FAULTLINES THE SHIFTING TECTONICS OF THE SUBMARINE CABLE MARKET BY KRISTIAN NIELSEN
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ince September 2025, a series of geopolitical developments have significantly impacted the global submarine cable industry. New national security regulations, consortium shake-ups, and even conflict-related incidents are redefining how undersea connectivity is built and protected. Below we provide a region-by-region overview of the latest changes – from Washington’s security-driven rules to Pacific partnership cables and Arctic ambitions – that are reshaping this critical infrastructure.
UNITED STATES: NATIONAL SECURITY RULES AND FASTER CABLE PERMITS
In the United States, regulators have moved decisively to address both security and deployment bottlenecks in subsea cables. In August 2025, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted new rules to modernize submarine cable licensing with a sharp focus on national security[1][2]. The FCC now presumptively disqualifies any cable license application if the applicant is owned or controlled by a “foreign adversary” nation (currently China, Hong Kong, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela)[3]. It likewise bars arrangements that would give such adversaries control over U.S. cable landing equipment[2]. For existing and future cables, operators must file new cybersecurity certifications and annual reports detailing ownership and any use of adversary-linked suppliers[4][5]. These measures aim
108 SUBMARINE TELECOMS FORUM MAGAZINE
to prevent espionage or sabotage via Chinese or other high-risk equipment in U.S. cable networks. Equally important, the FCC’s reforms streamline what had been a slow, cumbersome permit process. By
New national security regulations, consortium shake-ups, and even conflict-related incidents are redefining how undersea connectivity is built and protected. Below we provide a region-byregion overview of the latest changes – from Washington’s securitydriven rules to Pacific partnership cables and Arctic ambitions clearly spelling out application requirements – including mandatory risk management plans – the FCC hopes to cut red tape and speed up cable deployments[6][7]. It is even considering exemptions to reduce referrals to the multi-agency “Team Telecom” review that often delayed cable proj-
ects by months or years[8][9]. Faster approvals are seen as vital for U.S. competitiveness: Washington realized it was “hamstringing” American firms with permitting delays while Beijing aggressively backed its own cable companies[10][11]. As one analysis noted, accelerating U.S.-backed cables will both improve network resiliency and “unleash advantages in competition with China”[12][13]. Indeed, in October 2025 the new Bifrost trans-Pacific cable (a Meta–Indonesia–Singapore consortium project) went live after receiving its U.S. license earlier in the year[14]. Washington’s policy shift – pairing security restrictions with probuild incentives – reflects a broader strategic intent: to expand the U.S.-led undersea cable footprint and counterbalance China’s influence in global data routes[15][16].
EUROPE: RESILIENCE PLANS AND REDUCED DEPENDENCIES
Across the Atlantic, Europe has likewise sharpened its focus on submarine cable security and resilience. The European Union in early 2025 rolled out a comprehensive EU Action Plan on Cable Security, and by Autumn 2025 it completed a first-ever mapping of all submarine infrastructure and risks[17][18]. EU experts catalogued cable routes, landing stations, ownership, and incident history as a baseline to assess vulnerabilities[19]. The coordinated risk assessment flagged threats ranging from physical