The Mother of Western Philosophy? Diotima’s Influence on the Socratic Method

CAROLINE R. P. MURPHY-RACETTE

The Symposium is one of Plato’s best-known dialogues and one of his more literary works, recounting speeches in praise of the god Love given by members at a late fifth-century dinner party. One of the guests, Socrates, takes a different approach; instead of delivering a typical encomium, he recounts a conversation he had with the Mantinean priestess Diotima. Socrates claims that Diotima taught him the ways of Love, but it is apparent in his narrative that she had an even greater impact on him, influencing the development of his method of inquiry and one of his most fundamental epistemological beliefs. In this paper, I will argue for Diotima’s historicity, that Socrates’ claims that she was his teacher should be taken seriously, and that her influence extended beyond his ideas of Love to the development of his method in three major areas: the specific elenctic structure of his philosophical debates, the establishment of the dialectical requirement, and the distinction between knowledge and true belief.

Some scholars have brushed over the possible truth of Socrates’ claims that Diotima was his teacher, questioning the priestess’ historicity. Such doubts about her realness are compounded by the fact that little is known about her aside from her brief appearance in the Symposium. Due to the literary nature of the dialogue, scholars such as Francis Macdonald Cornford have argued that she is a fictional priestess whom the character Socrates invented to inoffensively criticize his host Agathon’s views.1 This objection, however, seems to be at odds with the stylistic conventions of Platonic dialogues; Alfred Edward Taylor observes that ‘the introduction of purely fictitious named personages into a discourse seems to be a literary device unknown to Plato.’2

While ‘purely fictitious’ people may be unfamiliar to Plato’s dialogues, female teachers are not. In Meno, Socrates claims that priestesses taught him the theory of recollection, and in Menexenus, that Aspasia taught him the art of rhetoric.3 Yet, while Diotima’s historicity is uncertain, Aspasia’s existence is widely attested; Aristophanes made her the target of comic insult in his Acharnians and Plutarch wrote of her relationship with Pericles.4 Her philosophical connection to Socrates is also documented. Plutarch notes that the philosopher visited her with his disciples and Socrates’ character in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus tells Critobolus that Aspasia has more knowledge than he possesses.5 The fact that Aspasia was both a real person and an associate of Socrates suggests that Diotima was, too. It is unlikely that Plato would be so inconsistent between dialogues as to seriously claim education from an historical woman in one

1 Cornford 1950, p. 71

2 Taylor 1960, pp. 224-5

3 Pl. Men. 81a10-11; Pl. Menex. 235e3-236a3

4 Ar. Ach. 527; Plut. Vit. Per. 24.1-6

5 Plut. Vit. Per. 24.3; Xen. Oec. 3.14 and pretend a fictional priestess was his teacher in another.

While the origins of Socrates’ method are disputed, it is certain that he did not invent the question-and-answer form of his method; Diogenes Laertius reports that it dates back to the pre-Socratic philosopher Zeno of Elea.6 Diotima thus did not invent this practice; nevertheless, the specific structure and process of her inquiry, which the character Socrates employs in other Platonic dialogues, is unique. Their methods are terminologically related; in giving his account of their conversation, Socrates calls it an interrogation [ἐλέγχω, elénkhō].7 Ἐλέγχω gives us the word elenchus [ἔλεγχος], a term frequently applied to the Socratic method, which is sometimes entitled the ‘elenctic method.’ The elenctic method has a clear purpose: Gregory Vlastos describes it as a ‘search for moral truth by question-and-answer.’8 What distinguishes the elenctic method from other forms of inquiry, however, is its specific structure. Socrates achieves his goal of ‘exposing inconsistency within the interlocutors’ beliefs’ through a system of hypothesis elimination.9 His strategy can be delineated as follows:10

1. The interlocutor asserts some proposition (p), which Socrates targets for refutation.11

2. Through questioning, ‘Socrates secures agreement to further premises…(q) and (r).’12

3. ‘Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that (q) and (r) entail (not-p).’13

4. The interlocutor discovers that his new beliefs are inconsistent with his old beliefs.

The conversation between Diotima and Socrates follows this same pattern of exposing discrepancies in the interlocutor’s beliefs; Socrates remarks that Diotima used his arguments to prove that it ‘followed from [his] own ideas that Love wasn’t good or attractive.’14 Their conversation progresses as follows:

1. Socrates makes the initial proposition (p) that: ‘Love is a great god and is attractive.’15

2. Prompted by Diotima, Socrates agrees that:

(q) Love is not a god, but lies ‘between mortal and immortal’ [μεταξύ; metaxú, ‘between/in the middle’] 16

AND that

(r) Love is neither attractive nor good, but lies between [μεταξύ] the two.17

3. (q) and (r) thus imply (not-p): Love is neither a god, as it occupies middle ground between mortality and immortality, nor is it attractive, as it occupies middle ground between attractive and repulsive.

4. Socrates’ new beliefs, which imply (not-p), are thus inconsistent with his old beliefs, which implied (p).

6 Diog. Laert. 1.18

7 Pl. Symp. 201e6

8 Vlastos 1994, p. 4

9 Vlastos 1982, p. 711

10 Ibid. p. 11; Irwin 1995, pp. 17-8; Matthews 2008, pp. 388-9

11 Matthews 2008, p. 388

12 Vlastos 1994, p. 11

13 Ibid.

14 Pl. Symp. 201e6

15 Ibid. 201e5

16 Ibid. 202d11

17 Ibid. 202b1-10

Socrates portrays Diotima as the instigator of their conversation and himself as the recipient of her teaching, answering, and cross-examining.18 The structure of their discussion thus reinforces Diotima’s function as Socrates’ teacher and influencer of his philosophical beliefs and method. Socrates also draws a linguistic connection between Diotima’s role in the elenchus and his own, claiming that he was convinced [πεπεισμένος, pepeisménos] by her and is therefore determined to convince [πείθειν, peíthein] others to believe the same things about Love.19

Diotima’s formal influence on the Socratic method extends beyond its structure; the priestess sets the precedent for the dialectical requirement, which necessitates that a definition ‘proceed through things that the questioner already knows.’20 When utilized, the dialectical requirement facilitates inquiry, ensuring that the interlocutor understands what is being discussed. Diotima employs the dialectical requirement by clarifying complex ideas with analogies and by providing Socrates with examples whenever he asks for them.21 Diotima further caters her explanations to him by presenting her ideas in the terms he requests; when he asks who Love’s parents are, she supplies an allegorical story about its birth from Poverty and Plenty.22

Plato portrays Socrates as adhering to the dialectical requirement in his other dialogues; in Meno, he uses analogies with bees and shapes and speaks to Meno in a sophistical way, the method with which he is familiar.23 Socrates even employs Diotima’s exemplification of the children of famous Greeks. In the Symposium, she explains the benefit of offspring produced from attractive people, suggesting that great men, such as Lycurgus, have achieved eternal fame through their children.24 Socrates takes a similar approach in Meno; in order to explain to Anytus why virtue may not be teachable, he notes that great Athenians, such as Pericles, were not able to teach their sons their own virtuosity.25 The dialectical requirement is essential for the interlocutor to fully understand and learn from the conversation. Socrates thus adopts Diotima’s practice of using analogies and including examples from real people and everyday life in his discussions.

There is reason to believe that the historical Socrates adopted the dialectical requirement, even if he did not explicitly state his practice. We know from Diogenes Laertius that Socrates’ interlocutors were not always famous thinkers; he conducted his inquiries in workshops and in the marketplace.26 As his interlocutors were likely ordinary people from non-philosophical backgrounds, Socrates would need to use examples from everyday life to speak to them in terms they could understand. It is therefore likely that Diotima’s introduction of the dialectical requirement to

18 ἣ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἐδίδαξεν [she taught me the ways of Love] (Pl. Symp. 201d5), ὥς ποτέ με ἡ ξένη ἀνακρίνουσα διῄει […just as the foreigner (Diotima) described to me in reply] (Pl. Symp. 201e2-3), ἤλεγχε δή με [she interrogated me] (Pl. Symp. 201e6). Subjects italicized, verbs underlined, direct objects in bold. As the direct object, Socrates is the recipient of the actions performed by Diotima, the subject.

19 Pl. Symp. 212b2-4; πεπεισμένος [having been convinced] is the perfect mediopassive participle of πείθω [I convince]; πείθειν [to convince] is its present active infinitive. ‘πεπεισμένος δὲ πειρῶμαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πείθειν’ hence reads literally as: ‘Thus having myself been convinced, I will try to convince others as well’ (Pl. Symp. 212b2-3).

20 Scott 2006, p. 57

21 Pl. Symp. 205b7-8: Socrates: ‘Ὥσπερ τί;’ Diotima: ‘Ὥσπερ τόδε…’ [Socrates: ‘Like what?’ Diotima: ‘Like this…’].

22 Ibid. 203a9 and 203b-204b

23 Pl. Men. 72b, 73e, 75e1-5

24 Pl. Symp. 209c2-e4

25 Pl. Men. 93d1-94e3

26 Diog. Laert. 2.21.3

Socrates had a real-life impact on the way he conducted inquiries with others.

In addition to influencing the structure of his method, Diotima shaped one of Socrates’ core epistemological beliefs, which is required for his inquiries to occur. Essential to the Socratic method is the notion that there is middle ground between knowledge and ignorance: true belief. Such a distinction is necessary to satisfy the complication Socrates creates when frequently disavowing knowledge; if he does not have any initial knowledge about a topic, ‘how can he inquire, or be justified in inquiring?’27 In distinguishing the two from each other, Socrates maintains that his method of inquiry is possible without prior knowledge; one can be guided instead by their true beliefs.28 True belief thus provides the starting point for the elenchus, while knowledge is the goal and product of frequent inquiry.

It is clear from the conversation between Socrates and Diotima that the priestess is introducing this concept to him. When she asks him about the middle ground between knowledge and ignorance, he responds that he does not know what she means.29 Diotima explains the distinction to him, arguing that true belief, when unsupported by justification, is not knowledge.30 Socrates adopts this very idea, maintaining in Meno that knowledge is true belief ‘tied down’ by reason.31 He even employs the same language as Diotima to differentiate the two, maintaining the use of ἐπιστήμη [epistēmē: knowledge] and ὀρθὴ δόξα [orthē doxa: true belief] in his own teachings.32 This separation becomes an integral tenet of Socrates’ ideology; he states that, if there were anything he would claim to know for sure, it would be that ‘true belief, when unsupported by a justification, is not knowledge.’33

It is likely that the historical Socrates upheld this difference between knowledge and true belief. The Socratic disavowal of knowledge is attested outside Platonic dialogues; Xenophon remarks that Socrates distinguished divine knowledge from human knowledge, arguing that, while people can master skills such as arithmetic or carpentry, they are in the dark about the most important matters, which are reserved for the gods.34 Plato’s contemporary, Aeschines, also wrote Socratic dialogues; his Alcibiades depicts Socrates disavowing mortal knowledge.35 Shigeru Yonezawa argues that the authenticity of the Socratic disavowal of knowledge is ‘even more probable considering that the relationship between [Aeschines and Plato] was not close enough to justify borrowing from one another.’36 The presence of the disavowal of knowledge in two independent authors thereby substantiates its authenticity. Given that the historical Socrates upheld a separation between human and divine knowledge, that the distinction between true belief and knowledge is needed for the elenchus to function, and that Plato represents Socrates as learning this concept from Diotima, it is probable that the priestess introduced the concept to the historical philosopher—a major contribution to 27 Fine 1992, p. 203. For the Socratic disavowal of knowledge, see e.g., Pl. Ap. 21d4-8.

28 Pl. Men. 97b8-c3

29 Pl. Symp. 202a2-4

30 Ibid. 202a5-9. Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ᾿, ἔφη, ὅτι οὔτε ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν (ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἄν εἴη ἐπιστήμη;) [‘To form and hold true opinions without giving a reason for them, you know, is not to have knowledge,’ she said, ‘For how can a thing without reason be knowledge?’] (Pl. Symp. 202a5-7).

31 Pl. Men. 98a3-8: ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ… ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται… καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης […So they (true beliefs) are not very valuable, until one ties them down with reasoning of their cause…and when they are tied down, they first of all become kinds of knowledge…and knowledge differs from true belief because of its being tied down].

32 Pl. Symp. 202a5 (ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν [to form true beliefs]) and 202a6 (ἐπίστασθαι [to have knowledge (for oneself)]); Pl. Men. 98a8 (both ὀρθὴ δόξα [true belief] and ἐπιστήμη [knowledge]).

33 Pl. Men. 98b1-4

34 Xen. Mem. 1.1.7-8

35 Aeschines, Dittmar fragment A 53, 26-7

36 Yonezawa 2012, p. 493 the development of his method and fundamental epistemological beliefs.

The Socratic method, therefore, owes much to the influence of Diotima. Not only did the priestess inspire its specific elenctic structure, but she also established the dialectical requirement, which is needed to ensure the inquiry’s success. Furthermore, her distinction between knowledge and true belief is required for Socrates to even conduct his inquiries, as it reconciles his method of question-and-answer with his disavowal of knowledge. Thus, Socrates’ claims that Diotima taught him the ways of Love should be taken seriously and extended to include her influence on his method of inquiry and one of the core epistemological beliefs that sustains it.

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