New Zealand International Review, March/April 2026

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NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL

REVIEW

Beyond Friendship: Strategic Alignment between Aotearoa New Zealand and Japan

Tadashi Iwami considers the evolving relationship between New Zealand and Japan.

10 Bringing Together Women, Peace and Security

Amy Brosnan examines UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and the recent NZDF WSP Symposium.

14 Embracing Multipolarity: Aotearoa New Zealand’s Place in a Shifting World Order

Chris Ogden explores the changing world order and the diplomatic opportunity offered to New Zealand by the BRICS+ grouping.

21 Strategic Dissonance: Projection and Protection in Aotearoa New Zealand's LGBTQ+ Statecraft

Robert Broughton examines dissonance in official approaches to the Rainbow community, and the potential impact on New Zealand's external credibility.

28 The Struggle for Democracy in Belarus

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, president-elect of Belarus, reflects on the fight for democracy in Belarus.

33 BOOKS

Jacinda Ardern: A Different Kind of Power: A Memoir (Bethan Greener)

Karl DeRouen Jr., Edward Newman and Paul Bellamy: Civil War and Intrastate Armed Conflict: Changing Dynamics in International Perspective (Stephen Hoadley)

Mark Hickford and Matthew S.R. Palmer (eds.): The Futures of Democracy, Law and Government: Contributions to a conference in honour of Sir Geoffrey Palmer (Tim Fadgen)

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37 INSTITUTE NOTES The views expressed in New Zealand International Review are entirely those of the authors and do not reflect those of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, which is an independent nongovernmental organisation fostering discussion and understanding of international affairs, and especially New Zealand’s involvement in them. By permission of the authors the copyright of all articles appearing in New Zealand International Review is held by the

Beyond Friendship: Strategic Alignment between New Zealand and Japan

Tadashi Iwami

New Zealand and Japan are complementing their values-based friendship with a strategically aligned partnership shaped by an increasingly challenged multilateralism and contested Indo-Pacific. Common geopolitical concerns, commitment to multilateralism, and mutual public trust underpin this development. Wellington and Tokyo now prioritise security cooperation, developing aligned security frameworks while increasing operational interoperability. Under the current leadership of both countries, their partnership has gained clearer strategic purpose. As maritime competition intensifies, New Zealand and Japan must prepare for more frequent regional challenges and deepen practical defence cooperation in the Pacific, including future maritime capability and reciprocal access to their defence resources.

On 21 October 2025, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) President Sanae Takaichi became Japan’s 104th – and first female – Prime Minister, more than a quarter of a century after New Zealand reached the same milestone. Her appointment is significant not only for its symbolism. Her leadership is a continuation of Shinzō Abe’s policy direction of increased defence spending, the easing of arms export restrictions, and greater foreign policy engagement, given her long-standing association with him.

Tadashi Iwami is a lecturer in the Modern Japanese Studies Program at Hokkaido University, Japan. He previously served as Chair of the Palmerston North Branch of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (2016–2020), before taking up his position at Hokkaido University in April 2022.

As of 9 February 2026, Japan under Takaichi has entered a significant new political phase. Following a historic landslide victory, Takaichi’s LDP has secured an unprecedented standalone supermajority in the lower house, effectively consolidating her political power. In light of this historic shift in Japanese politics, what should New Zealand understand about its partner? And how will the two countries – friends and strategic partners in the Pacific – navigate increasingly contested Indo-Pacific waters? This article offers a multi-layered overview of the New Zealand–Japan relationship. It:

1. Outlines the strong foundations built on economic ties, people-to-people connections, and genuine mutual trust and confidence;

2. Considers how the two countries’ leaders talk about each other;

3. Identifies the key features of an increasingly institutionalised strategic partnership;

4. Assesses Prime Minister Takaichi’s strategic policy direction and its implications for New Zealand; and

5. Highlights the undeniable realities both countries must confront as maritime competition intensifies across the IndoPacific.

Taken together, these developments reveal a relationship characterised by an unmistakable deepening of strategic purpose. Linking two liberal democracies whose values, interests and policy directions are increasingly aligned in navigating a more contested Indo-Pacific space.

Foundations: Economic Ties, Peopleto-People Connections, and Positive Perceptions

Broadly speaking, the relationship between New Zealand and Japan has been well-established, deeply intertwined, and steadily nurtured over the past 70 years. The modern bilateral relationship began in 1952, when Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, formally ending the war in the Pacific. Following the first substantive bilateral trade agreement in 1958, both countries focused primarily on economic partnership,

while deliberately downplaying politically sensitive issues such as regional security.

As the data in Figure 1 below indicates, total nominal trade (exports plus imports) between New Zealand and Japan has grown consistently over time. Japan remains one of New Zealand’s major trading partners, following China, Australia, the United States (US), the European Union and Singapore. In the dairy sector, Japan is New Zealand’s major export market, accounting for NZ$886.9 million (16.7% of total exports to the country) of exports in the latest figures.1 More recently, economic ties have been further institutionalised through regional trade frameworks, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) since 2018, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) since 2022. As founding signatories, both New Zealand and Japan have practically replaced the United States as a central power, taking a central role in advancing a freer and more open economic architecture across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. This multilateral architecture has become increasingly important as both countries confront shared challenges, ranging from the uncertainty created by US tariffs to China’s growing use of economic coercion and export restrictions as strategic instruments used for political gain.

People-to-people links have traditionally also been strong. For decades, Japanese tourists have regarded New Zealand as one of the most attractive tourist and educational destinations (as did I). At their peak in 2002, more than 173,500 Japanese visited New Zealand annually. The prolonged economic stagnation Japan experienced from the 1990s to the 2010s, however, saw this number fall below 70,000. In the post-COVID period, the recovery has been steady: Japanese visitor numbers reached around 67,000 in 2024. This is still less than half the 2002 peak, but rising.3

For New Zealanders, Japan has become increasingly popular as a travel destination too. The number of New Zealand visitors to Japan has already surpassed pre-COVID levels, rising from a little over 61,000 in 2019 to more than 76,000 in 2024. In fact, more New Zealanders visited Japan than Japanese visited

People-to-people connections are reinforced institutionally through sister-city relationships. According to the Embassy of Japan,⁵ New Zealand has 44 sister-city relationships with Japan. This is the highest number it holds with any country. While quantity is not everything, this demonstrates the depth of engagement at both the individual and regional levels, and the extent to which the relationship is embedded across society.

Public perceptions in New Zealand toward Japan are also overwhelmingly positive. The latest Asia New Zealand Foundation survey6 shows that Japan is regarded as one of the two most important countries in Asia (alongside China), with 73% of respondents rating it as important or very important. An impressive 80% consider Japan a ‘friend’ to New Zealand, a steady rise over the past seven years. This contrasts sharply with China, which only 38% view in a similar light.

When asked about trust, 62% of respondents expressed a high level of trust in Japan, compared with only 4% expressing low trust. For China, the pattern is reversed: 14% expressed high trust, while 48% expressed low trust (with 34% neutral). Figure 2 below illustrates these trends in New Zealanders’ friend/threat

Figure 2: Friend and Threat Perceptions – Japan and China

Source: Asia New Zealand Foundation.

Celebrating the 40th anniversary of sister-city relations between Hamilton and Saitama City, 24 October 2024.

perceptions of Japan and China over the last seven years.

Japan is, therefore, seen as probably the most reliable partner New Zealand has in Asia, a judgement that says much about whom New Zealanders believe they can trust in an increasingly complex region.7 Public sentiment at the societal level is especially significant in liberal democracies like New Zealand and Japan, where strategic policy settings are shaped and refined not only by governments, but also by the wider public’s confidence in key partners.

What Leaders Say: From Shared Values to Strategic Alignment

How have sustained free and open economic ties, strong people-to-people connections, and positive public perceptions of Japan influenced New Zealand’s political narratives? A clear development can be seen in both the quality and density of political narratives over the last two decades – from shared values to strategic alignment.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, leaders in Wellington and Tokyo consistently highlighted the values they held in common: freedom, democracy, human rights, a market-oriented economy and the rule of law. Descriptions such as ‘natural partners in the Asia-Pacific’ centring on these shared values captured the tone of the era. In 2008, Prime Minister Helen Clark and Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda agreed, for the first time, to begin strengthening security and defence dialogue, an important symbolic step, although concrete progress initially remained limited.

That progress came in 2013, which proved to be a decisive turning point. Foreign Ministers Murray McCully and Fumio Kishida elevated the relationship to a Strategic Cooperative Partnership, signalling a growing recognition that converging shared liberal values alone were no longer sufficient; the regional environment now required them to seek possible strategic coordination. This elevation reflected a shared understanding that economic interdependence, regional uncertainty, and shifting power dynamics in the Pacific demanded deeper and more structured alignment.

Prime Minister John Key acknowledged New Zealand’s need to engage more actively as the strategic environment

changed, while Prime Minister Shinzō Abe sought for Japan to contribute proactively to regional stability through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. Their successors, Jacinda Ardern and Fumio Kishida (the same Kishida who promoted the 2013 Strategic Cooperative Partnership as foreign minister), made this shift more explicit when they met in Tokyo in 2022. They affirmed that New Zealand and Japan were now ‘key partners in advancing and protecting peace and security in the

Indo-Pacific’.8 The narrative had clearly moved beyond shared values to gradual strategic alignment.

Prime Minister Christopher Luxon’s visit to Tokyo in June 2024 further reinforced this evolution. While celebrating the long-term benefits of open trade, Luxon stressed that economic prosperity cannot be separated from security, an acknowledgment of New Zealand’s growing reliance on like-minded partners (including particularly Japan) in an increasingly contested region. He remarked:

Despite the distance between us – joined together, but also separated by the vast blue continent that is the world’s largest ocean – New Zealand and Japan are united in our ambition for advancing and protecting our essential economic and security interests.9

Luxon’s message aligned with the maturing strategic narrative: economic security is inseparable from national security, and New Zealand’s partnership with Japan is central to both. In the New Zealand International Review, he described Japan as an ‘important longstanding partner’, underscoring Wellington’s intention to further deepen cooperation in defence, maritime security and regional resilience.10

Although a formal summit between Luxon and Japan’s new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has yet to occur (as of January 2026), Takaichi has already indicated her willingness to sustain and broaden this strategic trajectory. At the ASEAN-related Summit Meeting in Malaysia shortly after her appointment in October 2025, she met briefly with Luxon, noting publicly on X that New Zealand and Japan are ‘crucial partners in promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific [FOIP]’. She also affirmed her inten-

tion to strengthen the 2013 Strategic Cooperative Partnership.

The following day, in talks with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Takaichi emphasised multilayered cooperation with like-minded states, including New Zealand, through the Australia–Japan security framework. From Takaichi’s perspective, New Zealand remains a trusted and strategically aligned partner in navigating the region’s intensifying challenges as well.

Strategic Cooperative Partnership

What does a Strategic Cooperative Partnership actually mean, and how does it apply to New Zealand and Japan? Broadly, a strategic partnership is a structured and goal-driven form of cooperation that enables two states to work together in addressing shared challenges – often in defence, security, and regional stability – without entering into a formal alliance. It goes beyond a transactionally calculated partnership based solely on economic interests, yet remains short of a legally binding security treaty that comes with alliance-level obligations and costs.11

Such partnerships are particularly useful in today’s complex strategic environment. They provide states with a flexible institutional framework to deepen coordination, align policy directions

and interests, and reinforce interoperability across areas such as security, maritime awareness and contingency planning. Crucially, they typically build on existing layers of trust accumulated through economic ties, political dialogue, and people-to-people connections. This gives the partnership a high degree of approachability, manoeuvrability, and customisability.

In the case of New Zealand and Japan, their Strategic Cooperative Partnership rests on three mutually reinforcing building blocks:

1. Multilayered diplomatic consultation and interaction; 2. Enhanced military cooperation and interoperability; and 3. An institutional legal framework for security alignment.

Multilayered Diplomatic Consultation and Interaction

Multilayered diplomatic consultation and interaction form the backbone of the Japan–New Zealand strategic partnership, and both countries have expanded these channels significantly. Senior leaders and ministers now meet frequently in bilateral and multilateral settings. The informal Luxon–Takaichi exchange at the ASEAN-related meetings on 25 October 2025 is the most recent example.

Ministerial-level engagement has also deepened. During the intense coalition negotiations between Takaichi’s LDP and the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin no Kai), New Zealand’s Minister of Finance and for Economic Growth, Nicola Willis, was already in Tokyo (20 October 2025) meeting her counterpart Minoru Kiuchi (then Minister in charge of Economic Security in the pre-Takaichi administration, now Minister for Japan’s Growth Strategy under Takaichi).

On 2 November 2025, Defence Minister Judith Collins met the new Japanese Defence Minister Shinjirō Koizumi at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), reaffirming their intention to deepen defence cooperation in support of the FOIP vision. The next major step will be the first Foreign and Defence Ministers’ Meeting (the ‘2+2’), which would institutionally strengthen the diplomatic and security dialogue architecture.

These channels also extend to senior military leadership. On 20 October 2025, the Chiefs of Navy from both countries met in Japan and reaffirmed their shared roles in the FOIP framework. On the same day, the New Zealand Chief of Navy

met with Japan’s former Defence Minister, where discussions included New Zealand’s early interest in procuring a Japanesemade upgraded Mogami-class frigate to replace New Zealand’s Anzac-class frigates (discussed further below). At a day-to-day level, defence diplomacy is maintained through reciprocal military attachés: Japan has stationed a permanent defence attaché in Wellington since April 2022, mirrored by New Zealand’s attaché in Tokyo.

Enhanced Practical Defence Cooperation

Enhanced defence cooperation and interoperability are the second pillar of the partnership. New Zealand’s continued contribution to aerial surveillance of North Korea’s illegal ship-toship transfers is a prime example. Since 2018, the Royal New Zealand Air Force’s P-3 Orion, and now the P-8A Poseidon, have routinely operated out of Kadena US Air Base in Okinawa. The most recent deployment occurred in November 2025.

Both countries also participate in major multilateral exercises, including the US-led RIMPAC, a four-decade long tradition. A recent milestone came in September 2024 with the Multilateral Maritime Cooperation Activity in the South China Sea, where New Zealand joined the US, Australia, Japan and the Philippines in a coordinated maritime security gesture aimed at upholding international law and interoperability in the Indo-Pacific. Beyond multilateral engagements, bilateral defence cooperation has begun. In September 2024, the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force ship JS Sendai and the Royal New Zealand Navy’s HMNZS Aotearoa conducted the first bilateral maritime exercise in the East China Sea, enhancing tactical coordination at sea.12

Finally, in October 2025, RNZAF’s P-8A Poseidon partici-

pated for the first time in ANNUALEX 2025, Japan’s major annual maritime tactical defence exercise, alongside the US, Australia, Canada and France. Covering anti-submarine warfare, air operations, logistics, communications, and integrated aviation drills, the exercise strengthened participating countries’ interoperability and readiness in a range of contingency scenarios near Japan’s coastlines.13

Together, these activities demonstrate how ‘talking’ through multilayered diplomatic interactions and ‘walking’ through enhanced defence cooperation build practical trust and confidence, making the partnership substantive and realistic rather than symbolic.

Strengthened Legal and Institutional Basis of Security Alignment

The third building block is the strengthened legal and institutional legal basis that enables long-term security alignment. This consists of three key agreements. The first is the Information Security Agreement (ISA). While details of information sharing are classified, the agreement provides the legal basis for exchanging sensitive security-related intelligence, particularly relevant to maritime domain awareness and regional contingency assessments. Although the ISA does not automatically make Japan a member of the Five Eyes, it can effectively function as one of the ‘compound eyes’, complementing Japan’s existing information-sharing agreements with the US, United Kingdom (UK), Australia and Canada.

Second, the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) provides a practical legal basis for defence forces to exchange logistics, supplies, services, maintenance, and personnel support. It is central for interoperability during exercises

Table 1: Current status of Japan’s security agreements with key like-minded players. Country Alliance

New

US

Australia

UK

Canada

India

Philippines

Source: Ministry of Defence, Japan. Defense of Japan 2025 (Reference), Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2025, 118. https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/wp/wp2025/pdf/DOJ2025_EN_Reference.pdf

Rendering of upgraded Mogami-Class new FFM frigate.

and operations.

Japan already holds ACSAs with all Five Eyes members, as well as India, France, Germany, Italy, and soon the Philippines.

New Zealand and Japan officially signed both the Information Security Agreement (following more than a decade of negotiations) and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement on 19 December 2025. This milestone stands as a clear sign of the substantive strength of the legal and institutional basis of security alignment.14

Third, the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which standardises legal, administrative, and procedural processes for reciprocal troop deployments, removing the need for ad-hoc arrangements. As of January 2026, New Zealand and Japan have not begun RAA negotiations.

So what is the strategic significance of such agreements? Even without an RAA, the combined effect of the ISA and ACSA will significantly deepen interoperability and logistical accessibility between the two defence forces at the practical level. To be sure, the signing of these agreements does not imply a simple shift of their strategic partnership into a full-fledged military alliance such as the US–Japan security treaty. However, they do provide an increasingly stable legal and institutional platform for structured strategic alignment. Together, they enable New Zealand and Japan to plug more effectively into a network of likeminded security partners (see Table 1), forming, in effect, a more structured multi-node security architecture among like-minded countries such as the US, UK, Australia, Canada and Japan. As defence cooperation expands with other partners including India and the Philippines, this could evolve into a more complex mini-lateral framework across the Indo-Pacific, though that pathway remains challenging, particularly with India.

Strategic Partnership with Japan under Prime Minister Takaichi

With this institutional and strategic architecture in place, the question is how Japan’s new leadership under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi might shape the next phase of defence cooperation, and what this means for New Zealand. New Zealand media largely echoed international reporting on the appointment of Sanae Takaichi as Japan’s first female prime minister, with outlets such as Reuters, Radio New Zealand, and Australia’s ABC describing her as a ‘hardline’ or ‘hawkish’ conservative.15 While such labels attract attention, Takaichi’s early policy signals emphasise a strategic outlook that is far from radical: she stresses that national security and economic prosperity are inseparable, forming the core of Japan’s long-term security strategy across the military, economic, energy, food and cyber domains in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.

As touched on, this logic is not unfamiliar to New Zealand. During his visit to Tokyo in June 2024, Luxon underscored exactly the same point: economic security depends on national security and vice versa. Collins also expressed a similar view when she characterised the unannounced passage and live-fire exercises conducted by three Chinese warships in the Tasman Sea in February 2025 as a ‘wake-up call’ for New Zealand. This served as a stark reminder for New Zealand that China’s expanding maritime capabilities can challenge the rules-based order upon which the country relies, and undermine the security of New Zealand’s export-oriented economy. As Collins stated, ‘there is no economic security without national security’. In this sense, Takaichi’s strategic thinking still aligns closely with that of Luxon and Collins, and is neither more ‘hawkish’ nor more ‘hardline’ than the evolving policy approaches of many like-minded Indo-Pacific partners.

One area where we may see substantial development in the bilateral strategic partnership concerns New Zealand’s interest in Japan’s state-of-the-art upgraded Mogami-class (new FFM) frigates. They could replace the Royal New Zealand Navy’s ageing Anzac-class ships, HMNZS Te Kaha and HMNZS Te Mana, both expected to be decommissioned in the mid-2030s. In August 2025, Australia announced it would purchase 11 Mogamiclass general-purpose frigates by 2036. Three of which will be built in Japan, and the remainder in Western Australia. The Mogami-class design suits Australia’s strategic needs: it boasts strong stealth features, requires a relatively small crew (around 90 personnel), offers flexible defence configurations, high speed and cruising range (10,000 nautical miles), and is capable of supporting a 32-cell vertical launching system.

These features also align well with New Zealand’s requirements. Frigates like the Mogami-class vessels could help address the Royal New Zealand Navy’s long-standing personnel

shortages: the current Anzac-class vessels require more than 170 crew each. A coordinated procurement approach, mirroring Australia’s timeline, could significantly reduce long-term operating and maintenance costs across the Tasman.

In addition, the Mogami-class frigate is natively designed to operate the US-made MH-60R Seahawk helicopter, with the New Zealand government having announced in 2024 that it is negotiating the purchase of five MH-60R Seahawks as potential replacements for the ageing SH-2G Seasprites by 2028. While Seahawk on a Mogami-class frigate requires approximately 25 additional personnel, this creates a natural strategic synergy: selecting the Mogami-class frigate would, therefore, ensure seamless integration between ship and air capabilities, improving maritime surveillance and response capability of the New Zealand Defence Force overall.16

Together, these factors make the Mogami-class frigate an attractive option because it offers operational efficiency, personnel sustainability, and compatibility with New Zealand’s future maritime capability. While cost remains the key factor, such a synchronised acquisition would create a ‘triple win’ for Australia, Japan and New Zealand, while further strengthening their emerging security alignment and multi-node security architecture in the Pacific.

Beyond defence cooperation and interoperability, Takaichi has identified food technology, biotechnology, and energy security, including expanded geothermal energy, as strategic priorities for Japan’s long-term economic growth. These areas provide natural opportunities for deeper cooperation with New Zealand, whose industries, research capabilities, and skilled workforce are well placed to contribute to and benefit from Japan’s strategic focus.

Challenges and Opportunities

Although the intensity and frequency of military threats faced by New Zealand and Japan differ considerably, New Zealand is no longer able to selectively enjoy the economic benefits of regional stability. Its obligations now extend beyond the South Pacific to the wider Indo-Pacific. Like-minded partners, including Japan, recognise and appreciate the contributions Wellington is already making as part of this shared responsibility, both economically and strategically.

The ‘wake-up call’ in the Tasman Sea was ‘rare’ in 2025, but sooner rather than later it is likely to become more than a one-off event. At the current pace of strategic uncertainty, New Zealand should expect similar episodes to occur with greater regularity in the near future. Beyond more visible forms of assertive power projection in the maritime domain, New Zealand should also anticipate economic coercion targeting its primary product exports, as well as potential disruption or damage to the undersea cable infrastructure that connects it to the rest of the world, when maritime security deteriorates. Wellington will, therefore, need to confront the reality of growing maritime competition in its immediate neighbourhood, a reality that, while less frequent, bears resemblance to what Japan has faced for years in and around its own territorial waters

Looking ahead, now that the ISA and ACSA have been concluded, serving to deepen their bilateral defence cooperation in the increasingly challenging Indo-Pacific environment, a medium- to long-term objective for both countries will be to further strengthen their partnership by negotiating and signing a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). Together with the ISA and the ACSA, an RAA would enhance mobility, interoperability,

and operational access, and would meaningfully reinforce the emerging mini-lateral security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. In this regard, the Mogami-class frigates could become the new waka for New Zealand and Japan as they navigate rougher seas ahead. In this environment, neither country can afford complacency. The message is clear: we must anticipate the unexpected, and not be caught out twice.

NOTES

1. New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, “Is Japan the Right Market?”, myNZTE, https://my.nzte.govt.nz/article/is-japan-the-right-market. Reports indicate that milk powder exports to China alone were approximately NZ$9.7 billion, accounting for around 30% of New Zealand’s total milkpowder exports. See, for example, “China Remains New Zealand’s Top Milk Powder Destination,” Xinhua, https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/ article/583976.

2. Data converted to NZ$ using the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Exchange Rates for 22 November 2025: https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/ statistics/series/exchange-and-interest-rates/exchange-rates-and-thetrade-weighted-index.

3. “Visitor Arrivals from Japan to New Zealand by Sex, 1979–2024,” Figure.NZ, https://figure.nz/chart/9qMIRcv0PHRLyHUs-tfxYkRwsiLV9aNAu.

4. “Trips to Japan Taken by People Living in New Zealand,” Figure.NZ, https://figure.nz/chart/XzWHCYPV1kErpv1o-QKoxTw8Dqvp60cHs.

5. Embassy of Japan in New Zealand, “Sister Cities,” April 27, 2023, https://www.nz.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/sistercities.html.

6. Asia New Zealand Foundation. Perceptions of Asia: New Zealanders’ Perceptions of Asia and Asian Peoples, Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2025. https://www.datocms-assets. com/125706/1749613534-perceptions-of-asia-2025-pdf.pdf

7. This is not to suggest that New Zealand’s other key partners in Asia are viewed unfavourably. Singapore, for example, is regarded as an equally reliable partner according to the Perceptions of Asia survey results.

8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement: Japan and Aotearoa New Zealand: Strategic Cooperative Partnership for Common Peace, Security and Prosperity,” 2022. https://www.mofa.go.jp/ files/100334912.pdf.

9. Christopher Luxon, “Strategic Security Speech, Tokyo,” 2024. https:// www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/strategic-security-speech-tokyo.

10. Christopher Luxon, “Pacific Challenges,” New Zealand International Review 50, no.1 (2025): 21.

11. As for discussions on a strategic partnership, see, for example: Thomas S. Wilkins, “‘Alignment’, Not ‘Alliance’ – The Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment,” s 38, no.1 (2012): 53–76. doi:10.1017/S0260210511000209

12. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, “JMSDF News Release, 17 September 2024,” https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/sf/english/ news/2024/09/0917-1.html.

13. “Japan, U.S. Forces Begin Multilateral Exercise ANNUALEX 2025,” U.S. Pacific Fleet, https://www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/ Article/4325194/japan-us-forces-begin-multilateral-exercise-annualex-2025.

14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Signing of the Japan–New Zealand Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and the Japan-New Zealand Information Security Agreement,” 19 December 2025. https:// www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01940.html

15. Mariko Katsumura and Tim Kelly, “Hardliner Takaichi Elected as Japanese Premier, Shattering Glass Ceiling,” Radio New Zealand, 21 October 2025. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/world/576573/hardlinertakaichi-elected-as-japanese-premier-shattering-glass-ceiling; “Sanae Takaichi Wins LDP Leadership, Becomes Japan’s First Female Prime Minister,” ABC News, 5 October 2025. https://www.abc.net.au/ news/2025-10-05/sanae-takaichi-japan-ldp-leadership-prime-minister/105853536.

16. Tadashi Iwami, “Japanese frigate may be a lifeline for New Zealand’s maritime security,” East Asia Forum, 9 January 2026. https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/01/09/japanese-frigate-may-be-a-lifeline-for-newzealands-maritime-security/

Bringing Together Women, Peace and Security

Amy Brosnan

2025 marked the 25th anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Reflections on what has been achieved since are mixed, indicating both progress as well as ‘backsliding’ on the principles of gender equality that underpin this important resolution. This article explores New Zealand’s response, and highlights the release of, and commitment towards, a revised National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. A critical underpinning of this commitment is the recognition that within a global security context that has seen a resurgent focus on war and warfighting, issues of gender equality remain critical to peace and security.

2025 marked the 25th anniversary of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) – the first resolution of its kind to acknowledge the disproportionate impact of war on women and children, and which recognises that women are not simply

Lieutenant Colonel (Doctor) Amy Brosnan enlisted into the NZ Army in 1997, graduating from Officer Cadet School to the Royal NZ Signals Corps in December of the same year. Throughout her career LtCol (Dr) Brosnan has undertaken roles within both operational and training establishments of the NZ Army, including a deployment to Afghanistan as a member of the Provincial Reconstruction Team, Bamyan. LtCol (Dr) Brosnan graduated with a PhD in Defence and Security Studies in November 2024, and is currently posted to the role of Director of NZDF Women Peace and Security, Headquarters Joint Forces.

victims of war, but also critical agents of peace. UNSCR 1325 urges protection of women and children from the impacts of violence and conflict whilst encouraging increased participation of women in decision-making, peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Since 2000, nine further Security Council resolutions have been passed on issues such as conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) and the participation of women as peacekeepers. Together these ten resolutions constitute the WPS Agenda.

Celebrating (or Commiserating) 25 Years of 1325

In 2004 the United Nations (UN) urged member states to develop National Action Plans (NAP) to prioritise actions and ensure national accountability to the WPS agenda. Since then, 115 countries have developed a NAP on WPS, with plans typically assigning outcomes and activities to government agencies, including the military. The realisation of these outcomes has seen an increase in the percentage of women deployed on UN missions, as well as an increased awareness of gender in operational contexts. It is now broadly recognised by many militaries that analysis of the operational environment requires a nuanced understanding of gender and gender norms.

It might be assumed that, in the 25 years since the adoption of 1325, WPS has become an integral element of national defence and security strategies. However, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) conflict tracker clearly shows that humanitarian crises created by conflict are

increasingly impacting women and children in many parts of the world, leading researchers to declare that the ‘attack on WPS risks undermining efforts to build peace and strengthen security worldwide’.1 Björkdahl, Lorentzen and Skjelsbæk2 argue that 2025 not only saw a global backlash, but also a backsliding on gender equality and women’s rights.

As such, it is argued that WPS remains a ‘hollow concept’,3 with 2025 hailed as being an ‘unhappy birthday’ for UNSCR 1325.4 Despite the promise of 1325, progress can therefore be best described as stilted and stifled. The very issues that lead to the adoption of 1325 by the Security Council in 2000 continue to persist and challenge its implementation.

The WPS Paradox

Research consistently illustrates the need to take gender equality seriously as an indicator of, and precursor to, peace. However, as noted above, evidence suggests that the potential of 1325 has not been fully realised. Blame is often levelled at the military organisations that tend to be charged with its implementation. In particular, it is argued that the ‘militarisation’ of WPS has dislocated 1325 from its feminist origins.5 In other words, the military emphasis on the operational effect of WPS has been at the expense of the underpinning raison d’être and principles of WPS.

The paradox of militaries implementing what is largely regarded as a feminist agenda is, of course, that feminist and militarist approaches are distinctly different, if not diametrically opposed. Whilst conceptually both might strive for a similar end goal (i.e. peace), the practical means envisioned for achieving this differ vastly. Pragmatically, and tactically, militaries have applied WPS as an enhancement to existing operational frameworks. Consequently, although WPS has challenged militaries to think differently about the planning and conduct of operations, that is to ‘apply a gender perspective’, it has not transformed them. This is exemplified by the ongoing struggle of militaries

to increase participation of women, whilst also essentialising women’s participation as an enhancement to that of men’s.

It is this disjunction that has led to much of the critique on WPS implementation. The tension between these approaches is embodied by the assertion that 1325 does not exist to make war safer for women 6 This begs the question as to how (or whether) these two differing ideological approaches might be reconciled. However, this possibility seems more untenable within a political climate that demands increasing attention to military hardware and firepower, and where ideas of gender and gender equality are increasingly sidelined.

New Zealand’s Commitment

Given the political and security context that has seen a resurgent focus on war and warfighting, it is perhaps surprising that during 2025 New Zealand also released its second NAP on WPS. The revision was long overdue, however, with New Zealand’s first NAP having expired in 2019. Its release was significant for signalling New Zealand’s ongoing commitment to the WPS agenda. Underscoring this commitment, on 13 October 2025 more than one hundred senior leaders of the NZDF gathered at Parliament to acknowledge the revised NAP, and the role of NZDF in its implementation. Here the overarching message was clear: WPS remains critical to addressing issues of regional (and global) security.

In setting the tone for the day, Professor Bethan Greener of Massey University reminded the forum that gender equality is the number one predictor of peace, with compelling evidence showing that states who uphold higher levels of equality are less likely to resort to, or engage in, acts of violence. However, there is also a growing body of research which suggests declining support towards gender equality – particularly within younger demographic groups of society. Notably, the 2025 Gender Attitudes Survey indicated that in New Zealand 42% of young men (between the ages of 18–34) believe that equality has ‘gone too far’. This was in comparison to 14% of young women surveyed in the same year, and 30% of young men surveyed during 2023. The same survey also shows a significant regression in attitudes towards violence against women, with increased acceptance of physical abuse and rape in some situations.7

These results are particularly concerning when consider-

ing the backsliding of attitudes towards gender equality more broadly. We need look no further than the conflict between Russia and Ukraine to see how idealised gender norms are being strategically weaponised. Seemingly innocuous arguments about traditional family values have suggested that the corruption of societies can be attributed to the liberalisation of women’s roles. Such rhetoric disguises the underpinning message, one that promotes the suppression of women’s rights and incites social division. As such, the effectiveness of these narratives for undermining democracies and equal rights should not be underestimated.

Moving to an analysis of the security situation within the Pacific, Associate Professor Anna Powles highlighted that transnational crime, drug trafficking and climate change are key drivers of insecurity. Gendered inequalities continue to persist, with women consistently underrepresented in defence and security dialogues, and yet women are disproportionately impacted by these issues. Associate Professor Powles highlighted, for example, that Fiji has the second-fastest growing HIV epidemic in the Indo-Pacific region, which can be directly attributed to increased drug use. However, women experience multiple barriers to accessing treatment, which puts their health and wellbeing disproportionately at risk. This shows that the possibility of establishing stability is not only challenged by a lack of women participating in dialogue on security matters: it is also challenged by deeply entrenched gender norms. Growing areas of concern also illustrate that solutions to enduring security in the Pacific do not simply rely upon increased spending on military hardware but are instead rooted in social and economic stability.

The importance of strengthening implementation of WPS across the Pacific region was expanded upon by Professor Nicole George of the University of Queensland. Professor George offered an insight into her research and development of a guidance note on WPS for the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). This work focused on identifying high impact, low transaction initiatives that will improve integration between existing policy on WPS and security efforts. Professor George’s research reit-

erates the continued need to increase women’s participation in dialogues on security issues such as disarmament and disaster relief. She also drew attention to the gendered impacts of emerging non-traditional security threats such as technologyfacilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) and human trafficking. Fourteen opportunities to respond to the varied security challenges currently experienced by communities across the Blue Pacific Continent were identified in the guidance note on WPS, the release of which by the PIF is imminent.

Offering a military perspective, the Deputy Commander of New Zealand’s Joint Forces Brigadier Mick Bassingthwaighte highlighted the role of WPS as an ‘off ramp’ before conflict, and a key element to its resolution. This idea acknowledges that 1325 provides an alternate avenue for peace and security, one that is grounded in mutual respect between genders, cultures, and nations, and which could mitigate the need for conflict or provide an enduring pathway for the resolution of an existing conflict. To put this into practice, however, it is necessary for military planners to be able to recognise – and address – the gendered dynamics that create instability and give rise to violence. Brigadier Bassingthwaighte therefore drew attention to the importance of integrating gender perspectives into operational planning – a concept that has been embraced by the NZDF, with robust training established to support understandings of gender across the institution.

Drawing attention to areas of development and ongoing cooperation, it was highlighted that WPS simultaneously strengthens, and is strengthened by, international engagement. The WPS community extends well beyond the NZDF. Indeed, the symposium was attended by WPS partners from the Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF), Papua New Guinea’s Defence Force (PNGDF), the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF), the Republic of Fiji’s Military Force (RFMF), and His Majesty’s Armed Forces (HMAF) Tonga. Military cooperation across the Indo-Pacific region was brought to the fore with presentations on national implementation strategies by Colonel Karen Such (Director of the Australian Defence Force’s Gender, Peace and Security Directorate) and Tomoko Matsuzawa (Director for International Cooperation on

Attendees at the NZDF Symposium on WPS, including Chief of Army, Major General Rose King.

WPS of Japan’s Ministry of Defence).

Indeed, defence cooperation on WPS is not a new concept, with practitioners in the field having long recognised the value of mutual reinforcement. Supporting cooperative efforts, NZDF Gender Advisers deployed to a number of multinational activities and exercises throughout 2025: Exercise Khaan Quest in Mongolia, Exercise Talisman Sabre in Australia, Exercise Pacific Partnership in Samoa, Exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield in the Republic of Korea, and Exercise Bersama Lima in Malaysia. Here they worked alongside peers from militaries across the globe, including (but not limited to) the US, Canada, Australia and Japan. Understanding that WPS thrives on cooperation, representatives of the NZDF and ADF signed a memorandum of arrangement on the same day as the WPS symposium. This arrangement explicitly recognises shared knowledge and expertise between partners as crucial, and solidifies ongoing collaboration on matters related to WPS.

Strengthening WPS Implementation: beyond 2025

2025 was a challenging year for WPS, and in its aftermath there is no doubt more to commiserate than celebrate. Critique of WPS implementation has also consistently indicated that militaries could do more, and better. Importantly, however, New Zealand’s commitment to implementing WPS remains strong. This fact is perhaps not so surprising given that New Zealand has traditionally prided itself as a global leader on issues of gender and gender equality. Support to ongoing implementation of WPS was visibly evidenced by the release of a revised NAP – a plan which continues to acknowledge that security depends upon addressing complex social issues, with gender equality oftentimes at the core.

Taking this into account, whilst acknowledging the juxtaposition of militarist and feminist views, it seems possible to envisage how the concepts of gender equality which underpin 1325

might more explicitly support (and perhaps even transform) traditional notions of military effectiveness. The NZDF Symposium illustrated how shared forums can facilitate understanding between military practitioners and scholars of WPS. It also highlighted opportunities for collaboration – across sectors and between militaries – to explore the full breadth of possibilities that 1325 offers. There now exists opportunity for the NZDF to demonstrate leadership in this sphere and illustrate how the next phase of WPS implementation might increasingly and meaningfully contribute to national, regional (and global) security.

NOTES

1. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, “Why Women, Peace and Security Matters” https://giwps.georgetown.edu/makingthe-case-for-wps/

2. Annika Björkdahl, Jenny Lorentzen and Inger Skjelsbæk, eds., Backlash Against the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Contesting Gender Norms (Cham: Springer, 2026). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3032-10853-1.

3. Katharine A.M. Wright, “Moving beyond a ‘hollow concept’: realising women, peace and security at NATO under a Trump presidency,” Defence Studies, 25, no.3 (2025): 731–739. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702 436.2025.2474059

4. Columba Achilleos-Sarll,Paul Kirby, Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini, Kim Thuy Seelinger, Rachel Grimes, Chamindra Weerawardhana, Toni Haastrup, Tamya Rebelo, Paula Drumond, Yasmin Chilmeran, Kirthi Jayakumar, Katrina Lee-Koo, Kateřina Krulišová, Hannah Wright and Laura McLeod, “Unhappy birthday! Women, Peace and Security at 25,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, online early access (2025): 1–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2025.2600069

5. Stéfanie Von Hlatky, (2023). Deploying Feminism: The Role of Gender in NATO Military Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).

6. Italics added. Cora Weiss, “We must not make war safe for women,” openDemocracy, May 24, 2011, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ en/5050/we-must-not-make-war-safe-for-women/

7. National Council of Women of New Zealand | Te Kaunihera Wāhine o Aotearoa, “Gender Attitudes Survey,” Gender Equal NZ. https://genderequal.nz/ga-survey/

Embracing Multipolarity: Aotearoa New Zealand’s Place in a Shifting World Order

Chris Ogden

As global economic and diplomatic power shifts towards the wider Indo-Pacific – and thus away from the West – the current global order is in a state of innate change. Within these dynamics, relative shares of power, be they economic, military or diplomatic, are also being reconfigured. Such shifts are resulting in an emergent multipolar order, with multiple centres of power and influence. As this occurs, alternative multilateral groups are growing in importance. Foremost among these is the BRICS+, a maturing, expanding and (potentially) dominant centre of global economic power. Such institutions represent new opportunities but also new dilemmas for countries such as Aotearoa New Zealand.

As global economic and diplomatic power shifts towards Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific – and thus away from the West – the current global order is in a state of innate change. Within these dynamics, relative shares of power, be they economic, military or diplomatic, are also being reconfigured. At the vanguard of this change, the two Asian giants of China and India are increasingly representing a relatively

Chris Ogden is Associate Professor in Global Studies at Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland, specialising in the interplay between identity, culture, security and domestic politics in India, China, South Asia, East Asia and the Indo-Pacific. His expert knowledge concerns shifting world orders; global authoritarianism; the Asian Century; great power politics; Hindu nationalism; and the global rise of India and China. For more information, see https://chrisogden.org/

larger portion of power within international politics. As they do so, and as the recent historical hegemony of the United States (US) diminishes, the current liberal international order (as conceived and constructed by Washington) is increasingly being questioned and beginning to crumble.

While it does, alternative power centres are emerging, frequently in the guise of novel strategic groupings or new multilateral institutions. Underlying this process is the growing realisation that the era of American supremacy is reaching its end, and that a new form of world order is emerging whereby there will be multiple centres of influence. Within such a form of international diplomacy, there will not be a simple shift of leadership from a once-dominant power to another would-be dominant power. Instead, at least in the immediate short term, we will see a period of diplomatic skirmishing and institutional experimentation as countries grapple with this new set of strategic realities.

The hallmark of this new strategic reality will be a global environment of accelerated diplomatic complexity. As a new order emerges, and regardless of how it is identified (be it multipolar or multiplex in designation), it will have consequences for all countries, great or small. For all actors, the essential bandwidth of diplomacy will increase, coupled with an expansion of diplomatic possibilities and eventualities. Such an era will rest on the double-edged sword of opportunity and challenge, with flexibility, pragmatism and vision all being prerequisite skills for success. The BRICS+ grouping is a pertinent example of such a challenge and dilemma, and one that is especially relevant for

New Zealand.

Pax Americana

The current international order has its origins in the Western world. Characteristic of its conception, preservation and control under the US (with some major European inspirations), it is founded upon a set of social, political and economic values emanating from the historical experiences and aspirations central to the US’s national identity. With its roots dating from the end of the First World War, then US President Woodrow Wilson sought to implement a post-war peace vision based on ‘American ideas and ideals’. This global conception rested on notions of collective security and shared sovereignty, free trade and international law, liberal principles of democracy and universal human rights.

Crucially, a sense of national exceptionalism underpinned this vision of order, based on ‘a pervasive faith in the uniqueness, immutability, and superiority of the country’s founding liberal principles, and ... [the belief] that the US has a special destiny among nations’.1 As a result, US dominance – hegemony – was at the fulcrum of how Washington saw the world and its place in it. Moreover, the ensuing international order was inherently hierarchical and would be described as the ‘liberal hegemonic order’, the ‘American-led liberal world order’ or ‘American-led liberal hegemony’, as well as ‘the free world’, ‘the West’, ‘the Atlantic world’, ‘Pax Democratica’ or ‘Pax Americana’

From such a basis, this liberal international order functioned through the explicit and tacit consent of countries to the US’s broad ‘provision of security, wealth creation, and social advancement’.2 Via an emphasis on international law – and commensurate with its global pre-eminence after the Second World War – US-dominated institutions formed the foundations of this order. In the economic domain, they included the creation of the World Bank in 1944, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1945 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 (the predecessor to the World Trade Organization). In

the security domain – and reflecting a desire for collective and cooperative security to safeguard international stability – the United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945 and then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.

The US’s search for international preponderance, and the projection and expansion of its preferred vision of the world, rested upon three distinct dimensions.3 The first of these dimensions concerned the social and political aspects of this order. In this regard, the UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ promotion of freedom of thought and expression, of religion, of movement and association, and of sexual orientation, sought to guarantee rights on an individual level. Such an understanding was underpinned by liberal democracy that allowed freedom of political participation, representation, expression and association. Coupled with transparent judicial mechanisms and a free press, such systems also aimed to make national leaders accountable to the votes of their country’s citizens through regular free, inclusive, transparent and equal elections.

In line with such social and political rights being seen as generalisable to the domestic politics of all countries (and by extension, the whole international system), so too was the second – economic – dimension. Following the Second World War, trade liberalisation and economic growth went hand in hand with the creation of modern social democracy, as based upon the logic that economic prosperity would serve to enhance individual social and political rights. This was coupled with an understanding that open global markets and free trade practices should be enshrined through the rule of international law, as well as an overarching ethos which emphasised cooperation, interdependence and win-win economics. Furthermore, the US dollar was regarded as the pre-eminent international currency within such a system, and provided access to the US market and technology for countries across the West, as well as other reliable partners and allies.

The final dimension of the US-led international order per-

United States Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. addressing delegates at the Bretton Woods Conference, July 1944, at which key institutions of the post-War order (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) were established.

tained to the use of military force to stabilise and strengthen its desired vision of the world. Armed intervention was regarded as necessary to protect and enforce liberal democracy and human rights: it would form part of the justification for US involvement in conflicts such as the 1950–53 Korean War, the 1955–75 Vietnam War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, among others. Military power also served to secure global markets and access to resources via the threat or use of military force. Washington’s worldwide alliance system with its myriad regional partners, built on multilateral institutions and formal agreements, emboldened such vital aims. The centrality of military force to an international order that centralised US goals, values and interests is underscored by the US’s 800 military bases in over 80 countries.

Fracturing Foundations

In the early 2000s, the liberal international order faced a series of crises that challenged its ongoing legitimacy. The first of these occurred after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Resultant long periods of occupation of both countries, which were accompanied by widespread instability and death, effectively diminished the acceptability of utilising overwhelming military force in geopolitics. The use of torture (most notoriously at Abu Ghraib in Iraq), clandestine jails and extraordinary rendition, coupled with, at best, nebulous political reforms, further undercut the validity and interconnection of the military, social and political dimensions of the US-led international order. In turn, the 2008 credit crisis that emanated from a subprime banking crisis in the US, challenged the core logic and stability of the US-led global financial system and thus the wider liberal economic dimension of the entire order.

In addition, the seeming inability of the US (and other Western states, although notably not New Zealand) to comprehensively protect the wellbeing and security of their citizens during the Covid-19 pandemic, also weakened their domestic social and political credentials. Such failures raised the question as to whether the privileging of individual rights is the best basis for a society, rather than protecting the collective health of a population (as was the norm for many countries, especially in China and across East Asia). US President Trump’s attacks on

domestic human rights, as well as ‘personally profiting from official business, refusing oversight of government agencies, interfering with judicial investigations, abusing appointment power, … politicising the military, attacking judges, politicising diplomacy, … undermining intelligence agencies, contradicting scientists, (and) not accepting the 2020 election result,’4 further delegitimised (Western) democracy.

In the first year of the second Trump Presidency, we have also seen a range of actions that further point to a weakening and rejection of Pax Americana 5 These include the destruction of a range of international norms, especially in the multilateral

space, such as the US leaving the United Nations Human Rights Council, the World Health Organisation and UNESCO. In turn, we have also witnessed an unsettling of the US alliance system in relation to NATO regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine, whilst the expansion of the US nuclear arsenal undercuts nonproliferation efforts. Continued authoritarianism in the US and its active encouragement abroad also serves to undercut democracy globally. In addition, Trump's erratic US tariffs are sabotaging the universal basis of the international financial system, in particular relating to free trade. Finally, Trump’s exhortations to annex Canada, the Panama Canal and Greenland augment and accelerate the perception that Washington is a growing source of instability, if not threat.

As a result of such events, coupled with the economic, political and military rise of Asia, the material and perceptual foundations of the US-led international order are fracturing. With such changes, the system is resolutely moving away from the unipolarity of US hegemony that has so typified international politics since the end of the Cold War. And in line with other major balances of power in global history, such as the Concert of Europe from 1814 to 1914 and the bipolar world of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, a new configuration of power will emerge. With China and India rising to global prominence, and with the European Union remaining a major zone of influence, along with Russia, this emergent world order is moving to an arguably more multipolar basis. In such a dynamic, there will be multiple powers (or poles) simultaneously competing for influence across the international system, rather than it being dominated by one country.

At its heart, multipolarity will challenge – if not surmount –the hegemony of established Western-centric institutions and, by extension, the very liberal political and economic values on which they have been crafted, imagined and legitimised. Regarding multipolarity as less divisive and confrontational than unipolarity, both China and India subscribe to a multipolar vision to create a peaceful international environment in which to realise their mutual developmental goals. Such a system is regarded as being more inclusive and pluralistic, underpinned by notions of peaceful egalitarianism and non-intervention which

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio

Lula da Silva, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the first BRIC Summit, Yekaterinberg, Russia, 16 June 2009.

are both mainstays of Chinese and Indian foreign policy. Observers thus note how Beijing and New Delhi reject ‘the origins of great power managerialism and the long shadow that European imperialism [has] cast in the[ir]) countries’.6

For Beijing, multipolarity (duō jí hà) signals a way to ‘democratize international relations’ where ‘multilateralism is instrumental to the formation of multipolarization’,7 as evidenced by its creation of new institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and participating in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) grouping. For New Delhi, multipolarity is supported by the concept of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (‘the world is one family’) which has been a recurrent reference point for all generations of Indian leaders. Contemporarily, multipolarity has merged notions of non-alignment to become ‘multialignment’ as the most pragmatic way to pursue its diplomatic interests, whereby neither total autonomy nor outright alliance is fully applicable or desired.

Acharya’s ‘multiplex’ term has also emerged, denoting ‘a more decentered, pluralistically led … world – a decline in the relative importance of great powers, an increase in the interaction capacity of middle and small powers, and the significance of clusters of cooperation among nations that are not necessarily geographically close to each other’.8 Such an understanding encapsulates well the current fracturing of international politics, but also how co-existence will become central to global politics as different ideas and institutions gradually contest and challenge, and intermingle and enmesh, with each other. These sentiments are especially applicable to the BRICS+ grouping, and a wider desire by India and China to build institutions via their own values and worldviews that are based upon consensus not coercion, and may be more benevolent and less oppressive in nature.

The Emergence of BRICS+

BRICS+ was initially formed as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) grouping in September 2006, partially inspired by a term coined by Jim O’Neill at Goldman Sachs in the early 21st century to designate a group of emerging markets. With South Africa

joining in December 2010, the group then become the BRICS and solidified around a variety of core principles that have continued to form the bedrock of their association. Such principles can be seen to encapsulate a common and preferred shared vision of the world relating to seeking progress, development, equality/democracy (concerning representation within international diplomacy) and non-intervention, as well as anti-hegemony – and anti-unipolarity – in global politics, and advocacy of a multipolar world order.

The central strategic rationale of BRICS is based upon maintaining relations through consensus and solidarity, rather than through coercion or dominance, as well as to gain mutual benefits – be they economic, political or diplomatic – via the assertion of collective strength. As then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stipulated in 2009, ‘we share the vision of inclusive growth and prosperity in the world … [and] we stand for a rule-based, stable and predictable global order’.9 Having substantial economies, populations, landmasses and ambitions underpinned these ties, and their cooperative potency. In 2012, BRICS members signed the Delhi Declaration that focused upon global governance and sustainable development. It specified that ‘we envision a future marked by global peace, economic and social progress … [and] strengthened representation of emerging and developing countries in the institutions of global governance’.10 Common anxieties over terrorism, food and energy security, and climate change, buttressed these sentiments.

Sharing a mutual criticism of leading economic bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank in the liberal international order as being essentially biased in terms of the lower voting shares given to the BRICS countries (even if their economies were expanding rapidly), in 2013 the BRICS launched the New Development Bank (NDB). Designed to fulfil the shared aim of members to increasingly restructure global finance architectures, this creation was directly spurred on by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, which had raised questions as to the legitimacy and judgement of the economic dimension of the US-led order. As a mechanism to fund sustainable development and infrastructure projects in developing states, in a highly non-ideological manner, funding levels from the NDB now explicitly challenge – and provide an alternative to – Western-based institutions. In doing so, BRICS exemplifies an emergent multipolar and multiplex in-

ternational order.

BRICS cooperation is supported by annual meetings of leaders plus accompanying ministerial meetings between their respective foreign ministers, finance ministers, central bank governors, trade ministers and energy ministers. At each annual summit, the heads of state of the component countries to serve as a temporary (Pro Tempore) President of the BRICS. Focusing upon three pillars of cooperation11 – political and security, economic and financial, and people-to-people – since its foundation, BRICS has set up nearly 60 intragroup institutions and an extensive network including think tanks and dialogues. In the financial domain beyond the NDB, the group also set up the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement to help protect against global liquidity pressures, which entered into force in July 2015. Other initiatives include discussions for setting up a common global payments system (BRICS PAY) and the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication.

In 2021, BRICS formally agreed to create a constellation of six satellites from China, Russia and India to share remote sensing data. Relatedly, in 2023, Russia proposed building a joint BRICS research station on its space station. Such desires for collaboration as also exemplified by the establishment of a BRICS Deep-Sea Resources International Research Center and a BRICS Digital Ecosystem Cooperation Network in 2024. Not all such plans come to fruition, such as the proposed BRICS Cable to carry telecommunications between members via an optical fibre submarine communications cable system (to avoid US surveillance), which was abandoned in 2015.

BRICS’ rise to present-day importance has been accentuated by its recent enlargement. In 2024, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates all became members, as did Indonesia in 2025. This expansion has led to the BRICS now being seen as BRICS+ (or BRICS Plus). Argentina had also decided to join the BRICS in 2024, but then pulled out due to the election of its Trump-orientated populist President Javier Milei. Nearly 20 other countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Nigeria, Palestine, Senegal, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Vietnam) have either formally applied for membership or have been invited to participate as partner countries. Such a level of interest indicates that the 2024–25 expansion may be the first of many more to come. Whilst partner countries are not allowed to participate in high-level leader summits, they can engage with – and therefore benefit – from any of the myriad BRICS initiatives. Importantly, all BRICS countries must agree to the appointment of any new members.

With the recent expansion, the BRICS+ share of global GDP (in PPP) was 39% in 2023, plus 48.5% of the planet’s population and 36% of total global territory. Moreover, BRICS+ accounted for around 72% of the globe’s reserves of rare earth minerals, 43.6% of global oil production, 36% of the world’s natural gas production and 78.2% of the global production of coal.12 By such metrics, BRICS+ can be legitimately regarded as an economic and, by extension, diplomatic powerhouse. In economic standing, it has also exceeded the economic clout of the G7 (made up of the US, Germany, Japan, the UK, France, Italy and Canada) since around 2019. Diplomatically, BRICS+ members are also seeking to better align their national policies by regularly meeting on the sidelines of multilateral fora, such as the UN General Assembly, the IMF, the World Bank and the G20.

The most consequential endeavour of the BRICS is the plan to develop its own fully international currency, which would

not be controlled by a single country or a single nation-based central bank, or restricted to a specific geographic locale. The strategic logic of such a move is to reduce the grouping’s trade dependence upon the US dollar, euro or yen, whilst significantly increasing economic and financial interdependencies between its members. Such enhanced economic integration among BRICS members would reduce any economic shockwaves emanating from the US and the West in the event of recessions or depressions, such as a potentially imminent bursting of the current AI bubble.

This reserve currency – perhaps called the R5 or R5+ (so called because the core BRICS members’ currencies all begin with an ‘r’) – could mark the end of the US dollar’s dominance, with a former White House economist stating ‘it'd be like a new union of up-and-coming discontents who, on the scale of GDP, now collectively outweigh not only the reigning hegemon, the United States, but the entire G-7 weight class put together’.13 Such prospective de-dollarisation would also mark the death knell for the US’s dominance over international trade, and therefore further signify the denouement of the current order.

While a symbolic banknote of the R5 was unveiled during the 2024 BRICS summit in Russia, December 2025 saw the BRICS launch a supranational currency and payment system known as the ‘Unit’. Designed by the International Reserve and Investment Asset System, and backed by a fixed reserve basket of 40% physical gold and 60% in BRICS’ currencies, Unit is ‘a basket-backed, collateral-anchored settlement instrument intended specifically for wholesale, cross-border trade in a multipolar financial world’.14 Innately, this system reduces reliance on single-nation reserve currencies, which will primarily affect the centrality of the US dollar by redenominating trillions in trade away from it. The Unit’s impact is underscored by the US Dollar Index falling by 8.04% in value in 2025.15 In terms of

gold reserves, in 2024 the BRICS held around 6,143 tonnes compared to the US’s 8,134 tonnes, while China and India accumulated 572.5 extra tonnes between them from 2019–24.16

The attraction of the BRICS is thus more than purely its economic or developmental aspects. Its contemporary allure also comes from its diplomatic and system-defining dimensions. Joining such a body provides an attractive way for countries to enhance the bandwidth of their trade and diplomatic capabilities, as well as to hedge against US-inspired instability.

New Alternatives, New Dilemmas

With the concurrent rise of Asia and the debasement of the USled liberal international order, the nature of global politics and of the wider international order is undoubtedly in flux. The BRICS+ exemplifies the scale and extent of such shifts, and the new alternatives – as well as new dilemmas – that such emergent configurations pose for all countries, great and small. Signifying not only an evolution from an order based upon unipolarity to

one of multipolarity, the sheer scale and scope of interconnections is also accelerating. This is shown not only by myriad new multilateral and ‘mini-lateral’ groupings, but is also evidenced by the continuous expansion and normalisation of globalisation since the 1990s despite being under pressure during the second Trump administration.

In such a context, and as long-term economic and diplomatic power amasses further in the wider Indo-Pacific, all countries will need to adjust their foreign policies and hedge their bets. For smaller entities such as New Zealand, the rise of the BRICS+ characterises such alternatives that pose new strategic possibilities. Joining BRICS+ – a forum that already includes a range of major countries vital to the future of international (and thus New Zealand’s) politics – also comes with hypothetical risks. First among these would be that any potential move to join BRICS+ could be perceived as a delegitimisation or decoupling from current Western alliance systems. Such perspectives could result in reductions in aid and investment from the US, although Trump’s threat of imposing an extra 10% in trade tariffs on any countries aligned with BRICS is yet to materialise.

However, as Stephen Onyeiwu notes (with the exception of Russia and Iran) ‘most of the countries and partners in BRICS are either allies of western countries or neutral on global issues. They are unlikely to support decisions or actions that are grossly inimical to western interests’.17 Of extra note for New Zealand is that though it joined (along with many US allies) the Beijing-inspired Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and signed a Free Trade Agreement with China in 2008, it did not suffer adverse consequences for doing so. Equally, although Moscow is currently regarded as a pariah in international affairs, largely because of its ongoing conflict with Ukraine, times and diplomacy can change. Indeed, in 2018 then Deputy Prime Minister Winston Peters and Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern openly advocated for advancing a Free Trade Agreement with Russia, stating that ‘New Zealand should be looking to be able to trade around sanctions’.18

New BRICS+ members can be invited or may make a formal request to apply, which is then considered at the next BRICS annual summit. An alternative route is to apply to be a partner country, which is akin to ‘observer’ status. This allows for partaking in special summits and foreign ministers’ meetings, as well as contributing to official documents and policy statements, but not hosting meetings or selecting new members and partners. Being in BRICS would not force New Zealand to leave other multilateral institutions. Instead, being within the world’s most significant economic grouping should be regarded as a highly pragmatic way for Wellington to spread its diplomatic wings. Doing so will allow New Zealand to position itself for a future in which Asia and the Indo-Pacific – which now account for most global economic and military power – will dominate the world, not the West. By being within the BRICS+, New Zealand can also seek to influence its agenda and direction, and use this membership as a platform to promote its values and morals.

With the world becoming ever-more integrated, alongside the establishment of new centres of power, plus the extra-national power of Big Tech, maximising diplomatic flexibility will become essential for countries to protect and enhance their interests. Coupling national values with pragmatism will need to underpin such an approach, as will increasing the number of strategic nodes and interconnections, even if the benefits of such links may be unclear in the short-term. Moreover, the multipolar age will be far more complex than the ‘with us or

against us’ binaries of the West during the Cold War and postCold War periods. This understanding signals that strategic plurality will not only become the norm, but will be essential to national success in the twenty-first century. In such a world, making as many connections as possible with the most powerful and consequential actors, and doing so as soon as possible, will be a very logical action to take.

Notes

1. Robert G. Patman. “Globalization, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror,” Third World Quarterly, 27, no.6 (2006): 964, https:// www.jstor.org/stable/4017735

2. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), xi.

3. Chris Ogden, The Authoritarian Century: China's Rise and the Demise of the Liberal International Order (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2022), 10–11.

4. David Montgomery, ‘The Abnormal Presidency’, The Washington Post Magazine, November 10. 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ graphics/2020/lifestyle/magazine/trump-presidential-norm-breakinglist/

5. Chris Ogden ‘Trump Tariffs Make US Even More of a Rogue State’, Newsroom, August 27, 2025, https://newsroom.co.nz/2025/08/27/ trumps-tariffs-make-the-us-even-more-of-a-rogue-state/

6. Nick Bisley, Great Powers in the Changing International Order (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2012), 4–5.

7. Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium”, in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 163.

8. Amitav Acharya, Antoni Estevadeordal and Louis W Goodman, “Multipolar or Multiplex? Interaction Capacity, Global Cooperation and World Order,” International Affairs, 99, no.6 (2023): 2339–2365, https:// doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad242

9. Manmohan Singh, “PM's Statement at the Plenary Session of BRICS Leaders” (speech, Sanya, April 14, 2011), Government of India, https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=1012

10. Ministry of External Affairs of India, “Fourth BRICS Summit – Delhi Declaration”, , March 29, 2012, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/19158/Fourth+BRICS+Summit++Delhi+Declaration

11. John Curtis, The BRICS Group: Overview and Recent Expansion (London: House of Commons Library, 2024). https://researchbriefings.files. parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10136/CBP-10136.pdf

12. Chris Ogden, “As the World Order Shifts, NZ Should “Spread Its Diplomatic Wings” and Look at Joining the BRICS”, The Conversation, September 11, 2025. https://theconversation.com/as-the-world-ordershifts-nz-should-spread-its-diplomatic-wings-and-look-at-joiningbrics-264861

13. Filip De Mott, “The Dollar's Dominance Would Face a Threat Unlike Any Other From A BRICS Currency, Former White House Economist Says,” Business Insider, April 25, 2023.https://markets.businessinsider. com/news/currencies/de-dollarization-dominance-yuan-china-bricsalternative-currency-sanction-russia-2023-4?op=1

14. Vince Lanci, “BRICS Move Forward 40% Gold-Backed 'Unit' Proposal,” The Jerusalem Post, December 8, 2025. https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/precious-metals/article-879668

15. Trading Economics, “United States Dollar.” https://tradingeconomics. com/united-states/currency

16. Bruno Venditti, “Mapped: Which Countries Hold the Most Gold Reserves?,: Visual Capitalist, November 25, 2025. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mapped-which-countries-hold-the-most-gold-reserves/

17. Stephen Onyeiwu, “Nigeria’s Brics Partnership: Economist Outlines Potential Benefits,” The Conversation, February 25, 2025. https:// theconversation.com/nigerias-brics-partnership-economist-outlinespotential-benefits-248943

18. Claire Trevett, “PM Backs Winston Peters on Push for Free Trade Talks with Russia,” The New Zealand Herald, March 12, 2018. https://www. nzherald.co.nz/nz/pm-backs-winston-peters-on-push-for-free-tradetalks-with-russia/G7GGSA2RUQANQJVKWK4GRPWDTY/

Strategic Dissonance: Projection and Protection in Aotearoa New Zealand’s LGBTQ+ Statecraft

Robert Broughton

New Zealand state agencies increasingly frame LGBTQ+ visibility as both a national security and a human rights issue.1 The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service places ‘Rainbow communities’ within its account of transnational repression, warning that intimidation and harassment can be tactics of foreign interference. Material released under the Official Information Act shows Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade staff framing Pride Month visibility as ‘soft diplomacy’, but ministerial direction narrowed the ministry's planned Pride Month social media output. This article treats the resulting divergence as strategic dissonance and argues that small-state credibility, particularly in the Pacific, depends on aligning proactive practice at home with outward-facing signals.

Sexuality and gender diversity have usually entered New Zealand’s foreign policy through human rights, development partnerships and nation branding. These approaches frame LGBTQ+ people as beneficiaries of values-based policy, or as evidence of a liberal national identity that New Zealand can project abroad. The tone that emerged publicly in 2025

Robert Broughton (Ngāti Kahungunu, Ngāti Porou) is a doctoral candidate in Politics and International Relations at Te Kunenga ki Pūrehuroa | Massey University. His research sits at the intersection of international political economy, security and the politics of inclusion. His thesis investigates how social inclusion conditions macroeconomic resilience, using comparative structural analysis and quantitative modelling. His wider interests include the political economy of gender and sexuality, neoliberal governance, contemporary global capitalism and the politics of the New Right.

is sharper. It treats sexuality and gender diversity as terrain on which foreign power can be exercised inside New Zealand and as a site where sovereign integrity can be tested. In the Pacific, where sexuality and gender are contested in domestic politics and with diplomacy being intensely relationship-based, even modest shifts in New Zealand’s official LGBTQ+ policy visibility can carry disproportionate signalling effects, shaping perceptions of credibility well beyond Wellington.

This shift is visible in New Zealand Security Intelligence Service's (NZSIS) 2025 threat environment material. It explicitly identifies ‘Rainbow communities’ as targets of transnational repression within a broader account of societal foreign interference, noting tactics such as online harassment and blacklisting and warning that fear of reprisals can deter participation in legitimate community or political activity.2 It is a move that quietly reframes what many readers would consider ‘social issues’ as part of the state’s security perimeter.

At first glance, an intelligence service naming Rainbow communities could be misread as a cultural signal, or as a symbolic update to language. That reading is incomplete. NZSIS is not presenting this as inclusion policy. It is describing vulnerability and pressure points and therefore identifying a mechanism of influence. Once that point is accepted, the usual categories of ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ become less stable. Foreign policy is no longer confined to what New Zealand does overseas. It includes how New Zealand protects people at home from coercion that originates elsewhere.

The significance of this shift becomes clearer when placed alongside a second development within Wellington’s policy circles. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's (MFAT) own publicly released planning documents and other published material have treated the ‘non-discrimination of LGBTIQ+ persons’ as one of seven thematic priorities of New Zealand’s human rights diplomacy. They explicitly embed engagement on sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC) rights, including through Pride Month itself, as a core component of diplomatic practice.3 In 2025, MFAT’s Pride

Month social media plans were curtailed following ministerial direction on the scope of official channels, as reflected in material released under the Official Information Act.4 The episode matters not because ministers shape diplomatic communications, which is ordinary, but because MFAT’s own communications material framed Pride Month visibility as diplomacy while NZSIS was publicly warning that Rainbow communities are targets of intimidation and harassment.

A Case of Strategic Dissonance

Taken together, these developments form a case study in strategic dissonance: different arms of the state communicating different things about what Rainbow visibility is, and what it does. In this case, the dissonance is not mainly about symbolism. It concerns the alignment – or misalignment – between protection and projection. Protection refers to the practices through which the state safeguards communities from coercion and intimidation. Projection involves the practices through which the state signals norms, identity and partnership, often through visibility itself.

Strategic dissonance, as used here, refers to misalignment between the state’s diagnosis of risk and its visible practice. Divergence can be purposeful, but where it is unacknowledged it can create exploitable ambiguity. In small states, such misalignment is not mainly a rhetorical problem. It is a strategic vulnerability because reputation and relationship access often do more work than military and economic power. When external audiences perceive inconsistency, they can discount signals. When adversarial actors perceive inconsistency, they may exploit it. The question is therefore not whether New Zealand should ‘do Pride’ everywhere, but whether its agencies can align around a coherent account of why, where and how LGBTQ+ visibility supports resilience.

Protection: Transnational Repression

Transnational repression forces foreign policy analysis to move beyond the familiar image of influence as something that happens in conference rooms or media markets. It describes a form of power that travels through people rather than through treaties. It is exercised when foreign states seek to monitor, intimidate or silence individuals beyond their own borders, and to

prevent them from participating in public life in their country of residence. It is not unique to LGBTQ+ communities. Comparable tactics are used against exiled opposition figures, journalists and human rights defenders, They range from surveillance and online harassment to pressure channelled through family members abroad and, in extreme cases, targeted violence, as in the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018.5 The common objective is to make participation in public life feel too costly to sustain. NZSIS’s public framing matters because it treats this not as a marginal problem but as part of the foreign interference landscape.

Two implications follow for how New Zealand should think about protection as statecraft. The first is that transnational repression collapses the boundary between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’. If someone can be threatened in Auckland or Wellington because of their sexuality or gender identity or deterred from attending a protest or community event because they fear surveillance, then the safety of civic life becomes an external relations issue. The second is that the state’s relationship with minority communities becomes part of its ability to detect and respond to foreign interference. Protection is not only a matter of formal law. It is also a matter of whether communities trust institutions enough to report intimidation, and whether officials treat that intimidation as a security harm rather than as a cultural dispute.

This is where the language of ‘Rainbow communities’ matters. It is a public acknowledgement by the security community that inclusion affects security outcomes. If state institutions treat a community’s visibility as undesirable or politically inconvenient, it can inadvertently reinforce the very conditions that transnational repression relies on. Blackmail can be more effective when the target fears public exposure. Intimidation can be more severe when the target anticipates indifference. Coercion is easier when the social environment is structured by shame.

For LGBTQ+ people who have left jurisdictions where sexuality is criminalised or violently policed, the possibility of being identified, monitored or outed is not an abstract inconvenience. It can be experienced as a threat that reaches across borders,

affecting family members, community ties and the basic confidence required to participate in public life. Seen from that vantage point, ‘security’ is not only about borders or military capability. It is also about whether the state makes it easier to live openly, or easier for others to impose silence.

There is also a broader democratic stake. Transnational repression does not only harm individuals. It degrades democratic life by narrowing participation. When people withdraw from community events, protests or advocacy work because they fear being monitored or punished, the distribution of voice and representation changes. The end state can look like community silence, but the cause is strategic: foreign power operating through fear. In a small democracy, social cohesion is a strategic asset. Cohesion does not require uniformity, but it does require that people can participate without fear.

This is why it is misleading to treat the protection of Rainbow communities as a narrow identity issue. If foreign actors can exploit social stigma to impose costs on public participation, then inclusion is part of national security in the same way that cybersecurity and electoral integrity are part of national security. NZSIS’s public intervention signals that the Service sees this connection. The question for policy-makers is whether the state’s outward-facing practice supports or undermines that protective posture.

Projection: Public Diplomacy

If protection is the internal face of this problem, projection is its external face. Projection refers to the ways states communicate who they are, what they stand for and which communities they recognise. For a small state, projection is rarely a matter of coercion. It is enacted through diplomacy, development partnerships, defence engagement and symbolic signals that shape reputation and access.

MFAT’s Pride Month communications became controversial in 2025 precisely because MFAT staff were describing them as purposeful diplomacy. MFAT’s own public reporting positions sexual orientation and gender identity as an area where New Zealand seeks to show leadership in human rights.6 Internal

material released under the Official Information Act makes the logic explicit. A Pride Month digital content package prepared by MFAT framed visible support on official social media as a strand of New Zealand’s ‘soft diplomacy’ that can build connection and understanding with community groups or government stakeholders, ‘potentially opening the door to further discussion’ in some countries.7 The same material positioned Pride Month content alongside other annual digital campaigns (for example women’s rights and the rights of persons with disabilities), reinforcing that it was treated as routine public diplomacy rather than discretionary activism.

MFAT’s projection was not limited to speeches or press statements. In a formal message associated with Sydney WorldPride 2023, MFAT noted that the Consul-General and other consulate staff marched in the Mardi Gras Parade and Pride March. The Pride Month digital content package circulated in May 2025 similarly framed Pride visibility as diplomatic signalling, offering draft captions that linked Pride Month to New Zealand milestones including homosexual law reform, the Human Rights Act and marriage equality. This is a particularly direct form of signalling, precisely because it cannot be dismissed as abstract rhetoric.8

In 2025, ministerial direction had the effect of narrowing the boundary around that visibility. In correspondence released under OIA 30185, a senior adviser in the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs indicated that he had discussed Pride Month social media plans with the minister and emphasised that the minister viewed MFAT’s social media channels as being primarily for use to communicate New Zealand’s positions on foreign and trade policy issues, and to document engagement with other countries. A subsequent MFAT message to posts advised that updated social media guidance, informed closely by this direction, would ‘impact the Ministry’s social media engagement, most immediately, in relation to Pride Month’. The same adviser added that this ‘should not be read as having wider implications for our human rights diplomacy ... or for what activities/events our Post network choose to undertake/attend’.9

What This Means

From a foreign policy perspective, the attempt to separate hu-

man rights diplomacy from social media and from public attendance is where this episode becomes more than a communications dispute. Diplomatic work is increasingly evaluated through public-facing outputs, especially in contexts where traditional diplomatic access is constrained or where civil society engagement is central to influence. Social media posts and public attendance are not ornamental. They are part of the ways diplomats demonstrate priorities and build relationships, and they are routinely interpreted as signals of resolve.

Three cautions matter for interpreting this episode. First, the adviser’s caveat that the change ‘should not be read’ as having wider implications can be seen as an acknowledgement that official visibility carries meaning beyond the platform on which it appears. Second, NZSIS explicitly identifies online harassment as a tactic used to intimidate and harass targets of transnational repression. In that threat environment, limiting official Pride visibility by changing what is normalised on official channels may influence the information ecosystem in which harassment occurs. Third, for LGBTQ+ people in diaspora communities, and for asylum seekers and refugee claimants, the difference between official recognition and official silence is not merely symbolic. It can shape expectations about whether the state will treat intimidation as a material harm, and whether reporting is likely to be met with seriousness or discomfort.

This does not mean that every diplomatic post must be advocacy-oriented. What is appropriate depends on context, capacity and the risks of backlash. In some host states, overt LGBTQ+ visibility can expose local activists to heightened surveillance or violence. In others, it can be framed as foreign cultural imposition, feeding narratives that delegitimise local movements. These are genuine dilemmas that require local judgement.

It is also important to acknowledge that unevenness across agencies is not necessarily inadvertent or irrational. MFAT and NZSIS operate under different mandates, face different audiences, and often work with different risk tolerances, including situations in which lower-profile visibility is a deliberate choice to avoid elevating danger for partners. Strategic dissonance is therefore not automatically evidence of retreat. The problem is that, where such trade-offs are not clearly articulated, diver-

gence can be misread by partners as wavering commitment, and can be exploited by adversarial actors as evidence that signals are contestable. Alignment still matters, not as a demand for uniform messaging, but as a requirement that divergence is intentional, justified and paired with credible protective practice at home.

For a small state, credibility is not a moral adornment – it is operational. It shapes access to decision-makers, the willingness of civil society actors to partner with New Zealand institutions, and the capacity of New Zealand officials to speak persuasively about dignity and non-discrimination without being dismissed as inconsistent. When New Zealand’s security community says identity can be exploited by foreign actors, credibility becomes even more important. Communities may be less likely to report intimidation if they suspect that their recognition is conditional, contested or politically inconvenient.

Defence at the Intersection

Strategic dissonance is not uniform across the state. Even as MFAT’s planned Pride Month social media output was curtailed, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) continued to describe inclusion as an institutional priority. It did so not only through internal policy, but also through public communication that situates inclusion inside organisational professionalism.

In 2023, NZDF reported that it had hosted a Pride in Defence conference, partnered with the Pride Pledge workplace inclusion initiative, had its Rainbow Tick certification reaccredited, rolled out training workshops and supported the Big Gay Out public Pride event. The same release noted that NZDF won both the All-Accor Progress Award and the overall Supreme Award at the Rainbow Excellence Awards.10 These are not marginal activities in an organisation that relies on cohesion, disciplined teamwork and high-trust relationships in high-stress environments. They also matter externally. Defence is one of the most visible parts of the state when New Zealand trains with

partners, deploys on operations or contributes to humanitarian and disaster response. In those contexts, organisational culture becomes part of the state’s outward face.

NZDF’s own language connects inclusion to capability. Receiving Rainbow Tick accreditation in 2019, NZDF described an intensive 13-month assessment period that reviewed the NZDF’s policies and practices and ran 15 focus groups, and said it believed it was the first military organisation to receive the accreditation. It framed inclusion as part of modernising the organisation, stressing that improvements for LGBT+ people ‘actually benefit all our Defence people’. It also linked values to operational performance, stating that ‘whether in peacetime or on operations, our strength is team work’.11

Defence institutions sit at the intersection of internal resilience and external signalling. Internally, inclusion can reduce vulnerability to coercion by lowering the social costs of disclosure. It can make it easier for personnel to report harassment and to trust the chain of command, which in turn supports discipline and effectiveness. Externally, a defence force that publicises inclusion communicates something about the state’s institutional culture, and about which values it treats as non-negotiable. This is particularly salient in the security domain because coercion and intimidation thrive on secrecy, shame and fear.

NZDF therefore operates as connective tissue between protection and projection. It is part of the national security system that must respond to foreign interference, and it is part of the state’s external face in the Pacific and beyond. When a defence force treats dignity and diversity as organisational fundamentals, it is not only managing workplace culture. It is shaping how the state demonstrates sovereignty.

Domestic Contestation and Regional Signalling

Strategic dissonance becomes more consequential when it coincides with visible domestic contestation. In February 2025,

police described a Destiny Church-related protest at an Auckland library event as ‘intimidating and unacceptable’.12 The specific politics of the event matter less here than what the episode reveals. Rainbow visibility can be a domestic flashpoint capable of producing organised mobilisation and requiring a policing response. That is a social fact that foreign observers can see, and foreign interference actors can exploit.

Domestic episodes matter for foreign policy because they travel. They travel through news coverage, digital clips, diaspora networks and the routine attention that foreign ministries pay to the internal politics of partners and peers. They also travel because the boundary between domestic politics and international reputation is porous. New Zealand’s reputation for social cohesion is often seen as one of the assets it deploys in regional diplomacy and development. When domestic conflict is visible, that reputation can be questioned, and credibility can be weakened.

The Pacific context makes this more pointed, even if it is varied. For example, in 2025, reporting on Vanuatu highlighted proposals for constitutional change that would recognise only two sexes. The reporting also recorded concerns about implications for LGBTQIA+ rights and representation, and it noted how supporters framed the amendment through tradition and social values while critics stressed the consequences for inclusion and equality.13

This matters for New Zealand because the region’s normative landscape shapes what its signals mean. A Pacific activist or official may not necessarily distinguish between a ministerial preference about ‘scope’ and a deeper shift in commitment. Nor does a foreign interference actor. When states and communities assess resolve, they often look to visible signals, not

to internal assurances about how a directive should be interpreted. In a region where some political actors are seeking to entrench binary definitions of sex and to treat gender diversity as illegitimate, even small shifts in visible practice by an influential partner can acquire disproportionate meaning.

The point is not to romanticise Pride visibility or to treat it as a universal good. It is to treat it as a policy instrument that interacts with security concerns. If Rainbow communities are targets of transnational repression, and if domestic contestation makes their visibility a flashpoint, then the state’s external messaging and internal inclusion practices become linked. A fragmented approach, where one institution treats visibility as a security variable and another treats it primarily as reputational risk, creates space for hostile actors to exploit ambiguity. Coherence does not require uniform messaging. It requires a shared diagnosis of what the threat is and why inclusion, credibility and visible recognition matter to resilience.

Conclusion

The conventional story places sexuality and gender diversity at the edges of ‘high politics’. Evidence from 2025 suggests the opposite. NZSIS has publicly linked Rainbow communities to foreign interference and transnational repression. MFAT communications staff framed Pride visibility as soft diplomacy, even as ministerial direction curtailed planned Pride Month social media content. NZDF continues to frame inclusion as part of professionalism and operational life. Domestic contestation and regional normative conflict make the meaning of visibility both more salient and more contested.

These developments belong in the same analytical frame because they describe one strategic terrain. Protection and projection are not separate lanes. When foreign influence is exercised through intimidation of minority communities, domestic inclusion becomes part of counter-interference. When diplomatic visibility is used to build relationships and signal norms, symbolic gestures become instruments of statecraft. Strategic dissonance emerges when these logics are left unaligned, particularly in a small state whose influence relies heavily on credibility and relationship access.

At minimum, the episode points to the need for agreed cross-agency criteria for decisions about Pride visibility on official channels, treated as a risk and credibility question rather than a branding preference. Where reduced visibility is judged necessary, the state should be able to demonstrate how protective and diplomatic objectives will be maintained through other forms of engagement.

Operationally, that implies three priorities. The first is strengthening trusted reporting pathways for Rainbow diaspora communities, asylum seekers and refugee claimants, backed by clear signals that intimidation will be treated as a material security harm. The second is a more explicit account, in plain terms, of how inclusion supports sovereignty and resilience while preserving discretion in settings where overt visibility would elevate risk for local partners. The third is a Pacific approach in which visibility complements, rather than substitutes for, sustained relationship-based support for locally led SOGIESC work.

For a small state, coherence is not an aesthetic preference. It is a practical requirement. The lesson of 2025 is not that Pride belongs everywhere, nor that it belongs nowhere. It is that LGBTQ+ visibility has become entangled with security practice, and that security practices are most effective when they align across government.

Notes

1. LGBTQ+ is an umbrella term for diverse sexual orientations and gender identities. Where specific institutions or actors employ alternative acronyms such as LGBT+, LGBTIQ+ or LGBTQIA+, this article retains the original terminology when discussing those measures or documents.

2. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, New Zealand’s Security Threat Environment 2025: An Assessment by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (Wellington: NZSIS, 2025), 18–19. https:// www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/NZSIS-Documents/New-Zealands-SecurityThreat-Environment-2025.pdf

3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “New Zealand’s Thematic Human Rights Priorities.” https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/peace-rights-and-security/human-rights; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Pacific Gender Equality Ambassador Work Plan 22–24, INTD-222-1802 (released under the Official Information Act). https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/OIA/ OIA-2023/Pacific-Gender-Equality-Ambassador-Work-plan-22-24.pdf

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Official Information Act response to Henry Cooke (OIA 30185), 10 July 2025 (released under the Official Information Act 1982; documents on file with the author), including: email from the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘Re: Social media communications for Pride Month’ (27 May 2025) and Formal Message, ‘Updating Ministry Social Media Guidelines’ (30 May 2025).

5. United Nations Human Rights Council, Annex to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Investigation into the unlawful death of Mr Jamal Khashoggi (A/HRC/41/ CRP.1, 2019), paras 1, 31, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3809582

6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ”Case study: New Zealand’s International Human Rights Action Plan 2019–2023,” in MFAT Annual Report 2018–19. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/mfat-annualreports/mfat-annual-report-2018-19/case-study-new-zealands-international-human-rights-action-plan-2019-2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Joint statement on LGBTQI+/SOGIESC rights in the Pacific,” October 11, 2021. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/ joint-statement-on-lgbtqi-sogiesc-rights-in-the-pacific

7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, email, “Social media communica-

tions for Pride Month,” May 13, 2025 (released under OIA 30185), and attachment, “UN Pride Month Digital Content Package MFAT” (unclassified, May 2025) (released under OIA 30185).

8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Sydney World Pride 2023 –There is no natural floor to human rights,” Formal Message circular, March 24, 2023. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/OIA/OIA-2023/Sydney-World-Pride-2023-There-is-no-natural-floor-to-human-rights.pdf (accessed January 2026); Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “UN Pride Month Digital Content Package MFAT” (unclassified, May 2025) (released under OIA 30185).

9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, email from Senior Foreign Affairs Adviser (Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs), “Re: Social media communications for Pride Month,” May 27, 2025 (released under OIA 30185); and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Formal Message, “Updating Ministry Social Media Guidelines,” May 30, 2025 (released under OIA 30185).

10. New Zealand Defence Force, “New Zealand Defence Force takes out top spot at Rainbow Excellence Awards,” news release, September 28, 2023. https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/new-zealanddefence-force-takes-out-top-spot-at-rainbow-excellence-awards/

11. New Zealand Defence Force, “NZDF first military to get Rainbow Tick,” news release, November 26, 2019. https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/nzdf-first-military-to-get-rainbow-tick/

12. RNZ, “Destiny Church library protest ‘intimidating and unacceptable’ – police,” February 17, 2025. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/542159/destiny-church-library-protest-intimidating-and-unacceptable-police

13. RNZ Pacific, “Change expected for Vanuatu’s constitution on recognised sexes,” April 28, 2025, https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/559248/change-expected-for-vanuatu-s-constitution-on-recognised-sexes; ABC Pacific, “Vanuatu Government amends constitution,” May 8, 2025. https://www.abc.net.au/pacific/programs/pacificbeat/pacific-beat/105246530; Doug Dingwall and Lillyrose Welwel, “Vanuatu’s ‘two sexes law’ raises fears for rights of LGBTQIA+ community,” ABC News, August 24, 2025, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-08-24/ vanuatu-gender-law-constitutional-amendment/105641178

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The Struggle for Democracy in Belarus

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya

According to Independent observers, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya won the Belarus presidential election on August 9, 2020 against Alexander Lukashenko, having entered the Presidential race after her husband, Siarhei Tsikhanousky, was arrested for voicing his presidential aspirations. Following a forced exile from Belarus and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Tsikhanouskaya created and chaired the United Transition Cabinet. Belarusian anti-war activists led by Tsikhanouskaya conducted underground resistance in Belarus by sabotaging the railway transportation of Russian troops as well as volunteering for Belarusian-staffed units fighting for Ukraine. The following text is edited from the speech she gave on the struggle for democracy in Belarus to the NZIIA in Wellington on 3 November 2025.

New Zealand is, for us, a model of how to build a prosperous, sovereign, and democratic country while preserving national identity and culture. I believe Belarusians can learn a great deal from New Zealanders.

Many Belarusians have already discovered New Zealand. Hundreds of Belarusians now live in Auckland, Wellington, and

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is President-elect of Belarus, National Leader and the Head of the United Transition Cabinet in exile in Lithuania. Among dozens of distinctions, Tsikhanouskaya is a recipient of the Sakharov Prize awarded by the European Parliament, the 2022 International Four Freedoms Award, and the Charlemagne Prize. In 2021 and 2022, she was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda and Members of the Norwegian Parliament, respectively.

Christchurch. Some arrived recently, after our peaceful uprising in 2020, fleeing persecution and terror. This country has long offered a safe haven to many people from Eastern Europe.

Many Belarusians in New Zealand have even rediscovered their Belarusian identity here. Some of them believe that we must learn from Māori, when it comes to national identity.

I just met members of the Belarusian diaspora in Auckland and Wellington. Living 16,000 kilometers away from home, they have learned to love both Belarus and New Zealand. They work in business, in academia, and some in literature. I know at least two young Belarusian female writers who live here, and publish amazing books.

Belarus and New Zealand may not have many things in common, but one thing unites us for sure – ANZAC. Many Belarusian immigrants served with the ANZACs, like Norman Myer from Tatarsk near Orsha, or William Deonk, who was awarded the Military Medal for fighting at Gallipoli.

I hope that my visit here will help to build new connections and raise awareness about Belarus, Ukraine, and our region among New Zealanders.

Belarusian Hobbits

Yesterday, just after arrival, as an average tourist, I visited Rotorua, and stopped by Hobbiton. These films about Hobbits are very popular in Belarus too. People love them because in these movies truth, friendship and courage win in the end.

One Belarusian writer called Belarusians ‘Hobbits of European woods’. Not because we are small and arrogant, but because we love to live quietly in the comfort of our homes and communities.

You may say that we prefer not to step out of our comfort zone. But in 2020, we did step into the limelight of history. This is where my story began.

Belarus, Chernobyl

I admit that Belarus may not be the most popular country in the world. And before 2020, when our uprising started, it was very little known. Usually, when you ask foreigners about Belarus, they could name three stereotypes: Chernobyl, tractors, and Lukashenko.

Chernobyl affected Belarus a lot. This nuclear catastrophe left a huge wound – 70% of the radioactive waste fell on Belarus.

I myself was one of the so-called Chernobyl children. In my teens, I visited Ireland every summer in order to improve my health. It meant a lot to me: I learned that life could be different, and more fun.

You may also know Sviatlana Alexievich, our Nobel Literature Prize winner. She wrote brilliant non-fiction books about the impact of Chernobyl and about the disintegration of the Soviet empire.

Sometimes, the post-Soviet dictatorship in Belarus is called ‘political Chernobyl’. Which is probably worse than the nuclear one.

What is Dictatorship Like?

Do you know what life in a dictatorship is like?

It’s when you wake up, go to the internet and turn the VPN on, to learn what’s really going on in your country and in your town, and how many people were arrested yesterday.

It’s when you check out the extremist’s list everyday, just to find there another website or Telegram channel that you are subscribed to – so you have to delete the subscription right away.

It’s when you walk down the street and see your favorite cafe closed, because its owner, your longtime friend, was arrested. She made a donation to political prisoners five years ago, and now the police came for her. She may get several years of imprisonment in a politically biased trial. You go to visit her at the detention center, and they say that you can’t see her because she was declared a terrorist, so she can’t receive letters, money or food from outside. You can’t do anything about it. And when you come home, you probably start packing your stuff to leave the country, because you’re afraid that you’re going to be next on the list.

Overall, living in Belarus is very much like living in the former Soviet Union, but with hi-tech surveillance. An Italian journalist called it communism with a taste of cappuccino.

But there is not only dictatorship. There are also Belarusians. Courageous people who, five years ago, said 'Enough!' to the regime. They stepped out of the shadow of dictatorship – and of the shadow of stereotypes.

Siarhei and Sviatlana’s Story

My husband Siarhei was one of those who fostered that. He traveled the country with his camera asking people about their lives. His blog was called 'A Country for Living'. And people told him the truth – the truth that authorities don’t like to hear. When Siarhei announced his plan to run for president against Lukashenko, the dictator began to worry. He wanted to play it safe and arrested Siarhei to prevent him from running.

When my husband was in prison, I decided to step in for him and run in his place. I did that out of love for him: he invested so much effort in the campaign! And out of love for the people who sincerely believed in change. They stood in long lines to put their signature to my nomination. How could I fail them? My duty was to give them hope.

Before 2020, I was not even interested in politics. I was a mother busy with raising our two children. But Siarhei’s arrest and people’s enthusiasm changed everything.

Under people’s pressure, the dictator registered me as a candidate. But he didn’t believe for a second that I could defeat him. ‘Our constitution is not for a woman president’, he said. He was certain that Belarusians wouldn’t vote for a woman.

Diving into politics was, for me, a sort of a bungee jump. A leap of faith, without other support than that of the Belarusian people and my team of volunteers behind me. At first, I didn’t believe we could succeed. But with every meeting with voters, I felt more and more certain that we would win. Belarusians out-

grew the dictator. They changed. They wanted change. They turned more and more towards Europe.

Peaceful Revolution

The election took place on 9 August 2020. This time, we had an alternative count of the ballots. I received more than 50 per cent of the votes in the first round. I was supposed to be declared winner and president of Belarus. But dictators have a hard time saying goodbye to their beloved toy, power. Lukashenko refused to step down. He declared himself the winner, as he did for the previous 30 years.

People were outraged. They took to the streets to defend our victory, only to be met with brutal force. Several people were killed by police bullets. Thousands were arrested around the country. There was no internet for three days.

The KGB forced me to leave. They told me, ‘If you stay, you’ll never see your children again’. The regime hoped that if they pushed me out of the country, the protests would stop. But people in Belarus kept fighting and kept believing. Women in white were protesting against violence. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered all over the country. They faced brutal force with their bare hands and flowers.

Repression and War

Belarusians continued protesting for a year, but the Russiabacked terror prevailed. By violence, the dictator Lukashenko

took Belarus back, but he lost the Belarusian people forever.

After that, he began a hybrid war against Europe, using illegal migration. He hijacked a Ryanair plane to arrest journalist Raman Pratasevich. And finally, he dragged our country into war against Ukraine. If it was not for Russia, Lukashenko wouldn’t have remained in power. But Putin had his own plans with him. They were planning the invasion of Ukraine already. They needed Belarus to be a launchpad for the attack against Ukraine –against Western democracy.

With the war, repression in Belarus became even more fierce. But Belarusians didn’t remain silent. Railway partisans helped Ukrainians to slow down the Russian attack on Kyiv by sabotaging Russian military convoys. There were about 100 such attacks. For that, more than twenty people were brutally detained, tortured and sentenced to 10, 14, 20 and more years in prison. Many Belarusians protested in the open. They sent money to support Ukraine. They leaked information to Ukrainian forces. An underground group destroyed a Russian intelligence plane.

Hundreds of Belarusians went to fight for Ukraine. They formed the Kalinouski regiment – one of the best in the Ukrainian army – and 80 of them gave their lives for Ukraine’s freedom. One of them was Maria Zaitsava. In 2020, her face covered in blood became a symbol of our revolution. She was stunned by a police grenade and went to Europe to undergo a complicated ear surgery. After that, she could have stayed there to study, but she went to Ukraine. In her very first battle, she was killed. It happened in January this year. The day before she had celebrated her 24th birthday. As a queer person, Maria knew what it’s like to live in an unfree society. She wanted to change her life – and that of all Belarusians. She sacrificed herself for this dream.

Today’s Situation

Today, Belarus is under hybrid occupation. Russian troops are stationed there, including nuclear weapons. Putin and Lukashenko use Belarusian territory to terrorise neighbouring nations, primarily Ukraine.

War propaganda is everywhere. Political parties, independent media, trade unions and NGOs – including ecological, feminist, cultural – all are banned. About half a million Belarusians were forced to leave Belarus fearing persecution. More than 1100 remain in jail, including our Nobel Peace Prize winner Ales Bialiatski, Polish-Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut, Maryia Kalesnikava, Mikola Statkevich and others. A dozen people have died behind bars since 2020. Repression continues, people are arrested every day.

Siarhei’s Release

In June, after five years in jail, my husband Siarhei was released. It was due to president Trump’s personal involvement, and I’m very grateful to him for that.

After the release, Siarhei was unlawfully deported from Belarus. For two years, he was kept incommunicado. I had no news from him whatsoever. When we met again, I, at first, could barely recognize him, he was so thin and exhausted. Our little daughter couldn’t recognize him at all. He said that he managed to survive hell. For most of the time he was kept in total isolation: no talks, letters, phone calls. He was buried alive in his cell.

Siarhei’s release was a booster for our democratic movement. Today, he’s in much better physical shape. He continues his fight for a free independent Belarus and for releasing all the

political prisoners.

What We Do

This is what our movement has been doing for five years in exile. You can say that we are building a parallel Belarus, sowing seeds of democracy for the future. Our civil society is very active in Europe and all over the world. But our needs are multiple:

• To support the prisoners, their families, the released;

• To teach children Belarusian language and history;

• To provide help to immigrants in need.

Together with Norway and other European countries, we created the International Humanitarian Fund for Political Prisoners in Belarus. We even began to issue our own passports, to replace expired national passports which Lukashenko’s authorities don’t want to renew. Because of their decision, many Belarusians abroad became de facto stateless.

Our people are tough, hard-working and creative. Before 2020, Belarus was known as Europe’s IT lab. In the last years, almost all the creative educated class was forced to emigrate to keep their jobs and businesses. They continue working with us, using high-tech innovations to fight for democracy. We have our own voting application, our Cyberpartizans who hack the regime’s servers, our online education projects, psychological consultations and lawyers’ offices, etc.

We built resilient legitimate political structures in exile. The Office of the President-Elect, the United Transitional Cabinet as proto-government, and the Coordination Council as proto-par-

liament are all functioning. We conducted elections online, the next ones are next spring.

We advocate for more economic sanctions against the regime – but not against the Belarusian people. We must preserve their mobility: let them travel, study and see what life in democracy is like. We also call our partners to open cases against Lukashenko and his cronies, to ensure their accountability. We’ve collected evidence of 6,700 cases of crimes against humanity.

Thank God, we are not alone in our fight. We have powerful allies, such as the US, the UK, Canada and the European Union. And I hope that New Zealand will join this exclusive club too.

Our long-term goal is to join the EU. Only within the European Union can the survival of our nation be guaranteed, as our Nobel Prize winner Ales Bialiatski wrote. Otherwise, we are going to remain Russia’s colony, and dissolve into the so-called Russian world.

How to Help

Belarusians, who live in exile around the world, are united by one dream: to come back home, to live normal lives at peace with our neighbors, in harmony with our environment.

I want New Zealanders to discover our beautiful Belarus one day. To come to see the land of the European Hobbits. I’m sure you will love it.

Unfortunately, travelling there is not safe today. Not only because of the war in Ukraine. Sometimes foreign citizens are arrested and accused of espionage by Lukashenko, to serve as hostages in his political games with the West.

But you can help Belarusians in their fight wherever you are. Spreading information in your social media, telling the stories of Belarusian political prisoners. Donating to humanitarian organizations, such as the International Humanitarian Fund. Cooperating with the local Belarusian diaspora.

And, of course, supporting Ukraine. Ukraine’s victory will be our victory too. To support the Belarusian democratic movement is also to support Ukraine, and vice versa. Our destinies

are intertwined. We have a common enemy: Russian colonialism.

Ukraine’s victory will open a window of opportunities for Belarus. If Lukashenko loses Russia’s support, he won’t hold for three months. To weaken Russia is a key to both Ukraine’s victory and Belarus’s freedom.

I’m grateful to New Zealand’s government for introducing recent sanctions against Russia’s shadow oil fleet and against Lukashenko’s company Belneftekhim. I’ll ask your politicians to consider further sanctions against Lukashenko for crimes against humanity and war crimes. Even symbolic support matters for us.

Besides, I’ll ask them not to extradite Belarusian citizens to Belarus, where they risk being persecuted for their political views. And to officially recognize our democratic political structures, as the EU did. Let’s formalise our relations for the future.

Democracy and Solidarity

Our fight is a global one. Democracy is under attack everywhere around the world. Dictators believe that might is right. They don’t need to listen to people’s opinions. They just need obedient servants. They say that people can be happy without personal freedom. Let’s prove them wrong.

What I ask you to do is – don’t give up on democracy. It’s like air: you don’t notice it until you are suffocating.

Please cherish your freedom and your way of life. It is easy to lose and hard to get back.

Democracy is not perfect, Churchill said. But at least it can be improved. Dictatorship can’t.

Don’t think that what’s going on in Belarus doesn’t concern you. If democracy loses there, there will be less freedom everywhere.

Solidarity with freedom fighters all around the world is what will bring us victory. Thank you for standing together with the Belarusian people for peace, democracy and human rights.

Zhyve Belarus!

BOOKS

A DIFFERENT KIND OF POWER: A Memoir

Author: Jacinda Ardern

Published by: Penguin Random House, 2025, 352 pp, $59.99 (hb).

It must be difficult to write memoirs, particularly when you are still mid-career. It is difficult to balance personal and professional stories, to keep the tempo moving and provide depth. A Different Kind of Power does well on these fronts, for the most part at least. The opening pages about waiting for results – pregnancy and election both – draw the reader in. From here the work delivers accessible and personable retellings of key events in the life of Dame Jacinda Ardern, pre politics and beyond.

Appropriate to New Zealand culture, a great deal of selfeffacement is on the page. Almost immediately Dame Jacinda talks about how ‘my whole short life I had grappled with the idea that I was never quite good enough … but my fear of failing, of letting people down, was overshadowed by a grinding sense of responsibility’. The book also closes with an exhortation to those feeling ‘imposter syndrome’ to channel their fears, to see their sensitivity as strength and to understand that empathy makes you stronger.

At times the overarching earnestness of the author is almost overwhelming. The reader might wonder if this is a little forced – such as when, in remembering watching the events of Lockerbie, the Berlin Wall and Tiananmen Square unfold at night on national television, the author says that they were reminded of not only how big the world was, but also ‘not so big that one person couldn’t do something to change it’. But this eagerness is so consistent that this genuinely does seem to be a key feature of New Zealand’s 40th Prime Minister.

In terms of other key threads running through the text, we learn about the shaping of Dame Jacinda Ardern’s values, her politics and her personal life.

On values, Dame Jacinda writes of key events in her childhood and their impacts on her understanding of the fragility and value of human life: painfully recounting the significant injuries

Notes on reviewers

Professor Bethan Greener is Head of School (People, Environment and Planning) at Te Kunenga ki Pūrehuroa | Massey University.

Dr Stephen Hoadley, a retired Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland academic, is currently editor of the Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy.

Dr Tim Fadgen is a senior lecturer in politics and international relations and senior research fellow at the Public Policy Institute at Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland, and former Special Assistant to Samoa’s Attorney General.

her uncle sustained in an accident, and then later the trauma of the suicide of her best friend’s brother. Similarly, when she reflects on her childhood, she draws attention to the disenfranchisement of the Māori community around her and credits her upbringing in Murupara for making her a political animal.

The Mormon Church, too, was another key source of morals and values – even when rejecting it. She was raised surrounded by a warm and loving religious family and social setting. But as her world grew larger, she began to comprehend the church’s impact on the LGBTQIA+ population. She clearly recalls the time when she could no longer reconcile the discrepancy between the apparently welcoming church she grew up in and its approach to those who diverged from heterosexuality.

In terms of politics, Dame Jacinda recounts her journey to the top job as one of ascent by attrition – swiftly becoming Deputy PM and, within 5 months, unexpectedly finding herself running for the top job. Which she won. On route to take up office

she was asked by journalist John Campbell as to her intentions: ‘I want this government to feel different. I want people to feel it’s listening and that it’s going to bring kindness back’.

There are several instances where the former prime minister seeks to bring this to life. Some are well known – such as in her response to the terrorist event of 15 March 2019. Fiftytwo people lost their lives, and many others experienced unimaginable trauma. When at a school in Christchurch very shortly thereafter, a thoughtful young girl asked the then Prime Minister: ‘How are you?’ Clearly surprised, Dame Jacinda replied: ‘How am I going? I am very sad’. She later says that the sadness never left. But, in discussing the firearms reform that followed, she asserts that ‘perhaps some sadness is never meant to. Perhaps sometimes sadness is what keeps you focused on change’.

One enjoyable but quiet aspect of the political parts of the text is that Dame Jacinda appears to weigh people rather than their affiliations. One of the Labour Party’s ‘too many Daves’ comes in for critique, whilst National’s John Key and New Zealand First’s Winston Peters are shown to have certain strengths. Some previous Labour Government policies are also decried, with her recognition of the heavy social costs of the economic policies of the 1980s.

On the third theme of her personal life, Dame Jacinda calls out the constant speculation about possible pregnancy – raising the broader issue of gender and its role in politics and society. When she would visit schools in her early years, she would ask what politicians looked like. Students would answer with the stereotype of old, male, and grey with voices that would be confident, angry and aggressive. Globally that stereotype still prevails. At one international meeting there were 53 leaders, five of which were women. Clarke Gayford, Dame Jacinda’s partner, happily joined the spouses’ group, and later continued to actively play the role of main caregiver following the birth of Neve. However, despite the positive effects of this role reversal, Dame Jacinda was aware of this as a double-edged sword. Clarke was always ready to help, but she was concerned that this might result in her being seen as if she was not strong or resilient enough. Similarly, she notes that, although the photos of her with baby Neve at the United Nations could be seen as empowering for women, Dame Jacinda writes: ‘I think about all the people just outside the camera frame ... I worried that this photo would become a banner for “women doing it all” … Sure, women can do it all … But that doesn't mean they should’. She clearly states that ‘becoming a mum changed me’: her previous focus on children’s policy was sharpened further as she sought to make New Zealand ‘the best place in the world to be a child’. But much of this work was overshadowed by the advent of COVID-19.

The pandemic was an unprecedented crisis. Closing the borders ‘felt like the biggest decision I would make as Prime Minister’, but also ‘I also felt there was no choice’. New Zealand was looking at the possibility of tens of thousands of deaths, and a hundred thousand hospitalised. The government decided on an alert system that included different degrees of “lockdown” within the country and later embarked on a staged immunisation programme.

These decisions prompted a wide range of responses within New Zealand society. Some welcomed them as ways to protect the population. Others saw this as a serious affront to rights and freedoms. A convoy of protestors engaged in an occupation outside Parliament that lasted 23 days. The lesson Dame Jacinda took from this was that Parliament was clearly ‘a place

and an institution that they didn’t believe in anymore’. But she seizes on ‘the counter factual, the outcome of the decisions that we didn’t make. The lives that might have been lost’.

These events will have taken their toll, and she was missing time with a fast-growing Neve: ‘Mummy, why do you have to work so much?’ When finding a (later confirmed benign) lump in her breast, an unbidden thought emerged: ‘Perhaps I could just leave’. Eventually this turned into: ‘Did I want to keep going?’ As the then Prime Minister mulled the possibility of leaving, she returned to school visits. This time when she asks ‘what do politicians look like?’, she is greeted with a young woman raising her hand to say: ‘Kind … I think politicians can be kind’. This matters.

BETHAN GREENER

CIVIL WAR AND INTRASTATE ARMED CONFLICT:

Changing Dynamics in International Perspective

Author

: Karl DeRouen Jr., Edward Newman and Paul Bellamy

Published by: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2025, 530pp, £115.00 (hb), £34.99 (pb)

Although written for university students and teachers, this book offers valuable information and insights also to officials, researchers, journalists and interested readers. It is timely in content, comprehensive in scope and accessible in presentation.

After noting that most contemporary wars are instrastate, not interstate, the book discusses definitions of civil wars. Note the plural: definitions vary with the choice of threshold fatalities (25, 100 or 1000 a year), contending parties (governments, factions, militia or rebels) or protagonists’ aims (vengeance, capture, autonomy or secession). Generally, civil wars are a more intense sub-category of intrastate conflicts. The authors include both in their textbook, and sometimes use the two terms interchangeably. This reviewer will use the term civil war to include both.

Consequently, databases tabulating frequencies and scope of civil wars yield varied patterns of causes, outbreaks, courses, terminations and consequences depending on the definition chosen. The authors present five of the most prominent databases, those compiled by: the Correlates of War Project; Doyle and Sambanis (2000); Fearon and Laitin (2003); the State Failure Project; and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

Approaches to civil wars vary by academic discipline, too. Traditional accounts from history, law and political science are giving way to new perspectives from sociology, anthropology, peace studies and women’s studies, with a focus on victims rather than protagonists. More abstracted quantitative analyses have also emerged. Will AI generate new, as yet unimagined approaches?

The authors provide cogent analyses and vivid case studies of interventions by outsiders. Internationalisation of domestic conflicts, about a third of the tabulated total, usually makes them longer and more deadly. A chapter on atrocities in civil war makes sobering reading, dispelling romantic fantasies of the nobility of resistance to oppression or of the alleged legitimacy of counter-insurgency.

Civil wars rarely remain within national boundaries. They spill outwards, manifesting abroad as economic interruptions, resource plunder, refugee surges, proxy fighting and terrorism

far beyond the original outbreak. They demand international attention.

The authors offer a menu of international responses. Recommended mitigation measures range from mediation to peacemaking and peacekeeping to facilitation of post-conflict justice and reconciliation. A particularly revealing chapter offers examples — positive and negative — of forceful outside intervention to quell domestic fighting. The US intervention in Iraq and Syria against ISIS and inter-ethnic strife figures prominently.

While outside actors in civil wars tend to legitimise their initiatives as humanitarian interventions, the authors make clear that less benign motives, such as political popularity, geopolitical advantage or resource acquisition are often in play. Their analysis foreshadows President Trump’s attempts in 2025 to mediate, using economic suasion, a ceasefire in Ukraine to ‘stop the killing’, while one of his explicit aims is to gain US firms’ access to the country’s scarce minerals.

As befits not only an excellent textbook but also a handy reference source, this book offers a timeline of civil wars and related events, a glossary of key terms, numerous quantitative tables and appendices, a lengthy bibliography and a comprehensive table of contents and index. These appear in addition to clear analyses and insights based on the recent case studies that are woven into the text.

However, readers will search in vain for detailed case studies of two of the most deadly civil wars of the 20th century, still unresolved today. They are the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists in China and between the north and the

south in Korea. This should be rectified if the book enjoys a new edition.

The authors are senior academics currently or formerly associated with the University of Alabama, the University of Leeds and the University of Canterbury, respectively.

STEPHEN HOADLEY

THE FUTURES OF DEMOCRACY, LAW AND GOVERNMENT: Contributions

to a

conference in honour of Sir Geoffrey

Palmer

Edited by: Mark Hickford and Matthew S.R. Palmer.

Published by: Te Herenga Waka University Press, Wellington, 2025, 368 pp, $70 (hb).

Early in The Futures of Democracy, Law and Government: Contributions to a Conference in Honour of Sir Geoffrey Palmer, the editors quote the book’s subject, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, and Andrew Butler: ‘the relationship between the races in New Zealand will not be determined by the Treaty of Waitangi. It will be determined by the attitudes of individuals and by a collective sense of justice, fairness and tolerance’. This assertion resonates throughout the book, as contributors debate who should arbitrate these principles, whether a constitutional court, a reformed and enlarged parliament designed for more participatory democracy, or a legislature that reclaims accountability from executive agencies. Questions of justice, fairness, and tolerance permeate the volume and feel urgent in today’s climate. Globally, ideals once considered aspirational such as the rule of law and equity are increasingly dismissed as divisive or destructive to settler societies. Against this backdrop, the book’s consideration of these principles is both timely and contested.

The book spans more than 300 pages and is divided into five parts: politics and policy, Te Tiriti o Waitangi and legitimacy, constitutional design, human rights, and international governance. It is generally accessible to readers without a deep expertise in New Zealand law. However, familiarity with instruments such as the Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act will enhance engagement. The volume’s strength lies in its interdisciplinarity, weaving together law, public policy, and political theory to explore both domestic governance and New Zealand’s place in the world. While grounded in Commonwealth traditions, the text also reflects strong intellectual ties to the United States, a reminder of Sir Geoffrey’s international reach.

The first part addresses governance and policy challenges. Former Minister of Finance in Labour’s Fourth Government, David Caygill, highlights immigration as a key driver of population growth but warns that relying on attracting highly skilled migrants is unsustainable. He calls for systemic reforms to develop domestic technical and professional skills, framing a broader discussion on decision-making under uncertainty and the enduring tension between economic efficiency, social justice, and individual liberty. Writing separately, Victoria University Professor Emeritus Jonathan Boston and Simon Upton, a former Environment Minister in the Fourth National Government, extend the analysis to climate change, advocating for anticipatory governance and warning against short-termism, while emphasising the need for both citizen engagement and institutional resilience.

Part two turns to foundational constitutional questions sur-

rounding te Tiriti o Waitangi and political legitimacy in Aotearoa. Auckland University Professor of Law Claire Charters argues that sovereignty was claimed by the Crown under prerogative power and upheld by courts ‘irrespective of its legality’, framing this as evidence that ‘power, not law determines the prevailing legal narrative’. Her warning is stark: without transformative constitutional change, New Zealand will perpetuate injustice and the unlawful imposition of Crown authority. Victoria University Professor of Law Alex Frame views sovereignty as historically qualified and limited by the Treaty’s terms. His description of a hybridised view of New Zealand's legal systems, as ‘one plus one equals three’, captures the coexistence of British, Māori, and colonial systems, forming a unique constitutional arrangement. Frame revisits Sir Geoffrey’s unrealised proposal for a Bill of Rights with ‘supreme law’ status, which would have empowered courts to strike down legislation inconsistent with human rights and the Treaty. These contrasting perspectives sharpen the book’s central question: can justice and fairness be reconciled with historical realities in a constitutional order built on contested foundations?

In further pursuit of the elusive answer to this question, Part Three, led by lawyer, author and Sir Geoffrey’s law partner, Mai

Chen addresses the implications of super-diversity for law and governance. Chen advocates expanding judicial notice, the legal concept whereby a court can accept as a “fact” in a proceeding certain basic principles deemed to be beyond dispute, to include cultural evidence. The policy objective is to reduce reliance on costly expert testimony and ensure fair outcomes for culturally and linguistically diverse parties. She warns that constitutional legitimacy will be tested as ethnic minorities become a demographic majority, calling for a systematic super-diversity framework in policymaking, legislative consultation, and judicial processes. Chen situates these issues within a broader rights discourse, emphasising duties, contextual limits, and judicial empowerment to review legislation for human rights compliance.

Parts four and five deal with the topics of human rights and international governance, respectively. The final section is led by former Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations Colin Keating’s chapter on governance lessons for New Zealand. While conceptually appealing, Keating’s observations on the disconnect between state and citizen-centric governance suggest that this shift remains aspirational—and relevant. His chapter, which critiques public misunderstanding of rights and responsibilities, risks sounding condescending to younger readers. Keating’s assertion that Pākehā New Zealanders have never had to fight domestically for rights oversimplifies dissent, particularly in the context of COVID-19 protests. Yet his broader point that distrust of government and its inability to respond authoritatively to criticism undermines democratic legitimacy is compelling.

Despite its many strengths, the volume is not without limitations. The section on sovereignty feels too brief given the complexity of the issues it raises, and Chen’s proposed superdiversity framework remains aspirational, with limited guidance on implementation. The book tends to privilege normative prescriptions over empirical analysis, leaving readers with compelling ideas but few concrete strategies for operationalising them. Specific chapters expose tensions between theory and practice. Upton’s candid observation on parliamentary work – that MPs aspire to executive roles and neglect the detail required for effective policy oversight – underscores a structural challenge in governance. This lack of long-term focus is all the more troubling given the repeated warnings of the contributors that future crises demand anticipatory governance. Boston’s hopeful assertion that humanity possesses ‘the capacity to anticipate and imagine future risks and vulnerabilities’ contrasts sharply with Upton’s portrayal of careerist MPs, raising doubts about whether political culture can rise to meet these challenges.

Collectively, these reflections reveal a conundrum at the heart of this moment: institutional ambition, technological mediation, and demographic transformation are reshaping governance, but they have yet to resolve the fundamental problem of aligning political incentives with long-term societal needs. The book effectively diagnoses these challenges, yet falls short of offering concrete strategies to operationalise its normative prescriptions. By foregrounding issues such as anticipatory governance and cultural pluralism, the book positions itself as a vital resource for scholars, policymakers, and legal practitioners navigating the complexities of democratic resilience in an era of global and local transformation. Sir Geoffrey’s legacy continues to inspire those committed to deepening our understanding of justice, fairness, and tolerance – a project that remains unfinished.

TIM FADGEN

INSTITUTE NOTES

National Office and Branch Activities

On 2 December, the National Office held an event celebrating ‘Fifty Years of the New Zealand International Review’ and honouring Ian McGibbon who, at the end of December, stepped down after 44 years at the helm. The event also included talks by Malcolm McKinnon and Suzannah Jessep.

A final morning tea for the Review’s Editorial Committee was held in December. There, the outgoing editor Ian McGibbon was presented a framed copy of the last issue of his tenure.

On 15 December, HE Vasyl Myroshnychenko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Australia and New Zealand, addressed a meeting at Te Herenga Waka | Victoria University of Wellington on ‘Peace in Ukraine?’ The event was co-hosted by the NZIIA and the University’s Centre for Strategic Studies.

In February 2026, Hamish McDougall stepped down as Executive Director of the NZIIA. Hamish has been in office since January 2022, guiding the Institute through an active four years, including putting into full operation the changes from the Institute’s new constitution, promoting research and networking opportunities, and organising the 2023 and, most recently, the 2025 National Conferences. He also worked actively with branches on their activities. Hamish is also co-editing Volume 5 of NZIIA’s Aotearoa New Zealand in World Affairs, 2006–2025, which is due for publication in the middle of the year. NZIIA wish him well in his future pursuits.

Elections to the National Board of the NZIIA are currently underway. Three positions are to be filled. Two of these positions are created by the compulsory retirement after two terms of current Chair James Kember, and Suzannah Jessep, both of whom have made an extraordinary contribution to the Institute during their time on the Board. Nominations closed on 13 February, with the election due to take place ahead of the AGM in early May.

Auckland

On 5 December, the NZIIA Auckland Branch hosted ‘Z Empire Unmasked – Russia's War of Aggression, Ukraine's Defence, and Lessons for New Zealand’, a discussion on Kyrylo Cyril Kutcher’s insightful new book and in-depth research findings. The discussion examined the political and ideological roots of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine’s ongoing resistance, the role of Russian imperialism, the rapid evolution of hybrid warfare including new technologies and drones, and the importance of education prompted by thoughtful discussion for long-term security and peace.

Wairarapa

Wairarapa Branch has a busy year planned, following a successful year in 2025 of Branch meetings with good speakers. 2026 will open in February with a talk and discussion about the Middle East from former diplomat Rob Taylor. This will be followed in March with a presentation on Iran’s recent history from Sirous Amerian, well known as a commentator on Iranian affairs.

On 24 July, during the depths of winter, the Branch hosted Prof David Capie, Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations at Te Herenga Waka | Victoria University of Wellington. Prof Capie came to Masterton to speak to the Branch about ‘The Disrupted World Order and New Zealand's Future’. The presentation generated considerable discussion which extended well beyond the usual end time for Branch meetings – the world presents a grim picture with many uncertainties!

On 14 September, a successful film fund-raiser for the Branch was held, with the French comedy ‘Un Petit Truc en Plus/A little Something Extra’ selected from the New Zealand International

Branch

Film Festival’s line up. The Branch appreciates the cooperation of the NZIFF and of local boutique theatre ‘The Screening Room’.

On 16 October Max Rashbrooke addressed the Branch on ‘Trust and Democracy: Threats and Solutions’. Max has worked as a journalist, both in New Zealand and overseas, and since returning to New Zealand works as a political writer and researcher, being a founding member of the Institute for Democratic and Economic Analysis.

Max writes extensively on inequality in New Zealand and other aspects of public policy with a regular column for both The Post and The Spinoff, as well as being a frequent commentator in New Zealand news media.

On 20 November, Dr John Deane, a former Chief Engineer and Research Manager in the British aerospace industry, addressed the branch on ‘International Aviation Links with Wairarapa: A Surprising History!’ After 38 years in the industry, John joined Cranfield University for post-graduate teaching and re-

search. He retired in 2021. Dr Deane’s vocation is aviation history, and he volunteers for both the Shuttleworth Collection in the UK – home of the world’s oldest flying aircraft – and in New Zealand for The Vintage Aviator collection at Hood Aerodrome in Masterton.

His talk to the Branch described Wairarapa’s various links to aviation history, taking in some broader connections as well as local historic and current aviation personalities. This was a deliberately lighter topic before the Christmas break, but attracted a good audience and engendered much discussion.

Two Wairarapa Branch committee members and one life member attended the National Conference in June, and various members have attended NZIIA events in Wellington. The Branch is on a sound footing, both financially and in membership, but of course would welcome more younger citizens and students to events. The Branch is well served by the local paper, the TimesAge, and enjoys a high status within the district. We are well set to enjoy this new year.

Anand Satyanand,

Wellington

On 10 December the branch held a special event with HE Alfredo Pérez Bravo, Ambassador of Mexico and Dean of the Diplomatic Corp. The event, titled ‘Reflections of 50 Years in the Mexican Foreign Service Bravo’, followed a fireside chat format, modelled on the New Zealand television show ‘This Is Your Life’. A repeat event is to be held in Auckland in mid-March.

CORRECTION

In the Institute Notes in the January–February issue (vol.51, no.1), the photograph in the National Office section should have had the following caption: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya with Karim Dickie and Hamish McDougall following her address on 3 November.

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