Boeing 787 Dreamliner Logistics

1 Boeing 787 Dreamliner Logistics Use of Modern Technology in the Project Despite the challenging facing the Boeing 787 Dreamliner project, the project still concluded, and Boeing managed to present the new aircraft to the market. The use of modern technology was instrumental in the results. However, the way the company ended up with the technology also explains the delays encountered and the challenges that arose during the project.

Boeing encountered supply chain problems during the project, highlighting the challenges in using forecasting technologies effectively.

There was a shortage of specified and qualified aluminum-based fasteners that act like rivets. The company only had one supplier, and the supplier cut its workforce during the production time of the 787 projects. In this case, lack of coordination and information sharing provided by technology, which would help Boeing work well with its partners and predict the inventory levels, would then address the problem before it arose.

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2 Such problems highlight the limited use of information sharing technologies and coordinated systems to offer simultaneous access to production information, including quality tests and decision making by all partners.

There was a limited extrapolation of design changes to determine their impact on logistics and quality issues in the project. The outcome was a significant delay based on the discovery that the initial decision to use composite material affected almost all types of procedures, including the replacement of fasteners that required pressure, yet the material in use was more sensitive to clamping pressure than the traditional aluminum material.

Quality Methods in 787 Dreamliner Project Boeing went with a new manufacturing model where it would have the airframe developed in several large sections with a major cost and revenue sharing partner. The partner would be responsible for design and production. Once complete, the large pieces would go to the assembly at Boeing where the inspection and flight preparation would take place (Marsh, 2009).

The manufacturing model was new and it needed refining. However, Boeing picked it for its new project, creating two additional concerns; learning and refining the processes in the project and the manufacturing model.

Boeing used a trial program for its composite fuselage when working on the Sonic Cruiser, and it was going to use the same approach in the 787 projects, albeit at a large scale (Marsh, 2009).

As potential customers expressed concerns about defects, the company responded that the experiences it had in developing composite airframe, nacelles, empennages, and control surfaces and that it would address the customers' concerns.

The controversial supply chain model for the 787 Dreamliner was to act as a quality assurance model since the Tier 2 system partners would be responsible for the quality inspection

3 before delivering products to the Tier 1 (Tang et al., 2009). The multi-level quality checks in the supply chain hierarchy were to ensure that the final assembly at Boeing would require fewer quality checks. Unfortunately, this quality management model was problematic as Boeing did not have sufficient oversight on quality checks at the Tier 2 levels. The partners were independent in the design and implementation. Testing at the final assembly was a quality management practice utilized by Boeing in the project.

Valuable Logistics Lessons The being had contingency plans for its supply chain, and it ended up using four of eight contingency plans by January 2007 on the airframer (Marsh, 2009). It sent personnel to the partner's facilities in Europe and Japan. Smaller suppliers sent incomplete parts to each other for the recipients to complete the work. The outcome was the increase in the work to do at the end of the chain at the final assembly point at Everett, where Boeing completed the 787 Dreamliner assembly. On the other hand, the manufacturing model selected meant that the Everett facilities would have fewer resources since the supply chain partners would be handling much of the manufacturing (Marsh, 2009). The delivery of substantially unfinished parts at Everett meant that the facility remained strained since it needed to address the unfinished jobs and complete the designated assembly works. Boeing would end up appealing to partners to increase resources and cooperate to help address the looming delays and to clear the mounting backlog.

The lessons from Boeing are that working with partners early in the project planning, and determine case scenarios arising from a change in a manufacturing model is important. A present logistics manager must extrapolate errors and see how small delays and unfinished jobs between small suppliers become complex problems in a global aviation supply chain (Bowersox et al., 2013). Boeing ended up seeing the supply chain as a constraint and realized it took outsourcing

4 too far. The lesson is to maintain a significant level of control in the production process in the supply chain through vertical integration and the use of fewer large partners with demonstrated competencies. Moreover, creating testing designs that can help reveal flaws early in the project is more important than the number of tests claimed in the project (Tang et al., 2009). In the Boeing situation, testing slated late into the production process was part of the reason for the postponement of the launch as tests revealed structural flaws in the joint between the center fuselage of each wing.

Relationship management of suppliers and other partners is also important throughout the project when managing logistics and alliances. Such problems occur because the project managers and logistics managers fail to follow the basics of the best practices taught in management practice. Furthermore, the combination of several models into a complex system introduces many decision-making points that may occur concurrently and in a counterintuitive way, which creates challenges at the end of the project rather than the beginning when there is time to improve the schedule, cost, and planning.

5 References Bowersox, D., Bowersox, J., Closs, D., & Cooper, M. B. (2013). Supply chain logistics management (4th ed.). McGraw-Hill/Irwin.

Denning, S. (2013). What went wrong at Boeing. Strategy & Leadership, 41(3), 36–41. https://doi.org/10.1108/10878571311323208 Marsh, G. (2009). Boeing’s 787: trials, tribulations, and restoring the dream. Reinforced Plastics, 53(8), 16–21.

Tang, C., Zimmerman, J., & Nelson, J. (2009). Managing new product development and supply chain risks: The Boeing 787 case. Supply Chain Forum: An, 10(2), 74-86. Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.1080/16258312.2009.11517219