International
AN EVOLVING THREAT TO THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET China’s Land-based anti-ship missiles
By Sam Cohen
56 | Asia Pacific Security Magazine
O
ver the past two decades China has committed significant resources towards developing an effective Anti-area/Access-Denial capability in its littoral zones and surrounding Seas. Chinese military forces have sought to integrate advancements made in missile technology and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) systems to create a credible and persistent threat to any adversary seeking access within Chinese waters—claimed or legitimate. This has resulted in significant range and accuracy improvements for the PLA missile force, and particularly, the anti-ship missile force. These long and medium-range antiship missiles, which are deployed across a variety of platforms and augmented by a high-end, high-capacity Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS), pose a legitimate threat to the U.S. Navy’s ability to access and maintain presence in the maritime areas surrounding Taiwan, parts of South Korea and Japan, and those countries bordering the South China Sea. One of the most concerning threats to U.S. and allied naval forces in the Asia-Pacific stems from the Dong Feng ballistic missile family. Within this family, two of the more highly advanced ballistic missiles are the DF-21D, popularly
known as “the carrier-killer”, and the longer-range DF-26. U.S. military officials have recognized the DF-21D as having reached Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in 2010, while the DF-26, has not yet received this status. With IOC status, in addition to continued research and development initiatives and capability testing since 2010, the DF-21D ASBM has become one of the most pressing and real threats to the U.S. Navy in the Asia-Pacific. The missile has an estimated range of 900 miles (1450 km) and travels at high-hypersonic speeds where targets are impacted at velocities between mach 10 and mach 12 (7672—9206 miles/hour). Although not yet field proven, the missile’s advanced internal guidance technologies combined with the PLA’s increasingly effective and pervasive NOSS, likely provides China with the capability to track and hit moving targets at sea—which is an incredibly complex technological achievement. Using a maneuverable reentry vehicle assisted by a terminal guidance system and an electronic countermeasure capacity to overcome missile defense systems and countermeasures, US security analysts have speculated that current defensive systems fielded by the fleet may lack the