TEN DAYS IN SEPTEMBER The Rhodes Mission & the Kos, Simi and Leros operations, 1943
NICK JELLICOE LEROS, SEPT. 2017
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE DODECANESE ISLANDS
OPERATION ACCOLADE (prev. MANDIBLES) • Amphibious landings on Rhodes / Karpathos tabled by Churchill at Jan ‘43 Casablanca conference (SYMBOL). Increased opposition at Aug ‘43 Quebec (QUADRANT). • Allied effort to take over the Dodecanese islands opposed by Eisenhower, Gnl. Marshall, Stimson, Naval and Air C‐in‐Cs Mediterranean • Maitland‐Wilson reacted late (given 37 days advance notice). „Time to play high. Improvise and dare“
OPERATION ACCOLADE Dec ‘43, Cairo conference • Churchill: “His Majesty’s Government can’t have its troops standing idle. Muskets must flame.” • Marshall: “Not one American soldier is going to die on [that] goddamn beach”
WHAT WERE CHURCHILL’S OBJECTIVES? • Alternative route to Arctic convoys • Protection of Mediterranean sea lanes • Re‐positioning in case of a German invasion of Turkey. Using the Dodecanese as „bait“ to hold out to the Turks
CRITICAL ROLE OF AIR COVER
German bases - Athens (Megara) & Crete (and Rhodes, Kos) British Bases – Cyprus •Too far for Spitfires •Bristol Beaufighters •P-38 Lighnings (provided 4 days, 20 minutes over Leros)
Leros‐Piraeus 171 n. miles
Haraklion 221 n. miles Leros‐Cyprus 390 miles
Leros‐Gambut (Benghazi) 390 miles
DOOMED TO FAILURE? • Strategic disagreement between allies on the Aegean operation • Withdrawal of U.S. air support • Little or no planning preparation for Italian armistice • Little / no inter‐service co‐ordination • Loss of 8th Indian division & late assembly of landing craft • Lack of armour
RHODES MISSION • Cairo Conference September 8th 1943 • Background: Armistice terms agreed Sept 3. To be made public Sept 8. • Objective: persuade Campioni to put troops to allied purposes, hold the airfields 35,000 Italian troops „in penny packets and almost without transport“. Kleeman‘s 7,500 well‐positioned and re‐positioned Sept 9. Marriza, Calato & Cattavia taken over Sept 10. • Initial reactions pessimistic • Limitations: Earliest allied – limited ‐ reinforcement arrival Sept 15.
CAMPIONI • Initially enthusiastic but „too aasily influenced“ • Difficult position given allied delay & lack of airpower • Played for time – Jellicoe kept close, misinformation, „kept in reserve“ • Help with outer islands – MAS.
Inigo Campioni, Governor Rhodes
• • • • • • •
Jellicoe, Dolbey and Kesterton meeting with Campioni at 02:00 Would not allow Jellicoe to see situation on ground (e.g. Marizza) JU-87 over flight. Continued Italian AA fire long after departure Germans and British both at Governor‘s Palace at same time Dolbey evauated to Simi, then Cyprus By 17:00 Campioni nervous and wants Jellicoe to go but asks him to be „handy“ in Simi or Kastelorrizo Sutherland arrives in Kastellorizo
RHODES Sept. 10th
SIMI
Rhodes
Sutherland S & M Det. SBS
KASTELORRIZO ‐ RHODES ‐ SIMI Sept. 11th
• •
• • • Lloyd Owen
• •
Jellicoe arrives Kastellorizo before dawn on MAS 12 with Lt.Col. Rugerro Fanezza Group Captain Wheeler, Colonel Kenyon and Major Palmer form a 2nd mission to Campioni. It is turned back. Wheeler goed back. Kenyon gets ashore Turnbull leaves for SIMI Jellicoe follows but Fanezza orders MS 12 back to Kastelorrizo 17:15 Wilson is informed that Campioni wants no further contact Turnbull, Jellicoe & Sutherland at Kastelorizzo LRDG recce on Kalymnos
Turnbull (1) Jellicoe (2) Kenyon Mission
Sutherland Jellicoe (1) Turnbull (2)
• • • • •
Rhodes “out of the game” Turnbull, Jellicoe & Sutherland at Kastelorizzo Audit, planning and re-grouping Leaving Kastelorrizo, Jellicoe on MS 12 and Sutherlland on ML 249 head for Kos. Lapraik / Lassen head to Kos then Simi (after leaving Haifa for Kastelerizzo)
KASTELORRIZO Sept. 12th
Sutherland / Jellicoe
Sutherland Jellicoe Turnbull
Lapraik / Lassen
FAILURE IN RHODES • Loss of primary air coverage. • Switch to outer island strategy • Kos – Antimachia, Lambia • Leros – Portolago
Luigi Mascherpa, Governor Leros. Brigadier Brittorius; commander Borghi, the Italian chief of Staff; Brigadier Turnbull. Lieutenant Colonel Li Volsi, the Commander of Italian Infrantry Units. Back row, center, centre: Major Jellicoe, SBS, and Captain E.H.B Baker RN, Senior Naval Officer.
ALLIED SPECIAL FORCES Origins, Role and Structure
FORCE 292 STRUCTURE
SPECIAL BOAT SQUADRON (SBS) Bergé
Sutherland
Millner Barry
Jellicoe
Lassen
Lapraik
Jarrell
RAIDING FORCES MIDDLE EAST
Turnbull
Dobrski
LEVANT SCHOONER FLOTILLA (LSF)
Seligman
COMMANDO Easonsmith
Ramseyer
SPECIAL AIR SERVICE (SAS)
Stirling
Lewes
Mayne
FREE FRENCH
LRDG
IEROS LOHOS Easonsmith
Lloyd Owen
Prendergast
Bergé
Bergé
Tsigantes
SPECIAL FORCES COMBINED OPS EXAMPLES 1940 Roger Courtney FOLBOAT section (12 men). Sherwood, Tug Wilson (2iC)
10 commando groups started June. No.8 Bob Laycock – Stirling, Jellicoe, Churchill. Almonds, Mather, Berry, Astor, Evilyn Waugh, Philip Dunne.
SPECIAL FORCES COMBINED OPS EXAMPLES 1940
1941
Roger Courtney FOLBOAT section (12 men). Sherwood, Tug Wilson (2iC)
Rhodes recce Rhodes. Courtney transferred to subs from No.8. & formed SBS. Raids on Santa Eufemia & Saracino bridge in Italy Aug, Navarino, Greece, Dec w/ limpets. Nov Rommel Raid – sub landing (7 hrs. / 18 men down)
10 commando groups started June. No.8 Bob Laycock – Stirling, Jellicoe, Churchill. Almonds, Mather, Berry, Astor, Evilyn Waugh, Philip Dunne.
LAYFORCE (7,8,11 Commando to Egpyt Jan. planned Rhodes raids. Aphis raid disaster. Broken up. July Stirling forms Kabrit SAS (Churchill & Auchinleck support). Nov Rommel Raid (Laycock & Keyes) with LRDG
Nov Rommel Raid ‐ air drop (45 mph winds) & planned LRDG exit.
SPECIAL FORCES COMBINED OPS EXAMPLES 1940
1941
1942
Roger Courtney FOLBOAT section (12 men). Sherwood, Tug Wilson (2iC)
Rhodes recce Rhodes. Courtney transferred to subs from No.8. & formed SBS. Raids on Santa Eufemia & Saracino bridge in Italy Aug, Navarino, Greece, Dec w/ limpets. Nov Rommel Raid – sub landing (7 hrs. / 18 men down)
May – Crete airfield raids ‐ Kealy Malamé & Timbaki raids. Kastelli (George Duncan with SBS M Section). HMS/M Triton
10 commando groups started June. No.8 Bob Laycock – Stirling, Jellicoe, Churchill. Almonds, Mather, Berry, Astor, Evilyn Waugh, Philip Dunne.
LAYFORCE (7,8,11 Commando to Egpyt Jan. planned Rhodes raids. Aphis raid disaster. Broken up. July Stirling forms Kabrit SAS (Churchill & Auchinleck support). Nov Rommel Raid (Laycock & Keyes) with LRDG
May Jellicoe 2iC, part of L Det. with Bergé FFF (Bergé) and GSS (Tsigantes from Sep). Links with SBS (Section) for Crete Airfield raids ‐ Heraklion (Jellicoe & Bergé). 8 raids total 37 planes dviversion before Sicily invasion. Sidi Haneish massed jeep attack.
Nov Rommel Raid ‐ air drop (45 mph winds) & planned LRDG exit.
SAS now 4 Detachments – A Blair, B Olfield, C Street and D Langton. D became basis for SAS control of SBS.
SPECIAL FORCES COMBINED OPS EXAMPLES 1940
1941
1942
Roger Courtney FOLBOAT section (12 men). Sherwood, Tug Wilson (2iC)
Rhodes recce Rhodes. Courtney transferred to subs from No.8. & formed SBS. Raids on Santa Eufemia & Saracino bridge in Italy Aug, Navarino, Greece, Dec w/ limpets. Nov Rommel Raid – sub landing (7 hrs. / 18 men down)
May – Crete airfield raids ‐ Kealy Malamé & Timbaki raids. Kastelli (George Duncan with SBS M Section). HMS/M Triton
10 commando groups started June. No.8 Bob Laycock – Stirling, Jellicoe, Churchill. Almonds, Mather, Berry, Astor, Evilyn Waugh, Philip Dunne.
LAYFORCE (7,8,11 Commando to Egpyt Jan. planned Rhodes raids. Aphis raid disaster. Broken up. July Stirling forms Kabrit SAS (Churchill & Auchinleck support). Nov Rommel Raid (Laycock & Keyes) with LRDG
May Jellicoe 2iC, part of L Det. with Bergé FFF (Bergé) and GSS (Tsigantes from Sep). Links with SBS (Section) for Crete Airfield raids ‐ Heraklion (Jellicoe & Bergé). 8 raids total 37 planes dviversion before Sicily invasion. Sidi Haneish massed jeep attack.
Nov Rommel Raid ‐ air drop (45 mph winds) & planned LRDG exit.
SAS now 4 Detachments – A Blair, B Olfield, C Street and D Langton. D became basis for SAS control of SBS.
1943 April SBS (Squadron) formed (Jellicoe), part of SRF. Sep – Dodecanese LSF, ML, subs. Sutherland’s SB Section (15 officers & 45v ranks), balance 1st SAS and 62nd Commando (SSRF) absorbed into larger Squadron. Created L,M and S Detachments. Crete and Sardinia raids. Sep – Dodecanese SAS, SBS, LRDG, GSS
Jan – Stirling captured. Reorganisation of SAS / SBS with Paddy Mayne becoming CO of 1st SAS, renamed SRS. Sep – Dodecanese SAS, SBS, LRDG, GSS
FORCE 292 CAPABILITIES • Recconnaisance • Landing zones & beach recconnaisance (Sutherland Kos) • Intelligence (Stellin Rhodes, Blythe Allinda)
• Canvassing local Italian garrison commanders on Leros, Kos and Simi to aid pre‐emptive Territorial acqusition (Lapraik Antimachia) • Small‐scale assault • Rapid reaction Force (Lassen Simi, Calchi, Leros LRDG/SBS Buffs support) • Search, Rescue and Evacuation (see later) • Note: L Detachment had been sent into Sicily (July 7th 1943) leaving on M and S available for Aegean operations. Remaining SBS force around 55.
SECURING THE ISLANDS • Kos – Antimachia (Marmari) airfield (& Lambia, Sept 21, then Marmari) increased importance • Leros – Importance of deep water harbour and coastal batteries. • Simi – Proximity to Rhodes • Samos – 2nd largest island in Dodecanese chain
KOS –
LEROS Sept. 13th
• •
• Jellicoe (1)
•
Lloyd Owen arrives Kastelorrizo (w/ 100 men) KOS - Jellicoe / Sutherland south coast early morning. Both disembark on Kos LEROS - Jellicoe continues north. Meets with Mascherpa and selects landing sites. LEROS - Jellicoe takes a CANT seaplane back to Kastelorrizo
Sutherland
Jellicoe (1) Lloyd Owen
KOS ‐ LEROS Sept. 15th • Lloyd Owen
• •
A Co. 11th Para Btln. 1st Btln. Durham Light Inf. 46 Squadron
LEROS - Lloyd Owen arrives with mobile reserve KOS – Sutherland marks drop zone KOS – 1st aircraft lands Antimachia, 1st Batallion of Durham Light Infantry arrive to defend airfield
SAMOS ‐SIMI Sept. 16th
Sutherland – 25 men
A Co. 11th Para Btln. 1st Btln. Durham Light Inf. 46 Squadron
Lapraik
• •
Sutherland sent north to Samos Lapraik send south to Simi
Kastellorizo
GERMAN COUNTER‐ATTACK • Sept 23 Müller ordered to attack Kos then Leros • Müller‘s wish to proceed directly to Leros after Kos fell delayed by lack of LCs
OPERATIONS ON KOS ‐ EISBÄR • Attacked Oct 3. Fell Oct 4. • SBS identify initial drop zones to secure Antimachia • Search and Evacuation: • Using LSF LS2 (Lt.McLeod RNVR) evacuation duties. • Milner‐Barry – 16 officers and 74 men evacuated
OPERATIONS ON SIMI • Attacked Oct 7. Evacuated Oct 12. • SBS, Royal Irish & RAF personnel moved across from Kos after Oct 4 • Limited mission objectives • German assault cost 16 dead, 30 wounded, 6 prisoners. Two JU.87s shot down
OPERATIONS ON LEROS (LEOPARD / TAIFUN) • Attacked Nov 12. Fell Nov 16. Followed 984 air raids in 54 days • Arrival of SBS Oct 4 • Additional anti‐paratroop support, coast watch intelligence • 3,282 All ranks (source: War Office Nov 23 ‘43): • • • • •
2,468 Infantry 244 Anti‐Aircraft and Artillery 135 LRDG 65 SBS 306 Other (officers and ranks)
• Search and Rescue • Jellicoe left with 25‐30 mixed SBS / LRDG. 60 0thers. • Doc. Lawson (36 other LRDG and 80 or 90 of other units with several officers) • Prendergast, Olivey, Balisillie Lt.Pavlides (LRDG A Squadron reaching • LRDG 70 / 123‐135 men escape
Farmakonisi between Leros and Turkey)
LEROS Nov 11th • A ‐ SBS spent night in wadi 0616 4214
B – (DUSK) SBS withdrew to house at 0601 4118
C – (NIGHT) SBS spent night in wadi 0604 4215
12:00 approx. Major Alan Redfern (LRDG) ordered Yeomanry to advance to Point 64 on Germano when first Parachute drop came in.
(NIGHTFALL) Redfern leads NZ troops down NE side of hill into orchard and is killed.
LEROS Nov 12th
G – (03:30) LRDG withdrew to 057 432 in vicinity of Buffs HQ
I – (NIGHT) SBS to collect Jeeps wadi 068 426
(DUSK) Jellicoe sends out 2 patrols – To Alinda Bay under Capt. Blyth. Returned at dawn (14/11) with 2 jeeps of supplies.
LEROS Nov 13th
THE PRICE FOR ITALIANS
OPERATION ACCOLADE
General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, October 8th 1943
“I am slowly becoming convinced that in his old age Winston is becoming less and less well balanced! I can control him no more. He has worked himself into a frenzy of excitement about the Rhodes attack, has magnified its importance so that he can no longer see anything else and has set his heart on capturing this one island even at the expense of endangering his relations with the President and with the Americans, and also the whole future of the Italian campaign.”
THANKÂ YOU