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Strategic Vision, Special Issue (Summer, 2021)
Stronger Together New US deterrence strategy seeks closer cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners Richard Wei-Yi Chen & Jaime Miguel Ocon
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eterrence has always been the first line of defense: preventing conflict, when possible, is preferable than engaging. These words were spoken by US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III during the change-of-command ceremony for the US Indo-Pacific Command in late April of this year. Since then, overlapping maritime claims in the Indo-Pacific, security in the Taiwan Strait, and the management of freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the East and South China seas have all contributed to the mounting pressure against the current US administration. In layman’s terms, the United States, under strategic competition from a rising China, finds itself at a millennial-defining moment. An analysis of the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance released in March shows a clear pattern of states around the world “heavily investing in efforts meant to check US strengths and prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world.” The US military continues to use FONOPs as a way to not only reinforce internationally recognized rights but to uphold those freedoms by challenging excessive maritime claims. These operations, along with a renewed vision of integrated deterrence, set the stage for a modern US strategy and policy in the years ahead. The idea of integrated deterrence is nothing new within security policy circles, nor does it uniquely pertain to a single nation’s national defense strategy. For years, the notion of strategic latency, especially
in times of booming technological evolution, has enabled stakeholders and policymakers to shift to scanning the horizon with this toolkit of technological advances and developments. As such, a more integrated deterrence posture has become the standard for those who have access to such means. This undoubtedly will include space and cyber domains, and moreover the informational world. Increasingly, the United States’ tepid approach to foreign policy and security in the region has been thrown out, and bullishness left to the wayside as Washington and its allies finally rendezvoused after four years of the “America First” administration of former US President Donald Trump. Analysts on Capitol Hill and China watchers in the West have observed that China has, in recent years, been closing in on obtaining a fully operational triad of delivery systems for its nuclear weapons systems, all the while wielding a wider array of counterforce weapons aided by new technologies and advancements. Despite this, Beijing has always maintained a No First Use policy and claimed a defensive nature for its military endeavors. However, Washington and its allies in the long-term non-proliferation campaign with Moscow have left a widening gap, allowing Beijing to pursue the development of its nuclear capabilities. Beijing’s concept of “integrated strategic deterrence” from as early as 2001, described in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) publication The Science of Military Strategy, shows its adoption of just such ideas
Richard Chen and Jaime Ocon are research assistants at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies. They can be reached at wc675@georgetown.edu and jaimeocon1@gmail.com