FAULT LINES GEOPOLITICAL UPDATE (NOV 2025 – JAN 2026) by Kristian Nielsen The closing months of 2025 and the start of 2026 have underscored that undersea cables – the unseen arteries of the global internet – remain at the center of geopolitical fault lines. In the period from November 2025 through January 2026, governments and industry players worldwide advanced new policies, alliances, and safeguards to protect these submarine cable networks amid rising national security concerns and incidents. U.S. policymakers characterized fiber-optic cables as “strategic” infrastructure forming “the bedrock of global internet traffic”[1], while NATO and European leaders warned of “hybrid threats” targeting undersea links[2]. This update continues our “Fault Lines” coverage with a global overview of recent developments – from regulatory crackdowns and consortium realignments to military responses and resilience initiatives – that are reshaping the submarine cable market. Each region is navigating the delicate balance between cooperation and confrontation beneath the waves, as critical cables become entangled in great-power rivalry and security imperatives. NORTH AMERICA: STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND OVERSIGHT National Security Policies Tighten: In the United States, regulators accelerated efforts to shield undersea cables from foreign adversaries. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in November 2025 advanced a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking aimed at barring high-risk foreign technology from U.S.-linked cable systems[3]. The proposal would prohibit companies from using equipment made by entities deemed “foreign adversaries” – a clear reference to Chinese vendors – at submarine cable landing stations and terminals[4] [5] . It also suggests requiring existing licensees to remove compromised components from networks before licenses expire[6]. In exchange, the FCC seeks to expedite approvals for cables that meet these stricter security standards, even offering “blanket 94
SUBTEL FORUM | January 2026
licenses” for trusted operators of Submarine Line Terminal Equipment[3]. This regulatory push aligns with a broader U.S. policy of preventing espionage and sabotage via critical telecom links.
Congressional Scrutiny and Legislation: U.S. lawmakers likewise elevated subsea cables as a national security priority. In November, the House Homeland Security Committee held a dedicated hearing entitled “Securing Global Communications: An Examination of Foreign Adversary Threats to Subsea Cable Infrastructure”[7]. Committee leaders warned that “adversaries like Communist China and Russia are working to exploit our vulnerabilities and undermine this critical infrastructure”[8]. One congressman bluntly stated that if the Chinese Communist Party “can tap it, cut it, or corrupt it, they will”[9] – reflecting mounting concerns over cable tampering and surveillance. On the “Undersea cables – legislative front, a bipartisan group of the global intern of senators introduced the Strategic center of geopoli Subsea Cables Act of 2025 to bolster U.S. engagement in undersea cable security[10]. The bill calls for a multi-pronged strategy: increased State Department focus (including dedicated staff) on cable diplomacy, greater U.S. participation in international cable protection forums, and the establishment of an interagency committee to coordinate threat response[11]. Notably, it would mandate sanctions against any foreign actors who intentionally damage subsea cables[12] – a strong deterrent aimed at state-sponsored saboteurs. Lawmakers backing the bill cited a spike in cable cuts in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait as evidence that the U.S. “must respond” to protect these “critical infrastructure” assets[1][13]. Consortium Shifts and Market Responses: In parallel with government action, industry stakeholders have been realigning to meet security demands. Major U.S. tech firms – Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon – faced congressional queries in 2025 probing whether any cables they operate use equipment from China’s HMN Tech (Huawei Marine) or other adversary-linked providers[14]. This