Turkey's Foreign Policy

Introduction

Turkey’s foreign policy has often revolved around the desire of the nation to extend its control and domination over its neighbors and the region it occupies (Migdalovitz 1). This has been the desire of the Turkish nation ever since the reestablishment of a new Turkey in the early 1920s. The geographical position of Turkey between Europe, the Balkan states and the Middle East further underlines some of the advantages it has in effecting its influence over three distinct cultural bases each of which has in the recent decades illustrated their need for Turkey as a gateway to access the other (Inbar 1). Europe depends on Turkey so as to get a stronger economic foothold in the former Soviet states of Central Asia. The Black Sea nations, on the other hand, view Turkey as an important bridge for accessing the European and indeed world market by serving as a trade route. According to Turan from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Middle Eastern countries, due to the Islamic roots of Turkey, see it as a brother nation which due to its unique position in world and regional organizations can help to ‘protect’ them from negative western sanctions and ideals.

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The present Turkish Foreign Policy is hugely based on the ascent to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Migdalovitz 1). The AKP has been actively pursuing to make Turkey a key player in regional and global matters ever since they were first elected to office in 2002 (Önis 2). This evolution has seen Turkey stake its claim on organizations such as the Organization of Islamic States (OIC), join the G-20, become more prominent in NATO by providing an Assistant Sec. Gen., become more prominent in Arab League matters, and sought to have more influence on global monetary policies by seeking seats in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). All these are in addition to its increasingly more prominent stature in the Organization for Security Cooperation and Development (OECD) where it has provided a Secretary General. This new rediscovery of Turkey’s dominance has been labeled as ‘Turkish Gaullism’ (Migdalovitz 1).

According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all of Turkey’s involvement in the international arena has been in the pursuit of consistent, realistic and peaceful foreign policy under a principle that was made famous by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk of “Peace at Home and Peace Abroad.” The nation has ever since the AKP’s regime been more concerned with the human development aspect of prosperity, stability, peace, and cooperation by its neighbors. The country’s foreign policy is continually being shaped by present day challenges of illegal migration, international organized crime, terrorism, global warming and climate change, cultural and religious differences, and good governance (Ulgen 5). The adaptation of a multi-dimensional approach to these issues is what has made Turkey relatively successful in its international endeavors that have to the most part been focused on the humanitarian aspect of its international engagement. Association with the U.S. and NATO has seen Turkey play a central role in the pacification of the Middle East especially with respect to the Kurd’s of Northern Iraq. The march towards full accession of the nation towards the EU means that the country will definitely play an even greater role in international politics (Terzi 2).

This paper looks into the evolution of present day foreign policy of Turkey with regard to its neighbors of Iran, Syria and Israel. The association of the Turks with Iran and Syria has long been strong due to the integration of its people who are mostly drawn together due to their strong Islamic ties. There is a strong migrant population of Iranians and Syrians in Turkey and any instability in these two countries inevitably has repercussions on the peace and stability of the region and by extension of Turkey (Önis 18). In this respect, the trade embargos by America and the UN Security Council have had a direct effect on the stands of Turkey in the UN assembly. Recent developments in Syria about the continued abuse of human rights by President Assad’s government have also shaped recent Turkey’s foreign policy. The challenges to Turkey’s foreign policy with regard to Israel are however among the most challenging to the nation due to the traditional animosity between the Jewish state and the Arab world. Turkey has precariously tried over the decades to intercede in the clamor for peace within the Gaza strip. This paper delves deeper into specific Turkish foreign policy matters and tries to examine whether they have been successful in meeting their objectives in their various forms of intervention or not.

Turkey and Iran

Turkey and Iran are close national allies drawing from the fact that they are neighbors who share a wide border of almost 310 miles. This border was established between the Persian nation and the then Ottoman empire of the Turks. This good neighborly relationship however had a turbid past of wars and civil conflicts over the years, coupled with periods of collaboration and mutual beneficial interactions between the neighbors. The major bone of contention between the neighbors was mostly due to their different Islamic sect allegiances, with majority of the Turks being Sunnis and majority of Iranians belonging to the Shiite sect. There were international speculations of a possible flaring up of tensions between the two countries after the events of the Iranian revolution in 1979 where Iran was converted into an Islamic Republic. The reason for this fear was based on the fact that the reestablishment of Turkey adopted a secular constitution that guaranteed the principle of secularism. This was the first major test of Turkish foreign policy with regard to Iran; the Ankara based government was tactical in dealing with the potential thorny issue by taking on a pragmatic policy approach. This approach proved effective in avoiding conflict by being among the first nations to officially recognize and embrace the Islamic Republic and continue to foster stronger economic ties with the new regime (Migdalovitz 17).

The issue of the Iranian nuclear program has served to inadvertently strengthen ties between Turkey and Iran especially during the second regime of the AKP (Önis 4). What this nuclear issue did was to essentially see Turkey break away from NATO, EU, U.S. and the UN Security Council and chart its own foreign policy identity. After the collapse of the Iranian nuclear talks in 2009 that were spearheaded by the so-called Vienna Group comprising of Russia, France, United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S. proposed sanctions against Iran. However, Turkey wadded off any such attempts as it deemed such a move to be unproductive (Ulgen 2). According to Inbra (1), when in October of 2009 the Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Iran and held a meeting with the Iranian leadership and the Iran Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Turkey was satisfied by Iran’s stand that their program was for peaceful purposes. The Turkish PM went a step further by signing more trade treaties and pledged to foster more economic and cultural ties with Iran and consolidate their support internationally for the nuclear program. This new found activism in foreign policy by Turkey did not auger well with the U.S. who saw Turkey’s stand to be questionable and suspect at the very least. It is for this reason that America and other powerful countries within the security council rebuffed an agreement by Turkey on Iran, dubbed the Tehran Agreement, which had seen Iran commit to the Turks alternative approach in its nuclear program, just a day after the landmark agreement was signed (Önis 7). The reason the west rejected this plan was because Ankara had acted independently in the agreement which to the most part did not sufficiently cater for the interest of the West. The U.S. secretary of State, Hillary Clinton took a jibe at Turkey stating that, “buying time for Iran and enabling Iran to avoid international unity with respect to their nuclear program makes the world more dangerous, not less” (Ulgen 3). President Obama’s administration was to later write a letter to Ankara about the matter expressing its discomfort with the way Turkey was handling the business with Iran. Hence the reason why a day after the Tehran Agreement Washington was to become instrumental in pushing for the further sanctions to Iran that followed (Ulgen 4).

This stance by Turkey complicates any international efforts aimed at putting pressure on Iran to be more open in its affairs regarding its nuclear program. Any trade embargos against Iran have little effect due to Turkey’s refusal to support such measures in addition to the 500 km border that the two countries share. This has seen Iran continue with business as usual unperturbed as Turkey has effectively made it immune to any trade and economic pressures (Inbra 2). The second term of the AKP, due to Turkey’s support of Iran’s nuclear program, has seen the country differ with prominent EU members on the issue and has consequently seen the AKP’s current tenure ease its vigor and essentially cool off on its previously determined pursuance of EU membership commitment (Önis 5). By allowing Iran to continue with its nuclear program, analysts and expert observers in Middle Eastern affairs are of the opinion that this move could in the near future prove to be the greatest miscalculation in terms of foreign policy by Turkey. The reason is that Turkey has moved to establish itself through its foreign policy activism into an independent de facto regional power, some argue at the cost of ignoring very real and obvious signs of transgressions by its neighbor Iran in an effort to build regional stability by collaborating with Iran (Önis 5).

Apart from the controversial nuclear program, Turkey and Iran have other strong diplomatic ties based on successful economic ties from trade in energy and other essential goods and services. The issue of the American invasion of Iraq was also to bring the two nations together. Being the two nations in the region at the pinnacle of the balance of power, Iran and Turkey were to foster further bilateral ties in an effort to stop or mitigate any possible regional instability that could result in the aftermath of the collapse of Saddam Husein (Migdalovitz 17).

Turkey’s continued strengthening ties with Iran and its realpolitik saw the Ankara based government among the first nations to congratulate the completion of the 12 June 2009 presidential elections in Iran which saw the controversial incumbent, President Ahmadinejad reelected. Despite international outcry about legitimacy of the process, the Turkish PM, proceeded to congratulate the reelected president and termed any controversies that were observed during the process as the internal affairs of Iran (Migdalovitz 18). This diplomacy is further fostered by the two nation’s cooperation in counter-terrorism through sharing of intelligence. This notion of sharing intelligence with Iran could in the future prove to be an emotive issue between Turkey’s allies in NATO and Israel (Migdalovitz 18).

Turkey and Syria

Turkey’s engagement with Syria range in terms of foreign policy; starting with historical ties having roots in the common Islamic faith that the populace of the two nations share, all the way to current trade and fundamental differences in ideals and governance that the two neighbors share presently. With regard to economic ties with Syria, Turkey’s desire to be a regional economic power within the central location it occupies started in earnest with the AKP government’s better regulation of the financial and banking systems after the aftermath of the disastrous 2001 crisis. Turkey was known to experience regular crises in its financial sector and problematic balance of payment in the past (Önis 12). However, the AKP was able to transform the nation and effectively see the country able to operate without any direct need of the IMF’s assistance. The breakaway point saw Turkey’s relation with the IMF, which had seen agreement to a final deal delayed continuously, fracture when the two parties failed to sign a new deal (Önis 12). The AKP government saw that freeing itself from any form of control by the IMF as a sign of autonomy and national strength, which was to herald Turkey’s adoption of an economic foreign policy, was to the most part very assertive and independent in nature.

This new found Turkish economic strength saw the country aim to diversify its external trade relations. This effectively saw Turkey’s foreign policy towards its neighbors take on the practical approach of economy and commerce. However, Ankara’s new found financial power was to see the AKP government aggressively pursue an economic foreign policy with its neighbors. Expansion into its Balkan neighbor’s territory was however easier said than done due to the strong EU presence in the area that checked the influence of Turkey’s expansion in the region. In the Caucasus and former Soviet states, Russia also took aware of the increased financial strength of Turkey and moved to consolidate it’s strangle like grip on the area. Turkey’s only viable and realistic target for its economic policies was thus only left with the option of turning South to its Arab neighboring states, Syria included. What made this prospect ever so appetizing was America’s invasion of Iraq which left a vacuum in the region, which Turkey was tactfully able to fill (Ulgen 6). In addition to this vacuum that made the Turks strategically placed to take control of a large chunk of trading with its neighboring Arabic south, the AKP leadership has really served to focus foreign policy towards countries like Syria due to the numerous personal contact and cultural affinity that it has with the Middle East (Ulgen 7).

Another link between Syria and Turkey has come about due to Turkey’s international ‘de-securitization.’ Turkey’s security concerns have long shaped its foreign policy and saw the country heavily depend on the west as their major suppliers of security and hence among some of the reasons it joined NATO. The result of this shared security concern was that Turkey had to align its foreign policy along the priorities that were dictated by the West (Ulgen 8). This new de-securitization saw Turkey’s priority under the APK regime change towards a policy that focused on peace with its neighbors. This new policy shift saw Turkey embark on foreign policy approaches towards its “unfriendly” neighbors. Turkey was to, in 2004, first embark on smoothening ties with one such neighbor, Syria, following decades of suspicion and tense relations caused by Syria’s support of armed Kurdish separatist groups in Southern Turkey (Ulgen 8). This new relation was to culminate in the Turkish President Sezer visiting Damascus in 2005 despite continued American criticism of the diplomatic gestures being shown. The AKP’s diplomatic efforts with Syria eventually paid off when it was able to earn the confidence of Syrian leadership.

Syria’s cooperation with Turkey has historically not been as voluntarily as the AKP’s approach. The preceding government had in 1998 forced Damascus, via the Adana Agreement/Protocol, to recognize as a terrorist organization the Kurdistan Workers’ Party

(PKK), stop all aid to the organization and deport Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader from Syria failure to which Syria would face the full might of the Turkish military (Migdalovitz 16). Needless to say, Syria complied with the Adana Protocol since it was not ready to suffer a Turkish military assault in defense of Kurdish defiance. Matters of the Kurd’s aside, by January 2007 the two neighboring states had entered into an agreement for free trade; with the volume of trade by 2009 reaching $1.8 billion. The two governments had also entered an agreement that would see both nations collaborate in the energy sector; first by designing jointly a gas pipeline, followed by establishment of an oil company jointly owned by the national oil companies of the two. In addition to these government sponsored ventures, individual Turkish businessmen, as a result of the new found peace, could now venture and invest in Syria due to the lower costs of doing business in the country. With the continued strengthening of ties, the neighbors had by April of 2009 held a joint military exercise and by October proceeded to lift all visa requirements, further integrating the nations. In an effort to ensure that cooperation continued to strengthen, back-to-back joint meetings by ministers were held first in Aleppo, Syria then Gaziantep, Turkey (Migdalovitz 17).

According to Cagaptay in his 4th June 2012 article for the LA Times, Turkey was all good and back on the good side of its Western allies due to its efforts in coordinating peace in its neighborhood, particularly with regard to Syrian policy. But the humanitarian push by Ankara regime in relation to how its neighbors dealt with opposition groups was to prove too much of a demand on Damascus. As such, President Assad chose to ignore international calls for Syria to open up its democratic space. Turkey in an effort to assert its regional dominance broke off any formal ties with the Assad regime and in a completely new shift in its foreign policy which has now evolved into one that embarks on a strategy that actively seeks and funds separetists with the end goal of regime change in Syria. According to an article published by The Economist, Assad’s differences with Turkey could arise from the Kurdish problem, which both countries face. In fact the leader of the Kurdish Peace and Democratic Party (BDP) in Turkey Selahattin Demirtas, claims that among the key reasons why Ankara is pushing Assad’s ousting is “to ensure that the Syrian Kurds don’t get any more rights than Turkey is prepared to grant its own Kurds, which is hardly any at all.” Either way, the entrance of Turkey into its neighbor’s internal affairs some scholars argue, could herald a desire by the AKP to retrace the roots of the Ottoman Empire’s dominance in the region (Inbar 4).

Turkey and Israel

Turkey’s relation with Israel can be traced back to the establishment of the independent Jewish state in 1948. Ankara became the first country with a predominant Muslim populace to officially recognize the Jewish state. According to Migdalovitz (10), this relation was however of a discrete nature for decades and it was not until the peace process of Israel and Arabs that the bilateral Israel-Turkish relation was made public. After initial diplomatic ties between the two, Israel’s war with Egypt over the Suez in 1956 saw Turkey break off diplomatic ties and it was not until 1991 that Ankara was to reestablish these ties and send an ambassador to the Jewish state. What triggered this new found relationship were Syria’s activities which were of concern to both states. The Syrians were actively supporting the efforts of the PKK in Turkey by providing the Kurdish out fit logistical and financial support (Ulgen 8). Relationship between the Turks and Israelites was to blossom through their mutual dislike of anti-Turkish and support for pro-Israel groups in international and regional policies. It was indeed through Turkish intervention that Israel and Syria agreed to end animosity between them and foster for peace in the region. Turkey’s relationship with Israel was indeed on the up and up as it sought to foster even closer ties with its new ally. Cooperation between the two was to extend into social, commercial and political circles with high-powered official visits between the leaders of both states occurring more regularly. Booming trade ensued and tourism blossomed. Arms sales and military trade and cooperation were soon to follow (Ulgen 9). By the turn of the century Turkey and Israel were the best of friends if not the best of trading partners.

The election of the AKP party into power in Ankara was not to stand in the way of this blossoming relation and was to in fact even grow stronger despite increasing tensions in the Middle East between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The AKP adopted a foreign policy approach which had seen it transform into a trading state. What this meant was that Turkey laid more emphasis on economic interdependence during formulation of its foreign policy. This strategy of focusing on commerce as opposed to hard power and military capability was to see Turkey’s trade with countries like Israel whom it had severed ties with in 1956 due to the Suez crisis continue to do trade despite differences in opinion between Israel and Turkey’s Arab League colleagues. This policy has seen Turkey avoid being plagued down by national security concerns that are narrowly construed and instead focus on export markets expansion and boost the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) which the AKP considers to be of equal importance if Turkey is to become a regional power.

The relation between Turkey and Israel was however not always a rosy affair. Israel was not all that amused by the role and association of Turkey with the Palestinian group of Hamas and the Hizbollah of Lebanon. The Turks on the other hand were not amused by Israel’s military offensive dubbed “Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza against the Hamas that lasted from 2008 December up to January 2009. This operation saw tens of thousands of Turks spill into the street for demonstrations with the demonstrators openly expressing anti-Semitic sentiments. The

Turkish PM was to later express disgust for the Israeli operation after he revealed that the Israeli PM did not share the attack plan with him despite the two having a meeting four days prior to the attack. The Turkish PM was to further describe the situation in Gaza as being equivalent to an open- air prison and that “Allah will punish those who violate the rights of the innocent” in reference to Israel’s actions in Gaza (Migdalovitz 15). Turkey’s relationship with the Israelites was to suffer what has now turned into irreconcilable differences, according to Cagaptay of the LA Times after the flotilla incident of 2010 off the Gaza coast.

Conclusion

The Turkey’s foreign policy has evolved over the past few decades in order to meet various targets that successive regimes have had on the need for Turkey to reestablish itself as a major player in regional and international affairs. Turkey’s geographical position places it at prime position to be at the heart of regional dominance of the Caucasus to its east, the Balkans to the West, former Soviet states to the north, and more importantly the Middle East to the south. The invasion of Iraq by America left a void in the balance of power in the region which the new AKP regime in Turkey was quick to exploit and develop itself into a regional power. The foreign policy of Turkey with relation to its association with its neighbors Iran, Syria and Israel has been a rollercoaster and has shifted depending on the Ankara’s needs of the time. However, it is Turkey’s support and shielding Iran from sanctions that has brought into question the real intensions of Ankara’s foreign policy, with many suggesting that Turkey is putting its needs of becoming a regional power by fostering peace with its neighbors ahead of international security. Its interference in Syria’s national affairs is now seen as Ankara trying to reestablish the Ottoman Empire, while its now destroyed relationship with Israel over differences in the Gaza

Sea and the flotilla event of 2010 paints a gleam picture to the once promising association that promised to pacify the entire Middle East region.