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Strategic Vision vol. 10, no. 48 (February, 2021)
Tripwire Tricks
Examining covert deployment of tripwire force in Taiwan for de-escalation Kitsch Liao
photo: Samantha Simmons A US soldier in Baghdad, Iraq reconnects a simulated tripwire as part of a counter-improvised explosive device course in preparation for missions.
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hina’s unilateral escalation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait has intensified over the second half of 2020, with increased crossing of the midline by warplanes and incursions of the Republic of China (ROC) ADIZ on an almost daily basis. The United States has employed largely political measures in response, including high-level visits by US officials, an increase in arms sales, and public announcement of political and military dialogue, to signal its support for Taipei. Though impor-
measures to provide a more stable deterrence mechanism, one of which is the idea of placing a tripwire force on Taiwan. An overt tripwire deployment represents a discrete, non-continuous level of escalation that might spur further escalation by Beijing, and increases the cost for all sides should any side choose to back down. Therefore a salami-slicing approach to covert US force deployment to Taiwan, buttressed by credible communication channels to China, such as
tant and welcomed by the government and people of Taiwan, such oblique measures would do little to deter an armed invasion by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and analysts have suggested various
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), would constitute a superior option for eventual de-escalation. A successful tripwire’s primary mechanism of deterring an invasion operates on the logic of deter-
Kitsch Liao is an independent defense analyst who is currently based in Taipei, Taiwan. He can be reached for comment at kitschquixote@gmail.com