AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

USA AND THE LUMUMBA ASSASSINATION News. Analysis. Comment.

July-August 2022

Vol.5 No.21

Civil society and the search for justice SA: security risks one year after July 2001 looting

The US dollar as a potent sanctions weapon

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PUBLISHER’S NOTE

Lumumba’s legacy has thrown up reasons to distrust the West

T Africa bucks global

PUBLISHER’S NOTE of Congo’s murdered independence HE family of Democratic Republic

hero Patrice Lumumba buried his only known remains, a gold tooth, in the capital Kinshasa at the end of June, 61 years after his death at the hands of Belgian-backed secessionist rebels

economic trend

Lumumba’s assassination was a culmination of two inter-related assassination plots n 2018, six of the 10 fastest-growing

by American and Belgian governments, which used Congolese accomplices and a economies in the world were in Belgian execution squad to World carry out the deed.

Africa, according to the Bank,

I

with the pack.

With Ludo DeGhana Witte, leading the Belgian author of the best book on this crime, qualifies it as "the GDP for the continent projected to century". The assassination's historical mostgrowth important assassination of the 20th accelerate to lies fourinper cent in 2019 and 4.1 the most pertinent being the global context importance a multitude of factors, per cent init2020, in which took Africa’s place, itseconomic impact ongrowth Congolese politics since then and Lumumba's story continues apace. Meanwhile, the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Index overall legacy as a nationalist leader. reveals that five of the 10 most-improved countries are in Africa, and one-third of Forreforms 126 years, the US and Belgium played key roles in shaping Congo's all recorded globally were in have sub-Saharan Africa. destiny. In April 1884, seven months before the Berlin Congress, the US became the What makes the story more impressive and heartening is that the growth first country in the world to recognise the claims of King Leopold II of the Belgians – projected to be broad-based – is being achieved in a challenging global to the territories of thethe Congo environment, bucking trend.Basin.

When the atrocities related to brutal economic exploitation in Leopold's Congo Free In the Cover Story of this edition, Dr. Hippolyte Fofack, Chief Economist at the State resulted in millions of (Afreximbank), fatalities, the USanalyses joined other worldunderpinning powers in forcing African Export-Import Bank the factors this Belgium to take the country as a regular And it was during the colonial performance.

Twoover factors, in my opinion, standcolony. out in Dr. Hippolyte’s analysis: period that theAfrica US acquired a strategic stake in the enormous natural wealth of trade between and China and the intra-African cross-border investment andthe Congo, usingdevelopment. the uranium from Congolese mines to manufacture the first atomic infrastructure weapons that destroyed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Much has been said and written about China’s ever-deepening economic foray into With the outbreakbyofWestern the coldanalysts war, it was that who the US andbeen its western Africa, especially and inevitable commentators have soundingallies alarm about re-colonisation of Africa,effective this timecontrol by the over Chinese. empirical wouldbells not be prepared to allow Africans theirBut strategic raw evidence a different picture. materials,paints lest these fall into the hands of their enemies in the Soviet camp. This is why Patrice Lumumba'sglobal determination to achieve genuine independence and to have Despite the decelerating growth environment, trade between Africa and full control overby Congo's in order to utilise them improve the living China increased 14.5 perresources cent in the first three quarters of to 2018, surpassing conditions of his was perceived as a threat to western interests.economic To fight him, the growth rate of people world trade (11.6 per cent), reflecting the deepening dependency two trading the US and between Belgium the used allmajor the tools and partners. resources at their disposal, including the United Nations secretariat, under Dag Hammarskjöld and Ralph Bunche, to buy the Empirical evidence shows that China’s domestic investment has become highly support of Lumumba's Congolese rivals and hired killers. point increase linked with economic expansion in Africa.

A one percentage inInChina’s domestic investment growth is associated with of original 0.6 Congo, Lumumba's assassination is rightly viewed as an theaverage country's sin. percentage point in overall African exports. And, the expected economic Coming less thanincrease seven months after independence (on June 30, 1960), it was a development and trade of national expanding Chinese investment on resource-rich stumbling block to theimpact ideals of unity, economic independence and panAfrican countries, especially oil-exporting countries, is even more important.blow African solidarity that Lumumba had championed, as well as a shattering to the hopes ofofmillions Congolese freedom and material prosperity.

Since The resilience African of economies canfor also be attributed to growing intra-African cross-border and infrastructure development. combination the threat Lumumba's investment physical elimination had removed what theAwest saw as theofmajor two factors is accelerating the process of structural transformation in a continent to their interests in the Congo, internationally-led efforts were undertaken to restore where industrial and services account forregime a growing share of GDP. African the authority of output the moderate and pro-western in Kinshasa over the entire corporations andresulted industrialists which expandingregime their industrial footprint across country. These in ending theare Lumumbist in Kisangani in August Africa and globally are leading the diversification from agriculture into higher 1961, the secession of South Kasai in September 1962, and the Katanga secession in value goods in manufacturing and service sectors. These industrial champions January 1963. are carrying out transcontinental operations, with investment holdings around the globe, with adid strong presence inprocess Europe end and than Pacific Asia, together account for No sooner this unification a radical social movement formore a than 75 per cent of their combined activitiesthe outside Africa. state and its pro-western "second independence" arose to challenge neo-colonial mass movement of peasants, workers,with the urban Aleadership. survey of This 30 leading emerging African corporations globalunemployed, footprints and students and lowerofcivil servants found an eager leadership Lumumba's combined revenue more than $118 billion shows that theyamong are active in several lieutenants,including most of whom had regrouped to establish a National Liberation industries, manufacturing (e.g., Dangote Industries), basic materials, telecommunications (e.g., Econet, Ecobank) Council (CNL) in October 1963 inSafaricom), Brazzaville,finance across (e.g., the Congo riverand fromoil and gas. In addition mitigating correlated African economies, Kinshasa.

Whatevertothe strengthsrisks and highly weaknesses of thiswith “second independence” these emerging global corporations are of accelerating the diversification movement, the African sad legacy of the assassination Patrice Lumumba is that it ledofto sources of growthand anda de reducing the that exposure of to countries adverse social divisions facto war persists this daytoand was incommodity some ways a terms of trade. blueprint for Western interference in other newly independent African countries.

This me very bullish Africa!

Withmakes the protracted fightingabout amongst various militias in parts of the country one

cannot help but wonder if western machinations are still at play in the DRC.

Publisher Jon Offei-Ansah Editor Desmond Davies Publisher Jon Offei-Ansah Contributing Editors

Editor

Stephen Williams Desmond Davies Prof. Toyin Falola Tikum Mbah Azonga

Deputy Editor AngelaContributors Cobbinah

Justice Lee Adoboe Contributing Editor Chief Chuks Iloegbunam StephenJoseph Williams Kayira

Director, Zachary SpecialOchieng Projects Olu Ojewale Michael Orji Oladipo Okubanjo Corinne Soar Contributors Kennedy Olilo Justice Lee Adoboe Designer Chuks Iloegbunam Joseph Kayira Simon Blemadzie Zachary Ochieng Olu Ojewale Country Representatives Oladipo Okubanjo South Africa Corinne Soar

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Contents LEADER

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Multilateralism and Africa: old benefits, new dangers

Vol.5 No.21 July - August 2022

10

COMMENT

07

Will the ‘nearly man’ in Kenyan politics finally scale the mountain?

COVER STORY

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Civil society and the search for justice in Africa

The continent’s transitional justice interventions have been predominantly driven by states, with the nominal support of non-state actors more often in ad hoc and ill-defined roles. As a result, these interventions have not produced the necessary transformative outcomes that would lead to sustainable peace and societal healing, partly due to the politicisation of state mechanisms and institutions, argues Tim Murithi who has come up with a number of policy recommendations on how to enhance the role of civil society organisations in this area

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Societies emerging from authoritarianism, conflict or a period of human rights violations must first embark on research and investigation into what went wrong, how and why things went wrong, and subsequently draw from the evidence gathered to make recommendations for corrective measures that need to be taken to ensure a better future, writes Baba Galleh Jallow

ANALYSIS

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38

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The USA pulled the strings behind the assassination of Patrice Lumumba

The family of Democratic Republic of Congo’s murdered independence hero Patrice Lumumba buried his only known remains, a gold tooth, in the capital Kinshasa at the end of June, 61 years after his death at the hands of Belgian-backed secessionist rebels. In this dialogue with journalist Maurin Picard, Susan Williams throws light on America’s role in his assassination

BUSINESS & ECONOMY

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Truth commissions key to transitional justice and sustainable peace

Afreximbank recommits to Africa’s development The 29th Africa Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) annual meeting, held in Cairo, Egypt mid-June, delivered lively debates on Africa’s development dynamics. Stephen Williams reports

Cameroon: fuel crisis rocks the country Tikum Mbah Azonga reports from Yaounde on government measures to arrest the spiralling fuel crisis in the country

REVIEW

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US skulduggery in Africa exposed

41

Lugard’s ‘mistake of 1914’

White Malice: The CIA and the Neocolonisation of Africa, by Susan Williams; Hurst, £25 hardback What Britain did to Nigeria, by Max Siollun, Hurst, £20 hardback

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LEADER

Multilateralism and Africa: old benefits, new dangers T

HE war in Ukraine and its attendant global food crisis; the after effects of the pandemic; and the International Monetary Fund cutting its global forecast to 3.6 per cent for this year and 2023, and warning that things could get worse, have all conspired to highlight the growing divide in multilateralism. Isolationism and unilateralism are now the order of the day.

As nations appear to be neglecting the collective nature of multilateralism, this is now an opportunity for Africa to take stock of its position in this dysfunctional multilateral system. But what type of multilateralism would Africa like to see?

Clearly African interests will be best served through multilateral institutions and processes, which attend to the peace and development concerns of all citizens of states on an equal basis, and a world order in which the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong.

Usually, the opposite is often true, and apparently still is.

Compounding this, it seems that there is neither complete configuration nor total stability of existing institutions. The old is not totally gone, and the new is not yet born. This makes the current global (dis) order extremely dangerous.

How can a multilateral scheme be reconciled with existing partisan ambitions of Western powers and institutions? How are the new powers articulating their own interests?

The global balance of power will no doubt shift even more, but is this really in the interest of Africa? Perhaps the decline of Western leadership in global affairs might force the US to find new ways, perhaps more pervasively, of how it engages with the rest of the world.

Emerging powers are using their newfound economic might to negotiate with the West and carve out their own interests.

These nations are now powerful enough to resist even the combined power of the West.

Two critical issues figure prominently.

One is the disparate superpower competition that is emerging in this multipolar world. Secondly, but least discussed, there are deep divisions within each bloc.

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The current ailments are not limited to chaotic multipolarity but also to fractures within the respective multipolar blocs.

Similarly, unity among the new powers is elusive.

There are defections within the Western alliance; African countries are divided along conflicts and political systems; the continent’s regional organisations are paralysed; and the African Union is at its weakest.

Prudence dictates that there must be honest discussion of these issues, even if it makes African leaders uneasy.

Multilateralism must remain the fulcrum of Africa’s international relations.

The problem is, multilateralism is

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other regions don’t have large domestic markets to turn to. Against this backdrop, they are calling on the international community to come up with bold measures to support their people. This is a call we need to heed.”

In all this, the world is showing significant dissatisfaction over the rogue and erratic behaviour of both the old and new powers towards regional institutions and processes. Nonetheless, the blame game has only increased the discontent.

The destructive nature of the new powers, and the lack of Western interest in a fair and equitable global order have become all too evident. Africa should take note of this.

Multilateralism is being used selectively, primarily for promotion of crude national interests spearheaded by multinational corporations

being used selectively, primarily for promotion of crude national interests spearheaded by multinational corporations.

The result is clear: these corporations have stripped poor countries of their natural resources and left behind environmental devastation.

In addition, we are back to the bad old days of Africa’s debt burden. This July, the Managing Director of the IMF, Kristalina Georgieva, noted in her blog that there were “particularly difficult conditions in many African countries at this moment.”

She said that when she met with Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors from the continent, many highlighted how the effects of this “entirely exogenous shock was pushing their economies to the brink”.

She added: “The effect of higher food prices is being felt acutely as food accounts for a higher share of income.

Inflation, fiscal, debt and balance of payments pressures are all intensifying.

“Most are now completely shut out from global financial markets; and unlike AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

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It is time for the international system to find a new organising principle to strengthen global multilateral institutions.

This could, hopefully, assuage previous criticisms of the multilateral system.

In this case, all efforts to produce consensus on global problems and resolve the multi-layered conflicts must be conducted on a multilateral basis: that is, jointly managed and operated.

Unfortunately, there is not enough capital and consensus currently for robust multilateralism.

Nevertheless, this proposal provides a new opportunity for realistic and workable solutions to arrest the progressive marginalisation of Africa in global affairs.

Bringing sensitive conflicts into the multilateral ambit will help to resolve insecurity, reduce the risk of further battles and create the basis for a broader discussion not only of disagreements but of common interests as well. Drawing Africa into superpower rivalries will only increase instability. Preventing this is the prerequisite for African diplomacy for the foreseeable future.

AB

COMMENT

Will the ‘nearly man’ in Kenyan politics finally scale the mountain?

Desmond Davies

W

HILE I was in Nairobi in June, the Kenyan capital was awash with news of the upcoming presidential and other elections. Come August 9, Kenyans will vote for a completely new president, as Uhuru Kenyatta is stepping down after two five-year terms, according to the Constitution.

The debate, though, was not about policies. Instead, the focus was on the academic qualifications of candidates vying for governorships. According to the 2010 Constitution, those who put themselves up to become governor of one of the country’s 47 counties or the nation’s president must possess a university degree from a recognised tertiary educational institution.

The loudest noise was generated by arguments over the validity of some of the qualifications that were presented to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IBEC). I just

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by the electorate in between elections.

Well, the make-up of the candidates for the highest office this time has galvanised Kenyans to ensure that their votes count. Many are fascinated by what they see as an inspired selection of Martha Karua as the running mate of presidential candidate Raila Odinga.

Karua is a seasoned politician, just like Odinga who has been in politics for over 40 years.

Not surprisingly, Odinga’s supporters are now hoping that he could finally make it to the top with Karua and the support of women voters. The chances they could win are not yet cemented in facts and field research data. But their supporters are full of hope.

Indeed, they have been cock-a-hoop since the launch of the Million Women for Martha (MW4M) movement on July 9, which they think will push their team all the way to the presidency. In all this

Odinga’s supporters have always claimed that he was thwarted surreptitiously on two occasions from being president

find it ridiculous that if someone has cut his or her teeth in politics, garnering much-needed experience in parliament and the Senate as well as at county level, that person cannot stand for governor or president without a university degree.

This clearly bars the majority of Kenyans from the higher reaches of power in their country. A Kenyan friend of mine put it to me cynically: “The 2010 Constitution is a civil society Constitution.

The chattering classes want to keep the masses out of politics.”

Kenyan civil society organisations say that they have been at the forefront of shaping a more democratic country.

Their argument is that Kenyans vote in “unworthy leaders” who are not monitored

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excitement, there is the small matter of the likelihood of Kenya getting its first female president in the person of Karua. Odinga is 77, and many Kenyans do not think that he would go for a second term, thus leaving the door open for Karua, who will be 65 in September, to vie for the position in 2027.

Let’s wait and see. The presidency in Africa tends to reinvigorate leaders who have been written off when it comes to their health, as we have witnessed in Nigeria where Muhammadu Buhari is still hanging on.

What about William Ruto, Kenyatta’s deputy for the past 10 years? Is he going to let the prize slip from his grasp? He has been in politics for just 15 years but he is an acknowledged street fighter who kept AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

Kenyatta in power during the difficult days of Kenyan politics.

However, things came to a head in March 2018 when Kenyatta, in a bid to cool the political temperature generated by the 2017 elections, came up with his Building Bridges Initiative (BBI). Odinga bought the idea and shook hands on it with Kenyatta. Ruto did not support the BBI. That was when Kenyatta ditched his deputy and threw in his lot with Odinga.

But Ruto has had the opportunity to undertake his presidential campaign using the advantage of incumbency as Deputy President since 2016, argue Odinga’s supporters. They say that this accorded Ruto unrivalled opportunity to cover a lot of ground across the country when he was more or less competing against himself with no challenger in sight. Odinga, on the other hand, only publicly declared his intension to run for president in December 2021.

Ruto’s choice of running mate, though, is suspect. Rigathi Gachagua, an MP from the Mt Kenya region, is facing charges before the country’s anti-corruption court.

But he is from the part of the country that is most crucial in elections and where both sides are battling for supremacy.

Mt Kenya has the largest population in the country and the highest number of registered voters as well as affluence and influence. So, for the two main presidential teams, this is the region that has to be conquered at all costs.

Odinga has been the “nearly man” of Kenyan politics for a very long time.

His supporters have always claimed that he was thwarted surreptitiously on two occasions from being president. Will he finally scale the mountain this time and enhance his credentials as a political leader of substance in Kenya?

Kenyans will have the final say on AB August 9.

7

COMMENT

Delusion and Democracy Chuks Iloegbunam

O

N July 6, 2022, the American Embassy in Abuja went straight to the point:

Location: Abuja, Nigeria Date: July 6, 2022 Event: Abuja FCT Prison Break near the airport on July On the night of July 5, 2022, an attack on Kuje Prison freed a large portion of the estimated 1,000 prisoners. The prison lies approximately 27 miles southwest of the Central Business District. An increase in crime is expected in and around Abuja. It is recommended that U.S. citizens should maintain a high state of personal security awareness for the next two weeks and avoid unnecessary travel on the airport road.

Crime: Crime is endemic throughout Nigeria and tends to spike after dark. Avoiding locations and situations that increase the likelihood of being victimized is the best defense. Avoid displays of valuables and limit nighttime activity.

Terrorism: Terrorist groups and those inspired by such organizations are intent on attacking U.S. citizens abroad.

Terrorists are increasingly using less sophisticated methods of attack – including knives, firearms, and vehicles – to target crowds more effectively. Frequently, their aim is focused on unprotected or vulnerable targets, such as: • High-profile public events (sporting contests, political rallies, demonstrations, holiday events, celebratory gatherings, etc.)

• Hotels, clubs, and restaurants frequented by tourists • Places of worship • Schools • Parks • Shopping malls and markets • Public transportation systems (including subways, buses, trains, 8

and scheduled commercial flights) Actions to Take: • Be aware of your surroundings.

• Keep a low profile.

• Carry proper identification.

• Monitor local media for updates.

• Review your personal security plans.

• Always drive with your windows rolled up and the doors locked.

• Avoid large gatherings and protests.

• Review alternative travel routes in case of unexpected protests or unrest.

• Exercise caution if unexpectedly in

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5.

6.

7.

8.

Imo State attacked. (1,844 inmates freed.)

September 13, 2021 – Kabba Prison in Kogi State attacked. (240 inmates freed.)

October 22, 2021: Abolongo Prison in Oyo State attacked. (837 inmates escaped.)

July 19, 2021– Jos Maximum Security Prison in Plateau State sacked. (4 inmates escaped.)

November 28, 2021 – Jos Medium Security Prison also in Plateau State attacked. (262 inmates released. 10 killed.)

While Buhari flies around in circles and for reasons unknown to his subjects, the security situation continues to deteriorate

the vicinity of large gatherings or protests.

• Always keep the doors to your residence locked, even when at home.

All sensible people living in Nigeria today know and understand that the warning to American citizens by the US Embassy in Abuja applies, not just to Abuja and its environs, but also to the rest of the country. President Muhammadu Buhari, the Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces, was a General of the Nigerian Army. But under his somnolent watch, the country has, in so far as security is concerned, gone to the dogs.

There have been 15 successful jailbreaks in Nigeria in the past three years. Witness: 1. October 19, 2020 – Oko Prison in Edo State, attacked.

2. October 21, 2020 – Benin Prison in Edo State attacked. (1,993 inmates escaped from the two facilities.)

3. October 22, 2020 – Okitipupa Prison in Ondo State attacked. (58 inmates released.)

4. April 4, 2021 – Owerri Prison in AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

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9. September 3, 2015 – Sokoto Remand Home in Sokoto State attacked. (13 inmates escaped.)

10. June 4, 2018 – Minna Maximum Security Prison in Niger State attacked. (210 inmates escaped.)

11. January 2, 2022 – Mandala Prison in Ilorin, Kwara State attacked. (3 inmates escaped.)

12. May 13, 2022 – the fence of Agbor Prison in Delta State was brought down. (3 inmates escaped.)

13. October 7, 2017 – Enugu Maximum Prison in Enugu State attacked. (2 inmates escape.)

14. December 27, 2017 – Ikot Ekpene Prison in Akwa Ibom State attacked. (47 inmates escaped.)

15. July 4, 2022 Kuje prison Abuja, attacked. (856 escaped.)

The Kuje Prison attack right inside the Abuja metropolis raises disturbing questions, particularly after it was revealed that Intelligence sources had warned the military that the facility was going to be attacked. Rather than brace up to foil such

COMMENT an attack or disrupt it with a preemptive strike, soldiers posted to guard the Kuje Prison were redeployed a day before bandits sacked it. Flustered Nigerians were told that the redeployment of the soldiers was nothing to do with handing the terrorists a walkover; they had long passed the stretch of their deployment to the facility!

But the explanation raised even more worries. This latest attack was the third since 2016. The attackers numbered in the hundreds, riding on motorbikes, wielding rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) general purpose machine guns (GPMG), various makes of assault rifles, all sorts of explosive devices. Of the nearly one thousand inmates freed, about 70 were hardened Boko Haram terrorists.

A day after the attack, Buhari visited the prison. Said he: I am disappointed with the intelligence system. How can terrorists organise, have weapons, attack a security installation and get away with it?”

Nigerians had a different question for the man: How can you sit around, playing Commander-in-Chief, while security around the whole country is in wrack and ruin?” Buhari have never in his presidency had the time to entertain any questions from any quarters. He immediately jetted off to Senegal, days after he returned from Portugal and less than a week after flying in from Rwanda. While he flies around in circles and for reasons unknown to his subjects, the security situation continues to deteriorate.

On July 5, a presidential advance team to Buhari’s hometown of Daura was attacked. This was how the Presidency put out the story: Gallant presidential guards repel attack on advance team ahead of President’s visit: The Presidency has described as sad and unwelcome, the shooting incident near Dustinma, Katsina State, at the convoy carrying the Advance Team of security guards, protocol and media officers ahead of President Muhammadu Buhari’s trip to Daura for Sallah.

The attackers opened fire on the convoy from ambush positions but were repelled by the military, police and DSS personnel accompanying the convoy.

Two persons in the convoy are receiving treatment for minor injuries they suffered. All the other personnel, staff and vehicles made it safely to Daura.”

Nigerians were, of course, not fooled.

That a presidential convoy was liable to

direct attack was serious enough. But, added to the alarm caused by this, was the untidy attempt to hide the fact that casualties resulted from the two ambush.

Apart from ambushes, the terrorists have laid into the clergy. Since this year, nearly 20 Catholic priests have been kidnapped, some of them killed. During June, bandits killed Rev Father Vitus Borogo of the Kaduna Archdiocese. At his burial, the Archbishop of Kaduna Diocese, Most Rev Matthew Man-Oso Ndagoso said: “Government does not care about us.

Something is basically wrong with this country. We are in prison in our own country. Within one year, the Archdiocese has buried three while one of our priests is still in the hands of the bandits for over two years now.”

On July 8, 2022, another priest, Rev Father Christopher Odia, who was killed by kidnappers, was buried in Agenebode, Edo State. At the solemn occasion, Rev Father John Bosco Ezehi, the National President of Nigerian Catholic Diocesan Priests Association, called on Buhari to “take urgent steps to guarantee the safety and security of Nigerians.” It is unlikely that Buhari’s heedless government will pay any attention. On June 5, 2022, terrorists carried out a bomb and bullet attack during mass at the St Francis Xavier Catholic Church, in Owo, Ondo State. It left 40 worshippers massacred and double that number with life-threatening injuries.

Not even on one occasion has any of the bandits ever been apprehended, let alone tried and punished.

The impossible security situation has

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left about 50 passengers killed and nearly twice that number kidnapped.

Yet, in delusion, Buhari keeps telling the international community the stock story that Nigeria had become safer under his administration. He is giving to boasting that before his unfortunate accession to the presidency, Boko Haram controlled a slice of Nigeria the size of Belgium but that the situation had improved tremendously under his watch! Perceptive Nigerians are worried sick because the current brand of insecurity created by terrorists of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Boko Haram, as well as bandits of Buhari’s Fulani ethnic group, and assorted criminal gangs have permeated every nook and cranny of the country, with the Federal Government of Nigeria proving cripplingly unable and frustratingly unwilling to address the extremely dangerous development.

The question now is how Nigeria can conduct credible elections in the face of widespread terrorist campaigns and a government woefully ineffective in guaranteeing the safety and security of its nationals. This has led some into concluding that expectations of a change of government next year are delusory.

Such people accuse Buhari of a devious plan to cling on to power. They predict an escalation of terrorism and bloodletting in the next few months that would heighten to a crescendo by February when the elections are expected to commence.

In such turmoil of national proportions, movement of people would become severely curtailed and, in some

How can Nigeria conduct credible elections in the face of widespread terrorist campaigns?

made it clear to thinking Nigerians that the 2023 general elections expected to see the back of the corrupt, inept and nepotistic travesty that is Buhari’s government may not hold after all. Travelling by road and rail has become extremely dangerous.

With the skyrocketing of the price of aviation fuel, only very few can now afford the luxury of air travel on the very few planes still in operation. For two months, fuel scarcity has persisted in Abuja, the Federal capital, and Lagos, the commercial capital. Rail travel has become particularly perilous, especially after the March 22, 2022 attack on an Abuja-Kaduna train that AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

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place impossible. Campaigns would not hold. These would be the required signal for Buhari’s rubber stamp National Assembly to invoke Article 3 (Section 180) of the Constitution which provides thus: “If the Federation is at war in which the territory of Nigeria in physically involved and the President considers that it is not practicable to hold elections, the National Assembly may by resolution extend the period of four years mentioned in subsection (2) of this section from time to time, but no such extension shall exceed a period of six months at any one AB time.”

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COVER STORY

Civil society and the search for justice in Africa The continent’s transitional justice interventions have been predominantly driven by states, with the nominal support of non-state actors more often in ad hoc and ill-defined roles. As a result, these interventions have not produced the necessary transformative outcomes that would lead to sustainable peace and societal healing, partly due to the politicisation of state mechanisms and institutions, argues Tim Murithi who has come up with a number of policy recommendations on how to enhance the role of civil society organisations in this area

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T the heart of the nation-state project in Africa has been the attempt to consolidate artificial political communities through processes of nation-building and state-building. A key aspect of this attempt to forge states out of a plethora of “ethnic nations” has been the sphere of civic association and social mobilisation around issues of concern and interest.

Civic, and increasingly political, associations in colonial Kenya, Uganda, South Africa and Algeria, were at the forefront of the struggles against “settler colonialism” in Africa. Over a period of time these civic associations, through their engagement and partnership with other formal groupings like unions and print media, became more organised and more focused on their campaigns for independence and against injustice.

African Union (AU) has, from the outset, articulated a normative commitment to engaging with civil society in the implementation of its objectives. The Statutes of the AU Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) describe civil society as including social, professional groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), as well as voluntary and cultural organisations. However, this normative commitment has remained at the level of lip-service and has not translated

into widespread engagement with civil society actors on a range of interventions, including the promotion of peacebuilding through transitional justice processes. This is partly due to the prism of mistrust that clouds the perception of governmental actors in terms of their relationship with their own civil society.

This prism of mistrust has further been exacerbated by the phenomenon of “state capture” that is increasingly prevalent across the continent, which is evidenced by

In response to the emergence of civic associations in Africa, which appeared to contest their authority, colonial states, for the most part, adopted even more repressive policies to contain the forces which were being fuelled by the social mobilisation activities of these civic and political associations. In turn, civic associations could appeal to the so-called “legal” processes proscribed and controlled by the colonial state or they could opt for more insurgent strategies, including armed rebellion and international engagement.

Consequently, through their actions colonial administrations in Africa fostered a culture of mistrust, in which civic actors viewed the apparatus for the control and administration of their political communities with suspicion. It was at this point that the “prism of mistrust” between the state and civic sphere was fomented and nurtured.

Since its establishment in 2002, the 10

Africa leaders at an AU Summit: the AU has, from the outset, articulated a normative commitment to engaging with civil society in the implementation of its objectives

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COVER STORY encroaching authoritarianism, democratic reversals, constitutional manipulation and the closure of civic space. These have created conditions that entrench crisis and tension as well as undermine the ability to implement transitional justice processes, which has a knock-on effect on the stability of states.

A culture of complacency has afflicted the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) in terms of their efforts to promote peacebuilding, transitional justice and reconciliation.

In addition, the much vaunted AU campaign to “Silence the Guns by 2020” did not materialise as anticipated by the organisations’ leadership. This has been partly due to the failure to sustain societalwide peacebuilding and transitional justice interventions that address the legacies of the violations of the past and provide societies with better opportunities to quell the threat of internal violence.

In fact, there was a precipitous increase in crisis situations punctuated with incidences of gender-based violence that placed an emotional, mental and

The AU campaign to “Silence the Guns by 2020” did not materialise as anticipated

psychological strain on the people of the various regions of the continent. The prevalence of violent extremism in the forms of Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Isis in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) and Al Qaeda in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin is a persistent threat to the future peace and security of the African continent.

In addition, there is recurring tension and violence in Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, the Darfur region of Sudan, and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Furthermore, political and constitutional tensions have been escalating in Eswatini, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. Consequently, there is a need for urgency in promoting and supporting the agency of civil society actors across these countries to contribute towards enhancing peacebuilding through transitional justice interventions.

The AU Transitional Justice Programme (AUTJP) was adopted in February 2019 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It was conceived as a continental guideline for member states to develop their own context-specific policies, strategies and programmes towards democratic and socio-economic transformation to achieve sustainable peace, justice and reconciliation.

The AUTJP provides guidelines for addressing the legacy of violence, including colonial brutality, as well as confronting the governance and development deficits that continue to confront the continent. It advocates an inclusive approach that ensures that a wide variety of stakeholders can be engaged.

It includes developing and implementing

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transitional justice interventions in a forward-looking manner that contributes towards rebuilding and restoring the dignity of African citizens who have endured past violations.

The AUTJP identifies four actors who should take responsibility for its implementation: member states; Regional Economic Communities (RECs); AU institutions; and non-state actors, including members of civil society. Member states have the responsibility for “guaranteeing the space for debate and advocacy on transitional justice and mobilising the support of all sections of society across political lines”.

The AUTJP recognises the right of citizens to participate in framing transitional justice programmes, specifically by taking their views into consideration. But it anticipates that governments may not readily create and sustain spaces for citizens to engage with issues relating to transitional justice.

Thus, it states that “it is imperative that national and local actors take the lead in planning, implementing, monitoring, evaluating and reporting on lessons learned in all phases of the implementation” of the Policy. In addition, it proposes that “the process for national dialogue, reconciliation and healing should enable faith leaders, traditional and community leaders, not only to play an active part in such processes … but also pursue intra- and inter-community dialogue, reconciliation and healing at local levels”.

In effect, the AUTJP mandates local actors, including community leaders, to play a proactive role in its implementation

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COVER STORY and in the creation of national spaces for dialogue that will be appropriate for specific countries and communal groups.

It presents an opportunity for Africa to recalibrate the legacy of the enduring adversarial relationship between state and society by assigning specific tasks to nonstate actors.

Specifically, the shared implementation of the AUTJP between state and non-state actors will encourage closer collaboration on the promotion of peacebuilding and reconciliation, which can have positive effect in terms of forging platforms that can increase the interaction and exchanges between the state and society.

The AUTJP also envisages a technical role for civil society and think tanks to “support the production of relevant research and studies” through processes that systematically “collect best practices and facilitate the sharing of such best practices with societies contemplating or pursuing transitional justice processes”.

Therefore, it is important to create a continental network of transitional justice practitioners and analysts from civil

society and governments who can provide technical support and guidance to all of the continents 55 countries, most of which require some form of transitional justice intervention. African civil society actors

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It is necessary to empower civil society actors to work at national and regional levels so that they can contribute more

A culture of complacency has afflicted Africa’s peace, security and governance structures

need to take advantage of the opportunities presented in the AUTJP to establish a pan-African network of enablers, who can provide strategic advice to AU member states, inter-governmental and civil society organisations on the implementation of the provisions of the Policy.

On this basis, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation has established the Pan-African Reconciliation Network (PAREN) as a forum to bring together key experts and CSOs working on transitional justice from other parts of Africa. It will support strategic advocacy, research and capacity building in order to promote the

The prevalence of violent extremism is a persistent threat to the future peace and security of the African continent

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implementation the AUTJP.

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strategically to the transitional justice and peacebuilding outcomes that the continent aspires to achieve as enumerated in Agenda 2063. This will require rethinking the prism through which we understand and approach peace and security interventions.

Traditionally, in Africa, crises have been framed as national, and which need to be addressed primarily by state actors.

However, the degree of cross-border interaction and exchange, as well as the deepening reach of globalisation, means that we now need to frame Africa’s conflicts as regional with national dimensions.

COVER STORY

Civil society actors have to be empowered to also operate on a regional basis

In adopting this framework, it will be necessary from a strategic perspective to pursue regional transitional justice and peacebuilding interventions, which engage with all of the players involved in a particular crisis. Civil society actors have to be empowered to also operate on a regional basis, through network-building and coalition-formation.

Specifically, this approach will be based on identifying in-country “anchor civil society actors” who will act as the focal points for regional interventions.

They will undertake dedicated programmes to enhance the capacity of network partners to directly engage with governmental and inter-governmental processes and institutions in a manner that directly adds value to the transitional justice and peacebuilding interventions.

The role of civil society in supporting and implementing transitional justice and peacebuilding processes is of vital importance if Africa is to genuinely address the grievances that continue to perpetuate the cyclical violence against innocent civilians. The adoption of the AUTJP is a pioneering achievement for the

continent in terms of providing a guideline for countries and societies to design and drive their own processes of redress, accountability and healing for the harm done in the past.

their role and take the lead creating more awareness of the document. The adoption of this regional transitional justice and peacebuilding approach will enable civil society actors to create a mutually

AUTJP recognises ‘ The the right of citizens to

participate in framing transitional justice programmes by taking their views into consideration However, AU member states and regional institutions have not sufficiently engaged and used the AUTJP, and therefore civil society actors have to up

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supportive network of intervention that will achieve positive outcomes in the pursuit of peacebuilding and reconciliation across Africa.

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Tim Murithi is Head of the Peacebuilding Interventions Programme at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa and Extraordinary Professor of African Studies at the Centre for African and Gender Studies, University of Free State. The above is an abridged version of his policy brief on Civil Society Engagement with the African Union for the IJR.

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COVER STORY

Truth commissions key to transitional justice and sustainable peace Societies emerging from authoritarianism, conflict or a period of human rights violations must first embark on research and investigation into what went wrong, how and why things went wrong, and subsequently draw from the evidence gathered to make recommendations for corrective measures that need to be taken to ensure a better future, writes Baba Galleh Jallow

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RUTH commissions are the quintessential transitional justice mechanism, although there may be other important instruments involved in the work of looking at the past in order to recommend corrective action. But truth commissions mainly focus on investigating widespread human rights violations, promoting healing, reconciliation and the payment of reparations.

They also make recommendations for criminal prosecution of perpetrators as well as for administrative, institutional and policy reforms that would have transformative effects on society. Their essential characteristics include the fact that their mandate periods are clearly delineated and their periods of existence limited to a number of months or years, after which they cease to exist.

The work of truth commissions is generally divided into two main phases: truth-seeking; and implementation. The truth commission operates as a functional entity during the truth-seeking phase.

It ceases to exist as an entity once its final report and recommendations are submitted to the establishing authority, which marks the beginning of the implementation phase of its work. In general, the truth-seeking phase is relatively uncomplicated, depending on the context and the environment in which the truth commission operates.

Research and investigations are conducted into the past in question, evidence is gathered, and final reports containing recommendations are written and submitted to the establishing authority.

However, the implementation phase of a truth commission’s work is generally acknowledged to be rife with controversies and complications.

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Most of the work of truth commissions is centred on the “commission” itself

These complications often result from a lack of political will or the capacity to implement recommendations, some of which could run counter to the vested interests of the establishing authority, or be perceived as threats to the maintenance of peace and stability in society.

These difficulties of implementation have meant that historically, in many cases, truth commissions have not been able to have any significant transformative effects on society. In some cases, their

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made public at all and public demands for implementation are ignored. There have been cases where efforts at implementation are made and some success registered in this regard. In general however, little transformative changes are registered in the societies in question and the threats of recurrence or “a return to the past” remain visible during the post-truth commission periods.

The history of truth commissions reveals that a common but not so

Commissioner-centred truth commissions were not necessarily conceived as agents of transformative transitional justice

final reports are made public and promises of implementation are made, but little of substance in terms of follow-up is done.

In a few cases, their reports are not AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

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recognised explanation for the failure of truth commissions’ transformative potential resides in their institutional structures and modes of operation. Most of the work of truth commissions is centred on the

COVER STORY “commission” itself – the group of eminent persons, headed by a chair, entrusted with conducting the investigations and submitting a final report to the establishing authority.

The number of commissioners could range from three to over 30 persons, generally of impeccable character and sterling public credentials. These commissioners are often supported in their work by a skeletal secretariat staff composed of an executive secretary, researchers, investigators and statement taking assistants.

Most of the work – research, investigation, statement-taking and listening to witness testimonies – is done by the commissioners. With this model of “commissioner-centred” truth commissions, a lot of the work required to render the truth commission process effectively transformative cannot be done by the commissioners alone.

And even in the many cases in which these commissioner-centred truth commissions do a brilliant and thorough job of executing their mandates and submitting excellent reports, the transformative effects of their work remain at best, minimal and at worst, non-existent.

Perhaps, too, these commissionercentred truth commissions were not

necessarily conceived as agents of transformative transitional justice. It seems they were merely designed to conduct investigations and write reports containing recommendations that would help correct the wrongs of the past through reconciliation and healing, the payment of reparations, criminal prosecutions, and institutional, legal and policy reforms to

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embodiment of multiple entities. It embodies the various aspects of the body politic in which it operates as well as any external entities that might have been affected by the human rights violations and abuses it is tasked to investigate.

For example, in the case of The Gambia, the TRRC was an embodiment

A truth commission set up by President Museveni in Uganda existed for over 10 years without making much headway

help prevent recurrence.

In the event that their recommendations are not implemented, or are only partially implemented, their transformative effects on the society would remain negligible.

It was an early recognition of these pitfalls of previous truth commissions that made it possible for The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) to develop an institutional structure, operational procedures, and strategic communication plan that rendered it among the world’s, if not the world’s, most transformative transitional justice process so far.

Every truth commission is an

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of the government, the people, and other governments and peoples (such as Ghana) that were affected by the human rights violations of the Yahya Jammeh regime.

Within these categories, the TRRC embodied the personas of both victims and perpetrators.

The fact that truth commissions embody all these different entities is why their independence and impartiality cannot be compromised if they should have any credibility at all. Where the violations reach the threshold of crimes against humanity, the truth commission will also embody the interests of the international community.

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The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC)

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COVER STORY

Significant successes were registered by some truth commissions in Africa such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission

In addition to being an embodiment of these different entities, a truth commission is by nature Janus-faced: it faces both the past and the future at the same time. It looks to the past to discover what went wrong and to create a true historical record of such wrongs, and it looks to the future to ensure that the wrongs of the past are not be repeated.

Through research, investigations and hearings, a truth commission uncovers the scope and nature of past atrocities.

Through its findings and recommendations (and in the case of the TRRC its robust outreach activities), a truth commission brings out the systemic and cultural causes and enablers of impunity and points the way forward to a future of respect for human rights, human dignities and the rule of law, and a future in which the administrative, institutional and policy options of the society are designed and executed in an efficient and equitable manner.

A Janus-faced embodiment of different entities, a truth commission is also the impartial moderator of a crucially important and sensitive national 16

conversation on the past and the future of a society. This is an extremely important function whose recognition and efficient execution determine the extent to which a truth commission has transformative effects on society.

How effectively the truth commission moderates this crucially important national conversation is determined first, by its self-recognition as a transformative transitional justice mechanism; second, by the institutional structure it creates in order to maximise its efficiency; and third, by the communication strategy it develops and executes in order to effectively moderate the national conversation over past human rights violations and how best to prevent recurrence.

The historical evidence suggests that up until the emergence of the Gambian TRRC, not enough thought was given to these three prerequisites for the existence of a transformative truth commission process. This is not to say that significant successes were not registered by truth commissions in the past.

Truth commissions in Latin America, such as the ones in Argentina, El AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua and elsewhere did a brilliant job of uncovering mass human rights violations and making recommendations that led to some prosecutions and a level of public determination to ensure non-recurrence.

Significant successes were registered by some truth commissions in Africa such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995), as well as truth commissions in Chad (1990), Nigeria (1999), Rwanda (1999), Sierra Leone (1999), Ghana (2002), Morocco (2004), Kenya (2008) and Tunisia (2013), especially in terms of uncovering the scope and nature of human rights violations in their recent pasts and of submitting final reports and recommendations to the establishing authorities.

Levels of implementation of these recommendations varied widely, with several truth commissions having their reports and recommendations suppressed by the government, simply neglected, or only partially implemented.

A classic example of a successful truth commission was Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappeared (1983).

COVER STORY Its work led to the prosecution of several perpetrators and its final report, published as Nunca Mas (Never Again), was a best seller in Argentina that galvanised the people against dictatorship and human rights violations and inspired the formation of truth commissions in other Latin American countries.

South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995) also registered significant successes, although to this day, the South African government has failed to complete the payment of reparations to victims or to implement other important recommendations made by the TRC. A classic example of a failed truth commission was Uganda’s Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda (1974). When the four-man commission submitted its final report to Idi Amin implicating his government in the disappearances and other rights violations, the Pakistani judge who chaired the commission was sacked from his job, a second commissioner was

accused of treason and hanged, and a third commissioner fled the country.

may be prevented from recurring in that society.

A second Ugandan truth commission, the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, set up by President Yoweri Museveni existed for over 10 years without making much headway.

In a radical departure from this traditional model of truth commissions, the Gambian TRRC created an institutional structure, operational method, and strategic communication processes built on the twin principles of inclusivity and transparency that allowed it to be visibly transformative well before the completion of its work and submission of its final report and recommendations to the Government.

Nearly all of the above truth commissions operated in the traditional mode of the truth commission as a body that simply investigated past human rights violations, produced a final report and made recommendations for criminal prosecutions, reconciliation, reparations and reforms designed to help prevent recurrence. Often because of the sheer volume of work involved and the limited time and resources available to them, the transformative impact of most of these truth commissions on society was modest or almost negligible.

Yet, the magnitude of a truth commission’s transformative effects on society may be an important indicator of the extent to which human rights violations

The arrangements put in place – some under the TRRC Act and some at the commission level – allowed the TRRC to remain a fiercely independent embodiment of all relevant entities, to be a Janus-faced creator of an impartial history of human rights abuses, and to be a proactive and neutral moderator of an important national conversation on what went wrong in The Gambia under Jammeh and how best to prevent its recurrence, a principle best captured in the commission’s now widely adopted Never Again slogan.

Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, set up by President Yoweri Museveni existed for over 10 years without making much headway

Baba Galleh Jallow is the former Executive Secretary of The Gambia’s TRRC AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

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ANALYSIS

The USA pulled the strings behind the assassination of Patrice Lumumba The family of Democratic Republic of Congo’s murdered independence hero Patrice Lumumba buried his only known remains, a gold tooth, in the capital Kinshasa at the end of June, 61 years after his death at the hands of Belgian-backed secessionist rebels. In this dialogue with journalist Maurin Picard, Susan Williams throws light on America’s role in his assassination You grew up in Zambia and have researched extensively on the history of decolonisation. What is left of Patrice Lumumba’s legacy in Africa today?

Patrice Lumumba belongs to the pantheon of great Pan Africanist leaders of the twentieth century, alongside Kwame Nkrumah, Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, and Thomas Sankara. Currently, it is his brutal death that is being remembered.

But the power of his legacy in Africa today rests on the strength of his ideals: democracy, non-violence, freedom from colonialism and white minority rule, nontribalism, and non-alignment.

This legacy has also thrown up reasons to distrust the West. The CIA-backed overthrow and killing of Lumumba was a direct attack on the elected and legitimate government of the Congo. Such aggression was incompatible with America’s portrayal of itself as the world’s champion of democracy.

How do you explain the extraordinary success of this man, then, and his incredible popularity, comparable to Che Guevara? Is it well deserved and if yes, why?)

It is indeed deserved. Both Lumumba and Che Guevara can be seen as martyrs:

courageous men still in their thirties who were murdered in CIA-backed operations.

But, unlike Guevara, Lumumba was against the use of violence in the struggle for liberation. Barely three months after his election he realized that everything was against him and he told his supporters that it was up to them to carry on the fight. ‘For me’, he said, ‘it’s finished. I feel that I am going to die. I will die like Gandhi.’

Your book White Malice uncovers efforts made by the CIA and the Eisenhower Administration to keep a tight leash on newly independent African countries, starting with Congolese political elites …. What was the end goal?

The end goal was clear: to assert US control over the former colonial territories of Africa and their resources.

US administrations feared that the newly-independent nations might become satellites of the Soviet Union. The Congo was seen as central in this concern, because of its geographical position and its strategic mineral resources, especially the Shinkolobwe uranium mine in Katanga.

This mine produced the uniquely rich ore that was used to build the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945. A CIA agent explained: ‘We didn’t want the Russians to get all of the Uranium. They had Uranium of their own, but we certainly didn’t want them to control any of the ores that were coming out of Congo. We did our best to prevent them. . ..’

Some American leaders’ attitudes to Africa were fuelled by racial prejudice. At a meeting in January 1960, Vice President Richard Nixon revealed his extremely

Lumumba was perceived in Washington and Brussels as a potential friend of the Soviet Union

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ANALYSIS racist views when he stated: ‘Some of the peoples of Africa have been out of the trees for only about fifty years.’

When does the US turn against Patrice Lumumba (in other words, can we identify a watershed or a point of no return)?

American hostility against Lumumba started to brew even before the Congo’s independence at the end of June 1960. But matters accelerated swiftly. A watershed moment occurred in late July, when Lumumba was visiting New York and was asked whether Americans would still have access to Congolese uranium, as they had when Belgium ruled the country.

Lumumba’s response was a clear no: ‘From now on we are an independent and sovereign state. Belgium doesn’t produce any uranium; it would be to the advantage of both our countries if the Congo and the US worked out their own agreements in the future.’ Eisenhower was outraged.

He cancelled his planned meeting with Lumumba, saying he preferred to play golf.

A month later, at a meeting of the National Security Council, he backed the plan to assassinate the democratically-elected Prime Minister of the Congo.

Very early on, US spies start plotting against Lumumba. Yet, the last hours seem to involve only Belgian and Katangese personnel. Where is the American touch in Lumumba’s demise?

Yes: the Americans seem to be invisible. But they were lurking in the shadows of events in multiple covert and sinister ways, facilitating the steps that led tragically to Lumumba’s death. Important details about the involvement of the CIA are starting to emerge, especially from recent releases of documents under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act. The US managed events in such a way that their policy of assassination was enacted by others, who have been held responsible ever since.

With Lumumba gone, have you established a sense of relief on the American side, or did it prove to be in vain, with regards to American plans for the Congo?

It was not so much in vain, as a stage

The children of Patrice Lumumba, from left, Roland, Juliana and Francois, stand next to the casket with the mortal remains of Patrice Lumumba during a ceremony at the Egmont Palace in Brussels, Monday, June 20, 2022. (AP Photo/Olivier Matthys)

in the process of establishing American control of the Congo through the insertion of puppet leaders. Kennedy’s inauguration as the new president of the US in January 1961 – just a few days after Lumumba’s assassination – was perceived by newlyindependent nations as a reason for hope.

But the new administration did not alter Eisenhower’s policy in the Congo; if anything, it strengthened it. There were even contingency plans for a military intervention.

What was Lumumba’s ultimate weakness? Too naive (re: Mobutu), too inexperienced on the international stage as it is often said (threatening the UN and the US to appeal to the USSR to oust Belgian troops)? Something else?

Lumumba was too trusting; he found it difficult to accept that people might behave dishonourably. This weakness led him to trust Mobutu, even against the warnings of his advisors. But Lumumba’s murder was not the result of mistakes or failings on his part. The reason for his death was his commitment to the genuine and unfettered independence of his nation, including control over its own extremely valuable mineral resources. Lumumba never had a chance.

Is there any form of US guilt and apologies regarding American involvement in Lumumba’s death,

comparable to Belgium’s formal “ regrets” in 2002?

Thus far, Belgium has taken all the blame. The US Senate Committee that was set up in 1975 under Senator Frank Church to investigate the abuses of US intelligence agencies, acknowledged the fact of American plots to kill Lumumba. But it acquitted the CIA of any responsibility for his actual death. The 2001 report of the Belgian commission of inquiry does not accept this: it states that Belgian government files do not support the modest role claimed by CIA officials. This finding is abundantly supported by my own research, as set out in White Malice.

How do you see King Philippe’s visit to DRC, also this painful process regarding Lumumba’s remains and their return to Congo?

Belgium is trying to find a way of coming to terms with its colonial past and of shouldering its responsibilities for the terrible things that were done. It is a step forward and in sharp contrast with the approach of the UK government, which firmly resists the idea of facing up to any of the realities – and horrors – of its own colonial history. Indeed, the UK itself – as the junior partner to the US – supported plots to kill Lumumba, as official AB documents reveal.

This interview was first published in French in Le Soir on June 14 2022.

Dr Susan Williams is a senior research fellow at the School of Advanced Studies, University of London, Among the books she has authored is Who killed Hammerskjold?, which helped trigger a UN inquiry, and her latest book White Mischief which examines the role of the CIA and the Neocolonisation of Africa (both books published by Hurst & Co, London) AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

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ANALYSIS

South Africa: what are the insecurity risks one year after the July 2021 looting?

Risk consultants PANGEA-RISK assess the political, legal, and security indicators that will drive South Africa’s risk outlook in coming months, while the economy continues to be depressed by rising inflation, slow growth, and rolling power cuts

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EVERAL upcoming dates for key judicial and political events would be potential trigger events for a repeat of widespread unrest and politically motivated violence, particularly in the populous KwaZulu-Natal province that was the epicentre of last year’s riots and looting, as well as to a marginally lower extent the economic hub of Gauteng province.

On 15 July, (as Africa Briefing was going to press) the governing African National Congress (ANC) party will hold an elective conference to elect its leadership in the politically crucial KwaZulu- Natal province (KZN). KZN has the highest number of registered

ANC members in the country, and the province is supposed to make an important contribution to the ruling party’s national elective congress in December.

However, just as at the previous congress in 2017, KZN’s membership is deeply divided between supporters of current ANC and state President Cyril Ramaphosa, and loyalists to his predecessor Jacob Zuma, as well as other factions. In July last year, this factional rivalry triggered eight days of rioting that cost nearly 400 people their lives, left two million people jobless, and set the economy back by over $3.2 billion as it spread from KZN to the economic hub in Gauteng province.

KZN Premier Sihle Zikalala

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Based on various indicators in coming months, there is a growing probability that there will be a repeat of such violence in KZN and perhaps Gauteng, although likely on a smaller scale. In recent weeks, police and private security guards claimed to have foiled several plots to raid and loot shopping malls in these provinces. Acts of sabotage at power stations and blockades of highways by truck drivers have increased, reminiscent of the 2021 unrest, just as we forecast at the start of this.

This threat coincides with several court appearance dates for Zuma who is facing an array of legal trials, as well as the delayed publication on June 22 of the final instalment of the judicial report into

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Zandile Gumede

corruption during Zuma’s ten-year tenure, the so-called “State Capture Report”.

Meanwhile, President Ramaphosa faces the most serious challenge to his reputation and political legitimacy, just six months away from his otherwise anticipated reelection as head of the ANC party.

The frequent visits of leading ANC members to the home of Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in KZN, is an indicator of the extent of control the former president maintains over the party and the province.

Zuma has been released from a correctional facility in KZN on medical parole after being jailed for contempt of court last year when he repeatedly failed to appear at the State Capture Commission.

Since then, hundreds of party members have attended so-themed prayer sessions at Nkandla, while KZN’s provincial ANC leaders have met with Zuma in recent weeks. Various regions in the province have publicly expressed their support for

Zuma who will go on trial in August. ProZuma firebrand radio DJ Ngizwe Mchunu, who has been accused of stoking last year’s riots, continues to instigate unrest with impunity. Moreover, Zuma family members, such as his son Duduzane Zuma who has his own presidential ambitions, have similarly called for open rebellion if Zuma faces another day in court.

This dispute is spilling over into the party’s leadership in the province. Current ANC provincial chairman and premier Sihle Zikalala faces a re-election contest on 15 July with both the factions representing Zuma and Ramaphosapa loyalists seeking to replace him. Several scandals, including mismanagement of the disastrous KZN floods earlier this year, have weakened Zikalala’s hold on the party in the province.

Based on various indicators, the Zuma faction, loosely named the “radical economic transformation” (RET) is edging

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ahead of Ramaphosa’s grouping that nominally supports reform and curbing corruption. Ramaphosa’s camp suffered an embarrassing defeat earlier this year with the election of former Durban mayor Zandile Gumede as chairperson of the ANC in eThekwini region, which is KZN’s most populous region representing the city of Durban. Gumede’s election, despite facing multiple charges of corruption, fraud, and racketeering in relation to business tenders, indicates that the Zuma faction is far from defeated and may pose a challenge to Ramaphosa’s re-election bid in December. eThekwini is the biggest region in the ANC nationally with more than 110 branches and more than 100,000 members. So far, the ANC’s provincial elective conferences have mostly toed the party line and elected Ramaphosa loyalists as provincial party leaders. However, the stakes are the highest in KZN and the ANC in the province is deeply divided between

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ANALYSIS

President Cyril Ramaphosa

factions local to Zuma, Ramaphosa, Gumede, Zikalala, and even former health minister Zweli Mkhize, who was dismissed on graft accusations.

As a result, KZN is unlikely to attend the national ANC conference in December as one voting bloc, but rather as disparate regions or districts voting differently to each other. Just as in 2017, the KZN’s delegation at the national congress may be so divided that it will fail to score one of the top six positions in the national ANC leadership. The fragmentation of the ANC in KZN also means that an opposition alliance is increasingly likely to win the province at the next general elections, which would be a major blow to the ANC. Ramaphosa has already secured the support and endorsements of the provinces of Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Free State, and Northern Cape. The North West, Gauteng, Western Cape, and KZN provincial elective conferences are still outstanding. However, it would seem that KZN will no longer play the kingmaker role that it enjoyed at previous national party congresses. The fragmentation 22

of the long-time ruling party in KZN comes at a high cost, including a spree of assassinations of party leaders, intensifying banditry, and the prospect of renewed unrest. Such instances are increasingly being termed “economic sabotage.”

In late May, violent protesters stoned traffic on the N3 highway between Durban and Johannesburg, specifically at Mooi River in KZN, which was the epicentre of the July 2021 unrest. The busy N3 links South Africa’s inland provinces with the country’s key trade ports of Durban and Richards Bay. Haulage companies temporarily withdrew their trucks from the N3 as a result. Blocking roads and torching trucks on the N3 is not a new phenomenon in KZN. For at least the past five years, hundreds of trucks have been set alight during protests by local truckers, while others have been looted. Yet the frequency and intensity of such incidents is intensifying. In early June, protests flared again with burning tyres placed onto the N3 and nearby roads. The All Truck Drivers’ Forum (ATDF), which includes soAFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

called ANC military veterans, is often responsible for instigating such blockades in resistance to the growing number of foreign truck drivers. Legitimate strike action is increasingly difficult to distinguish from violent unrest or criminal action. Moreover, the protests are becoming increasingly politically motivated.

On June15, some 200 protesting truckers blocked off part of the N3 in an apparent strike action. In response, Labour minister Thulas Nxesi said the blockade of the N3 by striking truck drivers must be treated as “sabotage.” Some of the goods transported by road freight via the N3 include fuel, which is becoming increasingly precious due to rising global oil prices and supply chain disruptions.

The term “sabotage” is increasingly used in response to both genuine labour action and politically or economically motivated violence or criminality. Sabotage means the deliberate destruction of property or slowing down of work with the intention of damaging a business or economic system or weakening a government or

ANALYSIS nation in a time of national emergency.

South Africa’s government has created an inter-ministerial committee to assess the impact of so-called economic sabotage that includes the looting of state property in KZN, torching of public transport, theft of power cables, and reported instances of deliberate sabotage of state-owned power stations that is aggravating rolling power outages across the country. On 20 June, the inter-ministerial committee unveiled a plan to avoid more truck blockades, which was criticised by employer organisations such as the Road Freight Association as an attempt by the government to “capture” the haulage industry.

The situation is exacerbated by systemic weaknesses in law enforcement and a lack of trust in the national police force. A recent survey shows nine in 10 people do not trust police to respond in

an emergency. It also suggests corruption and a lack of ethical and competent leadership are among contributing factors to why people do not trust the police.

The survey’s findings match an internal police poll conducted in 2021 that found that roughly half of police believed their colleagues were dishonest (53 percent), abused their power (54 percent), were not self-disciplined (51 percent) and did not conduct themselves ethically (47 percent) or professionally (47 percent). The poll’s findings are disturbing in the context of rising violent crime rates. On June 3, the South African Police Service (SAPS) released crime statistics for the first three months of 2022. The data revealed an alarming 22 percent surge in murder, equating to a rate of 40 per 100,000 residents or seven times the global average.

All other categories of serious violent crime also increased.

Rather than calling on police and law enforcement, South Africans are increasingly relying on armed self-defence groups or industry groups to prevent a repeat of last year’s violent unrest and other forms of criminality. On 9 June, a taxi association and residents fought off a raid by looters at Hammarsdale Junction Mall in eThekwini. The Hammarsdale mall was looted and damaged in the July 2021 riots and it took several months for normal operations to resume. The organisation of local communities, industry groups, and vigilante groups or armed militias is becoming more widespread, as formal law enforcement institutions fail. The threat of a national shutdown in protests over rising food and fuel prices is a key indicator for a resumption of organised looting in coming weeks, as well as several other key dates.

Truck blockage on N3 highway

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ANALYSIS

Hunger tactics in conflict Starving civilians is an ancient military tactic, but today it’s a war crime in Ukraine, Yemen, Tigray and elsewhere, write Tom Dannenbaum, Alex de Waal and Daniel Maxwell

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HIDEOUS contradiction is playing out in war-torn Ukraine. Thousands of Ukrainians are starving in cities besieged

by Russian forces. Meanwhile, the country’s grain stores are bursting with food, and the government is begging for international assistance to export Ukrainian grain to world markets.

Freeing the wheat will blunt the world food crisis, which is an urgent imperative.

But it won’t stop belligerents around the world from using starvation as a favoured weapon.

At the end of 2021, almost 200 million people globally were suffering acute food insecurity. The number climbed after Russia’s invasion and blockade of Ukraine, a key exporter of grains and oil seeds, which disrupted world food markets. This is pushing up food prices and straining aid budgets.

Russia isn’t the only belligerent to weaponise hunger. Most people at risk of famine today live in places afflicted by war. Many are being deliberately starved in what amounts to a form of societal torture.

Historically, starvation tactics have been excluded from war crimes prosecutions. As scholars who study international law, humanitarian crises and food security, our view is that it is time to confront the criminality of this practice.

Starvation is one of the oldest weapons of war. Romans used it to defeat and destroy Carthage in 146 B.C. The tactics have changed little over time. They include destroying food, farms and water supplies and cutting off besieged enemy populations.

It’s tempting to think that only totalitarians would use food as a weapon.

Russia’s war on Ukraine today echoes the Holodomor, dictator Josef Stalin’s subjugation of Ukraine by starvation in 1933.

Adolf Hitler’s “Hungerplan” starved 4.2 million Soviet citizens to death in 24

Outlawing starvation tactics came after war-driven famines in Nigeria’s breakaway Biafra region in the late 1960s

World War II. In 1977, Cambodia’s Pol Pot used mass starvation as a tool of titanic social reengineering in his Year Zero effort to turn his country into a purely agrarian nation.

But liberal states are not innocent.

The Lieber Code of 1863, which President Abraham Lincoln issued to instruct the Union army on the limits of hostilities, provided that it is “lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed,” specifying that fleeing civilians could be driven back into a besieged location “so as to hasten on the surrender.” The US Department of Defence did not formally renounce this legal position until 2015.

programme designed to defeat communists in Malaya in the 1950s.

When the Geneva Conventions, key treaties governing warfare, were drafted after World War II, the US and Great Britain successfully resisted efforts to prohibit such methods, ensuring that starvation of civilians would remain permissible in war for several more decades.

This was not merely a paper doctrine.

The Atlantic powers used mass starvation as a weapon in both world wars, employing comprehensive maritime blockades as a favoured tactic.

The first significant steps toward outlawing starvation tactics came after war-driven famines in Nigeria’s breakaway Biafra region in the late 1960s and Bangladesh in 1972 and 1974. In 1977, nations adopted two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, each of which included the prohibition of “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare.” Those protocols have been ratified by 174 and 169 states, respectively.

The US went so far as to call its effort to encircle the Japanese homeland in 1945 Operation Starvation. Britain used the same phrase for its mass civilian relocation

In 1998 the International Criminal Court Statute codified starvation methods as a war crime in international armed conflicts. A 2019 amendment expanded

AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

ANALYSIS this doctrine to cover non-international armed conflicts – conflicts between states and organised armed groups, or between organised armed groups. In addition to

‘

99 million to 166 million. This includes nearly two-thirds of the population of South Sudan, with almost one person in four living in a full-blown humanitarian

The first significant steps toward outlawing starvation tactics came after war-driven famines in Nigeria’s breakaway Biafra region and Bangladesh

’

food, the legal definition of starvation also includes deprivation of water, shelter and medical care.

Despite these legal advances, starvation crimes have been evident in recent or current conflicts in Ethiopia, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, South Sudan, Syria, Yemen and now Ukraine.

Warring parties have attacked humanitarian aid workers and farmers; stolen or slaughtered livestock; and destroyed or rendered unusable crops, farmland and other food sources.

Herders have been blocked from moving freely with their livestock, farmers from working on their land and hungry people from foraging for wild berries and grasses.

The effects have been devastating.

From 2020 to 2022 the number of people who urgently require food assistance in situations of armed conflict rose from

emergency there.

World Food Programme workers airdrop food to people displaced by fighting in South Sudan.

The people of Yemen, isolated by a Saudi- and Emirati-led blockade on one side and subject to confiscation of food and medicine by the Houthis on the other, have endured years of what remains one of the gravest humanitarian crises in the world.

In a 2021 report, the United Nationsaffiliated Independent International Commission on Syria described “modern day sieges in which perpetrators deliberately starved the population along medieval scripts”. The commission described the Syrian regime imposing “indefensible and shameful restrictions on humanitarian aid” destined for civilians in cities such as Aleppo, Homs, Daraa and Eastern Ghouta.

Perhaps the most extreme case is

Tigray in Ethiopia, where the Ethiopian government has besieged the region for more than a year and a half, closing down banking and trade and restricting humanitarian aid to the tiniest of trickles.

This tactic has been used alongside a campaign of destruction, pillage, rape and killing that has wrecked the economy of a region of seven million people.

Russian forces in Ukraine have engaged in an ever-lengthening list of starvation tactics, besieging entrapped populations, attacking grocery stores and agricultural areas and granaries, deploying land mines on agricultural land, blocking wheat-laden ships from leaving Ukrainian harbours and destroying a critical grain export terminal in Mykolaiv. Moreover, although the US and EU exempted fertilisers from sanctions (Russia and Belarus are two of the world’s largest producers), Russia has decided to withhold fertilisers from the market.

In line with the International Criminal Court, many countries now prohibit starvation of civilians as a method of warfare in their national war crimes codes. Some of these states have opened investigations into alleged war crimes in Ukraine and Syria. Among others, these countries include France, Germany, Norway and Sweden.

Although Russia’s and Ukraine’s criminal codes do not refer explicitly to starvation tactics, they include provisions under which such crimes could be prosecuted. The Ethiopian criminal code also includes the starvation war crime.

Criminal punishment alone will not end starvation in armed conflict. That would require an effort that also includes reconstruction, reparations, support for displaced communities and targeted humanitarian action. However, in our view it is time to make accountability a central component of the response.

To that end, we urge investigators to focus on starvation methods in their extraordinary efforts to document war crimes in Ukraine. At the same time, it is important to recognise that Russia’s tactics are not anomalous. Those with the relevant jurisdictional authority should devote equivalent attention to the criminal use of starvation tactics elsewhere, such as in South Sudan, Syria, Tigray and Yemen.

The Ethiopian government has besieged the Tigray region for more than a year

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Tom Dannenbaum, Alex de Waal and Daniel Maxwell are academics at Tufts University in the US. This article was first published by The Conversation.

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ANALYSIS

Weapons amnesty: how can the continent prepare for its success?

In 2013, the African Union adopted its Silencing the Guns initiative with the aim of ending all conflicts in Africa by 2020, but this target was not achieved. Gorata Chepete analyses the challenges and prospects of this rather enormous task and makes some recommendations on how to enhance participation during Africa Amnesty Month in September

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or the past nine years the African Union has undertaken efforts to realise what it calls A Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns (STG) in Africa. The AU dubbed 2020 the “year of silencing the guns” in a bid to make peace a reality for all Africans and to end wars on the continent.

This roadmap envisioned putting an end to the proliferation of weapons in Africa by stopping rebels, non-state actors and their financiers from accessing arms; enhancing compliance with AU treaties and conventions by ensuring that parties comply, and sanctioning those who do not.

One of the practical steps included in the roadmap was an ambitious plan to stop all acts of terrorism and violent extremism through establishing a fund that would enable member states to counter these threats.

The AU had hoped that by 2020 it would have strengthened disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes, and security sector reform

(SSR), as well as built the capacities of institutions and states to implement effective post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes.

Why were the guns then not silenced in 2020? On paper, the practical steps and modalities for mobilising action sounded perfect, but in reality, they were not as clear cut as the AU would have hoped. In effect, attaining sustainable peace, security and development in Africa could not be implemented.

Another problem was that the initiative was more of a political declaration rather than a committed policy regime. Such a regime would have entailed institutional practices that reflected a common set of ideas to be implemented effectively by stakeholders.

Therefore, the politicisation made it almost impossible for member states to effectively participate and implement the policy in their own countries. The involvement of all relevant stakeholders in 2020 was not prioritised, making it difficult

for member states to fully take advantage of the initiative.

It is also important to highlight that though the AU is the steward and should have effectively pioneered the initiative, it is the responsibility of member states to domesticate this programme in their respective countries.

The outbreak of the pandemic has had devastating effects on the livelihoods of people in Africa with far reaching implications for the political, social and economic spheres. In 2022, the top three security issues ravaging the continent are terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government and intra-state conflict, according to the Africa portal.

The ethno-religious, resource-driven and politically-motivated conflicts across the continent that remain persistent are the biggest threats to Africa’s socio-economic development. Regions most affected are the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Great Lakes Region, East Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central Africa and North Africa, as well as Southern Africa, specifically Mozambique.

As a consequence, the 14th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly, in 2020, on Silencing the Guns in Africa extended the initiative for 10 more years in light of the pandemic, rampant insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, gender-based violence and instability. Two years after the announcement of the extension, the peace and security situation in Africa is worsening.

The AU had hoped to have strengthened disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes by 2020

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The extension is applauded, but there has to be a different approach to issues involved, and the practical steps as outlined have to be inclusive, decisive and swift.

Most importantly, the engagement of civil society organisations (CSOs) has to be at

ANALYSIS of CSOs through ECOSOC. It should equally establish collaborative efforts with UN agencies, peacekeeping missions, DDR bodies, UNDP’s preventing armed violence programmes, UN Women, AU Envoy on Youth civil society, and national agencies in order to enhance the campaign’s visibility and engagement. Crucially, the AU should develop key messaging that is relevant and engaging in terms of the premise of the campaign, consistent with the objectives of the campaign and relevant to each of the target audiences.

The AU has declared September as the Africa Amnesty Month

the centre of the initiative.

As it stands, there are no clear criteria and formalised avenues for the engagement of CSOs with the AU. Notwithstanding the establishment of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), which is supposed to facilitate this engagement, formal opportunities and engagement structures are still lacking.

This was evident in 2020 when CSOs did not know what formal role they were supposed to assume, even though they directly worked with affected communities.

Their formalised contribution would create a conducive environment for engagement with the AU and enable their full participation so that they could contribute immensely towards silencing the guns Now we have Africa Amnesty Month.

In 2017, the AU declared September of each year as the month for the surrender and collection of illegally owned small arms and light weapons. Africa Amnesty Month is the most concrete and tangible initiative to ever come out of the STG Master Roadmap, though it is not a holistic approach towards ending wars in Africa.

Africa Amnesty Month has focused on domesticating initiatives to end gun violence through tailored national action plans aimed at promoting the participation and contribution of citizens, in particular women and youth, in peacebuilding initiatives. Granting amnesty simply means releasing or protecting persons from prosecution for a particular criminal

activity, in this instance illicit firearms ownership. This, therefore, means that every September, Africans are given an opportunity to return the guns they own illegally, and will not be subjected to disclosure, humiliation, arrest or prosecution.

Though the initiative has not achieved any tangible results, it is aimed at ending all wars, civil conflicts, gender-based violence, violent conflicts and preventing genocide on the continent. This is quite an imperative initiative towards silencing the guns, since, quite evidently, all regions in Africa are experiencing an influx of illegal weapons.

It also protects young people who have been recruited into terrorism or violent extremism, as they can now break free from their past and be reintegrated into their communities without facing the wrath of the law.

How can the AU enhance participation in Africa Amnesty Month? While September is some two months away, the AU, member states and civilians can be more proactive to ensure maximum participation.

On the part of the AU, it should work with member states, supporting them to roll out the campaign in their administrative units, especially those experiencing growing cases of illegal ownership of weapons. The pan-African body should also develop clear criteria and formal structures that will enable the participation

For member states, they should inform and educate individuals about the negative consequences of owning an illicit gun and encourage owners to voluntarily hand in their weapons. The media should be encouraged to contribute to ongoing efforts to achieve the goal of a conflict-free Africa.

The media can open up dialogue spaces for youth, women, civil society and industry stakeholders to play complementary roles in conflict prevention and resolution, thus creating a ripple effect in terms of impact and sustainability in support of the campaign. Civilians and the police should also be informed about the amnesty and details of handing in illicit weaponry.

In the case of civilians, the aim is for them to be mobilised and work together with their respective governments by adopting peace practices, while eliminating all forms of intolerance.

In the final analysis, the extension of the implementation of Silencing the Guns to 2030 provides an important opportunity for all stakeholders to be hands-on and ensure implementation of the programme.

An inclusive approach towards ending all wars in Africa would emphasise the importance of everyone as a stakeholder, and hence encourage them to adopt peace practices.

While guns may not be silenced by 2030, Africa Amnesty Month could be leveraged to achieve measurable milestones as the most tangible initiative to ever come out of the STG programme.

While this programme was introduced by the AU, and there is a natural expectation that the AU should spearhead it, it is the responsibility of every African to ensure its success.

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Gorata Chepete is a Fellow on the African Leadership Centre’s Peace, Security and Development Fellowship Programme for Early Career Women in partnership with King’s College London. She has a background in criminology and is currently focusing on terrorism and counterterrorism.

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ANALYSIS

The search for transparency: the ICC at 20 With the International Criminal Court coming in for much criticism over the last 20 years for how it has been selecting and prioritising cases, Evelyn A. Ankumah argues that an improved policy paper can contribute to transparency or the perception of transparency as long as this is used objectively and not subjectively

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Genocide and now Special Adviser to the ICC Prosecutor, said: “Let us be clear…. whether it is in The Gambia, in another African country, before a special court, or at the ICC, justice must happen and justice will happen. Impunity is not an option.”

N July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) entered into force, sooner than many of us had expected. The first bench of 18 judges was elected by the Assembly of States Parties sitting at the UN headquarters in New York in February 2003.

In October 2003, Africa Legal Aid (AFLA) convened the first major conference to introduce the new ICC to human rights and justice sectors in Africa.

I remember telling participants that I hoped Africa’s contribution to the ICC would not be limited to the disproportionately high number of cases that would come from Africa.

Twenty years later, here we are commemorating the 20th anniversary of the ICC. Commemorations are occasions not necessarily to celebrate but more importantly an opportunity to reflect and look ahead on what can be improved. I will limit myself to transparency in the selection and prioritisation of cases; and the role of civil society in broadening the fight against impunity.

As many of you are aware, under the ICC Statute, the Prosecutor has discretion to decide which cases to pursue in accordance with the Statute’s objectives.

Prosecutorial discretion should of course not be equated with random and selective justice.

Therefore in 2016 the Office of the Prosecutor published its policy paper on case selection and prioritisation. Much has been written and said about that.

An improved policy paper on selection and prioritisation of cases can contribute to transparency or the perception of

The International Criminal Court in The Hague, The Netherlands

transparency if it is objective and not used subjectively. There has been much criticism on how cases have been selected and prioritised.

Take the case of Laurent Gbagbo, who was rushed to the ICC after a disputed election in Côte d’Ivoire. It was widely reported that crimes were committed on both sides of the political spectrum so why did this proprio motu [on one’s own initiative] case become a case of victor’s justice?

On the human rights crimes committed in The Gambia during the 22-year reign of Yahya Jammeh, the Office of the Prosecutor took the position that the crimes did not meet the gravity threshold.

However, after the testimonies before The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC), the now former Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, is reported to have suggested that the crimes were of sufficient gravity.

Incoming Prosecutor Karim Khan tweeted at the close of the hearings that “Justice Must Happen”. Subsequently, in a video statement that has gone viral, Adama Dieng, former UN Under Secretary-General for the Prevention of

Recently, the government of The Gambia issued a White Paper accepting the recommendations of the TRRC to prosecute those most responsible for atrocity crimes committed during the Jammeh era. The list includes Jammeh himself and 13 others.

Then there is also the question of whether the ICC should play a role in addressing the climate crisis to include the crime of ecocide. In 2002, under the auspices of Africa Legal Aid, The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences: an African Perspective were adopted.

Principle 4 stipulates: “In addition to the crimes that are currently recognised under international law as being subject to universal jurisdiction, certain other crimes that have major adverse economic, social or cultural consequences – such as acts of plunder and gross misappropriation of public resources, trafficking in human beings and serious environmental crimes should be granted this status.”

These were later echoed in the Malabo Protocol of 2014.

We are expansionist and, yes, the ICC should address the crime of ecocide. In fact, I would say that the ICC already can, if those crimes result in crimes against humanity are used as a weapon of war, and/or target specific populations.

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Evelyn A. Ankumah is Executive Director of Africa Legal Aid (AFLA). The above presentation was made at a public roundtable on 20 years of the ICC at Leiden University in The Netherlands in June and organised by the university’s Global Transformations and Governance Challenges programme and its Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies.

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BUSINESS & ECONOMY

Afreximbank recommits to Africa’s development The 29th Africa Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) annual meeting, held in Cairo, Egypt mid-June, delivered lively debates on Africa’s development dynamics. Stephen Williams reports

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ENTRAL to many of the discussions at the Afreximbank Annual Meeting was the potential of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) to transform the continent’s economic stature to meet her many challenges, including ensuring the positive legacies that successive generations will inherit.

As Afreximbank’s president, Benedict Oramah, pointed out in his opening address, with 85 percent of Africa’s population under 45 years of age, Africa is in a similar demographic position as the USA, Canada and the Asian tigers when they achieved economic transformation.

The theme for this year’s meetings was a recognition of the role that the youth is expected to play in the economic transformation of the continent.

that African can boast a combination of factors that can resolve it. These include visionary leadership, the youth and digital technology,” Oramah said.

through increased intra-African trade,” he said.

Amer said there is the need for more integration and commended Afreximbank for the role it is playing in making this possible. “The bank is a good stepping stone to achieve the goals of fighting poverty, creating jobs and fighting inflation

risk from the crisis. These interventions, Oramah observed, demonstrate the need to strengthen African institutions and make them better able to help the continent contain and manage crises and shocks.

Oramah also stressed that the bank will help find African solutions to African Welcoming participants to the meetings, problems. With the challenge of the war in Ukraine, countries in Africa face food and Tarek Hassan Amer, Governor of the Central Bank of Egypt, said: “For years, we fertiliser shortages as well as rising costs of petroleum products. have sought to find solutions from outside Africa but that was not right. Our solutions The bank has responded with a $4bn can be found from within.” facility to assist African countries at

Afrieximbank has also set up an intra-

“This resource is more valuable than oil and other mineral resources”, he argued, Complementing this focus on Africa’s youth was Afreximbank’s raison d’etre: trade. The AfCFTA Secretary General, Wamkele Mene was on hand to explain the agreement’s many potential benefits.

During the colonial era, the colonising countries had privileged access to raw materials in the colonised countries, while they also had their populations as captive markets for their manufactures.

This prevented the growth of local industry as well as developing trade with African neighbours.

Following the independence movement, African leaders sought to reverse the model, resolving at the very first meeting of the Organisation of African Unity to study the establishment of a free trade area, payment and clearing union. “While the problem was identified decades ago, it is only now Benedict Oramah: ‘Africa is in a similar demographic position as the USA, Canada and the Asian tigers when they achieved economic transformation’

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BUSINESS & ECONOMY

Rosa Whittaker: ‘Africa’s strength in the green economy is ultimately an advantage’

Africa trade division with a capacity of $20bn, which the bank intends to double in the next five years. Another Afreximbank initiative, the Pan African Payment and Settlement Systems (PAPSS) is now operational, with eight central banks and forty-five commercial banks integrated into it. The benefits of the payment systems include potential reduction in external debt and transaction costs.

Oramah said the bank has made good progress with the collaborative transit guarantee scheme and has admitted as a regional transit guarantor, with hopes to extend cover to the entire continent.

The bank’s Africa Trade Gateway, also known as digital AfCTFA, has also on-boarded nearly five hundred companies across the continent, with credit lines for 170 banks in 38 African countries. Oramah said it is necessary to build strong African banks to replace the international brands that have withdrawn from the continent, as this would ultimately put the African financial sector in the hands of African.

To increase investment, the AU has also partnered with Afreximbank to develop an automotive industry strategy that will be presented to trade ministers for approval.

This is already generating interest and

will help in the drive to improve Africa’s share of global trade, which has receded from 6.6 percent in the 1970s to today’s 2.7 percent.

He said the AU is working with Afrieximbank on an export diversification programme with a view to accelerating manufacturing and agro-processing on the continent. It is generally recognised that 45 out of the continent’s 54 countries remain dependent on exports of primary products in the agricultural, mining and extractive industries.

Among the many high-level participants in a series of panel discussions, was Rosa Whitaker, president and chief executive officer of Whitaker Group, a USbased company that is heavily involved in African infrastructure projects, notably rail in East Africa. Prior to entering the private sector, she was a public servant and was closely involved in introducing the AGOA trade treaty under President Bill Clinton.

What made Whitaker’s contribution so memorable was her reminding the delegates that the AU has determined that the African diaspora represents Africa’s sixth region, with a GDP of $1.8bn.

Rosa Whitaker identified four crisis points that, in her view, also represent opportunities for the continent. The cost AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

of capital, which is crippling investment in infrastructure, health and education on the continent (estimated to require some $213bn a year), can be addressed with the $8 trillion worth of mineral resources the continent is endowed with. With climate change, Africa may end up paying for the excesses of other economies, but its strength in the green economy is ultimately an advantage.

Africa also needs to address the lack of physical and digital connectivity and prepare for the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Whitaker said there is a proposal for the US and the G7 to support Africa’s infrastructure development through the use of bonds and called for tax incentives to encourage foreign investors to invest in Africa’s infrastructure.

Whitaker was joined by another representative of the private sector by the group chief executive of Oando, Adewale Tinubu, who addressed the meeting delivering an address on ‘Catalysing the Economic Transformation Power of SubSovereigns in the AfCFTA Era’.

Tinubu spoke on the need to support the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises within the framework of the AfCFTA accelerating the process of diversifying African trade.

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BUSINESS & ECONOMY

'Just do it' Patrick Utomi is an academic, management expert, industrialist and even a former presidential candidate in Nigeria. He chairs the PUFTRAC initiative that monitors the progress of AfCFTA. He spoke to Stephen Williams at the recent Afreximbank Annual General Meeting in Cairo Stephen Williams (SW): Professor Utomi, could you summarise what you will be taking away away from this meeting?

PU: Well, first of all, you know, especially because I've been coming to these conferences for years, I think that we have literally almost exhausted the important points of conversation – that the challenge now is the challenge of doing. Many years ago, the government of President Obasanjo of Nigeria held a retreat for his cabinet and I was invited to make remarks there. My comment was that they should adopt the Nike slogan – 'Just Do It'.

Just do it. So I believe this meeting must make the transition from setting the course to implementing things.

SW: Could you give us an idea of how we should implement the AfCFTA? PU: I'll give an example of one of the things that's very, very hot on the agenda.

For me, it resonated strongly because Egypt's President Fattah El Sisi made the point yesterday; it is the question of capital.

A lot of things we talk about sound very good –Afreximbank will make this new initiative happen.

But the question is one of evaluating the real impact, measuring the impact on the ground. And many times I find that the impact isn't as much as it should be; we are progressing, but not as far or as fast as Patrick Utomi: ‘Just Do It!’

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BUSINESS & ECONOMY we should be – because there's still too much left in the hands of governments and government driven institutions.

SW: So you would argue for more input from the private sector?

PU: Exactly. We should have private sector drivers who see incentives that are thrown at them, and take advantage of those incentives to make things happen to the finance, which I would say is the big elephant in the room.

People are repeatedly asking how Egypt is financing all of the infrastructure that has gone up so fast. And my basic response is, like Thomas Piketty says – the French economist who has become the great brand godfather of capital – there's probably more capital available in the world today than at any time in human history.

SW: So what is the problem?

PU: The thing is that globalisation just facilitated the accumulation of capital, but has left it in a just a few hands. Piketty is often seen as a new breed of Marxist because he focuses on the redistribution of that capital. I take a different approach by asking 'how do you incentivize the people who have this capital to use it where it is needed?’.

Much of the world’s capital resides in economies where interest rates are probably close to zero. Yet, that capital can do a lot of good elsewhere. But it's natural that people don't want to throw away the money that they worked hard to earn.

So the big question is what are these institutions doing to liberate this capital?

To literally meet that capital with where there de-risk the prospective investments and just making it exciting for people to be involved in doing that, without the great fear that they will lose all of their savings!

There's so many clever ways that we can do those things.

If African institutions, the organisations like Afreximbank become more capitalised because African leaders think more

creatively about how to deploy their pension funds, that would be positive We could use dormant capital as security for capital, SW: How could we stimulate this?

PU: First, eliminate the nepotism that is evident in Africa and leads to other corrupt practices. Then create an army of businesses peoples with the right knowledge, the right skills, and the right values who are competent, able people and deploy them as guardians of the resources we can create. We would gain access to that capital, and things would take off on the continent.

SW: Would you agree that we're currently facing a trio of challenges – the global pandemic; the Ukraine, Russia conflict; and of course, global warming – and they're all going to impact Africa?

PU: We have to be more creative in the way we try to solve problems, for example seeing global warming as an opportunity.

I have argued in Nigeria, for example, that with the huge unemployment that exists today, we could actually solve the jobs problem as part of the approach to global warming.

The greening of Africa, and stopping the expansion of the Sahara might be solved if we launched a global bond and we found a couple of billion dollars. I think that would be fairly easily.

Then we could put every graduate, after leaving university in Nigeria, to work for a certain amount of money, probably $200 or so a month.

From 7.30 in the morning, to 1pm in they would be building the Greenbelt, planting trees. From 1.30 till 3:30pm, learning new skills for the new eco friendly factories that will be built based on the dominance of that particular region. That would stimulate new growth, tackling the problem of global warming, creating employment for young people, and at the same time, you know, building prosperity for the country. We can actually turn the threats into potential.

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SW: Do you not get the feeling that youth in Africa do not really embrace the idea of agriculture or greening? They simply prefer urban lifestyles PU: The solution is to make rural life more attractive. The way we present it today has no sex appeal. It's just hard work. But if we broke the rural area into one hectare lots for the youth, and provided support services and a living area club somewhere –just like rural America – it would be a really pleasant place. You have as much fun as if you lived in the major urban centres, but you have a healthier life. Present that option it to the young graduates who are jobless in the cities. It's quite doable. It's just not been marketed as it should be.

SW: If you were to offer advice both to governments and African institutions like Afreximbank on the best way forward, what would you say?

PU: I would call for implementation councils, and bring together the stakeholders, the real stakeholders. I am talking about young people, get young people to challenge them with certain targets, and get them to come up with initiatives that will get them to that target.

I just think of pedagogy of the earth.

I think about the work Paulo Freire of the 1970s. He was a Brazilean educator and philosopher who held the view that all education should begin with imagination.

I do not hold with everything he says, he was a Marxist and I am not. But, you should begin with a vision of how a young person sees the world.

And in that vision, you must think of how you would you like your world to look like 30 years from now.Think about what has happened to China; What has happened to Brazil.

What is after they've seen all of this?

What kind of world you'd like to see for yourself 30 years from now? What kind of knowledge do you think is required for you to be the catalyst, to create your world from where it is today.

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The case for a circular plastics economy Jon Offei-Ansah has been reading a new report by the WWF that explores the economic case for transitioning from the current linear model of plastic production, use and disposal to a circular plastics economy by 2050, with a focus on plastic packaging in three African countries

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CIRCULAR plastics economy by 2050 will lead to positive cumulative effects for Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and South Africa in the form of additional GDP growth and an overall improvement in public welfare and household income, says a new report from the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).

This requires a shift away from the current linear (“take, make, waste”) model which sees the bulk of plastics finding its way into non-compliant landfills and open dumps with resultant leakage into the natural environment. A circular economy endeavours to keep materials within the economic system for as long as possible, reducing the need for continued resource extraction and trying to cope with the everincreasing volumes of waste.

Three core requirements to represent the circular plastics economy scenario in the macro-economic model from 2019 to 2050 were as follows:

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A reduction in overall consumption of single-use plastic packaging by 30 percent, including a phase out of problematic polymers and formats,

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50 percent of virgin plastic to be substituted by post-consumer recycled plastic,

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Wide adoption of packaging reuse and refill models to keep plastic packaging in the economy for longer periods.

This new report comes against the backdrop of a decision at the most recent United Nations Environment Assembly in Nairobi to work towards a legally binding international agreement on how to manage plastics across its life cycle from resin production to end of life.

The report argues that this proposed treaty is an opportunity to “harmonise, coordinate and provide regulatory measures to address plastic pollution holistically and comprehensively”. It further suggests that African governments should actively participate in negotiations towards such a treaty to offer perspectives and priorities from the African context.

The research looks at the economic benefits of the transition to a circular plastics economy by taking into account not only the market and indirect costs or externalities of the linear plastics economy, but also the net material savings, mitigation of price volatility and sectoral shifts that would result in job creation and improved livelihoods in the selected African countries.

In terms of the country scenarios, the report found that only for the packaging sector (or value chain): •

Plastic film and piping to be recycled at a recycling facility in South Africa

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An immediate implementation option enables Cote d’Ivoire to benefit from additional GDP growth of $1.1 billion over a business-as-usual outcome and savings of over $200 million by 2050 by avoiding the costs arising from the externalities of the linear plastic

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packaging model.

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Kenya could also immediately implement structural changes towards a circular plastics economy to benefit from additional GDP growth of $2.53 billion and savings of over $425 million by 2050 by avoiding the costs of externalities that would accumulate in the business-as usual scenario.

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In South Africa, delaying implementation would lead to an accumulation of costs of over $475 million by 2050 associated with the business-as-usual scenario. Incremental implementation of the transition to a circular plastics economy would enable the country to implement the necessary measures to minimise any negative impacts on the current value chain and still benefit from additional GDP growth of $7.2 billion.

The report says that a shift towards a circular plastics economy will lead to an overall increase in the demand for both skilled and unskilled labour, which suggests that there is strong potential for an inclusive circular plastics transition. The results also show that a significant number of informal waste sector workers and waste sector dependants stand to benefit from a transition to a circular plastics economy.

While employment is expected to decline in primary plastics sectors over the transition period, these sector-specific employment losses will be absorbed by growth in the secondary plastics and services sectors. This has implications for the need to design and ensure an inclusive plastics transition, even with more vulnerable groups downstream in the secondary plastics and services sector benefitting.

The term just transition still needs to be contextualised in the plastics space in South Africa. The question to ask is where does social vulnerability lie in these value

BUSINESS & ECONOMY chains? Livelihood vulnerability in the plastics sector is very different to the energy sector and might therefore need to be approached differently.

Kenya Kenya is the most industrially developed country in East Africa and the region’s financial and transport hub. About 27 percent of Kenyans live in urban areas, and according to the World Bank, the country is urbanising at about 4.3 percent a year. Its main urban nodes for plastics production and consumption are Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and Nakuru.

Kenya’s plastics value chain is reflective of its majority “kadogo” economy (a local word for “informal economy”). The major trend this economic format has introduced is the selling of conventional bulk products in smaller, typically single-use, units. About 70 percent of fast-moving consumer goods come from this sector. Sadly, this exacerbates the use of single-use packaging formats such as laminated plastic pouches and metallic foils used for snack packets.

These formats offer very little intrinsic material value on their own and have therefore typically no end-use market (due to a lack of demand) and local technology solutions in place.

Kenya uses a total of 514,000 tonnes of plastic for packaging per year. The Kenyan plastics sector as a whole is 38 times smaller than that of South Africa.

South Africa South Africa is one of Africa’s most industrialised and diversified economies and southern Africa’s economic hub. South Africa is urbanising rapidly: 63 percent of South Africans are already living in urban areas, with this figure expected to rise to 71 percent by 2030, increasing demand for basic goods and infrastructure. Owing to the size of South Africa’s economy and consumer market (relative to other African countries), the scale of plastic production and consumption is large. South Africa has a complete plastics value chain where the raw material is processed, manufactured and sold locally and exported, in contrast to many African countries that primarily import finished products. Furthermore, certain types of post-consumer plastics can be recycled, sold and reprocessed into new applications locally or exported for further processing.

The plastic production system largely hinges on fossil-fuel-based virgin materials and the unsustainable, non-circular design

Plastic trash gathered at one end of the beach on Rubu Island, one of the many islands situated in Kiunga Marine National Reserve on the north Kenyan coast

of products and packaging. In South Africa, a little over 2.5 million tonnes of plastic are consumed annually. More than half (54 percent) of post-consumer plastic is uncollected, improperly disposed of, or leaks into the environment as plastic pollution. A weak and already strained waste management system is supported by a marginalised but growing informal waste sector. Informal waste reclaimers play an important role in the collection of recyclables (paper and packaging) in South Africa. The latest research has found that informal reclaimers are responsible for about 51 percent of all paper and packaging waste collected in South Africa in 2017.

There are at least 300 plastic recyclers that process low-density polyethylene (LDPE), high-density polyethylene (HDPE) and polypropylene (PP), and a few that process polystyrene (PS), polyethylene terephthalate (PET) and polyvinyl chloride (PVC). There are about 58,500 jobs in the entire collection value chain (of which at least 7,892 are at recycling plants).

In South Africa, there are 1,800 plastics converters and manufacturing companies that are mostly small, medium and microenterprises (SMMEs).

Cote d’Ivoire Cote d’Ivoire has the second-largest economy in West Africa. The civil unrest between 2002 and 2011 contributed to the degradation of natural resources and the environment. This adversely affected local livelihoods, as well as broader economic growth and development. Another major consequence of these conflicts in the country has been mass migration towards urban centres in search of economic opportunity. Most of the industrial activity in Cote d’Ivoire, and thus the subsequent industrial pollution, is concentrated in three urban areas – Abidjan, Bouaké and AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

San-Pédro. Over half of the entire Ivorian population lives in these three cities, which are rapidly growing and will continue to serve as key industrial production sites in future. Abidjan is the economic capital, housing 19 percent of the Ivorian population and 80 percent of the country’s industry. It generates 27 percent of the GDP and provides more than 50 percent of secondary and tertiary sector employment.

The plastics sector in Cote d’Ivoire is very small. The plastic packaging value chain is limited, in that there is no primary production of virgin material and a very limited recycling infrastructure. All virgin material and most packaging are imported, but there is a small local plastic packaging manufacturing sector that converts imported virgin material into packaging.

Cote d’Ivoire is characterised by very little formal waste management. According to the Ivorian Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, the country produces more than 40,000 tonnes of plastic waste every year. More than 50 percent of this waste is littered directly into the streets, while less than 20 percent is sorted and recycled. There is limited knowledge of whether recycling activities are actually taking place.

The large variety of retail institutions affects the management of the plastics value chain. Consumers access packaged products from large formal corporate retailers, such as Carrefour and other French supermarket chains, alongside small-scale, informal market traders. The waste management and plastics sectors are dominated by small-scale private and informal operators, active predominantly in Abidjan and a few other urban nodes.

Circular economy activities in the plastics sector are nascent, driven by voluntary public and private-sector company associations and social enterprises engaging meaningfully with the AB informal sector.

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Region still too reliant on commodities exports, UN says Nearly 60 percent of African countries remain dependent on exports of commodities despite decades long efforts to diversify. A shift to technology and financial services could help them withstand economic shocks, the UN says

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HE United Nations has called for African countries to diversify their economies away from commodities African countries must break their reliance on commodities exports for economic growth and diversify toward higher-value services, the United Nations warned.

taken steps to boost their services sectors, the UN body noted that they have been mainly focused on transport and tourism, which now makes up to two-thirds of service exports across the continent.

Information technology (IT) and financial services account for just 20 percent of Africa's services exports, it said.

By moving economic sectors up the value chain, African nations could better

The call comes as the price of many key commodities — which skyrocketed over the past year to the benefit of many African export-led economies — have begun to cool off.

In its Economic Development in Africa Report 2022 released mid-July, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) urged governments across the continent to boost investments in technology and financial services, among other sectors.

UNCTAD noted that 45 of the continent's 54 countries still remain dependent on agricultural, mining and extractive exports, despite decades long efforts to diversify their economies.

The report said the heavy reliance on commodity exports like oil, gas, minerals, food and agricultural raw materials resulted in "highly volatile revenues" for low-income nations due to the "price boom and bust nature of the market."

The paper described the so-called "resource curse," where commodities-rich countries tend to have low growth and development outcomes due to the price instability of their exports.

UNCTAD said this vulnerability is "often amplified" by geopolitical factors and events like the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2008-09 global financial crisis.

While several African countries have 36

Nigeria and Kenya have become major hubs for fintech and health tech startups respectively

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BUSINESS & ECONOMY weather economic shocks like climate change, future health emergencies and the food crisis exacerbated by the Ukraine conflict, UNCTAD said.

"Our latest report focuses on the services sector … particularly enterprises that are high-skilled and high-knowledge, such as fintech, health care technology and logistics technology, as well as agriculture and energy [technology]," Paul Akiwomi, UNCTAD's director for the Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes, said.

Akiwomi said investments in new economic areas would also bring benefits to support countries' existing commodity sectors, for example, through new technologies.

"We believe that this can alter the development trajectory of many countries, moving them away from being solely commodity-based to more diverse

economies," he added.

He gave the example of Mauritius, which was an agricultural economy with sugar cane as its major export. Over the past 20 years, the Indian Ocean island has diversified its economy and more recently has moved into financial services and fintech, winning substantial investments from India and the United States.

UNCTAD is pushing African nations to create the environment for high-tech startups to thrive "Now SMEs [small and medium-sized enterprises] account for 40 percent of GDP and 56 percent of jobs. So this is a massive shift in the diversification of the economy," Akiwomi said.

He also noted how Nigeria and Kenya have become major hubs for fintech and health tech startups respectively.

Economic diversification would also help to boost the new middle class in

Africa, as it would create more high-skilled jobs in operations, finance, engineering and marketing, among others, the UN spokesman said.

However, UNCTAD's report said it was vital that African governments provide adequate regulatory frameworks and financial mechanisms, and called for more innovative financial instruments for local SMEs to secure access to financing.

"The financing of SMEs that are innovative and technology-driven is still a very difficult area in Africa," Akiwomi said, adding that ″the culture of lending money for an idea is still not there."

Citing data from the International Finance Corporation, UNCTAD's report noted that Africa's 50 million SMEs have an unmet financing need of $416 billion every year.

The paper described how the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which took effect in 2019 and which aims to create a single market for the continent's 1.4 billion people, will help new sectors thrive by boosting inter-Africa trade.

"AfCFTA allows for scale," Akiwomi said. "Each country will be moving at a different pace and level based on their comparative advantages."

"You have shorter distances between countries; you get access to intermediaries, lower trade costs, access to other services.

All of these benefits would allow African countries to transform their economies," he said.

Rising commodities prices as a result of supply chain delays in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic have been a blessing and a curse to many African countries.

While nations have achieved much higher prices for their exports, African consumers and businesses have not escaped the much higher costs of oil, gas, food and fertilisers.

While some financial analysts have declared a new commodity supercycle — a longer era of higher prices for raw materials — prices have already started to moderate in recent months.

The price of copper has since fallen to an 18-month low and oil prices are more than 20 percent off their recent highs, further boosting the argument for new, more reliable engines of growth.

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Cameroon: fuel crisis rocks the country Tikum Mbah Azonga reports from Yaounde on government measures to arrest the spiralling fuel crisis in the country

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AMEROON is going through one of its most serious fuel crises of recent times – with acute shortages in the political capital Yaoundé, the economic capital Douala and elsewhere across the country’s regions.

Scenes of long lines of motorists in parked vehicles waiting to fill their tanks are commonplace. The fuel seeker has to knock at the doors of several petrol stations in search of fuel, with most appearing to be out of stock. One taxi driver told Africa Briefing that he had spent the previous day hunting for fuel and was only able to buy a limited quantity when he finally found a station that had some stock, as the seller was rationing in an attempt to provide at least some to every motorist queuing for fuel.

The English language daily, The Guardian Post, described the mood in a front page article entitled: “Fuel scare has hit the country’s major city of Yaounde and Ebolowa in the South region, forcing commercial motorists and car owners to spend several hours at filling stations. In Yaoundé and Ebolowa, The Guardian Post reports that it witnessed long queues at several filling stations such as Tradex, TotalEnergies, and MRS. Although there were petroleum products at the said filling stations, which sold at CFA630 ($0.97) per litre, motorists still struggled to get gasoline with which to run their economic lives”. The paper explained that “Hundreds of motorists besieged the few filling stations that dispensed petrol at various neighborhoods in Yaoundé. Hundreds of others spent hours on queues in a bid to buy the essential liquid” The shortages have caused a slowdown in the activities of taxis and commercial motor bikes, as well as poor attendance at work places and in schools as a result of transport vehicles being grounded. A nurse in one of the health centres in the South West region (one of the two Anglophone regions where the war of secession is raging), told Africa Briefing that the crisis has disrupted services due to the challenges of moving drugs and medical equipment to the centre. Another consequence, she explained, was that patients and pregnant women who are a transportation priority, could no longer be easily moved to the 38

products are being immediately pumped into the system with a view to bringing some relief to the existing 123,000 cubic meters of super and gasoline. The minister assured consumers that the newlyannounced relief package, which consists of 28,000 cubic metres of super (gasoline), 22 000 cubic metres be gasoil and 12,500 cubic metres of Jet A1, was intended to calm and reassure consumers.

Unfortunately, the fuel shortage The crisis has also given rise to an increase in the occurs at a time when negotiations with presence of smuggled petrol in the country the International Monetary Fund (IMF) health centre for treatment. are somewhat tense. The Breton Woods institution has been putting pressure on the The crisis has also given rise to an increase in the presence of smuggled petrol government to stop subsidising prices at the pump – but the government continues in the country, mainly from neighbouring to subsidise. Official sources reveal that in Nigeria. For decades, a cheaper and lower the first half of this year, the government quality gasoline has been smuggled into subsidised the price of fuel at the pump Cameroon from the adjoining country. In to the tune of CFA317 billion to prevent a an effort to protect the home market, the price rise. forces of law and order in collaboration with customs officers, often impound The fuel crisis is, however, only one quantities of this fuel which is commonly link in a chain of events in Cameroon known in Cameroon as “Finge”and set it that was preceded by a hike in the prices alight in full public view in order to deter of basic food commodities some months other smugglers and buyers. However, since ago. Radio France International (RFI) the current fuel crisis erupted, government commented on the situation in Bamenda, officials have been careful not to impound headquarters of the English-speaking North smuggled fuel.

West region: “At the busy Bamenda food market, hawkers position themselves at the A police commissioner in the North market gate, selling basic home products West regional capital of Bamenda like washing soap; while shop owners serve explained, “We know what is going on. customers inside their shops. Shop owners However, we don’t want to rock the boat come here in the hope of buying local because in times of crisis like this one, it produce cheaper. But for more than three is our duty to ensure that social peace and months now, the prices of local produce order reign supreme. Besides, in the kind of precarious situation in which the country like plantains and tomatoes as well as basic finds itself today, any strategy that can help household commodities have skyrocketed” maintain peace and order is welcomed.

What was the trigger for the current After all, “Finge” helps people to move emergency? Some observers point the and carry out their usual activities. We call finger at the generally unfavorable world that administrative tolerance”. Indeed, economic outlook; some cite the knock-on the owner of a private car we spoke to on effect of the war in Ukraine; and others the road from Mbouda in the West Region hold the Cameroon government responsible heading towards Santa in the North West because of its apparent inaction in the told us that he had a permanent supplier face of endemic and systemic corruption. of “Finge”, which was why he was not At this point in time, does debating the “grounded”. cause really matter? The main priority should be tackling the situation – and it In response to the fuel scarcity, the is paramount that the government works government has announced some stopgap to nip this wave of discontent in the bud measures. Water and Energy minister before it deteriorates further and becomes Gaston Eloundou Essomba, has declared that some 62,500 cubic metres of petroleum uncontrollable.

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The US dollar as a potent sanctions weapon The American currency has long wielded outsized influence around the world with some now thinking the currency’s role in sanctioning Russia portends the end of that dominance. But a clear alternative has yet to emerge, writes John Letzing

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BOUT a decade ago, Swiss banks did something unthinkable. One by one, they set aside secrecy previously upheld for centuries and handed sensitive information to a US government in search of tax cheats.

A key reason for the turnabout: the dollar.

The currency provided a means to legally pursue even small Swiss financial institutions from across the Atlantic. It was not the first instance of the greenback being used to pull geopolitical levers. For at least the past 78 years, the global economy has more or less revolved around it.

Now, a major part of sanctioning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine involves obstructing its access to dollars. And some experts think this use of the currency to wear down a “rogue nation,” and the fracturing of global economy likely to result, may have a similarly taxing impact on the currency itself – hastening a process already underway.

Dollar reserves held by central banks have hit their lowest level in a quarter of a century

Meanwhile the relatively vast US bond market continued providing liquidity for investors buying and selling dollar-linked assets.

The desire for a less-dollar-dependent As with other aspects of geopolitical system has spurred interest in reviving influence, there may simply be no single something like the “bancor” – a global currency focal point in the future. The currency unsuccessfully proposed by the rise of the dollar began with World War I, which left its primary combatants and other economist John Maynard Keynes in the Last year, the International Monetary 1940s. Some believe it is digital currencies countries in need of dollar-denominated Fund noted that dollar reserves held by that will provide more wiggle room around loans and American goods. central banks had hit their lowest level in a the dollar. quarter of a century, reflecting what some It helped that the dollar remained At times of heightened geopolitical saw as the currency’s “declining role”. linked to gold even as other countries were tension it’s natural to ponder the forced off the gold standard, and that by In fact, one reason cited for Russia’s implications of a reserve currency that can the end of World War II the US owned resilience to sanctions so far is an effort serve as a pressure point. “I’m mindful most of the world’s gold. When the US long underway to pre-emptively rid its of that,” former US Congressman Eric itself abandoned the gold standard in 1971, economy of dollars. Fresh calls for China Cantor said during the World Economic it only solidified the dollar’s role as the to reduce its reliance on the dollar system Forum’s recent Annual Meeting in Davos. “world's currency”. have only furthered speculation about the “Because, every time we use it, even our American currency’s status. allies and our friends start to wonder: why Sure, potential usurpers have surfaced. is it that you can do this?”

In the early part of this century the euro Projecting the end of dollar dominance seemed poised for the top spot. American Yet, with the bulk of global trade still is longstanding practice, however. The being conducted in dollars, there is a good rapper Jay-Z even appeared to prefer euro American economist Paul Krugman deal of scepticism about prospects for the notes to store his own considerable wealth recently noted that he had published his currency's decline. in a 2007 video. first paper on the topic, and that was more than 40 years ago. Even as US soft power In June, the former CEO of Twitter, Not long after that video appeared, a digital-currency advocate, seemed and credibility have waxed and waned, its Europe’s sovereign debt crisis hit. That to selectively skip ahead in time by currency seems to abide. rattled confidence in euro-denominated wondering when the dollar had lost global debt issued by countries, and generally But if the dollar’s reign is truly now reserve currency status. His tweet was curtailed the “liquidity” – a measure of drawing to a close, what comes next? The buried by others correcting it. “Dude, how easy it is to buy and sell something in answer is unclear, because the perceived we need to talk,” one professor of an open market – of euro-linked assets. shortcomings of contenders like the yuan AB political science replied.

John Letzing is Digital Editor, Strategic Intelligence at the World Economic Forum. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and not the World Economic Forum.

(China’s relatively tight control of its currency) and the euro (tied to too many disparate political entities, and too few assets for global investors) are apparent.

REVIEW

US skulduggery in Africa exposed White Malice: The CIA and the Neocolonisation of Africa, by Susan Williams; Hurst, £25 hardback

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Lumumba’s gold tooth was returned by the Belgian government to the Democratic Republic of Congo and buried.

HE US government has been the most gung-ho Western administration when it comes to countering so-called state-sponsored terrorism. You could then be forgiven if you thought that this would absolve the US of being one of the states that perpetually disrupts things in countries around the world.

The country in its various guises – Congo, Zaire and the DRC – has not been at peace with itself ever since. Williams notes: “The destruction of the Congo’s hard-won democracy was pitiless, despite powerful resistance.”

But long before the concept of state-sponsored terrorism became part of modern-day relations among states, the US was working hard at disrupting the lives of people in other countries just because their leaders did not kowtow to Washington’s demands.

A close nationalist friend of Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, was soon to become another victim of America’s subversion. He was overthrown in a CIAbacked coup in 1966.

Of her research, Williams notes: “The uncovered information reveals an extent and breadth of CIA activities in Africa that beggars belief. Underpinning the success of these activities were dollars.”

And Africa, for that matter, was an early victim of US sponsored stateterrorism. The CIA, which is an agency of the American state, was the spearhead that the US government used to do its dirty work of subverting foreign governments.

Susan Williams has chronicled all this in great detail. America’s skulduggery in Africa began soon after Ghana gained independence from Britain in 1957.

Watching as British and French colonies were poised to be rid of their colonial rulers, Washington decided to step in and muddy the waters before the new African leaders could settle down to the business of running their countries.

According to Williams, America’s underhand tricks in Africa had nothing to do with the much-vaunted reason that Washington usually espouses: freedom.

The US was only interested in have a controlling influence in the newlyindependent African countries so that they

did not fall into the Soviet sphere. After all, the Cold War was at its height and Washington wanted to ‘recapture’ Africa, through clandestine activities, by all means necessary.

Also, independent African countries were seen by African Americans as a spur for their fight for civil rights. But Washington did not want to see African success stories galvanising America’s civil rights movement.

Congo was where the US began its destabilising tactics in Africa, when it contrived to get Patrice Lumumba, the nationalist Prime Minister, assassinated and his body dissolved in a tank of acid. In June this year, over 60 years after his death,

For the US, money speaks. With its huge wealth, Washington was able to suborn Africans who were willing to undermine their countries and destroy any attempt at stability, which was vital to the new African nations.

This is a book that every prospective leader in Africa must read. They should not be fooled by the diplomatic niceties of Washington when it comes to dealing with African countries.

The US and other major powers, including China, have their eyes focused on the continent to make sure that it does not chart a course that would make it less dependent on others. If only the current African leaders would understand AB this.

REVIEW

Lugard’s ‘mistake of 1914’ What Britain did to Nigeria, by Max Siollun, Hurst, £20 hardback

W

HEN Deborah Samuel, a university student in Sokoto in Northern Nigeria, was stoned to death by her colleagues and her body burnt for allegedly “insulting” Islam in May this year, a young and distraught Nigerian woman took to TikTok to lament the killing of the Christian student.

She kept blaming Lord Lugard, the British Governor who cobbled together two disparate regions – North and South – in 1914 to become Nigeria. The NorthSouth debate in Nigeria has raged since independence in 1960 and it has never been more vociferous than now.

While British historians have lavished praise on Britain’s “civilising mission” in Nigeria and its other African colonies, Max Siollun, in his excellent book, does not subscribe to this perspective. For him Lugard’s amalgamation of Nigeria, boiled down to balancing the books.

“Perhaps no question makes Nigerians disagree as much as why Britain created their country,” Siollun writes. “Nigerians looking for deeper meaning for their country’s existence may be disappointed to find that there was none. Nigeria’s existence is little more than the outcome of balancing the colonial account books.”

He notes that the notion of bringing Northern and Southern Nigeria together had been on the cards for 16 years. While Lugard was Northern Nigeria’s High Commissioner he discovered that the region was cash-strapped and was dependent on handouts from the British Treasury.

He needed to find alternative sources of income, which were not forthcoming.

The South, on the other hand, was flush with money. Lugard noted in his argument for amalgamation: “[In the South] the material prosperity had been extraordinary.

The revenue had almost double itself in a period of five years. The surplus balance has exceeded a million and a half.” So, amalgamation it was.

The semblance of economic dependency of Northern Nigeria on the South is still being touted today. But Siollun cautions: “…one must pause and reflect that amalgamation was a British idea

and decision, not a Northern one.

“Northern Nigeria had no more say in amalgamation than Southern Nigeria did (and probably, if given a choice, would have objected to it). One of the north’s leaders did, after all, later refer to amalgamation as ‘the mistake of 1914.’”

Siollun shows that amalgamation was not a clearly thought-out exercise by the British and points out how the colonial administrators completely failed to foresee the long-term consequences of a united Nigeria. “Not only did the colonial government fail to contemplate the north-south differences, but they paid little attention to how British rule had amplified the pre-existing differences between the two regions,” Siollun writes.

“The 1914 amalgamation and the fault lines between north and south remain among the most contentious issues in modern Nigeria…[and] the wisdom of this step is still being debated in Nigeria, and the country continues to grapple with how to deal with the divisions between north and south and the usual paranoia they often have about each other.”

Ironically, as Siollun records, many AFRICA BRIEFING JULY - AUGUST 2022

Nigerians tend to hark back to the days of colonial rule with nostalgia. “Nigeria is one of the few formerly colonised nations whose people view their country’s colonial era as a golden age,” he writes.

But does one blame Nigerians for having “a rose-tinted memory of colonialism” when they see the economic and political chaos that the country has to traverse today, not to mention the current state of insecurity? For Siollun, this state of mind of Nigerians is down to the spin that the British placed on the accounts of their colonial administration in Nigeria.

“Much of Nigeria’s colonial history was written by British colonial officers. Those narratives give the reader the impression that they are viewing Nigerians through the telescopic lens of a British rifle,” Siollun points out.

“To some extent Nigerians bear the blame for not presenting alternative narratives of colonialism and for allowing the British accounts to become standard version of their history.

“This phenomenon of allowing the coloniser to write Nigeria’s history troubled a Nigerian historian enough for him to comment: ‘I feel that Nigerian historians should bow their heads in shame at the phenomenon of non-Africans doing more than ourselves have been doing on research into our past…Historical scholarships on Nigerian peoples has been largely the handiwork of non-Africans.’”

Well, Siollun took up the challenge in 2017 to write a book that neither defends colonialism nor “celebrates pre-colonial Nigerian society as a utopia before Britain came and ruined everything”. Indeed, Siollun has written a colonial history of Nigeria from the perspective of a Nigerian who has presented clear facts of British misadventure in Nigeria that cannot be easily countered. This book is a great example of “decolonisation” – the current fad – without the rhetoric. Siollun has recorded history from a new angle that sheds better light on the subject and ends up with a different and credible perspective of British colonial rule in Nigeria.

AB 41

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