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ISSN 2050-6732 (Print) ISSN 2050-6740 (Online)

Counter-IED Report Winter 2019/20

GLOBAL UNIFICATION OF EOD TRAINING MODULES STRENGTHENING DETECTION AND RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS: LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT TOOLS DOUBLE PBIED ATTACK THWARTED, THE PHILIPPINES BRING THE HELL TO THEM: USE OF ARSON BY THREAT NETWORKS SMALL HAND-HELD INITIATION SYSTEMS (HZG) MEETING THE MOTHER OF ALL HOMEMADE WEAPONIZED DRONES IN LIBYA A QUICK LOOK AT EXPLOSIVES SEARCH DOGS AND CROWD SEARCHING

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ISSN 2050-6732 (Print) ISSN 2050-6740 (Online)

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COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

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FOREWORD

FOREWORD By Rob Hyde-Bales, Consulting Editor, Counter-IED Report

s we enter 2020 certain NATO members, mainly the United States, France and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom, remain mired in the legacies of military forays into the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel. In Iraq the killing of Iran’s most powerful military commander – General Qassem Soleimani head of Iran’s elite Quds Force - by a US airstrike near Baghdad Airport on 3 January marks a major escalation in tensions between Washington and Tehran in an already volatile region. The shooting down of a commercial passenger aircraft on 8 January by Iranian air defence forces was likely fall out from this rising tension. Iraq remains in political stalemate and turmoil that see no end in sight and at the end of 2019 Shiite militias stormed the US embassy in Baghdad – of note the largest embassy in the world. These attacks were stated to be a response to earlier US airstrikes on Iranian backed militias in Iraq and Syria, which in turn were a response to an attack on an Iraqi military base on 27 December that killed a US defence contractor. The longest running conflict is in Afghanistan where the United States still maintains some 13,000 troops, 19 years after entering the country in 2001. On 11 January two more US servicemen were killed by a roadside IED for which the Taliban claimed responsibility. The US Administration has declared its intent to finish “endless wars”, currently as it perceives those in Afghanistan and Syria. The US Presidential Election later this year is likely to

accelerate this process. The complex conflict in Syria now includes external forces from Russia, Turkey and the US – the latter two nations as NATO members have very differing views on the issue of the Kurds in Syria, who supported the US during the war against ISIS in Syria. Turkey has a long running and bitter dispute with the Kurds – that include elements that Turkey has long regarded as terrorists. The situation is further complicated by the combined operations of Russia and Turkey along the border between Syria and Turkey. Libya remains plagued by a long running civil war. The internationally recognised government in Tripoli has now formally requested from Turkey the presence of “air, ground and sea” military support to defeat an offensive by eastern forces to take Tripoli. Turkey’s President Erdogan has said that Turkey will send troops to Libya at the request of Tripoli as early as this month. Elsewhere in Africa the long running Islamist jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, specifically Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Northern Nigeria continue unabated despite the efforts primarily of France together with other nations to counter these insurgencies. In all these conflicts during the past two decades the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has been and continues to be employed by insurgents and terrorists alike to deadly effect. Indeed, it has been the defining component throughout these conflicts. It was during the 2003 Iraq War that the Western Coalition first counteriedreport.com

FOREWORD

encountered the IED, though member states, notably the UK and the US had dealt with them in Vietnam and Northern Ireland respectively during the second half of the last century. In the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the IED was the major cause of both military fatalities and life changing injuries and caused untold suffering to the civilian populations. In his instructive article retired Colonel Rafael Jimenez Sanchez, EOD advisor for aunav robots of everis Aerospace Defence and Security examines the crucial requirement for the appropriate equipment to neutralise explosive hazards. He highlights the clearance of subsurface land mines and IEDs. He describes a handheld plastic implement specifically designed for demining that comprises a trowel, ripper and prodder. He emphasises the necessity to approach the subsurface land mine using horizontal excavation and not from above in order to prevent contact with the pressure plate. Whenever possible and appropriate to the surroundings, the favoured method of explosive hazard neutralisation is the stand off method using remotely controlled robotic vehicles and robotic arms. It is always preferable to employ a robot rather than human action to undertake hazardous tasks. He illustrates various aunav counter-IED types of equipment He concludes by pointing out that the best path to success is achieved by learning from failures and that successful counterIED results from Lessons Learned and human network analysis. Dr Amanda Fond and Jessica Beckerman of Noblis in their highly informative paper examine the threat posed by Homemade Explosives (HMEs) today and ways in which the US Department of Homeland Security is working to counter this threat – a threat 14 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019-20

described by DHS as “persistent and dynamic”. They describe the use of HMEs by insurgents, terrorists and criminals over the past 25 years on mainland US and Europe. In response to this threat DHS has developed a Homemade Explosives Identification, Detection and Mitigation (HEID&M) Programme. These three elements form the basis of US efforts to counter the threat posed by HMEs. Identification seeks to validate the threat based on risk assessment methodologies and intelligence. The Detection strand examines current detection capabilities and their ability to locate HMEs. The authors draw an interesting analogy between the production of HMEs and that of homemade cookies to explain the complexity of characterising emerging explosives and the manifold variations in homemade cookies dependent on ingredients and recipes. Mitigation seeks to protect against current and evolving threats posed by HMEs. Such threats are dynamic and counter measures must remain agile, proactive and well informed and the HEID&M Programme seeks to Identify, Detect and Mitigate the continuing threats posed by HMEs. In her article Eunseo Jane Chung of Columbia University and formerly at UNMAS articulates very clearly the critical need for synchronised EOD and IEDD training material. With this in mind UNMAS, in participation with the Integrated Training Service has developed a standardised curriculum that is tailorable for individual nations with their differing technologies and equipment. An excellent example of this is in Mali where the UN Stabilisation Mission MINUSMA has adopted the UN training package and it has become their model within its country specific training programme. The process is iterative and feedback

FOREWORD

from the nations is a critical element of the continual refinement of the UN EOD/IEDD training courses. The training curriculum is specifically focused on Troop and Police Contributing Countries supporting the UN missions to train individuals and teams tasked with the disposal of land mines, ERW and IEDs. The training courses are incremental and train the various CMD and IEDD competency levels for individuals. Training is also provided for IEDD Teams – at the basic, intermediate and advanced levels. In his thought-provoking article Lt Col Jose M Rufas of the NATO Counter-IED Centre in Madrid examines the background to the use of arson by terrorists and insurgents to achieve their aims. Of note, authorities in Australia have pointed out that some of the recent apocalyptic bush and forest fires in Australia have been ignited by arsonists. The author notes that fire resulting from the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in Washington was the main cause of the almost 3000 deaths from the attacks. He illustrates numerous Islamist propaganda publications – one calling for the use of fire “to burn the houses of the infidels and their cities as they bombed our cities”. He describes how in 2018, Palestinians delivered aerial incendiary devices across the border into Israel in attempts to destroy Israeli farm crops. Whilst recognising the massive degree of damage caused by the bush and forest fires in California and more particularly in Southern and Eastern Australia, the author points out that to date it is likely that the terrorists and insurgents do not consider that arson attacks have the same propaganda value or result in the same amount of deaths as, for example, an IED. But recent events in Australia and California may alter this standpoint. ■

Rob Hyde-Bales biography During his career in the UK Royal Engineers, Rob Hyde-Bales was responsible for landmine clearance in Libya and, more latterly, Afghanistan in the running of the first United Nations humanitarian landmine clearance training programme – Operation Salam. The programme trained Afghan male refugees in landmine clearance techniques, and Afghan women and children in mine awareness and avoidance training. More recently he set up the Caribbean Search Centre in Kingston, Jamaica. The Centre is designed to train security forces across the Caribbean in modern search techniques. After retiring from the army he joined Cranfield University at Shrivenham, near Oxford, and undertook a research project on behalf of the UK Ministry of Defence that examined ways to improve the sharing of IED threat information between the military and civilian organisations in hazardous areas. counteriedreport.com

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GLOBAL UNIFICATION OF EOD TRAINING MODULES

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GLOBAL UNIFICATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) TRAINING MODULES SETTING UP THE UNITED NATIONS BASE STANDARD FOR ENHANCED TCCS (TROOPS AND POLICE CONTRIBUTORS) CAPACITY AND INTEROPERABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

By Eunseo Chung, former Intern with TMAT, United Nations Mine Action Service

VERVIEW

Currently, different versions of EOD/IEDD training courses exist throughout global EOD/IEDD entities â€“ UN Missions, separate national and international Centers of Excellence, individual nations with EOD/ IEDD capacity, etc.1 This causes confusion in understanding and utilization of the training material; for example, between 2018 and 2019, one country has received 8 -12 different bilateral EOD/IEDD training engagements that provided distinctly different curricula covering the same topics. It is therefore crucial to ensure that existing guidance and supporting training documents are up-to-date in overall coherence and

suitable to the changing peacekeeping environment. The aim of the UN is to synchronize the training courses for the current and future UN missions and provide a common platform on which other global entities can participate to synchronize a global EOD/ IEDD baseline curriculum. UNMAS, in partnership with the ITS (Integrated Training Service); under the Department of Peace Operations, funded by the United States Global Peace Operations Initiatives (GPOI) developed a standardized curriculum that is tailorable to each country because each has a myriad of different technologies/tools that are best left to

1 https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/20190211_2018-nato-encyclopedia-eng.pdf

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GLOBAL UNIFICATION OF EOD TRAINING MODULES

the individual nations to address. A quintessential example is The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) – MINUSMA has adopted the UN training and it has become their model with its country specific training program. Feedback from field missions and member states’ peacekeeping training centers is the key in the unification of the UN EOD/IEDD courses and the associated Specialized Training Materials in order to improve guidance to UN peacekeepers, to align training doctrine, and to adapt to the continually evolving and complex peacekeeping mission environment and improve performance.

BACKGROUND UNMAS together with the ITS, has developed a series of training curricula in line with the UN doctrine found in the curricula based off the military unit manuals developed by UN Office of Military affairs, UN Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) Standards, and International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)2. In addition, the curriculum includes feedback from UNMAS field and UN Member States’ experts, and provides for the safe, effective and efficient disposal of explosive hazards. Explosive Ordnance Disposal is inherently dangerous – a saturated and disjointed EOD/IEDD training environment causes

a great deal of confusion for the training audience. Therefore, every effort should be made to create a unified training environment that complements separate initiatives, building the training audience with each iteration. Considering the hazards of desynchronized EOD/ IEDD training curricula, the relevant country experts reviewed the curriculum built off the UN EOD Military Unit Manual and the UN IEDD Standards, leading to the contract with Janus that drafted the Explosive Hazard Awareness and IED Threat Mitigation training curriculum, funded by US GPOI. According to Maj. Pratik Tumbahangphe, a G7 Training Officer at Nepali Army, “It will help in ICT (in country training) as well by not spending the valuable time in synchronizing the standard mode of work for all the troops because it will be already done in PDT (predeployment training), which is also an advantageous part of having a standard module.”3 The training curriculum is specifically focused to Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and Police Contributing Countries (PCC) supporting United Nations (UN) missions to train individuals and teams tasked with disposing of Landmines, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or operating in an ERW/IED threat laden environment.

CMD level 1 qualification

CMD level 2 qualification

CMD level 3 qualification

Basic IEDD operator

358

Assistant IEDD operator

358

226

Intermediate IEDD operator

358

226

326

Advanced IEDD operator

358

226

326

Table 1 (continues on the opposite page): The CMD and IEDD courses built on each other and follow this approach.

2 Conventional Munitions Disposal and Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Curriculum Statement of Work (August 2018). 3 Maj. Pratik Tumbahangphe, a G7 Training Officer at Nepali Army.

18 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

GLOBAL UNIFICATION OF EOD TRAINING MODULES

SUMMARY OF THE CURRICULUM CONTENTS4 Conventional Munitions at levels 1 - 3 will train the licensed operators to determine which ERW (Explosive Remnants of War) are safe to expose, transport, and for disposal. The trained individuals will be able to conduct render-safe procedures and dispose of a wide range of Explosive Ordnance when he or she graduates from the level 3 course. The next stage is Improvised Explosive Device Disposal levels 1 -4 . The trainees will first be able to assist more advanced level team members conducting an array of IEDD task management, plan development and execution. Their skills will increase throughout levels 2 and 3, and once they graduate from the advanced IEDD course (level 4), they will conduct remote, semi-remote and manual IEDD rendersafe procedures on all types of IEDs and provide timely advice and supervision to IEDD teams. Most importantly, they will be able to regulate analysis of IEDD reports and build a Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) document for new equipment or tasks in the IEDD environment. As the trainees move on, at the CMD/ IEDD Instructor Train the Trainer course, they will develop instructional skills covering the following subjects: adult learning, teaching methods, instructor responsibilities, presentation skills, learner perception, delivery of

content, preparing to teach, classroom presentation and instructor development. At the Explosive Hazard Awareness Training (EHAT) course, the recipients are general purpose forces and police officers of Troop/Police Contributing Countries to UN peacekeeping missions and other personnel who may be exposed to an ERW/IED laden environment. They learn to distinguish common Explosive Hazards/ ERW, recognize the make-up and use of IEDs, understand and apply situational awareness through the conduct of a threat assessment, understand and execute the 5Cs (Confirm, Clear the area, Call appropriate authorities, Cordon, and Control) and associated immediate actions: Perform practical drills to potentially identify, locate and maneuver past danger/vulnerable areas using ground sign awareness and patrol techniques; Understand the roles of the EOD, IEDD and first responders; and Conduct pre and post mission briefs for unmounted and mounted operations. In the Improvised Explosive Device â€“ Threat Management (IED-TM) course, the intended recipients are Staff Officers, Planners, and Senior Leaders of Troop/Police Contributing Countries to UN peacekeeping missions. They will learn to understand common Explosive Hazards for ERW/IEDs, make-up of an IED, tactical force actions in an EH laden

IED level 1 qualification

IED level 2 qualification

IED level 3 qualification

IED level 4 qualification

Total module training time

Total training time

382

740

382

264

490

1230

382

345

185

511

1822

382

345

199

371

619

2207

Table 1 (continues from the opposite page): The CMDS and IEDD courses built on each other and follow this approach.

4 Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Awareness Curriculum Course Catalog, 25 June, 2019.

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GLOBAL UNIFICATION OF EOD TRAINING MODULES

Basic Team

Intermediate Team

Advanced Team

Team Member

Basic IEDD Operator

IEDD Assistant

Team Leader

Basic IEDD Operator

Intermediate IEDD Operator

Advanced IEDD Operator

Team Supervisor

Advanced IEDD Operator (on scene)

Advanced IEDD Operator (stand by)

Table 2: IEDD Teams Categories and Roles.

Environment, to understand the IED-Threat Mitigation Fundamentals and Cycle, and integration of available information and forces to enhance the IED-TM.

In order to implement the Standardized EOD/ IEDD training curriculum efficiently, UNMAS plans to generate a small mobile field-based technical advisory team to coordinate the integration of the training packages into all UNMAS field programmes, international organizations, regional training centres and bilateral training engagements to the maximum

would be located in Entebbe, in Central Uganda. Maj. Pratik Tumbahangphe, believes the ideal way to implement the uniform UN training module is “to be prepared with the consultation from the specific subject matter experts in accordance to UN guiding principles and philosophy and then the short-term training can be conducted in the TCC/PCC countries like recently the pilot course for STM UN EOD UNIT that had been conducted in Nepal. It was a great success, which will help us to better understand all the legal aspects, conceptual aspects and operational frameworks.”5

extent possible. The mobile team plans to engage in direct interaction with UNMAS programmes, international organizations, regional training centres and member states, through provision of technical guidance and advisory support and organization of workshops. Within resources and where relevant, Quality Assurance and assistance visits will be conducted to support TCCs where UN training is adopted as part of the national training curricula. Lastly, the mobile team will be responsible for consolidating lessons learned in order to amend and improve all courses, and to contribute to the relevant updating of policy, doctrine and manuals. To maximize efficiency, the mobile team

A current success story as well as an adoptable example would be Mali. Mali has its own quintessential in-country training program where the UN module has been successfully adopted and utilized to train the TCCs. Mali has succeeded in implementing the standard UN curriculum that is harmonized, assessed by UNMAS for the minimum Standards of Proficiency for Trained Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personnel to plan, manage and carry out EOD/IEDD within Mali. “UNMAS has been the integral part to Nepali Army as they came before to train and produce instructors who meet the UNMAS standard now they are coming to Nepal for Quality Assurance of the training conducted by Nepali Army” (Tumbahangphe).6

OBJECTIVE

5 Maj. Pratik Tumbahangphe, a G7 Training Officer at Nepali Army. 6 Maj. Pratik Tumbahangphe, a G7 Training Officer at Nepali Army.

20 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

GLOBAL UNIFICATION OF EOD TRAINING MODULES

CONCLUSION The standardized EOD/IEDD disposal courses are crucial in preventing unexpected hazards in an evolving and dangerous environment. The UN training courses will resolve the core problems regarding IED-TM training in the past – the doctrinal disparities between resources providers – removing unnecessary hassles and confusion as well improving training quality. By unifying IED-TM global training as a baseline, TCCs will experience greater interoperability when supporting international missions; thus, becoming a reference guide to “completing the missions in a set way” (Tumbahangphe).7 UNMAS is fully aware of the possible amendments of the courses depending on the nations for which the training is recommended. Accordingly, UNMAS is always reviewing the curriculum and welcomes feedback from the nations and international organizations using the standardized courses. The feedback will be made available to Member States through the UN peacekeeping resource hub or can be requested from UNMAS directly (unmas.ied@un.org). ■

REFERENCES Conventional Munitions Disposal and Improvised Explosive

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Device Disposal Curriculum Statement of Work. August,

Eunseo Jane Chung is M.A. at

2018. Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Awareness Curriculum Course Catalog, 25 June, 2019. NATO Encyclopedia.2018. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_ fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/20190211_2018-natoencyclopedia-eng.pdf Maj. Pratik Tumbahangphe, a G7 Training Officer at Nepali Army

Disclaimer The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or its officials or Member States.

Cognitive Studies in Education at Teachers College Columbia University. She is a former intern at UNMAS, Threat Mitigation Advisory Team. During her career at UNMAS, she was responsible for research and compilation of IED threat (mitigation) information from UNMAS programs for use in the IED threat mitigation database. Plus, she worked on the EOD/IEDD related projects such as UN SMiTMiTR (Smart IED Threat Mitigation Roadmap) that involves coordination of related agencies for IED threat Mitigation to enable a whole-of-system approach. Contact: ec3106@tc.columbia.edu

7 Maj. Pratik Tumbahangphe, a G7 Training Officer at Nepali Army.

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Counter-IED Report editorial team would like to invite government bodies, army personnel, researchers, industry experts to contribute their articles, case studies, white papers to the report. We are looking for theoretical and practice based non-promotional editorial contributions.* Spring/Summer 2020 edition deadlines: Abstract submission: 25 February 2020 Full article submission deadline: 6 April 2020 Autumn 2020 edition deadlines: Abstract submission: 30 June 2020 Full article submission deadline: 9 September 2020 Winter 2020/21 edition deadlines: Abstract submission: 2 November 2020 Full article submission deadline: 10 December 2020

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HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES IDENTIFICATION, DETECTION, AND MITIGATION (HEID&M) PROGRAM

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STRENGTHENING DETECTION AND RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES By Dr. Amanda Fond, Lead Scientist and Program Management Professional for Noblis and Jessica Beckerman, experienced System Engineering and Technical Assistance contractor for Noblis with a background supporting the Department of Defense (DOD) and DHS. Homemade explosives (HMEs), unlike commercial or military explosives, by their very nature are not repeatedly produced in an exact formula or recipe. The scope in which Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) looks at this problem involves the fact that adversaries are coming up with new and unique explosive threats, creative ways of concealing or constructing improvised devices, and novel ways to manufacture existing threats. DHS S&T has the challenge of not only characterizing existing threats to aviation but also anticipating future threats. To meet these needs, DHS S&T’s Homemade Explosives Identification, Detection, and Mitigation (HEID&M) Program has developed a rapid response protocol that is initiated in the event of an aviation attack or identified plot.

he worldwide threat of homemade explosives (HMEs) continues to evolve. Events such as the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and the London Underground bombings in 2005 emphasize this changing and complex threat. Additionally, other highprofile attacks such as the “Shoe Bomber” in 2001 and the “Underwear Bomber” in 2009 were specifically targeted at aviation. In more recent years, the Paris attacks of October 2015, the Brussels Suicide

Bombings (2016), and the Daallo Airlines Flight 159 bombing in Somalia (2016), further reinforce the need for strong detection, response and mitigation capabilities for homemade explosives. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is leading ongoing research and development (R&D) for explosives threat characterization and detection. S&T’s Homemade Explosives Identification, Detection, and Mitigation

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HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES IDENTIFICATION, DETECTION, AND MITIGATION (HEID&M) PROGRAM

After synthesizing improvised explosive material at the FBI laboratory next door, material is run though a comprehensive suite of analytical equipment at the Detection Technology Center (DTC) for testing and further scanning using on-site Transportation Security Equipment. (HEID&M) Program is a cross-cutting program that incorporates all DHS S&T HME efforts and supports DHS components to include the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and United States Secret Service (USSS). Additionally, HEID&M maintains strong relationships across the U.S. federal government and partnerships with foreign governments and international organizations, enhancing scientific and technical knowledge of HMEs. S&T, in support to TSA, has the challenge of not only characterizing existing threats to aviation but also anticipating future threats. The challenge stems from the fact that, HMEs, unlike commercial or military explosives, are not repeatedly 24 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

produced in an exact formula or recipe. The scope in which S&T looks at this problem takes into account that adversaries are coming up with new and unique explosive threats, creative ways of concealing or constructing improvised devices, and novel ways to manufacture existing threats. To meet these needs, the HEID&M Program has developed a rapid response protocol that is initiated in the event of an aviation attack or identified plot. “The threat to the security of the Homeland posed by HMEs is persistent and dynamic,” said S&T’s Director of Physical and Cyber Security Division, Mary McGinley. “Our adversaries continue to adapt their tactics and we must remain vigilant,

HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES IDENTIFICATION, DETECTION, AND MITIGATION (HEID&M) PROGRAM

The control station at the Tyndall Reactive Materials Group (TRMG) is used for remote synthesis of liquid homemade explosives to provide an extra level of safety for the chemists.

responsive, and proactive.â€? The HEID&M Programâ€™s role in combatting the threat posed by homemade explosives is to gather and prioritize requirements from stakeholders across the U.S. government, identify performers, facilitate the development of deployable solutions, and transition those solutions back to the stakeholders. The Program must look at both pre-attack activities, including training and information sharing, precursor logistics, HME production, targeting, and improvised explosive device (IED) delivery, through to post-attack activities which include recovery activities, investigation, and attribution. The HEID&M Program provides a path forward for HME threat solutions, concentrating on detection

signatures as well as validated characterization and testing procedures for HME threat materials and devices. Research and development are conducted to better identify, mitigate, and detect HMEs and associated explosive precursor chemicals.

IDENTIFICATION To identify the threat, the program relies on defensible risk assessment methodologies in addition to intelligence information on emerging threat materials to inform risk and response posture. Collaboration with the community of explosives experts and S&T laboratories is essential to validate the threat. Is this threat realistic? How is it made? What precursor chemicals are required? counteriedreport.com

HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES IDENTIFICATION, DETECTION, AND MITIGATION (HEID&M) PROGRAM

The laboratory set-up at TRMG includes a comprehensive selection of Transportation Security Equipment for testing. Depending on the specific HME composition, different scanning technologies may be used to support the data collection needed for characterization.

DETECTION The next step is to look at current detection capabilities and their ability to find HMEs. This is accomplished through HME characterization activities carried out at multiple S&T laboratories. The HEID&M Programâ€™s HME laboratory resources span several purpose-built test facilities to handle and characterize explosive materials. S&Tâ€™s Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), located in Atlantic City, New Jersey, is responsible for certifying transportation security equipment and has overall management of two separate facilities performing additional data collection and characterization efforts. The Tyndall Reactive Materials Group (TRMG), located in Panama City, Florida, and the Detection 26 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

Technology Center (DTC), in Huntsville, Alabama, are facilities operated by TSL in support of TSA and other DHS components. These three facilities jointly provide emerging threat response, access to unique range complexes, intelligence information, surge capabilities, and mitigation in case of an accident or natural disasters. The importance of characterization at three different labs is to provide repeatable and complementary data collection. HMEs are especially complex as they are often made of common commercial items and therefore make it challenging to distinguish true HME threats from the many harmless substances that one may encounter when screening a person or their

HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES IDENTIFICATION, DETECTION, AND MITIGATION (HEID&M) PROGRAM

Improvised explosive material testing.

belongings. Thus, chemical and physical properties of explosive materials or precursor chemicals need to be examined to support the development of new screening capabilities. In fact, there are hundreds of variations of HMEs in existence. A great analogy for explaining the complexity of characterizing emerging explosives threats is the variations in homemade cookies. Just as there are hundreds of combinations of HMEs that an adversary can make, there are hundreds of types of cookies that one can bake. HMEs, like cookies, can have different origins of “ingredients” based on regional availability and variations in “recipes” due to regional customs and access to recipes and

cookware. Even if you hone in on just one specific type of cookie - the classic chocolate chip cookie – you can still find hundreds of versions and various methods of making that particular type of cookie. Similarly, for HMEs, there are many varieties of explosives an adversary may choose depending on availability and cost of materials, skill, and other factors. These intricacies and variations, and the ability to account for all the various “recipes” that person may choose from, leads to the complexity of detection. Adding to this complexity is batch-to-batch variation, where one person may make one batch one way and the next batch may turn out completely different where the cookie counteriedreport.com

HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES IDENTIFICATION, DETECTION, AND MITIGATION (HEID&M) PROGRAM

may have a different taste, look and texture. By collecting characterization data at three different laboratories, the program accounts for any batch-to-batch variability, as well as recipe and precursor variations. For aviation specific requirements, the HEID&M Program works closely with TSA to collect necessary data once a threat is identified. This usually includes modeling, down selection, small scale safety testing, formulation and preparation of materials, and data acquisition. Analysis of these results is conducted to determine the “signature” of the material. Once the material is characterized, it is either validated or incorporated into new or updated explosives detection capabilities.

MITIGATION Lastly, S&T needs to determine how to mitigate the threat. To mitigate explosive threats, the program develops analytical tools to protect against current and evolving threats. These tools assist in rapidly assessing and identifying vulnerabilities, as well as providing information on how to respond to potential threats and provide mitigation measures. Additionally, the program works with DHS components and other customers to support any required changes to operations, policy, or technology. While the threat of HMEs is enduring and evolving, the HEID&M Program is working to assess, mitigate and recover from such threats. The HEID&M Program ensures the explosives community has a clear understanding of homemade and emerging explosive threats to improve detection technology, inhibits the unlawful use and manufacturing of HMEs, and provides a solid foundation for solutions to counter the threat. The HEID&M Program is part of the DHS S&T Physical and Cyber Security Division, which conducts research, development, testing, and evaluation based on customer requirements across three focus areas: physical security, cybersecurity, and explosives detection and mitigation. ■

28 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dr. Amanda Fond is a Lead Scientist and Program Management Professional for Noblis. She currently supports S&T as a subject matter expert in homemade explosives characterization and emerging threats and as the Program Coordinator for the HEID&M Program. Dr. Fond is the Principal Investigator for the Homemade Explosive Precursor Database program focused on using deep learning to identify anomalous purchasing behavior related to homemade explosive precursors. She also leads an effort using deep learning to rapidly aggregate and parse intelligence sources related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats. Prior to her work at S&T, Dr. Fond provided scientific consulting for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Defense Sciences and Strategic Technologies Offices in areas of materials characterization and chemical detection. She received her Ph.D. in inorganic chemistry from Johns Hopkins University and completed a National Research Council Postdoctoral Fellowship at the National Institute of Standards and Technology in analytical chemistry. Jessica Beckerman is an experienced System Engineering and Technical Assistance contractor for Noblis with a background supporting the Department of Defense (DOD) and DHS. Ms. Beckerman currently supports S&T on the HEID&M Program. She provides project management support for ongoing HME and chemical characterization and data collection efforts, working closely with TSA, DOD, and partner laboratories. Ms. Beckerman previously supported the Joint Staff (JS) at the Pentagon as a defense analyst for the JS J7 Irregular Warfare Division.

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COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS

COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS: LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT TOOLS By Rafael Jiménez Sánchez, Senior EOD Advisor at aunav, by everis ADS

xplosive weapons are the major threat in current wars. Most likely they will remain the dominant threat in future warfare. There are many factors making this type of weapon a subject for discussion: effectiveness and low cost, destructive power, difficulty to discriminate between civilian and military targets, etc. In recent conflicts, most casualties (both military and civilian) are caused by ordnance in its multiple variations: fired by guns or self-propelled, dropped by air platforms, thrown or emplaced (mines) or employed as a “terror” weapon. One peculiar characteristic of explosive weapons is that they continue causing suffering, without discriminating, when military operations are over. They may end up as ERW (Explosive Remnants of War), categorized into two types: AXO (Abandoned Explosive Ordnance) and UXO (Unexploded Ordnance). They may be transformed into IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) as well. C-IED is a complex matter. There are different approaches to dealing with explosive hazards, but a comprehensive view of the issue would need a full encyclopedia. We will address just some aspects related with the use of tools, and we will leave other points of the matter for future articles.

LEARNING FROM FAILURE Long time ago, back in the eighties, a young engineer officer instructed his platoon on how to lay and clear a minefield following STANAG 2036. The young officer was struck by the fact that laying a minefield using training mines always resulted in mine incidents (both while laying and clearing), so the obvious conclusion was that things were not as they looked on paper. Everything can be explained and at least three different causes were found: lack of experience which resulted in accidents, complicated method for laying mines, and the use of tools and procedures not certified by real experience. Field manuals and SOPs suggested the use of probing to detect buried mines followed by manual excavation using conventional tools, but the use of tools (probes, digging tools, etc.) in the vicinity of ordnance is always dangerous. Practical experience showed that the current hardware for demining (entrenchment tools and bayonets) were not suitable. Regarding the procedure, it looked very good in the manual, but not that good in practice: it involved too many people and an excess of movement and complexity, as the combination of too many people and too much time within the hazard zone results in high risk. counteriedreport.com

COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS

Manual plastic tool for demining. Handling of tools in the proximity of explosive hazards is always a risk to be considered by demining personnel, particularly when excavation and probing are done from above and close to the pressure plate. For this use, a simple and practical tool for demining was designed and tested with success. The tool, made of hard plastic material, consisted of a trowel, ripper and a prodder (inside the handle) attachable to the handle or the front end. A period of practical experience and failure helped us to develop several lessons: • Awareness of hazards due to the use of tools and heavy objects in the vicinity of armed mines. Tools must be dumb-proof and adapted to the needs: horizontal excavation, rather than conventional vertical digging. 32 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

• Always take into consideration stand-off and access in digging. Access from above should be avoided. • Use of protective equipment such as gloves, helmet, jacket or goggles, as well as appropriate tools like demining scoop, together with robots that keep us at a standoff distance. • Use standoff detection such as metal detectors, GPR, long linear junction detection or thermal vision. In other words, tools that compensate the limitation of our basic “eyeball” detection.

BACK TO THE FUNDAMENTALS: DISTANCE, TIME BARRIER… AND TOOLS The main rules of the First Responder state that standoff distance, time and barrier are the key factors to

COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS

fight explosive hazards. UGV are essential to get the job done, mostly because they permit to operate from a safe location. Tools have to answer back to a real need: moving heavy objects, defusing, handling hazardous gadgets (X-Ray, NLJD Non-Linear Junction Detector), handling and moving a dead body, a car bomb, etc. However, the standard EOD robot and light UGV have many limitations. A possible solution is the two-arm robot combining strength and dexterity, where Two arms C-IED robot aunav.NEXT understanding what we expect from tools (standoff distance, tasks to be carried out with the same skill as humans, (with an extinguisher or secondary tool for example), or more) is paramount. In the picture we see the two or both simultaneously performing a task requiring arms: one could be acting while the other is on standby certain dexterity. counteriedreport.com

COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS

Robotic arm aunav.CID

Robots are tools specialized in 3D (Dirty–Dull–Dangerous) and 3H (Hot–Heavy–Hazardous) environments. In addition to substituting humans in hazardous environments, robots fitted with the right tool can be very efficient, reducing the job of the soldier to decision making. Mechanical tools compensate the limits of our physical capabilities, computers boost our limitations handling data and speed up decision making. 34 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

Robotic arm aunav.CID Light

COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS

The job done by a sapper squad clearing a road can be facilitated by a robotic arm with a “flexible” front end able to search, dig, clear and dispose of obstacles; again a good understanding of the task together with the need of saving lives is the key. Firefighting in hazardous areas or evacuation of casualties from the front line are tasks suitable for a “robotic buddy”, the former to perform a task beyond human abilities, the latter to save manpower in critical circumstances.

BACK TO THE FUNDAMENTALS (AGAIN): DISTANCE, TIME, BARRIER, TOOLS… AND KNOWLEDGE There is always more than one method to do things, but the best path to success is learning from failure. Failure is not that bad, when we learn from it. Those with experience in forensic analysis of explosive incidents know that at the very end of the process we always meet the same sentence: “I didn’t know…” or “I wasn´t aware of…”. We also know that the best results in Counter-IED come from the “Lessons Learned” process and human network analysis. The way in which people, individually and as a group, interact has been transformed by the use of technology. New technologies, combined with traditional weapons, could be the core element of a new kind of threat. Again knowledge, in this case understanding the threat, is the foundation for a “cat and mouse” game of both conventional and unconventional warfare. So far technology is providing a substitute for human action, in our case robots performing hazardous tasks. The evolution is not limited to remote machine handling. Knowledge, and particularly the way we acquire and process it, remains the dominant factor in all human activities where risk is present. Handling knowledge and decision making are becoming the field of work for Artificial Intelligence. The use of knowledge as a tool is not within the scope of this article, but needs consideration as a subject matter for a future paper. ■

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Rafael Jiménez Sanchez Joined the Spanish Military in 1978. After getting his commission as an Engineer Officer he was posted to the Mountain Brigade (Engineer Battalion) in San Sebastian. He graduated from the University of Zaragoza and got a Master Degree in Security and Defense. His Military records include courses such as UN Military Observer, Signal Officer, Camp Construction and EOD Officer. His assignments and tours of duty since 1982 include Engineer Battalion at the Mountain Brigade, Instructor (Military Academy and Engineer School), Bridge Regiment, CID and EOD School. Tours of duty in Bosnia (1994-1996-1998), Instructor at ENTEC (2000), Chief Ops-Int and Spanish Engineer Unit Kabul (ISAF-2002/2003). Promoted to Colonel in May 2011. He was appointed Director of the International Demining Centre (CID) and EOD School (Spanish Army). Joined the Army reserve in 2018, since then is working as associated professor and EOD advisor for aunav robots, by everis Aerospace, Defense and Security. counteriedreport.com

PBIED ATTACKS

DOUBLE PBIED ATTACK THWARTED, THE PHILIPPINES By Chief Superintendent (ret.) Michael Cardash, Terrogence Senior CIED Analyst / Author of Mobius reports

n November 5, 2019, troops from the Philippine Army 11th Infantry Division shot dead three Abu Sayyaf Group militants near a checkpoint in Barangay Kan Islam, in Indanan Municipality, Sulu Province. Two PBIEDs were found in the possession of the three militants, who were reportedly on their way to carry out an attack at the Jolo Municipality Metro station. During a raid after the incident at an Abu Sayyaf Group hideout in Indanan Province, security forces found pipe IEDs, identical to those in the PBIEDs recovered from the three ASG militants. Since January 2019, suicide attacks, some fatal, as well as attempts to perpetrate suicide bombings, all attributed to the Islamic State-affiliated Abu Sayyaf Group, have been notably increasing in Sulu Province. The three ASG operatives were on two motorcycles and arrived from the Maimbung Municipality area, on their way to Jolo Municipality. They passed through Sitio Itawon, in Barangay Kan Islam, in Indanan Municipality, traveling on the main road in Indanan, where they encountered security forces on November 5 at about 4:50 pm. Following intelligence alerts about Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) operatives in the area planning to carry out suicide bombings, military forces (specifically, the 41st Infantry Battalion, under the 1102nd Infantry

Brigade) set up checkpoints and were on high alert. The three activists opened fire on security forces at the checkpoint, and the troops returned fire. After a five-minute firefight, security forces neutralized all three activists. Two PBIEDs were found in their possession, in addition to a .45 pistol, ammunition and a hand grenade. The PBIEDs comprised blue and pink vests similar to life jackets, containing 16 pipe IEDs with yellowish explosives, connected with detonating cord. After the incident, security forces arrested an ASG operative known as Mang, and he revealed the location of an ASG hideout in a remote village at Barangay Paligue, in Indanan Province. Security forces (the 41st Infantry Battalion) who raided the site recovered explosives and an additional 16 pipe IEDs identical to those used in the PBIEDs found with the militants. The arrested operative admitted he was part of the group that assembled the pipe IEDs and PBIEDs. The PBIEDs recovered from the three ASG militants in November 2019 appear to be fashioned from life jacket-type vests with pockets fitted to accommodate pipe IEDs. The pipe IEDs measured 24 cm in length and 6 cm in diameter. Each contained approximately 400 grams of explosives, totaling 3.2 kg of explosives in each PBIED. counteriedreport.com

PBIED ATTACKS

The PBIEDs and their pipe IED main charges.

Explosives and pipe IEDs. 38 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

PBIED ATTACKS

One of the pipe IEDs.

Initiation system â€“ switch and battery. counteriedreport.com

PBIED ATTACKS

Arming switch.

Red push button. 40 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

PBIED ATTACKS

The initiation switch documented in the hideout used by the two attackers in November 2019 comprises a tube with a push button on top, along with a slide switch, presumably used as an arming switch. A resistor discernible on the switch may indicate the presence of a LED indicator light for checking the integrity of the initiation system before connecting to the detonator. Two of the slain ASG militants in the November 2019 incident had foreign (Egyptian) citizenship and were the husband and son of a woman who attempted to carry out a suicide bombing in Barangay Tagnbak, Indanan Municipality in September. The third operative was a Filipino. The three militants were members of the Sawadjaan faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group. The two foreign members were named Abduramil or Yousoph (Jr.) and Abdurahman or Baker al-Seddik (his stepfather), while the Filipino operative was known by the alias “James.” According to a statement from an official in the Philippine Army, the PBIEDs recovered from the three slain ASG members after the firefight were identical to the PBIEDs used in an attempted attack on September 8 by Reda Mohammad Mahmud, Abdurahman’s wife

and Abduramil’s mother, and in both attacks on June 28 in Barangay Tanjung, in Indanan. On September 8, 2019, at 5:45 pm, a “Caucasianlooking” woman wearing an abaya (a simple, loose overgarment, essentially a robe-like dress, worn by Muslim women) was spotted walking from the Philippine Army 35th Infantry Battalion’s Kilometer 4 detachment to the next checkpoint, Kilometer 3, in Barangay Kajatian, Indanan, Sulu. Witnesses who saw her later reported they thought she was pregnant because of a bulge on her torso. As she approached the Kilometer 3 detachment, the guard on duty called out for her to stop, shouting at her “Do not enter! Do not enter!” but she ignored him and continued to approach, slowly. It then became obvious that she had a bomb strapped to her body. Moreover, she was reportedly holding the trigger mechanism in her hand. According to reports, the guard shouted to alert the other members of the detachment that there was a suicide bomber, and they took cover. The woman then cried out “Allahu Akbar!” and initiated her PBIED. The guard later reported the woman was walking in an unusual manner and seemed confused, as though uneasy, and she was alone.

The scene of the PBIED initiation at night. counteriedreport.com

PBIED ATTACKS

The scene of the PBIED during daylight. The woman, Reda Mohammad Mahmud, was

The attackers were both local ASG members. The

reportedly part of the [Hatib Hajan] Sawadjaan faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group. According to some reports, she was also involved in the Palm Sunday church bombings in April 2017, in Tanta and Alexandria, Egypt, in which 47 people were killed. On June 28, 2019, at about noon, two operatives wearing PBIEDs attacked a military camp of the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the Philippines Army in Sitio Tanjung, Barangay Kajatian, Inandan Municipality, Sulu. Six people were killed in the attack, including three soldiers and three civilians, and over twenty others were injured, both soldiers and civilians. The first PBIED was initiated at a military checkpoint outside Camp BCT. The second attacker took advantage of the distraction to run into the camp, where he initiated his PBIED.

Islamic State published a claim of responsibility via their Amaq News Agency for the attack, with images of the suicide bombers. They were identified by their aliases “Black” and “Norman.” One of the attackers was reportedly a Filipino, and was identified via DNA testing as 23-year-old Norman Lasuca. The second attacker was described as a Caucasian, and is believed to be the son of the attacker who committed the SVBIED attack in Lamitan City, Basilan in July 2018. The attack is believed to be the first ASG suicide bombing mission, and it is the first officially confirmed case of a suicide bombing in the Philippines perpetrated by a Filipino since a 33-year-old ASG suicide bomber initiated a tricycle VBIED outside a restaurant in Zamboanga frequented by troops in October 2002, killing an American Green Beret and two Filipinos, marking an escalation in terror tactics by local extremists.

42 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

PBIED ATTACKS

Remains of the initiation system and two 9 V batteries. counteriedreport.com

PBIED ATTACKS

The entrance to Camp BCT.

Signs of an explosion and fragmentation markings at the entrance to the camp. In the September suicide bombing, the attacker, Reda Mohammad Mahmud, was identified as a potential threat by soldiers who “took shelter” before the PBIED was initiated and thus were not injured. The ability to identify an approaching suicide bomber from a distance is testament to the alertness of the soldiers manning the checkpoint and their mindfulness 44 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

of the dangers posed by the threat of suicide bombers, among other known threats. Reportedly, the identifiable signs included external identification of a suspicious item on the suspect’s body, as well as signs of confusion, and a lack of coherence – indications that can sometimes point to a psychotic condition prior to a suicide bombing.

PBIED ATTACKS

James, is believed to be a Filipino. This combination of foreign suicide bombers with a local Filipino bomber appears to be the beginning of a local (ASG) suicide bombing tactic that is progressing at surprising speed and intensity each day. With IS in Iraq and Syria a pale shadow of the former caliphate, dwindled into sleeper cells in cities and towns, foreign fighters with experience in IS former territories or others who planned to join them started to turn their eyes to The ISEA claim of responsibility was accompanied with this image of the two suicide bombers. the Philippines, probably as a result of the moderate success Reda’s son and husband were two of the of Islamists in the Battle of Marawi in 2017. In some three attackers who were killed in the firefight in of the known cases, these foreign fighters came with November. The two were Egyptian citizens, like Reda. their families - spouses, children and sometimes both IS-sponsored or directed family suicide attacks is – who contributed to the IS cause in the Philippines a trend recently documented in a nearby area of by carrying out suicide bombings, thus making Southeast Asia, Indonesia, where entire families – maritime Southeast Asia the leading arena for suicide including the father, mother and children of all ages – bomber families. ■ have committed suicide bombings. The recent suicide bombings in the Philippine arena demonstrate the rapid escalation in the progression of such attacks in the arena. It appears that the IS trend of family suicide bomber attacks has expanded to the Philippines. In the first such case of family attacks, a father first perpetrated a suicide bombing with an SVBIED in Basilan in July 2018, and his son carried out a PBIED attack in June 2019, along with Filipino Norman Lasuca. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for both attacks, identifying the July 2018 attacker as Abu Khathir al-Maghrebi [Lit. “The Moroccan.”] In the second case of family attacks, the mother of the Egyptian family initiated a PBIED in an attempted attack in September 2019, and her husband and son attempted to follow in her footsteps in the thwarted November 2019 double PBIED attack. The November incident involved two foreign (Egyptian) residents, while the third perpetrator,

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Chief Superintendent (ret.) Michael Cardash, Senior bomb technician and former deputy head of the Israeli police bomb disposal division, commanded bomb disposal units within the border guards and police during intense terrorist conflicts in Israel. Michael currently is the senior CIED analyst at Terrogence, researches IED’s and authors the Terrogence Möbius C-IED reports analyzing and assessing global IEDrelated technical and tactical intelligence. counteriedreport.com

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USE OF ARSON BY THREAT NETWORKS

BRING THE HELL TO THEM: USE OF ARSON BY THREAT NETWORKS By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence “When all else fails, kill it with fire.” (Larry Correia, in his book “Monster Hunter Alpha”, firstly published in 2011)

nfortunately, fires seem not to be not a new weapon of choice for terrorist purposes at all, so among many other cases that happened during 20th & 21st centuries, at a first sight we could identify several cases with potentially direct or indirect usage of arson during incidents caused by non-state actors, as follows; • March 25, 1990 (New York, USA), some gasoline was burned at the exit of a night club, resulting in 87 killed persons; • December 2000 (New York, USA), a planned fires campaign from eco-terrorism took place; • September 11, 2001 (New York, USA), the fire as a consequence from airplanes’ impact was the cause for most of the almost 3,000 deaths; • November 28, 2008 (Mumbai, INDIA), Lashkar-iTayyiba fighters caused an arson fire at Taj Mahal hotel, which produced several casualties; • September 11, 2012 (Benghazi, LIBYA), arson fire was used against the USA Mission during the attack sponsored by elements of Ansar al-Sharia and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); • Several other plots regarding arson (e.g. sabotage of fire safety and gas lines in buildings) from AlQaeda militants have been discovered in the United States, the United Kingdom and some other countries…

Figure 1: Poster published in USA during the Second World War. (Source – http://warposters.blogspot.com/) counteriedreport.com

USE OF ARSON BY THREAT NETWORKS

In fact, the use of Molotov cocktails (and some other incendiary devices) by threat networks have been sadly habitual from decades ago, with especial relevance to anarchists, eco-terrorists, supremacists, and separatist groups, including proxy forces and insurgency too…

And fear the fire that was prepared for the disbelievers1 Although improvised incendiary devices have usually been included in insurgent/terrorist manuals and propaganda from long ago, it was on May 2nd 2012 when Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) published the article “It Is of Your Freedom to Ignite a Firebomb” in 9th issue of INSPIRE digital magazine, just promoting the use of arson fires in woodland, while instructing about how to manufacture improvised incendiary devices. From the other side of the radical jihadism, the fifth issue of DAESH’s magazine “RUMIYAH” was released

in January 2017, including an article about “Arson Attacks”, just recommending their terrorist use. On the other hand, the Gaza Strip has been a scenario of arson (intentional fires) caused by balloons fitted with incendiary devices and sent from Palestinian side, which have been burning crops in Israeli territories from 2018; just following the typical Palestine brands’ approach, numerous videos and pictures showing the effects of that activity have been widely distributed and visible through social media, and news agencies. The impressive effects of fires and the crisis associated with them in Western countries have effectively been identified by the 150th issue of AlNaba magazine (as released in October 2018), which highlighted the high impact of the California fires over the whole American country; the referred article in the magazine was followed by several comments in social media regarding why and how to cause that kind of fire…

Figure 2: “INSPIRE” magazine, 9th issue May 2012. (Source – www.archive.org) 1 Free translation from Quran, Sura 3: AL-E-IMRAN

48 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

USE OF ARSON BY THREAT NETWORKS

Figure 3: “RUMIYAH” magazine, 5th issue January 2017. (Source – www.archive.org)

Figure 4: Page from Al-Naba #150 & capture from Telegram comment “With only five euros”. (Source – www.twitter.com) counteriedreport.com

USE OF ARSON BY THREAT NETWORKS

Figure 5: Kites & balloons with incendiary devices. (Source – https://www.timesofisrael.com & https://aawsat.com/) More intense propaganda regarding the recommendation of the use of arson by Daesh’s followers has been conducted during 2019; on January 4th, a Daesh’s media agency (AL FAQEER MEDIA) released some posters under the “METHODS OF BURNING” series, in which they were informing about different tactics, techniques & procedures related to incendiary devices and arson…

It was on March 21st 2019 when the Daeshsupportive Al-Battar Media Foundation released a video (“And None Knows the Soldiers of Your Lord Except Him”, in Arabic language and Englishsubtitled). It mixed fires/metrics about losses caused in the California wildfires with scenes of children affected by airstrikes, just calling to “…burn the houses of the infidels and their cities as they bombed our cities…“

Figure 6: “Methods of Burning” posters by Al-Faqeer Media. (Source – www.twitter.com)

Figure 7: Banner from the referred Al-Battar Media Foundation’s video. (Source – www.twitter.com) 50 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

USE OF ARSON BY THREAT NETWORKS

Figure 8: Captures from “And None Knows the Soldiers of Your Lord Except Him” video. (Source – www.ghuraba.pw, Telegram) On March 19th 2019, an unofficial (by then) Daesh’s agency (AL-QURAYSH) published and released a poster in which the production of arson fires in Europe and United States were incited through “targeting forest and farms”, and reinforcing the action with the message “… it is painful to them”. There was even a Telegram channel in which that message was commented and refined as “To the monotheists; set fire to forests and farms. If you are living in Europe and America, this is Great Jihad”.

Between May & June 2019, Daesh-promoted “AL-NABA” digital newsletter was showing the effects of intentional arson fires developed by Daesh’s factions over Iraqi farmers’ crops; simultaneously, other regional Media Agencies (e.g. MAQDISI) were giving relevance and producing propaganda about it. We should take into account that those intentional fires in Iraq were imitated in Jordanian territory too.

Figure 9: Poster from Al-Quraysh Media. (Source – Twitter, Telegram) But not only Daesh has been promoting the development of arson against infidels during 2019; an AlQaeda’s ideologue (Abu Abdul Karim al-Gharbi) posted a message on his Telegram channel on March 23rd 2019, just urging that lone-wolf jihadists should carry out operations, suggesting arson and strikes on transportation and power plans in America “…Where are you from

Figure 10: “Al-NABA” magazine, June 2019.

burning the forests and agriculture in America?…“

(Source – www.archive.org, Telegram)

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USE OF ARSON BY THREAT NETWORKS

Figure 11: “Al-NABA” magazine #183 & #184, June 2019. (Source – www.archive.org, Telegram)

Figure 12: Poster from Al-Faqir Media. (Source – Telegram) 52 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

USE OF ARSON BY THREAT NETWORKS

In a similar manner than previously considered sources, Al-Abd al-Faqir Media Foundation was promoting the development of arson fires by Daesh’s followers in May 2019. Other jihadist propaganda sources have been distributing three posters in French language urging arson fires against the unbelievers late October 2019.

Flaming words; the rise of Al-Quraysh Media Do you remember Al-Quraysh Media? Well, they were also distributing propaganda (posters) asking for arson fires to Daesh’s fighters last April and June 2019 again.

Figure 14: Al-Quraysh Media’s poster promoting arson fires as released in April 2019. (Source – Twitter, Telegram)

Figure 15: Posters from Al-Quraysh Media, June 2019. (Source – Telegram, www.memri.com)

Figure 13: Posters promoting arson fires in French language. (Source – Twitter)

Aiming to open their scope, and most probably in the intent to gain some relevance inside the jihadist propaganda means, Al-Quraysh Media announced to include English language in their messages late September 2019. From the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Al-Quraysh Media has been acquiring some sort of co-leading role in Daesh-related propaganda, which reached its highest point when Al-Quraysh published a message urging Daesh’s followers to only pay attention to Daesh’s official media agencies, in which Al- Quraysh members included themselves. counteriedreport.com

USE OF ARSON BY THREAT NETWORKS

Figure 16: Al-Quraysh Media’s poster promoting use of airships & arson fires, November 17th 2019. (Source – Twitter, Telegram)

Figure 18: Al-Quraysh poster promoting arson fires through gas stations, November 19th 2019. (Source – Twitter, Telegram)

Figure 17: Al-Quraysh Media’s poster promoting arson fires in Europe, November 18th 2019. (Source – Twitter, Telegram)

Figure 19: Propaganda including arson & distributed in RIOT on December 9th 2019. (Source – https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/)

But it was Mid-November 2019 when several successive posters were released by Al-Quraysh including direct reference to the terrorist use of arson fires. Al-Quraysh is constantly influencing Daesh’s followers to conduct attacks through arson fires, even including ideas about the use of aerial unmanned

platforms as device vectors; the further connection with drones and/or balloons is highly anticipated. The influence from Al-Quraysh is having some effect over jihadist groups/forums in several social media platforms (e.g. RIOT…), which is effectively spreading the propaganda regarding terrorist use of arson…

54 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

USE OF ARSON BY THREAT NETWORKS

A tiny spark could probably get followed by a mighty flame Unfortunately, we could not avoid the bombardment with images that the Internet & public media are continually providing to the widest audience… and the last days have been witnesses of the huge disaster in Australia due to unstoppable wildfires devastating the whole country. There is no need of a PhD in Mathematics to anticipate the potential result of the sum of: • The Australian hell-in-the-earth’s vision; • Latest propaganda by a relevant official media agency serving Daesh; • The cost-effective use of flying burning items in Gaza; • The relatively easy way of manufacturing incendiary devices; • And maybe the affordable access to drones is not going to help security too much! Some analysts are identifying the probable consideration of the use of arson as a “non-sexy” weapon for terrorism by the potential target audience of jihadist propaganda as one of the reasons which is making the jihadist terrorists not to follow a path which has been traditionally appreciated by eco-terrorism, anarchism, separatism, supremacism, and some other networks… the close future will unveil intentions! ■

“War, like fire, doesn’t stay where it is created )”

(

(Hassan Daoud in his book “One Hundred and eighty Sunsets (

)”, firstly published in 2008)

REFERENCES “Report: Threat from Jihadist use of arson”, by Jose Rufas, C-IED CoE, November 2019.

Disclaimer

This article would never represent the opinion of any national or multinational organization, so its whole content should only be considered as the opinion from the author. Please feel free to send your comments, corrections and inputs to the author - it would always be highly appreciated.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas graduated from the Spanish Army Military Academy in 1993. He was commissioned into the C-IED Centre of Excellence as Head of the Defeat the Device Branch in August 2016, and currently holding a post of Chief of Attack the Networks Branch. As a Military Engineer Officer, his background has been mainly based on Explosive Ordnance Disposal activities in the Spanish Army and C-IED staff issues at the multinational headquarters. In addition to his EOD Operator / EOD Officer education, he attended some other military courses regarding Parachuting, Army Staff, Information Operations, War College General/ Joint Staff, Military Search, Technical Exploitation Operations, Weapons Intelligence Team, Exploitation Laboratories, Homemade Explosives and other C-IED courses. His operational assignments include Bosnia and Herzegovina (3), Afghanistan (3), Republic of Ecuador, Iraq and Uganda.

Email: jrufas@ciedcoe.org

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SMALL HAND-HELD INITIATION SYSTEMS

SMALL HAND-HELD INITIATION SYSTEMS (HZG) By DynITEC GmbH

NTRODUCTION

DynITEC GmbH was founded out of Dynamit Nobel in 2002 and is a leading supplier of energetic material for military and civil applications, explosive devices used by military and police, and electronic initiation systems. The company works within the law enforcement and civil sector in 20 countries worldwide. DynITEC was commissioned to develop a new small lightweight hand-held initiation system (HZG) according to military specifications, the outcome is already in use in several countries within the law enforcement. Not resting on successes with former developments like the Combifire (CF) or BFAS System, DynITEC created, even in a military-abusive environment and made out of a solid block of Aluminum, a durable hand-held initiation system with features including being waterproof down to 7 meters and qualified to Mil Spec’s MIL-STD 810, the HZG Hybrid. The HZG Hybrid requires a safety key that prevents unauthorized use leading to law enforcement/ blasting regulations not needing any adaptation. DynITEC had the vision of getting something out to the community helping the operators out there in all their missions to initiate everything that could be used to prevent any mission failure. We created a hand-held initiation system that is rugged enough to be used in all climate zones and temperature ranges with and without gloves. As an added feature, night vision can be offered switching the System to IR Mode using a different safety key, with a distinguishing

shape other than the standard safety key. The electric firing output is designed to fire Class 1 to Class 4 blasting caps. The HZG Hybrid can be ready to fire in less than 10 seconds and features an automatic circuit test, reducing the weight carried by the operator, eliminating carrying a separate circuit tester. The benefit for the operator lies in the fact that the system is safe and comprehensible under stressed conditions. The status of the hand-held ignition system and connected circuit is displayed with 3 each tri-color LED for successful and reliable use for applications in EOD, C-IED, EMOE or blasting operations also under extreme stress conditions. Amongst the electric detonators, the HZG Hybrid also initiates electronic blasting caps. Should the operator need to expand the HZG Hybrid to be able to use NONEL/Shock Tube systems, this can be achieved by adding the DynITEC FZ Adapter. The FZ Adapter is made from a solid block of aluminum and features easy maintenance in the field. With this add on, connected easily to the HZG Hybrid, the operator can use one system to cover all modern initiation possibilities available on the market (wired electric, electronic and Nonel/Shocktube). The HZG Hybrid is the choice of the majority of operators in day and night missions in different branches across law enforcement forces demanding a lightweight, reliable, rugged System built to Military standards.

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SMALL HAND-HELD INITIATION SYSTEMS

M2167 Wired Initiator

HZG M2167 The HZG M2167 complements the HZG family of systems, should the performance of the HZG, as described above, not be sufficient. Likewise, it requires a safety key that prevents unauthorized use leading to law enforcement / blasting regulations not needing any adaptation. DynITEC had the vision of getting something out to the community helping the operators out there in all their missions to initiate every electric Blasting cap on the market and in every country that it could be used, to prevent any mission failure. We created a hand-held initiation system that is rugged enough to be used in all climate zones and temperature ranges with and without gloves. As an added feature, night vision can be offered switching the System to IR Mode using a different safety key with a distinguishing shape other than the standard safety key. The electric firing output is designed with 39 Joules to fire Class 1 to Class 4 blasting caps, cartridges of rocket wrenches or disrupters, cable cutters or pyrotechnics, the output being sufficient to accommodate that the operator can be in the safe distance and can conduct demolition with a high number of blasting caps. The HZG M2167 has as a unique feature with 2 different firing circuits, which can be tested with the built in circuit tester and fired separately with a firing output of 925 Volts and 39 Joules and a maximum firing resistance of 199 ohms so bulk disposal or military demolition can be safely 58 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

DEX C-255

HZG Hybrid

conducted. The HZG M2167 can be ready to fire in less than 20 seconds and features an automatic circuit test reducing the weight carried by the operator, eliminating the need for a separate circuit tester. The benefit for the operator lies in the fact that the system is safe and comprehensible under stressed conditions. The status of the hand-held ignition system and connected circuit is displayed with 3 each tri-color LED for successful and reliable use for applications in EOD, C-IED, EMOE or blasting operations also under extreme stress conditions and is confirmed according to the AOP31.

DEX C-255 The latest development of the wired Systems by DynITEC is the DEX C-255, developed for customers not needing Military Systems. The DEX C-255 as a civilian classified system, is a lightweight, full aluminum housing, waterproof system, designed to have a fast charging of all types of electrical detonators (Class 1- 4 ) and with a Shocktube Adapter also NONEL. The System is also able to fire electronic Detonators. To meet safety standards the System has also a safety key like the whole DynITECâ€™s product family of the wired ignition systems and also a built in circuit tester. Should additional information be required, please do not hesitate to contact us at eod-ied@dynitec.com or call +49 2241 208 4465. â–

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WEAPONIZED DRONES IN LIBYA

MEETING THE MOTHER OF ALL HOMEMADE WEAPONIZED DRONES IN LIBYA… By Lieutenant Colonel Jose M Rufas, Chief of Attack the Networks Branch, C-IED Centre of Excellence

“You wanna fly, you got to give up the shit that weighs you down.”

(Toni Morrison in her book “Song of Solomon”, first published 1977)

n January 12th 2020, Al-Karama Operations Room of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) officially reported a shot-down “Turkish drone that was carrying mortar rounds in violation of the latest ceasefire between the LNA and the Government of National Accord (GNA)”.

Almost immediately after such an official announcement, the Internet results in a “swarm” of comments and opinions through social media, along with catching some attention from international public media.

Figure 1: Pictures of the referred drone. (Source - https://www.knnc.net/Details.aspx?jimare=26234) counteriedreport.com

WEAPONIZED DRONES IN LIBYA

There is even a video (https://youtu.be/oIK2UfMYGA) showing the allegedly captured unmanned aircraft system (UAS). Two matters are mainly highlighted in all the potentially informative sources; • It is declared as some kind of a “Turkish drone”; • It is carrying two 120mm mortar grenades as a payload…

Nothing fosters ignorance more than one’s own opinions… Opinions could be brave but facts are stronger; so that vehicle strongly referred as a “Turkish drone” could not be further away from some sort of “factory-made in Turkey” military grade UAS. It is merely based on something closer to an industrial drone manufactured with commercial components which could be acquired through the Internet (with the notable exception of the 120-millimeter mortar rounds). In fact, the unmanned vehicle is utilizing a commercial kit (most probably a GRYPHON DYNAMICS GD-120X ready-to-fly (RTF) kit or just all

its components separately bought) as a basis for its design… the flying device includes (at least); • A GRYPHON DYNAMICS XQ-2000SP-4p carbon/ aluminum airframe; • Eight (8) TATTU 32000 MAh 22.8V 10C 6S1P Li-Po batteries; • Eight T-MOTOR U15 II brushless motors 100kv; • Eight T-MOTOR FLAME 80A HV Electronic Speed Controllers (ESC); • Eight T-MOTOR 40’’ x 13.1’’ carbon fiber/epoxy propellers; • (Most probably, due to it is not fully mounted) Four-legged landing gear T-Type 390mm; • Additional battery trays; • Additional top & bottom center plates (it is not clearly identifiable as a HEXA or OCTO shape and their diameter, which could be most probably 320mm); • Additional supplementary accessories (e.g. connectors, battery eliminator circuits BEC, etc.)… The couple of (unidentified) servo robotic grips could easily be acquired through the World Wide Web.

Figure 2: GRYPHON DYNAMICS GD-120X RTF. (Source - http://gryphondynamics.co.kr/) 62 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

WEAPONIZED DRONES IN LIBYA

With regards to the rest of potential components and functions (e.g. camera, gimbal system, extended antenna, automated pilot, global navigation satellite system, weather-proofing covers, etc…), it is not easy to identify them from a couple of pictures from the web. Nonetheless, and in accordance with the specifications of a basic (so non-fitted with some supplementary accessories) GRYPHON DYNAMICS GD-120X RTF device, its 100-kilogram maximum payload (145 kg Maximum Take-off weight MTOW, and 90 Kg recommended payload) largely exceeds the one required for the referred drone configuration as shown in Figure 1. And finally, we will deal with the kind of carried munition; so although the markings and the whole number of undercut gas check rings are not fully visible, we could estimate the 120mm mortar grenades to be a version of the Russian OF-843 series or even a Serbian model (see number of flash holes, two-section body/tail, shape, amount of fin tails…). Please note the synthetic protective bands allocated along the grenade’s body to assure the proper action of the grips, and maybe to avoid potential vibrations… The mortar grenade’s fuze could be consistent with a version (modified or not!) of the Russian GVMZ series but… some sort of transportation safety ring seems to be allocated on the fuze!!! After analyzing the evidenced dirt, impacts and damages to the drone, it looks like the announced “shot down” should get made with some kind of jamming (all visible damages are focused on the extreme of one of the propellers, and maybe in the lack of some of the legs of the landing gear)… nonetheless, it is quite strange, the excellent condition of such a heavy UAS and munitions after an alleged shoot down over land surface! You could even accuse the author of unconfirmed suspicions about the reality behind the reported UAS or even the alleged manufacture by enemies of the people showing the drone, but at least you should admit that the potential sum of cleanliness, little damage, apparent non-usage, and safe fuze could led someone to a possible rational doubt about what the whole truth could be…

Figure 3: Details of the mortar rounds & servo grips. (Source - https://www.facebook.com/ObservatoryLY/)

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WEAPONIZED DRONES IN LIBYA

Figure 4: Downed UAS in Suweida SYR, September 2017. (Source – www.twitter.com)

A bit of history regarding marriage between UAS & mortar grenades As far as the author could know, the first evidence of the use of munitions similar to mortar grenades (considering size, weight, and shape, among others…) with drones by non-state actors (or 64 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

Threat Networks) was noticed in Suweida SYRIA in September 2017. It was July 2018 when a video from Houthi rebels showed a modified Iranian “Ababil” reconnaissance drone dropping seven Iranian 60mm mortar grenades with modified fuzes over Yemeni governmental forces.

WEAPONIZED DRONES IN LIBYA

Figure 5: Capture from a video produced by Houthi rebels in Yemen, July 2018. (Source – www.twitter.com) On June 3rd 2019, the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) announced a video showing a large ammo depot uncovered by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) during a search operation in Southern Syria; a DJI MATRICE 600 drone could be seen, and it seemed to have been modified to carry mortar grenades and additional optical systems.

Unfortunately, and in its well-intentioned intent of finding advanced means to defend our countries from external threats, the Military industry is continuously providing new clues and ideas for the threat networks to think about potential ways of creating terror… but nobody is perfect!

Figure 6: Capture from a video of SANA in Syria, June 2019. (Source – https://youtu.be/qnkKgQNf6NY) counteriedreport.com

WEAPONIZED DRONES IN LIBYA

Figure 7: Captures from a promotional video of Chinese CSSC company showing the capabilities of “Hetun-2” rotary-wing drone. (Source - https://twitter.com/i/videos/tweet/1112377231072911366) 66 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

WEAPONIZED DRONES IN LIBYA

On the other hand, the potential effects from the detonation of twin heavy mortar grenades over the land forces is always something to seriously think about getting protected from…■

“Small birds throw seeds out of the feeder; large birds pick them up off the ground, but the squirrels try to muscle in.” (Lilian Jackson Braun in her book “The Cat Who Sang for the Birds Quotes” published on February 2nd 1998)

Disclaimer This article would never represent the opinion of any Figure 8: An 81-millimeter GPS-guided Air Dropped Mortar shell, which is prepared for a test drop by General Dynamics. national or multinational organization, so its whole (Source - https://arstechnica.com/ )

“Cave ab homine unius libri1” The reported Syrian incident with the drone fitted with mortar grenades could maybe make us aware of the relative ease of buying a heavy-lift UAS through partial acquisition of different commercial parts through the Internet (you would merely need some serious savings between $30,000 and $50,000)… and the instructions to mount that kind of drone are fully accessible too, which could require basic to medium skills from a potential final user of those flying machines. The provision of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to be dropped from the drones, or even the discovery, recovery & manipulation of unexploded mortar grenades (or another kind of munition) from conflict areas, former war zones or even from military training ranges would be much more difficult, but not impossible at all. In fact, the dream of owning an air force with bombing capability by non-state actors or threat networks will most probably persist inside their minds… and Daesh has already produced powerful marketing about the attractiveness, visibility & impact in videos showing commercial and/or homemade drones dropping explosive devices over their enemies.

content should only be considered as the opinion from the author. Please feel free to send your comments, corrections and inputs to the author; it would be highly appreciated.

Email: jrufas@ciedcoe.org

1 (Free translation) Beware of anyone who has just one book…

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EXPLOSIVES SEARCH DOGS AND CROWD SEARCHING

A QUICK LOOK AT EXPLOSIVES SEARCH DOGS AND CROWD SEARCHING By Jim Vernon (Snr) DESA Projects Manager/Lead IQA (Drugs & Explosives Search Association)

ollowing on from my previous article in C-IED can I firstly thank you for the comments and questions in particular about standards issues, in the Explosives Detection Dog (EDD) sector. Clearly many of the issues and problems are still being encountered. But on a positive note, there have clearly been advances in the underpinning and scientific knowledge on the dog’s olfactory capabilities. Thanks to an increased demand for scientific data and a gradual and better understanding of the tactics and applications to maximise on the dog’s amazing odour detection capabilities rather than relying on individual ‘opinions’

feature hidden devices, hazardous substances and IED components abandoned and that are now being discovered in these partially populated areas. The Humanitarian requirements need to adapt and develop safe, effective and economical methods of dealing with these IEDs left undiscovered or purposefully hidden.

or worse, the myths and magic some pedal. I think it’s a great point to draw down on some aspects of the Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Sector, who are literally drafting from the ground up their own standards and Test and Evaluation Protocols (TEP’s) and so they (GICHD - Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining) are drawing together all the current scientific knowledge, best practice and feedback from the operational SME’s in order to create an operational and testing platform that is world class safe and effective. They are moving this way as the lines between non-permissive and semi-permissive environments have become somewhat blurred as normality returns to some areas. Populations move back into their former homes while the threat from sudden violent incidents often remains and many collapsed buildings

Some lessons have been learned from terror incidents at major public gatherings and sporting or entertainment events. From the Boston marathon (US) attacks to the UK’s Manchester Arena suicide bombing attack. The common denominator is the fact that those IEDs were carried to their target by individuals mingled with crowds. Both used rucksacks and one was placed among the crowds, the other also a rucksack was carried by a lone terrorist into the venue’s mass of exiting people and was detonated in a suicide attack. We are talking not about searching for buried mines, or roadside IEDs, or caches of devices or substances. But moving persons mostly and then the more ‘so called’ traditional EDD roles at crowded events i.e. searching litter bins, deliveries of freight, or materials and fixtures and fittings at these large events.

USING DOGS TO SCREEN MOVING PERSONS & CROWDS From these initiatives I agreed to this time focus on a growing need. Crowd safety requirements supported by utilising EDD Teams (EDDTs).

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EXPLOSIVES SEARCH DOGS AND CROWD SEARCHING

Let me start by saying that there is nothing new or patentable in the way a dog hunts their moving prey. The idea that someone can lay claim to the way a canine animal hunts I find somewhat bizarre. Using dog teams to detect and then follow a moving target’s odour plume, has been utilised and practised by many Police and Military and to great effect, for many decades. But, as in the previous article I advocated it is a team effort. The less the handler interferes with each dog’s individual natural pattern and behaviour, then the better. We should let the dog search naturally and only impose ourselves where some measure or level of control is required for safety and practical purposes. These somewhat traditional but challenging detection roles require that we develop suitable testing regimes that reflect the different operational requirements that have developed as terrorists change their modus operandi and they themselves become more dog savvy. We need to consider the end use and how to avoid confusion in the dogs’ need to switch from (and I generalise here) ground scenting to a more air scenting the odour plume role, coming from a moving prey (moving IED carrying people). There is ample evidence and trials data now to advocate we train and condition our dogs for specific roles and specialisms, in order to get a more

detection and readable indications given by dogs, when utilising their olfactory capabilities (Nose/ Sniffing) to detect target items and odours (Scent). These are neurocognitive issues behind olfactory processing and learning in relation to training scent processing canines for explosives and other Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) search.1

targeted search response from the dogs. If only to apply the human logic to a dog’s behaviour for easy understanding i.e. that a specialist will perform better in their specialism than if we expect them to constantly change between roles. I have used the analogy before but: “It is as different as a speed skater and a figure skater. Both can skate, but there is a world of difference in their performances” It is impossible or certainly impractical, to develop a test or assessment for every single situation or hazard type that might be encountered by Explosive Detection Dog Teams (EDDTs). But there are some generics and constants that we can utilise, that focus on the need for accurate

a dog can, but a dog cannot think, problem solve and analyse situations to the degree a human can. Training and assessment (T&A) should be/are designed to reflect a wide spread of search situations (humans) and target odours and items (dogs) for a so called general purpose dog team. The general purpose EDDT roles require them for example, to make a change in task for an immediate switch from searching vehicles, to suddenly be required to deploy to a suspicious package, or ground sign, or building. The required common denominator is: ‘the team’s ability to alert and indicate target items and odours’ this is what we are testing and assessing. Not the tactics chosen, or changed environmental, or

THE CONCEPT IS ‘THEY OPERATE AS A TEAM’ It is important that training, testing, and unforeseen circumstances can all be catered for by ensuring the test and training assessments are robust on the main principles i.e. that of odour detection and odour discrimination first and foremost. But, the handler’s interaction with their dog(s) is also a key to this successful team approach. This needs to accommodate, any flexibility in assessment requirements for working together as a team, or on-site adapting needed or that may be required at short notice. Such as medical emergencies, with any additional risks minimised as much as and wherever possible. The unique feature of the EDD dog and handler team’s complex interactions are starting to be better understood and are based on a huge element of familiarity, loyalty, trust and complementing senses. Put simply, humans cannot smell odours to the level

1 Canine Olfaction: Scent, Sign and Situation (with Catherine Reeve) In A. Horowitz (ed.). Domestic Dog Cognition and Behavior. New York: Springer.

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other distracting factors. The Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs), threat assessments (TAs) and onsite management decisions or requests will influence those mostly. The handler and dog(s) as a team…can then be tasked more effectively, providing the threat and risk assessments allows for their deployment to search as teams together. One nose and one brain complementing each other, hunting for their ‘trained for’ target Odours and items. Ideally in an environment they are familiar with and so they are mostly trained in what we call a Real Work Environment (RWE). But for searching moving people and with a high degree of accuracy then you need to consider and understand you are into a speciality area. A traditional mine detection dog (MDD) role is focused mainly on ground scent and a slow methodical pace and going on point (indicating) when their target is located. The other general purpose EDD is more used to free searching mainly, so combines mostly air plumes and near ground scent cones, then tracking that to source... often at speed in the most direct way i.e. not necessarily in a straight line or using mine taped lanes or boxes. Sometimes they need to search off lead and at long distance. The de-mining dog example chosen, reflects that the MDD is trained to focus more on close ground scent,

hugely. Whilst not compulsory, the ODT gives a measure of comfort to clients and handlers that their dogs (we use dogs in tandem always i.e. one handler two dogs) can and are actually recognising the primary odours foremost, rather than getting used to any of the other background components that accompany the IEDs. The research to date and trial results seem to vary and suggest there are pluses and minuses. If we can boil that down a bit: When looking for IEDs we also might first encounter component parts, such as crush wire switches and pressure plates. It is vital we can and do detect them also and so make them part of the dog’s target scent picture (odour repertoire), even if in some cases, there are no primed charges attached. The volatile compounds are the ones that are the primary odour within the desired outcome i.e. detecting items and compounds that have the potential to kill and harm. The pressure plate won’t kill you, but the attached explosives will. Discover one and you will discover and hopefully avoid triggering the other. This ODT was never meant to be, or used as, a test of ‘operational competence’. As the name suggests it is just an odour discrimination test and suggested T&A process.

often in minute quantities and the main background odours/distractors tend to consist mostly of simple soil types, ground disturbance and cut vegetation. That in itself is a different and desired specialism. If anything for the MDD their danger is one of repetitive task performance decline. (Boredom) Let us look at the first element of the EDDT’s testing regime, usually encountered or used by, Government agencies, NGO’s and some Mil/Pol... this one being the Odour Discrimination Testing (ODT). Often called ‘proofing’ in some dog sectors. This is still for some, arguably not necessary. As dog teams are rarely if ever searching for pristine, clinically pure explosive compounds and the other main Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) such as used for Home Made Explosives (HME) that are a mixture of varying ingredients and thus the overall ‘scent picture’ varies

It simply confirms the ability to absolutely detect the main target Explosives/VOCs and discriminate them from other non-target and non-harmful organic or inert distractors during that test.

THE UNDERPINNING TEST AND ASSESSMENT (TA) LOGIC Testing and assessing for Operational fitness are the only parts of the team’s own accreditation process that will Pass or Fail a team for these EDDT roles. That means Dog(s) and Handlers working in harmony and effectively and safely. The Odour discrimination (OD) testing however, will boost a team’s and their employer’s confidence (a vital and desired mind set) but importantly can highlight and give advanced notice of possible training gaps and requirements, or errors and can even prompt the issue counteriedreport.com

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of a CAPA2 notice, so is a ‘recommend compulsory’ periodic test for all teams with no exceptions. Simply setting the testing and assessing (TA) bar massively high, is not the answer to everything, or anything wrong in the whole, or indeed any QA process. But testing is a vital part and therefore must be fair, safe, effective and achievable. Dogs in most reasonable environmental circumstances regularly detect in the mid to high ninety percent (90%) range of success ratios. With good Quality Management Systems (QMS) and TA using a robust Corrective Action Preventative Action (CAPA) policy regular 100% success detection ratios are now more commonplace. So there are differences... but for EDDTs we want to interfere as little as possible with our dog’s nose and hunting technique, or what, or how it is reading and smelling and behaving. The more we suppress or interfere, or train-in any unnatural but human desired factors, then the higher the margin for error will be. We only command or control our dog for reasons of safety, or to restrict their search area or pattern, to one that we humans can interpret and see. Any regular maintenance training and any testing that takes place, should mimic as much as possible their expected RWE. Back on theme...Crowds at major Public events.

But forgive me here whilst I focus on just the dog aspects, rather than just the need to or how to task, hire and or involve the dog teams in your security briefings and hopefully the overall planning process. Although it is vital that they know or are effectively briefed and you can then better dovetail them into your own SOPs and immediate actions on (IAs or AOs) drills. This aspect of tasking and knowledge on how to utilise, to best effect EDDTs is another and lengthy article if required or requested? Let’s assume you have your own dog teams or have tasked a suitably reputable company to provide your search team requirements. Hopefully you have selected your EDDTs not just based on size of the company or their websites claims? How without dog knowledge yourself or your own country having a robust high standard licence and auditing system (and few if any have them), would you know what standard and what current training and operational status these teams are? Short answer currently is ...You don’t! Even in some countries and their Government Agencies such as Customs and Aviation, the landscape internationally is totally fragmented and most operate to different standards and most are totally independent of each other. Many hold or attend international search

In the early days on arrival at an event I lost track how many times I would meet the local on-site security team and get ‘TOLD’ where to put my dog teams and who and how to search? There’s the first mistake organisers need to accept. Unless you have a fair knowledge of how an EDD team work and how to get the best from their dogs. Then you need to start with the process of firstly selecting, tasking then working with them, once of course you have ascertained their credentials and abilities etc. If you’re the organiser, or event security manager, you will know best your own venues strengths and weaknesses (Or you should!)... You will or should have liaised with local or national law enforcement and have regular threat assessment updates etc.

dog conferences and forums, but the truth is interdepartmental politics and certainly always finances have shown, immediately after the conferences and their calls for Universal standards most get back to their desk and... not a lot happens or changes. As a civilian ‘Events Organiser’ or ‘Crowd Stewarding’ or security company, you currently “pays yer money and takes yer chances” when employing an EDD. One way forward is for senior managers to undertake some training and gain some more detailed knowledge on just how a dog’s nose works, what tried and tested methods are available or open for you to utilise? Then your next consideration, what experience or underpinning knowledge level do you personally have

2 CAPA - Corrective Action Preventative Action.

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regarding Counter Threat (CT-search) and combine that with your existing or new- found dog knowledge? That should be your minimum goal if involved in any form of Public events organising from Pop Concert to Football games. Alternatively of course you could employ someone with checkable credentials to do that for you. The next bug bear is, against what standard are you measuring their competence? There are large multinational NGOs operating in some of the world’s most active conflict zones that ‘Still’ employ Handlers and K9 Team managers even, based simply on CVs, or length of time on the job? I see ex-Police dog section handlers or big private security company handlers being accepted over the phone and shipped out to the likes of Afghanistan, or other non-permissive environments. Having only ever worked a search dog in a civilian environment does not prepare a person for tactical use in non-permissive, indeed hostile, extremely volatile environments. Conversely an experienced ex-military High Assurance dog handler or Special Forces (SF) handler will not easily adapt to the civilian customer experience orientated K9 search world, in such as sporting and other major public events. So as in my other articles, it’s not all doom and gloom, there are pockets of excellence and even

it ever was) to simply employ someone to close the ferry doors before sailing out to sea. It’s no longer acceptable to use inferior materials on your buildings and assume they are adequate. It’s no longer safe to hire or use anyone or anything, without first doing your due diligence and taking all ‘reasonable’ precautions in relation to your Public’s safety, first and foremost. FACT. I’m no legal expert, but there’s that horrible subjective legal definition we all hate to see in any contract...’reasonableness’. What is or is not reasonable? Maybe a judge or coroner’s court will look on you favourably if you only employ Ex-Police or Military handlers? Or perhaps the young drug overdosed kid’s parents - will they accept you had drug search dogs at your venue trained by A or B Kennels and because they had a great website? Maybe they looked the part with smart uniforms and you checked a couple of previous clients even? Maybe they were members of this or that dog association. Would that be reasonable? Methinks this is just another massive law suit class action just waiting to happen! Because the next thing is, who are these Experts that will challenge you in a court room, or fight in your corner? I stated this before, after 40 years in this business and numerous accolades from such

independent single person, or small private companies providing some first class services. But that’s going to be no help when the coroner calls you in to testify after a major IED attack on your paying public. It moves me onto the legal aspects of culpability and risk reduction. Ever since the Herald of Free Enterprise car ferry rolled over in the English Channel after its car deck doors were left open and a few other international disasters and enquiries (some on-going like the London Grenfell Tower horrendous fire incident). In law it’s pretty certain now that the buck stops right at the top. CEOs no matter how far removed from their front line services can and will be now more closely looked at when blame needs to be established. In a recent case (in the UK again) two company directors were jailed for 7 years on Corporate Manslaughter charges. It is no longer acceptable (if

as universities and many law enforcement agencies, I’m considered an SME? But if so, then I’m still an uncomfortable one. What is there I can measure my expertise or achievements against? Currently there is nothing really internationally recognised overall and proven. A few claims to be maybe...yes. But I await the first major large scale IED explosion event where someone challenges the K9 EDDTs that were on duty, or their boss, or those employing that K9 Company. It’s a massive and as of yet virtually an untested problem. Another statement I’ve used before: ‘the closest thing I have seen to acceptable and truly international standards are such as the materials and standards put out as International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). But that covers De-mining and is only just now embarking on EDDT standards. counteriedreport.com

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SWGDOG is another credible set of standards and is a cross section of independents from academia, science and K9 users, as a body that have some excellent totally independent standardised materials and underpinning science and logic to support them. None though that really tackle the civil requirements adequately, with all its multifaceted requirements and considerations. Having more than aggressively warned the readers of the dangers and bad things out there to consider when wishing to employ explosives search teams and dogs. I guess we can all relax now for a while and take another slurp of our morning coffee and hopefully continue to read on a slightly more positive note. The way forward is (apart from some possible strong Government initiatives) by licensing and independently Quality Assuring of ALL their EDDT’s...That’s Handlers and Dogs operationally together. That’s a good buffer and start point, a step forward at least. But remember to check the QA staff you employ, or who’s decision you accept have themselves sufficient Dog and Search skills and not just traditional QA skills. In order to be able to, Assess and Assure the very unique and complex interactions between dogs and handlers. It’s thankfully, but slowly getting recognised: it’s a Dual skill activity. The sector is even more slowly waking-up to the fact

warning you and the not to do’s, it is only right I try to help, or open your minds at least. One of the first things I would strongly suggest is you try to find an experienced (how to measure?) individual or “independent” (and that’s vital) Quality Assuring Company. There aren’t many with the required additional dog and specialist search knowledge, because right now there are not many that feel they need or should use them yet. After all it’s an extra expense and we all know cash is king. The caveat there is, “can you really afford not to use them”? Then if you intend to use a particular K9 company regularly, I strongly suggest you arrange some way to continually (and certainly just prior to) employing and during any contract period... that you have them fully vetted and assessed to the best of your ability... that’s each team not the company as a whole i.e. both dogs and handlers individually and operationally assessed working as a team. Remember the bow doors on the ferry! The Independent QA will/should check records/ log book entries and IDs also their ‘claimed’ current status and standards and test them in a real work environment (RWE) that mimics as near as possible your own event or stadium/venue etc. They must also ensure their morning pre-tasking motivational search processes and even the SOPs for handling their test

that it is no longer acceptable to just have a person at the other end of the dog-lead simply waiting for their dog to sit in front of an object...or person? We expect, nay we demand when someone is working on our Gas boiler at home, that they are properly trained and certified. So why should we expect someone we trust to search for explosives and with hundreds of lives at risk (to get paid just £15 per hour in some cases) to be able to search safely and properly when there is no official body overseeing this training and licencing? Well for a start there are no credible agreed standards to license or judge them against. Each have their own ideas of what is required. Until that gets more widely accepted and acted on let me at least give you some tips and advice on how an EDDT can or could be utilised to make things safer for your public. Obviously having used several pages

samples and training aids are of a high/acceptable standard. Certainly check they know and understand AOs for finds and or explosions. There’s more to consider obviously... but if you did that much even, then you are likely to be in the region of five (5) times safer already. Now and importantly note please: QA and even Internal QA (IQA) is not and should not ever be punitive. The teams must not feel it is an invasive or an ‘us and them’ situation. It’s of benefit to them as well. Good QA is about utilising a robust CAPA system(s) and giving feedback and advice and help to teams and their employers, on how to improve and prevent issues. A good QA and CAPA policy and regime, ensures that they assist and affect directly the teams whilst alerting them to the most appropriate level of training and encourage management to assist

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and provide support in a timely fashion that has its emphasis on ‘prevention’ and promotes transparency and openness rather than a culture of blame, or worse a...’It wasn’t me’ or ‘Not my job’ culture. To be achieved by: 1. Looking at the lessons learned and the journey so far. 2. Better understanding of the testing regime required for better integration of EDD teams in the EDDT tool box approach. 3. Reduce the general lack of understanding of error rates by some testing staff/management and those needing to task EDD teams. 4. Understanding of the unique operational complexities of EDD teams. 5. Share best practice for the certification and maintenance of EDD teams. 6. Improve the across the board standardisation of Testing & Assessment. 7. Develop better training and support for specialist QA officers globally. 8. Strengthen the audit and transparency of quality measures and test regimes. 9. Improve the capture of all and more relevant data for research and audit. 10. Compulsory not optional continual personal development (CPD) of EDD teams.

make it to the starting line even unless 100% ready operationally anyway. On site EDD work procedures also need to be scrutinised, such as rest periods, ‘trained’ actors or staff, to carry test items to motivate dogs and occasionally covertly blind test the team performance levels not just the dog’s nose in isolation of other factors. Even such as welfare checks on both handlers and dogs. By training and involving existing staff for dual purpose support roles this can be done quite economically. This EDDT role is a high stress and difficult job requiring good people skills, self-discipline and initiative. Being an EDD Handler means you can often find yourself operating alone and needing to make important decisions, possibly finding you are the only one on-site or at a scene with a reasonable knowledge of ‘actions on’ for an incident or even explosions and people will be turning to you for leadership and help. That is just another reason I advocate only senior and properly trained (I/We use and call them a ‘Gold Team’- this is equivalent to a level 4 in academic strands) individuals/handlers and current operationally licensed and fit dog(s) to undertake any of your live explosives search. The Catch 22 is these knowledgeable and effective individuals are not out there in abundance and there is

11. Making testing more affordable and achievable without compromising safety. 12. Enable any deviation or flexibility measures in testing to be accommodated safely. 13. Leadership and active mobile training help and mentoring to adjust existing EDD. 14. Educate assist and involve, Senior Managers in the processes of TA to improve confidence.

no government approved independent licensing. But to continue explaining the DESA thinking and MO: Other than Gold standard (level 4), the experienced but level 3 handlers (Silver teams) can also search effectively for explosives, simply because they too can only search after a Pass or Fail assessment. (There are no half searches). These can therefore search safely but only if they are mentored by a Gold standard team similar to the EOD fraternity MO. This enables young up and coming or fairly new teams, with good dog skills but less practical search skills to gain firsthand experience on the Job whilst being mentored and closely monitored. If you as an organiser have done your best to check their credentials and ideally they are also checked by an independent quality assurance team on your behalf (unless you hold that level of experience with search

But of course it is only ever a ‘pass or fail’ assessment. When looking for explosives there are no second chances. But it’s rare to totally exclude a team, mostly it’s a retrain or tweak that is needed and hence CAPA is so effective and economical. If the company supplying the teams has a robust QA policy and maintenance training regime themselves utilising a CAPA system, then no dog/team will ever

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Dogs yourself). Even then independence from any financial or other influence has a lot of merit. It removes any financial incentive to pass or fail an individual. We also, like the UK Drivers’ licence system ensure that if the handler is known or connected to the EDDT they appoint another testing officer. Or at least capture their test on CCTV for further scrutiny. If you or your chosen QA are satisfied with your EDD contractor, or your chosen individual EDDT, then you can move into the next phase after selection of the teams you wish to search your public and facilities.

HOW TO SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY DEPLOY EDDT’S I have already hinted using dogs to search crowds of people on the move, or even static lines and queues is more specialised than an already difficult but skilled role of being a so called ‘traditional’ EDD - arrive and search the venue and seating, freight areas, visiting vehicles etc. This is more a ‘sweep search’ but mostly then the target odour is expected to have been in place for some time.

Because the dog will next discriminate from all those odours the one or two we ask them to track to source and tell us where. I don’t know about the readers, but I have been doing this for forty years and Dogs still amaze me, daily with their ability and willingness to do it just to please their handler. But it’s not an exact science, so it is vital we also employ the ‘trained’ human brain and mark two eye ball to team up and make the dog’s unique ability even more search aware and accurate. Think like the terrorist or bombers if you want to better detect them. The main difference that the average reader will understand is as stated above that when or if explosives or hazardous substances (VOCs) are being carried on, or by a person that, the target odour will be on the move also. Some tactical and positioning issues may come into play... As do the shape/construction and features of your stadium, building or foyer and or seating areas.

SCREENING MOVING PEOPLE PBIED’s and VBIEDs tend to get made up just prior to an attack and have not been sitting in place or hidden on-site some time before, so odour plumes are mostly less easy and in less quantity to detect..Then add the fact that they are on a moving Internal air temperatures - Cross section. person or vehicle and that scent plume is being further dispersed and diluted by other people crossing their path or following behind them..Next add the individual odours of each person’s aftershaves, deodorant, clothing, body particles, accessories and the floor surface and surrounding street or building furniture and the millions of other background odours all around and you can hopefully begin to understand just how amazing is the dog’s olfactory ability. Internal air movement and velocities - Cross section. 76 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

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HOW WELL DO YOU KNOW YOUR STADIUM OR VENUE?

Internal temperature distribution.

Internal air velocities.

Air velocities and air movement patterns. Understanding explosive blast and the cause and effect, will help you perhaps channel any would be suspect’s route to, or through areas where shrapnel might have to encounter ninety (90) degree turns thus reducing their effect, away from corridors or tunnels and thus even the siting of your check and search points becomes possibly another serious consideration. Maybe if you know your stadium or venues’ main airflows you can introduce the dog teams downwind, so they get chance to hit the odour plume before encountering the suspects even. Remember I speak in general terms only as it is quite a complex model to create especially with limited dog and local physics knowledge.

A first that I’m rather proud of is that for the first time ever in the UK, we (DESA) won and tendered to provide explosives dog search at a major sporting event working in support of and alongside the Police...That was at the Commonwealth Games in Manchester 2002... Looking back we made mistakes and we also learnt a lot. They say a wise man/woman learns from their mistakes. But we say a truly wise man/woman learns from the mistakes of others. Fast forward to 2012 and the use of dogs at the London Olympic Games, it seems we had obviously not learnt enough. The dog sector was again found wanting on many fronts regarding the applications and their standards. So at your venue in 2020 some progress in other areas (Crowd Science) dictates you will have developed a local Police liaison and your interoperability will have improved, but maybe not enough. Few even today invite their dog team providers to their security planning and briefings. They still simply tell the teams where they want them to go, sometimes even ‘how’ they want them to search. I have been amazingly since 1987 lucky and fortunate in that I and or my dogs or DESA teams have

Commonwealth Games in Manchester 2002. counteriedreport.com

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searched or assisted others to search at most major event venues in the UK. From Earls Court, QE2 cruise liner, Manchester’s G-Mex, Chelsea football ground, Millennium Dome (O2 arena) Olympia, Excel, Canary Wharf, London Underground, Gatwick Airport to name just a few... Sadly, I still see the same mistakes being made by organisers and many of the dog teams, yet still no credible licensing and agreed standards? If the threat of jail time will not galvanise organisers to get themselves better trained to utilise search dog teams and the dog teams themselves won’t lobby for the Government to appoint an independent licensing body. Then who will? (I mean independent of Government, except for the requisite enforcement legislation). Those who read my last article in Counter -IED Report will know I had my sister blown up in the Woolwich Pub bombing... But of course I’m not advocating that we put search dogs on every pub! That would be silly. But I am saying that event’s organisers and people responsible for areas where large numbers of the public gather, you already understand and have recognised awards and even degrees about crowd safety. You also have legal obligations and should know H&S minimum requirements and there are massive fines for infringements. But as I type, there is still no legal process required or minimum standards

1. Invite the dog company CEO and his senior dog staff leader and interview them 2. Ask probing questions, walk the site with them asking their opinions on what we call a “walk n talk”... 3. Ask them to suggest solutions to your “What ifs” based on your current security measures and point out some of your venue features such as any foot fall or other issues. 4. If you’re the steward company contracted-in then you take the role of the venue owner or CEO and you carry out the ‘walk n talks’ and ‘what ifs’ 5. Introduce them to your own (whoever will be senior on the day) security manager, ensure you promote a cooperative attitude between them and both know how to reach you during the event in case any disputes or serious emergency issues arise. Don’t be hard to reach! Remember these are your point men/women in your ability to detect explosives. 6. I suggest you accommodate the dog team leaders at least, but ideally invite all the teams to a full walk around the venue and it is still important to show them around what on the day may be out of bounds. (No surprises then when suddenly that becomes the scene of a blast or the only escape route etc). 7. Certainly invite their boss or CEO to any pre-event

required for me, or anyone, to start offering services as an explosives search dog team or a dog search company to anyone or any organisation here in the UK and in numerous other countries or states? A few more pearls of wisdom that may help UK readers and others understand better the problems and benefits of using search dogs to screen moving people. Let us assume you’ve done as much due diligence as is currently possible. You have an event in a few months and there’s been another high profile terror attack on let’s say ‘a European Pop Concert’. You have made the decision and probably had the Police suggest to you, to use dogs and have found the company you will use. Here are ten simple tips that may help you currently to get the best from any EDD dog teams you hire:

briefings and co-ordinate them into your Police local CTA briefing’s (at the need to know level). 8. Invite them to make suggestions and ideas and be honest and open about any reservations they have, or they may be holding back for fear of losing out on their contract. 9. Ensure your own teams know how to work with and comply with the dog team’s needs and view them as a friendly and useful asset (Not an Us & Them situation). It’s worth hiring at least one extra ‘task as needed’ EDD team that are capable of responding quickly for any unforeseens or sudden extra footfall without having to pull another team of a vital route or area or to go to any packages or abandoned items. (A suspect package is by its very definition ‘suspect’ so different procedures will be utilised).

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10. Encourage and accommodate at least one free access training day on your site for the teams if you can. It will pay dividends and could possibly highlight flaws or problems that your own planning did not foresee. There’s clearly a lot more detail I could go into regarding what you the organiser can or need to do as an absolutely minimum and any venue involving moving people checks, can never really over-plan, or over-prepare. Just keep it simple. It’s a military mind-set that any good battle plan only lasts until the first few minutes or shots fired in any real battle. So you have to do your plan Bs’ and Cs’. This article is not covering that mentioned advanced training of the Human or the Dog. It is defining the need for a proper testing process and conditions for effective assessment of those teams as being fit for role, both prior to deployment and when they are in the field operationally. A few final words of general caution. Dogs should not replace other Hi-tech detectors, they complement them and you should adopt a layered ‘tool box‘ approach to screening and always create a sterile environment on the morning of the event and ensure that ALL your regular staff get checked, and again if

A DESA dog searching at Chelsea F.C. 2006

they have left for a short period and returned, then get screened again You are only as good as your weakest link. Generally, the dogs will work best having the crowds or footfall moving past them rather than them being manoeuvred through heavy pedestrian traffic. Dogs have another advantage for organisers and your public. The EDD’s are focused on what’s in the airflow so they don’t have to inspect every person queuing unlike normal bag checks or body searches and indeed most people queuing have no idea they’ve just been searched by the dogs’ nose as they strolled past. Strategically placed barriers and even opening certain windows or doors that will help create a directional airflow and other techniques should be known and utilised by EDDTs. Also creating a line of moving people even if several deep, is better for the dogs to move along rather than actually trying to move through widely separated groups of people or family groups, so you cleverly can create soft natural choke points, simply by having some small free standing pointer signs or that dreaded UK national symbol... the red road cones! Or use ‘natural’ choke points remembering that should not affect any evacuation requirements. Obviously, organisers need procedures to covertly, or otherwise key onto a potential suicide bomber or suspect carrying a rucksack/ pushing a trolley etc. But those will vary and there are options... But I have no intention of putting them here in print for any would be radical to read. One thing you and your dog teams need to master and carry out is the art of dynamic threat assessments (TA’s) Any handlers worth their salt are constantly threat assessing throughout their shift or search patrols. Looking for those little changes or nuances that might alert them that something counteriedreport.com

EXPLOSIVES SEARCH DOGS AND CROWD SEARCHING

Author here utilising modelling skills to explain large venue search planning. might just be developing. It could be something as simple as, someone suddenly changing direction as the dog team approaches to try to avoid the dog, throw in the mix, their appearance and demeanour, a topheavy rucksack maybe, a thick overcoat indoors and its warm. Sometimes it’s just such small things. So they should constantly threat assess and question in their mind, their dog’s attitude and what their own eyes and

It is important you have blind and double-blind tests while dogs are working, indeed the US TSA and other Homeland Security assets often have QA tests of their teams at airports (but in highly controlled situations), so another few words of caution here for you to ponder as an organiser of events if using EDDTs. It’s almost a folly to carry out tests with mystery QA planted in a live crowd on the day of your event.

ears might be telling them. We have all seen the Armed Police patrolling through airports or standing by exits then nonchalantly moving off and walking between the moving people. Or the agriculture and food dogs at US airports, those friendly little beagles. There’s nothing new in dogs screening vapour trails from people or their baggage. Some companies believed it is unique and charge massive premiums for this service. But to us it’s just another day at the office, it’s just what dogs do naturally in the wild, the difference is mostly the training we give their Handlers and the tactics we use when deploying them. You can’t have a dog walking through crowds in search mode for very long without rest and regular motivational finds on Team Actors mingling in the crowds. That becomes an extra but a necessary one.

Test them before... but never on the day for some fairly obvious reasons. But broadly in order to prevent mistakes by putting Explosives odour into the area of any live working dogs. To prevent any unplanned for reaction about a possible real suicide bomber... That one example alone could create panic and crush injuries or death and also put the covert Actor or QA personnel seriously at risk of harm from the Police or even the public. Take them aside to a controlled environment to check or check them before. Testing staff should exercise inventiveness and imagination when assessing and creating RWE. They should also utilise Hi-tech such as Drones and media and even models, to not only test but assist those they are assessing to better plan, better perform, better understand and apply their skill sets in CT-search beyond the minimums and to strive for excellence.

80 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

EXPLOSIVES SEARCH DOGS AND CROWD SEARCHING

If you’re not too sure the dog teams might not be working well on the day then you should not employ them or have them there in the first place. At least not without good QA and CAPA processes to do that job for you! For the Olympics there will be checks during the Games by the Police and or under orders from the Games committee security advisors. But those are and must be out of hours for the public attending and or in rigorously controlled situations where key people will be in the know... but not the EDDTs being tested. Also remember your QA system will insist all teams have every morning and at intervals in a selected secure area small test samples to motivate their dogs and check the dogs are on top of their game. In summary for the short term foreseeable future Events organisers and those responsible for large public gatherings will have to use caution and exercise a lot of common sense when deciding who to use and how to use these amazing search assets. Hopefully these few words on the subject may have helped and at least opened minds and drawn further attention to my campaign to get some form of official standards and licensing in this very specialised and important role. Do not employ teams just because they claim to be, or are the biggest, or that they belong to self-proclaimed and appointed dog associations’ claims to be custodians

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and are using all their knowledge and widespread sector expertise to review all their dog search standards and recognise that EDDTs work differently and therefore need different methods to QA them and new TEP’s. They are through their working group (I’m proud to sit on), now reviewing and re-drafting their Dog IMAS ensuring also, they are keeping up with technology and the changing landscape of needs as they move from permissive to semi- permissive areas of clearance operations. Surely if a modest sized operation in Geneva can implement this policy of safety first and standards and advisory roles, then any Government should be capable of doing the same... in months not years? ■

of standards. Events organisers are not in an enviable decisionmaking position regarding utilising explosives search dogs here in the UK and that is sadly the case in many, many, other countries globally. It is improving... but far too slowly. I anxiously and sadly watch the news reports as every major event and possible target are reported on. But I am hopeful and this is why DESA and myself I have re-invented our role to capture those years of experience we have to help others and to motivate them to put politics and finances in second place where it comes to saving lives and helping to prevent terror attacks using IEDs. The Humanitarian Mine Action sector (HMA), through the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), are again taking a lead with their

Humanitarian and NGO’s. It is fair to say he has a number of world firsts under his belt and includes a special award for ‘Services to Law Enforcement’ from Cambridge University Commonwealth Secretariat on Commercial crime in the early 90s. After retiring he spent three years as a full-time volunteer running a local charity he says, “To give something back”. Jim came back out of retirement to continue his push for better K9 CT-search standards in an Industry he says is still mired in its own problems. That includes lobbying politicians and decision makers worldwide, often at his own expense. He also writes and advises on training programs and is a level 4 Lead Internal Quality Assurance professional. Jim continues to advise and travel the world advocating and championing the cause of standards and safety in mainly explosives search sectors.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Jim Vernon is the former chairman and founder member of the Drugs and Explosives Search Association (DESA). After leaving the British Army in the mid 70’s Jim has spent his time teaching CT-search mostly utilising dog and handler teams. He has lectured, trained, supplied and provided services to mostly law enforcement, military and private security in many sectors including

counteriedreport.com

Protecting People and Infrastructure through Partnerships

Benchmark strategies with thousands of global security experts Earn CPD accreditation for your conference attendance Three days of learning and networking opportunities

Supported by

Organised by

Joint Security and Resilience Centre

PROTECTING PEOPLE AND INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS

THE UK’S LEADING COUNTER TERROR AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE (EPRR) EVENT - EXCEL LONDON, 19 - 21 MAY 2020 By CTX team

ow in its 12th year, Counter Terror Expo (CTX) 2020 will again deliver a programme of thoughtprovoking content in its three free theatres and World Counter Terror Congress (WCTC). Featuring a line-up of world-class speakers, CTX 2020 is not to be missed. CTX is the UK’s principal networking event for counter terror and security professionals from industry, government and policing. Its close relationship with UK law enforcement and the Home Office ensures that CTX’s content programme is focused on the latest developments in the fight against terrorism.

CONFERENCE OVERVIEW CTX’s conference and feature programme is aligned with its core themes of protection of people, critical infrastructure and emergency preparedness. With four theatres, each featuring experts from across government, industry and academia, the carefully curated content is designed to attract and engage an audience of high-level UK and international professionals seeking the latest thinking on counter terror and EPRR.

PROTECTING PEOPLE THEATRE Our Protecting People Theatre includes presentations on how to identify and mitigate the latest threats to individuals in public spaces, sports venues, festivals and other crowded places. Explosives remain a significant weapon that terrorists use, and as information about building effective devices is in the public domain and therefore unlikely to disappear, it is essential that security professionals and businesses are updated on how the effects of these devices can be mitigated.

Key topics will include: • UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) perspective on countering explosive ordnance • Strategies and urban design consideration for hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) given the continued use of vehicles as a weapon of attack • Ways that events, public spaces, borders and transport can be protected from terrorist activity. counteriedreport.com

PROTECTING PEOPLE AND INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS

Bert Appleton, Assistant Head, Counter-Explosive Ordnance Defence Engagement (CEDE) Office, UK MoD, will be speaking at CTX 2020. Drawing on his extensive experience in the British Army and as the co-designer of the CEDE business model, he will discuss how businesses can best protect themselves against the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Attendees will gain insight into the latest developments in event and venue security, including the latest on strategy, legislation and technology. The specific challenges of securing transport and postBrexit borders will also be discussed.

Other confirmed speakers include: • Ian Hughes, Assistant Director (Highways) for the City of London Corporation • Dr Katy Hayward, Reader, School of Social Sciences, Education and Social Work, Queen’s University Belfast • Sarah Austerberry, AU Security Consulting, exCPNI

Key topics will include: • Latest techniques and technology to protect Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and other sites • How body language, tone of voice and cultural norms can reveal the intent to attack • The technical, legislative and ethical challenges presented by automated facial recognition • The threat posed by malicious social media activity

Confirmed speakers include: • Tony Porter QPM LLB, Surveillance Camera Commissioner for England and Wales at Home Office Independent Government Regulator • Superintendent Helen Isaac, Head of Project Servator, which aims to deter, detect and disrupt a range of criminal activity, including terrorism • Malcolm Warr, Chair, CNI Scotland

AMBITION CONFERENCE & ZONE The Ambition Conference and Zone takes place

PROTECTING INFRASTRUCTURE THEATRE Since the Gatwick drone attack in December 2018, Heathrow and Gatwick airports have invested millions in military-grade anti-drone technology. The attack cost Gatwick airport £1.4 million, disrupted approximately 1,000 flights and inconvenienced 140,000 passengers. This has brought to the forefront the ease by which critical infrastructure can be compromised by drones. The Protecting Infrastructure Theatre explores how those charged with protecting critical national infrastructure, industry and business can safeguard against emerging threats. 84 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2019/20

alongside the Counter Terror Expo and focuses on bringing together the EPRR community. The event works with exhibitors and key partners to deliver thought-provoking content both on the show floor and in the Ambition Theatre. Ambition brings together key stakeholders, from senior emergency planners to operational first responders from the ambulance services, fire/rescue police, military and government.

Key topics will include: • Dealing with mass casualty incidents • Case studies and best practice on response from the strategic to the tactical level • Preparing for and mitigating terrorist attacks • Coordinated approaches for cross-force CBRN first responders

PROTECTING PEOPLE AND INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS

Confirmed speakers include: • Inspector Donal O’Driscoll, Special Tactics & Operations Command, An Garda Síochána, Ireland’s National Police and Security Service • Dr Claire Park MBE RAMC, Medical Advisor to Specialist Firearms Command SCO19, Metropolitan Police • Dr Matthieu Langois, Chief Doctor of RAID, French National Police • Deputy Chief Constable Paul Netherton, National Police Lead for Civil Contingencies, National Police Chiefs Council

the WCTC will place particular focus on countering violent extremism, protective security and intelligence gathering. A co-ordinated response is necessary to tackle the beliefs fuelling international terrorism, and strengthen our society’s ability to protect itself whilst the threat persists. With the common goal of reducing the risk of terrorist attacks to our nations, The WCTC 2020 will provide an opportunity for the national security community to meet and deliberate shared challenges in the counter terror space.

Early confirmed speakers include:

WORLD COUNTER TERROR CONGRESS

• Deputy Assistant Commissioner Dean Haydon, Senior National Coordinator (SNC) for Counter Terrorism, National CT Policing • Mr Russell Travers, Director of the National Counterterrorism Centre, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States • Mr Vijay Padmanabhan, Lead, Countering Violent Extremism & Hate Speech, Google

Alongside our free theatres, we have the internationally renowned World Counter Terror Congress (WCTC), a closed door, paid for conference.

For 2020, CTX, Ambition and the WCTC have expanded into ExCeL London, to co-locate with IFSEC International creating the UK’s largest security and EPRR event. Taking place over three

WCTC brings together over 200 internationally recognised senior government, law enforcement and intelligence services professionals who will provide thought-leadership and updates on counterterror strategies, operations and policy. The congress will also examine key areas of prevention, pursuit and protection against international terror threats. Transcending national borders, extremists have rooted themselves in society causing social/political instability and posing a considerable risk to public safety. Increasingly, terrorists are leveraging the internet to extend their reach and ability to radicalise online, rally their sympathisers and ultimately carry out attacks. With the common goal of sharing best practice and reducing the risk of terrorist attack to our nations,

days, the co-location will allow visitors to: • Benchmark their strategies with thousands of security and EPRR professionals • Earn Continuing Professional Development (CPD) accreditation for their conference attendance • Gain from three days of learning and networking opportunities Save the date in your diary - 19-21 May at ExCeL London. Register your interest at www.ctexpo.co.uk and be the first to know when our free registration opens. If you are interested in exhibiting contact the CTX team directly at: Telephone: +44 (0)20 7384 8232 Email: sales@ctexpo.co.uk counteriedreport.com

SMi Group proudly presents the 5th Annual

Future Armoured

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• Hear the latest host nation capability updates from the British Armour Centre, Joint Forces Command, DSTL and DE&S

Future Armoured • Network with key OEMs and System Integrators such as General Dynamics European Land Systems, Patria Land, Thales, Diehl Defence, SAAB Barracuda, BAE and General Dynamics UK • Deliberate key technological requirements in order to complete the ‘Situational Awareness Jigsaw’, including; vetronic architectures, communications, CIS capabilities, battle management systems, acoustic sensors, optronics, crew displays, active protection, defensive aid suites and mobile camouflage systems • Explore land force interoperability and training requirements for enhanced joint fires during coalition operations

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CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN: Mr John Crozier, Technical Partner, Urban Canyon Sixth Sense (UC6S), DSTL, UK MoD

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EXPERT MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT SPEAKERS INCLUDE: Colonel Jonathan Brooking, Commander HQ Armour Centre, British Army Lieutenant Colonel John Dagless, Senior Requirements Manager, Battlefield and Tactical CIS (BATCIS), ISS Joint Forces Command, UK MoD Mr Keith Smith, GVA Manager, DE&S UK MoD Mr Hans-Josef Maas, Armoured Fighting Vehicles Vetronics Project Leader, Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment and Information Technology, Bundeswehr Mr Thomas Honke, Indirect Protection Research & Technology WTD 52, Bundeswehr Dr Markus Mueller, Video Exploitation Systems, Fraunhofer IOSB Professor Merfyn Lloyd, Lately Science Advisor, DE&S (Retired) UK MoD

Dr Jack Watling, Research Fellow, Land Warfare, Department of Military Sciences, Royal United Services Institute Industry Speakers Include: Ms Helena Bishop, Senior User Experience Consultant, Human Centred Design, BAE Systems (Applied Intelligence) Dr Alexander Wolf, Head of Technology, Platforms and Unmanned Systems, Diehl Defence GmbH Mr Carlos Gil, Director Engineer, ASCOD and Tracked Vehicles, General Dynamics European Land Systems Dr Andy Lillie, Technology Director Network & Communications, Mission Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems UK Mr Pasi Niemela, Chief Engineer and Product Manager, Patria Land Mr Andreas Öhlin, Product Manager, Local Situational Awareness and Land Vetronics Systems, Saab Dr Iain Carrie, Systems Design Engineer, Land & Air Systems, Optronics & Missile Electronics, Thales Mr Ian James, Chief Technologist Land Systems, Land & Air Systems, Optronics & Missile Electronics, Thales

Counter-IED Report Winter 2019-20