Satellite Supremacy

Strategic Vision vol. 9, no. 46 (June, 2020)

Deployment of BeiDou satellites sharpens threat from People’s Liberation Army

Chris Liu

Artist’s rendition of the GPS Block IIF interim satellite, used to keep the Navstar Global Positioning System operational.

photo: NASA

In the 1980s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) realized the danger of relying on foreign Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) systems for military operations. In 1986, former CCP leader Deng Xiaoping initiated Plan 863 to promote satellite navigation technology as one of the key projects in aerospace development. Concerns about relying on foreign PNT systems proved to be well-founded in the mid-1990s during the third Taiwan Strait crisis from 1995 to 1996, as ballistic missiles launched by the CCP in an effort to influence voters in Taiwan’s presidential election became disconnected and failed to hit their targets due to interruptions in US GPS signals. This incident was a great humiliation for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and it strengthened the Beijing authorities’ determination to develop their own satellite navigation and positioning systems. In 2003, China accepted the European Union’s invitation to join the Galileo satellite navigation system. Due to security concerns and other differences, however, it was excluded from the program, and so China embarked on its own satellite navigation system.

Arrows and satellites

The BeiDou-1 project was launched in 1994. In 2000, the CCP launched two satellites into geostationary orbit to provide positioning, timing, wide area augmentation, and short message communication services to users in China. In 2003, a third geostationary satellite was launched. In 2004, construction began on the BeiDou-2 system, and in November 2012, BeiDou-2 began to provide users with regional positioning services in the Asia-Pacific area. The BeiDou-2 system contains 16 satellites with six geostationary satellites, six tilted geosynchronous orbit satellites, and four medium earth orbit (MEO) satellites. In 2019, the CCP implemented a high-density launch of “seven arrows and ten satellites.” All MEO satellites in the BeiDou-3 complex completed networking, and the core constellation of BeiDou-3 was fully deployed. In June of 2020, China launched its last geostationary satellite into orbit. At this point, the BeiDou-3 system was truly completed, and China has now entered a new era of global service.

“In areas with more severe COVID-19 outbreaks, hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles used the BeiDou system to precisely deliver urgently needed medical and anti-pandemic materials.“

With the completion of the BeiDou navigation satellite system (BDS), the CCP’s satellite navigation and positioning technology will be integrated with geographic information, Internet of things, big data, mobile communication, and other technologies, providing more comprehensive services. It is estimated that in 2035, a comprehensive positioning, navigation, and timing system will be built with the BeiDou system at its core.

A Minotaur I rocket lifts off carrying the TacSat-2 micro satellite as well as NASA’s GeneSat-1 spacecraft.

photo: Michael Kleiman

A DF-5B intercontinental ballistic missile on display during a parade held in front of Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, Sept. 3, 2015.

photo: Voice of America

Currently, the BeiDou system is already helping China in a wide variety of areas. The swift construction of Huoshenshan and Leishenshan hospitals in Wuhan during the CCP’s fight against COVID-19 were aided by the BeiDou system’s ability to provide accurate positioning information. In areas with more severe COVID-19 outbreaks, hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles used the BeiDou system to precisely deliver urgently needed medical and anti-pandemic materials. The Ministry of Transport also continued to broadcast information on the pandemic to more than six million vehicles through BeiDou terminals, which are connected to the national public supervision and service platform for road freight vehicles, providing information on road conditions and transportation services. Faced with rapid growth in logistics and distribution pressure, hundreds of thousands of BeiDou terminals across China have also joined the work of anti-pandemic logistics.

The BDS is critical to the PLA’s information warfare and global deployment capabilities. Without its own global navigational satellite network, it would be difficult for the PLA’s various strategic and tactical missiles to accurately strike their targets at medium and long distances.

“The BDS has an indispensable strategic importance for the PLA’s informatization and global combat capability development.“

During the CCP’s 19th National Congress in 2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping declared that the army should be equipped with the ability to win an information warfare campaign by 2035. This goal was originally proposed by former leader Jiang Zemin, and the schedule was set at the middle of this century. Xi Jinping moved the goal 15 years ahead, and seeks to use these 15 years to build the PLA into a worldclass fighting force. Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping both set this current year (2020) as the key year for laying a solid foundation for military informatization. The most important achievement of informatization this year was the completion of the BDS and its ability to provide global coverage. As the coverage range of the BDS expands, the distance and frequency at which the PLA’s naval and air forces can be projected outwards will increase accordingly, and the precision strike capabilities of its missiles will increase as well. The BDS has an indispensable strategic importance for the PLA’s informatization and global combat capability development.

Joint operations backbone

The CCP proposed the goal of army reform and modernization in its 3rd Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee. The goal is closely related to the CCP’s ability to achieve modernized joint operations. The C4ISR system forms the backbone of the joint operations’ command mechanism, of which the most critical is the use of space-based systems for reconnaissance.

The PLA’s Strategic Support Force operates and oversees space systems. The terminal equipment of the system can be installed on various platforms on land, sea, and air and provide positioning information including latitude, longitude, and time in a standard format, and then upload information to the joint operations command center at all levels to form a common image of the battlefield. Such an image is used as the basis for military commanders to make decisions. After the BDS completes its regional and global formation, the joint combat capabilities of the PLA’s various branches will be strengthened even further.

A ‘smokey’ surface-to-air missile is launched during training, giving off a distinct heat signature for realistic evasion training for pilots.

photo: Ian McMahon

China’s BDS system not only meets the country’s own needs but also provides an option for other countries, especially those that are not allies of the United States. Therefore, the BDS system can also enhance China’s relations with other countries and strengthen its military diplomacy.

In addition to the BDS system, China’s other satellite systems, such as those for reconnaissance and communications, are growing rapidly in terms of both quality and quantity. The CCP has demonstrated a determined attitude to surpass Russia and catch up with the United States in its development and deployment of space-based systems.

Taiwan’s soft-kill capability

In response to improvements in China’s military satellite capability, Taiwan has developed a number of countermeasures. Taiwan’s National ChungShan Institute of Science & Technology (NCSIST) has developed a soft-kill capability, which is able to jam GPS and BDS signals.

Important military facilities in Taiwan, including the Armed Forces Joint Operations Command Center and the Jiashan Base in Hualien, are all equipped with devices designed to prevent PLA ballistic missiles from hitting their targets. In addition to jamming BeiDou signals, Taiwan’s armed forces can send out false signals to confuse the CCP’s satellite positioning system and make its missiles hit false targets, so that damage can be reduced. Moreover, in view of the fact that PLA satellites can carry out reconnaissance at any time above Taiwan’s key military installations, the NCSIST has produced a synthetic aperture radar satellite countermeasure system to degrade China’s reconnaissance abilities. When PLA satellites pass over Taiwan’s strategic bases, the synthetic aperture radar reconnaissance and detection vehicles will detect the frequency band. High-frequency and low-frequency synthetic aperture radar jamming vehicles will then be deployed to counter and jam the signals. This will hamper or prevent the PLA from obtaining usable imagery of sensitive military sites and areas in Taiwan. In terms of hardkill capability, Taiwan’s forces can use their arsenal of Wan Chien, or Ten Thousand Swords, air-to-ground cruise missiles, produced by the NCSIST, to neutralize BeiDou support stations in China.

US Air Force’s Communications/Navigation Outage Forecast System (C/NOFS).

photo: NASA

Chinese rockets and space vehicles on display at a military museum.

photo: Gary Todd

With the completion of the BDS system, China’s military power will only continue to grow. Taiwan must take concrete steps to strengthen its space capabilities by deepening military cooperation with the United States, Japan, and other countries that have a vested interest in preventing a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. In particular, Taiwan must improve its ability to conduct reconnaissance, which would enhance its ability to conduct strikes against the enemy, and develop satellite jamming and other antisatellite systems.

Secondly, in response to the PLA’s growing number of long-range satellite-guided weapons, the BDS will be the PLA’s only long-range weapon guidance system. It is estimated that the CCP’s Dongfeng missiles, long-range missiles, anti-ship missiles, some air force air-to-air missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles will be fully converted to the BDS. Taiwan should mitigate the PLA’s offensive capabilities by developing advanced jamming systems, which will decrease the accuracy and effectiveness of the PLA’s satellite-guided weapons.

Furthermore, satellite combat and anti-jamming exercises must be added to actual military exercises and computer-driven wargaming to strengthen the professional skills of military officers and soldiers. In response to enemy threats and warfare capabilities, Taiwan’s military must develop its electronic warfare units, navigation and countermeasure equipment construction, education, and training.

Taiwanese education officials should also promote fields like aerospace. Only by strengthening people’s understanding and support of aerospace technology, and by integrating R&D talent and resources, can schools effectively cultivate the expertise that the nation needs. Currently, the government has not yet set a clear direction for the cultivation of aerospace talent. Government and industry should work together to develop and retain local talent in the aerospace sector.

Chris Liu is a PhD student at the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies, National Defense University. He can be reached for comment at sirhc885new@gmail.com