FEATURE
CABLE CONFLICTS A Subsea Cold War BY JOHN TIBBLES
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ubsea cables are now recognised as a critical part of the internet and the ‘cloud,’ i.e., virtually all human communication. Recognition has led to them becoming politicised with concerns expressed about their security and the consequences of interruptions or the risks of interception. At the time of writing subsea systems are not just politicised but tools and targets of geopolitical and even military conflict. Media frenzy about cutting cables and stealing the data they carry has increased pressure on politicians to ‘do something.’ Personally, I think this is sad. In the 1970s I saw how telecom networks brought countries and peoples together and shrank the world despite cold-war era geopolitics. It wouldn’t be stretching the truth too much to suggest that from 2023 cable strategies might end up pushing people and societies further apart.
HOW DID WE GET HERE?
Cutting cables is nothing new; telegraph cables were cut as part of wartime strategies in WW1 and the Spanish America war. But telegrams were not integral to all international commerce trade and social interaction to the extent that the internet is today. From the 1920s through to almost the end of the century cables were a secure means of communication. The INTELSAT satellite era which arrived in the early 1970s used capacity and flexibility to eclipse cable economics, but they still used readily interceptable radio wave technology.
The Millennium: cables are again the dominant factor in global telecoms. The application of high-speed optical technology radically increased capacity that could not readily be intercepted, except at landing stations. The Cold War was over, ushering in a relatively stable and cooperative era in international relations. Of course, efforts were still underway to intercept traffic carried by cables - it was very secret and didn’t make the news. Twenty years on instability reigns again. A new form of economic superpower conflict developed re-awakening mistrust. In the telecom’s world, it began with the 5G controversy. The idea that equipment sourced from a potentially hostile power could control or monitor networks in distant countries. Leaks to the media resulted in stories of huge-scale interception of subsea traffic by traditional Western allies arousing concerns that the cable network could be vulnerable to interception and interruption in the event of a new major conflict. In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and National Security is again front and centre. In a cyberspace-era conflict the components of the internet and the cloud become potential weapons - none more so than subsea cables.
HOW VULNERABLE ARE SUBSEA CABLES? INTERRUPTION AND DETERRENCE
Cables are hard to find in the deep oceans; they may be thousands of kilometres long but just a couple of centiMAY 2023 | ISSUE 130 45