Appendice a Assistenza Al Volo - trimestre 2 / 2018

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

Edizione Speciale

Accra, Ghana 19-23 Marzo 2018

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AKWAABA! IFATCA 57 L’annuale conferenza IFATCA, la cinquantasettesima, si è svolta ad ACCRA in Ghana, dal 19 al 23 marzo 2018.

traverso l’ottimizzazione della performance umana grazie al supporto tecnologico), e dall’altro la crescente domanda di capacità e servizi dovuta alla rapida espansione del settore in Asia ed Africa.

La conferenza è stata ufficialmente aperta martedì mattina alla presenza del capo dello stato ghanese Addo Dankwa Akofu-Addo e di altre autorità locali.

Il tema della conferenza è stato “Making the future ours”, un chiaro riferimento all’attuale situazione africana che vede aeroporti e servizi del traffico aereo in rapidissima espansione ma anche alla voglia di ritrovare la centralità del ruolo del controllore del traffico aereo che in questi anni è stata in parte messa in secondo piano a favore dello sviluppo della tecnologia.

Diversamente dalle passate edizioni, quest’anno si sono volute anticipare alla prima giornata le attività complementari alla conferenza vera e propria, come i meeting regionali ed i workshop IFATCA. L’aver posticipato l’inizio della discussione dei lavori dei comitati al mercoledì mattina non ha raccolto il favore di tutti: alcuni partecipanti hanno infatti lamentato che le tempistiche serrate e ristrette date ai relatori per rispettare la scadenza del fine lavori di venerdì, non ha permesso di approfondire le discussioni in maniera adeguata e costruttiva.

Il presidente Patrick Peters dopo aver illustrato il lavoro svolto da IFATCA nell’anno passato, gli interventi fatti direttamente dell’EB nel supportare alcune federazioni, ha prospettato le necessità ed i problemi che IFATCA sarà chiamata ad affrontare nei prossimi anni con, da un lato, la crescente pressione da parte degli ANSPs per una riduzione dei costi (at-

La cerimonia di chiusura del venerdì ha visto la presentazione dei resoconti dei lavori dei vari comitati che sono stati accettati dall’assemblea. C’è poi stato il passaggio di testimone al comitato organizzatore dell’assemblea del prossimo anno che si terrà in Costa Rica.

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AIREON (sponsor nonché corporate member IFATCA) Entro il 2018 è prevista copertura globale e tutti gli aerei equipaggiati ADS-B potranno usufruire del servizio.

La copertura attuale è migliore del previsto con overlap triplo nella maggior parte del globo, anziché singola/ doppia come inizialmente progettato. La certificazione EASA dovrebbe essere completata entro ottobre 2018 ed Aireon sarà così un data provider per gli ANSP che ne richiederanno il servizio.

EUROCONTROL – Future challenges for European ATM. Philippe Merlo, Direttore ATM, ha presentato i dati europei sul traffico: nel 2017, a fronte di un aumento del traffico del 4,3%, i ritardi sono aumentati del 25% a causa del raggiungimento della capacità massima degli aeroporti più importanti (Amsterdam, Londra, Parigi) e per questo anno le cose si prevedono in ulteriore peggioramento. Altro dato significativo riguarda il ritardo enroute, cresciuto del 34% per motivi legati all’ATC capacity. I 2/3 dei ritardi emessi si concentrano negli aeroporti e nei centri della core area europea, dove si sviluppa anche la maggior parte del traffico. Tra i maggiori contribuenti a questi ritardi Karlsruhe, Maastricht, Marsiglia e Brest. La causa principale è “ATC staffing”: durante il periodo di contrazione del traffico e crisi economica sono stati fermati recruiting e training e di conseguenza non si è stati in grado di stare al passo con la, seppur graduale, ripresa del trasporto aereo. Si stima che nel 2035 in Europa si gestiranno 15 milioni di voli (contro gli attuali 10.6) e se non si apporteranno modifiche sostanziali allo spazio aereo ed alla gestione dei voli stessi, il ritardo medio per volo sarà di 15’, cosa ritenuta ovviamente inaccettabile. Allo stato attuale però non si prospettano grandi rivoluzioni. Dopo il fallimento dei FAB (ndr), concetto comunque riproposto da Merlo per ottimizzare il free route (quasi tutta europa dovrebbe essere free route al 2022), una delle altre poche strade percorribili sembra quella della riduzione della separazione per turbolenza di scia da applicare attraverso RECAT (nuove minime di separazione per turbolenza di scia) oppure l’applicazione di separazioni TBS. Per raggiungere gli obiettivi previsti da Merlo, sarà necessario che tutti gli stakeholder mettano da parte la competizione e collaborino per definire nuovi scenari, possibilità alquanto remota allo stato attuale. Lo spazio aereo europeo dovrà essere ridisegnato andando a ridefinire anche le TSA/TRA e CBA e continuando con l’implementazione dei concetti APOC/ACDM per aumentare l’efficienza e coordinare i diversi stakeholders nelle attività di un volo.

Sul fronte data link, Merlo ha riconosciuto che le potenzialità del sistema non sono ancora espresse al meglio e prevede una crescita del 50/75% degli aeromobili equipaggiati DL entro il 2022. Entro la fine del 2018 i DLS saranno disponibili nella maggior parte dello SA Europeo. Ad oggi Reims, Marsiglia, Malta e Portogallo forniscono un servizio non compliance con il regolamento 310/2015. Il servizio non è ancora fornito da Norvegia, Grecia e Lettonia.

Concetti come SWIM e virtual center consentiranno servizi ATM più veloci efficienti e cuciti su misura alla domanda. Le ROT aumenteranno l’efficienza aeroportuale ad iniziare per quegli aeroporti che non sono più economicamente sostenibili e dando quindi una nuova possibilità di crescita per tutti, non solo per i grandi aeroporti.

Per quanto riguarda i servizi ATFM, questi dovranno essere migliorati soprattutto in fase tattica, puntando poi a FDP basati sui concetti di trajectory based operations.

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LOW-COST REMOTE TWR La Finlandia, nella persona di Jakko Autio, riporta che il proprio provider, Air Navigation Services Finland Oy (ANS Finland), ha in progetto le Low-Cost Remote Twr (LCRTS). Tali strutture saranno installate in 12 aeroporti a basso traffico e a bassa complessità e non potranno gestire più di due IFR simultaneamente ed un solo aeromobile alla volta sarà ammesso sull’area di manovra. Queste caratteristiche sono tali da, secondo il provider finlandese, permettere al singolo CTA di operare simultaneamente (concetto ancora da approfondire) su un massimo di tre aeroporti con carico massimo di 4 IFR/h/aeroporto. Le LCRTS combineranno i servizi TWR/APP e potranno fornire i svz ATS nei rispettivi ATZ/CTR/TMA fino a FL95, indipendentemente dalle condizioni meteo, portando la classificazione dello SA da l’attuale C a D. Gli orari di servizio delle LCRTS dovrebbero andare da 30’ prima dell’ETA a 30’ dopo ATD. Per le notizie giunte fino ad ora, ai controllori non sarà richiesto il monitoraggio del funzionamento dei vari sistemi di terra, compito che verrà assegnato a tecnici specializzati.

La notizia che ha oltremodo colpito tutti è che gli ATCOs che opereranno con questi sistemi saranno abilitati su tutti e 12 gli impianti che potranno essere raggruppati senza specifici vincoli fino ad un massimo di tre. Come riportato dalla Finlandia e ribadito dagli interventi dei presenti, questo crea non pochi problemi in termini di situational awareness e disorientamento. Si è portato come esempio la possibile confusione con i nominativi di chiamata dei mezzi al suolo diversi, o peggio uguali, tra i vari aeroporti. Si pensa quindi che le frequenze saranno utilizzate separatamente per evitare overlap di comunicazioni su diversi aeroporti e le procedure RTF dovranno necessariamente cambiare (prevedendo ad esempio il nome dell’aeroporto prima di ogni autorizzazione di pista o di rullaggio, ridenominazione dei mezzi a terra a livello nazionale per evitare callsign uguali di tug, rimozione neve ecc.).

REPORT EVP EUROPE Tom Laursen ha riferito sullo stato di avanzamento dei programmi in atto, in particolare di SESAR. La data finale, inizialmente prevista per il 2020 è stata posticipata al 2035 a causa dei problemi riscontrati sia dai provider sia dalle compagnie.

WORKING PAPER Durante la conferenza vengono presentati i lavori svolti e gli studi fatti dai vari comitati o panel IFATCA. Questi lavori prendono il nome di Working Papaer (WP) e possono o proporre delle policy, che verranno poi discusse e votate, oppure essere di tipo divulgativo (Information Paper).

In allegato riportiamo le WP che l’Italia ha contribuito a realizzare e presentare: En-route Wake Turbulence (Enrico Fisser), State Aircraft and ‘Due Regard’ Operations (Eugenio Diotalevi, Nicola Gallo), Position Paper on Remotely Operated Towers (Giusy Sciacca), Air Traffic Management for Tiltrotors (Oliver Barsanti).

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COMMITTEE A Il comitato A, che tratta di argomenti di carattere amministrativo come le quote di iscrizione, le richieste di adesione e la gestione finanziaria della federazione, è stato presieduto da Helena Sjörström, ex presidente di SATCA, l’associazione dei controllori del traffico aereo svedesi.

Le sedute nelle due giornate si sono svolte in maniera fluida, all’insegna di discussioni interessanti e uno scambio di esperienze sempre arricchente. Tra le working paper che maggiormente sono state seguite da dibattito segnaliamo quelle relative alla gestione delle finanze e le ammissioni/sospensioni delle associazioni membre.

Durante i lavori le associazioni nazionali maggiormente in difficoltà, soprattutto quelle della regione africana, hanno avuto modo di far conoscere la propria situazione e i propri sforzi per mantenersi al passo soprattutto con la formazione degli associati e il pagamento della quota annuale.

Questo infatti è stato un argomento al quale è stata dedicata molta attenzione.

L’EVP Africa Fateh Bekhti riporta per questo primo anno di incarico numerose difficoltà relative ai viaggi e agli spostamenti all’interno della propria regione. Questo discorso è ulteriormente confermato dallo Yemen, che a causa della delicatissima situazione politica è vincolato soprattutto a voli di tipo umanitario e pochi di tipo civile nonostante l’intervento delle UN. Alla medesima regione si riconduce il caso della collega Margret Kagendo, a sostegno della quale la Federazione ha messo il proprio surplus dell’anno precedente per il pagamento delle spese legali. E’ stato specificato che tale caso non può costituire un precedente e per quanto la Federazione si impegni a mobilitarsi in tutti i modi per garantire supporto e solidarietà ai colleghi in difficoltà, eventuali altri casi saranno valutati uno per uno.

John Carr, EVP AMA, riporta la difficile situazione seguita agli uragani soprattutto in Porto Rico e all’incidente in Colombia.

NUOVE ADESIONI Argentina Marocco Filippine

THE CONTROLLER MAGAZINE & COMMUNICATION COMMITTEE Nonostante le ricerche, la figura dell’editor rimane ancora scoperta e ciò potrebbe comportare la chiusura del magazine. Vista comunque la necessità di pubblicare e comunicare all’esterno le numerose iniziative a livello internazionale, una alternativa potrebbe essere una pubblicazione annuale (proposta Australia).

PROSSIME CONFERENZE 2019: COSTA RICA 2020: SINGAPORE

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COMMITTEE B Il Committee B tratta argomenti tecnici e operativi della professione. Nel dettaglio, durante le riunioni, sono analizzate tutte le working paper (WP) sviluppate dal Techincal and Operational Committee (TOC) durante l’anno e ascoltati i report dei rappresentanti IFATCA nei diversi pannelli ICAO o di altre istituzioni chiamate a intervenire all’interno dello stesso.

TITOLO WP E SOMMARIO

POLICY APPROVATA

WP No. 85 Future of CPDLC When properly implemented CPDLC can prove a benefit to controllers in many ways including clarifying communications, reducing radio congestion and potentially freeing up more time to dedicate to high priority tasks. There are some areas that pose a concern, however, such as lack of frequencies and several networks with different protocols (multi stack). As CPDLC has developed there have been several different systems, including disparate systems in oceanic and continental airspace, and there is a lack of a clear plan toward harmonization.

IFATCA supports efforts to define global safety and performance requirements for data link services in order to: • achieve harmonization • support further implementation to improve safety and efficiency

WP No. 86 Phraseology on ground based safety nets

When implementing ground based safety nets, common phraseology and procedures shall be used Proposals on implementation of standard phraseology and common procedures for in their operation. ground based safety nets in conjunction with approach path monitoring (APM).

WP No. 87 SID/STAR-Phraseology

Airspace, procedures and charting should be designed and implemented based on the latest ICAO New ICAO SID/STAR-Phraseology has been introduced in some countries with some provisions regarding SIDs and STARs. The result shall problems arising. This working paper gives an overview of existing IFATCA policies and be that ATC clearances are unambiguous and their regulations, compares their advantages and drawbacks, and proposes improvements to intended effects are achieved. Controller workload policies and phraseology. shall not increase beyond an acceptable level.

WP No. 88 ARIWS - Autonomous Runway Incursion Warning Systems

IFATCA fully supports and encourages the future development of Autonomous Runway Incursion WarnThis paper highlights the implementation of autonomous runway incursion warning ing Systems provided the following criteria are met: systems developed to improve runway safety. A comparison is made on the develop- • The system will be used as a safety net. ment of similar systems and to the standing provisions on ARIWS by ICAO and the exist- • False warnings are kept to an absolute minimum. ing IFATCA policy on runway status lights (RWSL).

• When an ARIWS warning c o n flicts with an ATC clearance, common phraseology shall be used.

• Comprehensive training is provided to all pilots, vehicle drivers and controllers.

WP No. 89 En-route Wake Turbulence

When the prescribed separation is applied, ATCOs shall not be held responsible for wake vortex enAll the prescriptions about wake turbulence separation are established only for ap- counters and related accidents/incidents. proach/ or departure phases. En-route separation (time or distance based), is not established to prevent wake vortex encounters at all, but only to reduce the possibility of them. Any aircraft wake turbulence recategorisation shall: The amount of wake turbulence encounter reports while en-route have been consistent, • Conduct appropriate safety assessments, inhowever a recent accident raised the general attention towards the phenomena. At the cluding a thorough understanding of the husame time, the reduction of the en- route separation, due to the re-categorisation of airman factor element. craft are under preliminary study as a possible way to increase the airspace capacity in • Design clear procedures for the application of the medium-term period. the new wake turbulence categories.

• Provide adequate tools to support the controller when applying those procedures.

• Incorporate contingency procedures for cases where support tools are unavailable and/or the new wake turbulence categories cannot be applied.

• Ensure that the new system does not have a negative effect on the efficiency of the overall ATM system.

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COMMITTEE C Il Committee C discute i lavori sviluppati dal PLC (Professional and Legal Committee) durante l’ultimo anno. Con gli stessi temi vengono inoltre presentati i report degli Executive Vice President (EVP) delle varie regioni, oltre alle partecipazioni ai panel ICAO ed EUROCONTROL. TITOLO WP E SOMMARIO

POLICY APPROVATA

WP No. 156 Competence Assessment The competence of ATCOs should be assessed regularly. Most ANSP’s have a process in place for competence assessment, being observed while working on the job or through a practical test on the simulator. Recent developments are the implementation of competency-based assessment and pursuing a weighted average of multiple observations, instead of a snapshot. Both ICAO and Eurocontrol have guidelines on the subject.

A recent survey of PLC revealed interesting data on how competence assessment is conducted around the world and what differences exist between countries. While most ANSP’s are satisfied about the process in general, there is always room for improvement. In the African region, the idea is still in its infancy.

IFATCA has addressed competence assessment for 30 years; this paper aims to refresh existing policy and bring terms and requirements in line with ICAO.

WP No. 157 Review on Just Culture and IFATCA´s Technical and Professional Manual update Just Culture has been at the forefront of IFATCA´s professional and legal debates for many years. In the past, several high quality papers on Just Culture have been submitted arguing that Jut Culture is about creating and supporting a learning culture, building an open and fair reporting system, designing safety systems and managing behavioural choices. Therefore, this paper will present a very brief review of the Just Culture concept, propose some changes at the IFATCA´s Technical and Professional Manual (TPM) and provide our Member Associations with some Guidance Material on the Just Culture implementation within aviation organisations.

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IThe results of competence assessments shall be treated confidentially. Member Associationsshould, together with their management, draw up a “code of conduct” which to the greatestpossible extent will guarantee the objectivity and confidentiality of competence assessments.

Before a competence assessment system is implemented, the following, as a minimum, shall betaken into account: • a suitable period of evaluation of the system should take place; • adequate facilities to enable remedial training.

IFATCA supports competence assessment for all personnel engaged in operational duties, forevery endorsement or validation. Theoretical knowledge and practical competence shall beassessed at least once a year, for every rating that a controller holds.

The standards to be achievedand the check list of items to be evaluated should be made available to all those concerned.

When assessments are conducted, controllers shall be able to view their results and to discussthem with the assessing officer. Additionally, a controller shall be able to record his comments,regarding the results and the manner in which the assessment was carried out.

All ATCOs selected to act as assessors should undergo appropriate training that will provideguidance on achieving a fair, objective, and valid assessment.

Additionally, a controller considered for the assessor role should have the following as aminimum: • 4 years operational experience; • 1 year experience on the position where the assessment takes place; • 2 years OJTI experience; • having a high standard of credibility and communication skills in the OJTI/coaching role; and • currency on the position where the assessment takes place.

Controllers having an assessor qualification shall be subject to the same competence assessmentsas other controllers.

The assessor’s qualification should be the subject of periodic refresher training, at periods notexceeding 3 years, to ensure that skills are maintained and new techniques and procedures areincorporated.

Just Culture IFATCA definition is “a culture in which front line operators and others are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them which are commensurate wit their experience and training, but where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated”.

Those Member Associations under national legal frameworks where mandatory and/or voluntary incident reporting systems are not yet compulsory, are encouraged to create one provided it is based on confidential reporting, the reported data shall be protected and never be used against the reporting

Assistenza Al Volo - Speciale IFATCA 57 person nor any other person mentioned in the report and it is compliant with the ICAO SAFETY MANAGEMENT MANUAL guidelines.

In regard to data protection see IFATCA policy on Use of Recorded Data and policy on Protection of Identity Just Culture is in the service of safety and by no ways a mean of social control or disciplinary mechanism.

IFATCA shall encourage Member Associations to urge their aviation organisations to develop a Just Culture Policy as part of a mature safety culture. This policy, supported by the highest organizational level and visibly endorsed by workforce level, should include the following elements: • Just Culture principles ensuring fair treatment of staff at all levels (managers and employees) • Recognition of staff at all levels for the role they play in delivering a safe service.

• Compromise to provide with the appropriate tools, training and procedures required to perform their job and guaranteeing that they would not be put in situations where safety is compromised because of organizational factors. Anyhow, systemic factors outside the scope of individuals in case of unwanted outcomes are to be considered.

• Means to constantly measure maturity and effectiveness of Just Culture within the organisation.

Any incident reporting system shall be based on the following principles: • Cooperation: with all those having a legitimate and appropriate interest • Dissemination: distribution of safety-related data to all those with appropriate interest.

• Confidentiality: for the whole procedure, guaranteed by law.

• Protection: for those involved or mentioned in the report , the provision of which be within the remit of an independent body .

• Trust and mutual respect.

WP No. 158 Duty of care principles and over servicing At the 56th Annual IFATCA conference in Toronto, Canada, the Professional and Legal Information paper Committee (PLC) presented a paper titled ‘ATCO Duty of Care’.1 The purpose of the paper was to promote discussion about the concept of duty of care and how it applies to air traffic control officers (ATCOs). It was intended to be an introduction to a concept that many have heard of but that can be difficult to define. Of course, while the topic may be interesting to some, without the means to practically apply the concepts, it may remain too abstract.

For this reason, the paper proposed a number of broad principles that may be useful in determining the standard of care owed by ATCOs and whether or not that standard has been met. These principles were distilled from a selection of case law where duty of care was considered, particularly where it involved air traffic control.

The purpose of this paper is to build on the concepts presented in last year’s paper, with an emphasis on developing a methodology to apply duty of care principles to specific situations. Applying duty of care principles to scenarios is useful for two reasons. Firstly, it will help test the principles providing an opportunity to further refine them. Secondly, it will provide an opportunity to examine a typical air traffic control scenario from a ‘duty of care’ perspective and propose a methodology to make sound decisions.

The paper will attempt to apply duty of care principles to the concept of ‘over servicing’.

The paper will define over servicing and then examine the concept in the context of providing traffic information to aircraft in class G airspace. The duty of care principles will be applied to this scenario to determine whether or not they can be useful in determining what actions, if any, should be taken.

WP No. 159 Review of the IFATCA Initial Training Manual for Air Traffic Control In the six years since the IFATCA Initial Training Manual for Air Traffic Control was intro- The IFATCA Initial Training Manual for Air Traffic duced, training methods and information available have changed significantly.

Controllers is removed as an IFATCA document This working paper reviews the Initial Training Manual in order to assess relevance and accuracy.

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Assistenza Al Volo - Speciale IFATCA 57 WP No. 160 Vigilance during OPS shift

Member Associations should devote resources for research, development of collaborative solutions Monotony, vigilance and complacency are sometimes underestimated hazards in the and training for ATCOs to combat monotony and ATC environment. This paper will highlight these hazards and the risks associated, as complacency. well as offer some examples of countermeasures.

WP No. 161 ATCOs and colour vision The issues surrounding colour vision deficiency testing were examined in WP165L at the Information paper Toronto conference 2017. This follow up paper looks in more detail at the subject, and includes a more in-depth study of testing regimes across the world.

It also follows up on further work carried out by ICAO on the subject as a result of working paper WP104 presented at the 39th ICAO Assembly regarding colour vision testing.

WP No. 162 HF Considerations when operating multiple operational positions/sectors In the six years since the IFATCA Initial Training Manual for Air Traffic Control was intro- Information paper duced, training methods and information available have changed significantly.

This working paper reviews the Initial Training Manual in order to assess relevance and accuracy.

WP No. 163 Provision of ATS over foreign territories

ATCOs working foreign airspace shall be informed about all regulatory framework, requirements, ManFor several reasons ATC is sometimes responsible for airspace of two or more countries. ual of Operations, Letters of Agreement and procedures valid for such airspace. Procedures shall For ATCOs working this airspace, it is essential to be aware of all regulations and in partic- conform to the agreed terms in contracts between ular differences in procedures and legal liabilities between the neighbouring countries. ANSPs. ATCOs shall be informed about their legal liability when working airspace which includes that over a foreign territory.

COMMITTEE B+C (COMBINED WP)

TITOLO WP E SOMMARIO

POLICY APPROVATA

WP No. 90 Display of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) surveillance data on Controller working position Availability of surveillance data from Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), and the potential displaying of that data on controller working positions in current ATM systems raises many issues that may translate into additional responsibilities and liabilities for controllers, and new technological issues that must be overcome.

Consideration of all aspects of integration, including consultation with controllers and their representative bodies, must be a priority for Regulators and ANSP’s when proposing changes to regulations, policies, procedures or work practices associated with this technology.

Information paper

WP No. 91 Clearances vs instructions

Information paper

At the 2017 conference, some indistinctness was found in the difference between clearances and instructions. It was concluded that clearances are for aircraft, while instructions can also be provided to vehicles. There was no legal difference found between clearances and instructions

(CONCLUSION: even though there is a difference in definition, TOC and PLC found no significant legal or practical difference between clearances and instructions. Both are orders that have to be complied with, without one being stronger or more urgent than the other. This opinion is endorsed by ICAO)

WP No. 92 State Aircraft and ‘Due Regard’ Operations ICAO rules are applicable only for civil aircraft. State aircraft – identified by ICAO as military, customs and police services – are not required to comply with these rules but States must, when issuing rules for their State aircraft, have ‘due regard’ for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

This working paper will examine the legal basis on which State aircraft operate with ‘due regard’, what ‘due regard’ is, where it applies and what controllers can do if State aircraft operate with due regard in their area of responsibility.

In the appendix to this paper, Duty of Care principles are applied to controller actions when managing State aircraft in the absence of guidance regulations.

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Controllers shall be trained in handling State aircraft operations including: • State aircraft not conforming to civil aviation rules and regulations • The implications of sovereign and international airspace on State aircraft operations.

Assistenza Al Volo - Speciale IFATCA 57 WP No. 93 Incorporating Cybersecurity into Unlawful Interference policy In the current Unlawful Interference policy, only the security of ATC personnel is men- IFATCA considers cyber-attacks to be a form of untioned. Cyber-attacks are targeting the computerized automation systems instead of lawful interference. personnel. At the 2017 IFATCA conference, provisional policy on cybersecurity was adopted. This policy is now incorporated to the existing IFATCA unlawful interference policy.

RTG (Remote Twr Group) La proposta per la creazione di uno standing committee centrato sulle operazioni in remoto è giunta durante la Conferenza di Accra da parte della Svezia. Tale richiesta risponde all’urgenza diffusa di monitorare e contribuire principalmente in maniera proattiva all’implementazioni delle ROT (Remotely Operated TWR). Il committee che ad oggi è una folta e attiva Task Force internazionale, conta rappresentanti da tutto il mondo e un gruppo di piloti rappresentanti IFALPA come observer.

Simulazioni sul funzionamento delle torri remote sono state effettuate da SESAR su numerosi aeroporti e queste sono già una realtà in Svezia, Finlandia, Danimarca, Olanda, Inghilterra, Ungheria.

Le ROT possono essere operate singolarmente, in maniera multuipla (sequential, simultaneous) o fungere da recovery in caso di contingency.

IFATCA si oppone con forza alle operazioni multiple simultanee.

La Task Force sulle Remote Operations, attraverso il suo chair Giusy Sciacca, ha presentato una WP in cui si descrive laposizione IFATCA

WP No. 97 Position Paper on Remotely Operated Towers

Conclusioni:

In the last years the operational concept or Remote Tower Operations (RTO) has been • tested and in some cases already implemented. ROTs are a remarkable example of how the digitalisation and virtualisation of ATS provision is affecting our profession raising new issues and challenges. The aim of this paper is to convey an updated view of the pro- • cess of the current implementation and highlight the need for further research in order to cope with all the already known and emerging issues related to such a revolutionary change of the tower environment.

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IFATCA highlights the need for detailed safety assessments and human factor analyses in remotely operated facilities.

A definition of the impact of working models and procedures in a highly technological environment with particular regard to liability for the operators, as well as more experience with the new concept, is considered necessary.

IFATCA detects the urgency for concise definitions with particular regard to the definition of modes, of operations, including low and high traffic volumes.

In IFATCA’s view there is a need for minimum international requirements for all known aspects of RTO. At this time IFATCA opposes the performance of simultaneous RTO and/or Visual Tower by one ATCO. IFATCA recommends establishing endorsements, which are in line with new procedural and technical requirements for ATCOs, AFISOs as well as ATSEPs. IFATCA recommends the introduction of transition training and programs from conventional to remote tower operations.

IFATCA points out the need for the deployment of contingency procedures to be in place.

IFATCA calls for data integrity.

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Flight Operations Panel (FLTOPSP) La funzione primaria del FLTOPSP, presieduta da Oliver Barsanti (ANACNA, Italia), è quella di lavorare al continuo aggiornamento e mantenimento dell’Annesso 6 e il Doc 8168 di ICAO. I due documenti toccano moltissimi argomenti il che rendono gli incontri del panel sempre molto fitti.

Particolare attenzione è stata posta all’avanzato stato di sviluppo della tecnologia dei convertiplani (tiltrotor) che a breve saranno introdotti nel mercato civile. Dato l’interesse, è stata prodotta una paper separata, grazie alla collaborazione tra ANACNA e Leonardo.

Tra gli altri argomenti discussi: fraseologia SID/STAR (con nuova proposta da parte di IATA), All Weather Operations (AWO), Operazioni RPAS e relativo aggiornamento dell’Annesso 6 parte IV, operazioni ACAS durante discese di emergenza, uso corretto delle terminologie “Authorization”, “Approval” e “Acceptance”, continuous decent final approach (CDFA), duplicate naming of waypoints.

WP No. 98 Air Traffic Management for Tiltrotors The first commercial use of tiltrotors is starting in 2018. As the performances and typical Information paper behaviour of such machines can be as similar as both airplanes and helicopters, this working paper will provide short explanation and a Questions and Answers list on how to manage tiltrotor from an ATM perspective

Rinnovo comitati TOC e PLC Le votazioni per il rinnovo dei comitati si sono svolte secondo le nuove regole di spoglio approvate allo scorso Congresso mondiale. Viene in primo luogo garantita rappresentatività di almeno un membro per Regione (quello che ha ottenuto più preferenze all’interno della regione) e a seguire, i posti residui vengono assegnati in ordine di preferenza generale.

Per il 2019, l’Italia si è candidata ed è stata eletta nel PLC mentre rimane corrisponding member per il TOC.

TOC 2018-19

Australia Canada Georgia

Germania Giappone Olanda

PLC 2018-19

Australia Bulgaria Germania Ghana

Romania USA Sudan 11

Israele Italia Kenya Olanda

Nuova Zelanda Spagna USA UK

Assistenza Al Volo - Speciale IFATCA 57 Gli studi di nuovi argomenti sono fondamentali, ma grande importanza riveste il continuo lavoro di revisione e aggiornamento del Manuale Tecnico Professionale (Technical and Professional Manual, TPM) della Federazione. È essenziale infatti mantenere attuali e aggiornate le posizioni della Federazione, seguire il progredire della tecnologia e delle realtà operative e adattarne i contenuti di conseguenza. Le Associazioni Membre (Member Associations, MAs) hanno così la possibilità di accedere a dati e informazioni sempre aggiornati evitando di utilizzare policy obsolete e quindi non più applicabili nei contesti odierni. In questi anni di forte sviluppo dell’aviazione, soprattutto in asia ed africa, la federazione necessita di materiale, come ad esempio line guida o piccole brochure, che siano di immediata e facile consultazione da parte degli associati, facilitando in tal modo anche l’introduzione delle policy IFATCA nella regolamentazione degli ANSPs.

PROGRAMMA TOC 2018-19

PROGRAMMA PLC 2018-19 • • • •

• Cut-off Point Separation • Use and application of Mode-S data • Effect of airport growth in ATC (WP condivisa tra TOC e PLC) • Interoperability of different systems • Compatibility of clearances issues • Less than minimum separation with uncontrolled traffic • Review of ATS 3.16, Strategic Lateral Operation Procedure, SLOP • Protection of Aeronautical Spectrum • ATFCM/A-CDM • Review of HEL5.1, Discrete ID flightplans • Review of HEL5.2, Helicopter phraseology

• • • • • • • • • •

CISM guidance materials Crisis Management Guidance Material Cybersecurity Review of the manual Evaluation of the need for dedicated FIS positions incl surveillance needs for FIS HF considerations when operating multiple sectors How to translate ATM language in to legal language Just Culture Guidance Material Licensing for ATCOs after training Performance Based Endorsements Revision and Review on the Ageing ATCO and Retirement Age for ATCOs policy Role of the Regulator in regard to RPAS about education and training Tools for initial recruitment of candidates for ATCo’s Usage of Radar Data in Tower Environment Help airports are getting bigger

All’Italia è stata assegnata la stesura della WP “HF considerations when operating multiple sectors” (coautore: Nuova Zelanda), mentre è coautrice delle WP “Evaluation of the need for dedicated FIS positions incl surveillance needs for FIS” e “Usage of Radar Data in Tower Environment”.

Giusy Sciacca,

Oliver Barsanti,

Nicola Gallo,

Enrico Fisser,

Eugenio Diotalevi,

Milano Linate

Roma ACC

Palermo

Padova ACC

Padova ACC

Segr. Gen. Naz. ANACNA

Presidente ANACNA

Dir. Comm.Esteri

TOC

PLC

Chair RTG IFATCA

FLTOPSP IFATCA

ANACNA, PLC

12

Assistenza Al Volo - Speciale IFATCA 57

13

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 57TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE – Accra, Ghana March 19-23, 2018 Agenda Item: B.5.5

IFATCA 18 WP No. 89 En-route Wake Turbulence Presented by TOC Summary

All the prescriptions about wake turbulence separation are established only for approach/ or departure phases. En-route separation (time or distance based), is not established to prevent wake vortex encounters at all, but only to reduce the possibility of them. The amount of wake turbulence encounter reports while en-route have been consistent, however a recent accident raised the general attention towards the phenomena. At the same time, the reduction of the enroute separation, due to the re-categorisation of aircraft are under preliminary study as a possible way to increase the airspace capacity in the medium-term period.

1.

Introduction

1.1.

Wake turbulence is generated by wake vortices that are present behind every aircraft, but is particularly severe when generated by large and wide-bodied aircraft.

1.2.

Studies about wake turbulence started in the late 1960’s when wide bodied turbo-jet aircraft were introduced. Since then, the phenomenon was known but never considered as a serious hazard for the en-route phase of flight.

1.3.

ICAO only prescribes separation minima (time or distance based) for wake vortex turbulence (WVT) for departing and arriving aircraft 1. The prescribed en-route separation minima is the same for all aircraft types and do not necessarily prevent Wake Vortex Turbulence encounter generated from other aircraft operating in the vicinity.

1.4.

En-route wake propagation is almost unpredictable. It is not only related to the weight and wingspan of the generating aircraft, but also to wind, atmospheric conditions as well as, to the aircraft configuration. Additionally, the effect on the trailing aircraft depends also on its weight, wingspan and resistance.

1.5.

Wide bodies represent 24% of the worldwide commercial aircraft fleet (cargo and passenger) and the number is foreseen to increase. Precision of navigation makes aircraft fly with greater accuracy both on the vertical and the horizontal path, which potentially increases WVT encounters.

1

ICAO. (November 2016). Procedures for Air Navigation Services – ATM (Doc 4444), 16th Edition, Chapter.5, 5.8 and Chapter 8, 8.7.3.4

B.5.5 / Page 1 of 10

1.6.

In history, there are numerous reports of en-route wake turbulence encounters. Some of them led to the loss of control of the aircraft, with very difficult recovery of the flight conditions.

1.7.

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), in June 2017, published a Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) on En-Route Wake Turbulence2. Recommendations are addressed to Operators, Pilots and ATS Providers.

2.

Discussion

2.1.

2.1.1

History Boeing together with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the ‘70s conducted the first studies using smoke generating towers to observe the wake turbulence of aircraft flying by. It was noticed that:  The strength of the wake turbulence is governed by the weight, speed and wingspan of the generating aircraft;  The greatest strength occurs when the generating aircraft is heavy, at slow speed with clean wing configuration.

2.1.2

According to the result of this study, aircraft were grouped according to their maximum take-off weight. It was noted that a classification based on the wingspan of the following aircraft was more technically correct to establish categories but it did not appear to be an easily workable method.

2.1.3

Since there’s a correlation between aircraft gross weight and wingspan, the gross weight was selected as a means of categorizing aircraft and wake turbulence strength.

Minimum separation values were established for the following aircraft depending on the weight of both the leading and trailing aircraft.

2.1.4

Adjustments of the separation values were made through the ‘1980’s and ‘1990’s but the basic concept of using the weight remained constant.

2.2.

2.2.1

Definitions Wake Vortex Turbulence (WVT) is defined as turbulence, which is generated by the passage of an aircraft in flight.

2.2.2

Wake Vortex Turbulence will be generated from the point when the nose gear of an aircraft leaves the ground on take-off and will cease to be generated when the nose gear touches the ground during landing.

2.2.3

When another aircraft encounters such turbulence generated by the leading aircraft, a Wake Vortex Encounter (WVE) is said to have occurred.

2.2.4

ICAO, in PANS-ATM Doc 4444 in chapter 4 paragraph 4.9 “WakeTurbulence Categories”, defines: “Wake Turbulence is the term used to describe the effect of rotating air masses generated behind the wing tips of large jet aircraft. Wake Vortex is the term that describe the nature of the air masses.”

2

EASA SIB no. 2017-10 issued on 22 June 2017

B.5.5 / Page 2 of 10

2.3 2.3.1

Causes and effects The factors contributing to the wakes are:  Leading aircraft weight - Heavy category types, in particular with MTOW (Maximum Takeoff Weight) above 350 tonnes (incl. A340-500/600, A380-800, B747-400/800, B777-300ER) induce the strongest wake turbulence vortices;  Relative size of leading and following aircraft;  Relative track and position of proximate aircraft- the risk is greater when aircraft are in the same direction of flight and are climbing or descending behind a heavy aircraft or when an aircraft encounters a heavy aircraft climbing or descending ahead of it.  Flying below the tropopause3 - the atmospheric conditions are generally favourable for the wake vortex to remain strong for a longer period of time, and the wake vortices may potentially descend one flight level lower;  Wind velocity relative to the track being flown by the generating aircraft - crosstrack wind reduces the risk to in-trail aircraft.

2.3.2

The main effects on the trailing aircraft are induced roll, loss of altitude or reduced rate of climb and possible structural stress. The impact of a WVE is stronger during a turn due to the fact that the load factor is already higher during turns.

2.3.3

In Terminal Airspace (TMA) operations, flight crews are more focused and ready to quickly react to a potential WVE, since there is more likeliness that hazardous events may occur. On the other hand, the response time in en-route may be delayed, since the crew may not expect the event and might be completely relying on the autopilot in the specific moment of a potential interaction with the WVE.

2.4 2.4.1

Project R-WAKE4 The project is part of the “SESAR-07-2015 - Separation Management and Separation Standards” package5 that has in general the target to reduce separation minima to allow an increase of airspace capacity: one of the global key objectives of SESAR.

2.4.2

The project develops a simulation framework to assess the risk and hazards of potential wake vortex encounters for the en-route phase of flight.

2.4.3

The goal of this research consists on a proposal of potential enhancements in the current separation standards to protect flights against WVE. Both pilots and controllers are involved in the expert group and the project will be concluded in March 2018.

2.5 2.5.1

Mitigation of Wake Vortex Encounter The encounter of Wake Vortex can lead to unexpected roll and loss of control. The prescribed separation applied within controlled airspace by ATC does not necessarily prevent WVE from the preceding aircraft, but possibly reduces the risk of encounters.

2.5.2

The only direct defence for pilots is to keep high situational awareness monitoring the traffic in the vicinity and to minimize the effects of WVE, and when necessary recommend passengers to keep their seatbelt fasten when seated.

3

The tropopause occurs between approximately FL300 and FL600. www.rwake-sesar2020.eu 5 Founds by SESAR-JU under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.

4

B.5.5 / Page 3 of 10

2.5.3

When an en-route air traffic controller identifies a traffic situation with risk of a potential wake encounter, traffic information to the trailing aircraft may be provided. This procedure shouldn’t be expected by pilots: since it’s not mandatory, it is subject to ATCOs workload or personal judgement of the hazard.

2.5.4 ICAO Phraseology 2.5.4.1 ICAO only provides standard phraseology for wake turbulence warning for aerodrome and approach control. Procedure for Air Navigation Services – ATM (Doc 4444), 16th Edition, Chapter 12.

12.3.3.2. Approach instructions ... in case of successive visual approaches when the pilot of a succeeding aircraft has reported having the preceding aircraft in sight: q) CLEARED VISUAL APPROACH RUNWAY (number), MAINTAIN OWN SEPARATION FROM PRECEDING (aircraft type and wake turbulence category as appropriate) [CAUTION WAKE TURBULENCE]; 12.3.4.19 Information to aircraft …wake turbulence: e) CAUTION WAKE TURBULENCE [FROM ARRIVING (or DEPARTING) (type of aircraft)] [additional information as required]; f) CAUTION JETBLAST; g) CAUTION SLIPSTREAM; 2.5.4.2 ICAO Procedure for Air Navigation Services – ATM (Doc 4444), 16th Edition, Chapter 4, 4.9.2. “Indication of Heavy turbulence category” prescribes: For aircraft in the heavy wake turbulence category the word “Heavy” shall be included immediately after the aircraft call sign in the initial radiotelephony contact between such aircraft and ATS units.

Note. – Wake turbulence categories are specified in the instructions for completing Item 9 of the flight plan in Appendix 2.

2.5.5 Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure (SLOP) and Free Route Airspace (FRA) 2.5.5.1 Route or track centrelines are now routinely flown over long distances to within a few tens of metres of lateral and vertical accuracy, and often much better than that, therefore a clearance error from any source has a reduced margin error attributable to that accuracy. This includes intentional variation in route to avoid the worst effects of wake vortex turbulence.

2.5.5.2 A provision in ICAO Annex 2 "Rules of the Air" 6 requires that aircraft operating controlled flights shall, when on an established ATS route, operate along the defined centre line unless SLOPs are authorised on that route by the appropriate ATS authority, or directed by the appropriate air traffic control unit.

2.5.5.3 SLOPs are mitigating the risk of collision and wake turbulence encounters between aircraft with high precision navigation capabilities. SLOPs are meant as special procedures for oceanic and remote continental airspace. The arrangements for the application of SLOPs are detailed in ICAO Doc 4444 PANS-ATM (§16.5).

6

ICAO. (November 2005). Annex 2 – Rules of the Air, 10th Edition, Chapter 3, paragraph 3.6.2.1.1 a).

B.5.5 / Page 4 of 10

2.5.5.4 The introduction of the free-route concept is reducing the effectiveness of SLOP and, if at the same time reducing the chances of WVE, makes predicting the path of other aircraft more difficult to pilots.

2.5.5.5 IFATCA performed studies on SLOP presented at Annual Conferences in Arusha 2008 and Dubrovnik 2009. IFATCA provisional policy is: ATS 3.16 (ADVANCED) STRATEGIC LATERAL OFFSET PROCEDURE IFATCA endorses Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure (SLOP) in oceanic or remote continental airspace where there is no ATS surveillance service provided.

IFATCA only supports an advanced strategic offset concept provided that: • Studies conclude that the concept enhances safety; • The concept is globally harmonised; • The concept is taken into account in airspace and procedures design; • ATC surveillance systems accommodate the concept; and • The concept is transparent to ATC, requiring no controller intervention at all.

2.5.6

ICAO defined a minimum separation distance between successive arriving or departing fixed-wing aircraft according to their Maximum Take Off Weight (MTOW) classification.

2.6 2.6.1

Aircraft Categorization The aircraft categorization presently adopted is the one described in ICAO PANS-ATM Doc 4444 chapter 4 paragraph 4.9.1 “Wake Turbulence Categories of Aircraft”: 4.9.1.1 Wake turbulence separation minima shall be based on a grouping of aircraft types into three categories according to the maximum certificated take-off mass as follows: a) HEAVY (H) – all aircraft types of 136 000 kg or more; b) MEDIUM (M) – all aircraft types less than 136 000 kg but more than 7 000 kg; and c) LIGHT (L) – aircraft types of 7 000 kg or less.

4.9.1.2 Helicopters should be kept well clear of light aircraft when hovering or while air taxiing.

Note 1. – Helicopters produce vortices when in flight and there is some evidence that, per kilogram of gross mass, their vortices are more intense than those of fixedwing aircraft.

Note 2. – The provision governing wake turbulence separation minima are set forth in Chapter 5, Section 5.8, and Chapter 8, Section 8.7.3.

2.6.1.1 The United Kingdom, already in 1982, introduced some modifications to the weight and separation relationship to improve the airport capacity. Weight threshold between Light and Medium were modified and new aircraft groups were introduced. Because the safe operations through the years, in 2010, it was decided to extend the new classification to all the airports in the UK. Other Countries adopted similar solutions, preceding in time all the recent RECAT studies.

B.5.5 / Page 5 of 10

2.6.2 2.6.3

Airbus A380-800 Aircraft Specifications Following the Airbus A380 introduction, ICAO published a state letter (and successive updates)7 on the topic: “Wake Turbulence aspects of A380-800 aircraft”. An ad hoc group of experts under the auspice of the US-FAA, Eurocontrol, JAA and Airbus, studied the wake vortex of this new aircraft. The State Letter recommends the implementation of its guidance, pending an amendment to the PANS-ATM.

2.6.3.1 The aircraft is in the heavy wake turbulence category and the PANS-ATM Doc 4444 applies.

2.6.3.2 For A380-800 aircraft the letter “J” should be entered into the space allocated to wake turbulence under the Item 9 of the ICAO flight plan.

2.6.3.3 For A380-800 aircraft the expression “SUPER” should be included immediately after the aircraft call sign in the initial radiotelephony contact between such aircraft and ATS units.

2.6.3.4 Specific time or distance-based separations are recommended when the A380-800is preceding any other aircraft in approach or departure phases.

2.6.3.5 En-route separation minima remain as prescribed in the PANS-ATM Doc 4444 5-5.8 and 8-8.7.3.

2.7 2.7.1

Wake Turbulence separation reduction Projects as “Aircraft Re-categorization – Wake-RECAT” (a collaborative research between EUROCONTROL and US Federal Aviation Authority) and “Time-Based Separation (TBS)” were developed through the years with the aim of optimizing the use of runways.

2.7.2

Both studies have proven that, in addition to weight, and aircraft characteristics (such as speed and wingspan), that atmospheric conditions, also effect the strength of the wake generated; as well as the following aircraft’s reaction to that wake.

2.7.3

These projects were extensively analysed in the past by IFATCA8. The Federation’s policy is: ATS 3.36 RECATEGORIZATION OF AIRCRAFT FOR WAKE TURBULENCE Any aircraft wake turbulence recategorisation, be it distance-based or timebased, for the purpose of increasing runway capacity, must: - Conduct appropriate safety assessments, including a thoroughunderstanding of the human factor element.

- Design clear procedures for the application of the new wake turbulence categories.

7

November 2005: T13/3-05-0661.SLG, October 2006: TEC/OPS/SEP/T-11/72-06-320.SLG and July 2008

TEC/OPS/SEP/08-0294.SLG. 8

Resolution B2 – WP90, Bali 2013 and resolution B10 – WP92, Toronto 2017.

B.5.5 / Page 6 of 10

- Provide adequate tools to support the controller when applying those procedures.

- Incorporate contingency procedures for cases where support tools are unavailable and/or the new wake turbulence categories cannot be applied.

- Ensure that the new system does not have a negative effect on the efficiency of the overall ATM system.

2.7.4

The current policy is the result of the review study of previous policy performed by TOC for IFATCA Annual Conference in 2017 and it focused on runway and approach operations. The reduction of the en-route longitudinal separation could be a way to increase the airspace capacity and an aircraft recategorisation project for wake turbulence en-route would be a first step in this process. A review of the current policy would extend its validity to all operations.

2.8

En-route Wake Vortex Encounter reports Wake turbulence occurences in the en-route phase are 5% of the total generated reports by the phenomenon (whilst 70% happen during the approach, 13% during takeoff and 12% while manoeuvring in other phases) 9.

While en-route, passengers and cabin crew are most likely not secured. An unexpected WVE with a consequential un-commanded roll and loss of control could cause severe injuries in the cabin.

2.8.1.1 On Jan 7, 2017, the wake turbulence caused by an A380-800 sent a business jet (Canadair Challenger 604) that was flying 1000ft below on opposite direction, in an uncontrolled descent.

The Bundestelle fßr Flugunfalluntersuchung (German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation – BFU) on its interim report released in May 2017, reported the crew first observed the aircraft above them in opposite direction on their TCAS, the captain subsequently identified an A380 and the airline. The A380 passed them slightly to the left and above. A short time later the aircraft was exposed to wake turbulence, the aircraft rolled to the left uncontrollably and the autopilot disconnected. Both pilots applied right aileron, however the aircraft continued to roll left and made several revolutions, both Inertial Reference Systems, the flight management system and the attitude indicators failed. Both pilots were wearing their lap belts and crotch belts; the first officer was also wearing his shoulder harness. The captain lost his head set; the quick reference manual lifted off in the cockpit and was distributed over the cockpit with single pages around the cockpit. Using external horizon reference the captain identified their attitude and was able to stabilize the aircraft again at FL240, 10.000 feet below their original altitude.

2.8.1.2 Encounters of turbulence generated by A380-800 aircraft are those more evident (because of the big weight difference compared to other categories) but there are several reports of wake turbulence generated from aircraft of the same category.

2.9 2.9.1

9

EASA Safety Information Bulletin 2017-10 After the WVE of Jan 7, 2017 EASA urged to publish a Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) about en-route wake turbulence encounters. The aim was to enhance the awareness of

Source: Airbus

B.5.5 / Page 7 of 10

Aircraft Operators, pilots, ANSPs and air traffic controllers of the risks associated with wake turbulence encounters in the en-route phase of flight and provide recommendations and advisories with the purpose of mitigating the associated risks.

2.9.2

The Bulletin informs that en-route, the vortices evolve in altitudes at which the rate of decay leads to a typical persistence of 2-3 minutes, with a typical sink rate of about 400ft/min. Wakes will also be transported by wind.

2.9.3

The Bulletin highlights that considering the high operating air speeds in cruise and the standard 1000 feet verticalseparation in RVSM airspace wake can be encountered up to 25 nautical miles (NM) behind the generating aeroplane. The most significant encounters are reported within a distance of 15 NM. However, no specific horizontal wake turbulence separation minima are detailed within PANS-ATM for en-route flight, with states using procedural or surveillance-based separation minima.

2.9.4

EASA identifies three major contributing factors: crossing traffic situation, thermal tropopause altitude and weight of the generating aircraft.

2.9.5

The SIB concludes with no procedures, but with recommendations as precautionary measures addressed to operators, pilots and ATS providers to mainly increase the knowledge and situational awareness about en-route wake turbulence.

3

Conclusions

3.1

Wake Vortex are strongest during approach and departure phases because of aircraft configuration, additionally, those are the phases where the highest amounts of accidents are recorded. Although en-route wake turbulence has been reported at higher distance than the prescribed separation minima applied by ATC, ICAO currently does not provide any provisions about it. In regards of WVE, all the separation standards are established to minimize the effects and not to prevent them.

3.2

Many countries independently adopted en-route wake turbulence separation criteria.

Increased separation between heavier aircraft and others are often prescribed also according to factors like operating speed and altitude. In some cases, same approach/departure separation minima are applied regardless the phase of the flight.

3.3

ATC awareness of the persistence of wake turbulence at en-route altitudes, beyond the minimum separation, is most of the times insufficient. On the other hand, flight crews are in general less aware of the hazard at en-route altitudes resulting in slower in reaction if compared to TMA operations.

3.4

Because wake turbulence is invisible, and influenced by many variables, its presence and location cannot be determined or forecast with precision. Presently, reliable ground system support functions to inform and warn air traffic controllers of potentially hazardous wake encounters are not yet in operational use. Additionally, still today not all the ATC-system accepts the letter “J” as WT-identifier and display “H” for A388.

3.5

There are no specific rules regarding wake turbulence encounter prevention that ATCOs can apply for en-route separation. ATCOs are in this way indirectly called to

B.5.5 / Page 8 of 10

apply their “Duty of Care� and this lead to personal action/reaction based on experience, workload, perception etc.

3.6

A re-categorisation of the aircraft for wake turbulence also for en-route operation is likely to happen as an action to increase airspace capacity enhancing separation. Ongoing projects, such as R-Wake, demonstrate the interest for international agencies on the topic.

4

Recommendation It is recommended that

4.1

IFATCA policy is: When the prescribed separation is applied, ATCOs shall not be held responsible for wake vortex encounters and related accidents/incidents.

And it is included in the IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual

4.2

IFATCA policy on page 3 2 3 41 of the IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual: ATS 3.36 RECATEGORIZATION OF AIRCRAFT FOR WAKE TURBULENCE Any aircraft wake turbulence recategorisation, be it distance-based or timebased, for the purpose of increasing runway capacity, must: - Conduct appropriate safety assessments, including a thoroughunderstanding of the human factor element.

- Design clear procedures for the application of the new wake turbulence categories.

- Provide adequate tools to support the controller when applying those procedures.

- Incorporate contingency procedures for cases where support tools are unavailable and/or the new wake turbulence categories cannot be applied.

- Ensure that the new system does not have a negative effect on the efficiency of the overall ATM system.

Be amended to read: ATS 3.36 RECATEGORISATION OF AIRCRAFT FOR WAKE TURBULENCE Any aircraft wake turbulence recategorisation, be it distance-based or timebased, for the purpose of increasing capacity, must: - Conduct appropriate safety assessments, including a thoroughunderstanding of the human factor element.

- Design clear procedures for the application of the new wake turbulence categories.

- Provide adequate tools to support the controller when applying those procedures.

B.5.5 / Page 9 of 10

- Incorporate contingency procedures for cases where support tools are unavailable and/or the new wake turbulence categories cannot be applied.

- Ensure that the new system does not have a negative effect on the efficiency of the overall ATM system.

5.

                   

References ICAO (November 2016) Procedure for Air Navigation Services - ATM (Doc 4444), 16th Edition.

ICAO (November 2005) Annex 2 - Rules of the Air, 10th Edition ICAO (July 2008) ICAO State Letter. Guidance on A380-800 Wake Vortex Aspects.

IFATCA (2017) IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual (TPM). ATS 3.16 (Advanced) Strategic Lateral Offset Separation, p 3 2 3 19.

Review of ATS 3.36 Recategorization of Aircraft for Wake Turbulence. B.5.12, WP 92. IFATCA Annual Conference 2017.

IFATCA (2017) IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual (TPM). ATS 3.36 – Recategorisation of Aircraft for Wake Turbulence, p 3 2 3 41.

EUROCONTROL. (2017) http://www.eurocontrol.eu Airbus (June 2005) Flight Operations Briefing Notes – Wake Turbulence Awareness / Avoidance. FLT_OPS-OPS_ENV-SEQ 07-REV 01. 8 pages.

Hoogstraten, Visser, Hart, Trevé and Rooseleer. “An Improved Understanding of En- route Wake Vortex Encounters”. 15 pages. Retrieved on December 2017 from http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2510.pdf Rojo, Frei and Vitalle. “An Analysis of En-route Wake Turbulence Behaviour based on In-Flight Measurement”. 9 pages. Retrieved on January 2017 from https://www.atca.org/2017technical-papers Rossow, James. “Overview of wake vortex hazards during cruise”. Journal of Aircraft, vol. 37.

(2000).

UK Civil Aviation Authority (2017). www.caa.uk.gov EASA (2017) Safety Information Bulletin 2017-10. 7 pages.

Airbus (2017) www.airbus.com.

Boeing (2017) Current Market Outlook 2017-2036. 63 pages.

BFU (2017) Interim Report BFU17-0024-2X. 24 pages. Retrieved in December 2017 from http://www.bfu-web.de.

The Aviation Herald (2017) Wake Turbulence Reports. Retrieved in December 2017 from http://www.avherald.com SKYbrary (2017) Wake Vortex Turbulence. Retrieved in December 2017 from http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Category:Wake_Vortex_Turbulence SESAR http://www.sesarju.eu R-WAKE (2017) The R-Wake project. Retrieved in December 2017 from http://www.rwake-sesar2020.eu

- END -

B.5.7/C.6.2 / Page 10 of 4

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 57th Annual Conference – Accra, Ghana 19th-23rd March 2017

Agenda Item: B.5.8/C.6.3

IFATCA 18 WP No. 92

State Aircraft and ‘Due Regard’ Operations Presented by PLC/TOC Summary ICAO rules are applicable only for civil aircraft. State aircraft – identified by ICAO as military, customs and police services – are not required to comply with these rules but States must, when issuing rules for their State aircraft, have ‘due regard’ for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

This working paper will examine the legal basis on which State aircraft operate with ‘due regard’, what ‘due regard’ is, where it applies and what controllers can do if State aircraft operate with due regard in their area of responsibility.

In the appendix to this paper, Duty of Care principles are applied to controller actions when managing State aircraft in the absence of guidance regulations.

1.

Introduction

1.1

Controllers are accustomed to issuing clearances/instructions to pilots operating aircraft in their area of responsibility. Some types of flights are not bound to comply with those clearances/instructions and they may operate contrary to civil aviation rules even when they are operating in non-segregated civil airspace.

1.2

Military, customs and police aircraft – collectively known as State aircraft – are permitted by international agreement to operate contrary to civil aviation rules even when they are operating in non-segregated civil airspace. Controllers cannot exercise control over these State aircraft when they operate contrary to civil aviation rules; however, there are some provisions that are intended to safeguard civil aircraft from State aircraft.

1.3

This paper will examine the legal basis on which State aircraft operate contrary to civil aviation rules in sovereign and international airspace. It will also examine the ways in which State aircraft give ‘due regard’ for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft and find examples of the way in which some States regulate State aircraft operations. The appendix to this paper will use the principles of duty of care to consider appropriate controller actions in the absence of guidance or regulations for handling State aircraft that are operating contrary to civil aviation rules.

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2.

Discussion

2.1

State aircraft

2.1.1

The definition of State aircraft was set in article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944 (commonly known as the Chicago Convention), now included in ICAO Doc 7300 which contains the full text agreed at that time. Article 3 of the Chicago Convention expressly excludes State aircraft from ICAO scope of applicability as follows: Article 3 Civil and state aircraft: a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to State aircraft. b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be State aircraft. c) No State aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, in accordance the terms thereof. d) The contracting State undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft (ICAO 2006, p. 2).

2.1.2

It is important to highlight that the term ‘State aircraft’ includes military aircraft but it is not limited to it. According to ICAO, aircraft used in customs and police services are also State aircraft (ICAO 2006, p. 2).

2.1.3

ICAO, in Circular 330 Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management, recommends a number of best practices for cooperation between civil and military agencies. Circular 330 explains the consequences of the particular wording of Article 3 of the Chicago Convention: As a consequence of Article 3, in particular subparagraph 3 (d), States are required to safeguard navigation of civil aircraft when setting rules for their State aircraft. This leaves it up to the individual State to regulate these operations and services, generating a wide diversity of military regulations. However, especially in congested airspace, harmonized regulation is a precondition for a safe, efficient and ecologically sustainable aviation system (ICAO 2011, p. 2).

2.1.4

Circular 330 explains in detail what roles are performed by military and non-military flights under the title of State aircraft. It also highlights circumstances when State aircraft can be fully compliant (airlift or VIP aircraft) or partially compliant (counter-air missions, aeromedical evacuation, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance, unmanned aircraft systems, search and rescue, large-scale exercises, police and customs) with international civil aviation rules, as provided for in ICAO standards and recommended practices (SARPs), and it lists the general expectations for handling such aircraft by an air navigation service provider (ANSP) (ICAO 2011, pp. 17-19).

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2.2 2.2.1

Territory and Sovereignty The way in which State aircraft may operate depends on the airspace in which they are operating. The concepts of territory and sovereignty are key and these are considered in the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 10 December 1982.

Article 2 Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space over the territorial sea and of its bed and subsoil 1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.

2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.

3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law.

Article 3 “Breadth of the territorial sea” Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention (UN 1982, p. 27)

2.2.2

The Chicago Convention affirms the sovereignty of States over their airspace and defines the extent of the States’ territory in line with those limits set out in UNCLOS: Article 1 Sovereignty The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.

Article 2 Territory For the purposes of the Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State. (ICAO 2006, p. 2)

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2.3 2.3.1

ATS (Air Traffic Services) Controllers are able to provide ATS to aircraft in their area of responsibility because States have defined the framework within which controllers and pilots must operate.

States define airspace classifications, rules of the air etc. that apply within their territorial airspace because, as noted earlier, the Chicago Convention states that: Article 1 Sovereignty The contracting States recognise that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory (ICAO 2006, p. 2).

2.3.2

Most states have adopted the ICAO SARPS for the benefit of international traffic; however, as the States retain ‘complete and exclusive sovereignty’ of their airspace, they are free to, and indeed many do, maintain some differences from the ICAO standards.1

2.3.3

For the safety and efficiency of international civil aviation, provision of ATS in airspace outside of the territory of States has been assigned in regional agreements.

Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention declares that: 2.1.2 Those portions of the airspace over the high seas or in airspace of undetermined sovereignty where air traffic services will be provided shall be determined on the basis of regional air navigation agreements. A Contracting State having accepted the responsibility to provide air traffic services in such portions of airspace shall thereafter arrange for the services to be established and provided in accordance with the provisions of this Annex (ICAO 2001, p. 2-1).

2.3.4

It is important to note that the States that accept the responsibility for providing ATS beyond 12 NM from the coast are only administering that airspace.

Clearances/instructions and advice are issued for the safety of civil aviation but it remains international airspace and ICAO requires that ATS in this airspace will be provided in compliance with ICAO standards, regardless of any differences from the ICAO standard that apply in the administering state.

1

Although differences are allowed, States are expected to incorporate ICAO standards (Annexes and SARPS) into their national aviation law. Differences must be notified to ICAO and the difference must be published in a supplement to the relevant Annex and also be listed in the State’s aeronautical information publication.

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2.4

Due Regard

2.4.1

As seen previously, States issue regulations for civil and for state aircraft too: Article 3 Civil and State aircraft d) The ICAO Contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their State aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft (ICAO 2006, p. 2).

2.4.2

The Chicago Convention demands that the States, when writing their own rules for their State aircraft, ‘take the proper care and concern for’ the safety of navigation of civil aircraft (The Merriam Webster dictionary definition for ‘with due regard to’). These rules may be made public and/or shared with ANSPs but in many cases, they are not available.

2.4.3

What does ‘taking the proper care and concern’ actually look like? It’s difficult to know when some States are disinclined to make their regulations publicly available but it seems that in many instances it simply means to operate just like a civil aircraft.

When a State aircraft requests an airways clearance and complies with a controller’s clearances/instructions, it is giving the proper care and concern for the safety of civil aircraft by complying with civil aviation rules. A brief sentence from Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) Enterprise2 can be taken as an example: ‘fly as civil as possible and as military as operationally necessary’ (SAC 2016, p. 15).

2.4.4

Operating like a civil aircraft is not the only way in which a State aircraft can give due regard for the safety of civil aviation. In the UK and Canada, State aircraft under the control of military controllers can operate in non-segregated airspace without

2

In 2008 ten NATO members signed together with Sweden and Finland, a Memorandum of Understanding to share the resources to acquire the maximum airlift capability for many nations in a restrictive budgetary environment B.5.8 / C.6.3 Page 5 of 16

coordination with civil controllers. The military controllers maintain horizontal and vertical separation between the State and civil aircraft and this procedure is usually used in order to transit between segregated airspace for exercises.

2.4.5

Other States allow their State aircraft to operate in non-segregated airspace without military controllers overseeing the flight. The pilot of the State aircraft may establish their own separation from civil aircraft using on-board equipment and visual observation and the State aircraft’s route and levels may be disseminated prior to the flight. As some State aircraft are highly manoeuvrable, they may maintain a distance from civil aircraft that is much less than the separation minimum that controllers apply in the same airspace.

2.4.6

In summary, regardless of their mission, a State aircraft must always have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft and they achieve this by either: a) operating like other civil aircraft and complying with the civil aviation rules; b) operating inside segregated/reserved/restricted airspace; or c) operating contrary to the civil aviation system’s rules, using special procedures established by the State that ensure the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

2.5

State aircraft and due regard in sovereign and international airspace

2.5.1

The airspace over water beyond 12 NM from the coast, as we saw, does not belong to any State but ATS are provided according to regional agreements. Any State aircraft from any State operating in international airspace may choose to ignore the civil aviation system’s rules at any time because they are not subject to the national regulations of States that administer this airspace; however, even in international airspace, State aircraft must always operate with due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

2.5.2

In sovereign airspace, State aircraft of the sovereign State may ignore the civil aviation system’s rules if the State’s regulations for State aircraft allow it.

Remembering that the Chicago Convention resolves that ‘no State aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, in accordance the terms thereof’, it follows that State aircraft from a foreign State may only enter another State’s airspace and may only ignore that State’s civil aviation system’s rules if the sovereign State agrees to allow it.

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2.6 Examples of regulations for due regard operations 2.6.1 The USA example 2.6.1.1 The FAA and the US Department of Defense have explicitly defined due regard as follows: Flight operations in accordance with the options of “due regard” or “operational” obligates the authorized state aircraft commander to: 1.

Separate his/her aircraft from all other air traffic; and 2.

Assure that an appropriate monitoring agency assumes responsibility for search and rescue actions; and 3.

Operate under at least one of the following conditions: a. In visual meteorological conditions; or b. Within radar surveillance and radio communications of a surface radar facility; or c. Be equipped with airborne radar that is sufficient to provide separation between his/her aircraft and any other aircraft he/she may be controlling and other aircraft; or d. Operate within Class G airspace. e. An understanding between the pilot and the controller regarding the intent of the pilot and the status of the flight should be arrived at before the aircraft leaves ATC frequency. (FAA 2015, p.1-2-1)

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2.6.1.2 Moreover, the US Department of Defense has published its procedures for state aircraft operating over international waters: (a) DoD respects that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has allocated, through regional air navigation agreements, responsibility for civil air traffic management in international airspace adjacent to coastal States in specified FIRs. (b) DoD also respects that States responsible for managing FIRs generally establish rules and procedures relating to civil aviation operations to carry out their responsibilities for providing air navigation facilities and air traffic management services in both national airspace and in assigned FIRs. However, DoD understands that these FIR rules and procedures do not apply as a matter of international law to State aircraft, including U.S. military aircraft.

(1) When practical and compatible with the mission, U.S. military aircraft operating in international airspace must observe ICAO flight procedures.

(2) When following ICAO flight procedures is not practical and compatible with the mission, U.S. military aircraft must operate with due regard consistent with “Operations Not Conducted Under ICAO Procedures” delineated in Enclosure 3 of this instruction. These procedures fulfil U.S. Government obligations under international law (Department of Defense 2017, p. 3) 2.6.1.3 This makes it clear that, when in international airspace, State aircraft from the USA will comply with international civil aviation rules unless they are engaged in a mission that is incompatible with what civil aviation rules demand of them. In that case, the State aircraft may ignore controllers’ clearances/instructions. However, they must continue to operate with due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aviation.

2.6.2 The European example 2.6.2.1 In Europe, on 24th October 2013, EUROCONTROL published a set of specifications for harmonised rules applicable to IFR traffic operations not conducted under ICAO procedures, flying inside controlled airspace of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)3.

2.6.2.2 The document, referred to as EUROAT 4, is the result of a number of years of sustained effort from EUROCONTROL and State military experts and was developed on the request of the EUROCONTROL Member States to harmonise the national rules applicable to this type of military air traffic.

2.6.2.3 While ICAO classifies the traffic only according to the type of aircraft (military, police, customs or civil) the European approach is operational, which means that the same aircraft may be served by controllers as operational air traffic (OAT) or general air traffic (GAT) as its operations require:

3

European Civil Aviation Conference, an intergovernmental organisation established in 1955. All EUROCONTROL member States are member of ECAC. 4 EUROCONTROL Specifications for harmonised Rules for Operational Air Traffic (OAT) under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) inside controlled Airspace of the ECAC Area (EUROAT) B.5.8 / C.6.3 Page 8 of 16





General Air Traffic (GAT) means all movements of civil aircraft, as well as movements of State aircraft (including military, customs and police aircraft) when these movements are carried out in conformance with the procedures of the ICAO; Operational Air Traffic (OAT) means all flights, which do not comply with the provisions stated for GAT and for which rules and procedures have been specified by appropriate national authorities.

2.6.2.4 OAT is the status that facilitates military and other state aircraft flights, for which the GAT framework is not suited to provide the rules, regulations and ATM support needed to fully ensure successful mission accomplishment. This is accomplished by adhering to the three following principles (§1.3.4):  Whenever possible the same definitions, rules and procedures as specified by ICAO (SERA) for GAT flights shall be applied;  Required rules for OAT, in addition to and/or rules deviating from ICAO (SERA) provisions are detailed within this document; and  Where the operational requirements of a flight are incompatible with either of the above, these requirements should be met by use of an Airspace Reservation (ARES) of appropriate type and dimension, or other methods that are considered sufficiently safe and are approved by the appropriate national authority.

2.6.2.5 Then the document, at paragraph 2.1 specifies the applicability of ICAO Rules of the Air: Unless the OAT rules within this document detail addition to and/or deviation from ICAO and/or SERA 5 provisions, OAT-IFR flights shall be conducted in accordance with all parts of Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Rules of the Air, ICAO Doc 4444 and the ICAO SUPPS – Doc 7030/4 and/or COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 923/2012 (SERA).

2.6.2.6 Moreover, paragraph 3.2 and 3.3 report: ATS personnel shall be trained and qualified to provide ATS to OAT-IFR flights in accordance with national regulations and should demonstrate equivalence to ESARR 5.

Air traffic control and other relevant air traffic services (ATS) shall be provided by an Air Traffic Control Officer (ATCO) to OAT-IFR in accordance with national regulations and the provisions laid down in the EUROAT. However, in accordance with relevant national regulations, States may consider personnel form other organisations than dedicated Air Traffic Services (e.g. national air defence) being appropriately qualified to provide services to OAT-IFR flights.

2.6.2.7 EUROAT does not prevent aircraft operating with due regard if state aircraft regulation allows. Subsequently to an increase of occurrences over the high seas involving military aircraft, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published, among others, the following recommendations: 5

Standardised European Rules of the Air: a transposition of ICAO’s rules valid for all states of European Union.

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1.

Although the Chicago Convention does not apply to state aircraft, the Agency recommends ICAO to continue working in close coordination with the Contracting States, the relevant military authorities and organisations, and other relevant stakeholders to further update Circular 330 taking into account the results of this analysis and the work carried out in the area of civil/military coordination since its publication.

2.

The Agency recommends that Member States endorse and fully apply the practices promulgated in ICAO Circular 330 and its subsequent updates 3.

The Agency recommends that Member States closely coordinate to develop (if not already accomplished) and to harmonise the operational requirements and instructions for state aircraft operations in order to ensure that, when flying over the high seas, ‘due regard’ for civil aircraft is always maintained. The Agency also recommends making these procedures publicly available so that civil flight crews are aware of such procedures.

4.

In addition, the Agency recommends that ICAO considers initiating amendments to Article 3 of the Chicago Convention in a way that requires Contracting States to publish their regulations or procedures in force regarding the ‘due regard’ concept for the safety of civil aircraft.

5.

The Agency recommends that Member States work closely together to further develop and harmonise the concrete civil/military coordination procedures for ATM at European Union level. These coordination procedures should address, among other things, the timely dissemination of information when non-cooperative military traffic is likely to fly over the high seas within neighbouring Area Control Centers (ACCs).

Similar coordination has to be implemented at the tactical level between Air Defence and ATC units when scramble aircraft becomes airborne for interceptions.

6.

In cases where non-cooperative traffic over the high seas is highly probable, and where primary radar systems are still used by state/military air defence units, the Agency recommends that this primary surveillance radar data be provided to civil ATC units to the maximum possible extent (EASA 2014, p. 4).

2.7 2.7.1

Developments in Guidance Material for Civil/Military Cooperation ICAO, in EUR OPS BULLETIN 2015_002: Guidelines to airspace users in order to raise their awareness on State aircraft operations especially in the High Seas airspace over the Baltic Sea, reports: A State aircraft operating under “due regard” might not have filed a flight plan, might not necessarily establish radio communications or enable its identification through means of cooperative surveillance. State aircraft operating under “due regard” are required to maintain safe separation from civil aircraft flying in their proximity.

Civil Air Traffic Control (ATC) units have normally no responsibilities for the separation of State aircraft when they are operating under "due regard", and can only, when known to them, provide traffic information to all other aircraft which are in the vicinity of the particular State aircraft. (ICAO 2015, p. 1)

2.7.2

This is also what is expected from the civil pilots’ point of view. IFALPA has published a safety bulletin titled Principles and best practices in case of air Encounters, especially

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in the High Seas airspace commonly shared by civil & military aviation over the Baltic Sea, a reprint from the ICAO EUR OPS BULLETIN 2017_001.

Air Traffic Control should consider: To share all available information of all known traffic to adjacent ATC units; When necessary, provide traffic information of non-identified traffic to all affected aircraft under control according to national rules and regulations (IFALPA 2017, p. 2) 2.7.3

ICAO, considering EASA’s recommendations, during the Fifth Meeting of the APANPIRG ATM Sub-Group (ATM SG/5) Bangkok, Thailand, 31 July – 04 August 2017, has described the status of new ICAO Document on Civil/Military Cooperation: An update of Circular 330 as ICAO Document 10088 Manual on Civil Military Cooperation is progressing well, with the task of completing a working draft by 4Q 2017 on track, despite the difficulties of the subject.

The new document had to strike the right balance between regional and global perspective, while keeping a readable content, and ensuring that States will agree with the guidance material contained therein. This is particularly difficult when discussing subjects such as High Seas operations. The document is being written by a group of both civil and military experts on civil/military cooperation, and will be technically overseen by the ATM Operations (ATMOPS) Panel at ICAO HQ. (ICAO 2017, p2)

2.8 2.8.1

2.8.2

Controller actions when handling State aircraft operations ANSPs should provide their controllers with guidance for handling State aircraft, including when State aircraft operate contrary to civil aviation system rules and ignore the clearances/instructions of controllers. A voluntary survey of MAs undertaken by PLC and TOC found that only around 30% of ANSPs provide their controllers with any guidance for handling State aircraft yet as demonstrated above, any State aircraft from any State may operate contrary to civil aviation rules in international airspace.

The absence of training and guidance may not absolve controllers from responsibility for the safety of aircraft in their area of responsibility: Appendix A to this paper suggests appropriate actions in the absence of any guidance considering duty of care.

3.

Conclusions

3.1

Every State undertakes that when issuing regulations for their State aircraft, they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft. In most cases, State aircraft give due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft by operating alongside civil aircraft and in accordance with civil aviation rules. When civil aviation rules are not conducive to a State aircraft’s mission, State aircraft may operate contrary to civil aviation rules but they must still have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft. State aircraft operating contrary to civil aviation rules give due regard to the safety of navigation of civil aircraft by operating in reserved airspace or using special procedures developed by the State.

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3.2

Any aircraft flying over a State’s territory (its land as well as waters extending 12 NM from the coast) is subject to its sovereignty, so State aircraft may operate outside the civil aviation system if permitted by and following the relevant overflown State prescriptions. In international airspace beyond 12 NM from the coast, controllers may provide ATS but they are only administering the airspace: it is not airspace that is owned by any one State. Any aircraft operating in international airspace operates according to its national regulations and State aircraft in international airspace may operate contrary to civil aviation rules without the permission of the administering state.

3.3

Although some bodies have recommended changes to the documents and practices regarding State aircraft operations, the number of interested parties means that any change may take years to implement. In the absence of change, controllers should be trained in handling State aircraft operations. That training should include handling State aircraft that are not conforming to civil aviation rules and regulations and, where appropriate, the implications of sovereign and international airspace on State aircraft operations.

3.4

The absence of training and guidance may not absolve controllers from responsibility for the safety of aircraft in their area of responsibility. It is impossible for IFATCA to provide exhaustive guidance applicable in each State but duty of care principles may provide a starting point for controllers to consider their actions when State aircraft operate in their area of responsibility.

4.

Draft Recommendation It is recommended that:

4.1

IFATCA policy is: Controllers shall be trained in handling State aircraft operations including:  State aircraft not conforming to civil aviation rules and regulations  The implications of sovereign and international airspace on State aircraft operations.

And be included in the IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual.

5.

References  Department of Defense (2017), Use of International Airspace by U.S. Military Aircraft and for Missile Projectile Firings (DoD 4540.01), Washington DC, USA  EASA (2014), Report on Occurrences over the High Seas Involving Military Aircraft in 2014, Brussels, Belgium  FAA (2015), Order JO7110.65W, Washington DC, USA  ICAO (2001), Annex 11 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: Air Traffic Services (13th ed.), Montréal, Canada

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 ICAO (2006), Convention on International Civil Aviation (Doc 7300) (9th ed.), Montréal, Canada  ICAO (2011), Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management (Cir 330), Montréal, Canada  ICAO (2015), Guidelines to Airspace Users in order to raise their awareness on State Aircraft Operations especially in the High Seas Airspace over the Baltic Sea (EUR OPS Bulletin 2015_002), Paris, France  ICAO (2016), Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Air Traffic Management (Doc 4444) (16th ed.), Montréal, Canada  ICAO (2017), Civil/Military Cooperation Update, Presented at the Fifth Meeting of the APANPIRG ATM Sub-Group (ATM SG/5), Bangkok, Thailand  IFALPA (2017), Principles and Best Practices in case of Air Encounters, Especially in the High Seas Sirspace Commonly Shared by Civil & Military Sviation over the Baltic Sea (17SAB10), Montréal, Canada  IFATCA (2016), ATCO Duty of Care (WP/156), Presented at the 56th IFATCA Annual Conference, Toronto, Canada  SAC (2016), Compliance or Due Regard of Military Aviation Organizations with EC Basic Regulation 216/2008, Presented at the 1st Cross-Industry Safety Conference - UOA/AS, Amsterdam, Netherlands  UN (1982), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, New York, USA

- END -

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Appendix A Controller actions and duty of care in the absence of State guidance or regulations A.1

Not all ANSPs provide their controllers with guidance for handling State aircraft and even when they do, guidance may not envisage all types of operations. What should controllers do if they become aware of a State aircraft operating in their area of responsibility but not complying with civil aviation rules and no guidance exists?

A.2

With so many States, each with its own ATS procedures, State aircraft regulations and legal systems, it is impossible for IFATCA to develop comprehensive guidance for all controllers; however, some guidelines can be developed based on the principle of duty of care.

A.3

In its study of duty of care in 2017, IFATCA described how a duty of care is considered to exist if ‘it’s reasonably foreseeable that not performing a duty with reasonable care could result in damage to another party’ (IFATCA 2017, p. 6). The standard of care owed is measured against the rules and regulations that are provided to the controller. In situations that the rules have not considered, the standard of care that is owed is that of a reasonably competent person trained in the same profession (they need not possess the highest expert skill, just the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising a particular art) (IFATCA 2017, p. 7).

A.4

The 2017 IFATCA study proposed three questions that may be useful in determining if a controller has met the requisite standard of care. By applying those questions to State aircraft operating with due regard, we may establish some guidelines for controller action in the absence of local procedures. It cannot be emphasised enough that these questions are only offered as a tool that may be useful for controllers to measure their actions against decisions made by some courts in selected jurisdictions. They do not and cannot be an accurate reflection of the law in all the member association States.

A.4.1

Question 1: Has the controller made reasonable efforts to obtain and maintain information to ensure the safety of aircraft in their area of responsibility?

A.4.1.1 If a controller observes or is made aware of an aircraft operating in their area of responsibility that is not conforming to the rules of the airspace, the controller should make reasonable efforts to establish the intentions of that traffic. It has been established that controllers have a duty to maintain a proper lookout: for aircraft operating with due regard, this may include observing uncorrelated surveillance returns or observing unidentified aircraft out the tower windows.

A.4.1.2 Reasonable efforts to obtain and maintain information may include making blind transmissions to the aircraft on regular and emergency frequencies, informing a supervisor or contacting the authorities that are approved to operate with due regard (where communication links are established).

A.4.2

Question 2: Has the controller reasonably acted on information so as to ensure the safety of aircraft in their area of responsibility?

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A.4.2.1 Having observed or been made aware of State aircraft operating with due regard in their area of responsibility, a controller should not necessarily be expected to apply separation between the State aircraft and civil aircraft. Knowing that States must, in accordance with the Chicago Convention, ‘undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft’ (ICAO 2006, p. 2) we can expect that there are procedures for the conduct of the State aircraft’s flight that will allow for collision avoidance. In the case of a State aircraft operating with due regard and merely transiting airspace, it may be inappropriate to attempt to provide separation; however, there may be situations where, in the reasonable controller’s opinion, the State aircraft poses a threat to the safety of civil traffic and it may be appropriate to establish some segregation. If the controller issues clearances/instructions to aircraft under their control, the controller has a duty to ensure that those clearances/instructions are accurate and not misleading.

A.4.2.2 In determining whether they will attempt to provide separation or segregation between civil aircraft operating under their control and State aircraft operating with due regard, the controller should consider that there may be dangers posed by changing the flight path of the civil aircraft. The controller may not be aware of other State aircraft operating with due regard and self-segregating from the civil aircraft’s expected flight path.

A.4.3

Question 3: Has the controller passed to the pilot information that it’s reasonable to assume the pilot will rely on to ensure the safety of their aircraft?

A.4.3.1 There is a concurrent duty on pilots and controllers to maintain the safety of a flight.

Although regulations may stipulate that the pilot is responsible for the safety of their flight, courts have found that ‘the air traffic controller, whether or not required bythe manuals, must warn of dangers reasonably apparent to him, but not apparent in the exercise of due care, to the pilot’ (American Airlines Inc. v United States in IFATCA 2017, p. 11).

A.4.3.2 Regardless of whether or not the controller determines that they will provide some separation or segregation between State aircraft operating with due regard, when the controller becomes aware of State aircraft operating with due regard and the controller expects that those aircraft will operate in proximity to civil aircraft, the controller has a duty to provide accurate, unambiguous and timely information to the pilot of the civil aircraft.

A.4.3.3 PANS ATM provides guidance for controller actions in the case of unknown aircraft operating in close proximity to controlled flights: 8.8.2.1 When an identified controlled flight is observed to be on a conflicting path with an unknown aircraft deemed to constitute a collision hazard, the pilot of the controlled flight shall, whenever practicable: a) be informed of the unknown aircraft, and if so requested by the controlled flight or if, in the opinion of the controller, the situation warrants, a course of avoiding action should be suggested; and

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b) be notified when the conflict no longer exists (ICAO 2016, p. 8-21).

A.4.3.4 PANS ATM provides similar guidance in the case of unknown aircraft operating in close proximity to uncontrolled flights:

8.8.2.2 When an identified IFR flight operating outside controlled airspace is observed to be on a conflicting path with another aircraft, the pilot should: a) be informed as to the need for collision avoidance action to be initiated, and if so requested by the pilot or if, in the opinion of the controller, the situation warrants, a course of avoiding action should be suggested; and b) be notified when the conflict no longer exists (ICAO 2016, p. 8-22).

A.4.3.5 European regulation SERA 7002 and some State regulations provide similar guidance to controllers for handling unknown aircraft operating in the vicinity of identified aircraft.

A.5

In the absence of any guidance from their ANSP, controllers may use the three questions in this Appendix to consider their actions when handling State aircraft operations. It cannot be emphasised enough that these questions are only offered as a tool that may be useful for controllers to measure their actions against decisions made by some courts in selected jurisdictions. They do not and cannot be an accurate reflection of the law in all the member association States; therefore, it is always preferable that ANSPs publish guidance for their controllers for handling State aircraft.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 57TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE – Accra, Ghana, 19-23 March 2018 Agenda Item: B.9.1

IFATCA 18 WP No. 97

Position Paper on Remotely Operated Towers Presented by Giusy Sciacca1 Summary In the last years the operational concept or Remote Tower Operations (RTO) has been tested and in some cases already implemented. ROTs are a remarkable example of how the digitalisation and virtualisation of ATS provision is affecting our profession raising new issues and challenges. The aim of this paper is to convey an updated view of the process of the current implementation and highlight the need for further research in order to cope with all the already known and emerging issues related to such a revolutionary change of the tower environment.

1.

Introduction

1.1

The ROT Group was stablished during the Toronto Conference under the leadership of former EVPT (current DP). The group was tasked with the development of a position paper on the subject.

1.2

Responsibility of coordination of the group was taken by Giusy Sciacca. All coordination was made by email with no presencial meetings.

2.

Discussion

2.1

Several drafts were developed being the sources IFATCA policy on the subject as well as European regulations, guidelines, papers, ICAO documents and HF studies. o o o o o o o

2.2

1

Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/340, 20th February 2015.

ICAO Annex 11, Air Traffic Services, 14th Ed., July 2016.

ICAO, DOC 4444, PANS-ATM, Procedures for Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management, 16th Ed., November 2016.

EASA, Guidance Material on the implementation of the remote tower concept for singe mode of operation, Issue 1, 3rd July 2015.

EASA, Explanatory Note to Decision 2015/015/R, 3rd July 2015.

EGHD, The Human Dimension in Remote Tower Operations, Position paper, December 2017.

Erik Hollnagel, David D. Woods, Nancy Leveson, Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts, 2006

The final version is included as an annex to this working paper.

On behalf of the ROT Group as Coordinator.

B.9.1 / Page 1 of 2

2.3 In order to maintain consistency between the TPM and the position paper, it is the opinion of the ROT group that the conclusions and recommendations of the position paper should be included in the TPM.

3.

Conclusions See position paper in annex.

4.

Recommendation It is recommended that the current IFATCA policy ADME 2.15 (TPM 2017) is updated taking in consideration the development of the RTO implementation.

5.

References o o o o o o

Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/340, 20th February 2015.

ICAO Annex 11, Air Traffic Services, 14th Ed., July 2016.

ICAO, DOC 4444, PANS-ATM, Procedures for Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management, 16th Ed., November 2016.

EASA, Guidance Material on the implementation of the remote tower concept for singe mode of operation, Issue 1, 3rd July 2015.

EASA, Explanatory Note to Decision 2015/015/R, 3rd July 2015.

EGHD, The Human Dimension in Remote Tower Operations, Position paper, December 2017.

- END -

B.9.1 / Page 2 of 2

IFATCA Position Paper Remotely Operated Towers 1

Introduction

The development of the Remotely Operated Tower (ROT) concept and its implementation all over the world is often driven by the search for lower costs for the air traffic services (ATS).

So far, these developments have occurred faster than the regulatory development process at international, national and regional levels.

The ROT concept is not to be deemed as a mere technological implementation, as it implies a radical change in the acquisition of data and affects the nature of the controllers’ work itself.

Accordingly, the effect of staff related issues and new tasks as well as responsibility and skills should be analysed and recognised by all stakeholders. Also, a standardisation on the working procedures, working environment, technical solutions and minimum technical standards by new and advanced systems and tools must be set.

IFATCA, as the leading International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations, means to highlight and stress the needs for staffing related issues, minimum technical requirements, standardisation of procedural design and safety issues for the ROTs.

2

Definitions

Remote Tower Operations (RTO) The concept of providing ATS from a different location rather than from a traditional control tower at an aerodrome. Using different surveillance technologies such as infra-red cameras and thermal sensors, a complete or partial tower view can be recreated virtually at a Remote Tower Module (RTM).

Remotely Operated Tower (ROT) A facility that is operated remotely and transmits collected sensory data to a RTM.

Remote Tower Module (RTM) The RTM is the workstation from which remote aerodrome services can be provided. It includes both the Controller Working Positions (CWPs), including the necessary ATS systems and the visual presentation display screens.

Remote Tower Centre (RTC) One or more remote tower modules compose the Remote Tower Centre (RTC), from which ATS can be provided to several aerodromes.

B.9.1_Attachment / Page 1 of 7

3

Mode of Operations

Two main modes of operations have been developed so far: single and multiple. Within the multiple modes of operation, sequential and simultaneous can be further distinguished. The concept of multiple modes of operation is still not mature and deserves careful assessments and considerations.

Single mode of operation An air traffic service provision from a Remote Tower Module (RTM) for only one aerodrome at a time. ATS will not be delivered to more than one airport at a time concurrently.

Sequential multiple mode of operation An air traffic control service provided to two or more aerodromes with only one aerodrome being provided with a service at any one time from a Remote Tower Module (RTM).

This concept is being trialled for low density operations to operate strategically on demand.

Simultaneous multiple mode of operation An air traffic control service provided to two or more aerodromes with a service being provided to more than one aerodrome simultaneously.

Contingency operations An air traffic control service provided from a remote location to be used as a contingency in the event of a failure of the traditional facility.

4

Discussion

4.1

Safety

According to IFATCA`s view on safety RTO must provide an equivalent level of safety to that of conventional tower operations. In this context it should be clear, that new technology and tools shall support staff in accomplishing their tasks and providing a service that is equivalent to a tower. Highly automated systems that can also be used in conventional towers, like thermal and infra-red cameras can enhance the level of target detection during night or low visibility with positive effects in terms of surveillance and people’s understanding of the situation.

All liability issues which might be extended to all those involved in the whole cycle of implementation from design project managers to manufacturers and from the operators ( ATCOs and FISOs) to maintenance (ATSEPs) shall be clearly addressed and defined by the regulator. Likewise, any cross-border operation, where controllers licensed in one State provide ATS to locations in another State, must be regulated and coordinated by the authorities concerned.

IFATCA policy1 is: 1

IFATCA 2017, Technical and Professional Manual, ATS 3.14 p. 3 2 316 B.9.1_Attachment / Page 2 of 7

Organisations that provide ATM services beyond state borders shall clearly define the operational legal implications of providing these services, and train controllers in the implications.

The introduction of new technology, tools and procedures affects task performance and responsibilities and therefore shall undergo a safety assessment.

Such changes need evaluation by a change management system and requires a continuous effort from the Safety Management System to keep up with the technological evolution of the aviation system.

IFATCA policy2 is: Operational controllers shall be involved in the design, development and implementation of new ATM systems. Their role shall include:     

Establishing users’ requirements; Defining operational training requirements prior to implementation; Participating in the risk assessment process; Validating the system; Providing feedback in the further development of the system.

The design, development and implementation team of a new ATM system/equipment/tool shall include, as a minimum:      

System developers - typically software and hardware engineers; Project managers; End-users – i.e. the operational controllers, supervisors and ATSEPs (Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel); Legal experts; Human factors specialists; Safety specialists.

4.2 Licensing The approach to the job, the environment and the modes the tasks of the operators are accomplished in RTOs are different from today’s work and the environment of the conventional towers. Tasks and responsibilities will differ depending on technical equipment and supporting tools than in conventional towers. Staff will be faced with significantly different settings to perform and achieve service provision.

IFATCA policy is3: 2

IFATCA 2017, Technical and Professional Manual, AAS 1.13 p. 3 2 1 17 B.9.1_Attachment / Page 3 of 7

Provisions, training programmes, separation standards and a specific Remote Tower endorsement are required for operating at Remote and Virtual Towers.

4.3 Training Training is a keyword when facing such an innovative era and it has a strategic importance.

With regard to the implementation of ROTs, the introduction of a transitional and conversional training, as recommended by EASA4 for the European Member States, is highly relevant and recommended for both ATS and maintenance operators.

Currently (2018) training for operational staff is not covering all these methodologies and procedures.

Therefore, IFATCA suggests the introduction of Unit Training Plans for RTO operators in a harmonised way to meet Common Core Content training requirements. ROTs unit training and competence plans, including OJTI and Supervisory, shall therefore be introduced and followed. RTO Unit Training Plans shall focus on all the training needs above the standard Unit Training Plans belonging to the conventional towers, which have not been entirely identified, yet.

4.4 Technical requirements The development of the RTO solutions is not standardised in any way in today’s competitive environment. Early iterations of the RTM presented technical solutions that more or less replicated the 360° visual world of a tower with displays surrounding the operator, which in some recent technical solutions tend to reduce the displayed covered view to 270° or even 240°. As a consequence, the ATS operator must rely on surveillance for the hidden portions of the air or ground. The cases of reduced displayed view might lead to important legal implications.

Furthermore, the compression of the images might affect the visual perception of distance of the operator. In this latter case an Human Factor and Human Performance analysis might bring to relevant results.

Despite being in most cases very accurate, the presentation of traffic in a RTM is the result of digitally elaborated images acquired through the use of cameras, that is electronic surveillance systems rather than visual observation, as stated in DOC 4444 ICAO.5.

These solutions introduce unknown challenges to the operator, whose perception of traffic will no longer be three-dimensional, but the interpretation of a visual presentation where flight paths and geometry are not the same as real life.

Therefore, IFATCA believes that all separation and ATS procedures applied in conventional towers shall be assessed to be applied in the remote environment.

IFATCA policy6 is: 3

IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual (2017), ADME 2.15 Page 3 2 2 17 EASA, Guidance Material on the implementation of the remote tower concept for single mode operation, 2015, pag.26, 2.11 5 DOC 4444 ICAO 16th ed. 2016, Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Air Traffic Management, Chapter 7, 7.1.1.2.

6 IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual (2017), ADME 2.15 Page 3 2 2 17 4

B.9.1_Attachment / Page 4 of 7

Separation standards and procedures for Remote and Virtual Towers shall be developed or adapted and implemented based on a robust safety case and the demonstrated capabilities of the system.

Likewise, the introduction of new contingency procedures and checklist is are requested.

IFATCA is concerned that ATCOs will have to operate in a visual environment that is not intuitive (natural, similar to real life) and will, in high workload situations, revert to natural interpretation of the visual presentation in the RTM, with the risk of leading to unsafe situations.

4.5 Human Factors Remote tower technology is a change in the way operators deliver ATS, and several new operational concepts have arisen in response to specific local needs. An identification of all human factors implications along the process of implementation shall be carried out, because all the emergent properties7 of the system are still not known. Not only safety assessments and human factor analyses are recommended, but also more research and experience in every ROT in order to make the operational concept fully mature.

Virtualisation and digitalisation are new concepts arising new challenges, which are still not entirely understood and integrated into the current standards and regulations. The availability of technology alone is not sufficient to motivate the change. Sociological, cultural and micro economical assessments shall be taken into account as well.

The Federation is seriously concerned about the implications related to the potential provision of simultaneous multiple operations by one single operator (i.e. from one RTM).

Research maturity itself on the concept for remote provision of ATS for multiple aerodromes is not fully reached. So far, SESAR has published just one solution8 about multiple mode of operations with significant recommendations and additional activities relevant for the industrialisation phase (see Annex 1).

The challenges associated with remote ATS provided to multiple airports cannot be underestimated. Lessons can be learned from area control where one controller has ratings for different sectors. However, care should be taken in drawing analogies between differing types of operation (for example, ADC-runway controller, ADC/APP) as situational awareness for tower control has different complexities to area control.

For instance, in area control north is always up on the situational display. In the RTM the cardinal directions of north and south may not be represented on the same spot on the visual display for the different airport. The cognitive challenges of handling this kind of differences shall be addressed, especially in case of unusual occurrences.

7

Erik Hollnagel, David D. Woods, Nancy Leveson, Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts, 2006 8 SESAR, Release 4, Solution #52, Remotely Provided Air Traffic Services for Two Low Density Aerodromes.

B.9.1_Attachment / Page 5 of 7

Furthermore, the case of Ăœberlingen is an evidence sadly, of how the complex issues arising from the management of multiple tasks remain. One of the recommendation following the accident of Ăœberlingen requires that an additional controller shall be assigned the task in case of service provided to more than one sector. Coherently, the same principle is applicable to the management of simultaneous RTO.

IFATCA policy9 is: ATCOs shall not be required to provide a Remote and Virtual tower service for more than one aerodrome simultaneously.

Some remote technologies are integrated into a traditional tower to enhance visual observation. This combination of conventional and remote technologies may also need to be considered in a human factors context to establish the impact on operations in towers.

The prolonged exposure of the human eye to digital representation of information, bright lights and artificial ventilation might cause eye fatigue. Likewise, the new environment characterized by several audio and visual inputs might lead to alarm fatigue. Furthermore, the bi-dimensional vision, the effect of lights and the continuous movement of the eyes focus on several screens might concur in creating spatial disorientation.

4.6 Integrity of data ATS provided in a remotely operated facility rely on the integrity of data and digital data sources, which transfer information by distributed network lines of communications. The total digitalisation of the information flow makes cybersecurity threats and corruption of data more likely. Data must be secured and protected to avoid interception, data corruption or malicious intervention (hacking).

Data reliability and liability have to be defined and set up. Contingency procedures, in case of wrong, corrupted and unreliable data must be developed and implemented.

5 Conclusions and recommendations 1. IFATCA highlights the need for detailed safety assessments and human factor analyses in remotely operated facilities.

2. A definition of the impact of working models and procedures in a highly technological environment with particular regard to liability for the operators, as well as more experience with the new concept, is considered necessary.

3. IFATCA detects the urgency for concise definitions with particular regard to the definition of modes, of operations, including low and high traffic volumes.

9

IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual (2017), ADME 2.15 Page 3 2 2 17 B.9.1_Attachment / Page 6 of 7

4. In IFATCA’s view there is a need for minimum international requirements for all known aspects of RTO. 5. At this time IFATCA opposes the performance of simultaneous RTO and/or Visual Tower by one ATCO. 6. IFATCA recommends establishing endorsements, which are in line with new procedural and technical requirements for ATCOs, AFISOs as well as ATSEPs. 7. IFATCA recommends the introduction of transition training and programs from conventional to remote tower operations.

8. IFATCA points out the need for the deployment of contingency procedures to be in place.

9. IFATCA calls for data integrity.

6 Abbreviations    ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

ADC Aerodrome Controller AFIS Aerodrome Flight Information Service APP Approach Centre ATSEP Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel CNS Communication, navigation and surveillance CWP Controller Working Position EFS Electronic Flight Strips OTW Out-of-the-Window ROT Remotely operated tower RTO Remote Tower Operations RTC Remote Tower Centre RTM Remote Tower Module

7 Regulatory references Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/340, 20th February 2015.

ICAO Annex 11, Air Traffic Services, 14th Ed., July 2016 ICAO, DOC 4444, PANS-ATM, Procedures for Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management, 16th Ed., November 2016.

EASA, Guidance Material on the implementation of the remote tower concept for singe mode of operation, Issue 1, 3rd July 2015 EASA, Explanatory Note to Decision 2015/015/R, 3rd July 2015 EGHD, The Human Dimension in Remote Tower Operations, Position paper, December 2017 IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual (2017)

B.9.1_Attachment / Page 7 of 7

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 57TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE – Accra, Ghana, 19-23 March 2018 Agenda Item: B.9.2

IFATCA 18 WP No. 98

Air Traffic Management for Tiltrotors Presented by ANACNA Summary The first commercial use of tiltrotors is starting in 2018. As the performances and typical behaviour of such machines can be as similar as both airplanes and helicopters, this working paper will provide short explanation and a Questions and Answers list on how to manage tiltrotor from an ATM perspective

1.

Introduction

1.1.

Leonardo Helicopters, formerly known as Agusta-Westland, is developing the AW609 which represents the first tiltrotor for civil use.

1.2.

Tiltrotor is not a brand-new technology as they were studied since the 50’s of the 20 th century. the final use has always been military. The Boeing V22 “Osprey” is the most known one and is very active in all those operations where the performances of an actual airplane (speed, load capacity, endurance) is needed in conjunction to the ones typical of helicopters (no need of landing runways, possibility to hover and to fly as slow as needed).

1.3.

For certain operational scenarios, tiltrotor might be useful for civil use too. Oil platforms, offshore activity, emergency evacuation and coast patrol could benefit on the use of aircraft which can fly as fast and far as an airplane but doesn’t need long runways to take off and land.

2.

Discussion

2.1.

The regulatory framework of tiltrotors is already being developed by ICAO which is going to adopt the guidance material formulated by the Tiltrotor Sub-Group. This is expected to be published in 2018.

2.2.

The Italian Air Traffic Controller Association (ANACNA) was asked to help in the development of guidance material within the Tiltrotor Sub-Group of the ICAO Flight Operation Panel (FLTOPSP).

2.3.

As a result, many question raised during the studies on how ATCOs should deal with the performance and capabilities of tiltrotors which might be unknown by operators, especially if compared to helicopters.

B.9.2 / Page 1 of 9

2.4.

The attachment is a joint document between Leonardo Helicopters and the Italian Air Traffic Controllers Association ANACNA which aims to provide answers to these points.

3.

Conclusions

3.1.

The Q&As is intended as informative material for the use of CAAs, ANSPs and operators on the differences between tiltrotor and conventional aircraft from an Air Traffic Management perspective. It might still be updated with the suggestions readers would provide.

3.2.

For this intent ANACNA encourages to send feedbacks and suggestions to the following address: info@anacna.it

4.

4.1.

Recommendation It is recommended that this working paper is adopted as Information Paper

Attachment ASS. NAZ. ASSISTENTI E CONTROLLORI DELLA NAVIGAZIONE AEREA ITALIAN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS’ ASSOCIATION MEMBER OF IFATCA

AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT FOR TILTROTORS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS Issue 1 Introduction The history of aviation has seen many technologies developed and matured by the military prior to their introduction into commercial service such as jet propulsion, fly-by-wire flight controls and composite primary structures. Today tiltrotor technology follows a similar path, having been used successfully by the military for over 10 years in the Bell Boeing V-22, Leonardo Helicopter’s AW609 is on the verge of civil certification for commercial use.

As the speed, range, and VTOL capability of the V-22 tiltrotor has revolutionized military missions like combat search and rescue, medical evacuation, and long-range ship to shore transportation, so too will the AW609 in commercial SAR, EMS, and offshore oil and gas transportation.

The AW609’s use in civil operations will revolutionize transportation, enabling true point to point travel and help reduce congestion at busy airports.

As the technology and operational regulations are on the horizon 1, some questions, remarks or doubts might arise within the Air Traffic Management (ATM) community on how to integrate tiltrotor activities into 1

First commercial civil tiltrotor activity is expected in 2019.

B.9.2 / Page 2 of 9

usual aircraft management and on how to interact with tiltrotor flights. This joint document between Leonardo Helicopters and the Italian Air Traffic Controllers Association ANACNA aims to provide answers to these points.

From a 1.

2.

3.

4.

Gate-to-Gate perspective this Q&A sheet is divided into the different flight phases: Departure In flight Arrival General

Definitions Airplane Mode: A configuration with the proprotors on the down-stop and set to cruise RPM.

0°

VTOL/Conversion Mode: means all approved configurations (gated proprotor positions) and flight modes where the design operating proprotor speed is that used for hover operations.

Note: the term ”Helicopter Mode“ is not used. This is to avoid confusion as helicopter mode implies a configuration where the proprotors are fixed at 90°. This configuration is used for stable and very low speed hover only. Angles greater than 90° may be used for hovering backwards at low speed.

5 0°

90°

Maximum Dimension: The largest overall dimension of the tiltrotor (rotors turning), equivalent to “D Value” for a conventional helicopter.

B.9.2 / Page 3 of 9

Maximum Dimension

Further Guidance In addition to this sheet, ICAO is developing guidance material for tiltrotor aircraft. It is anticipated this guidance will be issued in early 2018.

Disclaimer This document is intended as guidance material only. The material within has the sole purpose of providing information on the differences between tiltrotor and conventional aircraft from an Air Traffic Management perspective for awareness only. The data given is based on experience from the AW609 tiltrotor, when other tiltrotors begin operating this material will require review. Whilst this material may be used to give suggestions on the way to manage tiltrotors or to provide guidance and best practice, in no way does it supersede existing national or international regulation on the affected environment and matters.

Q&As Table of Contents

1. Departure ............................................................................................................................................. 5 1.1. Start-up ......................................................................................................................................... 5 1.2. Taxi ............................................................................................................................................... 5 1.3. Roll and Take-off........................................................................................................................... 6 2. In Flight................................................................................................................................................. 6 2.1. Climb ............................................................................................................................................. 6 2.2. Cruise............................................................................................................................................ 7 2.3. Descent ......................................................................................................................................... 7

B.9.2 / Page 4 of 9

3. Arrival ................................................................................................................................................... 8 3.1. Approach....................................................................................................................................... 8 3.2. Landing ......................................................................................................................................... 8 4. General................................................................................................................................................. 8

Q&As 1.

1.1.



Departure Start-up Q: Is there any difference in start-up time between helicopters or airplanes start-up and tiltrotors? A: No. Start-up times are comparable with those of modern helicopters and aeroplanes.



Q: Can Tiltrotors use the same helipads as helicopters? A: In general, yes. Advice is being sought from the ICAO Aerodromes Panel to issue guidance that tiltrotors may use helicopter helipads based on the tiltrotor’s maximum dimension.

1.2.



Taxi Q: Shall ATM expect tiltrotors to taxi on the ground or hover like a helicopter? A: Ground taxi will be the preferred way to taxi. But a hovering taxi will be possible as well, but not recommended due to down-wash.



Q: In case of ground taxing what speed will the tiltrotor normally keep? A: 10 kts



Q: As in some airports, runway crossing is required to be as fast as possible with written additional requirements such as mandating to have all engines on, is there the possibility to ask tiltrotors to speed up? Up to what speed? A: 20-30 kts



Q: In airport design, might wingspan of tiltrotors be considered as consistent with airplane wingspan or is there the need to add some rotating tip effects? A: Not when compared with medium and large aircraft.



Q: Tiltrotors propellers can be set on different positions during taxiing. Could this produce undesired or higher than actual known vortex (like those already known for helicopters)? 

B.9.2 / Page 5 of 9

A: No.



Q: Is there any other different behavior during taxiing from actual aircrafts? A: No.

1.3.



Roll and Take-off Q: Does rolling on runway for take-off take the same length as airplanes? What is a typical runway occupancy of the AW609 in time/distance?  A. Less than 15 sec./Less distance (200-300 m)



Q: Can a tiltrotor roll for take-off be considered as Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) operation?  A: Yes.



Q: Can take-off be carried both through vertical lift from Helipad (VTOL) as horizontal (STOL) from a runway? A: Yes but limits are placed on VTOL take-off weight. If a high weight is present a STOL may be the only possible procedure.



Q: During take-off rolling, is the vortex generated by tiltrotor consistent with its wake turbulence category or is there any additional vortex area to be considered? A: Yes the vortex generated is consistent with its wake turbulence category.



Q: What is the minimum height for tiltrotors to set from lifted take-off to horizontal configuration? How long does the conversion take? A: It depends on the take-off procedure used (Performance Class 1 or 2). In general, there is no need to rush to complete the conversion to aircraft mode since airspeed and climb rate achieved in airplane mode and VTOL/conversion mode overlap for a long time during a standard departure profile.

Minimum height will be 15 ft during take-off Performance Class 1.

2.

2.1.



In Flight Climb Q: What is the average vertical and horizontal speed of a tiltrotor during climb? A: In Airplane mode 160 KIAS and 1000-1500 ft/m during initial climb.

B.9.2 / Page 6 of 9

In VTOL/Conversion mode 80 KIAS up to 2500 ft/m.



Q: Can ATC request an increase in the rate of climb of a tiltrotor? Up to what value? A: Yes. It depends: 2500 ft/m

2.2.



Cruise Q: Is the vortex generated by tiltrotor consistent with its wake turbulence category? A: Yes.



Q: What is the usual and maximum cruising altitude of tiltrotors? A: Around 20,000 ft, max 25,000 ft.



Q: What is the usual and maximum speed of tiltrotors? A: It depends on altitude and the specific tiltrotor model, but generally speaking Vcruise will be approximately 250 KTAS and maximum speed will be around 275 KTAS.



Q: Down to what speed can tiltrotors be requested to slow? A: For low level cruise (up to 8000ft) a slow down to hover can be achieved. Above this altitude the tiltrotor is an airplane mode and therefore can be slowed down to the standard minimum airspeed (130 KIAS (C-12 type)).



Q: In case of such request from ATC, how long does it take for a tiltrotor to slow down from cruising speed to hovering (or to the minimum speed)? A: It will be consistent with a helicopter.



Q: What is the maximum altitude that a tiltrotor can reach in helicopter configuration both moving and hovering? A: 8000 ft according to gross weight.

2.3.

Descent

 Q: Is the Top Of Descent (TOD) and subsequent vertical speed consistent with other airplanes? A: Yes.

B.9.2 / Page 7 of 9

3.

3.1.



Arrival Approach Q: When Instrumental Final Approach has initiated, how far from the touchdown zone of the runway should ATC expect tiltrotor to start slowing down and setting for landing configuration?  A: Before IAF an initial conversion to 50° nacelle and 140 KIAS (no later than FAF); 75° nacelle and speed less than 90 KIAS after MAP.



Q: During an instrumental approach, which is the most suitable altitude/height to brake the approach and convert to go towards the Helipad? A: The final portion of an instrumental approach will be flown already in VTOL/conversion mode (nacelle not in horizontal position >50° nacelle/max speed 140 KIAS) therefore the approach can be flow down to standard minima and after MAP perform a final speed reduction (if not performed before) to proceed to the helipad.



Q: Is the vortex generated by tiltrotor consistent with its wake turbulence category or there’s the need for additional spacing from following traffic during the approach phase?

A: It is consistent

3.2.



Landing Q: What is the final approach speed of a tiltrotor? A: It depends on the nacelle configuration used but it can be considered compatible with modern helicopter speeds during final approach.



Q: What is the landing speed of a tiltrotor? A: For a landing roll around 40 Kts.



Q: Can a tiltrotor land both vertically on the helipad as horizontally on the runway? A: Yes.



Q: What is the runway minimum occupancy time after landing?  A: No additional time to the normal time required to taxi out.

4.

General

B.9.2 / Page 8 of 9



Q: According to its profile, tiltrotor might be conducted as a helicopter. Would it be feasible to allow a tiltrotor to comply to the less-restrictive requirements which are related to helicopters only (e.g. visibility minima)? A: Yes.



Q: In general, will a tiltrotor be managed over and around airports more in a helicopter configuration or more in airplane mode? A: VTOL/Conversion mode to be managed as a helicopter.



Q: In the intent of providing Air Traffic Service Providers and Officers with tiltrotor traffic management guidance material, please add any other suggestion, data and information you might find useful: A: In all critical phases of flight it is comparable to a helicopter.

During take-off, up to 1500 ft AGL approximately, can be handled as a helicopter. From 1500 ft AGL on departure to 1500 ft AGL before landing or Holding pattern included, can be considered as an airplane, on final as an helicopter. For fuel planning and weather minima as a helicopter. Emergency procedures will be handled as a helicopter in VTOL/conversion mode.

- END -

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