The Rwanda Genocide

The Rwanda Genocide The Rwandan genocide can better be defined as the 1994 murder of an approximated 800,000 people in a country in the east of Africa known as Rwanda. Rwanda is made up of the Tutsi, Hutu (main community) and Twa communities. Numerous researches have been attempted, and volumes written by various researchers to dig into the real rationale behind the crop up of such an unprecedented humanity crime. There have been many accounts that have been brought up to this effect. Almost all the results attribute the genocide largely to the culmination of an ethnic competition and tension that had long stood between the minority Tutsi, who had been in power for many years, and the majority Hutus, who had risen to authority in the rebellion of 1959 to 1962.

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In a broad sense, though, three types of descriptions, but not limited to this, are identifiable from these researches: Spotlight on the domestic causes, including ethnicity conflicts and demographic factors, external influences i.e. colonial and neo-colonial, and finally psychosocial influence based Rwandans conformism and obedience. This article examines the extent to which this genocide arose due to ethnic identities, political ideologies and international interests.

Colonial legacy During the pre-colonial epoch, the three communities in Rwanda swore allegiance to the same monarch, “Umwami”, with the same language, “Kinyarwanda”, and the same culture (Anderson, 2005). The post-independence Rwanda continued the previous colonial and monarchical ability of the state to control each person using a network of controls from the top of the regime down to the grassroots level. Apparently, Rwanda became a good epitome of a state that does not embrace the whole polis, but embraces only that portion that the elites feel is fit to embrace. The result was tragic; those who were not fully included in the full citizenry consequently became victims. Instead of being protected, they became the ultimate target and hunted group (Magnarella, 2002). Early Germany reports suggest that Batutsi supposedly originated from the invaders (Bahima) from Ethiopia (or Middle East). These invaders then set up dominance over the indigenous Bahutu and Batwa (Berman, 2001). Therefore, this account tries to explain that the Tutsi are not the indigenous people in Rwanda, unlike the Twa and the Hutu people. In 1865, John Hanning sought to demonstrate the inter-lacustrine zone aristocratic kingships’ superiority over the Bantus. Other missionaries who came later also further attempted to fabricate funny theories about the origins of Batutsi. The Batutsi were also known as the Hamites, a tribe that descended from Noah, well known as a cursed tribe (Hintjens, 1999).

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Throughout the colonial domination, the churches, schools, the army, and even the administration were structured based on the supposed Batutsi superiority. This notion of innate and absolute inter-racial disparities in capacity brought about a pre-colonial “premise” of inequality. The racial ideals of Europeans as well as their religion later become superimposed on the pre-existing earthly social order interpretations. The idea served most to define the three communities in Rwanda apart, rather than define them as being a single system of class, position and occupation (Magnarella, 2002).

While some Rwandans refute this as a concocted historical “fact”, some sources point out that at around 1920s, the colonialists introduced identity cards to help them distinguish the “superior Tutsi” and the “inferior Hutus and Twas”. When they discovered that it was too hard for them to tell apart the two groups, they devised a means of identifying them; any one with more than ten heads of cattle was permanently known as a Tutsi, and the others were considered Hutus and Twas (Magnarella, 2002).

International interests The international community failed utterly to prevent or stop the Rwandan genocide, when in the real sense they had a pivotal role to play. Belgium was the colonial power in Rwanda during this era, but it is said that France is the country that had shown the longest interest in Rwanda. However, their actions during this genocide served to perpetrate the atrocities more, rather than quenching them. Therefore, France has a big part to be blamed for in the Rwandan genocide. France was fully aware that there were ethnic massacres being carried out in Rwanda, but it continuously provided military and political prop up to the acting government. In 1993 when the Rwandan Patriotic front (RPF) besieged Rwanda from Uganda, the France are said to have generously released a substantial number of their troops and their

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weapons to support their friends against an “Anglo-Saxon invasion”. France considered the Anglo-Saxon countries greatest threat to their position, owing to their insecurity in terms of their prestige as well as their international stature (Chafer 2002). This could be the main reason for their prompt intervention in Rwanda.

The French embassy was deserted just a few days after the commencement of the Rwandan genocide, with just but seventy French soldiers. The soldiers fervently kept training the militia, provided them with firearms, and even managed check points for identity cards. They could capture Tutsi people and pass them over to the Rwandan army. It took very long before there was any media coverage in France, and thus the French citizens would not solicit for any assistance (Chafer 2002). While it is a fact that the France colony had interest in Rwanda, the Rwandan citizens were not saved by this same power; instead, France selfishly sought to deteriorate the powers of the Belgians by allowing and supporting the perpetration of the genocide. As the only western force that was willing to send its force to Rwanda, France ought to have supported the UNAMIR. However, they chose not to. Their role became that of a silent accomplice.

Ethnic identity Ethnic groups exist in every economy, but that does not matter so much as far as this article I concerned. What matters is whether there is a perception of ethnic disparities and whether these perceptions guide persons who embrace them. As noted earlier, all the communities in Rwanda had coexisted as one society with one language and culture. The terms Bahutu and Batutsi were historically used in relation to one another, and even more flexibly. The Hutu, the majority community in Rwanda, have been traditionally renowned as farmers, whereas

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the Tutsi are the cattle keepers. Ownership of cattle was historically considered as the gauge of status.

The differences between these groups became more conspicuous with the coming of colonialism that explicitly drew lines between them. The practice of tracing origins of the three Rwandan communities through male lines was merely an initiative of the Belgians coined as an administrative device in 1933 (Hintjens, 1999). The earlier on flexible use of the terms, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa categories of identity was now replaced with a very rigid ethnic/racial understanding of such identity groups. After independence, those who were legitimately classified as Batutsi faced very tight quotas in education and in employment. The Batutsi, who lived among the Bahutu, were made to feel underprivileged and always being reminded that they were former exploiters who were only left peaceful and performed their businesses by luck. The Batutsi always considered themselves to be innately superior to the Bahutu, and this superiority complex spread even to the poorest Batutsi. Cynical identity boundaries resulted to a shift in the attitudes towards mixed marriages. Sexual hatred was articulated in ethnic terms over the media, and the envy of Batutsi was wholly exploited in the abhorrence campaigns carried out during the 1990s.

The idea of two special and incompatible Hutu and Tutsi grew gradually through exploitation of every probable source of aggravation of the Bahutu majority. Among the many ordinary Rwandans who participated in the 1994 genocide were the Bahutu. This can be attributed to the fact that they had been trampled over by the Batutsi who thought themselves as supreme all along. Enmity had developed between the two tribes. The Bahutu had been provoked long enough. Since it is clear that the genocide was pre-planned, thus not ethnical, the Bahutu must have grasped this as an opportunity to avenge the persecution they had suffered from the

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Batutsi. It is also evident that a tiny number of Batutsi had disguised their identity, and thus fought from the side of the Bahutu.

The RPF invasion in the 1990 as well as the latent economic disaster in the earlier 1990s did not breed impulsive inter-tribal conflicts between the Bahutu and the Batutsi in Rwanda.

Arguably then, the ethnic conflict that was experienced in the 1994 genocide perpetration in Rwanda was purposely spearheaded in the run-up to the massacre, given that the attacks on the Batutsi amplified (Hintjens, 1999).

Political ideology When Rwanda and Burundi, became independent, the domestic politics of each country developed soiled perceptions about their neighbours. Consequently, intricate relationships of mutually dependent and counter-reaction cropped up. This largely gave a lot of weight on the idea of separate rather than interdependent Bahutu and Batutsi identities (Mann, 2005).

Between 1960 and 1990 or thereabouts, the Rwandan State was controlled by the Bahutu elites while the Burundi state was managed by the Batutsi elites. This was carried out in such a way that the institutions were aimed at benefitting a particular social group. The perceived social enemy was persecuted. Therefore, persecution of Bahutu in Burundi was provoked and used to rationalize the persecution of the Batutsi in Rwanda. Refugee movements by the side of the Burundi-Rwanda borders further fuelled these retaliations. The main reason that Burundian politics used to validate the genocide in Rwanda was the assassination of the first popular Bahutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, in 1993, four months following his election. This killing is believed to have been performed by the army and it cemented the perception that it was impossible to unite the Bahutu and the Batutsi (Mann, 2005). In the 1990s, the regime of the Batutsi refused to accept the Batutsi leaders and association in the military. This was greatly

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attributed to the fear of dominance by Bahutu majority in the Rwandan style. The assassination of Ndadaye led to commencement of a sequence of lethal events that partly bore genocide (Hintjens, 1999).

The competition between the Tutsi elites for domination of Burundi was harmonized with the inter-Hutu elite’ competition for Rwanda state, but as the political and economic crises bit deeper, the conflicts took an ethnical or racial turn. Partly, genocide was feasible in Rwanda in 1994 due to the penetration of these perceptions of the associations between the Batutsi and Bahutu in Burundi and Rwanda (Kuperman, 2001).

Other factors Some more other factors that can be attributed to the rise of the Rwandan genocide include demographic and economic reasons. The genocide is said to have been partly possible because of intense stresses and strains that are cumulatively caused by population pressure.

Population pressure has a long history in Rwanda. Rwanda is a small country whose population skyrocketed to about 7500000 by 1992 from 1887,000 in 1948. This population is high for the small land in Rwanda; it hence qualifies it as one of the most highly populated countries of Africa. It is, therefore, possible that the overpopulation of the Rwandans as well as their poverty set at the heart of rising tensions of ethnicity. Hutu extremists managed to mobilize the killers by convincing them to kill the Tutsi to acquire land, cattle, houses and other property (May, 1995).

Another cause is religion. The missionaries are said to have included into their curricular, the lesson that the pupils had explicit ethnic identities. They played a very pivotal role in concocting the renowned ethnic ideologies. Their efforts largely brought up profound social divisions, which are the root of ethnicity in many areas in Africa (Kuperman, 2000).

Conclusion

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The Rwandan genocide is a calamity whereby more than 800000 people were murdered.

The genocide was complicated, with multidimensional rationale behind it. The underlying reason behind this disaster is greatly due to the ethnic differences between the two distinct communities of Rwanda; Bahutu and Batutsi. The rest of the other factors all culminated in the amplification of these ethnic disparities, providing more reason to fight. It is also distinctly notable that the political leaders were the master planners of this genocide, but only hid behind the ethnicity as a main cause of the tragedy. The genocide was skilfully pre-planned and it was evident even before it began, therefore, it cannot be said that it arose spontaneously due to ethnic ideologies.

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Anderson, T. (2005). Rwandan Genocide. New York, NY: Great Neck.

Berman, G. (2001). The International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda): Lessons and observations from the Fielda. The American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 616 Chafer, T. (2002). Franco-African relations: No longer so exceptional. African Affairs, 343-363 Hintjens, H. M. (1999). Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37(2), 241-286.

Keane, F. (1995). Season of blood: A Rwandan journey. London: Penguin Books.

Kuperman, A. J. (2000). Rwanda in retrospect. Foreign Affairs, 79(1), 94.

Kuperman, A. J. (2001). Limits of humanitarian intervention: Genocide in Rwanda .Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press Magnarella, P. (2002). Explaining Rwanda’s genocide. Human Rights and Human Welfare, 2(1), 25-34.

Mann, M. (2005). The dark side of democracy: Explaining ethnic cleansing. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

May, J. (1995). Policies on population, land use and environment in Rwanda.

Population and Environment, 16(4), 321-334.