“I watch TV every day and fall asleep to it. So I hear every day from TV [news]... ‘everything is okay, you can go and live your everyday lives, there are no [Russian] assault groups by the Ukrainian border, blah, blah, blah, everything is calm’. And I remember that almost every day I hear other reports of British saying there will be a big attack on Kyiv from Belarus side. But the former Ukrainian Minister of Defence says we have our reconnaissance and everything is okay – there are no assault groups by the border.” – Ukrainian civilian1
FULL-SCALE INVASION
F
ACING an enemy dictating the ‘when and where’ and with a pre-war military strength of only 196,000 active personnel, it would have been extremely challenging for Ukraine to defend against any invasion along its almost 3,000 kilometre-long land border with Russia and Belarus. Consequently, in the lead up to the 24th February, the bulk of Ukrainian forces were postured to repel Russian attacks in the east and south of the country.3
The task of protecting Kyiv was assigned to the 72nd Mechanised Brigade, Ukrainian Army, which had to defend a 180-degree arc to the capital’s north, stretching from Stoyanka in the west of the city through to Brovary in the east – a frontage, straddling the Dnipro River, of approximately 70 kilometres.4 From interviews with those briefed on Ukrainian Army level planning, it is understood that commanders believed that if Russia did attack Kyiv from Belarus, its main assault would come from the northeast, through Chernihiv. While the Ukraine military considered an attack on its capital was unlikely, it had conducted some high-level contingency planning before the invasion. On the 22nd December 2021, the 72nd Mechanised Brigade ordered its engineers to reconnoitre the Ukraine-Belarus border in the Chernihiv Oblast to assess crossing points that could 14
THE BRITISH ARMY REVIEW
be used by Russian forces massed near Gomel. They were asked to make plans and preparations to destroy vulnerable routes5 and conducted the reconnaissance mission wearing civilian clothes to maintain a low profile. The engineers identified only one viable road for use by armoured forces – the E95 highway, which ran from Gomel, Belarus to Chernihiv and on to Kyiv6 – and a bridge in the small village of Novi Yarylovychi, just six kilometres south of the border, as being the best location to impede any advance. If the
1
Interview with civilian 46, September 2023.
A note on terminology: Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and illegally occupied Ukrainian territory. The February 2022 offensive was an escalation of their ongoing actions. For the sake of brevity we refer to it here as the ‘full-scale invasion’.
2
Angela Dewan, “Ukraine and Russia’s militaries are David and Goliath. Here’s how they compare,” CNN 25 February 2022, edition.cnn.com/2022/02/25/europe/ russia-ukraine-military-comparison-intl/index.html, accessed 8 November 2023.
3
4
Interviews with soldier 13 and soldier 18, August 2022.
5
Interview with soldier 47, September 2023.
6
Ibid.
7
Interview with soldier 3, September 2023.
8
Ibid.
9
Interview with soldier 13, August 2022.
2
crossing was destroyed, it would significantly slow an approach from the northeast. However, neither this bridge nor others were ‘denied’ to the enemy before Russian forces entered Ukraine. Given the expected course of enemy action, 72nd Brigade’s intent was to deploy the majority of its fighting power to the northeastern side of Kyiv, on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River, to defend against an attack from Chernihiv.7 This plan – and the brigade’s area of responsibility – was briefed by the brigade commander to senior officers at their base in Bila Tserkva (approximately 85 kilometres south of Kyiv) on the evening of either the 17th or 18th February. The orders saw 1st and 3rd Mechanised Battalions, 1st Division of 2S1, two batteries of BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, two batteries of MT-12 Rapira anti-tank guns, and the majority of the Brigade Artillery Reconnaissance, along with the Brigade Headquarters and supporting elements, assigned to the eastern bank of the Dnipro.8 The 2nd Mechanised Battalion was tasked to shield Kyiv’s north-west from the western side of the Dnipro River. It would defend from the E373 highway through Horenka to the P02 highway and Lyutizh, a frontage of approximately 22 kilometres.9 The 2nd Battalion was made up of a headquarters, SPRING 2024