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The Mudd Journal of Ethics
Can Objective Aesthetics be Used for Valuing Nature? William Bray, Washington and Lee University In Aesthetics and the Value of Nature, contemporary philosopher Janna Thompson attempts to establish aesthetics as an objective foundation for an environmental ethic where wild nature possesses intrinsic value due to its beauty. Objective differences in aesthetic value could then be applied as a new environmental, aesthetic ethic. To prove this, Thompson considers art as an analogous case, considering several examples of parallels of aesthetic value between art and nature. However, I argue that the objectivity of art criticism cannot be translated to nature. Thompson establishes the work of 20th century philosopher G. E. Moore as a foundation in aesthetics by regarding beauty, whether in nature or art, as an intrinsic good. By extension, Thompson concludes that as good things, all beautiful things should be appreciated. The difficulty for Thompson lies in proving that differences in beauty are objective. For art, Thompson argues that critics are expected to provide a justification for why they think a work of art ought to be valued, and through appreciating criticism we can gain an improved understanding of the beauty of a work of art (Thompson, 292). Thompson argues that in the same way this establishes an objective platform for valuing art, studying nature can provide an objective way to value nature. This would provide the possibility for a practical aesthetics framework to approach environmental issues while the exact metrics for objectively valuing nature are open to improvement. Thompson’s aesthetic is relatively intuitive and has clear practical applicability, so it may be easy to accept. Additionally, Thompson presents a philosophy that is reconcilable with other contemporary environmental ethicists, such as J. Baird Callicott, while separating her philosophy from objectionable parts of those philosophies. For example, Callicott’s argument to value the history of nature is separated and even disproved by Thompson, but the desirable conclusion is still achieved with Thompson’s arguments. Callicott writes in support of a “land ethic,” first proposed by the conservationist Aldo Leopold. According to Callicott, everything in nature is intrinsically valuable. To fully realize and appreciate this value, Callicott finds it necessary to study natural history and ecology (Callicott, 125-136). Allen Carlson, a contemporary philosopher in environmental aesthetics, uses this as a foundation for a positive nature aesthetic, though both he and Callicott find categories of aesthetic appreciation of art not appropriate to nature (Thompson, 295). In contrast to the land ethic of Callicott, Thompson’s aesthetic is more equipped to address specific cases, whereas a land ethic calls for appreciation of all land but does little in instructing how to prioritize one ecosystem over another. I argue that because different methods must be taken for valuing art and nature, Thompson’s proof of the objectivity of such a valuation of nature does not apply. Thompson does address a related objection, which she claims too readily accepts the idea that the intentional nature of artistic products makes their evaluation different from the evaluation of natural objects because not all judgments about art do or can depend upon reference to artists’ intentions (Thompson, 300). However, Thompson fails to prove that those evaluations specifically are objective. Just because some art critiques are objective does not necessarily mean that all critiques of a certain category of art are as well. Additionally, all comparisons between nature and art provided by Thompson are not necessarily objective. Thompson’s first comparison between art and nature examines the magnificence of the