do more in-situ studies and field- based experiments to optimize conditions to grow high

25 January – February 2021

value species such as some seaweeds and other invertebrates (e.g., sea urchins and cucumbers) that are not possible to be grown in mainland China’s coasts.

Biodiversity surveys could reveal traits of organisms that are beneficially adaptive in harsher future conditions.

The understanding of the oceanography, seasonality, and local processes in the area will optimize designs for possible deployment of open ocean mariculture technologies, like those deployed in the northern waters, which were also co-developed with Chinese private companies. These activities will certainly enable China to expand its “farms” and make the waters of the SCS as its “food basket,” further strengthening its food security and independence—and all these are made possible because of its MSRs.

MSR BOTH AS A THREAT AND A PATH TO DIPLOMACY As early as the 1990s, joint MSRs11 and environmental cooperation12 have been proposed as potential platforms to promote collaborative conservation and management of the environments in the SCS. However, even these initiatives are subject to accepted norms, processes, and international treaties. On the other hand, the recent actions of China demonstrated how MSRs can also be used to unilaterally assert claims and even project power. The generated knowledge on the environment will help engineer and design infrastructures that are more suitable to the conditions of the region, which will ultimately help strengthen China’s presence in the disputed waters.

Different Chinese research vessels were also spotted several times in the West Philippine Sea and other areas within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines in the past years without proper MSR permits, with the latest incident occurring during the pandemic in September 2020.13 Together with the research stations in the artificial islands, these scientific activities can then be considered illegal and will result in the disenfranchisement of Filipinos who own and have exclusive rights in these waters.

These also further raise questions on China’s integrity in holding its part of the bargain to settle disputes in the SCS, especially that the SCS code of conduct is yet to be finalized and ratified.

26 January – February 2021

China is not the first to put up a scientific base in the Spratlys. Taiwan has been operating the Nansha Taiping and Dongsha Research Stations. The Philippines also established the Pagasa Research Station in the 1990s but currently non-operational while Vietnam is also reported to have some in its controlled islands. While illegal MSRs are a threat, scientific collaboration via data sharing, facilities and personnel exchange, and joint expeditions and monitoring could also be worthwhile endeavors that can be explored to reduce tension and develop cooperation.

Discovery and development of the bioresources in the SCS could also then be a collaborative effort with all the countries surrounding the region benefiting from them. However, it should be emphasized that these bioresources will only be useful if the habitats where they thrive remain healthy and protected.

The SCS is experiencing and will continue to experience threats—both manmade and natural—and the challenge for the littoral states around its basin is to understand its environments to protect and manage it better. Thus, while we recognize that the benefits of their utilization should be shared, the responsibility for their protection should also be collaborative and collective.

This is where MSRs will contribute significantly. The Philippines and Vietnam, 27 January – February 2021

for example, have successfully carried out several joint expeditions in the past decades, a demonstration of possible science diplomacy in a hotly contested maritime area.14 Science diplomacy should be continuously explored as another route to promote the protection and sustainable management of the natural resources in the region while exploring more peaceful means to settle territorial disputes. However, this should be done now while we still have the time to save whatever we can in the SCS to secure for the succeeding generations.

Fishing vessels in the South China Sea.

NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

“New research stations come into operation on Nansha Islands,” Xinhuanet online, March 20, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2020-03/20/c_138898845.htm.

“China launches comprehensive reef research center on Nansha Islands,” Xinhuanet online, January 20, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet. com/english/2019-01/02/c_137715291.htm “New research stations come into operation on Nansha Islands,” Xinhuanet online, March 20, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2020-03/20/c_138898845.htm.

Youna Lyons et al., “Moving from Mpas to Area-based Management Measures in the South China Sea,” Zenodo, November 1, 2019, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2607086.

Harriet R. Harden-Davies and K.M. Gjerde, “Building scientific and technological capacity: a role for benefit-sharing in the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond National Jurisdiction,” Ocean Yearbook Online 2019, 33(1): 377-400.

“CORONAVIRUS: La molecule d’Hemarina peut sauver des vies en remplacant les respirateurs artificiels pour oxygener des patients atteints de covid-19,” Hemarina online, March 19, 2020, https:// www.hemarina.com/news-and-events/detail/coronavirus-la-moleculedhemarina-peut-sauver-des-vies- en-remplacant-les-respirateurs-artificiels-pour-oxygener-des-patients-atteints-de-covid-19-69.

Tony Le Gall et al., “In vivo biodistribution and oxygenation potential of a new generation of oxygen carrier,” Journal of Biotechnology (2014) 187: 1-9.

“CORONAVIRUS: La molecule d’Hemarina peut sauver des vies en remplacant les respirateurs artificiels pour oxygener des patients atteints de covid-19,” Hemarina online, March 19, 2020, https:// www.hemarina.com/news-and-events/detail/coronavirus-la-moleculedhemarina-peut-sauver-des-vies- en-remplacant-les-respirateurs-artificiels-pour-oxygener-des-patients-atteints-de-covid-19-69.

Daniel Rubin et al., “FDA Approval of Remdisivir – a Step in the Right Direction,” New England Journal of Medicine (2020), 383: 25892600.

Katherine L. Seley-Radtke, and Mary K. Yates, “The evolution of nucleoside analogue antivirals: A review for chemists and nonchemists. Part 1: Early structural modifications to the nucleoside scaffold.” Antiviral research, Vol. 154 (2018): 66-86, https://doi. org/10.1016/j.antiviral.2018.04.004.

Edgardo D. Gomez, “Marine Scientific Research in the South China Sea and Environmental Security,” Ocean Development & International Law, 32(2): 205-2011, https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320151100343.

Sulan Chen, “Environmental cooperation in the South China Sea: Factors, actors and mechanisms,” Ocean & Coastal Management (2013), 85, Part B: 131-140, https://www.researchgate.net/deref/ http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1016%2Fj. ocecoaman.2013.02.004.

Frances Mangosing, “Chinese research vessel encroaches into PH waters anew”. Inquirer.net, last modified September 18, 2020, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/190989/chinese-research-vessel- encroaches-into-ph-waters-anew#ixzz6j9BYduLU. Agung Satyawan, “The diplomacy of scientific research in the South China Sea: the case of join to oceanographic marine scientific research expedition between Vietnam and the Philippines,” IOP Conf. Ser.: Earth and Environmental Science, 129:012024, https:// iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/129/1/012024.

28 January – February 2021

The Belt T and Road Beyond the Pandemic

he COVID-19

pandemic has cast a

shadow over the Belt

and Road Initiative’s future.

However, even before

the pandemic, a recently

released dataset by Boston University illustrates a

major decrease in Chinese energy to host countries.1 Recently, The Financial Times has in particular

WILL THE CHINESE STATE CHANGE THEIR PREFERENCES FOR STRONGMEN? Alvin Camba 29 January – February 2021

called this the end of BRI,2

a controversial declaration that has unsurprisingly

earned some criticism.3

Despite the bold prediction, I argue

focus often overestimates the degree

end any time soon, even if financing

In actuality, relying on strongmen

that the Belt and Road is not likely to commitments have dropped in 2020.

As I have argued elsewhere,4 China has pursued a strategy of investing

in strongmen who could protect their investments. Upon close inspection,

to which China influences these states. demonstrates China’s difficulties of

investing in host countries with different institutional settings and political systems.

this strategy of investing in strongmen

China is a late-capital exporting country,

against their investments within

engage in cross-border services only

leaders has generated backlash

host countries. Both the firms and the Chinese state reason that the

safest course of action is the rely on

strongmen. Even though this approach appears quite rational at face value, it is not produced consistent results

for the Chinese state. Observers have

described China’s tendencies to invest and propagate “strongmen” across

the world,5 ranging from Cambodia’s Hun Sen, Philippines’ Duterte, and

Thailand’s Prayut.6 However, such a

sending out their firms to invest or

from the late 1990s to early 2000s.7

However, China’s “going out” was later than those of similar investors. As early as the 19th century, Western countries or the former colonial powers shaped

the rules and norms that govern inter-

firm relations across the colonial world,

shaping the initial rules that came out of

the Bretton Woods system in the 1950s.8 Eventually, these rules were reshaped to suit the surge of multinational firm investments under the Washington

30 January – February 2021

Consensus during the 1980s and 1990s.9

and city-level ones have local cadres.

investment laws, intellectual property

regularly join private firms after their

Rules of the game particularly on foreign rights, and investment arbitration were

suited for Western firms that were usually from democratic states. Some newly-

emerging countries such as Japan, Korea,

Former communist party members

retirement from public office, a system akin to the “revolving door” of the West.12

and Singapore not only adapted to these

This is not to say that every firm in China

themselves.

at provincial and local levels act more

rules but eventually became key players

As a party-state under the rule of the

Chinese Communist Party, China follows a mercantilist approach with the goal of maximizing wealth creation at the expense of everything else.10 This is

reflected in China’s state-firm interaction, where the division between state and private individuals disappears.11 For

instance, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the national or central government level regularly have board members

from the important cadres of the CCP;

provincial SOEs have provincial cadres; 31 January – February 2021

reflects security interests. Indeed, firms like private enterprises with the goal of wealth maximization. Firms at the

national level have broader goals, such

as social stability, employment creation, and maximizing security. As most firms at any level comprise state officials, they bring along their experience

and particular ways of dealing with

risk. In China, the usual strategy is to

befriend or work with the government official in power, like provincial and

city-level leaders who could protect

firm investments and suppress radical demand.

As a result, the Chinese state represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies regularly befriends “strongmen” in the global south to protect their firms from the potential problems in the host state environment.

This diplomatic move comes in multimillion-dollar foreign direct investment, construction contracts, foreign aid, loans, and other forms of inflows. This behavior is not because of the Chinese state’s geostrategic motive to diffuse or spread authoritarianism or Chinese capitalism in countries. In other words, Chinese state resorts to befriending strongmen as a substitute for influencing institutions and rules that govern foreign investment or contracting ventures between states.

In some way, Chinese firms at all levels follow the parameters set by the Central Government. Some firms believe in the host country strongman’s capacity, replicating their behaviors inside China that rely on provincial level leaders to protect their assets. Some firms do not, pursuing the ventures of the Chinese

government because of the government incentives and state financing support.In either case, the Chinese state befriends strongmen leaders in the global south, leading to the strategy of creating financial incentives for Chinese firms to invest in strategy of the host country leaders. This leads to investments between Chinese firms and the host country leader’s state and business elite partners, neglecting elites outside the leader’s coalition in the process. Indeed, major Chinese investments during Arroyo, Najib, and Duterte regularly work with the people or firms of the state and business elite partners of these respective leaders.

There are two effects in this process of Chinese firms looking for strongmen.

First, if the leaders are actually weak contrary to the perception of the Chinese state, Chinese firms are likely to face cancellation risk. This is because the Chinese state creates incentives for firms to work with the elites tied to the host country leader, leading to the

32 January – February 2021

President Rodrigo Roa Duterte with President Xi Jinping.

marginalization of elites outside that coalition. As a result, elites left out of the deal collectively mobilize to bring down the leader if possible. For instance, many of the Chinese deals during Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s time worked with firms and people tied to Arroyo herself.13 Elites marginalized by the Chinese deals mobilized to bring down Arroyo and the Chinese deals. A similar process occurred when Chinese deals worked with Najib Razak’s deals, leading to Najib’s downfall in 2018.14 Second, a pushback risk may occur if the leader is indeed strong. Since opposition and other elites have been marginalized, the Chinese state and firms have no other choice but to rely on the leader, who now possesses leverage to pursue interest against the Chinese state and firms.

33 January – February 2021

An example of this type of relationship is Rodrigo Duterte’s relationship with the Chinese state. After ignoring the Hague Tribunal’s decision, Duterte has opened the Philippines to online gambling firms, which has caused some disagreements between him and the Chinese government. Online gambling firms generate money laundering, crime, and illegal labor migration for the Chinese government. However, Chinese state needs Duterte to keep his stance in the South China Sea, resulting in some tolerance on online gambling firm investments. In Indonesia, China’s friendship with Joko “Jokowi” Widodo resulted in major agreements in foreign investment and aid.15 However, Jokowi has recently pushed back on the Natuna Islands issue to the detriment of the Chinese government’s interest.16

All in all, the post-pandemic Indo-Pacific might demonstrate a Chinese government adjusting their investment strategy, which has relied on strongmen in the past, and could explain the decrease in investments in 2019. This reliance on strongmen has limited China’s ability to make real inroads in host countries. For Western governments, the approach on institutional building as a comparative strategy is correct. Crucially, there is also a need to reforms on these rules to make growth inclusive for the rest of the population in order to further stave off the advances of Chinese state and firms alike. Western governments could also, to some degree, encourage China to participate in building and strengthening

institutions. This final solution is unlikely as China’s domestic system encourages this strategy of befriending strongmen leaders.

President Xi Jinping.

NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16

Cornell, K., “The evolving relationship between the international development architecture and China’s Belt and Road. Who is making the rules?” Brookings. October 2020. Url: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-evolving-relationship-between-the-internationaldevelopment-architecture-and-chinas-belt-and-road/ Wheatley, J. & Kynge, James, “China curtails overseas lending in face of geopolitical backlash.” Financial Times. December 7, 2020. Url: https://www.ft.com/content/1cb3e33b-e2c2-4743-ae41-d3fffffa4259 Kenderdine, T. & Yau, “N. China’s Policy Banks are Lending Differently, Not Less,” The Diplomat. December 12, 2020. https:// thediplomat.com/2020/12/chinas-policy-banks-are-lending-differently-not-less/ Alvin Camba, “The Rise of Strongmen Regimes: Duterte, Jokowi, and Chinese Capital in Southeast Asia,” Talk given at Jeffrey Cheah Institute & Sunway University, March 4, 2020 and Alvin Camba. “Strongmen Regimes and Chinese Capital: Elite Conflict and Consolidation in Southeast Asia,” Talk at AidData, College of William and Mary, February 8, 2020.

Editorial Board, “Southeast Asia’s strongmen looking to China as Trump visits Asia,” East Asia Forum, November 6, 2017, https:// www. eastasiaforum.org/2017/11/06/southeast-asias-strongmen-looking-to-china-as-trump-visits-asia/.

Alvin Camba, “The Sino-centric Capital Export Regime: State-backed and Flexible Capital in the Philippines,” Development and Change, 51, no. 4 (2020): 970-997.

Ho-fung Hung,“America’s head servant?” New Left Review (2009), 60: 23.

James Raymond Vreeland, The IMF and Economic Development (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Sarah Babb, “The Washington Consensus as transnational policy paradigm: Its origins, trajectory and likely successor,” Review of International Political Economy (2013), 20, no. 2: 268-297.

Di Rodrik, “The new mercantilist challenge,” Project Syndicate, (2013), Vol. 9.

Margaret Pearson et al., “Party-State Capitalism in China,” (Working Paper 21-065, Harvard Business School, 2020), https://www.hbs. edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/21-065_f90a6710-5f74-49df-ac70-f5ef6b3d48c5.pdf.

Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change, (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Alvin Camba, “Inter-state relations and state capacity: the rise and fall of Chinese foreign direct investment in the Philippines,” Palgrave Communications (2017), 3, no. 1: 1-19.

Hong Liu and Guanie Lim, “The political economy of a rising China in Southeast Asia: Malaysia’s response to the Belt and Road Initiative,” Journal of Contemporary China (2019), 28, no. 116: 216-231, http://www.sss.ntu.edu.sg/Programmes/ppga/Documents/ The%20Political%20Economy%20of%20a%20Rising%20China%20in%20Southeast%20Asia%20Malaysia%20s%20Response%20to%20 the%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative.pdf.

Cliff Venzon,“Philippines bets on online casinos, e-cockfights as Chinese flee,” Nikkei Asia, December 18, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/ Business/Media-Entertainment/Philippines-bets-on-online-casinos-e-cockfights-as-Chinese-flee.

Reuters Staff, “Indonesia’s president visits island in waters disputed by China,” Reuters, January 8, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-indonesia-china-southchinasea/indonesias-president-visits-island-in-waters-disputed-by-china-idUSKBN1Z710N.

34 January – February 2021

Indian Foreign Policy in South Asia ON THE VERGE OF EROSION?

T

Don McLain Gill he COVID-19 pandemic has taken a serious toll on the states of the international system as economies have

been crippled and the outset of strategic polcies have

been relatively constrained due to the problem rooted in

the purchasing and spending power of each state. However, going beyond the pandemic, it is important to note that

the state still has the primary role in international politics

and that powerful states are still trying to bounce back and

increase their relative material capabilities to project power and engage in competition with other powerful states in order to dominate their respective regions in the world.

The pandemic, however, has in fact exacerbated interstate

power rivalry. Among the states that have bounced back from the pandemic, China has continued engaging in assertive

policies all over the Indo-Pacific in order to expand its power projection capabilities and fulfill its strategic interests to dominate Asia.

35 January – February 2021

China in South Asia Among the regions of the Indo-Pacific, it is worth looking at the case of South Asia, most especially, vis-à-vis the power competition between the status quo regional power, India, and the revisionist power, China. The common narrative we hear today from various news outlets and political pundits is that China has overtaken India as the major state in South Asia. However, looking into the dynamics of international politics where issues of security often come at the primary in state affairs, these narratives should not be overexaggerated. It must be understood that China’s engagement with the states of the region merely rests on being a major import source to some states coupled with its mega infrastructural investments. However, in the security domain, India continues to maintain and cement its position in the region.

However, China’s rapidly increasing involvement in South Asia does not come without any strategic consequences for India. Despite Beijing’s insistence of having only commercial intentions in the region, evidence shows that these actions are tainted with geopolitical goals.

Considering that China’s engagements with the smaller states of the region

often come at the expense of India to constrain its influence.

China is dissatisfied at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India and is trying to improve the situation unilaterally.1 Beijing is also frustrated with New Delhi’s persistent support of the Dalai Lama and its rejection of the Belt and Road Initiative due to issues of transparency. As a result, China seeks to undermine India’s interests by trying to tip the balance of regional affairs to its favor.

China has been cementing its “allweather” partnership with Pakistan – a state that has been at loggerheads with India since 1947. Both states converge on a common goal to constrain India’s influence in the region. China has shown its support for Pakistan and has safeguarded the latter’s strategic interests.2 China has also been shielding Pakistan from facing allegations due to its support and sponsorship of terrorism in the region.3 In addition, China has invested billions of dollars in Pakistan to develop the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that runs through the area that India considers to be part of its territory.

What aggravates the situation further is that China does not want the issue to resolve in India’s favor because 36 January – February 2021

the territory is the physical “umbilical cord”. China has also been investing heavily in the development of strategically located ports in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar that all form a noose around India’s neck.

China has also been pouring down investments and financial aid to Nepal and Afghanistan to increase its influence over the states.

37 January – February 2021

Evaluating India’s Position Despite China’s increasing economic clout over the states of South Asia, India’s role in the region cannot be easily eroded or replaced. Geopolitics matters and has become a determining factor in understanding regional affairs in South Asia amid the competition for influence between China and India.

Going back to China’s trade and investment relations in South Asia, due to geographical constraints Beijing has not created that sort of dependency among the states of South Asia and, therefore, cannot apply too much pressure on them to comply with its interests. Unlike Southeast Asia where China can use coercive strategies on the states by threatening to cutoff trade and investments, it does not have

that sort of leverage over the states of South Asia.4 Moreover, South Asian states have now been seen to be slowly pushing-back Chinese-led megaprojects due to lack of transparency coupled with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.5 China has put a significant amount of effort to draw South Asian states closer and increase connectivity in the economic realm. However, despite these attempts, it is necessary not to discard the fact that the South Asian states would still not want to engage in any compromising competition against India.

Despite India having unpleasant relations with its neighbors throughout history such as during the time of President Yameen of Maldives, President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka, and Pakistan since the partition, the states did not offer China any military bases. Additionally, majority of South Asian states are bound geographically to India and any aggressive Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) wearing face masks march behavior against the at Bhendi bazaar during the COVID-19 Coronavirus pandemic. latter will have serious 38 January – February 2021

SLNS Sindurala leave for India to take part in SLINEX 2019.

implications for the states of the region (recall the blockades). As a result, South Asian states have always tried to maintain positive security relations with India. Recent examples include Sri Lanka’s recently announced India First approach that greatly takes into consideration India’s security interests.6 Accordingly, the approach states that Sri Lanka will not engage in any action that will compromise India’s security and strategic interests.

Other states of South Asia, despite not being as explicit, also share similar perspectives vis-à-vis India. In fact, Pakistan, regardless of its animosity towards India, still takes precaution in dealing with extra-regional states in a way that will not upset the balance of power in the region.

39 January – February 2021

A Way Forward for India Despite the prominence of geopolitics in the interstate equation of South Asian affairs, India must not be complacent with its current position. Considering that China is continuing to enhance its capabilities in the region, India must recalibrate its engagements with its neighbors and create avenues for accommodation and consistent dialogue.

This was seen when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reinvigorated the country’s “Neighbourhood First Policy” that highlighted the need to engage more effectively with India’s neighbors in the Indian Ocean. In fact, this has been a cornerstone of Prime Minister Modi’s Indian foreign policy. Recent examples of this policy are highlighted through India’s enhanced interest to forge connectivity projects with states

like Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Maldives.

In addition, India has been enhancing its role as a net security provider in times of natural calamities by offering immediate humanitarian relief and bolstering the resiliency of neighboring states.

However, current trends show that this policy is suffering setbacks with tensions spiraling between India and its neighbors including Nepal, Pakistan, and (to an extent) Sri Lanka. As a result, India must not allow China to take advantage of these fault lines. As mentioned in the previous section, India’s neighbors may not be willing to take major steps to

compromise India’s strategic interests; however, any level of tension can be used as leverage. India must prioritize its relations with its neighbors and cultivate a secure and stable environment. A way forward would involve India shedding its “big brother” image – which involves clear power asymmetry – and taking part to understand the issues that plague the individual states of the South Asian region. By being a responsible partner, India may be able to reinvigorate its image in the strategically located region.

Moreover, as China continues to increase its strategic footprints and

40 January – February 2021

constrain India’s strategic capacity and compromise its national interest, it would be beneficial for New Delhi to forge and deepen cooperation with like-minded extra-regional partnerships that will balance China’s efforts to revise the

status quo in the region. As a result, India will have to significantly recalibrate its foreign policy to enhance its position as a security provider in the region, and at the same time, play a more vital role in intraregional affairs.

NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6

Derek Grossman, “What China Wants in South Asia,” Observer Research Foundation, June 11, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/ research/what-china-wants-in-south-asia-67665/.

Sun Weidong, “Pakistan-China Relations: CPEC and Beyond,” Policy Perspectives 14, no. 2 (2017): 5, https://doi.org/10.13169/ polipers.14.2.0003.

“US report slams Pakistan on terrorism: Here is what it says,” Times of India, June 26, 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/ pakistan/us-report-slams-pakistan-on-terrorism-here-is-what-it-says/articleshow/76645391.cms.

Sameer Lalwani, “China’s Port to Nowhere,” Foreign Affairs, April 8, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-04-08/ chinas-port-nowhere.

Don McLain Gill, “The Myanmar Challenge in China’s ‘String of Pearls’ Strategy,” 9DashLine, August 12, 2020, https://www.9dashline. com/article/the-myanmar-challenge-in-chinas-string-of-pearls-strategy.

“Sri Lanka to adopt ‘India first approach’ as new policy, says Foreign Secretary Colombage,” The Print, August 26,2020, https://theprint. in/diplomacy/sri-lanka-to-adopt-india-first-approach-as-new-policy-says-foreign-secretary-colombage/489742/.

41 January – February 2021

NATALIE SAMBHI FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR:

Mark Payumo

D

oing interesting things leads one to meet interesting people. We at Analyzing War embarked on this journey roughly four years ago with a laser focus on Indo-Pacific security issues, not on the people that drive, influence, and study them. Of course, as in war, the first casualty is always the plan and since then we’ve decided to become real publishers and reoriented closer to security scholars—and experts—whom we found to be brimming with passion and, almost invariably, exude hope for the future. Our advocacy for a more stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific region has made great strides as a consequence.

Security scholarship requires nuance and to assert that we are headed for an

optimistic future will always be open to dispute. But it is fair to say that so long as we choose the right people who will take us to a better place, we are in good hands and the future certainly looks bright. We chose Natalie Sambhi as our inaugural featured security scholar on this magazine because for us she represents what our time is striving towards: diversity, equity, kindness, honesty, nuance. She first interviewed on our podcast where she talked to us about civil-military relations in Indonesia and we’re truly thankful to have her here for another appearance.

The following is our email exchange with Natalie as she writes to us from Perth, Australia. Read on and learn about her journey and the work that she does for the security of our world.

42 January – February 2021

Natalie Sambhi is a nonresident fellow with the Foreign Policy program at Brookings Institution.

She is also the founder and executive director of Verve Research, an independent research collective focused on the relationship between militaries and societies in Southeast Asia.

Through her research, presentations, and publications, Natalie is committed to helping people gain a more nuanced understanding of Indonesian civil-military relations, Indonesian defense policy and Southeast Asian security.

Natalie is also a Ph.D. scholar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University, focussing on Indonesian military history. In 2018, the Royal United Services Institute awarded her the Leo Mahony bursary to support her doctoral research.

From 2016 to 2020, she was a research fellow with the Perth USAsia Centre. From 2012 to 2016, Natalie worked at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) as an analyst and managing editor of ASPI’s blog, The Strategist.

She has previously worked at the Department of Defence, University of Canberra and for the academic journal Asian-Pacific Economic Literature. In May 2014 and in January 2016, Natalie was a visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C. Natalie has been a guest lecturer and presenter at the Australian National University, Australian National Security College, Australian War College, Indonesian National Resilience Institute, Indonesian Defense University, Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian Department of National Defence, and several international think tanks and universities. Her writing has appeared in Security Challenges journal, South China Morning Post, War On The Rocks, The Diplomat, The Interpreter, and The National Interest.

Born and raised in Perth, Western Australia, Natalie holds a Bachelor of Arts (Asian studies, hons.) from the University of Western Australia and a Master of Arts (international relations) and Master of Diplomacy from the Australian National University.

Affiliations: Young Australians in International Affairs, board member

43 January – February 2021

AW: What drew your interest to become a security scholar?

Natalie: I’ve always wanted to work on

international affairs but I never thought

I’d end up working so closely on military

issues! Neither in my childhood nor in my family or friends did we have much to do

thinking about the armed forces. Being a

complete newbie to defence, I started by going straight to the Defence library and reading anything I could online. Looking back on it now, I’m grateful for that

experience and the reminder to keep an open mind.

with the military. But I ended up working

After I left Defence, I wasn’t sure what

while and it completely reorganized my

engaging with what was going on with

at the Department of Defence for a short

I wanted to do but I kept reading and

44 January – February 2021

publish online and I have made so many close friends from natsec communities and networks around the world.

After several years of moving around and working in think tanks and then

setting up Verve Research, I decided it

was time to step up my game and delve

even more deeply into a topic via a PhD. Given the concentration of expertise of Indonesia in my homeland, it seemed like a natural choice to apply for the

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

at the Australian National University. So, back to Canberra I went!

AW: Can you give a brief description of your thesis topic?

Natalie: In a nutshell, my thesis looks Australian deployments in Afghanistan and the Indonesian military’s presence in its provinces. Seeing that so many

rich discussions and important debates were happening across blogs and

Twitter (which was much tamer and more collegial than today), I decided to set up Security Scholar blog in December 2010

(named after my Twitter handle), focusing more on analyzing security affairs and

learning from my peers. Without them, I

wouldn’t have built up the confidence to 45 January – February 2021

at the Indonesian military’s collective memory of its time in East Timor

(1975–1999). More specifically, I’m interested in how the Indonesian

military as an institution understands

not just what happened in East Timor

but how individuals remember the loss of the province. Who do they hold

responsible? Do younger officers hold different views to older ones? Does it vary across services? What does this

tell us about civil-military relations in Indonesia?

To answer these questions, I’ve looked

of the Indonesian military’s sometimes

histories and memoirs but also the Seroja

day I’d then sit down with TNI members,

at not just publicly available official

Monument, which commemorates the

campaign and is a rough equivalent to the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial in DC in terms of function and design. I’ve

also interviewed active duty and retired

officers on their views, which resulted in some light-hearted moments but some emotionally heavy ones as well. It was

quite jarring in some ways. For instance, during fieldwork, I would read accounts

brutal occupation of East Timor. The next some of whom were friends, and talk about a sensitive historical chapter. I

developed a deeper appreciation for

journalists, psychologists, or researchers

who have personally ambivalent feelings around an interview subject while still

discharging their role in a professional manner. Separating personal and

professional sentiments is sometimes not easy!

46 January – February 2021

AW: What motivated you to choose this topic for your PhD thesis?

Natalie: As I was filling in holes in my

own knowledge about the Indonesian military’s history, I realized there was

a bit of a gap in the English-language

my research can spark a bit more interest in our region in one or two younger minds.

AW: What is your favorite book and why?

literature, particularly scholarly

Natalie: That’s a tough question to ask a

Indonesian perceptions of the East

greatly in recent years: one is Black Hearts

works, that focused on contemporary Timor campaign. Given Australia’s role,

particularly in leading the peacekeeping force during the Indonesian military’s

withdrawal, I thought it was important

to shed light on how one of Australia’s

significant strategic partners interpreted that event.

On a personal note, I wanted to choose

a topic that required a lot of Indonesian language sources and interactions with Indonesian people. As I learn more

about the Indonesian military and its

history, the more I am engaging with

the history and culture of my mother’s

homeland. That matters to me because

I didn’t spend as much time in Indonesia as a kid as I did in Malaysia, where my

father is from, so I’m trying to fill in some gaps. There also isn’t a lot taught about Indonesia in our education system and,

with Asian Studies enrollment shrinking across Australian universities, hopefully 47 January – February 2021

bibliophile! Two books have influenced me

by Jim Frederick, which grapples with the

reasons why four members of a U.S. Army platoon in Iraq committed the rape of a

14-year old girl and murdering her family

in late 2005. The other is In Extremis: The

Life and Death of the War Correspondent

Marie Colvin by Lindsey Hilsum, published

after the journalist’s death in Syria in 2012.

Frederick’s book impressed me for the

sheer breadth and depth of its interviews; I felt the author really mastered the art

of leaving no stone unturned, examining all possible angles of the organizational culture (including toxic leadership) and

particularly dire deployment conditions leading up to the atrocities without

cutting the perpetrators any slack. The book captured the complexities of the human condition, its strength, and its

frailties. I picked it up in May 2019 and it became much needed inspiration during a slight slump in my PhD morale at that time.

Straight after, I started Hilsum’s

relations and Southeast Asian militaries.

Colvin (she looks like such a badass

us to focus on, please don’t hesitate to

biography of the indomitable Marie on the cover) and found a similarly

complex portrait but this time of an

If there’s an area or question you’d like shout out.

individual. As I turned the pages, I felt a connection with a woman working in a predominantly male field, torn

between the warmth of stability and

the allure of an unmoored and daring

life, between sheer independence and the nascent joys of step-motherhood.

Those were things that I could deeply relate to at that time of my life. By

accident, reading those books backto-back fuelled both my personal and professional contemplations.

I freely extol the virtues of both

works to anyone asking for book

recommendations, going so as far to

gift copies of Black Hearts when I find them in secondhand bookshops!

AW: Where can we find your work and learn more from you?

Natalie: The best place to find Verve’s work is via our social media accounts, particularly our Facebook page or Twitter @verve_research. We’ll be

ramping up our online presence in

2021, so we look forward to bringing you more content on civil-military

48 January – February 2021

When evil men plot, Good men must plan.

When evil men burn and bomb, Good men must build and bind.

When evil men shout ugly words of hatred, Good men must commit themselves to the glories of love.

Where evil men would seek to perpetuate an unjust status quo, Good men must seek to bring into being A real order of justice.

Martin Luther King, Jr.