Issue 3 April/May 2011
IN FOCUS
DOSSIER
Infocusrevue.com
Revue des Affaires Internationales
Revolutions
(and those that did not occur)
How to handle transitions Algérie : un paisible printemps Lifeline to Libya Egypt: Between revolution and stagnation Revolutions, regime changes and human rights ALSO IN THIS ISSUE
EU - India Free Trade Agreement Elections présidentielles au Pérou
Partenaire
Premier partenaire de l’association, la Société Générale soutient financièrement l’AAISP, et propose à nos membres une offre avantageuse ( p. 42 ) notamment pour ceux qui partent à l’étranger : un package permettant de s’affranchir de tous frais de paiement et de retrait, partout dans le monde. N’hésitez pas à nous contacter pour tout renseignement - ouvrir un compte avec notre parrainage, c’est une bonne opération pour vous comme pour l’AAISP!
WE’RE ONLINE! Find more InFocus news, articles, and opinions at www.infocusrevue.com Learn more about the AAISP at www.affaires-internationales.org or e-mail info@affaires-internationales.org NOTE: L’AAISP n’est affiliée à aucune cause politique ou gouvernementale. Les positions des rédacteurs ne sont pas nécessairement partagées par l’association, son parrain, ses partenaires et SciencesPo.
A publication of the Association Affaires Internationales de Sciences Po (AAISP) 27 rue Saint Guillaume 75337 Paris Cedex 7 Directeur de Rédaction Radu Botez
InFocus Team
Letter from the Editors
Rédactrice en Chef the Soo-Rae Hong Rédacteurs Audrey Couprie Charlotte Gunka Elodie Besnier Laura Dix Lola Cecchinel Margaux Portier Tamás Medovarszki Tanya Koshy InFocus would like to thank Oliver Wack, Nada Tarbush, Julius Hugelshofer, Jan Stern, Jinah Roe, Jozef Janovský, Jeremy Domergue, Livia Murray, Julie Bernath, Elena Ocenic and Marion Ehalt for their contributions to this issue. Special thanks go to Luis Martinez and Thomas Klau for the time they kindly accorded us. All photos are under the copyright of their author unless stated otherwise. En couverture: Place Tahrir. Le Caire, 25 février 2011. Photo: Maggie Osama/Flickr/CC
Revolutions and those that did not occur The recent events in North Africa and the Middle East have not only dramatically changed the political landscape, but the everyday life of millions of people. In some cases, liberty has won over repression. In others, people are continuing the struggle to get their voices heard. Their actions, successful or not, have exposed the leaders and elites who are part of and benefit from repressive and corrupt regimes. They are showing that ignoring human dignity will not be accepted. This issue of InFocus includes a look at revolutions in the world from a variety of perspectives; it features a first-hand account of a student’s trip to Libya during the first days of the rebellion, revolutions are examined from a human rights perspective, and parallels drawn to the events of 1989. In an interview with Thomas Klau from the European Council on Foreign Relations, we moreover address their implications for the European Union. There also remain many revolutions that did not occur, although voices were raised. People took to the streets but could not stand against the brutality of the state. By addressing the lack of revolutions in certain places, this issue also provides a comprehensive picture of how these events come about and what explains their absence. In an interview with InFocus, Luis Martinez, a senior research fellow at the Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI) in Paris and an expert of the region, looks at the reasons behind Algeria’s relative calm, while one of our editors has a closer look at the situation in Saudi Arabia. The possibility (or impossibility) of revolutions in other parts of the globe, such as Asia and Latin America, are highlighted in some of this issue’s opinion pieces. For the revolutions that have occurred, the way forward is a long and difficult one. This issue’s cover photo was chosen with this in mind; a father’s jubilant cheers for the victory of the present over the past, meanwhile his son’s face carries the fears of the future. Let us hope that he will soon have a reason to smile. Radu Botez Directeur de Rédaction
A year in review
It’s hard to believe that InFocus began a little less than one year ago, as part of a new vision for the AAISP student magazine. Now, as this school year comes to a close, we take stock of what we have achieved thus far. The three issues published, with themes of “Environment and Peace”, “Emerging Actors”, and “Revolutions (and those that did not happen)”, reflected the trajectory of international affairs throughout this past year. Within its pages, InFocus has published three expert interviews, and several first hand accounts of global events. In addition, our website has posted over 35 articles on current events and has become an active forum for political analysis and debate. The accomplishments of InFocus would not have been possible without its editing team, whose tireless efforts and creative problem solving have been at the heart and soul of this magazine. From coming up with the name of the magazine, to giving design suggestions, to running bake sales and searching for sponsors, our team of editors have demonstrated their versatile skills in all aspects of news media. And of course, InFocus would like to thank the contributors to the magazine, who shared their opinions, research, and writing with the rest of the student body. The insightful perspectives of students at PSIA are exactly what make this publication so special. Lastly, we would like to thank the readership of InFocus, whose loyal dedication to the magazine is what motivates us to do what we do. We look forward to hearing your stories in September 2011! the Soo-Rae Hong Rédactrice en chef
InFocus est une revue en constante évolution : vos questions, suggestions et commentaires sont donc les bienvenus ! Contactez-nous à revue@affaires-internationales.org. InFocus is a constantly evolving publication and we welcome all questions, suggestions and comments! Please send any correspondance to revue@affaires-internationales.org.
Read
our previous issues online at www.infocusrevue.com
November/December 2010
February/March 2011
4 | InFocus
Cairo
Photo: Tim Kelley/Flickr/CC
InFocus April/May 2011
Contents
Photo: Mohammed A. Hamama/Flickr/CC
Photo: Globovisión/Flicr/CC
Opinion 6| Talking the talk: Barack Obama’s Latin America Trip 7 | Two myths about the Middle East the world should do without 8 | The Arab Spring and realism in international politics 9 | How will you go, Hugo? 10 | “Jasmine Revolution in China”? I don’t think so 11 | The West and Syria: Towards new foreign policies
Photo: Ian Iott/Flickr/CC
12 | Yemen: A short history repeats 14 | Japan: “A revolution in moral concern”?
Dossier 18 | How to handle transitions
Photo: Fabrice Clerc/Flickr/CC
22 | Lifeline to Libya 24 | Egypt: Between revolution and stagnation 26 | Entretien avec Luis Martinez Algérie - un paisible printemps
29 | Interview with Thomas Klau The EU and the Arab revolutions 31 | Le printemps de Ryad aura-t-il lieu ? 34 | Revolutions, regime changes and human rights
Current Affairs 37 | Unity by division: African responses to Arab revolts 38 | EU-India Free Trade Agreement and health concerns 39 | Elections présidentielles au Pérou : premier tour 40 | Le droit français et le Statut de la CPI
Activités de l’AAISP 44 | L’AAISP : Bilan de l’activité 2010-2011 45 | Voyages : Istanbul et Ankara 46 | Conférence : Justice pénale internationale au Cambodge 47 | Conférences en 2011 InFocus
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Opinion
Photo: Blog do Planoalot/Flickr/CC
Talking the talk: Barack Obama’s trip to Latin America
US president Barack Obama and his Brazilian counterpart, Dilma Rouseff. March 2011
D
uring his recent trip to Latin America, Barack Obama made his own attempt at an “Ich bin ein Berliner” moment. Speaking to an audience of selected guests at the Moneda presidential palace in Santiago as a part of his three day trip to the region, it seemed Mr. Obama was trying to convince everyone that a new chapter in US-Latin America relations had finally begun. “Todos somos Americanos” (We are all Americans) was the message he had come to deliver. Ever since President Obama took over the White House in 2009, commentators have wondered how much has changed in US foreign policy towards the region. Throughout much of that period, the answer has been simple: not much. With his recent trip to Brazil, Chile and El Salvador, Mr. Obama finally seized the opportunity to acknowledge the region and underscore the strategic importance that it holds for the United States. 50 years after President Kennedy declared his grand vision for the region through the ‘Alliance for Progress’, the trip raised a lot of expectations. This is not to say that people expected Mr. Obama to announce his own ‘master plan’ of incentives for the region. For most of Latin America those times are over, and both Latinos and the US are tired of ‘master plans’ that don’t deliver what they promise. What people did expect, however, were bold propos6 | InFocus
als and concrete steps to improve regional cooperation and bilateral relations. As Mr. Obama said in Chile, “there are no senior partners and there are no junior partners; there are only equal partners.” In Brazil, the two Presidents agreed on a new Strategic Energy Dialogue and increased cooperation in both oil and biofuel production. Considering both the volatility of the US’ other sources of oil and the growing strategic and economic importance of renewable energy, this was a step of notable significance. Energy efficiency and renewables were also on the agenda in Chile, where Mr. Obama also signed contracts on cooperation in education, disaster preparedness, environmental protection and, ironically, civilian nuclear energy. In El Salvador, concrete proposals were made on both regional security cooperation and immigration reform. These were all fundamental issues, and increased US-Latin American cooperation is likely to greatly benefit both sides. And yet, Mr. Obama fell short of expectations. Granted, progress on all these issues is necessary and important. But beyond that there were no grand policy changes, no bold proposals, and no surprises for most observers. At the same time, opportunities to mark a clear break with the past were missed over and over again. One such opportunity could have been addressing the issue of Brazil’s bid for a
permanent seat in the Security Council, as he did with India on last year’s trip to the subcontinent. Much to Brazil’s consternation, Obama merely acknowledged the bid, without explicitly endorsing it. Also notoriously absent from Obama’s speeches were references to the importance of the pending ratification of free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama. Both are more than overdue, and their delay has caused unease across the entire region. By continuing to stall on these issues while calling for increased trade, the administration continues to send mixed and confusing signals. It took Chile’s President Piñera to remind Mr. Obama of this. As he announced in Santiago, President Obama wants to turn a page in the US’ relations with the region and look towards the future. But moving forward also means drawing a line under the past. What better opportunity to do so than at the Moneda Palace, stage to the final moments of Chile’s Popular Unity before it was overthrown in a US planned coup not even 40 years ago? But Mr. Obama did not even refer to the issue, let alone apologize, much to the dismay of many Chileans. The markedly cool reception of his “Todos somos Americanos” remark, centerpiece of the trip’s keynote address in Chile, is thus a good metaphor. Mr. Obama has, it seems, come to the conclusion that cooperation with the region is important, especially in economic terms. That, rather than the announcement of the beginning of a new era in US-Latin America relations, was the result of his trip. There is still a long way to go before Latin Americans will buy the idea that the US and they are ‘equal partners’. Talking the talk is one thing. Walking the walk, is quite another. Oliver WACK Oliver Wack is a graduate student in International Security at the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po). He has worked in Latin America for several years.
Opinion
Two myths about the Middle East the world should do without O
ne collateral “damage” of recent events in the Middle East may be the crumbling of two widely-held myths: one speaks of the “Arab exception” and seeks to explain it through culturalist notions asserting that Arab and more broadly Muslim societies are inherently anti-democratic; the second hails Israel as “the only democracy in the Middle East.” The popular uprisings originating in Sidi Bouzid last December and still spreading to other parts of the Arab world have surely knocked down the first myth. The myth persisted throughout the years despite the fact that Arab outcries for freedom existed well before the popular revolt erupted in Tunisia. Indeed, for generations, many Arabs have paid with their lives in defense of freedom. Still today, Arab jails are teeming with political prisoners whose only crime was to oppose the repressive regimes that have been ruling over them for so long. But these outcries were often hushed up, sometimes for pragmatic reasons by countries that continued business as usual with those regimes, or dismissed as outliers by some intellectuals whose fanciful theories reduced the culturally rich and heterogeneous Arab societies to a simplistic black or white. Proponents of such models spoke shamelessly of a “clash of civilizations,” of the “Arab mind,” of the “Arab exception.” These notions sometimes made their way into the prose and speech of journalists and politicians, who, not so infrequently, juxtaposed them with yet another dubious generalization: Israel as a beacon of democracy in a sea of darkness. The painful truth is that there are no true democracies in the Middle East and North Africa, period. No doubt, Israel is a democracy for its Jewish population, but the fact remains that some 20 percent of its citizens are not Jews. They are those Palestinians who managed to avoid expulsion after the creation of Israel in 1948, and their descendants. In Israeli government parlance,
they are referred to as “Israeli Arabs”. By Western standards, protecting such a minority would be a fundamental tenet of a liberal democracy. In Israel, however, there has been a chronic failure to protect the rights of the Arab minority. Worse, this failure did not emanate from some kind of bureaucratic oversight but rather from premeditated government policies, particularly on matters of land ownership, as Ben White has amply documented in “Israeli Apartheid.” Over the years, Israel’s Arab minority saw the bulk of its land confiscated by the State. This expropriation was made possible thanks to the promulgation of arbitrary laws and regulations rich in Orwellian newspeak such as classifying some of these Arabs as “Present Absentees” in order to justify taking away their properties. According to White, about one in four Arab citizens of Israel is considered a “Present Absentee.” Since the 1970s, Israeli politics has been significantly influenced by hard-line settlers and parties openly hostile to the indigenous Palestinian minority. While masses of Arabs have now initiated significant movements toward democracy, some leading Israeli politicians are steering Israel in the opposite direction, as recently manifested by the bringing of a series of anti-democratic bills before the Knesset, for instance the Boycott and Anti-Incitement bills which, if passed, would greatly constrain Israelis’ freedom of choice and expression. Just beyond the Green Line, Israel’s behavior in the occupied Palestinian territories is hardly consistent with democratic values. For nearly 44 years Israel’s conduct there has been notorious for its scornful disregard of human rights and international law with killings of civilians, arbitrary detention, torture, siege, confiscation of land, home demolitions, construction of settlements, a wall, bypass roads excluding Palestinians of the West Bank, random closures and road-blocks. No, Israel is no island of democracy.
And no, the Palestinians, as all Arabs, are no bearers of anti-democratic genes. Like their Arab brethren everywhere, they yearn for a dignified life free of oppression. The struggle for freedom of the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is too well known to require elaboration. The 1987 Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation coined the term intifada. Yet, Palestinians are still waiting for longoverdue justice. By failing to grant the Palestinians their rights, Israel is swimming against an overwhelming wave of change. Not only are we at the threshold of a new dawn in the Middle East, where people stand up against injustice with hitherto unprecedented determination, but there is also a sea change in people’s awareness everywhere, notably in Europe and the United States. One has to look no further than supportive online comments and YouTube to see that. In this new age, if not out of a sense of morality, then at least out of sheer expediency, Israel should liberate itself from all sorts of dogma, give equal rights to all its citizens, and at last free its neighbors in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Nada TARBUSH Nada Tarbush is a graduate student in international affairs at the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po) and Columbia University focusing on international security, economic and political development, and the Middle East. A version of this article first appeared in The Hill on March 11 2011:
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/ foreign-policy/148933-two-myths-aboutthe-middle-east-the-world-should-dowithout
InFocus | 7
Opinion
The Arab Spring and realism in international politics T
he world, and particularly the Middle East, has seen calmer times than these first few months of 2011. The events in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and other parts of the region have left local populations euphoric amidst the successive demises of their strongmen. Western commentators and media appear even more enchanted by recent events, with talk of an “Arab Spring” comparable to the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall filling the headlines of the press. Similar to the period after 1989 and the end of the Cold War, liberal voices are proclaiming a new victory of liberty over oppression, of peace over war, and of democracy over authoritarianism. There is a striking resemblance, it appears, between events today and events 20 years ago. The events in the Middle East, it is argued, constitute proof that values and norms such as democracy or freedom will eventually prevail, and that the anarchic, nasty world of realpolitik is a thing of the past. Political realism is declared dead as millions of people rally in the streets of Cairo or Tunis, eventually managing to topple their authoritarian governments. But do these events represent a victory of values over calculated interests, with serious ramifications for the way the world conducts its politics? Eleven years ago, the American professor Kenneth N. Waltz wrote a seminal paper entitled “Structural Realism after the Cold War,”1 in which he asked a similar question with respect to the end of the Cold War and the effects it had had on international politics. Reading his paper today makes it obvious how pertinent his argument still is, and how little the world has changed since then. The events in the Arab world today, although a blessing for its people just like the fall of the iron curtain was for the inhabitants of Eastern Europe, are no more a sign of the prevailing of a liberal democratic world than the end of the Cold War was. It is true that the world has turned to multilateralism during the past 20 years as a legitimate form of governing the political affairs of its countries. Yet far from 8 | InFocus
being a tool unanimously accepted by the international community, this multilateralism has been selective to say the least, consisting of an alliance of northern industrialised democracies whose main interest in intervening outside their region was to ensure their own security. The last two decades have been among the bloodiest in the history of mankind, moving the world nowhere near the “end of history” and the establishment of a unified and peaceful international society intervening upon the basis of a universal multilateralism. Recent events in the Middle East, alas, won’t do so either. Have the Arab revolutions left a lasting mark on both the people in the region and politicians and policymakers in London and Washington? Yes. Are they going to change the way the world will conduct politics with respect to the Middle East? No. As Waltz argues, for a groundbreaking shift in international politics to take place it does not suffice if there is some change in the international political system. What is required is a shift of the entire system. The world, however, is still the same as it was at the start of this year: an anarchic system of states with unipolar power centred on the United States, far ahead still of China and even further from its Western European allies France and Great Britain. Peace in such a world is maintained by a very delicate balance of internal and external constraints of states.2 Those with a surplus of power are likely to use it whereas weaker states will be reluctant to do so. What will remain dominant, however, is the essentially anarchic environment in which states interact with each other, based on interest calculations and a deep mistrust of one another despite attempts to cooperate. If cooperation occurs on occasion, it does so only selectively and among like-minded states with similar concerns. The western reaction to the “Arab Spring” is a good example of the prevalence of these conditions today. The western intervention in Libya was conducted
by France, Britain and the United States, wherein the latter and most powerful country was in charge of a majority of the military activity. This reflects the reality of power distribution in the world. Only the United States has the military capacities to conduct such an operation, while the British and French assistance is real but very marginal. Similarly, interest-based realist theory came into play during events in Bahrain. Whilst condemning, and even intervening, in other Arab states witnessing upheaval, the US decided to completely ignore events in Bahrain out of concern for its relations with Saudi Arabia, a major American oil supplier and at the same time suppressor of the protests in Bahrain. Had the United States and the other western states really upheld their norms and principles of democracy, a condemnation of Saudi Arabian action would have surely occurred. Yet the world has not reached the stage where countries practise what they preach and adhere to universal standards of human rights, liberty, and democracy. Realism was called obsolete after the end of the Cold War and is under renewed threat today after the groundbreaking events in the Middle East this year. Yet as long as there is no fundamental transformation in the way states make politics, cooperation and institution-building along common norms and principles will remain a fruitless exercise. Julius HUGELSHOFER Julius Hugelshofer is a 4th year student in the Masters of Economic Policy at the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po) as part of a double-degree program with the London School of Economics.
Notes 1 Waltz, Kenneth N., “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, 25:1, 2000 2 Waltz p. 13
Opinion
The West and Syria: Towards new foreign policies defending democracy? T
Photo: Amar abd rabbo /Wikicommons/CC
he recent revolts in the Arab World have led to significant consequences for the external relations of many members of the international community. In the past, France and notably the United States have shown no remorse over maintaining friendships with well-known dictators. The cooperation of these authoritarian and corrupt leaders in the name of anti-terrorism and economic interest has suddenly come to an end. And as Bernard Henry-Lévy rather bluntly puts it: “It will be very difficult now to make blowjobs to dictators in the Arab World when we are a European government.” We are witnessing the power of revolution. For as long as we can remember, the Arab countries have been put in a box; a box which is compartmentalized into elements influencing foreign policy: the energy-rich states, the ones fighting terrorism, the terrorist or un-cooperative ones, the liberal ones, the cooperative ones, the Israel-friendly ones… the unifying element for outsiders being that all of the populations of these countries were docile and non-rebellious, at least not under the “democratic” institutions that were theirs. In fact, the submissiveness of the population was so largely accepted that it was easy to rally domestic support in many western
countries to rescue the people of Iraq (as the people of Afghanistan) against their oppressor. It was inconceivable that the “Arabs” could fight for themselves (other than by exploding “Muslim” bombs) because they had grown tired of poverty, oppression, corruption, and extortion - just like the Europeans, the Americans and a number of countries had in previous centuries. Then came Tunisia and Egypt and Jordan and Bahrain and Libya and Yemen and now Syria... And now that all of these elements are contested by the recent events. The international community, and especially the leading warrior bunch, simply do not seem to know what to do! Strategies need to be reviewed, to be re-thought. The powerful military states are either over-extended or too few, to “police” all of the “Greater Middle East”. Additionally, the region’s stability is of major importance in international security as a whole since, as was notably shown by the Jasmine Revolutions, conflicts and popular unrest spread easily. The Syrian revolt example is a good illustration of this indecision. Syria’s regime has been a dictatorship since the Assad dynasty took power under the Ba’ath flag in 1963. Its population is as religiously diverse as the Middle
East itself, with a Sunni majority and an Alawi - a branch of the Shia denomination of Islam - minority. The internal politics have therefore always been difficult and the President Bashar Al Assad has had to conduct his policies very carefully, trying to appease the Sunni majority by including them to a small degree in the political life run by the Alawis. He is himself part of that branch and for him to relinquish power in the face of the demonstrations against his government could be a fatal blow to all the minority Shia population of Syria, which has reaped the majority of the benefits thus far. Apart from the internal pressures, international forces are at play as well. Syria is an undeniable ally of Iran, who needs Syria to supply logistical support to the Hezbollah in Iran, and it is also a major champion of the Palestinian cause through its support to the Hamas. Even the United States does not want to meddle with this mess. Hillary Clinton had at first said that Bashar Al Assad was a reformer, and now Washington is looking for its position on this “issue”. The admitted truth is that no one knows how far unlimited interventions could or should go. All governments are reviewing their foreign policies in the region. How could they not be? But the question remains. Will the western powers accept the new governance chosen by the people or will they support only new leaders ready to follow their economic ways? The revolutions have begun, surprising just about everyone. But the directions, in which they go, will probably have to be another fight… and another great cost, which will either be calculated in human lives or in the standard of living for millions of people. Audrey COUPRIE Editor, InFocus
French president Nicolas Sarkozy receives Syrian president Bashar El Assad
InFocus | 9
Opinion
“Jasmine Revolution” in China? I don’t think so. nspired by Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution that ousted Ben Ali from rule, boxun. com called for similar demonstrations to take place in China. It did not call for open revolution, but for a more subtle approach: “We invite every participant to stroll, watch or even just pretend to pass by. As long as you are present, the authoritarian government will be shaking with fear.” The call was answered by a ‘moderate’ amount of people, and that’s a euphemistic estimation. The most prominent appearance was in fact that of a Westerner. Jon Huntsman, who is the outgoing US ambassador to the People’s Republic of China and who is most likely seeking the GOP nomination for the 2012 presidential election in the US, was spotted in Wangfujin in Beijing (a famous shopping street where the protests were to take place) on February 20th 2011. Other than this, a meager 200 people showed up; with probably more foreign journalists and civil police than actual protesters. So why were these protests unsuccessful? Firstly because of the extremely efficient (and also innovative) control apparatus in the PRC. Shortly after the call for demonstrations, a large metal fence was installed in the middle of the square, making it almost impossible for a large group of people to assemble. Also, the ‘Great Firewall of China’ (an estimated 80.000 internet censors) proved to be highly effective, banning not only boxun.com, but also any reference to the word ‘Jasmine’ (among others). Reports in the Chinese domestic press were of course suppressed. With China’s rise on the international stage, its self-confidence is growing at an equal pace. And it is more and more at ease to display and use its influence. Since China opened up to the world, it has enjoyed an unprecedented period of economic growth. As long as the Chinese government can uphold a certain percentage of GDP growth every year (believed to be around at least 7-8%), the economy can create enough jobs to keep the unemploy10 | InFocus
Photo: shreyans bhansali/flickr/CC
I
Temple of Heaven, Beijing
ment rate below a certain percentage (believed to be around 4-5%) which in turn appeases the larger Chinese public. In fact, with China’s awesome demographic and geographic size, social and political stability are crucial values. Communism may have lost its appeal, but the CCP simply incorporated Confucianism in their doctrine, thereby attracting larger Chinese historical heritage and sentiments. And unlike Arab dictators who tried to hold on to power indefinitely, the CCP has understood that power transitions are necessary. The fourth generation leadership team of Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao was the first organized transition, and will soon be followed in 2012 with the Xi Jinping/ Li Keqiang team. The power transition is thus increasingly institutionalized, although all vital decisions are still taken in behind-closed-door sessions of the CCP. Still, the Chinese leadership is indeed afraid for its political survival. The absurd number of police officers in response to the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ exemplifies the fears of the central government. The long imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo is yet another example of just how nervous the CCP leadership gets in the face of diverging opinions.
The calls by the Chinese for more political participation, for more income equality, more environmentally sustainable development etc. are often answered by the Chinese government through an ‘appeasement strategy’ to keep its public in check. If we look at how drastically China has changed in the last 30 years, it is reasonable to expect further change. For now, one can only hope that the Chinese government will continue to be open to change that eventually may lead to democratic scrutiny of the central government in the long run. Jan STERN Jan Stern is a graduate student in European Affairs at Sciences Po Paris. He spent one year at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Opinion
How will you go, Hugo? O
huge success in regional elections, returning triumphantly to parliament after 5 years of absence. Chavez promptly responded with an enabling law granting him decree powers for 18 months. With an eye on the 2012 Presidential elections, the battle lines are being drawn. The big question is, what will happen now? A mass popular uprising against Chavez is unlikely, at least in the near future. Broad sectors of Venezuela’s popular classes still support him, and will most likely continue to do so as long as he has sufficient petro-dollars to satisfy their needs. Just as unlikely is the idea of Chavez giving up on power. High ranking officials have said clearly that, even in the case of an electoral defeat, they will not step down peacefully. Chavez supporters in Caracas’ slums have vowed to fight to the death to defend ‘their’ revolution. Chavez himself hasn’t been idle either: modeled on Cuba’s Revolutionary National Militias, in 2005 he created the so-called Bolivarian Militias. Totaling 120,000 civilian volunteers united in their fervent support for Chavez, the militias outnumber the Venezuelan army, and swear their allegiance not to the state but to the President himself. In March, Chavez significantly
extended the militias’ power by authorizing the military to supply them with weapons, thus effectively converting the militias into the paramilitary arm of his revolution. The signal is clear: Chavez is preparing for all eventualities, and determined to remain in power by all means. Now all eyes are on 2012. Chavez’s has already unofficially begun campaigning, and can be expected to toughen up his rhetoric as the polls draw nearer. On the other side is the loose coalition of opposition parties. United temporarily for the last parliamentary elections, the coalition has not been able to consolidate into a cohesive bloc. But if it is to stand a chance in 2012, much will depend on its ability to quickly field a unity candidate for the presidency. The earlier the parties can agree to hold their primaries, the better. But either way, the outlook is bleak: should the opposition fail to unite, Chavez will have no noteworthy challenger. This would be the easy scenario. Should the opposition manage both to agree on a single candidate and win the elections, however, Venezuela will be faced with the specter of civil war. Oliver WACK
Photo: Bernardo Londoy/Flickr/CC
ver the past months, the world has watched dumbfounded as popular revolts and angry street protests in the Middle East have swept away, or severely threatened, one authoritarian leader after another. The ripple effects of this momentous occasion are being felt elsewhere as well, and even as far away as Latin America. In the blogosphere, many observers are wondering whether Hugo Chavez shouldn’t be worrying too. But even if worst came to worse one thing is for certain: Chavez won’t go quietly. Since his rise to power in 1999, Chavez’s “Bolivarian” revolution has systematically turned the Venezuelan state upside down in an attempt to break the “oligarchy’s” hold on power and enfranchise the previously marginalized poor sectors of society. In doing so, he has become increasingly radical, adopting measures to suppress internal opposition, limit freedom of the press and undercut civil liberties. Chavez has made some serious enemies, particularly with the middle and upper classes. Led by Caracas’ traditional elites, the opposition initially tried to get rid of him violently, through a 2003 workers lockout, a 2005 boycott of general elections and even a coup d’état (which lasted a mere 48 hours in 2002). All of these initiatives backfired, however, allowing Chavez to advance his project amid unwavering popular support. But now, for the first time in a decade the tide seems to be changing, and popular opposition to President Hugo Chavez’ increasingly authoritarian grip is slowly but surely building up. Faced with economic recession, spiraling inflation and Latin America’s highest violent crime rates, public dissatisfaction is growing, and the situation has become difficult for Chavez. Coinciding with the events in the Middle East, several dozen Venezuelan students began a hunger strike to pressure the OAS to investigate government human rights abuses. At the national level, the opposition has reorganized itself and is attempting to regain power through the democratic process. In 2010, it won a
Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. February 2011
InFocus | 11
Opinion
Photo: the soo-rae hong
Yemen: A short history repeats
I
Sana’a
’ve learned to stop making predictions about the Middle East. After years of living in Yemen, and months in Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq, I’ve learned one thing: People in this region will always surprise you. What I can tell you is what I know about Yemen, its past, and its people, and perhaps better contextualize the recent demonstrations in Yemen, which, while notable in their scale and response, may be less a “revolution” and more the amplification of pre-existing struggles which have been ongoing since Yemen’s last (and quite recent) “revolution”. Politics in Yemen is a complicated web of tribal allegiances, regional resentments and historical grudges, aggravated by foreign intervention, high illiteracy rates, and economic stagnation. And for a Yemeni, your politics are determined by your origins. In general, Yemenis from Sana’a, Taiz, and Ibb (the central governorates) hold the opinion that the president is doing as well as he can. Most families have a photo of Ali Abdullah Saleh somewhere in their living room, where the TV is perpetually tuned to Kanat Al-Yemen, blaring patriotic songs while displaying images of the countryside and the President in various official uniforms. Even for some of my more “liberal” central Yemeni friends, Saleh is a man who can do no wrong. The government is admittedly corrupt, but alRayees is beyond reproach. On the other side, are Yemenis who hail from the Houthi-dominated governorates of northern Yemen. These folks remember the high times under the Zaidi Kingdom of Imam Yahya, a theocracy 12 | InFocus
overthrown in 1962. After suffering decades of neglect and abuse from the government, the Houthis have made no secret of their hatred of the regime, manifested at first in attacks, hijackings, and kidnappings in the north. In 2009, the tensions culminated in the renewal of an underpublicized civil war in the Sa’adah governorate, killing over 5,000 and displacing over 200,000. The fighting continues today, despite ceasefire efforts made by local and international actors. Likewise, Yemenis from the “south”, — previously British protectorates stretching from Aden in the south towards the east through Hadramawt—nurse grievances against the government for abandoning what used to be booming centers of trade while siphoning off the little revenue gained from oil exports to fill the pockets of officials in Sana’a. Having fought off the British in 1970, “southerners” enjoyed stability until the unification of North and South in 1990, after which mismanagement and clashes led to a bloody civil war in 1994. For the past few years, discontent has led to the intensification of demonstrations and subsequent government crackdowns in the region. To delve into the complexities of tribal politics in Yemen is beyond the scope of this piece, but there is truth in the saying that the president controls only as far as the checkpoints of Sana’a. Beyond that, it’s the law of tribal custom that rules. Every man has at least one gun in his house, and feuds are still arbitrated by local sheikhs. At the same time, it would be unfair not to mention a new demographic that is on the rise in urban areas. This new “generation” consists of, firstly, upper-class progressives who work with international NGOs and have traveled abroad. These men and women speak easily about reforms and rights, and are unafraid of criticizing the government, protected by their foreign connections. Then, there are the university students, amongst whom one can find a handful who outspokenly push for change, motivated by the fact that their
futures depend on economic growth and stability in a country with ever-rising unemployment. It is from these groups that a new cadre of demonstrators has been drawn. I used to receive weekly reports describing protestors injured in demonstrations, roads being shut down, “insurgents” killed in clashes with the government, not to mention the deaths that went undocumented up north. Today, the news is the almost the same, though there has been a significant increase in participants as well as casualties, and a more aggressive military response. But this time, the context is different. The battles and struggles fought in Yemen are no longer different factions fighting for power, but have become a part of the “Jasmine Revolution”. The one-revolution-fits-all notion of the “Arab Spring” is certainly an attractive one. But it is important to remember that situations are particular. And among other countries in the Middle East, Yemen is certainly special. Despite its long history, Yemen is a fairly new state, having unified in 1990 from two very different political systems. It is a country that has undergone three or four civil wars (depending on how you count them) in the past three decades. It ratified its constitution in 1991, which could be considered a revolution in itself. So the question is, is the current “revolution” a country revolting against a stagnant regime and breaking off in a new direction, or merely a continuation of the struggles of a fractured country trying to find its legs? Then again, if the end result is change, perhaps this distinction does not really matter. the Soo-Rae Hong Editor-in-chief, InFocus
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InFocus | 13
Opinion
The Japanese nuclear reactor crisis: “A revolution in moral concern”1? I
n the midst of the current North African and Middle Eastern revolutions, to what extent has the world recognized the Japanese nuclear reactor crisis in Fukushima Daiichi power plant as a “revolution” prompting moral concern? On Friday, March 11, 2011 double disaster in the form of an earthquake of unprecedented magnitude and a tsunami hit Japan and destroyed an entire village, uprooting the lives of thousands of people. As a consequence of Mother Nature, Japan’s nuclear reactors broke down and are still leaking radioactive materials as of this writing. Recently, Japanese authorities called it a nuclear disaster on a scale equivalent to Chernobyl, the Ukrainian nuclear reactor that melted down in 1986, releasing a wave of environmental and radioactive damages.2 The Japanese nuclear reactor crisis should be a wake-up call for the world community in two senses. On the one hand, it should be a warning for nations who have or are acquiring nuclear reactors to once more think through the risks involved in depending upon nuclear energy. At the same time, the nuclear reactor crisis should be seen as an opportunity to refocus attention on the nuclear non-proliferation debate. The decision to implement a nuclear reactor involves both the material goods (nuclear fissionable metals uranium 235 and/or plutonium 239) as well as the ambition to use it for peaceful purposes (under International Law). Yet as international relations has illustrated, the acquisition of nuclear reactors under the pretext of Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which encourages states to use nuclear energy for peaceful civilian purposes, has been abused and ultimately violated. Iran and North Korea are but two of the most infamous examples of nations that construct nuclear reactors under the guise of civilian energy development, but then convert the materials into use for military nuclear programs. Although many nations including Japan legitimately use nuclear reactors 14 | InFocus
to fuel their energy supply, the risk of having a nuclear ‘accident’ always remains. The response to Fukushima has prompted a debate around two camps – those who argue that the disastrous events at Fukushima are proof of the lethal and destructive nature of dependence on nuclear energy. A cost-benefit analysis for using such energy maps off the chart when taking into consideration the consequences for what would ensue should an even bigger accident occur. On the other hand, there are those who argue that nuclear energy is the only viable way of supporting the world’s energy needs and reducing carbon emissions. Compromise on this debate seems tough. However common ground can be sought baed on the fact that for the future, all energy resources - not just nuclear - will need to be harnessed to provide for the soaring populations of China and India who will be consuming electricity on an unprecedented scale. Although it is not feasible for nuclear energy to be eliminated completely in the short-term, recalibrating our dependence on it by redoubling efforts to invest in other renewable energies will be well worth the cost – both financially as well as humanely. All energy technology comes with its own set of risks and drawbacks, yet the repercussions of nuclear energy are especially high risk and impact every facet of human security. Environmental groups remind nuclear energy advocates that the human costs of nuclear accidents are real and should not be downplayed, “It’s crucial that Japanese authorities, the nuclear industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency stop playing down the threat of radioactive contamination, and instead provide clear and honest communication about the risks to public health.”3 As the aftermath of Fukushima illustrates, the danger of radioactive materials is that they have a boomerang effect carrying into the future with invisible long term costs for our health and environment, like cancer and radiation poisoning. More-
over, Japan’s geographical location near an earthquake fault line should have been the first red flag against building reactors there. Yet nuclear power makes up 13.6 percent of Japan’s total energy supply and a substantial portion of its electricity production.4 Its dependence on nuclear energy began in 1973, when its lack of indigenous fossil energy resources led it to expand its nuclear capacity. In the aftermath of Fukushima, it was discovered that Japan’s nuclear industry is plagued with safety problems and has been accused of sheltering an inadequate safety culture.5 Given the recent turn of events, Japan will most likely end and/or stop nuclear expansion. Popular and elite opinions towards nuclear energy have been changing in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear reactor crisis. There has been a knee-gut reaction from states possessing nuclear reactors to ensure that a similar fate does not fall upon them. For Germany, nuclear energy, which has been a contentious issue for decades (nearly 70% of Germans opposed nuclear power before Fukushima), decided to close some of its older reactors. Beijing announced a moratorium on building new nuclear power stations pending a safety review. Switzerland has suspended plans for replacing two ageing reactors, and stakeholders in the US are getting ready to review and reposition their policies on nuclear reactors. After twenty five years of being accident-free from nuclear disasters, Fukushima has instilled doubt and shaken confidence in the “nuclear renaissance,” the reinvigoration of nuclear energy programs in response to global climate change. Apart from the multifaceted risks that nuclear energy brings, the Fukushima nuclear reactor crisis should also be viewed as an opportunity to focus renewed attention on the nuclear nonproliferation movement which has gained in strength in the past few years. Notably, on January 4, 2007, a group of hard core realists - former US secretaries of state, defense, and a former chairman
Photo: Jensen Walker/Getty Images for Save the Children/Save the Chldren/Flickr/cc
Opinion
Okinawa. 16 March 2011
of the Senate Armed Services Committee (“Gang of Four”) wrote an article in The Wall Street Journal, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” that underlined their shift in tone on nuclear disarmament – from utopia to possible reality. The “Gang of Four” endorsed “setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal.” Following this momentum, US President Barack Obama gave a speech in Prague on April 5, 2009 which further reaffirmed the move towards a world of zero nuclear weapons, declaring, “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” One explanation for the shifting attitudes towards nuclear non-proliferation can be attributed to the work of global civil society organizations like the Global Zero Movement (GZ). Launched in December 2008, GZ includes citizens from all around the world as well as more than 300 political, military, business, faith and civic leaders committed to the goal of a phased, verified elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere and the securing of all nuclear materials.6 Initiatives and campaigns like the GZ Movement illustrate
the strength of civil society in bringing the international governance structure in line with growing expectations of what the state could and should provide us with – the very basic demand of security. What is interesting is that both the crisis in Japan and the Arab revolutions underline the extent to which individuals and ideas can impact the structure of international security. Twenty years ago the very idea of ‘human rights’ or the idea that the sovereignty of a state was conditional upon respect for its people would have been far-fetched. Today, the transformation of ideas into principles like “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), the creation of international legal structures that hold state leaders accountable for their actions, like the International Criminal Court, and the recognition by realists that nuclear nonproliferation is possible, as the Gang of Four publicly acknowledged - is proof of the normative revolution we are experiencing. Despite these advances, much work remains. The revolution in moral concern means nothing unless states can use their political will to effect real change. To begin with, world leaders can revisit the age-old assumption posed by US President Dwight Eisenhower in his “Atoms for
Peace” speech on December 8, 1953 in the aftermath of the atom bombings on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Is it truly feasible for mankind to control and exploit the atom for peaceful purposes? In a perfect world, the Japanese nuclear reactor crisis would have caused the world to look at our use of nuclear power since 1945 and provoke a “never again” response, in much the same way the world reacted to Srebrenica, Rwanda, and Darfur. Yet the issue of nuclear non-proliferation has never received the same attention as humanitarian interventions. It is a cliché that war is sexier than peace. And what is nuclear nonproliferation if not the ultimate search for peace? Let our generation prove this cliché is as old as the Cold War. The Japanese nuclear reactor crisis should be our first step towards formulating the nuclear equivalent of “never again.” Jinah ROE Jinnah Roe is a graduate student in International Security at the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po).
Notes 1 The term “revolution in moral concern” is Michael Igantieff ’s “Human Rights and Politics as Idolatry“, Princeton Press, 2003 2 Tabuchi, Hiroko, Keith Bradsher, and Andrew Pollack, “Japan tries to explain delays in reporting radiation,” New York Times, April 12, 2011 3 Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2011 4 “Fukushima and Future Shape of International ‘Nuclear Renaissance’ – Analysis” Lydia Walker, www.eurasiareview.com 5 Brookings Institute, “Fukushima and the Global ‘Nuclear Renaissance’” April 7, 2011) 6 www.globalzero.org
InFocus | 15
Revolutions
Dossier
(and
those that
did not occur) How to handle transitions Lifeline to Libya Egypt: between stagnation and revolution
AlgĂŠrie : un paisible printemps The EU and the Arab revolutions Le printemps de Ryad aura-t-il lieu ?
Revolutions, regime changes and human rights
Tunis. January 2011
Photo: Nasser Nouri/Flickr/CC
InFocus
| 17
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
How to handle transitions Lessons learnt from the Velvet Revolution
A
s has become widely known, on December 17, Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in front of a police station in a small city on the Tunisian coast. His brave, though desperate act of resistance against the arrogance of state power sparked a wave of uprisings across the Arab world. Political scientists, analysts and commentators have since discussed the developments of the events which followed, and their future implications. Is 2011 going to be the next 1989? Or using Huntington’s (1993) terminology has the fourth wave of democratization already begun? Despite the indisputable similarities, it is becoming clear that developments in the Arab world will be far more divergent than those of Central and Eastern Europe.1However, even though history does not repeat itself, not to learn from it would be nothing short of foolish. To some extent, the learning process has already begun. Arab dictators evidently learnt from each other and are striving to avoid fate of Tunisian and Egyptian ex-presidents. Similarly, it is documented that coordinators of the Egyptian demonstrations thoroughly studied the Serbian Bulldozer Revolution and planned their actions accordingly (AlJazeera English 2011) Although the uprisings left virtually no Arab country unaffected, whether any one of them un- Wencelas Square, Prague. November 1989 dergoes successful democratic transition will be very much dependent on the particular decisions of leaders of national democratization forces. While demonstrations are mostly spontaneous and require little strategic thinking above mass coordination efforts2, in the uncertainty of a transitional period3 choosing a proper strategy is vital. I believe the Velvet Revolution provides us with a unique opportunity to better understand transitional processes. Since Czechoslovakia was a federation at the 1 Some of the valuable contributions include Carothers (2011), Lynch (2011) or Tucker (2011). 2 Interestingly grasped by Kuran (1991). 3 Beginning roughly when regime elites start negotiations with the opA crew chief of the 1st Infantry Division’s Combat Aviation Brigade position leaders.
18 | InFocus
time, two more or less parallel revolutions took place simultaneously. In Czech lands people rebelled against the Czechoslovak federative government and Czech national government. On the other hand in Slovakia, a rebellion was waged primarily against a Slovak national government. Despite a few distinctions, the two nations were nearly identical with regard to political, economic and cultural aspects.4 However, different transitional strategies employed by Czech and Slovak revolutionary actors contributed to remarkably different political consequences. The circumstances are well suited for a comparative research design; they allow us to evaluate degree of success of these strategies and recommend preferable courses of action for revolutionaries of today.
The Velvet Fall of a Frozen Regime On January 16, 1969, university student Jan Palach set himself on fire in Prague, in protest against the Warsaw Pact invasion. After Soviet-led armies crushed a reformist movement of the Prague Spring in 1968, a period of normalization began with the extensive use of state repression and massive intra-party cleanses. Since all demonstrations inspired by the self-immolation were violently suppressed, its significance was Wencelas Square, Prague. November 1989 yet to come. As a consequence of the normalization campaign, the Communist Party managed to build up a strong post-totalitarian regime with a tight grip on power and no political opposition. Political repressions were legitimized by a dogmatic reformulation of Stalinist ideology and backed by relatively high economic benefits for large segments of the population. Until the very fall of the regime, it was barely touched by reform processes which occurred in other Central Eastern European states during the 1980’s. It is because of this Photo: Piercetp/Wikicommons/CC
4 For a discussion of similarities and dissimilaries of Czech and Slovak polities at the time, see f.e. Cabada (2003: 168-171), Marušiak (1999) or Žatkuliak (1999).
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
“While demonstrations are mostly spontaneous and require little strategic thinking above mass coordination efforts, in the uncertainty of a transitional period choosing a proper strategy is vital.”
rigidity that the regime is often described as frozen5 (Balík et al. 2007: 159-177, Linz and Stepan 1996). The first series of mass demonstrations took place in January 1989 after a peaceful commemoration of Jan Palach’s death was repressed with unprecedented brutality. More than a thousand were arrested in several days, including future president Václav Havel. However, the strong regime withstood the public pressure as well as international criticism and maintained its control of the state without making any significant concessions. The beginning of the regime’s collapse came with International Student’s Day. A memorial gathering for nine Czech students executed after their participation in an anti-Nazi demonstration fifty years earlier was violently repressed with more than 500 injured (Radio Prague Archive 1999). After rumors about the “violence against our children” spread, and the demonstrations gained momentum. Beginning the very next day, a strike was announced at all Prague universities and in theatres while preparation for a general strike began. Hundreds of thousands peacefully protested day after day in all of the big cities across Czechoslovakia. It should be stressed that throughout the demonstrations, their peacefulness remained an essential feature. The crowds never initiated any violence against the police. On the contrary, the light of candles and key ringing became symbols of the Velvet revolution.6
Two Transitional Strategies and their Consequences In this spontaneous situation, a need for political leadership and coordination of demonstrations emerged. Because of the rigidity of the frozen communist regime, no organized political opposition existed in the country when the revolution began. The dissent had an atomic structure; it was not generally regarded as a single unified movement, but rather as an aggregate of individuals. The void was filled on November 19 when two political movements, Civic Forum (CF) in the Czech lands and the Public Against Violence (PAV) in Slovakia, were founded. Similarly to analogous democratization movements, they intended to encompass all pro-democratic anti-regime forces and claimed to be representing society as a whole 5 In contrast to more flexible and open mature post-totalitarian regimes of Poland or Hungary. 6 More information about the Velvet Revolution and the developments that followed, including those described in the text that follows, find in Civín(2004), Cottrell (2005: 111-136), Suk (2003) or on websites included in the references.
with legitimacy derived “directly from the street”. Since no opposition leaders possessed democratic experience, the leadership positions were filled by the most prominent dissent members and student representatives.7 Up to this point we had observed a very similar development in both Czech lands and Slovakia. After a long period of internal political stability under tight communist regime, all of a sudden, massive but peaceful anti-regime demonstrations demanding more freedom, democracy and human rights arose all over the federation. With the foundation of CF and PAV, the paths of the Czech and Slovak revolution started to diverge. While CF demanded political concessions primarily from the federate government, dominated by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), PAV aimed their demands at the Slovak national government, controlled by cadres of the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS), a Slovak counterpart of CPC. Thus, parallel negotiations between the opposition leaders and regime representatives were held simultaneously but independently in Prague and Bratislava. In this situation, both OF and PAV publicly declared their aim to serve as guarantors of a peaceful and successful transition to democracy. Their primary proclaimed role was to ensure free and fair elections to be held as soon as possible so that a democratically elected government could take office. The question arose: What strategy should the opposition choose to best achieve this goal? What actions should it take in the transition period to bolster the process of democratic practices?
Failure of the Strategy of External Power Control In Slovakia, PAV consistently followed a strategy of external power control (Suk 2003). The movement put the national government under strong pressure, demanded its dissolution and subsequent reconstruction into a bureaucratic cabinet. PAV avoided nominating any political candidates to the newly appointed government and insisted that it was to be composed of either reformist bureaucratic communists or independent experts with no political ambitions. As the interim government would not possess the electoral legitimacy, it was not to be making any political decisions, but rather only preparing the country for the transfer of power. 7 It should be noted that particularly during the first weeks of their existence, the institutionalization of both CF and PAV remained on very low level, their structures were very fluid and unstable, created and managed in an omnipresent revolutionary chaos.
InFocus | 19
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
Photo: Piercetp/Wikicommons/CC
During the first days and weeks of the negotiations, the strategy led to many promising achievements. PAV leader Ján Budaj, resolute and adamant in negotiations with communist leaders while powerfully backed by the massive demonstrations momentum, quickly gained control over the situation. The communist government was dissolved and a new bureaucratic one, with a majority of non-communist independents, took office on December 12. PAV members wished to stay outside the state system, performing the role of a neutral policeman supervising the direction of events. However, things started to change before the end of the year. After it became clear that public demonstrations had succeeded in the way that pro-democratic PAV had intended, ordinary people slowly returned to their dayto-day lives. At the same time, the power of PAV, which was derived from the momentum of the demonstrations and “from the streets” and which prevented the PAV from institutionalizing its power in any way, began to fade. Its ability to exert influence on state institutions began to decrease. Interim politicians, including the head of the Slovak National Council Rudolf Schuster and Prime Minister Milan Čič, who were deemed as transitional bureaucrats, adapted quickly to the transforming circumstances. The conflicts between them and PAV members began to emerge. The fact that the strategy of external power control did not work as expected was acknowledged in the beginning of 1990. In the hope of repairing the situation, PAV shifted the strategy and tried to penetrate the institutional structure of the state. However, it was already too late. When Budaj decided to stand as a candidate for the lead position of the Slovak National Council, he lost the vote because the Council was still composed of old communist cadres who supported a “bureaucratic” communist Schuster instead. Similarly, PAV did not succeed in attempts to replace Čič (Szomolányi 1999: 105-106). The message was clear: Those who were supposed to play the bureaucratic role became the main players of the game.8
Consequences of Czech Transitional Strategy In Prague, the task to make an interim government for reconstruction was left to reformist communists while 8 Čič later became one of the co-authors of Slovak constitution and the head of the Constitutional Court, Schuster an ambassador in Canada then a city mayor of the second biggest Slovak city of Košice and in 1999 a president.
20 | InFocus
Vacláv Havel. Prague, November 2009
CF operated as a veto player, based on the strategy of external power control. However, a striking difference existed between the character of a conciliatory Havel as the leader of negotiations and the strong-minded Budaj. The communists were not under as much pressure to make significant concessions in the government composition and the strategy did not function as envisaged, even in the early phases of the talks when the demonstrations were strongest. This inability to effectively exert influence led CF to change its initial stance. The plan to carry out “apolitical politics”, meaning the pursuit of a bureaucratic-like politics in the times of transitional government, was abandoned. CF did a U-turn and commenced infiltrating the state apparatus striving for internal power control. The important figures of CF took the reins of both the administration and the government of the state. Both the Czech national government and the federal government were replaced by interim governments with CPC members occupying less than half of the seats. Also, many CF allied deputies were co-opted in the Czech national assembly and the federal assembly. The process of the transformation of the transitional strategy was symbolically crowned on December 29, when the icon of CF and the whole revolutionary movement, Václav Havel, was elected president of Czechoslovakia. Compared to its Slovak counterpart, CF managed to institutionalize its momentum of power and firmly entrench the democratization process by the time of the 1990 election. The pro-democratic activists and revolutionists embodied in the CF retook the top institutional offices, this time with strong electoral mandates. As such, the democratic politics stabilized much sooner in the Czech lands than in Slovakia and the foundations of this stability were laid during the transitional period.
Implications for Arab Transitional Politics The comparison of the two transitional strategies speaks clearly in favor of the latter. The elites of PAV squandered the power they possessed in November 1989 and did not manage to transform the revolutionary po-
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
“The wild spirit of the age simply does not accept bureaucratic politics.”
tential into an ability to control the events in the long run. Personal alternation in state institutions remained limited and “bureaucratic” communists were given a chance to become political and guide the transition. As a consequence, democratizers themselves unintentionally placed obstacles in the way of the Slovak democratization process. Their Czech counterparts, however, correctly assessed the state of affairs much sooner, before their potency faded away and degraded into a virtual power. The comparison shows that, other factors being generally similar, the strategy chosen can make a difference. This conclusion is even more urgent for Arab countries whose populations demand a peaceful transition to democracy. It may be argued that hard times await these societies since they have little to no democratic experience from which they are able to draw. In contrast to Czechoslovakia, which experienced a period of democratic stability in the inter-war period and also possessed a vision of a “return to Europe” represented by the goal of EU and NATO membership, Arab states have no such guidelines to follow. For these reasons, the transitional period is likely to last much longer than it did in the Velvet Revolution. Consequently, every step taken by pro-democracy decision-makers may have dramatic consequences regarding the possibility of democracy as “the only game in town”.9 Also, we have seen that there is no necessity for a pre-revolutionary existence of an organized opposition movement. Quite the contrary, in times of revolution, pro-democracy movements covering all parts of the political spectrum provide the potential for effective navigation through the stormy waters of transitional politics. We thus shall not be too pessimistic about the lack of institutionalized opposition politics observed in some of the Arab countries. The void itself does not do any harm if it is replaced by a provisional coalition movement during the revolution. And as in any massive demonstration, there are always people who organize and coordinate. These leaders are indispensable for any successful revolution to occur, however spontaneous the demonstrations might be. It must be understood that this article does not by any means intend to promote a uni-dimensional view of reality. It simply takes advantage of the comparative research logic and derives justified conclusions. I hope to make clear that there is no “apolitical politics” and no govern9 In the meaning of Przeworski (1991).
ment that is purely bureaucratic in the periods of transition. These times are especially fluid with fluctuating popular support for individual political leaders. Politics is widely reported by the media and closely watched by public. An unknown individual might become a popular politician in just several days. The wild spirit of the age simply does not accept bureaucratic politics. That is why it is so utterly important not to allow representatives of the ousted-regime to retain dominance in high state offices and why the pro-democracy movement must be prepared and willing to supersede them. Even if the strategy of external power control works well in the beginning of the campaign, it is inherently destined to perform worse and worse with the clocks ticking and the revolutionary momentum disappearing. Jozef JANOVSKÝ Jozef Janovský is a 4th year student of Political Science, International Relations and Applied Mathematics at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Rebublic. He co-edits the student-run academic blog www.globalpolitics.cz. References Stanislav Balík et al. Politický Systém Českých Zemí 1848–1989, 2nd ed. (Brno: Masarykova univerzita Brno, Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 2007). Jan Civín, “Rámcová charakteristika československé tranzice 1989 - 1990,” Central Euroepan Political Studies Review VI, no. 1 (2004): 1-14. (http://www.cepsr.com/clanek. php?ID=190). Checked on 25.3.2011. Robert C. Cottrell, The Czech Republic: The Velvet Revolution (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 2005). Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 1st ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” World Politics 44, no. 1 (1991): 7-48. Juraj Marušiak. Nezávislé iniciatívy na Slovensku v rokoch normalizácie. In: Ján Pešek, Soňa Szomolányi (Eds.). November 1989 Na Slovensku: Súvislosti, Predpoklady a Dôsledky: Štúdie a Úvahy (Bratislava: Nadácia Milana Šimečku, 1999). Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 1991). Jiří Suk, Labyrintem Revoluce: Aktéři, Zápletky a Křižovatky Jedné Politické Krize (od Listopadu 1989 Do Června 1990), 1st ed. (Praha: Prostor, 2003). Soňa Szomolányi. Novmeber 1989: otvorenie kľukatej cesty k demokracii. In: Ján Pešek, Soňa Szomolányi (Eds.) November 1989 Na Slovensku: Súvislosti, Predpoklady a Dôsledky: Štúdie a Úvahy (Bratislava: Nadácia Milana Šimečku, 1999).
Karel Vodička, Politický Systém České Republiky: Historie a Současnost, 1st ed. (Praha: Portál, 2003). Jozef Žatkuliak. Čo otvoril November 1989 vo sfére politickej, ekonomickej a štátoprávnej. In: Ján Pešek, Soňa Szomolányi (Eds.) November 1989 Na Slovensku: Súvislosti, Predpoklady a Dôsledky: Štúdie a Úvahy (Bratislava: Nadácia Milana Šimečku, 1999). Thomas Carothers. Think Again: Arab Democracy (Foreign Policy: 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2011/03/10/think_again_arab_ democracy?page=0%2C0).Checked on 25.3.2011. Marc Lynch. Will the Arab revolutions spread? (Foreign Policy: 2011, http://lynch. foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/26/will_ the_arab_revolutions_spread). Checked on 25.3.2011. Joshua Tucker. State of the World: Will 2011 be the next 1989? (The Monkey Cage: 2011, http://www.themonkeycage.org/2011/01/ will_2011_be_1989.html). Checked on 25.3.2011. Radio Prague Archive. (http://archiv.radio. cz/1989/17listopad/cesky.html). Checked on 25.3.2011. “Sviečková manifestácia - 25.marec 1988”. (http://www.svieckovamanifestacia.sk/ english.php). Checked on 25.3.2011. “Home | 1989 Democratic Revolution”, http:// www.89.usd.cas.cz/en.html. Checked on 25.3.2011. “The Events of 1989 in Czechoslovakia - Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů“, http://www. ustrcr.cz/en/project-the-events-of-1989-inczechoslovakia. Checked on 25.3.2011.
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Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
Lifeline to Libya Photo: Jeremy domergue
Libyan diaspora organizes medical aid convoy from Cairo to Benghazi: A first-hand account
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22 | InFocus
Photo: Jeremy domergue
gainst the tide of humanity fleeing the current carnage between rebels and pro‐Gaddafi forces in Libya, a group of Libyan men has gathered in Cairo, Egypt, to deliver a medical relief convoy into the contested country. The idea began when Ala al‐Din, a Libyan‐born 38‐year old sales manager from Dubai, and Osama, a U.S.‐born 31‐year old sales consultant from Abu Dhabi, created a Facebook page to mobilize support for the deteriorating situation in Libya. “The idea snowballed from there and spread like wildfire,” explains Osama. Within days the pair got the attention of some of the brightest members of the Libyan diaspora. Mahmoud, a U.S.‐born 31‐year old graduate of UC Davis Medical School and cardiologist at Olive View Hospital in Los Angeles, California, saw the Facebook page and contacted Osama to volunteer his medical expertise. Tariq, a Libyan‐born 30‐year old from Ohio, is a graduate of UCLA Medical School and decided to join his friend Mahmoud. Others like Youssef, a 27‐year old recruiter from Atlanta, Georgia, heard about the idea through family connections and volunteered to help his cousin Ala al‐Din. Several other Libyan men joined their cause and together they raised over $400,000 for their idea through personal contributions from the Libyan diaspora. At a time when analysts claim that the tribal nature of Libyan society will lead to the outbreak of civil war upon Gaddafi’s removal, these men represent a united front of Libyans assisting Libyans. “These divisions are superficial and were leveraged by Gaddafi to pit Libyans against each other,” says Mahmoud, whose family is from Misrata, a western littoral town. Osama, whose family is from a small village on the outskirts of Tripoli, says that “I see
our brothers and sisters on TV and our people need to know that we are one family.” As for Ala al‐Din, who is originally from Benghazi, he says “We are doing this for one reason and one reason only: for Libya.” The men chose to stage their operation in Egypt because the collapse of Gaddafi’s security forces in eastern Libya “creates an opportunity for the convoy’s safe passage through the Libyan‐Egyptian border,” explains Osama. In Cairo Ala al‐Din collects supply orders through personal contacts at hospitals throughout eastern Libya, while Mahmoud and Osama coordinate their purchase in bulk through the Arab Medical Union, a non‐profit organization based in Cairo. Supplies include thousands of doses of intravenous medication, antibiotics, anesthetics, and oxygen tanks. Ala al‐Din explains, however, “We are not interested in organizing a campaign or in becoming an NGO.” Instead, “Thanks to our Libyan sources, we pride ourselves in being able customize our aid packages to the most up‐to‐date needs of the people.” While Egyptian workers finish loading the medical supplies onto the seven‐truck Convoy, Youssef discovers that U.S. Air and Naval forces are repositioning near Libyan shores and shares the news with the rest of the group. A discussion regarding foreign intervention in
Local Libyans Celebrating Egypt and Expressing their Views of Gaddafi
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
Photo: Jeremy domergue
Local Libyans celebrating the transfer of food and medical aid
Libya ensues. “I would support a surgical missile strike to end Gaddafi’s regime,” says Ala al‐Din, “but the Libyans will fight against any occupation.” As for Mahmoud, he believes that “Foreign intervention should be limited to the supply of weapons to rebel forces,” even though “Gaddafi will fight to the end or will die trying.” Various views are exchanged but a consensus emerges that prolonged foreign intervention in Libya is undesirable and likely to backfire. At the time of the convoy’s departure for Libya some of the men decide to stay behind while others decide to ride along. “I need to stay in Cairo because the group needs me to continue coordinating the provision of medical supplies,” explains Tariq. As for Mahmoud, he says he wants “to accompany the convoy all the way to Benghazi to provide medical care to whoever needs it.” Youssef also joins the convoy but receives a phone call en route informing him that the security situation in Benghazi remains unstable. He subsequently decides to stop at the Libyan‐Egyptian border. According to Ala al‐Din the crossing of the border through the Egyptian town of Saloum is time‐consuming but easily done. Despite several hours of processing he explains that Egyptian authorities have been “very supportive of our efforts.” He proudly adds that his men were the first not only to provide medical aid but safe passage for journalists into Libya. “Complementary to our medical aid mission is to provide the press access to Libya to counter Gaddafi’s lies about what is really happening there,” he explains. Upon arrival into Libya the convoy explodes in jubilation. Salutations are gleefully exchanged between Mah-
moud and a group of local volunteers, whose mission is to transfer the medical cargo to cities including Tubruk, Bayda, and Ben Ghazi. Ala al‐Din finds a patch of desert upon which he prays solemnly. Youssef eagerly jumps on the back of a truck to assist the volunteers. Others affix banners in large Arabic print that read “Medical Aid from Libyans Living Abroad” onto the cargo trucks. The men pause only to brandish Libyan flags in the air. The atmosphere is one of dutiful cooperation and palpable solidarity. This scene is occurring about a hundred yards from Gadafi’s former security outpost at the Libyan‐Egyptian border, which today is eerily deserted. Nearby, Libyans celebrate the end of Gaddafi’s 41 years of dominion over them and their land. Some of them, like Ala al‐Din, have not set foot on Libyan soil in over twenty years. When asked why he will not follow Mahmoud to Benghazi, Ala al‐Din responds that for now he is “more value‐added in Cairo because I can continue to organize these convoys.” “I have waited my entire life for Gaddafi to leave,” he adds, “so what’s a few more days?” Jeremy DOMERGUE Jeremy Domergue is currently a dual Master’s Degree candidate in International Security at the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po) and Columbia University. This article was written following his visit to the region in March 2011.
InFocus | 23
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
Egypt: Between stagnation and revolution Pro-democracy activists face many obstacles as they struggle to obtain genuine political change
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Photo: Maggie Osama/FLckr/CC
he 11th of February marked a turning point in Egyptian history as former president Hosni Mubarak heeded the call of demonstrators against his regime and resigned from his title. This moment resonated throughout the Arab world as a symbol for victory of the people against authoritarian regimes and as a milestone for Egyptian freedom and democracy. It struck an emotional chord not only with Egyptians but with people of all countries. Can this event, though, really be considered a revolution? Despite the revolutionary atmosphere that accompanied these developments, true revolutions imply substantial change that cannot happen overnight, but rather occur over a broader time frame. February 11th was a highly symbolic ‘peak’ moment, but it was not a revolution in itself. It did, however, open the way for change, and in this sense marks the first step towards a revolution. Whether Egypt does undergo a revolution, now, depends on the will and capacity of Egyptians to carry out the changes that they called for. The events in Egypt could take two directions. The first possibility is that the current system remains mostly unchanged, and though it might present itself under a new name with new individuals in its leadership it would keep the same form and structure as the one under Mubarak. The alternative is that the events in Egypt lead to a veritable rupture with the old system, and to the emergence of a new one in agreement with the demands of the people. It is only in this second instance that the events could genuinely be called a revolution. Linguistically, the word “revolution” means making a full circle – a turn-around. The Arabic equivalent “thawra” means a semi-circle – which implies taking another path. In either
Tahrir Square. Cairo, Egypt. April 2011
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| InFocus
case the word signifies a new direction. The overthrow of a ruler does not necessarily lead to a change in direction – measures that target intrinsic change in the political system must accompany it. Now is the time when the real change should be taking shape, if it indeed takes shape, given that a revolution is not completed until there is a rupture with the old system. Now that the initial euphoria has subdued, and as new developments arise in post-Mubarak Egypt, challenges to the activist-led calls for reform become apparent. The first challenge is the ever-present role of the army in Egyptian politics. The army has been in power since 1952 and has obvious interests in maintaining this position. February 11th marked the overthrow of Mubarak, not the system, and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces remains in provisional control until a democratic government is elected. The question we must ask ourselves here is how much the military’s interests are aligned with the people’s. To properly answer this question it is crucial to note the division in military ranks. Because of conscription, the lower-ranking military officers are closer to the people. The higher-ranking officers, however, have stakes in the system and have interests in the status quo. In fact, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces has not met with the young activist leaders in several weeks. It seems dubious that a social class that is favoured by the system would push for change, and the continued presence of the army in politics limits the potential for such change. Egyptian activists have become aware that the changes offered by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces do not meet their demands. They see the continued presence of the military in power as a remnant of the old regime, and are pushing to further break away from it. Many Egyptians believe that the regime they tried to oust has not been abolished with the departure of Mubarak, and are taking once again to the streets to finish what they started. As I wrote this article, new protests broke out in Tahrir square, in which activists demanded, among other things, that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces hand power to a civilian council. They were surrounded by the military – a clear sign that they have diverging interests. Interestingly, a handful of military officers joined the protest. They were diligently arrested by the military – though some managed to escape. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces claims to be on the side of the people, claims that it is seeking out remnants of the old regime, and has even dismissed some officers to pacify the peo-
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
“Whether Egypt does undergo a revolution, now, depends on the will and capacity of Egyptians to carry out the changes that they called for.”
Photo: Ahmed al-hilali/FLckr/CC
ple’s demands. This, however, only echoes the rhetoric and concessions made by Mubarak before he was finally forced out of office – those of a desperate man trying to cling to power. The second challenge is the division of public opinion over the measures to be taken now that Hosni Mubarak is out of the picture. The new protests in Tahrir only represent a fraction of society. Many Egyptians are content with a change in leader, and are especially anxious for the country to be economically running again. They fear that continuous protests will cause considerable harm to the Egyptian economy, and are satisfied with the new status quo. One thing that particularly highlighted the rifts in society on this aspect was the dialogue over the constitutional amendments that were voted on March 18 and subsequently passed. Approved by the Muslim Brotherhood and the NDP – Mubarak’s former party – this referendum created much dissent within certain groups, particularly among the young activists who led the revolution. One point of view sees this referendum as a good way to move forwards and establish elections quickly and easily, before the country becomes further de-stabilized. The other point of view sees this referendum as an obstacle to real change and instead advocates for an outright replacement of the 1971 constitution. This rift in opinion may undermine the efforts of the young activists pushing for change, and thus lead to a prolonging of the old political system rather than a revolution. The third challenge is that there is very little political organisation outside of the traditional parties. Mubarak’s regime made the organisation of opposition groups difficult. Political groups that are now emerging after his departure will not be able to properly mobilize for the elections in the limited amount of time. This will also limit their abilities to build a strong enough platform to compete with the NDP and with the Muslim Brotherhood, two traditional political forces. In fact, these two welcomed the constitutional amendments because they paved the way for a quick election, which would most likely play in their favour. This would give the NDP and the Brotherhood an unfair advantage, and activists are pushing for a broader time frame to be more competitive in the elections. The attempts to speed up the electoral process can potentially hinder democracy itself, as it does not provide an environment that gives emerging political groups the same opportunities as their traditional counterparts.
Army. Cairo, Egypt. February 2011
Challenges to the Egyptian revolution are still looming. The ousting of Mubarak from office was an empowering and symbolic moment for the Egyptian people, but it was not the solution to the problem, nor could this event alone cause substantial change in the political structure. Many Egyptian activists are aware of this and, as the new protests in Tahrir show, they are not appeased by superficial change and continue to demand a break from the old system so that the country may take a new direction. The Egyptian revolution has not ‘happened’ in so far as it is not over yet. The next few months and even years will be a test to the resolve of the Egyptian activists and people in their attempts to take the future of their country into their own hands. Livia MURRAY Livia Murray is a 3rd year student at the University of Toronto and currently in the Exchange Program at the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean undergraduate campus of Sciences Po Paris in Menton. This article was selected as the winning article in a competition held by InFocus for students at the Menton campus. Finalists in the essay competition can be found online at www.infocusrevue.com.
Winner of InFocus essay competition at Sciences Po undergraduate campus in Menton. Read other finalist essays at: www.infocusrevue.com
InFocus | 25
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur) - Interview
Algérie : un paisible printemps Entretien avec Luis Martinez
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epuis l’avènement de son indépendance en 1962, l’Algérie a connu d’importantes vagues de révolutions : le printemps berbère en 1980 et le printemps noir en 2001 qui ont donné lieu à une série de manifestations revendiquant la reconnaissance de l’identité berbère ou les évènements et les séries de grèves de 1988 qui ont ouvert la voie au processus de démocratisation. L’arrivée en tête du Front Islamiste du Salut aux élections en 1991 a provoqué l’intervention de l’armée et une décennie de guerre civile sanglante par la suite. Aujourd’hui l’Algérie du président Abdelaziz Bouteflika qui remplit son troisième mandat depuis 2009 compte plus de quarante partis politiques dont le champ d’activité reste néanmoins limité. Les rentes pétrolières du pays pourraient permettre la restructuration de l’économie mais le régime manque de vision stratégique. Selon l’Office National des Statistiques de l’Algérie, le taux de chômage est estimé à 10% dans la population et 21,5% parmi les jeunes (16-24 ans). Les partis d’opposition dont le Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie de Saïd Saadi ont organisé des marches de contestation au mois de février mais elles n’ont pas réussi à réunir plus de quelques milliers de personnes et ont vite été dispersées par la police. Le peuple algérien a du mal à se mobiliser. S’agit-il d’une fatigue générale des révolutions ou est-ce la mémoire de la guerre civile qui les hante ? L’entretien suivant réalisé avec Monsieur Luis Martinez vise à trouver des éléments d’explication possibles. Luis Martinez est directeur de recherche au Centre d’études et de recherches internationales de Sciences Po Paris (CERI), spécialiste du Maghreb et du Moyen-Orient. Ses recherches portent sur l’islamisme et la violence politique, les politiques de sécurité en Méditerranée et les rentes pétrolières et la démocratie.
Photo: Ceri
InFocus : Les premières révoltes du « Printemps arabe » ont commencé il y a presque trois mois en Tunisie avant de s’étendre à l’Afrique du Nord et au Moyen-Orient. Cependant, les vagues de manifestations, à part quelques révoltes atomisées en février, ont évité l’Algérie tandis 26 | InFocus
que toutes les conditions similaires à celles de l’Egypte, la Tunisie ou la Libye semblent être réunies : une population considérable de jeunes touchée par le chômage, le prix élevé des produits alimentaires de base, un bouillon d’autoritarisme et enfin la corruption qui mijote depuis longtemps dans le pays. Quels sont les facteurs qui pourraient expliquer la situation relativement stable en Algérie par rapport à ses voisins ? Luis Martinez : Effectivement, l’Algérie représente une surprise dans la région dans la mesure où en Algérie on était plus habitué à imaginer des révoltes, voir des révolutions. Or aujourd’hui, les révolutions touchent les pays dans lesquels jusqu’à présent on avait plutôt l’impression d’une grande stabilité à laquelle l’Algérie n’était pas associée. Il y a plusieurs éléments qui pourraient expliquer ce phénomène. D’une part, lorsque les évènements ont eu lieu en Tunisie et en Egypte, en Algérie il y avait parallèlement des petites révoltes et des manifestations. Mais celles-ci ne sont pas parvenues à développer un effet « boule de neige », à agréger sur elles-mêmes des catégories sociales, des acteurs politiques et elles n’ont pas réussi à susciter une politisation de la part des intellectuels algériens au sens large du terme, susceptibles de les transformer véritablement en menace politique. D’autre part, les autorités ont pris des mesures avec succès afin d’étouffer des mouvements sociaux. Sur le plan politique, le régime parvient très vite et avec beaucoup de professionalisme à les restreindre dans l’espace, on ne prend pas des lieux symboliques de l’Algérie et encore moins d’Alger. En même temps, sur le plan économique le régime a très vite essayé de prendre de cours la possibilité pour les manifestants de bâtir quelque chose d’envergure, en mettant en place un transfert de revenus vers des couches très ciblées de la population de façon extraordinaire. InFocus : Vous faites allusion à cette augmentation récente des salaires de 34% pour les employés du secteur public ? LM : Bien sûr. Mais le salaire des professeurs a également augmenté, ainsi que celui des policiers et de toute une catégorie de fonctionnaires qui avaient jusque là beaucoup de mal à obtenir des augmentations de salaire. On voit très rapidement leurs fiches de paie augmenter sans aucune négociation et souvent d’ailleurs avec un intérêt rétroactif, c’est-à-dire que du coup certains se retrouvent avec une ou deux années de salaire versées sur
Interview - Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
“... l’Algérie vit avec des manifestations mais celles-ci sont litérellament atomisées dans le sens où elles ne sont pas concentrées dans une ville ou un lieu précis.”
Photo: Antoine Walter/FLckr/CC
leur compte parce que la loi qui a été votée est censée prendre effet à partir de 2009 ou 2010. Donc on redonne des sommes d’argent assez considérables dans un laps de temps très rapide. InFocus : Muammar Kaddhafi a essayé de prendre des mesures similaires mais cela n’a pas marché. Le mécontentement et les tensions ne seraient pas assez fortes en Algérie pour pouvoir permettre une révolte d’envergure malgré ces allocations sociales ? LM : Si, justement l’Algérie, à la différence de l’Egypte ou la Tunisie ou voire encore la Libye connaît des contestations atomisées depuis maintenant une dizaine d’années. C’est-à-dire qu’il n’y a pas une semaine sans qu’il y ait une manifestation que ce soit dans le Sud, dans les villes pétrolières, sur la côte, dans les villes moyennes de l’intérieur ou dans les hauts plateaux. Donc l’Algérie vit avec des manifestations mais celles-ci sont littéralement atomisées dans le sens où elles ne sont pas concentrées dans une ville ou un lieu précis, symbolique, à la différence de ce qu’on a pu observer sur la place de la Kasbah à Tunis ou la place Tahrir au Caire. On a vraiment le sentiment que tout cela est diffus, ces manifestations n’arrivent pas à se construire ou à coaliser ce qui pourrait permettre une plus grande circulation de la contestation. Il y a un autre facteur qui explique celui-ci, c’est que l’Algérie ne dispose sans doute finalement plus d’acteurs politiques capables de politiser les revendications socio-économiques. InFocus : Cela ne s’explique certainement pas par le manque d’acteurs d’opposition. Contrairement à d’autres pays de la région, il y a une palette assez hétérogène de partis politiques : des islamistes jusqu’aux trotskistes, un spectre assez large d’idéologies est représenté... LM : Certes, mais il y a un immense discrédit qui frappe les élites de ce pays, elles ne parviennent plus à se faire entendre. Les manifestations qu’encourage Saïd Saadi (Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie) sont considérées comme fomentées par le régime afin de pouvoir mieux les contrôler. Par exemple, le simple fait de choisir la journée du samedi pour les manifestations et non le vendredi est symptomatique dans la mesure où le vendredi dans les pays arabes est une journée de mobilisation religieuse dans les mosquées. Il permet donc sur le plan quantitatif de ratisser très large alors que la journée du samedi au contraire mobilise assez difficilement dans la semaine. On peut remarquer aussi que les partis politiques les
Après la Tunésie, l’Algérie? Manifestation de soutien au peuple tunésien et algérien. France. Janvier 2011
plus traditionnels qui auraient pu porter finalement le message de la contestation vont le faire auprès de leurs militants mais ne vont pas véritablement chercher à l’imposer au niveau national, et ce parce qu’il aurait nourri une logique de conflit avec le régime. InFocus : La plupart de ces partis comme le RCD ou le FIS ont quand-même été fondés il y a une vingtaine d’années. Est-ce qu’on trouve des raisons plus historiques et profondes qui expliquent ce manque de confiance de la part de la population ? LM : Tout à fait. Ces partis n’ont pas su lors de la période de transition entre 1990-1991 trouver un compromis pour favoriser la transformation pacifique du régime, notamment de l’ancien Etat FLN vers un régime représentatif-démocratique. Il en a résulté que les partis ont souvent été immatures dans leur stratégie politique, et ont été très vite capables de faire le choix de la violence contre la population. Donc l’enjeu pour ces partis pendant les semaines précédentes a été de maintenir une stratégie pacifique sans recourir à la violence cette fois. InFocus : Comme vous l’avez souligné vous-même, en Algérie les contestations s’inscrivent plutôt dans une dynamique locale que nationale. Est-ce que cela est aussi dû au fait qu’à la différence de la Tunisie ou encore de l’Egypte, la communication de masse via Internet n’est pas si répandue en Algérie ce qui rend l’organisation des manifestations d’envergure plus difficile parmi les jeunes ? LM : Cela peut être un élément d’information mais je ne crois pas. Il y a deux principales différences qui font qu’en Algérie on n’arrive pas à basculer dans une dynamique nationale. D’une part, on voit qu’en Tunisie comme en Egypte les jeunes ont su retrouver au sein de leur famille un souInFocus | 27
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur) - Interview
“... il y a un immense discrédit qui frappe les élites de ce pays, elles ne parviennent plus à se faire entendre.” tien politique, idéologique voire matériel pour justement se lancer dans la bataille contre le régime. Sans doute en Algérie ces jeunes ne trouvent pas cela auprès de leurs propres familles et environnement. Cela s’explique pour beaucoup de familles algériennes par la crainte de revivre les années de guerre civile, ce qui fait qu’elles hésitent un peu à encourager les jeunes à défier le régime. D’autre part, en Algérie la contestation ne s’est pas cristallisée autour d’un symbole ou personnage suffisamment fort. Dans les années 1980, le symbole honni en Algérie était le FLN. En 1988 il est détruit, ses locaux sont saccagés et taggués par les manifestants. Aujourd’hui le FLN, qui est un peu le RCD en Tunisie, ne veut rien dire pour un Algérien. Si vous lui dites de manifester contre le FLN, cela n’a aucun sens. Par contre, vous allez en Tunisie, le RCD est un Etat-parti au même titre que l’était le FLN en Algérie dans les années 1980. Donc le parti n’est plus une force cristallisante pour génerer des engagements politiques. InFocus : Qu’en est-il du président Bouteflika ? Lors des manifestations, les slogans « anti-régime » semblaient surpasser le nombre des slogans « anti-Bouteflika ». Pourquoi ? LM : Premièrement, le président Bouteflika ne représente absolument pas, du point de vue du sentiment de la détestation, un équivalent de Moubarak ou de Ben Ali. Deuxièmement, même si c’était le cas, les gens savent que le slogan « Bouteflika dégage ! » en Algérie ne résoudrait rien. Tout simplement parce que les Algériens ont déjà fait l’expérience d’un président qui a dégagé, c’était le président Chadli Benjedid en 1991 mais ce n’est pas pour cela que les Algériens ont vu une démocratie voir le jour. Donc le personnage du président ne correspond plus disons du point de vue politique à ce qu’on pouvait imaginer dans le passé. En revanche, si on faisait de la fiction historique, si l’Algérie était aujourd’hui gouvernée par le président Boumedienne [président entre 1965-1978- l’Ed.], on aurait sans doute une situation à la libyenne, c’est-à-dire une insurrection contre un chef d’Etat qui aurait peut-être été légitime dans le passé mais qui serait insupportable à vivre sur le plan politique pour les 4/5 des Algériens. Le fait qu’il n’y ait pas ce personnage qui cristallise un peu les mécontentements rend beaucoup plus difficile l’organisation d’une contestation capable de mettre en avant un leitmotiv politique. Les slogans de type «système dégage » ou « régime dégage » ne veulent rien dire pour mobili28 | InFocus
ser. Qu’est-ce qu’est le régime dans ce cas-là? L’armée, les institutions, les partis? D’une certaine manière, le slogan est tellement diffus que chacun comprend qu’il n’a aucune chance d’être réalisé. Et bien pourquoi se mobiliser pour un slogan dont on voit bien qu’il est impossible de le mettre en œuvre? S’il s’agit de cibler un parti, un homme, on peut les identifier et dénoncer leur présence. Si on appelle à une révolution, il faut qu’elle ait à la fois un programme, des idéologues, une doctrine, des intellectuels capables de la diffuser, des militants capables de la défendre et on ne voit pas en Algérie ce type de mobilisation. Aujourd’hui, ces composantes sont tellement isolées les unes des autres que finalement l’Algérie donne l’impression d’être une poudrière dont la mèche est mouilllée et donc ne permet pas de prendre feu. InFocus : A votre avis peut-on s’attendre à des réformes plus profondes en Algérie dans un avenir proche allant au-delà de mesures symboliques comme la levée de l’état d’urgence ou les allocations sociales? LM : Le problème qui se pose aujourd’hui pour les autorités au sens large est qu’elles sont prises au dépourvu par l’évolution de la Tunisie, à savoir si le pays va vraiment consolider sa transition vers la démocratie ou non. De la même manière, elles se posent la question de savoir si au Maroc les promesses royales de sa majesté Mohammed VI seront véritablement mises en œuvre dans la pratique: parce que l’Algérie ne veut pas se retrouver à promettre des réformes qui ne seraient pas mises en oeuvre dans les pays voisins. Dans ce cadre-là, l’Algérie est très en retrait et elle préfère attendre et voir comment la région va réagir concrètement avant de pouvoir se lancer dans des réformes qui lui permettraient de ne pas finalement apparaître comme une sorte de régime archaïque régional. Propos receuillis par Tamás MEDOVARSZKI Rédacteur, InFocus
Interview - Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
The European Union and the Arab revolutions Interview with Thomas Klau
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he response of the European Union to the events in North Africa and the Middle East has been very timid and loudly criticized. It was only after the Libyan crisis gained speed at the beginning of March that the EU head of states met in Brussels for a special summit to discuss how to deal with the situation in North Africa. The following week, the United Nations Security Council voted Resolution 1973, paving the way for an international intervention in Libya. While France and Britain took the lead in the operations, Germany isolated itself, having abstained on the vote of Resolution 1973. Is this yet another example of the failure of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy? And has Europe’s timid reaction to the events jeopardized any possibility of it playing a meaningful role in the transition process of the region? The following interview with Thomas Klau further examines these issues.
Photo: EU Parliament/Pietro Naj-Oleari/FLckr/CC
Thomas Klau is head of the Paris office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), a think tank that conducts research and aimes to promote informed debate across Europe on the development of coherent and effective European values based foreign policy. The ECFR has just published its European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010, a systematic assessment of Europe’s performance in dealing with the rest of the world, available on its website (www.ecfr.eu). InFocus: Looking at the way the EU chose to address the wave of revolutions before the special summit which was explicitly dealing with this issue; how would you characterize its approach? One author has argued that the EU was following a “zero-doctrine” ...
Catherine Ashton, the Union’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy during plenary debate on EU foreign policy. March 2011
Thomas Klau: There could be no doctrine because the situation was unprecedented and unexpected. It is probably fair to say that virtually no observer would have expected that the tragic self-immolation of a fruit salesman in Tunisia would trigger a wave of revolutions and massive protests across the Arab world. The EU and its member states were taken by surprise by this extraordinary chain of events, but so was everyone else. The initial absence of a strong reaction was an expression of bewilderment and cluelessness about how to respond. It is important to remember that the last time Europe was confronted with the issue of democracy in the Arab world in a significant way were the 1991 elections in Algeria, where the military coup to suppress the Islamists who had won the elections was largely endorsed by the Europeans. This approach remained for a long time the basis for the Western approach to democracy in the Arab world. The more recent electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza strip only served to reinforce the deep scepticism - verging on hostility - towards democracy in the Arab world. As the unrest in Tunisia unfolded, governments remained initially largely speechless, despite the fact that public opinion in Europe immediately reacted in an overwhelmingly positive fashion. There was a contrast between the enthusiasm of the public and the caution of governments and diplomatic elites. But then the US took the lead in pressuring the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to relinquish power; and European powers are leading the military intervention in Libya. So what we currently have is a scenario where Europe and the West have become deeply engaged in the process of revolutionary change. At the same time, there are growing concerns that the Arab spring might give way to an Arab winter. InFocus: Do think that the legacy of Europe’s earlier approach to the Arab world is an impediment to Europe playing a constructive role in the transition process that is unfolding in Egypt and Tunisia? TK: Anyone who would suggest that it is easy to calibrate the right degree of European involvement would be ignoring the complexity of the transformation that is underway, and the great differences that exist between countries in the region. European newspapers have described the revolution in Tunisia as the “jasmine revolution”, but Tunisians themselves have named it the “revolution of dignity”; and that crucial perception of recovered dignity is strongly linked to the perception of recovered indeInFocus | 29
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur) - Interview
“... the European Union and its member states must exercise great caution about what kind of help they offer and how they exert their influence.” pendence. And that means independence from dictators, but also from outside interference. Anti-colonialism is still a powerful political sentiment across the Arab world, and Europeans must realise that they are still very much perceived as the carriers of that legacy. So the European Union and its member states must exercise great caution about what kind of help they offer and how they exert their influence. For instance, it would harm pro-democratic forces if they were seen to be financially dependent on European or Western funding. InFocus: If we move from the EU to its member states, when Security Council Resolution 1973 was passed, Germany was suddenly isolated and France and Britain were leading the process. What does this tell us about the Common Foreign and Security Policy? Do we have to accept a two-tiered system where France and Britain take matters into their hands, and where other member states merely follow? TK: No, I don’t think we are looking at a future where France and Britain will always be the ones that act jointly with others, such as Germany, standing aside. To take a recent example, the divisions within the EU over Libya are very different from the divisions within the EU over Iraq; and the recognition of Kosovo saw yet another split between member states. There are national preferences on given policy issues, and there are also changing political circumstances and majorities. Ironically, a red-green government in Berlin might have found it far more difficult to abstain in the Security Council than the current coalition of Christian-democrats and liberals. And if Joschka Fischer rather than Guido Westerwelle had been foreign minister in Berlin, we would probably not have seen an abstention. It is a mistake born out of habit and analytical laziness to see a government’s European or foreign policy choices as the mere expression of an immutable national preference, without factoring in political majorities. What we are currently seeing is a European foreign policy where coalitions of member states act and others abstain; but without blocking the joint policy of the others. And this is the kind of European scenario which we are likely to see for a considerable time; in other words, on important, difficult, and contentious issues, unanimity amongst the member states might well remain the exception rather than the rule. This is not a sign of European weakness or disunity, but merely a consequence of the present institutional state of European integration. Let us imagine for a second that the institutional set30 | InFocus
up for foreign policy in the US was the same as in the EU. The instances in which all fifty states of the American Union would be unanimous in their foreign policy choices would be rare indeed. We might for instance see Vermont blocking a Texas-led policy, or California abstaining from a policy endorsed by all the others. But the US have delegated most foreign policy making to the federal level, although the states do of course retain a voice through the US-Senate. And we have seen how many in Congress were unhappy over the federal power overstepping its prerogative, when the President decided to bomb Gaddafi-forces in Libya. As long as individual member states in the EU retain the power and the legitimacy to pursue national foreign policies, as long as the federal dynamics in European foreign policy are weak institutionally and politically, we will see situations where a number of member states choose to abstain from, or not to back, policies pursued by the others, and where the EU can regard it as a clear success when majority policies are not vetoed. Kosovo is a case in point where Spain was deeply unhappy about the decision to recognize the break-away territory but chose not to block the action of the others. As damaging as Germany’s decision to abstain in the Security Council vote has been in terms of sustaining the dynamics of the movement towards a European Security and Defence Policy, the fact is that Germany did not actually block European action. It is of course a messy picture, but it is the picture we will see as long as the institutional framework remains as unsatisfactory as it is. . InFocus: What consequences does Germany’s abstention on resolution 1973 carry for its ambitions to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council? TK: Berlin’s abstention has clearly damaged Germany’s ambitions, but then I think Germany should not get a permanent seat on the Security Council anyway, because the notion that European countries should have individual permanent seats is deeply archaic. The EU should be given a single seat and thus be forced to speak with one voice. This used to be the German position on Security Council reform, and it is a great pity that it has changed. Interview by Radu BOTEZ Managing Editor, InFocus
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
Le printemps de Ryad aura-t-il lieu ? lors que les dictatures arabes se voient renversées les unes après les autres par une jeunesse excédée, l’Arabie saoudite semble épargnée par le vent de révolte qui souffle aujourd’hui au Maghreb et au Moyen Orient. Alors que des centaines de personnes avaient rejoint le groupe Facebook appelant à une « journée de colère » le 11 mars 2011, aucune manifestation d’envergure n’a eu lieu dans le pays. Le déploiement massif de forces de sécurité à Riyad et dans d’autres villes comme Damman a tué la révolte dans l’œuf, et seuls de petits rassemblements de la minorité chiite ont pu être observés à l’est du pays. Pourtant, les contestataires ne manquent pas d’arguments contre le régime de la famille Saoud, en place dans le pays depuis la fondation de l’Etat moderne d’Arabie saoudite par ibn Saoud en 1932. En effet, la situation politique, sociale et religieuse n’a rien à envier à celle de ses voisins qui ont vu leurs dictateurs chuter. Le régime saoudien s’est construit sur une alliance avec Mohammed ibn Abd el-Wahhâb, fondateur du wahhabisme. Cette doctrine issue du sunnisme ultra orthodoxe s’oppose à toute glorification du prophète et préconise un retour à un islam pur et originel. Elle est à l’origine de toute la conception religieuse dans le pays qui interdit tout culte autre que l’islam et ne fait que tolérer la minorité chiite de l’est. Les statistiques officielles font même état de 100 % de sunnites dans le pays. Le sunnisme est ainsi religion d’Etat et le régime est explicitement soutenu par les Oulémas, savants religieux qui s’élèvent régulièrement dans l’émission de Fatwas contre toute forme de contestation du régime des Saoud. Le système politique repose également sur cette alliance entre wahhabisme et saoudisme. Le pays est en effet une monarchie absolue islamique : seuls les descendants de ibn Saoud peuvent prétendre au trône. Il n’existe pas d’assemblée élue mais un conseil consultatif (Majlis al-Choura) composé de 120 membres nommés par le roi, qui soumet lui même les sujets à traiter. Le roi contrôle donc tous les aspects la vie politique, dans un régime où les pouvoirs ne sont bien entendu pas distincts. D’autre part, le pouvoir absolu du roi est complété par le pouvoir de la famille royale entière, basé sur le modèle de la tradition tribale ; le contrôle de la famille régnante est total et de type patriarcal. Des assemblées tribales consultatives permettent aux populations des tribus de demander aide et assistance au pouvoir mais la décision finale est toujours prise par le souverain, ne laissant au gouverne-
Photo: Baker_88/Flickr/cc
A
Contrairement aux pays voisins, les révoltes peinent à prendre forme dans la royauté
Ryad
ment que les décisions mineures à prendre. La confusion entre politique et religieux est totale puisque le roi tire également son pouvoir de son titre d’Imam et donc de chef religieux descendant de Mahommet. Il consulte ainsi aussi bien le Conseil qu’il nomme, que le Conseil des Oulémas, plus haute instance religieuse du pays. Le droit, qu’il soit pénal ou familial est une application de la Shari’ah, loi islamique telle qu’elle est décrite dans le Coran et la Sounnah. Celle-ci prévoit entre autre, la supériorité de l’homme sur la femme ou encore l’absence de liberté de religion ou d’expression. Le régime saoudien repose donc sur un système absolutiste et dictatorial, potentiellement sujet à des révolutions comme ce fut le cas en Tunisie et en Egypte. La situation économique du pays est également propice à la révolte et les inégalités montrent bien les contradictions qui traversent le régime. En effet, l’Arabie saoudite est le premier exportateur de pétrole, disposant de 27% des réserves pétrolières mondiales et dont l’exportation lui a rapporté 106 milliards de dollars de recettes en 2007. L’économie saoudienne est excédentaire mais les investissements se tournent principalement vers le pétrole. Ainsi, la croissance ne profite qu’aux élites des affaires et aux proches de la famille régnante alors que 40 % des 2024 ans seraient sans emploi. Cette population très jeune (les deux tiers de la population ont moins de 30 ans) et qualifiée ne trouve pas d’emploi en fin d’études, malgré la hausse du niveau scolaire dans le pays. Le revenu par habitant a diminué de moitié en vingt ans tandis que dans InFocus | 31
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
“La censure opère efficacement dans le pays et montre la peur du régime face aux révoltes et aux révolutions qui agitent les pays voisins.”
Photo:Ammar Abd Rabbo/flickr/cc
le même temps, le pays est devenu le premier importateur d’armes du tiers-monde, et que les plus riches hommes saoudiens investissent massivement à l’étranger, en particuler dans les pays arabes. A ces inégalités s’ajoute une forte corruption, un des facteurs principaux ayant mené la révolution tunisienne. En effet, selon l’ONG Transparency International, le pays se place au 50e rang sur 178 pays en matière de corruption, personnalisée par le clan des sept Soudayri, sept frères parmi lesquels on compte Fahd bin Abdelaziz, prédécesseur du roi Abdallah ou encore Nayef, actuel ministre de l’intérieur. Les protestations contre le régime se font entendre parmi toutes les mouvances politico-religieuses, des Salafistes aux progressistes, à travers des pétitions par exemple, signées par des milliers de militants de toutes confessions. En plus de l’accès à la richesse du pays qui a été renforcée encore avec la hausse des prix du pétrole et a créé une forte économie du désir ; les saoudiens demandent des réformes politiques profondes, et notamment
Roi Abdallah d’Arabie Saoudite
32 | InFocus
la mise en place d’un conseil représentatif élu ou d’une justice indépendante. Un mouvement de protestation, né en 2003 à la suite de la guerre en Irak, avait été porté par l’arrivée sur le trône du prince Abdallah en 2005 et l’espoir d’un « printemps de Riyad ». Espoir déçu puisque de nombreux activistes politiques ont été enfermés ou empêchés de quitter le pays. La critique du roi et des princes détenteurs des principaux postes exécutifs reste taboue jusqu’à aujourd’hui encore étant donné le déploiement de forces massives dans le pays suite à l’appel à des manifestations pour le 11 mars. La censure opère efficacement dans le pays et montre la peur du régime face aux révoltes et aux révolutions qui agitent les pays voisins. En effet, la forte répression des récentes contestations du régime, pourtant peu enclines à prende des formes violentes de remise en cause du pouvoir, a montré à quel point le soulèvement du monde arabe préoccupait le roi Abdallah. De retour du Maroc où il était en convalescence le 23 février, il a annoncé dans la foulée une série de mesures sociales et d’investissements de 36 milliards de dollars et de 300 milliards d’ici 2014. Ces mesures prévoiraient une revalorisation des salaires des fonctionnaires, des aides au logement ou encore un soutien des saoudiens travaillants à l’étranger. L’intervention du 14 mars à Bahrein des forces du royaume, qui ont violement réprimé la révolte de la place de la Perle, a aussi mis en évidence la méfiance du régime à l’égard des révoltes chiites dans les pays voisins. Par ces décisions on sent également la peur du régime face à l’influence de l’Iran et de son bras armé, le Hezbollah libanais. Toutefois, le régime peine à identifier ses ennemis et pourrait donc faire face à des soulèvements imprévus. En effet, alors qu’il tente de faire taire les protestations par des mesures économiques d’investissements sociaux, il reste sourd aux demandes de démocratie, de transparence et de liberté. Si le roi reste relativement populaire, son gouvernement et les proches de la famille Saoud sont vivement critiqués, tout comme le fut le clan Trabelsi de l’épouse Ben Ali en Tunisie, qui tenait les rouages économiques du pays. D’autre part, le roi agé de 87 ans à la santé fragile peine également à identifier les protestataires, qui ne font plus seulement parti aujourd’hui des courants progressistes mais également des mouvances salafistes, pourtant habituellement réticentes à critiquer le régime wahhabiste. Un groupe d’universitaires et de professionnels a ainsi annoncé la création du Parti de l’Oumma Islamique Salafiste, qui demande la tenue d’élections démo-
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
“En effet, alors qu’il tente de faire taire les protestations par des mesures économiques d’investissements sociaux, il reste sourd aux demandes de démocratie, de transparence et de liberté.”
Photo: Radio nederland wereldomroep/Flickr/cc
cratiques et des avancées dans le domaine du respect des droits de l’homme. Le prince Talal, neveu du roi et détenteur d’une fortune estimée à 20 milliards de dollars s’est lui même déclaré en faveur d’une monarchie constitutionnelle. Tout en faisant l’éloge de son oncle qualifié de « réformateur » et en qualifiant les manifestations du 11 mars de « tempête dans un verre d’eau », il a préconisé des réformes internes et mis en garde les élites régnantes contre de possibles révoltes. Déjà engagé politiquement dans le mouvement libéral des Principes Libres créé en 1958, ce personnage montre bien que les critiques ne proviennent pas uniquement des chiites et ne ciblent pas seulement le chômage et la précarité. Cette incapacité à identifier la demande des saoudiens pourrait entrainer une remise en cause plus forte que celle observée au mois de mars, à condition qu’une coalition entre les différents mouvements protestataires, encore très divisés, ne se mette en place. Les chiites sont apparus pour l’instant comme les leaders du mouvement, mais la forte répression du mouvement chiite bahreïni a bien montré la détermination du régime saoudien. Ne pouvant pas agir seuls, les militants chiites doivent trouver des alliés parmi les progressistes sunnites du reste du pays, qui se trouvent notamment à l’ouest dans des villes comme Djeddah. Si cette union ne s’est aujourd’hui pas encore mise en place, la récente intervention de la coalition mandatée par l’ONU en Libye peut offrir l’espoir aux saoudiens que les pays occidentaux ne resteront pas immobiles en cas de répression du régime. Souvent critiqués pour leur tolérance à l’égard du régime de la famille Saoud du fait des intérêts économiques (pétrole et armes) en jeu entre les deux pays, les Etats-Unis pourraient cette fois se révéler réticents à intervenir, même si la relation qu’ils ont entretenue avec les Saoud jusqu’à présent a été sévèrement entachée à la suite du 11 septembre 2001. La chute du régime du plus grand pays du Golfe, exerçant sa domination régionale par l’intermédiaire du Conseil de Coopération du Golfe notamment, pourrait également remettre en cause l’équilibre de toute la péninsule arabique. En effet, les saoudiens jouent sur de nombreux litiges frontaliers avec leurs voisins afin d’asseoir la domination du pays dans ses relations bilatérales. Or, une chute du régime des Saoud risquerait d’entrainer une remise en cause du statu quo imposé par la puissance militaire, concernant les conflits les plus emblématiques comme celui avec le Yémen, partiellement résolu par le
Sommet de la Ligue Arabe à Ryad. Mars 2007
traité de Taëf, ou encore celui qui oppose les Emirats Arabes Unis et Oman sur l’oasis de Bouraymi. D’autre part, une chute des Souadayri représenterait une victoire pour l’Iran, en lutte avec le pays pour une domination notamment idéologique du monde musulman. Toutefois, le printemps de Riyad n’a pas (encore) eu lieu, et les probabilités d’une union nationale contre le pouvoir établi sont faibles. Aujourd’hui la contestation se fait essentiellement par le biais de pétitions en ligne ou de réseaux sociaux. Or, si ceux-ci ont été sur-médiatisés comme principal vecteur de réussite des révolutions en Egypte et en Tunisie, la mobilisation virtuelle s’y est traduite par un mouvement protestataire de grande ampleur, ce qui n’est pas encore le cas en Arabie Saoudite. Margaux PORTIER Editor, InFocus
InFocus | 33
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
Revolutions, regime changes and human rights Are human rights violations an aftermath?
T
he last few months have been witness to historiPunishment, the International Convention for the Procal events that will change the future of nations. tection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance etc. What started out as protests in Sidi Bouzid The implementation of these rights are seen to by variagainst the Tunisian government has turned into ous organizations at the regional and international level, a full-fledged wave of revolutions across the Arab world. including the Council of Europe, Organization of AmeriEver since the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouaziz on can State and the African Union as well as many non-gov17th December, 2010, protests have been sparked in counernmental organizations such as Amnesty International, tries such as Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and Human Rights Watch etc. more recently in Libya, against corrupt and authoritarian Unfortunately, for as long as there have been human regimes. These countries have seen major protests, demrights, there have also been human rights violations. onstrations, riots, road-blocking and more self-immolaMore importantly for this article, where revolutions have tions by mainly frustrated youths who have had enough occurred, so have human rights abuses abounded. This of police brutality, poverty, grinding unemployment and is a global phenomenon, and we have witnessed the deprepressive regimes. rivation of even the most basic human rights during the While many parallels have been drawn between these revolutions and regime changes in South America, Cuba, recent revolutions with previous revolutions, such as those Algeria, Burma and Iraq as well as in the recent Arab Revin Iran in 1979 and Prague in 1989, as well as some referolutions. These human rights violations usually take place ences made to revolutions dating as far back as the 1848 before a revolution and unfortunately, in a lot of cases, European Revolutions, one thing is clear – revolutions continue throughout and many times even long after a are not just a thing of the past. The twentieth century has revolution or a regime change is over. probably seen more revolutions take place than any other Take Iraq for example. Under Saddam Hussein, there period of time. What is not so widely talked about is what were many cases of torture and mass murders. Saddam impact these revolutions have on Hussein used the secret police, the civilians caught in the midst “The principal reason for torture, murders, deportations, of these regime changes and wars these revolutions has been forced disappearances, assassinaof ideologies. While many people the attainment of human tions, chemical weapons, and the actively take part in protests and destruction of wetlands to rule demonstrations against regimes rights.” Iraq with an iron fist.1 Iraqi citiknow the risks they take in doing so, many others find zens were not free to assemble unless it was to support themselves unwillingly caught in the line of fire. And their government. Citizens were not permitted to travel most of them, whether they join the revolution by choice abroad without government permission and expensive or by force, find themselves threatened or subject to the exit visas. For criminal offences, which under that regime threat of human rights violations. included theft, corruption, currency speculation and milThe principal reason for these revolutions has been itary desertion, the punishments included amputation, the attainment of human rights. Human rights have been branding and even the death penalty. around since almost the beginning of human history, Then in 2003, the US invaded Iraq, leading ultimately even if the concept of human rights seems to have evolved led to the fall the Saddam Hussein regime. Whatever the through the centuries and only come into full force in the rationale for the Iraq War, it was hoped at least that it past few decades. While there have been declarations would lead to the end of the brutal and repressive Hussein concerning human rights dating as far back as the 1789 government and grant basic human rights to the Iraqi Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, today people who had so long been deprived of these rights. Unthe concepts of human rights can be found in the nine fortunately, while the Hussein government did end, the ‘core’ UN human rights treaties which include treaties post-US invasion Iraq was still rife with human rights such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social violations. According to Human Rights Watch, in 2006and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on 2007, more than 1.5 million Iraqis fled their homes due Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture to sectarian violence that had become rampant in their and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or communities, leaving thousands of internally displaced 34 | InFocus
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
“... where revolutions have occurred, so have human rights abuses abounded.”
Photo: RamyRaoof/FLckr/CC
persons with no proper shelter or access to basic necessities such as clean water, electricity, and sanitation.2 Even eight years after the invasion, things do not seem to be much better. Amnesty International reported that about 30,000 Iraqis are being held without trial or charge while Iraqi prisons are overcrowded and have bad sanitary conditions.3 The major human rights violations there are the use of the death penalty, detentions and torture. Within the cities, one can observe a refugee crisis, vigilante violence and the persecution of minorities. The US army and contractors in Iraq have been accused of human rights violations. There exists as well the intimidation of journalists and human rights activists. Joe Stork, the deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch said that “Eight years after the US invasion, life in Iraq is actually getting worse for women and minorities, while journalists and detainees face significant rights violations.” This includes assassination, intimidation and trafficking of women and girls. There are also thousands of amputees wounded during years of armed conflict who are unable to find work or have access to adequate medical care. Another example is Chile – the year 1973 saw a coup d’état which overthrew the democratically elected President Salvador Allende and established a right-wing military dictatorship led by General Augusto Pinochet that lasted for 17 years. While the casualties on the military side during the coup d’état that took place were not a very large figure, tens of thousands of people were arrested arbitrarily and held inside the National Stadium because the coup called for the arrest of every man, woman and child on the streets that morning.4 The figures for abuses of human rights during this period vary, with some estimates saying that 40,000 to 50,000 people were subject to perfunctory arrests. Additionally, a number of people became cases of forced disappearances and hundreds of people were detained, questioned, tortured, and in some cases murdered in the aftermath of the coup. The government-appointed National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture reported in 2004 that more than 18,000 people were tortured during the four months after the September 1973 coup, and another 5,266 people from January 1974 until August 1977.5 The Rettig Report found that at least 2,279 persons were murdered by the Chilean government for political reasons during Pinochet’s rule, and the Valech Report found that at least 30,000 persons were tortured by the government for political reasons. In
Riot police. Cairo. January 2011
fact, the Pinochet regime attempted to suppress all political dissidence, which some termed as ‘politicide’ or political genocide6. So what was the international community doing while ordinary Chileans bore the brunt of this oppressive regime? It is clear Pinochet had the support of the United States of America right from the beginning, with the then US President Nixon giving instructions to “do anything short of a Dominican-type action” to keep the democratically elected president of Chile from assuming office.7 And when there were initial reports of the massacres that occurred after the coup, Kissinger was said to have told his staff, “... I think we should understand our policy--that however unpleasant they act, the [military] government is better for us than Allende was.” 8 The UK and France also supported this regime, albeit secretly, and foreign aid that had been reduced during Allende’s presidency was increased under the Pinochet dictatorship. In Asia, Burma has seen human rights violations throughout its post-independence history with prominent dates being the 8888 Nationwide Popular Pro-Democracy Protests (1998) which were, much like the current Arab revolutions, protests against a repressive and corrupt government. As a result, these protests saw the imposition of martial law, indiscriminate firing upon and killing of thousands of protestors, and even the closing down of schools and universities to prevent further uprisings. More recently, during the 2007 Burmese anti-government protests which have also been referred to as the InFocus | 35
Dossier: Revolutions (and those that did not occur)
“The irony in most cases, is that these revolutions are meant to restore human rights to the people, but instead prolong the duration of the violations.” Photo: nasser nouri/FLckr/CC
basic fundamental rights. The longing for human rights can never be suppressed. For as long there are human rights, there will be a constant fight to restore these rights to those deprived of them. Our responsibility, as part of the international community, is to make known these violations and to call on governments to hold these perpetrators accountable for their actions. Because unless we raise our voices and make ourselves be heard, there will be no real motivation to stop the abuses. Tanya KOSHY Editor, InFocus
Notes Riot police. Tunis. January 2011
Saffron Revolution, the demonstrations protested against the rising cost of basic commodities which left most of the Burmese population deprived of even their basic rights to food and health security. The military crackdown on these protests led to raids of monasteries by junta security forces, several hundreds of people being arrested, as well as the government blocking access to email and internet sites concerning news about Burma. A final example is of the recent revolutions in the Arab World. They have been revolutions for freedom, democracy and most importantly human rights. Ironically there have also been revolutions where significant human rights violations have taken place. In Syria, security forces used live bullets and tear gas against protestors.9 In another case in Yemen, unidentified gunmen opened fire on peaceful demonstrators while security forces looked away, killing at least 45 people and wounding hundreds of others.10 Bahrain has taken to arresting doctors and human rights activists and detaining them without any explanations11 and has also denied injured people of critical medical care. These are only a few instances of the many human rights violations that have taken place because of the Arab revolutions. The above cases demonstrate that human rights violations tend almost to be synonymous with revolutions and regime changes and are not confined to a certain region. They show how people’s basic rights are violated despite revolutions and changes in regimes. The irony in most cases, is that these revolutions are meant to restore human rights to the people, but instead prolong the duration of the violations. And yet people still fight for their 36 | InFocus
1 “SADDAM HUSSEIN: crimes and human rights abuses”
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London “ Saddam Hussein’s Human Rights Record” The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2 “Iraq: Vulnerable citizens at risk” (21.02.2011) Human Rights Watch 3 “New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq” Iraq Human Rights, Amnesty International 4 In Chile, a New Generation Revisits Haunted Space, Ford Foundation Report, Winter 2003, Alex Wilde 5 Chile: Pinochet Held on Torture Charges, (31.10.2006) Human Rights Watch 6 The legacy of human-rights violations in the Southern Cone 7 “ The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability” Peter Kornbluh 8 “ The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability”,(Transcript dated 1.10.1973) Peter Kornbluh, 9 Syria: Government Crackdown Leads to Protester Deaths, (21.03.2011) Human Rights Watch 10 US: Suspend Military Aid to Yemen (18.03.2011) Human Rights Watch 11 Bahrain: New Arrests Target Doctors, Rights Activists (20.03.2011) Human Rights Watch
Current Affairs
Unity by division: African responses to Arab revolts Fractures show in African Union response to Libyan crisis he African Union’s response to the revolutions on its northern coast has been cautious. Initially paralysed at the prospect of aligning itself against one of its chief proponents and funders, the AU has come to adopt a proactive stance in the Libya crisis. Yet despite the oft-repeated maxim that in international relations “Africa is one,” the Union’s efforts have been fractured by its composition of nation states in relations of dependence and antagonism with one other, the Union concealing a web of internal and international bilateral relations. Firstly, the AU as a body and as individual states has considerable ties to Ghadaffi, who has far from neglected his regional partnerships in his forty two-year rule. His year-long Chairmanship of the African Union having only ended in 31 January 2011, Ghadaffi’s influence has been longstanding. Libya’s financial assets, currently frozen under UNSC Resolution 1970, were said to be directed towards the establishment of the African Investment Bank (Libya), the African Monetary Fund (Nigeria) and the African Central Bank, which would print its own money thus ending reliance on non-African companies. Three quarters of the cost of the first African communications satellite, the one-time $400m purchase cost of which would replace the annual $500m charged by Europe for the use of its satellites and so dramatically reduce the cost of calls within Africa, was met by Tripoli, which contributed $300m in 2007. Libya’s status as one of the wealthiest African states renders the African Union particularly cautious. The 17-state coalition that makes up Operation United Protector has done little to support the African Union’s mediation efforts. NATO refused permission to fly in the no-fly zone to the AU mediation delegation—composed of the Heads of State of five countries: Mali, Mauritania, Republic of Congo, South Africa and Uganda—which would have allowed them to meet with both Ghadaffi and the Benghazi-based forces in a single day, the symbolic value of which, in a context paranoid of partisan motivations, cannot be understated. In turn, the African Union has rejected invitations to attend the Paris, London and Doha summits, further diminishing the opportunity of cooperation, with Chairperson of the Commission of the AU denouncing the meetings as a “photoshoot.” In Brussels on the 4th April, AU Commission Chief of Staff John K. Shinkaiye pointedly remarked that “the considerable efforts that African leaders and African institutions make to proffer solutions to unfortunate events in Africa, should be taken into full account by others who are helping to deal with those same issues.” Yet despite the AU condemnation of the Coalition’s intervention, three African states in fact voted in favour of Resolution 1973 in their roles as non-permanent members of the Security Council: Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa. Jean Ping has asserted that these votes in favour should be considered “consistent
Photo: OEA-OAS/FLckr/CC
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Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission. April 2011
with the position of the African Union,” whilst South Africa has declared its commitment to the AU Peace and Security Council decision to “to respect the unity and territorial integrity of Libya and its rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form.” Yet the actions of these three states in the SC context clearly oppose the African Union voice that they endorse. The composition of the AU mediation delegation is itself contentiously composed, with pre-existing bilateral ties further fracturing the “Africa is One” ideal. Ghadaffi crossed the AU Peace and Security Council merely a month into his chairmanship in 2010 by opposing sanctions that the Union sought to impose on the “anti-constitutional” regime in Mauritania following the 2008 military coup that brought General Abdel Aziz to power. The inclusion of President Abdel Aziz in the five-person delegation to Libya to mediate with his one-time champion Ghadaffi, is something of a “sweetener” to induce the Libyan president to accept the Mediation and its Peace Plan; yet with the Mauritanian regime suppressing revolt at home, his inclusion is unlikely to be favourably received by the Benghazi rebels, nor the governments soon to be voted into power in Tunisia and Egypt on a wave of revolution. Laura DIX Editor, InFocus InFocus | 37
Current Affairs
EU-India Free Trade Agreement Raising concerns for patients in the developing world housands of HIV-positive individuals across Asia marched on March 2, 2011 to express their opposition to the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) currently under negotiation. In December 2010, Mr. Anand Grover, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, expressed his concerns about the impact of this agreement on access to affordable medicine in the developing world. The agreement is said to include a clause on intellectual property that would seriously hamper Indian generic manufacturers. India is one the world’s largest providers of generic drugs for developing countries. It currently produces up to 93% of generic anti-retroviral (ARVs) in the developing world. This country has also been on the frontline of the global fight to defend developing countries’ right to produce generic drugs that address major public health issues such as HIV/AIDS. In the 1970’s, India developed a comprehensive patent law on drugs to allow generics to be manufactured in India. The Doha declaration and the 2005 amendment to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which extended the right of compulsory licensing, enabled India to take the lead on the provision of generic drugs to the developing world. Compulsory licensing is a mechanism developed under the WTO Uruguay Round to enable developing countries to grant licenses for the production of generic versions of patentprotected drugs that are vital to address public health crises. The 2005 amendment not only allowed compulsory licensing for the production of generic drugs for national use, but also to export such drugs to developing countries that lacked proper manufacturing facilities. At the time, the EU supported this clause. Since then, however, it has constructed several barriers to prevent the development of generic markets and industries in developing countries. For example, a current regulation on counterfeited drugs prevents Indian generics from transiting through Europe while they are en route to other developing countries. So, what would the EU-India FTA change? Both the EU and the Indian government are denying that any clause in this agreement would reduce access to affordable drugs in the developing world. In response to the campaign of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) “Europe! Hands off our medicine!” against the FTA, the European Commission publicly revealed its intention to include the following provision, “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as to impair the capacity of the Parties to promote access to medicines.”1 It has also underlined its compliance with TRIPS. But lack of transparency in the negotiation process and the parties’ unwillingness to communicate the details of the Agreement have raised suspicion. Moreover, leaks from the Agreement’s draft seem to confirm health activists’ fears. 38 | InFocus
Photo: Rukmini Pillai/flickr/cc
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March against FTA. New Delhi. March 2011
The EU is right on one point though: from what we know, none of the EU-India FTA’s provision infringe upon the TRIPS Agreement, as the latter deals mostly with patents. However, the EU-India FTA includes strong provisions on intellectual property rights such as data exclusivity, which is currently not allowed under India’s Patent Law. Such a clause prevents other companies from accessing a company’s clinical trial data for 5 to 10 years, forcing them to redo costly clinical trials themselves and therefore hampering their capacity to produce generic at a low price. Although this provision does not ban market access to generic drugs, according to Dr. Unni Karunakara (President of the International Council of MSF), it will lead to a quasi-monopoly on the drugs market, a situation that will inevitably raise drug prices. The Indian Parliament has always made an active effort in balancing public health issues and trade interests, but the potential benefits that the EU-India FTA could bring in other fields of the Indian economy have incentivized it to sign this agreement. On the European side, the Commission is supposedly facing great pressure from the pharmaceutical lobby, which claims protection of intellectual property as the key component in enabling the pharmaceutical industry to cover its high R&D costs and risks. For the time being, the EU-India FTA is still in negotiations. But now that the provisions of the agreement have become public, NGOs, health activists and patients associations have entered the game…. Affaire à suivre. Elodie BESNIER Editor, InFocus
Notes
1 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/december/tradoc_147167.pdf
Current Affairs
Elections présidentielles au Pérou : premier tour Photo: steven levitsky
Ollanta Humala et Keiko Fujimori en ballotage
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es résultats du premier tour des élections présidentielles au Pérou sont tombés dans la nuit du 10 avril : le lieutenant-colonel à la retraite Ollanta Humala s’est imposé avec 31,7% des voix, suivi par la congressiste Keiko Fujimori avec 23,6% des voix. Le premier tour des élections signe la déroute de la droite garante de la continuité économique et politique. Les premiers analystes à s’être exprimés sur les résultats du scrutin qui a écarté les trois candidats de droite de la course - Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Alejandro Toledo, et Luis Castañeda- ont pointé du doigt l’incapacité des partis politiques à concentrer les votes autour d’une même candidature : en divisant un même espace électoral, la droite s’est coupée la voie au deuxième tour. L’échec de la droite révèle aussi que Lima ne pèse pas encore assez face à l’électorat provincial pour déséquilibrer le jeu politique péruvien. La capitale, forte de plus de 8 millions d’habitants, a majoritairement bénéficié du développement économique du pays. Concentrant un électorat urbain de droite, la capitale a soutenu Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK), le candidat néolibéral, ancien économiste de la Banque Mondiale et ministre de l’Economie. Pourtant le favori de la capitale n’a pas fait le poids face aux candidats portés par les régions rurales en province. Les réactions à l’international au lendemain du premier tour évoquent pessimisme et risque pour la démocratie. Dans la région, la presse chilienne et argentine a souligné l’extrême polarisation idéologique des candidats, tous deux majoritairement soutenus par les franges les plus pauvres de la population mais défenseurs de modèles politiques radicalement opposés. Pour les observateurs de la presse américaine et européenne, les résultats du premier tour sont alarmants : Keiko Fujimori est généralement perçue à travers l’image de son père, Alberto Fujimori, Président autoritaire du Pérou dans les années 1990, aujourd’hui en prison pour corruption et multiples violations des droits de l’homme. Quant à Ollanta Humala, il reste associé à Hugo Chavez et son modèle révolutionnaire de gauche : ni ses déclarations contre l’intervention du président vénézuélien dans sa campagne, ni son discours de sympathie vis-à-vis du modèle Lula au Brésil ne semblent convaincre. Aussi, les pronostics
«Si l’on peut accorder à Humala le bénéfice du doute, Keiko elle, nous a déjà prévenu»
dégagés au lendemain du premier tour font état d’une situation bien funeste : le choix se fera entre le « passé sombre » de Keiko ou le « saut dans le vide » avec Humala. Mais ni Keiko ni Humala n’ont été soutenus pour les alliances qu’ils représentent. L’électorat péruvien n’a pas donné plus de 30% de ses voix à un dévoué chaviste garant de la révolution bolivarienne, pas plus qu’il n’a souhaité voir en Keiko une dirigeante autoritaire poursuivant l’héritage de son père 20 ans après lui. Le vote au profit des candidats les plus polarisés de la scène politique ne doit pas cacher premièrement, le rejet de la droite de l’establishment favorable au statu quo, et deuxièmement, l’appel à des mesures de justice redistributive. Il est maintenant clair que l’enjeu des élections du 10 avril s’est centré autour de la question de la répartition des richesses accumulées depuis le boom économique du pays La percée d’Humala dans un pays dont le taux de croissance avoisine les 8% depuis quelques années s’explique par la très faible redistribution par l’Etat des recettes de la prospère économie du Pérou, dont plus du tiers de la population vit encore sous le seuil de pauvreté. Humala a centré son « Programme de gouvernement 20112016 » autour de mesures phares comme la taxation des revenus du secteur minier, l’augmentation de l’impôt sur le patrimoine, l’instauration de programmes de santé et de retraite, et a réaffirmé tout au long de sa campagne sa détermination à lutter contre la corruption. Keiko a quant à elle rappelé à plusieurs reprises les avancées obtenues pour stopper l’hyperinflation sous le gouvernement de son père pour justifier ses positions en matière de politique économique. La congressiste conservatrice s’attire de ce fait la sympathie dans les rangs des business men et investisseurs nationaux comme étrangers, ce qui n’est certainement pas le cas d’Humala, qui prévoit des réformes « à la Chavez » ciblant la communication audiovisuelle, les traités de libre-échange et prévoyant la « nationalisation des activités stratégiques ». Depuis les résultats du 10 avril, les alliances tentent de se mettre en place : tandis que l’ex-président de la République, Alejandro Toledo, a déclaré soutenir Humala au second tour, il est fort probable que Keiko récupère les votes de l’électorat de PPK. Alors que les deux candidats appellent dans leurs discours au consensus et au dialogue entre les diverses formations politiques, la difficulté majeure reste pour eux de prouver leur attachement aux principes démocratiques de gouvernement : un modèle de développement plus redistributif de la croissance qui se ferait au prix de restriction des libertés individuelles, voilà un scénario que beaucoup au Pérou se sont engagés à ne plus répéter. Lola CECCHINEL Rédactrice, InFocus InFocus | 39
Current Affairs
Le droit français et le Statut de la Cour pénale internationale
Loi du 9 août 2010 portant adaptation du droit pénal à l’institution de la CPI
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a création de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) par le Statut à l’identique le détail de l’article 7 du Statut. Aussi, le nouvel arde Rome en 1998 a rendu nécessaire l’adaptation du système ticle 212-1 incrimine expressément le crime contre l’humanité. pénal de chaque Etat partie. En France, cette adaptation s’est faite Il s’agit là d’une modification importante car l’ancienne formulaen plusieurs étapes. Tout d’abord, la Constitution a été révisée tion de l’article visait uniquement certains actes constitutifs, seul suite à la décision du Conseil constitutionnel du 22 janvier 19991, le titre du chapitre faisant référence aux « autres crimes contre par l’introduction d’un nouvel article 53-2 qui a rendu possible la l’humanité ». L’infraction de crime contre l’humanité est ainsi érireconnaissance de la juridiction de la CPI. Cette révision a per- gée au même rang que celle de génocide. mis à la France de ratifier le Statut de Rome le 9 juin 2000.2 EnsuiLe cœur de la loi est la création d’un nouveau livre dans le te, la loi de 2002 relative à la coopération avec la CPI3 a déterminé Code pénal (livre IV bis) consacré aux crimes et délits de guerre. les règles relatives à l’entraide judicaire, l’exercice des poursuites, Selon la définition de ces crimes et délits de guerre donnée à l’arl’exécution des décisions et l’indemnisation des victimes. Enfin, ticle 461-1, le livre IV concerne les « infractions commises, lors après plus de deux ans de débats législatifs, a été adoptée le 9 août d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation 2010 la loi portant adaptation du droit pénal à l’institution de la avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et des coutumes de la guerre ou CPI.4 Ce troisième volet est supposé marquer « la pleine partici- des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés, à pation de la France à la justice pénale internationale et adapte[r] l’encontre des personnes ou des biens visés aux articles 461-2 à 461notre droit aux infractions qui en relèvent ».5 31 ». L’incrimination des actes constitutifs d’un crime de guerre En effet, la législation française était lacunaire s’agissant des tels que prévus par les Conventions de Genève de 1949 et le Staviolations les plus graves des droits de l’homme, tant au niveau tut de Rome, ainsi que la référence aux conflits armés internatioprocédural que substantiel. Le Code de naux et non internationaux, marquent de crime une volonté certaine du législateur franprocédure pénale, qui prévoit la com- “L’infraction pétence des juridictions françaises ré- contre l’humanité est ainsi çais de lutter contre toute forme de viosultant de conventions internationales graves des droits de l’homme en érigée au même rang que lations spécifiques prévues à cet effet (article temps de guerre. Effectivement, l’article 689), ne contenait aucune disposition celle de génocide.” 8 du Statut de Rome définissant les crisur la compétence universelle accordée mes de guerre se réfère aux infractions par le Statut de Rome et les quatre Conventions de Genève du 12 graves prévues par les quatre Conventions de Genève – notamaoût 1949. Quant au Code pénal, le livre II intitulé « Des crimes ment les violations graves prévues par l’article 3 commun en cas et délits contre les personnes » incriminait de manière beaucoup de conflits armés non internationaux – et aux autres violations plus restrictive le génocide et le crime contre l’humanité, et ne graves des lois et coutumes applicables aux conflits armés intercontenait aucune disposition spécifique sur les crimes de guerre. nationaux et non internationaux. Or, selon l’article 1er du Statut de Rome, c’est d’abord aux Etats L’énoncé des modalités relatives à la complicité du supérieur parties qu’il incombe de juger des crimes relevant de la compé- hiérarchique pour des crimes commis par ses subordonnés est tence de la CPI dans le cadre de procédures spécifiques à chaque également révolutionnaire en droit français. En effet, inscrite aux Etat. La compétence de la Cour n’est donc que complémentaire et articles 213-4-1 (crimes contre l’humanité) et 462-7 (crimes et intervient en cas de carence de la législation interne ou une ab- délits de guerre), la complicité y est détaillée exactement comme sence de volonté de poursuivre. Cette troisième étape représente aux articles 25, 3 et 28, a) et b)7 du Statut de Rome. Ainsi, peut donc un enjeu décisif pour la lutte juridique contre l’impunité. être considéré comme complice d’un crime de son subordonGrâce à cette nouvelle loi, le droit français se trouve enrichi né tout chef militaire ou supérieur hiérarchique « qui savait », de dispositions fondamentales qui parachèvent l’adaptation du ou, s’agissant uniquement du chef militaire, « aurait du savoir que système pénal français à la CPI. Cette loi complète en effet les ces subordonnés commettaient ou allaient commettre ce crime ». incriminations prévues par le Code pénal français. Ainsi, l’arti- Cette dernière formulation – « aurait du savoir » – remet néancle 211-2 inscrit dans le Code pénal la « provocation publique et moins en cause le principe consacré par l’article 121-3 alinéa 1er directe, par tous moyens, à commettre un génocide », qu’elle soit du Code pénal, selon lequel « il n’y a point de crime ou de délit ou non suivie d’effet, à la suite de l’article 211-1 incriminant le sans intention de le commettre », ainsi que la formulation de l’arcrime de génocide.6 Cette incrimination correspond exactement ticle 121-7 alinéa 1er qui exige que le complice d’un crime ou d’un à l’article 25, 3, e) du Statut de Rome. La définition du crime délit ait « sciemment » facilité l’infraction. En effet, l’intention se contre l’humanité est quant à elle modifiée et reprend quasiment définit comme la « conscience et volonté de commettre un crime 40 | InFocus
Current Affairs
“L’énoncé des modalités relatives à la complicité du supérieur hiérarchique pour des crimes commis par ses subordonnés est également révolutionnaire en droit français.”
Photo: EKENITR/flickr/cc
ou un délit, élément constitutif de l’infraction ».8 Le chef militaire pourrait donc être condamné comme complice d’un crime ou d’un délit sans intention coupable de sa part. Si cette apparente contradiction n’a pas été relevée par le Conseil constitutionnel dans sa décision du 5 août 2010 validant la future loi du 9 août9, le Conseil avait pourtant déjà attribué une valeur constitutionnelle à la nécessité de l’élément moral, notamment en matière délictuelle.10 Il est donc fort à parier qu’une question prioritaire de constitutionnalité (QPC) sera un jour soulevée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 61-1 de la Constitution11, afin d’apporter une clarification sur ce point épineux. Si la loi du 9 août 2010 instaure une meilleure cohésion entre le droit international et le droit national, il convient toutefois de constater que les nouvelles dispositions du Code pénal et du Code de procédure pénale ne témoignent pas d’une adaptation entièrement fidèle au Statut de Rome. S’agissant des incriminations, plusieurs éléments distincts donnent lieu à des divergences entre le Statut et les nouvelles dispositions du Code pénal.12 La principale d’entre elles est l’exigence d’une attaque commise « en exécution d’un plan concerté » pour l’infraction de génocide et de crime contre l’humanité. Cette notion purement interne induit une incrimination plus restrictive puisque le Statut de Rome n’évoque qu’une « connaissance de cette attaque ». De plus, pour certaines infractions qualifiées de crimes ou de délits de guerre, le texte français apparaît plus clément, notamment concernant les atteintes aux biens justifiés par une nécessité militaire (article 461-16). C’est en fait la distinction même entre crime et délit qui concourt à une divergence entre les crimes de guerre.13 En outre, le droit français demeure également plus souple sur le plan des motifs d’exonération de la responsabilité pénale. Si l’article 462-8 du Code consacre la méconnaissance de l’illégalité de l’ordre de l’autorité légitime comme cause d’irresponsabilité pénale, il ne précise pas que « l’ordre de commettre un génocide ou un crime contre l’humanité est manifestement illégal » (article 33 du Statut de Rome). Sur le plan procédural, le régime unitaire d’imprescriptibilité applicable à tous les crimes relevant de la compétence de la CPI (article 29 du Statut) n’est pas repris. Si le génocide et le crime contre l’humanité demeurent imprescriptibles, l’article 462-10 du Code pénal porte la prescription de l’action publique à 30 ans à l’égard des crimes de guerre, et à 20 ans à l’égard des délits. Le Conseil constitutionnel avait pourtant décidé en 1999 qu’« aucune règle, ni aucun principe de valeur constitutionnelle, n’interdit l’imprescriptibilité des crimes les plus graves qui touchent l’ensemble de la communauté internationale ».14 Enfin, l’article 689-11 inséré dans le Code de procédure pénale, assortit la compétence extraterritoriale des juridictions pénales françaises de conditions
CPI. La Haye.
cumulatives qui restreignent la possibilité de poursuites basées sur la compétence universelle. En effet, est imposée une condition de résidence habituelle de l’auteur des faits sur le territoire de la République, mais également une condition de double incrimination.15 Ces obligations ne sont pas exigées dans les dispositions relatives à la compétence extraterritoriale des juridictions françaises s’agissant des autres dispositions du Code de procédure pénale (articles 689-1 à 689-10). L’article 689-11 se fonde également sur une interprétation erronée du principe de complémentarité en exigeant du Ministère public qu’il s’assure que la CPI ait décliné expressément sa compétence. Ainsi, la loi portant adaptation du droit pénal français soulève de nombreuses questions notamment sur le plan constitutionnel, qui ne tarderont certainement pas à être relevées lors de futures QPC. Néanmoins, malgré certaines lacunes majeures, cette loi représente une avancée considérable dans la lutte contre l’impunité car elle a permis de consolider, dans une certaine mesure, le droit international pénal. La France a joué un rôle fondamental dans la mise en place de la CPI et elle se doit donc d’être exemplaire. Au-delà d’une justice internationale pénale lointaine basée à La Haye, c’est une justice pénale internationale de proximité qu’il est important de promouvoir. Charlotte GUNKA Rédactrice, InFocus
Notes 1 Décision n° 98-408 DC du 22 janvier 1999, J.O. 24 janvier 1999, p. 1317. 2 Loi n° 2000-282 du 30 mars 2000 autorisant la ratification de la Convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, J.O. 31 mars 2000, p. 4950.
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3 Loi n° 2002-268 du 26 février 2002 relative à la coopération avec la Cour pénale internationale, J.O. 27 février 2002, p. 3684. 4 Loi n° 2010-930 du 9 août 2010 portant adaptation du droit pénal à l’institution de la Cour pénale internationale, J.O. 10 août 2010, p. 14678. 5 Selon les termes du Garde des Sceaux lors de l’examen par le Sénat du projet de loi - M. Thierry Mariani, Assemblée Nationale, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l’administration générale de la République, sur le projet de loi, adopté par le Sénat (n° 951), portant adaptation du droit pénal à l’institution de la Cour pénale internationale, n° 2517, 2010, p. 8. 6 Le chapitre 1er du titre 1er du Code pénal consacré aux « crimes contre l’humanité et contre l’espèce humaine » incrimine donc désormais le génocide (article 211-1) et la provocation au génocide (article 211-2). 7 L’article 28 du Statut de Rome énonce les conditions de responsabilité des chefs militaires et autres supérieurs hiérarchiques. 8 Gérard Cornu, Vocabulaire juridique, Puf, Paris, 2007. 9 Décision n° 2010-612 DC du 5 août 2010, J.O. 9 août 2010, p. 14682. 10 Décision n° 99-411 DC du 16 juin 1999, J.O. 19 juin 1999, p. 9018. 11 La loi organique n°2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009, entrée en vigueur le 1er mars 2010, a instauré « la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité » (QPC) à l’article 61-1 de la Constitution : « Lorsque, à l’occasion d’une instance en cours devant une juridiction, il est soutenu qu’une disposition législative porte atteinte aux droits et libertés que la Constitution garantit, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi de cette question sur renvoi du Conseil d’État ou de la Cour de cassation qui se prononce dans un délai déterminé ». 12 Ces divergences avaient été relevées par la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (CNCDH) dans de nombreux avis concernant à l’époque le projet de loi: CNCDH, Avis sur le projet de loi adaptant la législation française au statut de la Cour pénale internationale, 6 novembre 2008 ; CNCDH, Avis sur le projet de loi adaptant la législation française au statut de la Cour pénale internationale, 29 juin 2006 ; CNCDH, Avis sur un avant-projet de loi portant adaptation de la législation française au Statut de la Cour pénale internationale, 15 mai 2003 ; CNCDH, Avis sur la mise en œuvre du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale, 19 décembre 2002 ; CNCDH, Avis sur l’adaptation du droit interne au statut de la Cour pénale internationale, 23 novembre 2001. 13 Claire Saas, « La nécessaire adaptation du droit français au Statut de Rome », AJ Pénal, 2007, p. 267. 14 Décision n° 98-408 DC du 22 janvier 1999, préc., note 1. 15 « Si les faits sont punis par la législation de l’Etat où ils ont été commis ».
42 | InFocus
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En visite au bureau de l’UNHCR à Ankara
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AAISP
Mot de la présidente L’AAISP : bilan de l’année 2010 - 2011 Fondée en 2009 sous l’impulsion de Julien Crampes, l’Association Affaires Internationales de Sciences Po (AAISP) s’était fixée des objectifs ambitieux qu’elle a relevés avec brio dès sa première année d’existence. Entre l’organisation d’une dizaine de conférences, la mise en place de séjours d’études entres autres au Maroc et en Serbie/Kosovo et les propositions régulières de soirées et rencontres-métiers, le défi à relever pour l’équipe 2010-2011 de l’AAISP était de taille : poursuivre les activités et maintenir voire améliorer la qualité associée aux différents évènements de l’association. L’enjeu était de rester fidèle aux missions fondatrices tout en inscrivant l’action de l’AAISP dans un nouveau contexte institutionnel et en développant son ancrage dans le monde associatif. S’adapter au nouveau contexte institutionnel Reprenant les procédures et l’organisation mises en place par l’équipe précédente, le nouveau Comité Directeur élu le 30 septembre 2010 bénéficiait d’une organisation interne solide et de soutiens importants au sein de l’administration de Sciences Po. Mais la création de l’Ecole des Affaires Internationales (PSIA) a imposé à l’association un nouveau paysage institutionnel. Créant à la fois des opportunités et des contraintes, l’AAISP s’est adaptée. Discussions, négociations, confrontations et coopération sont autant de mots clés pour résumer cet exercice pratique qui a permis l’acquisition de nombreuses compétences professionnalisantes, de la médiation à la résolution de conflits en passant par la communication évènementielle, les relations publiques et le travail en équipe. Apprendre autrement, professionnaliser, développer l’esprit d’école Avant tout destinée aux 900 étudiants de PSIA, l’AAISP a proposé en 2010-2011 de nombreuses activités complémentaires au cursus académique. Soutenue par plus de 250 adhérents, l’association vise à proposer un enrichissement intellectuel et culturel en lien avec l’actualité des affaires internationales, à faciliter les liens avec 44 | InFocus
le monde professionnel et à permettre l’émergence d’un véritable esprit d’école. C’est dans cette perspective que l’AAISP a organisé un débat sur l’avenir de l’OTAN à la suite du sommet de Lisbonne, une conférence autour de S.E.M. l’Ambassadeur Coulibaly alors que la Côte d’Ivoire connaissait une véritable crise politique ou encore une discussion sur l’avenir du Soudan et du Sud-Soudan au lendemain du référendum. La venue de M. Blix, ancien directeur de l’AIEA et président de la Commission sur les armes de destruction massive, le débat autour de spécialistes de la malnutrition ainsi que la dernière conférence de l’AAISP avec M. Jouzel, vice-président du GIEC et prix Nobel de la paix, et Mme Tubiana, fondatrice de l’IDDRI, ont également permis d’aborder des thématiques centrales dans les affaires internationales. Afin d’offrir aux étudiants l’opportunité d’échanger avec des professionnels et de découvrir les possibles débouchés de leurs études, l’AAISP a organisé trois rencontres métiers, autour du thème de l’environnement et du développement durable, des métiers de la sécurité et de la diplomatie et sur les carrières dans les organisations internationales. Les séjours d’études ont également contribué à promouvoir une ouverture sur le monde professionnel. Les voyages organisés au siège de l’OTAN, au Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations de l’armée française (CPCO), au Commandement de la Défense Aérienne et des Opérations Aériennes (CDAOA), à Vienne et en Turquie ont notamment fait découvrir aux participants diverses organisations nationales, bilatérales et internationales tout en profitant d’activités extra-académiques. En complément, et pour renforcer les liens entre les étudiants, des soirées ont été régulièrement organisées pour marquer différents évènements de l’année : la rentrée, Halloween, Noël, la fin des examens, le retour des étudiants de 5ème année et bientôt un évènement avant les vacances d’été.
Créer et développer des partenariats Confortée par son expérience acquise la première année, le nouveau Comité Directeur souhaitait également développer des partenariats au sein du monde académique de Sciences Po et en dehors de l’Ecole. Aussi, des collaborations ont été mises en place avec des associations comme Junior Consulting, Sciences Po Monde Arabe, Sciences Po Environnement ou Niños de Guatemala, mais aussi avec l’ANAJ-IHEDN (Association des Auditeurs Jeunes de l’Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale) et FFIPP (Faculty For Israeli Palestinian Peace). Notre coopération avec différents services de l’administration de Sciences Po a également contribué à l’intégration de l’AAISP dans et hors l’Ecole. Des projets sont en cours pour établir des partenariats avec d’autres associations à l’échelle internationale. Proposer une publication de qualité Last but not least, l’équipe de l’AAISP composée d’une quinzaine de nationalités différentes reflète le caractère international non seulement de ses membres, de PSIA mais aussi des lecteurs d’InFocus. Reprise et améliorée, la revue bilingue de l’AAISP permet à tous les étudiants le souhaitant de s’exprimer sur l’actualité, sur le thème du dossier central à chaque numéro, de réaliser des interviews, de publier des études de cas ou tout simplement d’exprimer leurs points de vue. Grâce au travail de qualité effectué par toute l’équipe d’InFocus et aux multiples contributions des étudiants, la revue de l’AAISP a acquis une notoriété à l’Ecole des Affaires Internationales et dans différents centres de recherche français et étrangers. Ces réalisations n’auraient pas été possibles sans l’implication formidable des membres du Comité Directeur, des différents pôles, des projets collectifs, le soutien de l’administration de PSIA, de Sciences Po et l’aide de l’équipe précédente. Un grand merci à tous ! Marion EHALT Présidente de l’AAISP, 2010-2011
AAISP
AAISP Voyages Istanbul and Ankara
Photo: AAISP
Turkey is a country boasting incredible landscapes and it is well known as a great destination for relaxing holidays, offering also some of the world’s most important ancient monuments. Istanbul, historically known as Byzantium and Constantinople, is the largest city in Turkey and was the European Capital of Culture in 2010. In addition to the variety of touristic attractions (especially in Istanbul), Turkey hosts several international organizations (mostly based in Ankara). With this in mind, the AAISP organized a trip for PSIA students to discover Turkish hospitality, delicious national cuisine, beautiful tourist attractions, and the many international organizations based in the country. 14 students joined in this study troup. In total, the group spent five days in Istanbul and three days in the capital city of Ankara. During the first stay in Istanbul, the students had the opportunity to visit some of the most important monuments of Istanbul, including the famous Hagia Sophia, the Blue Mosk, Dolmabahçe Palace, Topkapı Palace, Basilica Cistern, Galata Tower and the well-known Grand Bazaar (Kapaliçarşı). Among the most famous neighborhoods, the group visited Beyoğlu, notably İstiklâl Caddesi (Independence Avenue) and the French-Algerian street with its entertaining and charming restaurants and bars. On February 28, before the journey to Ankara the group attended the first of a series of five conferences at the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). The time spent in Ankara was primarily dedicated to attending conferences. On March 2, the group was warmly welcomed by Mr. Erdenir, Deputy Secretary General and Mrs. Ertan, Director for Civil Society, Communication and Culture from the Secretariat General for EU Affairs of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey. After the lunch break, the group attended a conference at the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In between the scheduled conferences, the group visited Anıtkabir (the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) and the Museum of Ana-
Hagia Sophia, Istanbul. March 2011
tolian Civilizations. During the last day spent in Ankara, on March 3, the students were cordially hosted Mr. Atassi, Deputy Representative in Turkey of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The series of conferences came to an end with a lecture given by Mr. Parla, National Information Officer of the United Nations Information Center (UNIC) in the UN House. The students then returned therefore to Istanbul where they could freely enjoy and discover the metropolis for three more days. The culminating moment of the trip was the Bosporus cruise. Personally, I am thankful for the support and patience with the organization of all the members of the above mentioned international organizations. I think that the real interaction and the debates between the speakers and the students contributed to the success of the study trip. Moreover, the knowledge and experience of the different speakers was very much appreciated by the participants. Elena OCENIC Elena Ocenic is vice-president of the AAISP and in charge of the organization of the society’s trips.
Autres activités du pôle voyages: Visite du Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations de l’armée française (CPCO), mercredi, le 16 février et du Commandement de la Défense Aérienne et des Opérations Aériennes (CDAOA), mercredi, le 30 mars 2011. InFocus | 45
AAISP
Conférence
de l'AAISP
La place des victimes dans la justice pénale internationale à l’exemple du Cambodge
46 | InFocus
saxons des CETC ne connaissent pas ce type de procédure. C’est donc sur un fort appui de la société civile que la participation des victimes fut d’abord initiée. Suite à l’expérience du premier procès et dans une « volonté de rationalisation de la procédure », aussi pour « éviter que les parties civiles ne prennent trop de place lors du procès », de « profondes modifications » furent adoptées, a noté Me Boyle. Parmi elles figure la création inédite d’une coordination du travail des avocats des parties civiles autour de deux co-avocats principaux. Lors du premier procès à l’encontre de Duch, chef du centre de sécurité de S-21 (Tuol Sleng), 90 parties civiles ont participé. 24 ont été rejetées lors du verdict prononcé l’été dernier, et une grande majorité d’entre elles a ensuite fait appel. Dans l’affaire n°2 concernant quatre anciens dirigeants du Kampuchéa Démocratique, 4128 demandes de constitution de partie civile ont été soumises. Le rejet de près de la moitié de ces demandes –principalement du fait que les préjudices subis par les victimes concernées se trouve en dehors des sites examinés dans le cadre de l’instruction– est actuellement en procédure d’appel. M. Chum Mey, président de l’Association des victimes du Kampuchéa Démocratique « Ksem Ksan », est une des parties civiles ayant participé au premier
Lors de la conférence
procès des CETC. Un des seuls survivants du centre de sécurité Khmer rouge S-21 dans lequel il fut emprisonné pendant près de trois mois, M. Chum Mey se rend aujourd’hui chaque jour à Tuol Sleng afin de raconter inlassablement, surtout à la jeune génération cambodgienne, les conditions de sa détention –afin que cela ne se répète jamais. Présent à presque chaque audience du procès dans l’affaire n°1, il fut parmi les 22 parties civiles à avoir témoigné lors des audiences publiques du procès. Avant de conclure, M. Chum Mey a tenu à souligner l’écart entre le financement du personnel national et international de la Cour et, surtout, l’écart entre les moyens logistiques et financiers mis à la disposition des avocats de la défense et ceux disponibles aux avocats des parties civiles. Les nombreux avocats des parties civiles présents dans le public ainsi que plusieurs parties civiles cambodgiennes ont enrichi la courte séance de discussion qui a clos la conférence. Julie BERNATH Julie Bernath est étudiante en 5ème année à Sciences Po Paris (Master Recherche Théorie politique).
Photo: AAISP
Le 9 mars dernier, l’AAISP a organisé une conférence sur le thème « Quelle place pour les victimes dans la justice pénale internationale : le Cambodge, un exemple à suivre ? ». Les Chambres Extraordinaires au sein des Tribunaux Cambodgiens (CETC) représentent en effet le tribunal internationalisé prévoyant les mesures les plus progressives de participation des victimes, au-delà de celles de la Cour pénale internationale. À cette occasion, l’AAISP avait invité Maître David BOYLE et Monsieur CHUM Mey, assisté de l’avocat des parties civiles Maître KIM Mengkhy. Avocat australien et chercheur en droit international, Me Boyle a travaillé en tant que juriste au sein du Bureau des co-juges d’instruction des CETC (2006-2010), après avoir participé à la rédaction du Règlement intérieur en tant qu’assistant aux juges. C’est donc avec une connaissance interne des CETC qu’il les a présentées lors de la conférence. Suite à de longues et difficiles négociations entre les Nations Unies et le Cambodge, les CETC ont été créées par une loi cambodgienne en 2004 pour traduire en justice les hauts dirigeants du Kampuchéa Démocratique et les principaux responsables des crimes commis du 17 avril 1975 au 6 janvier 1979. Pour la première fois dans un tribunal internationalisé, les victimes peuvent participer non seulement en tant que témoin, mais aussi en tant que partie civile. Si la loi créant les CETC ne fait aucune mention des victimes, elle statue clairement que c’est la procédure pénale cambodgienne qui doit être appliquée en priorité –or celle-ci, inspirée du droit français, prévoit le statut de partie civile. Toutefois, ce n’est que tardivement, lors de l’adoption du Règlement intérieur des CETC en juin 2007, que le statut des victimes a été clairement défini. Surtout, selon Me Boyle, si les CETC ont eu le mérite de prévoir la participation de parties civiles, elles n’ont pas prévu les moyens logistiques et financiers nécessaires à sa réelle mise en place. Par ailleurs, Me Boyle a relevé comme défis la peur d’une participation massive des victimes et le fait que les juges anglo-
AAISP
Conférences
de l'AAISP
Le deuxième semestre 2010-2011
Le 17 février 2011 : “Enjeux pour la démocratie et l’Etat de droit en Côte d’Ivoire” C’est avec un sujet hautement sensible que l’AAISP a inauguré ce semestre : la crise ivoirienne. A cette occasion, l’association a invité Son Excellence M. Coulibaly, ambassadeur de Côte d’Ivoire en France nommé par M. Alassane Ouattara. Exposant tout d’abord les enjeux de la démocratie en Afrique, l’ambassadeur ivoirien s’est montré très critique envers Laurent Gbagbo, qu’il qualifie d’opportuniste et d’ « usurpateur ». Ses propos concernant l’évolution des évènements en Côte d’Ivoire avaient d’ailleurs été prophétiques lorsque Son Excellence avait annoncé que « l’usage de la force légitime » contre Laurent Gbagbo paraissait inévitable. Mais au-delà des luttes de pouvoir, l’intervention de M. Coulibaly a mis en lumière la situation humanitaire catastrophique que les Ivoiriens subissent depuis le début de cette crise politique : crise économique, détérioration de la situation sanitaire, violations des droits de l’homme, affrontements sanglants entre partisans des deux camps… la liste est longue. Face à ce « drame humanitaire national », M. Coulibaly ne voyait qu’une seule solution : la prise de fonction effective d’Alassane Outtara – par la force si nécessaire. Le 21 février 2011 : “Face à la malnutrition, quelle stratégie de la communauté internationale ?” Cette table ronde autour d’un enjeu majeur du développement et de la santé mondiale a réuni représentants de la FAO (Mehdi Drissi), du Ministère français des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes (Matthias Lange) et d’ONG (Elise Rodriguez pour ACF et Stéphane Doyon pour MSF). Soulignant à la fois les progrès exceptionnels faits dans ce domaine et la prise de conscience grandissante de l’importance de cet enjeu, cette discussion a cependant rappelé que près de 50 millions d’enfants souffrent aujourd’hui encore de malnutrition et qu’un enfant meure de faim toutes les 6 secondes. Mal invisible et
souvent plus répandu qu’on ne le croit, la question de la malnutrition est – comme l’ont expliqué nos intervenants - complexe en ce qu’elle englobe des enjeux sociaux, agricoles, économiques et sanitaires. En même temps, comme l’a rappelé Stéphane Doyon, les mesures nutritionnelles ont été consacrées par le Consensus de Copenhague parmi les meilleurs investissements en matière de développement. Cependant, les questions de nutrition souffrent de leur caractère hybride. Entre urgence et développement, politique agricole et intervention médicale, la communauté internationale, comme notre panel d’invité, reste divisée quant à l’approche à employer pour éradiquer la malnutrition. Le 31 mars 2011 : « Soudan et SudSoudan au lendemain du referendum » Organisée en partenariat avec Sciences Po Monde Arabe, cette conférence réunissait doctorante et maître de conférence à Sciences Po Paris - et Rachid Saeed Yacoub – journaliste soudanais et rédacteur en chef de la lettre d’information TTU. Rappelant l’histoire tourmentée du Soudan durant les vingt dernières années, nos intervenants ont souligné que l’indépendance du Sud-Soudan était loin d’apporter une solution définitive aux problèmes de la région. D’abord, comme l’expliquait Maria Gabrielsen, l’indépendance n’a été envisagée que comme une solution de secours durant les négociations entre Khartoum et le SPLM. De plus, le conflit au Darfour avait focalisé l’attention de la communauté internationale, qui ne s’est souciée de l’organisation du référendum au Sud-Soudan que tardivement. Les invités ont ainsi souligné les multiples problèmes que ni le référendum, ni les négociations entre Khartoum et les différentes factions armées n’ont réglés. Les questions du Darfour, de la laïcité de l’Etat, du partage des ressources naturelles entre Nord et Sud ou encore la réconciliation et le partage du pouvoir entre groupes rivaux au Soudan comme au Sud Soudan restent en suspend.
Le 12 avril 2011 : « Quelle gouvernance pour le réchauffement climatique ? » Après le climate gate et l’échec des négociations de Copenhague, les étudiants ont pu poser leurs questions à Jean Jouzel (vice-président du Groupe d’experts intergouvernemental sur l’évolution du climat, le GIEC) et Laurence Tubiana (fondatrice et présidente de l’Institut du développement durable et des relations Internationales, IDDRI) lors de cette discussion organisée en partenariat avec Sciences Po Environnement. Nos invités ont d’abord souligné la forte mécompréhension de la science et des travaux scientifiques sur le climat par les politiques. Comme le GIEC tient à maintenir son impartialité et à rester en dehors des négociations, cette mécompréhension sert les sceptiques et pousse à l’inaction. M. Jouzel d’ailleurs rappelé que ces malentendus avaient nourri le climate gate – qui selon lui ne reposait que sur des points de détail des travaux du GIEC. Mais au-delà des incompréhensions entre scientifiques et négociateurs politiques sur les questions climatiques, Mme Tubiana a souligné le manque de confiance et la méfiance entre négociateurs des différents pays - une situation qui, avec les différences d’agenda entre pays du Nord et du Sud, nuit fortement à l’adoption d’une politique globale pour réduire le changement climatique. En conclusion, nos invités ont cependant rappelé qu’un consensus favorable à l’action se développait actuellement, bien que, selon Mr. Jouzel les accords actuels sont loin d’être suffisamment ambitieux pour atteindre les objectifs internationaux. Elodie BESNIER Pour plus d’information sur les conférences organisées par l’AAISP, rendezvous sur le site internet de l’association : http://www.affaires-internationales.org/ evenements/conferences.php
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