“Critical Infrastructure”(Department Homeland Security Initiative)
THERE IS NO SAFETY IN NUMBERS… (James Thurber) THE SECURITY ISSUES OF MULTIPLE CABLE LANDINGS. Jim Bishop and John Walker
of
Further to the thought provoking article by Jack Runfola and Alfred Richardson in Sub Tel Forum 24, discussing the security of submarine telecommunication cable, it is clear that the topic is rising in importance with many network operators and owners. Great importance is now being placed on system design and self healing ring networks to reduce the impact of security breaches.
ducts then connect to a Beach Manhole where a transition is made from submarine cable to land cable. The land environment does not normally require the land cable to be as robust as the marine cable. Several international cables may only be separated by the wall thickness of a PVC duct. Between the beach manhole and the Cable Station, several international cables can share the same duct bank. Yet, it is immaterial whether a cable break occurs at sea or on land - system traffic is interrupted.
Optimizing maintenance costs -
The global telecommunications Managing risks infrastructure is increasingly dependent submarine cable The primeon driver of maintenance costs is the networks. New cable infrastructure in with the frequency of repairs, combined the effithe maintenance response. developing world isciency seenof as one of the pre- Even with the newer model of fixed-cost mainterequisites for promoting growth in national and nance agreements (unlimited repairs under regional economies. Some countries depend on a fixed standing cost), which Global Marine submarine cables to provide virtually all of the have undertaken on certain systems, the aninternational telecommunications traffic. The term nual cost is indexed against the expected fre“Critical Infrastructure” is well justified. quency of fault occurrence. This risk is dependent upon two factors: The aggression threat existing in the A glance at any world or� regional map showing region of the cable system (fishery the technicolour spaghetti of existing submarine
Proposed Fibre Opt Out of Se Telegraph
statistics show that the cont
� 82% of all faults occur in less than density and techniques, dredging, networks clearly displays the Achilles Heel in the “Fog In 200 Channel – Continent Isolated” (Headline resents a greater threat than meters water depth (1997-2000) other seabed users, etc.), and, security of the whole infrastructure. The landing from “The Times” of London) The chart shown abov � 85% of faults arise through ‘external � The quality of the route planning and points of the systems are clustered together, of the key reasons for the in aggression’ installation techniques used to mitiwith some beaches being used land multiple Historically, submarine cableaggression land routes been Simply pu low have water threat. � The incidence of external gate theto above risks. landings are already taken’ faults has increased 69% between submarine cables. A good example can be clearly well designed and engineered and consequently Identifying risk – aggression faults Singapore, shown 1986 and 1996 seen on the February page of the 2006 Sub-Tel have proven to be fairly resilient to natural above, r It is interesting to note that, with the inthe most challenging sites i � In this same time, component failure Forum Calendar. occurrences, such as landslides and floods. cumbent systems now carrying more re-
as a cause of faults is down from 17% tive to the planning and in sponsibility than ever to provide secure cacure route. Global Marine to 6% of all faults multiple cable landing providers are areporting in the pacity, the external threat to point, these systemUtilityRemarkably, every successful system insta during period whenan the increase
In the case of a separation between the cables going seaward is Thetheft of castindustry’s iron manhole covers. Although this cables has never been more abundant. landings since 1984, and the construction combined capability following data are further illustrates a disturb-presents quickly established. Most cables buried below a real hazard to the general public, it also to plan and install shallow water routes has aggression faults in any bur ing trend.armoured. However, the seabed and are heavily continually aggression fault landing. exposes thegrown, cablethetoabove further opportunists with an in the other direction, where cables make landfall, interest in the copper content of the cable. It is still 42 the opposite occurs. The cables funnel into a duct not widely known in these circles that many optical system often no larger than 20 square inches. These land cables contain little or no copper. 16