InFocus Issue 4 Nov 2011 by Radu Botez

SCIENCES PO•PSIA•Issue 4 November 2011

IN FOCUS

Infocusrevue.com

Revue des Affaires Internationales

]DOSSIER[

INROADS INTO AFRICA

•Food for Thought

•Perceptions et Arts en Afrique •Road Back to Rwanda

•2011 Benin Elections •The Ambassador for All

Also in this issue

•Afghanistan:

Back on track •South China Sea •Venezuela without Chavez •Europe and LNG

PARTENAIRE

Premier partenaire de l’association, la Societé Générale soutient financièrement l’AAISP, et propose à nos membres une offre avantageuse ( p. 16 ) notamment pour ceux qui partent à l’étranger : un package permettant de s’affranchir de tous frais de paiement et de retrait, partout dans le monde. N’hésitez pas à nous contacter pour tout renseignement - ouvrir un compte avec notre parrainage, c’est une bonne opération pour vous comme pour l’AAISP

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InFocus Team

A publication of the Association Affaires Internationales de Sciences Po, AAISP rue Saint Guillaume 27 Paris Cedex 7 75337

Directrice de Rédaction Viktoriya Kerelska Rédactrice en Chef Ritika Passi

Rédacteurs / InFocus Blog Anna Abenhaim Morgane Estival Pierre Falconetti Hibba Itani Nithya Kochuparampil Kinga Neder Natalia Santoyo Rivera Claire-Marine Selles Jamie Stevenson Alexander Wang InFocus would like to thank Guillermo Chavez, Avi Cohen, Muska Dastageer, Timon Dubbeling, Krista Moore, Ole Ohlhoff, Philipp Petermann, Jay Pinho, Priyanka Vij, Vaagisha for their contributions to this issue. Much thanks to Dominique Kerouédan, Dr. Frannie Léautier, Yumiko Yamamto for contributing quotes. Special thanks to Philip Bloomfield and Radu Botez for the time they kindly accorded us All photos are under the copyright of their author unless stated otherwise En couverture: On the streets of Rwanda PHOTO: DAVID FULLERTON/RWANDAN STORIES. ORG

ED’s NOTE

InFocus: c’est à vous de jouer! Vous offrir un terrain d’expression sur les enjeux des affaires internationales : c’est notre tâche primordiale, chers collègues de PSIA! Pour la deuxième année consécutive, « InFocus », la revue de l’Association des Affaires Internationales de Sciences Po (AAISP), vous donnera l’occasion de partager vos analyses, commentaires et points de vue sur les développements et dynamiques (im)prévisibles des relations internationales dans le but d’échanger des idées et de s’enrichir mutuellement et intellectuellement. Notre objectif est très simple : de rédiger une revue dont la qualité rivalisera, nous en sommes certains, avec les ouvrages de presse les plus spécialisés et renommés. La barre est mise très haut pour la simple raison que nous comptons sur votre excellence, académique et personnelle. Ressortissants d’une diversité de pays du monde entier et représentatifs de neuf masters différents au sein de PSIA, c’est vos expériences et savoirs personnels ainsi que vos expertises et révélations académiques que nous vous invitons à mobiliser et à partager sur les pages d’«InFocus ». En plus, comme vous êtez déjà spécialistes, voire des professionnels doués, dans l’écriture d’exposés/papers/essais, « InFocus » vous donnera la possibilité de consolider vos savoir-faire rédactionnels dans le format d’un article de presse. Bref, n’hésitez pas à saisir l’opportunité de vous exprimer si le domaine des affaires internationales vous tient à cœur. Forgeons l’esprit de communauté de PSIA et créons ensemble une revue qui sera porte-parole de notre vision, interprétation et projection des affaires internationales ! Viktoriya Kerelska Directrice de Rédaction

The land that is Africa Civil wars and child soldiers, tribalism and congo drums, safaris, malnutrition and food aid camps - such terms prove easily within grasp when thinking of Africa, the ‘dark continent’. Viewing the land through the lens of exotism, a land rife with troubles and underdevelopment is the order of the day. Some may ask if there is any other way to see it; others may criticise the injustice with which most club the whole continent as one. The aim of our dossier is not to provide an alternative vision with which to look at and understand Africa. Neither is it to regurgitate the misery and gloom the media revels in when it comes to this land mass. Instead, it has been our attempt to display an array of stories: from the ensemble to the specific, from the much-mentioned to the little-talked of, from the objective to the personal - from food security to a re-vist to Rwanda, from China in Africa to the elections in Benin, from the Kampala Convention to a woman’s dedication to the continent. At the end, we hope you yourself as a reader can judge what ‘Africa’ stands for - and indeed, if it needs to stand for a specific something at all. We also offer a wide variety of topics that have been dealt with either as an opion piece or as a current affairs issue: from Venezuela’s future to renewable energy resources, from North Korea-South Korea relations to Afghanistan. This is our first issue of the new academic year, and it is rewarding to see it all come together. Much has been learnt through this first leg of the journey, and we only hope to improve hereon after. And now? Onwards to the next! Ritika Passi Editor-in-Chief InFocus est une revue en constante évolution : vos questions, suggestions et commentaires sont donc les bienvenus ! Contactez-nous à revue@affaires-internationales.org InFocus is a constantly evolving publication and we welcome all questions, suggestions and comments! Please send any correspondance to revue@affaires-internationales.org

AAISP

Mot du Président Po en général et pour PSIA en particulier. En effet, notre école s’est lancé dans une vaste entreprise de redéfinition et de réorganisation d’un certain nombre de ses formations.

ondée en 2009 sous l’impulsion de Julien Crampes, l’Association Affaires Internationales de Sciences Po (AAISP) se fixe des objectifs ambitieux qu’elle compte relever – encore une fois – au cours de cette année. La mise en place d’un tout nouveau cadre institutionnel et administratif, au sein duquel s’est inscrit l’association à partir du 1er novembre, ouvre un certain nombre de nouvelles perspectives. L’organisation de séjours d’études, de conférences ayant trait aux affaires internationales, de nombreuses soirées ainsi que les rencontres-métiers sont bien sûr toujours à l’ordre du jour. Il s’agit donc d’une part de reprendre le flambeau porté jusque là avec brio par les deux équipes précédentes ; mais la nouvelle convention annuelle en cours de négociation entre l’administration et l’association nous pousse à envisager un ensemble d’objectifs et d’actions encore plus vaste que précédemment. La tâche n’en sera que d’autant plus enrichissante mais également plus lourde ; comme l’avait déclaré assez justement W. Churchill, « La responsabilité est le prix à payer du succès ». Notre responsabilité va croissante d’année en année ; espérons que le succès suivra toujours. A nouveau contexte: L’heure est à l’organisation pragmatique pour Sciences

L’idée sous-jacente est la suivante : simplifier le choix offert aux étudiants tout en privilégiant une formation toujours plus approfondie. Pour ce faire, les Masters relevant des mêmes disciplines ou champs d’expertise se retrouvent regrouper au sein d’écoles. On retrouve ainsi l’école de journalisme, celle de droit et depuis maintenant deux ans, PSIA, l’école dédiée aux Affaires Internationales. Des nouvelles responsabilités: Dans ce nouveau cadre académique, la commission paritaire de Sciences Po a donc décidé de garantir le statut d’association permanente à l’AAISP, reconnue dès lors comme l’unique association étudiante permanente de PSIA, véritable fer de lance et vecteur d’intégration de la vie étudiante de l’école. Ce changement de statut explique en grande partie la montée en puissance de notre association et l’élargissement de son champ d’action. Outre les projets que l’association a toujours soutenu et défendu, elle se voit maintenant chargée de développer activement la vie universitaire de PSIA et de renforcer l’intégration de ses éléments au sein d’un univers cosmopolite et diversifié. En tant qu’association permanente et représentative de PSIA, notre rôle en tant que vecteur et moteur d’intégration et d’animation de la vie étudiante universitaire devient crucial. Des objectifs identiques et de nouveaux modes d’actions: L’AAISP conserve donc sa vocation première d’association visant avant tout à proposer aux élèves de PSIA

un ensemble d’activités et d’événements à caractère éducatif et académique, afin d’enrichir et d’approfondir ce qu’ils ont déjà pu voir en cours dans les murs de la rue Saint Guillaume. Pour ceci faire, des conférences, des séjours d’études et des rencontres seront à l’ordre du jour pendant toute l’année. Plus loin encore, nous envisageons à développer l’aspect intégrateur de l’association, en multipliant les événements permettant de fédérer les élèves et de développer un véritable esprit de promotion et un attachement à PSIA. Cette dimension se concrétisera avec nombreuses soirées et dîners ainsi qu’un gala de fin d’année. L’AAISP n’est pas non plus un cercle privé et fermé aux personnes non membres ; nous sommes en train de développer un certain nombre de partenariats avec d’autre associations (Sciences Po Monde Arabe, FFIPP, Alumni Sciences Po entre autres) ainsi qu’avec des groupements d’étudiants internes aux différents masters de PSIA (Master Energie entre autres) afin de proposer à tous de événements fédérateurs ciblés répondant aux attentes précises de tous les élèves de notre école. La route sera longue avant de pouvoir se retourner sur le travail accompli. Mais si la route est difficile, elle sera aussi, j’en suis sûr, formatrice et constructive, nous offrant au bout du parcours le plus beau des présents : la satisfaction d’avoir offert à tous les étudiants de PSIA l’opportunité d’avoir pu participer un peu plus à la vie de leur école à travers des événements et des projets de grande qualité. Boris Meton, Directeur, 2011-2102,

www.speaking-a-language.com est un nouveau réseau social spécialisé dans les langues et cultures étrangères dans les grandes villes du monde entier, à travers l’organisation de tandems, d’ échanges de conversation, de tables rondes où vous pratiquez votre langue étrangère préférée : apprendre l’anglais, apprendre une langue étrangère... Vous avez aussi l’occasion de participer (ou d’organiser) à diverses activités qui vous permettront aussi de parler l’anglais ou une autre langue étrangère, apprendre le français, des cours d’anglais conviviaux entre amis... ! Des textes-supports mis en ligne dans le cadre de cet apprentissage convivial sont à votre disposition également. 4 InFocus

PHOTO: NASA/FLICKR/CC

Contents

PHOTO: Woongjae Shin/ WIKICOMMONS/CC

November 2011

DOSSIER: Inroads Into Africa

Comment

PHOTO: Krista Moore

The sinking of the Cheonan: a further tensing of North KoreaSouth Korea relations p.46

PHOTO: Pierre Holtz/Flickr/CC

Vive la Révolution - A photo essay on Tunisia in the after-math p.38

Renewables: Can They Beat Projections?

Challenges for China in Africa

Afghanistan: Back on Track

Road Back to Rwanda

South China Sea: China versus Who?

Ghana: La Malédiction des Ressources

No Happy End Yet Again

Naturelles

The Right to Non-Development

Scramble for the Nile

Venezuela without Chavez

Ambassador of All

Tunisia: A look through the lens

DOSSIER: Inroads Into Africa

Current Affairs

Perceptions et Arts en Afrique

2011 Elections in Benin

Turquie et Moyen-Orient: Le Jeu Politique

Road to Durban

Europe and LNG

Food For Thought

Anatomy of Inter-Korean Relations

The Kampala Convention

The need to secure food p.21

InFocus 5

COMMENT

Renewables: Can they beat projections?

Guillermo CHAVEZ

IEO 2011, U.S. EIA

renewable industr y knows better than anyone that policy is the air to breathe, and that the success of a growing industry is tied directly to government support.

our percent? That’s the EIA’s projected global increase in renewable energy generation by the year 2035. You would think that around 30 years of technological, economical and environmental inroads would make a bigger dent in the world’s future energy mix. Aren’t we supposed to be living the renewable energy dream by then? Wouldn’t we have already overcome the RE’s variability problem? Wouldn’t we develop less cost-feasible electricity storage? Wouldn’t we be driving all algae-powered “Autolib” cars? The utopian vision of our energy future may not exist in our lifetimes, but it has to have a better outlook than the one released on September 2011.

The short recapitulative of the report: By 2035, world consumption is going to rise more than 50 percent (cf. Figure 1). That’s four percent RE supply growth on 50 percent more power demand. We’re going to be just as reliant on fossil fuels as we are now. And our carbon emissions problem won’t really be solved by then. But the International Energy Outlook points out that any policy changes that may affect the energy mix across the world are taken into account. The 6 InFocus

T h e world energy outlook to 2035 hinges critically on government policy action, and how that action affects technology, the price of energy services and end-user behavior. A wide variety of policies can be introduced in order to encourage technological innovation and market penetration of renewable energy. Here are some notions policy-makers may consider to promote the renewable energies spreading: Third world emergence Developing nations are fairly new as investment areas; furthermore, population increases at a faster rate and therefore so does energy consumption. Figure 1 illustrates Non-OECD almost doubling OECD consumption, so pre-emptive solutions from the latter could ideally help counteract the global increase. Successful projects early on could go a long way toward turning economies toward renewables and away from fossil fuels.

become a matter of retiring systematically existing fossil fuel plants. A New Wave of Marketing: The energy input labeling, (like the Bio labeling), involves producers of goods and services determining how much energy is used to produce their product, and then including that information on their product packaging. Consumers may give more thought to how their energy is generated and consider where their power comes from. Consumers will perceive energy as an ingredient. The same could happen at petrol pumps, if drivers are presented with real, competitively priced renewable fuel options. Growth Through Crisis: It’s an unfortunate reality that change happens through crisis. The Chernobyl disaster, oil spills, hotter weather, Fukushima’s nuclear accident are credited with sparking the green movement and with bolstering public backing of renewables. Whether it’s a man-made occurrence or a natural disaster, these events often tick the needle closer towards renewable sources. We need to take steps now: envisioning the end should be enough to put the means in motion. Only long-term stable policy that prices the pollution, the feed-in tariff, renewable energy certificates (portfolio quotas), investment credits and true costs of acquisition of conventional energy will create the kind of growth suggested. So if the future of renewables hinges critically on strong government support, what are policy-makers waiting for? Energy efficiency and renewables are both important if a sustainable future is to be realized. When appropriate actions are taken today, the trend and scenarios might have a different outcome.

Grid Parity and New Technology: The point at which alternative means of generating electricity is at least as cheap as grid power can be reached before 2035. Pricing will truly be the transformative force that redefines the world’s energy mix. Once we’re at true grid parity, it will

Guillermo Chavez is a first year Master Student at PSIA, studying International Energy.

COMMENT

Afghanistan - Back on Tr a c k In view of the strategic pact signed Tuesday by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Afghan President Hamid Karzai according to which India will help train Afghan Security Forces - an idea that yours truly played with as early as 2008 - it’s worth throwing a glance at the regional security machinations underlying this move. And where are the Pakistani objections? Well, you see...

ubbed a Great Game by Kipling in the years before War's final fall from grace, the good, the bad and the terrifically tragic permutations of two centuries has given way to the millefeuille realpolitical construct that is the South Asian security complex. Rather than there being one multi-modality mesh of agents from all of the world's corners, it appears now, for the swift eye, to hold only two highly disparate military theatres – one intrastate and the other interstate – and wholly discrete they are, these conflicting structures. The war in Afghanistan and the smouldering conflict in Kashmir may have as commonalities the conduct of asymmetric pinprick warfare executed by extremist insurgencies against uniformclad soldiers and the former's alleged objectives: the attainment of freedom and independence - 'azadi' for kashmiris and 'esteqlal' for Afghanis – but to here and no more. Acknowledging the existence of a common antecedent variable is not testament to a deeper grasp of the situation; it marks a shift in the modus operandi of articulation, from problematizing and securitizing both contingent conflicts to one of solution-making. Staying in line with the game analogy, this understanding discloses a final draw in the South Asian security complex. A draw with potentially game-changing ramifications. The Pakistani connection and ISAF's counterinsurgency doctrine, prescribed in the US Army Field Manual 3-24, are the coupling links. The former, on the basis of a deep-rooted fear of fur-

ther dismemberment, incessantly Winning hearts and minds? sparks life into both protracted conflicts to the point that it has become the main impetus; and the latter, COIN, holds within it the potential to resolve an impossible war. Deeply contradictive impulses and the consequent foreign policies that rest on them are encompassed by temporal trajectories whose current windings are being played out in dimensions of spatial politics where disentanglement and separation are no longer possible: this is the Pakistani connection. The Janus-faced security strategy of simultaneously supporting and countering their tried-and-tested instrument for leverage, extremist insurgents, has become a decidedly self-defeating practice for Pakistan. This is the dawning realization in Islamabad these days, and it is the concluding act draw to be worked out by the political and military establishments. Lingering on COIN, the second coupling link, it needs to be understood by security architects that while the US did not succeed with it – and they didn't, let that be quite clear – it doesn't take away from the manual's ideational validity and its applicability in the Afghan context, particularly in the southern Pashtun one. Unfit execution has been the problem throughout. Human interaction between foot soldiers and civilians, so as to win 'hearts and minds' of the civil populace, encapsulates the fundamental pillar of COIN: the tactical level has clearly been the incessant source that has undermined the overall strategy. The ground-level soldier matters, - it is with him that the COIN strategy stands or falls. It is paramount that he knows the local populace; that he sees himself not only as a soldier, but also a

PHOTO: ISAFMEDIA/FLICKR/CC

Muska DASTAGEER

bridge-builder, an institution-maker; and most importantly of all, that he is culturally in sync with the people whose trust and support he has to win. Are Americans, or Westerners, in sync culturally with rural-based Pashtuns? Rather than being sardonic, the important question at this point is to ask whether Westerners can train the Afghani security forces. Indians, whose army have conducted COIN for decades, share cultural, historical and, as commonly held, dispositional affinities with Afghanis. In virtue of the current constellation of circumstances in the conflict structure, what most thought would be a provocation can be argued to take on a limited realpolitical character. One rounded by the expected ideological antipathy, which compared to what Pakistan de facto must rationally want, is deeply irrational. The temporal architecture of the antagonism happens to have reached a point where heightened Indian involvement can help muffle the blow of either of the roads Pakistan may take. An important indicator that this has seeped through to some parts of the military and political establishments, if not exactly the ISI, is the conspicuously absent opposition from Pakistan vis-a-vis India's decision to train the ANP. Muska Dastageer is an exchange student at PSIA. InFocus 7

COMMENT

The South China Sea: China versus Who?

Ritika PASSI

It all re-started with China’s not long ago claims of the South China Sea (SCS) as one of its ‘core interests’ – on par with Taiwan and Tibet. This raised eyebrows in the region, worried the other contenders, sparked much rumination over the status of the body of water in question, and has over the past two years led to increasingly regular direct and indirect steps to reinforce claims as China adopts an increasingly aggressive stance. It doesn’t help that this seemingly abrupt bestowal of higher status coincides with the behemoth’s military, naval, air force and otherwise all-round rise. And what certainly exacerbates the situation is the ubiquitous US of A’s presence and involvement in the area, forever following its personal interests. India’s recent arrival in the picture further complicates the situation. The board is set, the game has commenced, and with each passing play, we come closer to either an impasse or a check-mate: but the question is, who is China really up against?

he region has long been an area of simmering tensions between the littoral states that claim some parts of the waters and/or Paracel and Spratlay Islands; a renewed appreciation of its strategic and economic value has again placed centre-stage the long-standing sovereignty disputes. Skirmishes, diplomatic and otherwise, abound. The USNS Impeccable incident, China’s fishing ban, live-fire exercises, and – surprises of all surprises – India’s recent demarche in the region are all omens of a potential gunpowder keg revolving around economic and energy security. The issue has invited much expert analysis on whether and when an all-out confrontation is due. First up: is the USA the de facto brick wall to stop China? The US has a lot on its plate at the moment. A faltering domestic economy is but one of Washington’s foremost preoccupa8 InFocus

tions. The withdrawal from Afghanistan is another. And yet Leon Panetta, U.S. Defense Secretary, recently confirmed not only continued plans but a ratcheted military presence in the region, even amid defense budget cuts. The SCS is purpoted as a “national interest” and it is impossible to image the global policeman backing away from what it considers its own backyard. Today, it need to reassert its authority and superiority in the region, and reassure its Pacific Rim allies, uneasy over the growing literature about America’s Pacific reign coming to an end and fears of greater Chinese aggressiveness. China and the U.S. already do not see eye to eye on a multitude of issues, not to mention conflict over Taiwan. U.S.’ containment strategy hasn’t borne adequate fruit.

exploration in Vietnamese waters is an expression of its Look East Policy as well as intent to secure energy sources for its growing economy. Whether or not Vietnam sees the recent pact through an economic point of view or with political undertones is another matter. While some Indian analysts are applauding Indian refusal to be intimidated by Chinese condemnations and feel New Delhi should actively / forcefully assert itself in these waters to maintain a regional balance of power, a significant population recommend restraint and caution, advocating a path which does not provoke China. Given that there haven’t been any volatile replies to Chinese suspicions and no explicit steps to take sides in the conflict, it’s a good bet to guess which door India’s picked.

What about the smaller contenders themselves? Can Vietnam and Philippines (recently dubbed the ‘noisiest troublemakers’ by a mouthpiece of the Communist Party) afford to go up against the strongest opponent in the game, who outweighs them in all aspects? Given China’s refusal of non-bilateral negotiations, ‘ganging up’ on Big Brother hasn’t been an option so far, although recent attempts by Philippines have tried to ‘multilateralize’ the conflict through ASEAN. Moreover, as long as all the littoral states in the region stay dependent on China vis-à-vis trade and economic assistance, there’s still some doubt as to how far these countries are willing to go down the path of resistance. Taiwan, for example, is careful not to antagonize China (no matter the huge territorial claims it has in the Sea), since it needs open SLOC to reduce dependany on its neighbour for energy supplies. Not much has been heard from Malaysia and Brunei either, the other two participants in the conflict. Yet there are a growing calls to ‘wage war’: intimidation tactics on the part of China or a serious consideration of - what it would consider - rag-tag yet worthy band of opponents?

Despite China’s attempts to keep disputes largely bilateral, the constant media attention and its own belligerent stance (throwing its “good neighbour policy” to the dogs?) has invited growing relations between the other contenders, who are raising voices and as of yet refusing to yield. On the one hand, this is but a recurrence of what has happened in the past as well, albeit under glaring media lights this time: an increase in hostilities on the part of the smaller nations vis-à-vis China’s designs in the SCS before ultimately backing down – verbal sparring and strong condemnations only go so far, after all. On the other hand, it is true that a loose regional coalition seems to be forming, if indeed it can be called that, as a potential counterpoint to China. As for the United States, Washington is not exactly in the power of position to dictate terms and conditions.

And India’s brave trek to Hanoi – to what purpose? It can hardly be called a declaration of intent to be involved in the dispute; India’s national Oil and Natural Gas Corporation’s decision to invest in offshore

The question remains: a potential flashpoint, yes, but to what extent? China is clearly on one side, but who’s really going up against it on the other in the South China Sea dispute?

Ritika Passi is a first year Master Student at PSIA, studying International Security.

COMMENT

N o H a p p y E n d Ye t A g a i n Jay PINHO

PHOTO: PETE SOUZA/WIKICOMMONS/CC

President Barack Obama with Israeli President Shimon Peres in 2009

n the seemingly interminable IsraeliPalestinian conflict, it is helpful to take almost nothing at face value. In his speech at the United Nations on September 23, 2010, for example, United States President Barack Obama stated, “When we come back here next year, we can have an agreement that will lead to a new member of the United Nations – an independent, sovereign state of Palestine, living in peace with Israel.” Almost exactly a year later, Obama stood at the same podium in New York and, explaining his intention to veto the upcoming Palestinian request for national recognition by the UN, declared, “Peace will not come through statements and resolutions at the United Nations – if it were that easy, it would have been accomplished by now.” What had changed in the intervening year to account for such wildly opposing statements? For one, presidential election politics. But Obama’s sharp transformation from dove to hawk signaled far more concerning realities than the relative banality of election-period jockeying. It reflected, too, the underlying unease in both Jerusalem and Washington, D.C. with the uncertain progression of the Arab Spring. Especially following the rapid demise of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, whose regime was one of only two in the Arab world to ratify a peace

treaty with Israel, the prevailing prognosis for the region’s immediate future has been nothing short of apocalyptic.

And as often happens under such selfconceived nightmare scenarios, rationality has taken a back seat to demagoguery. Hence, in a remarkable public rebuke of Obama at the White House on May 20, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu flatly declared that “while Israel is prepared to make generous compromises for peace, it cannot go back to the 1967 lines… we can't go back to those indefensible lines, and we're going to have to have a longterm military presence along the Jordan.” And yet, just over two months later, on August 2, UPI reported that Netanyahu would “resume peace talks based on [Israel’s] 1967 borders if the Palestinian Authority stops seeking U.N. Palestinian state recognition.” Once again, the only constant was utter inconsistency. Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas, meanwhile, has returned to Ramallah a Palestinian hero, even as his mostly symbolic quest for nationhood remains unattainable. Presiding over a fractured portion of the Occupied Territories, Abbas’ perceived position as spokesman for a future Palestinian state is as much a product of Western distaste for Hamas as it is of his own influence over a divided people. And yet there is a certain maddening logic to the Israeli-Palestinian impasse that, thanks to missed opportunities and the inexorable passage of time, has imposed itself on the conflict in the form of an accepted conventional wisdom. This orthodoxy is centered on timing – it would be a perfect moment to negotiate peace, we are so often told, except for one

or another element of unfortunate timing: former Israeli PM Ehud Olmert appearing ready to concede a fairly generous deal to Palestinians just as he was being investigated for corruption; the waning days of George W. Bush’s administration when the then American President was too weak domestically to pursue a major foreign policy objective. And today, the same tired tropes are being refitted to address Abbas’ search for a unilateral solution. Problematically, many of the self-proclaimed experts on the Middle East benefit from its endless conflict: the absence of violence would leave a void even a seasoned pundit would have trouble filling, and the years of tension have spawned a virtual peace process-industrial complex whose perpetuity has edged out actual peace as its ultimate raison d’être. The overemphasis on the domestic policy obstacles of the states involved crowds out all other reflections on the genuine prospects for peace. And yet, for the most part, the factors affecting the region’s outlook are fairly constant. Any lasting peace deal must adjudicate the final status of Jerusalem, the right of return, and borders: fundamental issues, acknowledged for years, which will continue to exist until their resolution. Secondary matters (the composition of each government, the disposition of coalition partners, and so on), while important, will never collectively satisfy all the conditions for a perfect negotiating scenario anyway. In fact, Israel, which – with the aid of the U.S. – nearly always holds vast leverage, is perhaps more obliged to accede to generous concessions now, in the wake of new political realities in the Arab world generally and the uncertain status of its treaty with Egypt specifically. There are always reasons to wait until later. But a historic peace awaits the leaders of today, if only they would grasp it. Jay Pinho is a first year Master Student at PSIA, studying International Security. InFocus 9

COMMENT

The Right to Non-Development? “As this century with its bloodstained record draws to a close, the nineteenth-century dream of one world has re-emerged, this time as a nightmare. It haunts us with the prospect of a fully homogenized, technologically controlled, absolutely hierarchized world, defined by polarities like the modern and the primitive, the secular and the nonsecular, the scientific and the nonscientific, the expert and the layman, the normal and the abnormal, the developed and the underdeveloped, the vanguard and the led, the liberated and the saveable.” Ashish Nandy, The Intimate Enemy

he semi/fully/un-tainted idea of development has never been an easy subject to approach. Its aura of aloof goodness or blatant evil (with regard to Africa), could probably be best contextualized through the continent’s encounter with colonialism. Ashish Nandy’s ‘The Intimate Enemy’ explores the colonial legacy as well as its periodic reinforcements through a very specific type of ideology

that was internalized in its subjects. In fact, Macaulay’s Minute is (in)famous for this reason: It declared that self-belief, belief in one’s customs and ways of life- the very “backbone” of the native had to be broken for the British Raj to have a fighting chance. Once the dust from the rubble had settled, reconstruction could begin- albeit, with alien materials. The construction of this “new social consciousness” that Nandy speaks of was to be guided along its carefully constructed trajectory, with even spaces for assent and dissent being marked out. It would be nice to think that we changed – and changed drastically - with our fiercely nationalistic freedom movements, but Nandy makes a cogent case for continuity over change through a penetrating look at a colonialism that has embedded itself into our conscious and subconscious. The most captivating part is that even in our (conscious/subconscious) psychological resistance to colonialism today, there are clear models we follow: “models of conformity but also models of ‘official’ dissent”. This idea is particularly fascinating. Let us consider the creation of the new social consciousness Nandy speaks of, as the groundwork for the introduction of polarities of thought- “the modern and the primitive…the developed and the underDifferent perspectives to happiness?

PHOTO: PAlejandra Quintero Sinisterra/WIKICOMMONS/CC

10 InFocus

Nithya KOCHUPARAMPIL developed…the vanguard and the led”. Going by this, there were sides that had to be picked- defined very clearly as ‘the right/ good choice’ and the ‘wrong/bad choice’ as the ascriptive feature of polarity indicates. Development was clearly the right/ good choice. Started by the colonial powers, Africa’s tryst with developmentalism was continued by the post-colonial state. The state was to continue as the main actor in the transformation of society, with the highly educated in positions of power- the exclusivity of this model being apparent. Here, it might not be very far-fetched to draw links with globalism in Africa today, with its exclusive economic aims of ‘development’ and its consequent promotion of the polarity of acceptance or alienation. This particular polarity can also be seen as a spill-over effect from parts of the world where globalism has firmly entrenched itself. This is a particularly important aspect to consider when assessing the orientation of developmental policy- which is perhaps what Nandy is alluding to in speaking of the “fully homogenized” one-world. It would be worthwhile to pause and reflect on the role of migrant communities in promoting this trend. At the same time, the continued importance Africa attaches to developmentalism does not imply that Africans have been submerged in a developmental discourse that has oriented the entire course of their colonial and post-colonial history – such a view would negate the agency and autonomy displayed at different times in the African past and present. The point, however, is to look more closely at the molding of mindsets. This, I think, is necessary, if not essential, when considering actions undertaken by African migrants (working outside Africa) in developing their continent- if for nothing else, because history’s eternal memory testifies to the enduring power of influences. Nithya Kochuparampil is a first year Master Student at PSIA, studying International Security.

COMMENT

Ve n e z u e l a W i t h o u t C h a v e z ? Natalia Santoyo RIVERA

PHOTO: AGENCIA BRASIL/WIKICOMMONS/CC

Chavez: the man without whom the country can’t do without?

which has resulted in the nationalisation of strategic economic sectors like banking and telecommunications, and exploration and exploitation activities of gold. Furthermore, the movement has been developed around Chávez himself: he is the ultimate decision maker.

prominent figure in Latin American politics, president of Venezuela Hugo Chávez has managed to hold onto power for 12 years. Throughout this time, Chávez has become a prolific figure in the media, a sort of “love or hate” politician. He is now battling with cancer, giving rise to the question: what will happen if he goes? What will be the direct impact on Venezuela and on the Latin American region, if any?

It is important, as well, to mention that during his administration, the Venezuelan presidency has accrued special powers to legislate without going through the Parliament, giving Chavez the ability to act unilaterally on a wide variety of issues. Furthermore, Chávez has always voiced strong opposition against the US, consequently maintaining close ties with other left-leaning leaders (e.g. Fidel Castro, former Cuban leader).

Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías was born September 28th, 1954 in Sabaneta de Barinas, Venezuela. He studied military science and held several posts in the militia. In 1982, he founded the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Bolivariano). Ten years later, in 1992, he was involved in a failed coup d’état against President Carlos Andrés Pérez and imprisoned for two years. He was released by former President Rafael Caldera, who then granted him an honorable retirement from the militia. It was then that Chávez started a new political movement called “V Republic Movement” (Movimiento V República), through which, in 1998, he was elected President of Venezuela: a post he has held for three terms, or 12 years. His reelection is expected next year.

In July, he revealed he has cancer. Since then, news of his condition has been intermittent. No one knows details – what kind, since when. Opposition parties in Venezuela are exerting pressure to know the state of Chávez’s health, raising concerns on the President’s ability to govern in ill health. The right of the civilians to know has also been floated around in the media. Attention is also focused over whether Chávez’s condition is improving or deteriorating. He received medical treatment in Cuba in late June, and did not return to Venezuela until July 4th; throughout his-month-long absence, Chávez refrained from delegating any of his presidential powers to vice-president Elías Jaua.

His administration follows what they call the “Bolivarian Revolution” (Revolución Bolivariana), a socio-political movement presented as 21st century socialism,

Chávez has had four cycles of chemotherapy in Havana prompting many people to consider his and Venezuela’s future. Will he still be able to lead the government? Will 21st century socialism have a future without its figurehead? Will there

be any direct or indirect effects on the Latin American region? Many analysts believe that Venezuela will be immersed in a double power struggle: a battle between minor leaders within his group and a battle for power within the opposition. With Chávez as President, opposition groups have been united against a “common enemy”. Without him, agreement could dissolve. The other potential outcome is greater political debate and social participation, leading to a potential return for democracy in the country. An equally important effect could be on Chávez’s ideological and political movement. The future of the 21st century socialism is uncertain, given that it centers on Chavez. Could it disappear with him? Latin America will also be left without one of its key political references. Not even Rafael Correa, Ecuador’s president, or Evo Morales, Bolivia’s president, receive the amount of global media attention and occupy the level of political power Chávez does. Given the pressures of global economic and financial uncertainty, and the greater level of instability that could result from a power vacuum in one of Latin America’s important regions, the bloc may suffer a financial shock, even if only a temporary one. At the same time, regional cooperation mechanisms could be destabilised, especially the countries dependent on Chávez’s projects, such as the ALBA, Bolivarian Alliance for the People of our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América). Only time can tell how the situation will pan out. Lack of information about Chávez’s health has given rise to media speculation both within Venezuela and abroad. We can only be sure that Hugo Chávez will always be thought of as a political reference for all of Latin America. Natalia Santoyo Rivera is a first year Master Student at PSIA, studying International Development. InFocus 11

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Inroads into

A f r i ca

PHOTOS (clockwise): PIERRE HOLTZ/WIKICOMMONS/CC; Matthew Bookwalter/WIKICOMMONS/CC; IICD/WIKICOMMONS/CC; WAYAN VOTA/FLICKR/CC

Perceptions et Arts en Afrique 2011 Elections in Benin Food for thought The Kampala Convention Road to Durban Challenges for China in Africa Road Back to Rwanda Ghana: La malĂŠdiction des ressources naturelles Scramble for the Nile The Ambassador of All Tunisia: Back to the Streets

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Perceptions et Arts en Afrique Diversité dans l’unité : Morgane ESTIVAL dévoile les nombreux visages et perceptions de l’Afrique par l’expression artistique.

pas plus qu’il n’existe une catégorie d’art primitif. Evoquer l’art africain renvoie par exemple à une myriade de masques ethniques et de peintures colorées aux formes dénuées de tout réalisme, aux statuettes en bois représentant des corps nus ou vêtus de pagnes… L’art africain, c’est aussi la musique – cette musique rythmique dont on imagine le pouvoir de faire entrer en transe ceux qui l’écoutent, comme Kessel le décrit si bien dans Le lion à travers l’effrayante cérémonie rituelle de la tribu Masaïe, qui rend malade Sybil Bullit,

PHOTO: FA2010/WIKICOMMONS/CC

e que nous connaissons, ou croyons connaître en tant qu’européen non spécialiste de la question, de l’Afrique, de ses arts et de ses cultures, est bien souvent une histoire de perception que l’on peut résumer en un mot : l’exotisme. Tout comme nous avons pu imaginer et ensuite créer l’Orient au XIXe siècle, il semble qu’il subsiste une tendance à vouloir ranger l’Afrique dans une catégorie homogène : la culture africaine. Or personne ne prétendrait le contraire, l’Afrique n’est pas un continent uniforme,

Yoruba People, West Nigeria, 1st half of the 20th Century. Tropenmuseum Amsterdam. 14 InFocus

la mère de l’héroïne. Et enfin, il y a notre perception de la littérature africaine, dont on peut dire qu’elle est binaire : celle qui, dans notre imaginaire n’est souvent qu’une transmission orale transcendant les époques comme par magie, et qui évoque des traditions que les colons ont bouleversées faute de les avoir comprises. Ou cette littérature mieux connue des librairies occidentales : cette littérature des élites intellectuelles et politiques des pays d’Afrique sub-saharienne, souvent écrite en langues occidentales – la langue des colons. L’œuvre de Cheikh Hamidou Kane, fonctionnaire Sénégalais dont le roman majeur L’Aventure Ambigüe est aujourd’hui l’un des piliers de ce cette «littérature africaine», est symptomatique de cette binarité de la littérature, et par làmême, de la culture africaine telle qu’on se la représente communément aujourd’hui. A travers le déchirement du jeune Samba Diallo entre deux cultures, deux prismes émergent. D’un côté, l’héritage oral, traditionnel, sacré, musulman, et véhicule d’une morale ou d’une certaine sagesse ; de l’autre, la rationalité occidentale, l’écrit ou cet « art de vaincre sans avoir raison »1, symbolisé par l’école nouvelle. Est-ce à dire que la «culture africaine» n’est perçue qu’à travers ce paradigme opposant tradition et modernité : la tradition d’un côté, renvoyant à un passé précolonial dont on a rendu les peuples colonisés fiers d’avoir eu leurs propres périodes de gloire artistique ; ou de l’autre, la modernité, expression d’une élite africaine à travers des supports occidentalisés? Il semble qu’au-delà de cette perception binaire et homogène de l’art en Afrique, existe une culture vivante, extrêmement diverse, populaire, et qui est née avec l’indépendance et la modernisation des sociétés africaines. Selon Karin Barber, professeur à l’Université de Birmingham, spécialisée dans la littérature Africaine anglophone, l’indispensable connaissance de la langue pour appréhender la culture

PHOTO: JEAN-PIERRE DUBOIX/JPDUBS.HAUTETFORT.COM/CC

La pouvoir de la représentation

africaine populaire est l’une des barrières expliquant le vide académique sur le sujet : la diversité des dialectes utilisés dans l’ensemble du continent africain rend difficile l’étude des pratiques locales pour les spécialistes européens, mais aussi, souligne-t-elle, pour les spécialistes africains. Les régions les mieux connues sont l’Ouest de l’Afrique, au cœur de la culture Yoruba et Hausa, le sud, à la découverte des Sotho, des Xhosa et des Zulu, ou encore l’est du continent, à travers ses cultures Somali et Swahili. Les études que mènent Karin Barber ne sont pas non plus exhaustives : que ce soit dans Readings in African Popular Culture ou Africa’s Hidden Histories, elle nous fait découvrir les secrets d’une Afrique Sub-saharienne surtout anglophone. Découvrir une culture populaire Le terme populaire, tel qu’appréhendé dans ce contexte, n’implique aucun jugement de valeur ; bien au contraire: « je ne pense pas que l’étude d’une culture puisse commencer par un jugement moral », souligne l’auteure dans son introduction. Le terme populaire renvoie ici bien plus à un champ d’investigation (qui n’est pas spécifique aux sociétés africaines, d’ailleurs) qu’à une volonté de classifier des productions culturelles. Tout ce qui est produit par le peuple est valorisé comme porteur de sens, porteur de significations et d’informations sur la mentalité, les pratiques quotidiennes d’un groupe de personnes, d’une communauté appartenant à une ère géographique restreinte et don-

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née. Quand elle parle de culture populaire, Karin Barber parle d’une culture de masse. Or l’originalité et l’intérêt de la production issue de cette culture de masse ne tient pas dans sa qualité artistique ou dans la réflexion intellectuelle qui repose derrière sa création. Bien au contraire, une telle culture est par définition naïve, gaie, insouciante, et dépendante de ce que la population veut entendre, voir ou lire, comme toute culture populaire. Mais selon l’auteure, le fait que les histoires ou les personnages sont souvent stéréotypés n’empêche pas leurs auteurs d’illustrer une réalité sociale intéressante en ellemême.

sociétés africaines postcoloniales3. Les pratiques administratives reprises après l’indépendance, mais aussi les progrès de la scolarisation, couplés au développement croissant de grands centres urbains en Afrique, ont rendu indispensable l’appropriation de ce mode d’expression par les populations locales. C’est ce phénomène d’engagement d’une frange de la population dite populaire au sens de Bourdieu4, ainsi que la diffusion, la mise en circulation, la conservation et l’utilisation de documents, de manuscrits, d’imprimés, de textes visuels, de pièces de théâtre, et enfin le développement de la presse et de l’édition, qui constituent les processus que Karin Barber discute.

Ainsi, cette catégorie de productions culturelles échappe aux règles du paradigme binaire à travers lequel la culture populaire africaine a toujours été étudiée et appréhendée. Nous sommes loin de la culture illustrant la tradition, loin de cet art étudié comme représentatif des cultures « tribales » – si tant est que ce terme lui-même ne soit une construction historique et occidentale – cet art ancien, austère, artisanal, tourné vers le passé, et revalorisé pour répondre à un besoin de nationalisme, de construction identitaire à travers la référence à une gloire passée. Mais cette culture populaire n’a rien à voir non plus avec la catégorie à laquelle appartient la littérature africaine créée pour et par une certaine élite, écrite en langues occidentales, et visant à être exportée hors du continent africain plus que destinée aux populations indigènes qui ne maîtrisent pas parfaitement ces langues.

Sociologiquement, le critère de la nonappartenance à l’élite est indispensable pour définir les auteurs d’une telle culture. Selon Aïssatou Mbodj Pouye5, les individus auxquels s’attachent Karin Barber et les autres spécialistes appartiennent à des milieux sociaux variables, mais dont « le niveau scolaire assure un statut social de lettré suffisamment reconnu, sans toutefois oser s’autoriser pleinement l’appartenance à ce statut»6. Les méthodes qu’ils utilisent pour cette production culturelle sont donc informelles, et elles résultent en une création bon marché, accessible à tous tant par les coûts que par la distribution.

Tout le paradoxe de la culture populaire tient en ce qu’à travers la langue, elle est accessible au peuple, alors qu’elle ne nous est précisément pas accessible à nous occidentaux, puisqu’elle ne nous est pas destinée. C’est aussi peut-être une raison pour laquelle cette expression vigoureuse de l’expérience africaine2 nous est invisible: Johannes Fabian, dans son article, suggère que les spécialistes africains connaissent peut-être un léger péché d’élitisme à dénigrer la créativité de la musique, des arts visuel et écrit émergeant des masses. L’importance de la diffusion de l’écrit La culture populaire dont parlent Karin Barber et les nombreux spécialistes européens et africains ayant contribué à ses ouvrages, est née d’une diffusion sans cesse croissante de l’écrit dans les

Or pour Karin Barber, étudier ces diverses cultures populaires africaines, et par là-même, reconstruire l’histoire sociale des masses qui les produisent, passe par l’étude de différents genres : les écrits du quotidien, identifiés dans la catégorie de la « tin-trunk literacy », et qui comprend également les « lettres, journaux intimes, notices nécrologiques, pamphlets, et autres écrits qu’à travers l’Afrique, on conserve dans des boîtes cachées sous son

“Je ne pense pas que l’etude d’une culture puisse commencer par un jugement moral.

”

- Karin Baber InFocus 15

DOSSIER lit7 », et d’autres genres autrement plus originaux et plus caractéristiques de la vie quotidienne et populaire en Afrique sont mis en valeur en tant que lieux de création d’une richesse insoupçonnée. Il s’agit de cette culture étalée dans les places des marchés, dans les bidonvilles, les bars et discothèques, dans les salles d’attente de gare, les pensions, les journaux, ou sur les chaînes de télévision, et même sur les carlingues des taxis8. Quand la vie quotidienne mêle le visuel, le texte, et la musique Qualifiés par l’interpénétration entre le texte et l’objet matériel, voire musical9, ces genres permettent aux mots de se concrétiser, de s’adapter à la vie quotidienne africaine. Karin Barber donne pour exemple ces proverbes ou orìkis, peints sur les camions ou les taxis dans l’ouest du Nigeria. Le monde matériel est saturé de textes, de proverbes, d’épithètes, d’anecdotes, d’histoires, afin que les « objets deviennent du texte, et les textes, des objets »10. Ces genres doivent être localement reconnus comme des modes d’expression du peuple avec leurs conventions propres, afin de permettre d’accumuler des connaissances sur la vie de communautés spécifiques. Le proverbe peint par le conducteur de taxi du Nigeria devient en effet intéressant lorsque l’on s’attache à comprendre pourquoi ce proverbe précis a été choisi, et le sens dont il est porteur. Souvent ambigus, métaphoriques, allusifs, ces messages demandent une interprétation, indissociable d’une certaine connaissance de la communauté dont ils parlent, mais aussi révélateurs de ses caractéristiques. Les thèmes abordés sont vastes : inégalités sociales dont souffrent les petites gens, leurs luttes et espérances traduites parfois avec humour ou sur le ton d’une amère ironie. Karin Barber donne l’exemple de la chanson « Paiva » des travailleurs dans les plantations au Mozambique11 pour illustrer cette aspiration à une vie meilleure. C’est cette culture populaire qui permet l’émergence d’une conscience collective, critique, publique, à travers notamment la prise en compte de la nécessité d’une amélioration de sa condition sociale dans la lecture d’histoires d’amour que l’on trouve sur les quais des gares, la croyance en la possibilité de changer son identité dans les slogans que l’on lit sur les taxis, bref, l’hybridité de la culture africaine entre modernité et « africanéité ».

16 InFocus

De la nécessité de comprendre l’Autre En remettant en cause l’habilité et la pertinence du folklore traditionnel ou des productions culturelles de l’élite africaine à rendre compte d’une réalité sociale en mouvement, la culture populaire africaine nous permet de découvrir une pléiade de talents témoignant de la capacité d’adaptation des masses dans les sociétés postcoloniales africaines aux nouvelles pratiques de l’écrit, tout en restant fortement ancrées dans l’importance du visuel et de l’auditif. Lorsque les chanteurs Jùjù (appartenant à la culture Yoruba au Nigeria), proclament que « notre tradition est une tradition moderne »12, ils résument l’obsolescence du paradigme binaire entre tradition et modernité. On a longtemps perçu la culture et les arts africains à travers cette représentation trop peu caractéristique de la réalité sociale en Afrique, et qui laisse dans l’ombre une foison de productions culturelles vivantes, et qui en disent plus long sur la culture africaine que ce que nous nous attendons simplement à trouver. Or si les écueils de la représentation de l’Autre pendant la colonisation, phénomène étudié par les partisans d’Edward Said et de sa théorie Orientaliste, ont mené à une aberration historique, le dialogue entre les cultures et les civilisations aujourd’hui ne peut pas faire l’impasse sur une remise en question des perceptions que nous avons de ces différentes cultures. Ainsi, la passion de Jacques Chirac pour les arts primitifs semble l’avoir mené à pratiquer une lecture relative du principe universel des droits de l’homme : comprendre dans leur profondeur les cultures africaines, chinoises, américaines, océaniennes, bref, non-occidentales, permet de saisir que la conception des droits de l’homme au sein de ces sociétés peut diverger de la nôtre : certains droits de l’homme non intangibles, mais considérés comme évidents et acquis dans les pays occidentaux, où la société est au service de l'homme, ne peuvent être appréhendés de même dans les pays où l’homme est au service de la société. Morgane Estival is a first year Master Student at PSIA, studying International Security, specializing in Human Rights Law and African Studies.

1 L'aventure ambiguë, 1961 (Julliard) – Cheikh Hamidou Kane. 2 Readings in African Popular Culture, Popular Culture in Africa, Johannes Fabian, p.18. 4 Karin Barber, ed., Africa’s Hidden Histories. Everyday Literacy and Making the Self, Aïssatou Mbodj Pouye. 3 Karin Barber, ed., Africa’s Hidden Histories. Everyday Literacy and Making the Self, Aïssatou Mbodj Pouye. 4 Readings in African Popular Culture, Views of the field, Introduction by Karin Barber, p.3. 5 Membre associée du centre d’études africaines de l’EHESS et ayant travaillé sur les pratiques de l’écrit et de l’alphabétisation au Mali. 6 Readings in African Popular Culture, Views of the field, Introduction p.4 7 Ibid. 8 Readings in Africa’s Popular Culture, The world in creolization, Ulf Hannerz, p.12. 9 Readings in African Popular Culture, Views of the field, Introduction, Karin Barber, p.7. 10 Ibid. page 8. 11 Readings in African Popular Culture, Views of the Field, Introduction, Karin Barber, p.5. 12 Readings in African Popular Culture, « Our tradition is a modern tradition », Waterman, p.48.

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The 2011 Presidential Elections in Benin A firsthand account of the vote from Ole OHLHOFF

The day I sat on a bench, waiting to get my scooter fixed, watching all this unfold before me, was perhaps the first time I felt the country was about to vote. Newspapers and expats had been discussing the elections for months, fearing riots and reminding everybody to stock up on fuel and water. Technical glitches in the electronic electoral roll had led to a situation in which more than one million people entitled to vote weren’t registered. Yet till this day, I had not witnessed anybody openly taking sides in the streets, or heard grumbling over the technical inefficiencies of the process. Why did every Beninese seem so relaxed about the upcoming elections, when the media and political classes kept talking of an upcoming civil war? It is true that the situation was extremely politicized, but when talking to Beninese in the streets, not a single one believed in post-electoral troubles. Togo and Ivory Coast probably served as warning examples to a country proud of its democratic transition since its former President and ex-dictator Mathieu Kérékou introduced a multiparty system in the 1990s. The Beninese seemed to

PHOTO: OLE OHLHOFF

was sitting on a bench in Cotonou, waiting to get my scooter fixed, as I observed the proceedings in front of a newspaper stand on the other side of the road. The stand was a well-known dropin point for motorcycle taxi drivers, and today there were dozens of yellow-shirted men in front of the newspaper display. Loud and excited, they were exchanging political opinions, sometimes needing to calm each other down as the discussion became heated. Some time later, two big American cars drove up, escorted by a pickup with a gun man on the loading space. Cheering and hurling broke out when the son of a former Beninese president and the main candidate of the opposition party, Adrien Houngbedji stepped out and took a quick walk in the crowd

Exercing the right to vote in numbers

have managed a tightrope walk, managing spillover effects and maintaining a civil conscience: yet again the cliché about an alleged, general African political immaturity has turned out to be wrong. Instead of aggression or violence, decorated trucks drove through Cotonou, in which girls and boys danced to rumbling Ivorian music from refrigerator-sized speakers. In the residential district, a papier-mâché plane had been constructed, with a puppet of the president, Thomas Boni Yayi, visible in the cockpit waving with an olive branch between his teeth. The campaign was peaceful and relaxed in other parts of the country as well. A case in point: At the end of January I was invited by a friend to assist the transformation of his political movement into one of Benin’s 140 political parties. Hundreds of people had travelled together, packed in loading spaces of various trucks. The event resembled more a popular festival, interrupted by short speeches and traditional dances. Indeed, a few well-known and already established leaders of other parties were thanked and reimbursed for their support during the campaign. And yet it must be said that the political campaign was in part a product of

relegation of political funds to the background and “achat de conscience” – buying people’s participation. Despite this duality, it was impressive to see that politics could still evoke passion and interest among the population, instead of indifference and boredom as I am used to in my home country. The determination of the people to vote was impressive: on Election Day, which had been postponed twice, people waited for hours in long lines to mark their choices on the ballot paper. Two days before the National Assembly had passed a law making it possible for the "forgotten" to vote without voting cards. Not even during the counting of ballots there was a hint of manipulation; a crowd shouted its displeasure and disapproval each time a seal wasn’t clearly readable. Coming from a world where we accord more significance to our breakfast choices, it was an eye-opening experience to witness elections where the civilian populations showcased their pride in the democratic process.

Ole Ohlhoff is a first year graudate student in International Environmental Policy . InFocus 17

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Road to Durban Jamie STEVENSON asks whether Africa can speak with “one voice” at the next UN Cllimate Summit through the newly-formed African Group of Negotiators

reparations are underway in South Africa for this year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP17) to be held in Durban, South Africa at the end of November. Durban is only the second such summit to be held in Sub-Saharan Africa and, like the 2010 World Cup, serves as yet another affirmation of South Africa’s ascendance as an emerging power. For the continent at large however, the significance of the summit is more than symbolic. With issues on the negotiating table that could have a considerable environmental, social, and economic impact for a large majority of the African Countries, the region has much at stake. However, it is not only the final agreement that will be important for these countries: the negotiations themselves may prove to be an important test for the fledgling Africa Group in international climate negotiations. The Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN), established by the African Union (AU) in 2009 to consolidate a common position and strategy in climate negotiations, has become the nexus of the African strategy on climate change, providing a unified platform from which the continent can pursue its interests and priorities. The AU has reinforced support to the Africa Group in the lead-up to the negotiations, but nevertheless faces significant challenges if it is to successfully impose its ambitious agenda at Durban. High stakes, rising profile

Several recent studies have placed the “fundamental injustice” of the global climate change beyond dispute: the countries contributing the least to global greenhouse gas emissions are the countries that can expect to be the most adversely affected by environmental problems attendant to a rising average global temperature. Sub-Saharan Africa is certainly no exception in this respect: African countries account for only 3% of 18 InFocus

Sprawling cities, growing needs

PHTOTO: SIMISA/WIKICOMMONS/CC

global greenhouse gas emissions, with South Africa alone accounting for 39% of the continent’s emissions.1 Nevertheless, the effects of climate change will have important implications on the environment, health, and food and water security in the region, all of which pose a serious threat to African socio-economic development. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that the cost of adapting to the effects of climate change in subSaharan Africa could be as high as 5-10% of the continent’s total GDP.2 African governments have long been aware of these challenges, but often found their agendas sidelined by structure and focus of international climate negotiations. With few human or financial resources and little political clout, African countries had a limited ability to impose their priorities independently in international forums. The AU established the AGN in 2009 ahead of the COP15 summit in Copenhagen in order to allow Africa to “speak with one voice” in international climate negotiations, fielding a single

negotiating delegation with a common platform and strategy. The AGN increases the negotiating capacity of its member countries by pooling the resources that had previously been spread thin across multiple national delegations. Moreover, as an advantage of the collective weight of the AU, which constitutes 28% of UN membership. While the Africa Group has not produced a wholesale change in the dynamics of international climate negotiations, it has made significant progress in promoting African common interests on the international agenda. Negotiators have aggressively pursued the inclusion of adaptation concerns in international climate agreements as well as defending their methodological interests, notably staging a full-scale walkout in negotiations in Barcelona in 2009 in defense of the Kyoto Protocol. The AGN has further served as springboard for certain African countries and officials within the UN climate nego-

tiations. Several key members of the AGN delegation now hold chair positions on UNFCCC committees relevant to African demands, multiplying the impact of the group. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who led the AGN delegation in Copenhagen, has been appointed co-chair of the Advisory Group to the UN Secretary General on Climate Change Financing. Similarly, Trevor Manuel, South African Minister of National Planning, who is currently co-chair of a trans-national committee charged with operationalizing the Green Fund ahead of the Durban negotiations, has been a strong advocate for the centrality of African development concerns in the mechanism’s design. Perhaps the most striking indicator of the AGN’s potential effect on negotiating dynamics has been the attention it has garnered from countries outside of the region. Within months of its establishment, the Group was approached by a number of emerging and industrialized countries– among them China and France– seeking to establish bilateral partnerships that included negotiation cooperation, adaptation financing, and mitigation projects. Such external interest in the AGN indicates a rising profile for the African countries in international negotiations and could prove useful in terms of improving the group’s leverage. However, these relationships are something of a doubleedged sword; the effective management of bilateral partnerships will be essential to the Group’s ability to maintain an independent position on climate change. Looking toward Durban The Durban negotiations are particularly relevant to the Africa Group for two principal reasons. First, COP17 could make significant contributions to shaping the legal form of future agreements. As a result of its widespread vulnerability to climate change and the glaring insufficiency of the bottom-up commitments resulting from the previous two conferences, the African common position forcefully maintains the necessity of a top-down, legally binding approach to emissions reductions, pushing for the prolongation of the Kyoto protocol beyond 2012. Secondly, Durban is expected to operationalize two transfer mechanisms, the Technology Transfer Mechanism and the Green Fund, which would have a direct impact on African countries’ ability to overcome technical and financial deficits in addressing the costs of adaptation projects. African

negotiators therefore seek an agreement that ensures both the reliability of funding and a broad definition of adaptation vulnerability that would make such funding available for a wide variety of projects including infrastructure. Partially in response to the high stakes of the upcoming negotiations, the AU has taken steps in recent months to strengthen the negotiating capacity and cohesiveness of the Africa Group. In June 2011, the organization established a permanent bureau for the Africa Group of Negotiators in order to enhance the functioning of the AGN. The bureau brings together 200 government officials, experts, and negotiators, charged with providing technical support to the AGN in updating the African common position and setting negotiating strategy. This process seems to have been effective in building consensus among member states around the “The African Platform for Durban,” and in garnering support for South Africa as conference chair. The bureau has also set an ambitious research agenda intended to enhance future negotiating and implementation capacity, which could also help increase the participation of civil society and stakeholder organizations in the formulation of the Africa Group climate change agenda further reinforcing the capacity of the group. Challenges ahead: bridging the “gaps” Despite the progress made within the AGN over the last five months, the group still faces a number of important gaps both in capacity and cohesiveness that will need to be addressed if it is to succeed in ensuring favorable outcomes on adaptation and negotiation procedures at Durban. The pooling of human and technical resources through more formalized channels in the AGN permanent bureau will go a long way in increasing the negotiating capacity of the AGN member states. However, the group remains constrained by an overburdened diplomatic corps as well as limited financial capacity. The African delegation is at a significant disadvantage relative to other groups with more available resources to dedicate to climate negotiations, and who may further hold more negotiating capital by virtue of their global economic or geopolitical importance. The AGN will also need to contend with serious internal divisions on the continent that could place a strain on the

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unity of the Africa Group in high-stakes negotiations, particularly on future negotiation processes and the distribution of adaptation funds. The membership of AGN is composed of 54 states with differing economic, environmental, and demographic profiles, and equally varied priorities and interests with regard to climate change and adaptation. Most importantly, the AGN’s membership overlaps with several other formal groupings with divergent interests in climate negotiations. Angola and Nigeria are members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which tends to emphasize “fair and realistic solutions” to emissions reduction and adaptation that do not disadvantage the consumption of fossil fuels. The Least Developed Countries (LDC) and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), on the other hand, are a source of pressure in the opposite direction. These organizations, which have significant African membership, demand drastic binding commitments to emissions reductions from both Annex-I countries and major developing country emitters in order to keep global average temperature increases to 1.5º C.3 These interests have been harmonized to some extent in the Durban Platform, but nevertheless remain an important challenge. As a regional leader, South Africa has already borne a great deal of the burden in bridging internal divides within the AGN, and will undoubtedly play a role in addressing the larger fault lines that will arise during the negotiations in Durban as conference chair. South Africa has a strong foreign policy commitment to subSaharan Africa, which stipulates that the region should be its primary focus. The country also acutely aware of its somewhat unique position on the continent in terms of both its economic and emissions profile, and is therefore careful to interact with its regional partners on an equal footing.4 This emphasis on the inclusion and promotion of other African voices in negotiations should help the country avoid some of the mistakes made at Copenhagen. Yet South Africa’s regional obligations will be balanced against its own national interests as an emerging major developing country emitter as well as against the demands of its position as conference host, which require the country to act as the primary mediator of a growing conflict between North and South over the shape climate change regime. Should the South African delegation fail in its task to balance these InFocus 19

DOSSIER multiple roles at Durban and once again find itself negotiating in a restricted group of so-called “big players,” it could place the unity of the AGN considerable strain.

despite these divisions will be an important litmus test for the Africa Group and for the viability of African collective diplomacy in general.

An African COP? With several priorities for the African continent on the agenda, the AU and its member states have high hopes for COP17. Will newly reinforced AGN is capable of making the conference in Durban a truly “African COP” by placing African adaptation and mitigations needs front and center in international negotiations? That will depend to some extent on the group’s ability to manage its internal divisions and limited diplomatic capacity. The emphasis on adaptation transfer mechanisms in the AGN and the broader COP17 agenda is an advantage for the group; it will facilitate cohesion among African countries, making the primary question for the group the maximization of its diplomatic capacity in order to ensure the best “deal” for African countries. Ultimately, it is the negotiations on future of the Kyoto Protocol that will most challenge the resilience and capacity of the AGN at Durban; divergent opinions within the AU membership on the repartition of mitigation responsibilities and substantial international pressures will bring latent divisions in the AGN to the fore. The ability of the African negotiators to maintain a unified position on the legal form of future climate negotiations

Jamie Stevenson is a first year graudate student in International Economic Policy in the Sciences Po-LSE dual degree program.

François Gemenne (2011), “Une voix oubliée? L’Afrique dans les négociations internationales sur le climat?” in Énergie, Croissance et Développement Durable: Une Équation Africaine. Paris: IFRI. 2 IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007: Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability -Summary for Policymakers. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. 3 “Emerging Agents of Change? Africa in International Negotiations” (2 February 2011) African Agency in International Politics Seminar Series, Chatham House-Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. 4 Ibid. 1

Dominique Kerouédan, MD, MPH, PhD, MSc. Founder and Maître de Conférences, Concentration in Global Health, PSIA-Sciences Po

“

When it comes to thinking about diseases or health in Africa, people are really afraid. They imagine that they are going to die fast from a severe disease such as malaria or meningitis, cholera, or some kind of high fever you don’t even know of. The reality is that many severe infections can be prevented by a vaccine: yellow fever, typhoid fever, polio, hepatitis B, various vaccines to prevent meningitis, etc. Effective preventive medicine protects you from malaria. Besides, by ensuring a good hygiene around food, drinking and body, simply washing your hands, you stay healthy with limited efforts and costs.

”

PHTOTO: SOUZA/WIKICOMMONS/CC

ANY SUGGESTIONS? COMMENTS? GET IN TOUCH AT revue@affairesinternationales.org

20 InFocus

Food for Thought Kinga NEDER on famine and food crisis in Somalia

Gaajo... ravaging the population

tention.

PHOTO: SLICK/WIKICOMMONS/CC

The State of Famine: Somalia

are are countries with a population of only 10 million to capture daily the attention of leading international journals. Regardless of the odds, one such country has succeeded to feature regularly on the front pages. This country has no outstanding natural resources, a very low GDP, and virtually no political influence internationally. What it has to offer for the international audience is its long standing history of conflict and famine. A quick frequency search for the word “Somalia” on The New York Times website1 results in about 8,000 hits for the past 30 days – in the context of famine, conflict, and piracy. The current food crisis in the Horn of Africa equally strikes about 4.8 million people in Ethiopia, 4.3 million in Kenya and 165,000 in Djibouti; yet the famine effecting 4 million people in Somalia requires once again special at-

The UN defines the state of famine based on three strongly connected criteria: first, 20 percent of the population must have fewer than 2100 kilocalories of food available per day. Secondly, more than 30 percent of children must be acutely malnourished; and third, at least two deaths per day must occur in every 10,000 people caused by the lack of food.2 This later figure was about 4 children per 10,000 Somalis at the end of September, while in the neighboring regions around Mogadishu, this number reached the astonishingly high rate of 13. According to the UN estimates, about 750,000 people could die in the coming months and as much as 10 million are at direct risk in the Horn of Africa.3 In mid-July, the UN has declared famine in the regions of South-Central Somalia. So far, as many as 380,000 Somalis left their land and sought refuge in the Dabaab camp for displaced people in the neighboring Kenya. As the famine – or gaajo in the local language – is ravaging the population, a cholera epidemic broke out in mid-August and a growing number of measles, malaria and typhoid cases are being reported. Even if the fall rains finally start to pour over the parched land, before any crop could bear fruit, the emaciated and weak population would be exposed to a heightened risk of waterborne and infectious deceases. However, according to the forecasts of the World Meteorological Organization, the drought is likely to extend to the first quarter of 2012 and even the most optimistic calculations anticipate next harvest only a year from now4. Images of the famine-stricken region have shocked the world a number of times in the past two decades. Somalia has seen the first of what became a series of severe famine in 1990-1991 as the central government collapsed in Mogadishu and the country fell into a long period of turmoil,

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impeding the agricultural production in the Southern parts of the country. Since the outbreak of the civil war, Somalia has experienced two other severe food crises in 2006 and most recently in 2008, affecting all together 30 million people. The causes are multiple. The African drylands have first experienced the effects of climate change about forty years ago. The prolonged dry seasons are often forcing the traditional pastoralist communities to sell their animals that they can no longer feed on grass. The rise in supply automatically results in falling animal prices which has been coupled recently with the sharp increase in food prices, toppling in January 2011 since 19905. The growing prices of food partially induced by diverting production to biofuels and low interest rates in the major food exporting Western countries are hitting particularly hard countries with high food import dependency rate, such as Somalia where the domestic political crisis and the present drought virtually ended food production. Nonetheless, the prolonged domestic conflict in the country had greatly undermined food security long before the food price shock. It has been practically impossible to open a bank account in the Southern part of the region controlled by the Muslim fundamentalist Al Shabaab since 2006, thus food imports often have to be paid by cash. Shipments pass through different checkpoints controlled by the rebels who levy “extra taxes” on the importers. The additional costs are consequently incorporated in the already high food prices felt first and foremost by the poor rural communities. What leaves room for even deeper worries is that the lack of transparency in the dealings naturally results in smuggling cheap, low quality food often not met for human consumption. The Conflict-Famine-Conflict Cycle The beginning of the current drought was the last drop in the Somalian bucket, ironically in its inverse sense. While the extreme weather is affecting the neighboring countries as well, in the recent years, they have been experimenting with droughtresistant crops, built water projects and gradually diversified their livelihoods; as a consequence, they are much less affected by the present crisis. In Ethiopia for instance, the government developed the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) to mitigate the effects of food shortages InFocus 21

DOSSIER by the construction of an effective food and cash distribution network among the poorest, in order to avoid the selling of their productive assets, such as animals. Although the famine does not stop at the border, humanitarian aid workers and food shipments often have to due to the blockade imposed by Al Shabaab. The death toll in the Southern region under the control of the fundamentalist rebels is remarkably higher than in the North, still controlled by the weak, Western-backed moderate government led by Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali. Aid workers cannot or are reluctant to penetrate the South. As a result, there is either zero humanitarian access to these areas or local groups are appointed for the supervision of food shipment distribution without any direct control by the aid organizations. This results among others, in the wholesale theft of food aid by local businessmen and the officers of Al Shabaab. The current situation is showing a high resemblance to the crisis in 1990 resolved by an eventual shift in the weather rather than by Western aid. As the result of the long history of Somalia’s conflict-famine-conflict cycle and the quasi insurmountable obstacles humanitarian workers are facing in the country, donor enthusiasm has been fading. Although Al Shabaab has given up the bullet-ridden capital in late August, it is still not sure that aid can reach the region due to the ensuing tribal conflict driven by starvation in the power vacuum not properly filled by the weak transitional government. Recent discussion in security studies began to broaden the scope of security threats to include human (in)security in the international discourse, an aspect neglected or rather ignored by the traditional realist approach dominating the field until the early 2000s. Since then, an increased attention has been given to the relation between conflict, poverty and horizontal inequality opening up the debate on the nature and origins of threats to national and international security. The UNDP has summarized it “the conflict trap is part of the poverty trap”6. The present humanitarian crisis in Somalia is a perfect textbook case for illustrating the poverty-conflict-poverty-conflict cycle partially induced by climate change. Somalia has been consistently figuring in the list of the ten poorest countries in the world. Al Shabaab grabbed power in 2006 from the Transitional Federal Gov22 InFocus

ernment in the Southern areas of Somalia, with the purpose of overthrowing the Western-backed government. The incumbent Somalian government is perceived by the followers of the Muslim fundamentalist group as cooperating with the West’s asphyxiating food policy in Somalia. Since

refuge-seekers is mounting. Immigration minister Gerald Otieno Kajwang declared in late August that “the numbers coming in are too large that they threaten our security”.7 The estimated number of direct conflict deaths in Somalia between 2004 and 2007 amounted to about 8,400, con-

4 children out of every 10,000 Somalis die every day, due to the lack of food PHOTO: CATE TURTON/DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT/CC

its arrival to power, Al Shabaab, officially affiliated with Al Qaida since 2007, has been blocking cheap foreign food shipments that drew down local prices, in order to encourage local agriculture and decrease Somalia’s food dependency on the West. In other words, the ongoing conflict is revolving around the acute food crisis in the region whether induced by the cheap Western imports, the food price hike or falling agricultural returns caused by climate change. Al Shabaab describes itself as waging an open war against the enemies of Islam and therefore, it is considered as a terrorist group in several Western countries. Although Al Shabaab has proven its capability to strike abroad in numerous suicide attacks in Ethiopia, the West has already learned through the painful lesson of Operation Restore Hope in 1993 to stay out of Somali politics, thus direct military involvement in order to restore peace and order in the failing Somali state is highly unlikely. The domestic turmoil within Somalia has spillover effects in the neighboring, relatively stable states. In the 1990-1991 civil war, 2 million Somalis have left the country out of which the majority never returned. Therefore, it is not surprising that while the population of the Dabaab refugee camp, originally for 90,000, is currently peaking at 750,000, the reluctance in Kenya to admit new

stituting approximately 4% of all direct conflict deaths in the time period8; this number dwarves behind the estimated death toll of the 1990-1991 famine alone, which was around 250,000, while more than 30,000 children have died already since the outbreak of the present crisis9. These facts and figures unquestionably cry for a solution for the Somali conflict from a local community-based, food security approach. R2F - Responsibility to Feed Although the picture painted above might appear bleak, the current situation also gives reason for hope. Since the recent droughts in the region, much progress has been made in order to forecast and alleviate future famine. Thanks to the Global Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture launched by the FAO in 2005 and more importantly to the Famine Early Warning Network (FEWS NET) operated by USAID, the present drought had been foreseen since August 2010. The early warning network considerably improved ability to forecast humanitarian crisis and reduce risks by a timely, coordinated and efficient manner. Ethiopia, for instance, used data from the warning system to prepare food reserves for the leaner times. The local government has been investing substantially in soil conservation,

crop storage facilities, drought-resistant seeds, and water systems since 2006, in order to keep food products affordable even at distant rural areas in times of distress. International assistance in mitigating the risks is essential, from food shipments to technical knowledge on agriculture and irrigation to access to telecommunication technologies. Advice from financial experts and risk analysts on dealing with the economic consequences of the sharp drop in agricultural production and increased food dependency on the short run can prevent further damage of the local economies. Much can be done with concerted effort and available technological and scientific knowledge, but requires concerted effort from the international community. Regardless of the Aquila Food Security Commitments to which donor countries pledged themselves on the 2009 G8 summit in Italy, there is still a shortfall of about $924 million in order to meet the UN appeal for donor contribution in the crisis10. Additionally, donor response has been uneven, with different areas receiving unequal assistance. Donors themselves have also unevenly contributed to the efforts. While the European Commission, the US, Canada, the UK, and Germany have made generous contributions (amounting to about $2 billion all together) other countries such as France and Italy contributed more modestly, while smaller European countries like Austria and Luxembourg only offered token donations. The Gulf countries on the other hand, have shown an increasing readiness to contribute to the mitigation of the crisis in the Horn of Africa. Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar together offered more than $90 million, while the Organization of Islamic Corporation pledged to offer $350 million. African countries also took their share of the burden both financially and by making human resources available. 2010 saw the debut of the Drylands Initiative at the Earth Institute of Columbia University in New York City, providing a brainstorming platform for the leaders of six of the drylands countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, South Sudan, and the Government of Sudan) to find effective solutions and share best practices on assisting pastoralist communities to prevent crisis and promote growth in the region. AMISOM, the African Union’s peacekeeping force, is actively involved in the efforts of mitigating the recent outbreak

of deceases in the refugee camps. Security for the aid workers in Somalia is provided by the AU Mission to the extent of the possible, while the Mission also keeps the seaports and airports open to secure food shipments. Additionally, the Union has already fundraised $346 million from the African Development Bank, South Africa, Algeria, the DRC, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. The crisis shines a light on the growing African non-governmental sector, illustrated by the amazing efforts of the “Kenyans for Kenya” organization that raised about $7 million since the beginning of the drought.11 These remarkable efforts give ground for hope that famine and humanitarian crisis like the one today in Somalia, is evitable in the near future. The current famine puts in the spotlight the efforts African governments have done since 2005 in order to address the challenges their communities are facing. It shines a light on the strengthening partnership among countries in the region and between governments, local communities, international organizations and private stakeholders. The present crisis in the Horn of Africa serves as a compass to indicate the direction of the necessary and inevitable shift in the Western attitude for a Responsibility to Feed approach as our Responsibility to Protect. Conclusion Although the international media is rarely optimistic, there is reason for hope in the region, as illustrated by the story of Ethiopia. Somalia’s western neighbor also has a history of famine and conflict; yet, the government has been putting increased efforts in fortifying the country’s food security system since 2005 and consequently, the current drought effects the population to a much lesser degree. It is important to distinguish between causes and consequences in the Somalian story. The drought is caused by the human-induced climate change for which the West has to bear the responsibility. The famine, on the other hand, is caused by the lack of precautionary government action in Somalia and could be prevented by a more concentrated government effort. Western interference in the domestic situation not only violates the principle of sovereignty but upsets the already fragile situation, as the past has already indicated. There is, however, something in the power of the donor countries beyond offering material assistance. By supporting the efforts of the neighboring govern-

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ments to tackle the challenges they face in a region-specific way – as proposed by the Drylands Initiative – and by providing financial, technological and political expertise responsively to the needs of the blossoming regional alliance, the African drylands could be set on a slow but longterm peaceful recovery from the decades long poverty-conflict-poverty cycle. Such a positive change in the Horn would not remain unnoticed in Somalia, where what the ongoing conflict ultimately boils down to is the daily struggle for affordable food. Providing a sustainable, local-community oriented solution could set the stage for an uneasy but certain stabilization of the domestic situation of the conflict-ridden country.

Kinga Neder is a first year graudate student in International Public Management at PSIA and already has a double MA in French and American Studies.

The New York Times website. www.nytimes.com “Integrated Food Security Phase Classification”. FAO website. www.fao.org/docrep/010/i0275e/ i0275e.pdf 3 ONE (Campaign) Report. http://www.one.org/c/ international/hottopic/3983/ 4 ONE (Campaign) Report. https://s3.amazonaws. com/one.org/images/ONE_Horn_Policy_ Brief_9.21.11.pdf 5 “World Food Price Index”. FAO website. http:// www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/ 6 “Human Development Report”. UNDP website. ochaonline.un.org/ochalinkclick. aspx?link=ocha&docid=1003986 7 “Somalis Flee Drought”. The New York Times website. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/world/ africa/16somalia.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all 8 “Global Burden of Armed Violence, 2008”. Geneva Decleration Secretariat. http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Global-Burden-of-ArmedViolence-full-report.pdf 9 ONE (Campaign) Report. https://s3.amazonaws. com/one.org/images/ONE_Horn_Policy_ Brief_9.21.11.pdf 10 ONE (Campaign) Report. https://s3.amazonaws. com/one.org/images/ONE_Horn_Policy_ Brief_9.21.11.pdf 11 ONE (Campaign) Report. https://s3.amazonaws. com/one.org/images/ONE_Horn_Policy_ Brief_9.21.11.pdf 1 2

InFocus 23

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The Kamapala Convention Priyanka VIJ

hen one thinks of Africa what comes to mind is forbidden treasures and poor populations, rich heritage and underdeveloped administration, incessant mounds of beautiful sand and endless suffering. This article talks about one such image that Africa has tried to change, an “Oasis” in the land of desserts and a tool that has empowered Africa as a continent to protect its own people. In an unprecedented step, the African Union has initiated the drafting of a unique clause in its convention for the protection of Internally Displaced Persons i.e. the “African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)”. Though the Convention is mostly inspired by the basic texts of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, it has caught the attention of international legislators. This is due to the introduction of the new concept of levying legal obligations of Non State Armed groups. The obligations entail the code of conduct and responsibilities that these Non State Armed groups have towards the internally displaced persons residing in the areas of their influence.

“ The Convention is a major achievement. It represents the will and determination of African States and peoples to address and resolve the problem of internal

”

displacement in Africa.

- Dr. Chaloka Beyani, UN Special Reporter 24 InFocus

Dabaab refugee camp on the Kenyan-Somali border

PHOTO: Bjørn Heidenstrøm/Flickr/CC

Non-State Armed groups are non-state actors who are defined to be any armed actor(s) operating beyond the control of the state in order to achieve a political/ non political objective. By slipping into the shoes of the government in many areas and displacing the government itself, warlords and armed groups have gained much power and local support in many parts of Africa. Their territorial control lies unchallenged; thus, there is a dire need to make them responsible under international law for acts of aggression and crimes against humanity. Their presence among the civilian population often hampers delivery of humanitarian assistance causing distrust among local and international institutions. It is therefore pertinent that they join the campaign to protect the rights of the Internally Displaced Population. Even though international humanitarian law has clearly defined laws for refugees, it has left internally displaced populations helpless at the behest of dicta-

tors. It was therefore incumbent upon the drafters of the convention to demarcate the fine line between refugees and internally displaced persons while laying the foundation of the convention. Article 1 Clause k of the convention states that “Internally Displaced Persons” means persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” It was felt that the definition must be specific to gain attention of the national community to the problems faced by this particular type of group. The clear demarcation of the two types of displaced populations helped the drafters garner the support of states whose native population is suffering at the hands of the Non State Armed Groups. The irony in the defini-

“ Displacement is a devastating experience. Those who flee or are forced to leave their homes may pay a find security but they have to heavy price.

”

- Walter Kälin, (former representative on the human rights of IDPs tion depicts that there is a need for protection of the native population from the militia even though they are both factions of the same nation. Pioneering efforts of the drafters to include accommodating language clarifies the position and responsibilities reasonably attributed to the Non State Armed groups in the African Union. Accordingly, they would be responsible towards the care and security on IDPs who are within ‘their’ territory. Arcile 4(6) requires states to modify their national criminal law in order to “declare as offences punishable by law, acts of arbitrary displacement that amount to genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity”. The Convention also provides that States Parties must hold members of Non State Armed Groups “criminally responsible for their acts which violate the rights of Internally Displaced Persons under international law and national law”. It is a measure that resonates positively with the need to restrict African states and non-state actors’ tendency to displace populations as a war or counter-insurgency strategy or in order to disenfranchise groups associated with political opposition. The fact that the convention is drafted as an instrument of international law would make it incumbent upon the actors included in its terms and conditions to adhere to the obligations they have been assigned in the convention or else face trial in respective international forums. This is essentially significant from the point of view that Article 7(5) of the convention entails some negative obligations on armed groups. These specifically prohibit them from carrying out arbitrary displacement or hampering with

the provision of protection and assistance to Internally Displaced Persons under any circumstances. Furthermore, it clarifies that they cannot deny this protected population the right to live in satisfactory conditions of dignity, including the right to security, sanitation, food, water, health and shelter. It prohibits them from separating members of the same family and restricting the freedom of movement of Internally Displaced Persons within and outside their areas of residence. One major concern that has been clarified in this convention is the prevention of recruiting children or requiring or permitting them to take part in hostilities under any circumstances. This is to overcome the persistent quandary of recruitment of child soldiers by armed groups in the member states of the African Union. It is clear that this convention of the African Union serves as a model for solving the problems faced by Internally Displaced Persons and it should be seen to be a model for the future. It is the first of its kind to encompass a whole content to solve the grave issues concerning gray areas of internal displacement. As in the case of other International Humanitarian Law instruments, the challenge will be to get Non State Armed Groups to accept the terms of the convention. This is a tough task since these groups have been subjected to the terms of this revolutionary instrument without involving them in the process of its negotiation and adoption. It now seems that international organizations like the International Committee of Red Cross and United nations bodies like UNHCR are the most appropriate forums to negotiate the terms of the convention with the Non State Armed Groups so as to constrain their actions as well as put forth their constraints.

“ The Convention represents an important achievement, but

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The other strengths of the convention are in the fact that just as other conventions of a similar nature it provides for specific rights related to nationals with its assurances based on postulates of international law. For instance the right to freedom of movement, right to live in any place of choice within our county, right for the civilian population not to be displaced outside their territory even in cases of armed conflict etc. It provides for mitigating the root causes of internal displacement. It also deals with issues of displacement during natural disasters, including climate change (Article 5 of the Convention). This convention was the first of its kind in the African Union to be discussed directly by heads of States. It has been drafted in an attempt to make a legally binding commitment to the principles discussed in the Great Lakes Protocol. The transformation of the non-binding Guiding Principles for internally displaced in 1998 (Great Lakes Protocol) to this remarkable draft has shown the determination that the Africa Union has to provide its members with the potent tool of human rights. The fact that several African states, including Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Uganda, have already developed national laws and policies based on the Internally Displaced Persons Guiding Principles is a welcome sign. It is now hoped that the world witnesses the implementation of the mandate of this convention by Non State Armed Groups, so as to enable the continent to restore the balance of peace and social responsibility to its own natives. Once the world sees the African Union implement the terms of this virtuous legal document, it shall forever applaud the initiative taken by the continent to giving a rightful place to the displaced and an oasis to its nomads.

Priyanka Vij is a first year graudate student in International Public Management at PSIA.

not an end in itself. Everything is in fact just starting as this is an indispensible tool that will serve a regional vision aiming at improving the life of the populations...

”

- Walter Kälin, (former representative on the human rights of IDPs InFocus 25

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China in Africa Chinese unconditional development assistance for African energy resources: a win-win cooperation? Philipp PETERMANN finds out.

ver since the first decolonisation movements, China has played an important role in the African continent. At that time, its objectives were twofold. On the one hand, the Chinese leadership under Mao Zedong sought the support of African countries in order to repel the recognition of Taiwan as the representative of China in the United Nations. On the other hand, China aimed at repelling Western – and maybe more importantly – Russian influence. With the economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, initiating China’s development to one of the world’s fastest growing economies with an annual growth rate of more than nine percent over the last two decades, China’s strategy towards Africa was gradually adapted to the new circumstances. What are the strategic objectives of Chinese foreign policy in the African continent and with which challenges China is thereby confronted? In a first part, we will analyze the level and intent of China’s involvement in Africa over the last ten years. China adopted an innovative strategy aiming at creating a win-win situation for both sides. The second part of the paper will examine how this approach created new challenges that are currently only partly addressed by the Chinese leadership. China’s growing need for resources and its strategy in the African continent

China’s emergence as a global player 26 InFocus

PHOTO: FIR Z/FLICKR/CC

on the economic scene has augmented its need for oil and other natural resources. In fact, China has become the second largest oil consumer (behind the U.S.) as well as the third largest oil importer. For this reason, the security and diversification of energy supplies and other strategic resources has become one of China’s most important foreign policy objectives. While the African continent accounts for a mere nine percent of world’s proven oil reserves (Middle East: 62%), experts assume that undiscovered reserves may be detected in the near future. Therefore, Africa moved gradually into the centre of attention and China has increased its involvement, becoming Africa’s largest trading partner with bilateral trade growing to nearly $115 billion in 2010. Moreover, Chinese foreign direct investment jumped from less than $0,5 billion in 2003 to more than $9 billion in 2009 and one

third of China’s imported oil comes from Africa (mainly from Angola, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan). Bearing in mind that Western companies often have decades-long relationships with the continent’s most resource abundant countries, the success of Sino-African trade may be traced back to an innovative strategy of (energy) investment. In a pragmatic foreign policy approach, the Chinese government sealed exploration and production deals with African countries by offering in return integrated packages of aid and infrastructure programs as well as military assistance. As a result, more than 1000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have made substantial investments in mining, telecommunications, infrastructure, transportation and fishery sectors – while China’s assistance to African countries has surpassed aid provided by the World Development Bank. This

The challenges for China’s strategy towards Africa However, this strategy found itself confronted with several challenges, many of them bound to China’s close ties to corrupt African authorities. For this reason, China gradually adapted its strategy in order to meet its political and economic objectives. First of all, Beijing realized that its increased investments in pariah countries exposed its companies to an unsecure and corruptive environment that is harmful for profitable business. Moreover, protecting its assets and citizens in conflict-laden countries has proven to be difficult. On account of this, Chinese companies have become more and more careful in signing investment plans with fragile regimes. Secondly, China’s increased role in world’s politics and economy has heightened Western expectations for Beijing’s global role. Because China cannot yet afford to damage its political and economic relationships with the West, the country is determined to demonstrate that it is ready to assume responsibility. For instance, Beijing stopped blocking UN Security Council resolutions authorizing peacekeepers for Darfur. Moreover, China withdrew in mid 2007 its support from Robert Mugabe’s regime, one of his oldest allies, by dropping all assistance except humanitarian aid. This represents a major shift away from its former strict non-interference policy.

Finally, and this seems to be the less addressed and therefore most dangerous challenge, China’s investment is increasingly confronted with resentment in local African communities. The majority of Africans are precluded from the benefits of China’s investments because several infrastructure deals define that the majority of labour for the project must be Chinese. But Africans not only have limited employment opportunities, they are also confronted with bad working conditions and low pay. For example, eleven Zambian coalmine workers were shot and wounded by Chinese managers in 2010 during a demonstration against poor worker treatment. This disrespect for worker welfare might politically backlash in the long term when it creates anti-Chinese rhetoric and actions. For instance, a Zambian opposition presidential candidate ran his 2006 election campaign on the slogan “Zambia for Zambians”, urging for repelling Chinese influence in the country. If China does not adapt its involvement towards a more worker-friendly strategy, this scenario might become political reality. This seems even more possible when one bears in mind the recent revolutions in North Africa where the people were ready to take the future into their own hands. Conclusion As we have seen, China’s strategy towards Africa has been very successful by creating win-win situations for both sides. China was able to benefit from Africa’s resources while African countries benefitted from Chinese (unconditional) aid and assistance programs. But the unrestricted support for pariah states has created un-

desired economic and political side effects. While Beijing has recognized these challenges and adapted its foreign policy approach, it must be prudent not to overlook the African people. Only when Chinese companies are ready to share parts of their profits with the local population through improving labour opportunities, working conditions and payment, the current strategy can remain successful.

Philipp Petermann is a Sciences-Po undergraduate student currently at Columbia University for his third year.

BIBLIOGRAPHY HANSON, Stephanie: China, Africa and Oil, Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/ china/china-africa-oil/p9557. HU, Raymond: Chinese Investment in Africa: A Dangerous Game, American Foreign Policy, 2011, http://afpprinceton.com/2011/03/chinese-investment-in-africa-a-dangerous-game/. KLEINE-AHLBRAND, Stephanie and SMALL, Andrew: China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs, 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/63045/stephanie-kleine-ahlbrandt-andandrew-small/chinas-new-dictatorship-diplomacy. LYMAN, Princeton: China’s Rising Role in Africa, Council on Foreign Relations, 2005, http://www.cfr. org/china/chinas-rising-role-africa/p8436 MEDEIROS, Evan S.: The African Dimension in China’s Foreign Policy, Rand Corporation, 2006. SPENCER, Richard: China is to withdraw backing for Mugabe, The Telegraph, 2007, http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1561824/Chinais-to-withdraw-backing-for-Mugabe.html

Future of China-Africa Relations held at World Economic Forum 2011 earlier this year in South Africa

PHOTO: ERIC MILLER/FLICKR/CC

aid takes several forms such as financial assistance (millions annually, estimates vary), debt relief (e.g. $1.27 billion in debt to 31 African nations in 2003), technical assistance (e.g. training doctors), cultural exchange programs (via the establishment of “Confucius Institutes”) or infrastructure development (e.g. stadiums in Mali, Djibouti and the CAR). Moreover, China’s development assistance – in contrast to Western programs – remains unconditional and not bound to human rights or governance standards. This non-interference in domestic affairs and the separation of business and politics make China’s investment plans attractive for pariah and rogue states that lack the support of the international community (e.g. Sudan, Zimbabwe). In addition, China did not shy away from offering limited but consistent military assistance to these countries. For instance, Zimbabwe benefited from a $240 million arms deal.

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InFocus 27

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Road Back to RWANDA Cicero Krupp DA LUZ looks at catastrophe, justice and development in the country.

PHOTO: THE DILLY LAMA/WIKICOMMONS/CC

Victims of the brutal genocide

wanda: a country that bears the scars of the largest African massacre of the modern age. Nonetheless, after its initial recovery period involving both international and national trials, Rwanda is surprising even the most optimistic predictions of its development. Despite being faced with the challenges of being a developing country and a torturous national memory of genocide, Rwanda is able to dream again. This East African country had a population of roughly seven million people in 1994, composed of three ethnic groups: Hutu (approximately 85%), Tutsi (14%) and Twa (1%). The animosity between the majority Hutus and minority Tutsis had grown substantially since the colonial period, even if the two ethnic groups were, at least on paper, very similar - the same language, same areas, same traditions. However, both have been engaged in civil war conflicts in 1959, 1963, 1966, 1973, and almost annually since 1990. Over the years, the contentious cultural divides and the continued experience of impunity on the part of international actors permitted violence to proliferate with mounting strength and speed.1 Through manipulation of media and skillful political maneuvering, Juvenal Habyarimana, the then-president and a

28 InFocus

Hutu, had exacerbated the division between Hutus and Tutsis by the end of 1992. The catalyst of the tragedy, however, was not until April 6, 1994, when Habyarimana’s plane was shot down over Kigali airport, resulting in his death. Within hours, a campaign of violence had spread from the capital throughout the country, and did not see a decline for three months. Between April and June, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed. Most of the dead were Tutsis, and most of their executioners, Hutus.2 The statistics are still hard to believe: an estimated 250,000 women had been widowed; at least 100,000 children had been separated from their families, orphaned, lost, abducted or abandoned; more than 300 children, some less than ten years old, were accused of genocide or murder; 300,000 children were thought to have been killed.3 The country was destroyed and the population was in pandemonium. Anything from stocks of basic drugs to water supply were squandered. Hospitals, schools and the most of public facilities were in ruins and any qualified staff had been killed or fled the country.

Only six judges and ten lawyers remained in the entire country. In order to successfully make a fresh start, there were crucial yet daunting tasks to be achieved: enforce justice to treat the past, rebuild the economy for present development, effective public policies to build a new future. Justice for Rwanda The consequences of the Rwandan situation are reflected in a series of measures taken by the international community, particularly the United Nations, which serve to prevent similar events from recurring. The Security Council of UN created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute cases.4 The ICTR was established particularly for the prosecution of those responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed within Rwanda’s borders, as well as of Rwandans responsible for violations committed in neighboring territory between 1st January and December 31, 1994.5 UN Security Council, in its Resolution 955, authorized its jurisdiction on November 8, 1994. According to this Resolution, the situation in Rwanda constituted a threat to international peace and security as defined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Government of Rwanda also requested the establishment of an international tribunal, but Rwanda´s representative in the Security Council voted against Reso-

“ In order to successfully make a fresh start, there were crucial yet daunting tasks to be achieved: enforce justice to treat the past, rebuild the economy for present development, effective public policies to build a new future.

”

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Survivors and perpetrators together

PHOTO: DAVID FULLERTON/RWANDAN STORIES.ORG

lution 955, which implemented the ICTR. It was the hope of the Rwandan government that the International Tribunal would investigate and prosecute most, if not all, of the thousands of detainees in Rwandan prisons. When the government realized that would not happen, it revoked its support of the ICTR. The ICTR judged 65 completed cases, condemning 38, but the impunity of Rwanda crimes remained unsolved.6 Overcrowded prisons always were and still are a real issue. In 1999, five years after the genocide, about 120,000 alleged genocide criminals were being held in Rwanda’s prisons.7 Faced with a seemingly irreparable problem and a halting legal system, it was necessary to create another channel through which justice could be guaranteed. This ultimately led to the adoption of a local ancient judiciary form known as gacaca. While it offered a potentially successful alternative, it was highly controversial, as it allowed community participation in the prosecution. The hope was clearly that such a shift would ultimately use the past to make a transition to the future. Initially very difficult to administer (since all demanded a formal means of justice such as through ICTR), this national judicial system with very informal procedures and courts, has today prosecuted around 1.5 million cases8 – all thanks to the involvement from local communities across the country. While some were fair and objective sentences, others, for example, delivered solitary confinement for life on the basis of little evidence. This, however, is an inevitability of any judicial system, be it France, the U.S. or Rwanda. Changing patterns of economy and public policy: moving toward the future

While successful in procuring a local solution for its judicial system, Rwanda also needed to face emerging issues: the economy needed to grow by itself, despite international aid. And so it has; today, everything from methane extractors to tourism restaurants, as well as universities, technical schools, and preschools, are opening up. Public policies were central for this period of success. As is very well known, one of the most severe health problems in the whole of Africa is AIDS, and Rwanda is no exception. However, due to good public management of international investment aid, the rates of HIV/AIDS in the country have fallen dramatically over the last decade. Today, the adult HIV prevalence rate is less than 3%, down from 13% in 2000.9 Rwanda is also committed to addressing “developed countries worries”, like environment. It will probably reach its target of 30 percent forest coverage by 2013, seven years ahead of schedule. It plans to plant 44 million trees by the end of 2012. The current forest coverage is about 21 percent, which is also vital for tourism as the Gorillas Mountains are extremely attractive to international tourists. Six years ago, the country struggled to get tourists in for $375 permits to visit the mountain gorillas, whereas today during high season there are not enough $500 tickets to meet the demand.10 According to Josh Ruxin, in 2020, Rwanda intends to be on par with Brazil, Thailand, and other nations that have pulled themselves out of poverty in recent decades. The author also emphasizes that “All of this development is important to recognize because it has been the government’s express policy to deliver basic services and economic growth to its people

The gacaca: a local, ancient judiciary system - highly controversial as it allowed community participation in the prosecution. A sutiable alternative to speed up judgments? in order to mitigate genocide ideology”11 . Entering Rwanda nowadays, you easily find anything from supermarkets to universities. You can buy a cell phone or use the brand new roads to travel across the country. Rwanda has undeniably seen much development in a short time, but is it enough? Many challenges remain, such as poverty, overpopulation and limited political and civil rights. Though it has seen advancements, poverty still affects about 40% of the population. In average, every woman gives birth to six children. This means that today Rwanda holds a population of 11 million, and it will hold an estimated 14 million by 2020. If current rates remain constant, in 10 years 70% of the population size will have been born after the 1994 genocide12. In accordance to Humans Rights Watch World Report of 2011, while the development and economic growth continue, violations of civil and political rights have also increased, and “the government failed to fulfill its professed commitment to democracy”13. Last year, President Paul Kagame was re-elected with 93.8 percent of the vote in an election in which he faced no significant opposition. InFocus 29

DOSSIER At the same time, human rights organizations encountered hostility and numerous obstacles to their work. The same violations were reported by Amnesty International , including the restrictions on freedom of expression and association before the elections. Though free from the experience, the next generations will still feel the wounds of 1994 – that scar may remain forever. Regardless, it does seem evident that Rwanda, though faced with challenges and limited resources, seems committed to guaranteeing a bright future of development and opportunity. Cicero Krupp da Luz is an exchange student at PSIA and a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the University of Sao Paulo (FAPESP Scholarship) . Data and detailed information from The United Nations Human Rights Council “Genocide in Rwanda”. 2 BBC News United Kingdom. “Rwanda: How the genocide happened”. 17 May 2011. 3 Rwandan Stories is a website created for information about the genocide, aftermath and recovery of Rwanda, having John Steward as the main responsible. <http://www.rwandanstories.org> 4 Moreover, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, observing the failures of humanitarian intervention that had occurred in Rwanda (as well as Srebrenica, Somalia, and Kosovo) recognized the need to build a new concept for humanitarian protection. This concept was the responsibility to protect (R2P), which is comprised of three objectives: to prevent, to react, and to rebuild In: United Nations: <http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/ responsibility.shtml> 5 SHRAGA, Daphna; ZACKLIN, Ralph. “The International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda.” European Journal of International Law (1996) 501-518. 6 Final Report United Nations Security Council Document “S/1994/1115”. 7 For further information about “gacaca”, Rwandan Stories Op. Cit. 8 Humans Rights Watch World Report “Rwanda”. January 2011. 9 Extracts from the Canadian Medical Association Journal, cited in Rwandan Stories Op. cit. 10 RUXIN, Josh. “16 Years after the Genocide, Rwanda Continues Forward”. The New York Times. April 6, 2010. 11 RUXIN, Josh. Op. Cit. 12 Ibid. 13 Humans Rights Watch World Report “Rwanda” . January 2011. 14 International Amnesty Annual Report 2011 “Rwanda”. 1

30 InFocus

Dr. Frannie Léautier is the Executive Secretary of the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). A Tanzanian national, she served as Vice President of the World Bank and Head of the World Bank Institute from 2001 to 2007. Among other things, she is currently the Secretary of the Board for the Nelson Mandela Institute for Science and Technology in Africa and founding Board member of the African Institute for Governing with Integrity.

Thoughts on your home country, given your extensive work abroad My experience [abroad] has provided me with important benchmarks and lessons which have proved very useful to transfer back to my country of origin. However, I have also learned to appreciate aspects that I took for granted in [Tanzania]: the investment the early political leaders made in developing human capacity for example. The early efforts at building institutional capacity which has secured social and political stability in Tanzania are lessons I have shared... in other contexts. Africa the thought vs Africa the reality There are a large number of creative and imaginative people in Africa who succeed under very challenging circumstances. There are also many misconceptions about Africa that put highrisk premiums on what would otherwise be seen as excellent opportunities. But I see the gaps shrinking and a better realization of what the potential of Africa is by outside stakeholders and a growing confidence on individual capabilities of young Africans within the continent. The state of science and technology in Africa Africa has lagged behind other regions in its investment in education in the sciences and in its linkages between universities and the world of work which has caused a deficit in the development of the scientific and technological solutions. The Nelson Mandela Institute for Science and Technology tackles this deficit head on by creating an environment whereby young people can be trained in the sciences and engineering and do so... such that the issues they learn are relevant to the scientific challenges needing resolution on the continent. 'African Institute for Governing with Integrity' The African Institute for Governing with Integrity works with young leaders and change agents, helping them develop their skills in the area of accountable governance, and supports graduating fellows in their projects and programs of change that they manage in their countries and organizations of origin. As such the young people [are provided] guidance and mentoring.

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GHANA: La Malediction Des Ressources Naturelles? Alexander Wang analyse la nécessaire réforme des institutions pour inciter au changement au Ghana

e débat sur la « Percée de l'Afrique » devrait placer le phénomène de malédiction des ressources comme étant l'un des obstacles les plus sérieux au développement de la région. Au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années, de nombreux pays, riches en ressources naturelles, ont souffert d'une très faible croissance, d’une corruption omniprésente, et même souvent de désordres internes. Paradoxalement, ces pays souffrent davantage de ce genre de problèmes que les pays dépourvus de ressources naturelles. Dans ce contexte, la découverte de nouvelles ressources énergétiques au Ghana pose la question de savoir si leur exploitation en vaut vraiment la peine ? Une grande partie de la littérature académique porte sur l'analyse rétrospective des pays ayant subi la malédiction des ressources, aussi connu sous le terme le « paradoxe de l’abondance». Un des exemples les plus souvent cité est celui du Nigeria où l’absence d'institutions stables au moment de la découverte des ressources pétrolières a accentué leur affaiblissement et a contribué à l’intensification de la corruption. Si, jusqu’ici, la recherche académique n’a pas su apporter l’attention nécessaire à l’aspect préventif de la malédiction des ressources, il faut noter néanmoins que lorsque le Ghana a découvert de grandes réserves de pétrole au large de ses côtes en 2007 (les champs pétrolifères du Jubilee), de nombreux chercheurs et acteurs politiques ont commencé à se poser la question de savoir comment le Ghana pouvait éviter le « paradoxe de l’abondance » et se transformer en un modèle de développement réussi ? Afin d’établir une analyse sur cette question, la Freedom House International - une organisation de surveillance – a confié cette tâche à une équipe d’étudiants diplômés de l'Ecole des Affaires Publiques et Internationales de l'Université Columbia (une école partenaire de Sciences

Po). Sous la direction du professeur Jenik Radon, ancien collègue du président du Ghana à la Stanford Law, et une équipe d’étudiants de formations et spécialités diverses, comprenant des citoyens Ghanéens, notre étude visait à compléter cette brèche, jusqu’ici limitée, de la littérature académique. En adoptant une approche novatrice afin d’analyser les institutions du pays, nous avons évité tout jugement de valeur qui sont, malheureusement, souvent monnaie courante dans le domaine du développement, et nous nous sommes concentrés sur les obstacles principaux du pays afin échapper à la malédiction des ressources. La recherche menée a éclairé de nombreuses questions qui représentent des défis récurrents pour les économies émergentes, riches en ressources telles que la gestion des ressources, le conflit d'intérêt dans les agences anti-corruption, le renforcement institutionnel, et des contrats avec les investisseurs internationaux. Tous ces problèmes s’appliquent aussi de façon pertinente pour de nombreux pays voisins du Ghana. La conclusion générale a été que bien que le Ghana ait manifesté sa volonté de surmonter ces défis en engageant des réformes conséquentes, de nombreuses erreurs sont malgré tout survenues en chemin. Ces erreurs, cependant, étaient connues du public, puisque la société civile au Ghana a été très loquace sur ces questions de gouvernance. Les pays où la corruption est présente et qui ont également des sociétés civiles solides, démontrent que la société civile n'est pas une condition préalable à la création d’institutions nationales. A l’inverse, les pays modèles qui sont parvenus à réduire sensiblement la corruption en leur sein dans un court laps de temps sont également ceux qui avaient historiquement des sociétés civiles faibles telles que Singapour et un pays voisin – le Botswana. Ceci suggère, contraire-

ment aux idées reçues dans le domaine du développement des institutions démocratiques, que la société civile sert plutôt de complément au renforcement des institutions dans les économies de ressources et n’est pas un prérequis essentiel. Par ailleurs, la corruption endémique dans des pays à la société civile dynamique, comme l'Italie, la France et de nombreux autres pays montre qu’une telle affirmation est crédible. Heureusement, le gouvernement du Ghana essaye de faire face aux défis en adoptant des réformes conséquente pour minimiser la corruption, telle que la création de mécanismes de contrôle au sein des organismes de réglementation et en étant plus vigilants avec les contrats pétroliers. Par ailleurs, on trouve au Ghana une société civile dynamique de laquelle a découlé une transparence accrue de la part du gouvernement. Ainsi, le défi de prévention contre la malédiction des ressources demeure la diversification de l’économie par le renforcement des secteurs autres que les secteurs d’export (le pétrole et les matières premières). Une stratégie plus prudente de gestion des revenus doit être adoptée. Le projet de loi actuel permettra la mise en place d'une garantie constitutionnelle des revenus pétroliers. Néanmoins, cette loi pourrait entraîner l'accumulation d’une dette extérieure et pourrait entraîner des dépenses gouvernementales supérieures aux moyens réels ce qui pourrait finalement compromettre les perspectives de développement. Le manque d’innovation dans le domaine du contrôle et de la surveillance de la structure administrative actuelle est également un problème, car, malgré la volonté politique actuelle du Ghana d'adopter les réformes nécessaires, si le gouvernement n’entreprend pas de réformes il reste difficile d'imaginer un scénario dans lequel les gouvernements suivants se soucieront des intérêts du pays dans le futur. InFocus 29

DOSSIER La réforme institutionnelle et la gestion des ressources ne sont pas chose facile. Avant qu'un pays puisse échapper à la mauvaise répartition des ressources entre les fonctionnaires corrompus, la corruption doit tout d'abord être réduite. Ceci est soutenu par la preuve que même une société civile forte n'est pas suffisante pour induire les changements nécessaires étant donné que les rendements tirés de la richesse des ressources l'emportent sur les coûts et les risques juridiques potentiels pour de nombreux fonctionnaires. Par conséquent, un changement institutionnel efficace dans les économies basées sur les ressources naturelles exige une approche gouvernementale et non pas citoyenne. Tourmenté par la bureaucratie, le chevauchement de juridictions, des conflits d'intérêts entre les entités de financement des organismes de réglementation et le manque d'institutions développées et contrôlées, la transparence et la plani-

fication à long terme d'une économie durable, un catalyseur est nécessaire pour construire des institutions solides et pour répondre aux défis de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles au Ghana. Malgré une volonté politique sans faille, cette tâche est rendue plus difficile à cause de l’incontournable collision avec les paradigmes de gouvernances des institutions actuelles. Les sacrifices exigés présentent un paradoxe. D'une part, des réformes englobantes mais nécessaires, peuvent rendre le gouvernement mécontent car elles nécessitent de réduire un pouvoir politique déjà déséquilibré et de le redistribuer d’une manière plus égale et équilibrée. D'autre part, au fur et à mesure que le développement du pays se poursuit, des impôts plus élevés seront nécessaires pour créer une structure de représentation politique plus durable mais qui naturellement sera impopulaire parmi les citoyens. Ainsi, si le titulaire du pouvoir ne réussit pas à mener à bien ces réformes lors de son mandat, sa réélection et la cohérence

Yumiko Yamamoto is a Doctorate Candidate at Sciences Po-CERI. She is a specialist of international aid in West Africa. Currently she is working on comparative aid policies of India, China and Japan.

des politiques économiques et sociales, qui doivent elles aussi évoluer au rythme exigé par les circonstances, ne pourront être plausibles. Seul l’avenir nous dira si le pétrole au Ghana donnera à son économie l'impulsion dont elle a besoin pour devenir un modèle régional. Il est important d'établir les institutions formelles stables de sorte que le Ghana puisse bénéficier de ses ressources naturelles en suivant le modèle d’autres pays qui ont déjà réussi la transition, tel que la Norvège. Cela nécessitera une forte volonté politique et des sacrifices -catalyseurs qui devront être négociés avec soin.

Alexander Wang est un candidat de l’Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Économiques .

tee (DAC): since they are non-member of OECDDAC, their loan aid project is not necessary to include 25% grant, while DAC donors are obliged to include it as well as to respect certain common regulations such as excluding corrupted or human rights non-respecting countries (cf. Angola, Zimbabwe… ) from their aid distribution circuit.

Do China and India consider themselves on On the other side, not having the historical conpar with Africa, or do they hold the same text of colonial relations with African countries, perceptions as the developed world towards China and India see West African countries as the continent? more equal economical and commercial partners, Chinese and Indian approach to African de- while industrial countries have been traditionally velopment is very different from that of industri- seeing those countries as, at first, the major destialised countries. In the domain of development nation of their development aid, due to the poverty aid to West Africa, Chinese political interest and political instability that the region has been constitutes an important dimension of their en- faced. In another word, China and India are free tire action, while India searches economical and from the negative perception on West Africa. These commercial returns when it provides aid. These freedom that China and India have, differentiate political and economical/commercial motivations their perception towards West Africa from that of can be maximised by China and India, but it is industrialised countries. not the case for industrialised countries. But, by the recent Chinese and Indian increasThe major reason for maximising their gain is, ing engagement to Africa (since 2000), this traon one side, the freedom that China and India can ditional perception of industrialised countries toexercise as being outside of international conven- wards West Africa is probably going to change… tion such as OECD Development Aid Commit-

32 InFocus

DOSSIER

Scramble for the Nile Viktoriya KERELSKA looks at the challenges and prospects for Nile river management

PHOTO: PHOTOGRAPHER/STIE/CC

It has pushed all Nile riparian states to deal with a pressing dilemma: to accommodate the imminent need for cooperation with ever-growing national concerns. The Nile river management has thus become a strategic game in which various factors such as history, politics, economic development, population growth and environmental concerns shape the behavior of the parties involved. The deeply-rooted interplay of numerous interests will be the major determinant for the destiny of the Nile river basin regime, and by default, that of the peace on the African continent in the near future.

welve years ago, the ten signatory parties to the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) had a dream: to “achieve sustainable socioeconomic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources”. Established in 1999 by Burundi, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, one of the main NBI’s goals was to set up the framework for a new Nile River agreement that would update existing water management provisions. However, the elaboration of a Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) introduced a major dividing line between NBI’s partners with respect to the 1929 and the 1959 Nile treaties: the first gave Egypt veto power over any water projects in the Nile delta that

could be deemed harmful to Egypt’s interests; the second assigned full utilization of the Nile’s waters between Egypt and Sudan that the two countries vigorously sought to preserve under the CFA as well. Tensions between NBI’s partners came to a high point in May 2010 when Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda signed the CFA in order to modify the colonial-era agreements that had so far deprived them from access to an equal share of the river’s flow. The Nile water management picture got even more complicated as the Arab Sring’s turmoil exacerbated Egypt’s intentions to protect its strategic interests in the river’s water allocation while the independence of South Sudan, in July 2011, brought an eleventh riparian state in the Nile river dispute. Water scarcity has upped the stake.

In fact, the eleven riparian states Burundi, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda shape their national approaches firstly according to locally specific challenges. Geographical and climate specifications make for variations in the Nile’s water volume along its 6,650 km basin. While upstream states as Ethiopia, located in humid regions, can generally profit from greater rainfalls, downstream states, such as Egypt or Sudan, are much more dependent on Nile’s water. Concurrently, national interests will have to adjust to the shift in global trends that are projected to affect the African continent by 20501, namely a significant population growth entailing an increase in food and energy demand further exacerbated by global warming consequences. Changes are already visible since high temperatures due to the greenhouse effect and climate change have contributed to the decrease of Nile’s volume and have led to a significant reduction of underground waters. The development of socio-economic activities in the Nile delta went hand in hand with a greater level of pollution and deforestation along the river’s basin. Thus, a greater water demand in all riparian countries will makes the Nile a critical and existential resource to all states conInFocus 33

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cerned and will require a greater cooperation among them. Cooperation perspectives for the Nile, however, hit a stumbling block because of Egypt’s efforts to preserve the status quo. The country has the most to lose from possible amendments to water treaties, since the Nile is the country’s lifeline since the times of the pharaohs. On the one hand, 90% of the 80mn Egyptian population lives in a narrow valley along the Nile banks, which accounts for only 3% of the total Egyptian territory, the rest being desert lands. Egypt, whose population is projected to grow to 115mn by 2050 , is already experiencing serious water deficit and is struggling to accommodate its population growth with a food security dilemma and the derived need for more agricultural lands. On the other hand, the river gives access to trading routes which have been major drivers in the country’s rise as a leading economic and military power in the region. This transformation, the argument goes, would not have been possible without the 1929 and 1959 Nile treaties which not only allocated 90% of the river’s water to Egypt and Sudan, but also assigned Egypt with a veto power over any water project along the Nile basin that could potentially reduce water flow to the country . It is for this reason that the CFA represents a “national threat” in the eyes of Egyptians for it will modify colonial arrangements deemed essential to the survival of the nation. However, other riparian states deem the Nile vital to their survival as well. Ethiopia, where 86% of the Nile flow originates, was the first to oppose colonial-era provisions favoring, for more than half a century, the Egyptian and Sudanese population, totaling 130mn at the expense of the 240mn rest. Securing water access is of existential importance to Ethiopia for it has recently overtaken Egypt as Africa’s second most populous state and 40% of its population depends on erratic rainfalls for farming. The country counts on developing its hydro-power potential by building a series of micro-dams to address increasing energy demand at home and to export cheap electricity to neighboring countries. The construction of the Grand Millennium Dam (GMD), started in April 2011, set the first stage of Ethiopia’s plans to become a hydro-power in the region. Yet, economic shortcomings temporarily 34 InFocus

put to a halt the country’s ambitions since neither the World Bank nor private institutions have agreed to help finance the $3 to 4.8 bn required for the erection of the GMD. Moreover, socio-economic development concerns dictate the will of other riparian states, primarily Kenya and Tanzania, to revise colonial treaties in order to open new prospects for fisheries, access to potable water, energy and agriculture in the Great Lakes’ region. Since 2004, Kenya has raised its voice against the restrictions on the use of Lake Victoria’s waters that have made the country dependent on food-imports from Egypt. Moreover, fast growing populations in Burundi and Rwanda have pushed both states to seek new opportunities for agricultural development in the reallocation of the Nile flow. Egypt also has to worry about bringing an eleventh riparian state – South Sudan – in the water quarrel for several reasons. Prior to separation, Sudan’s oil resources offered the country the opportunity to pursue its economic development by becoming a rentier state at the example of Middle Eastern states. Independence provisions however accorded South Sudan 50% of the oil and thus pushed Sudan to stick to water resources in order to irrigate its fertile lands and uphold its position as the breadbasket of the Arab world.2 South Sudan has indicated its intentions to demand a share of Sudan’s water rights under the 1959 Treaty; if the two sides fail to a reach an agreement with regard to the reparation of water flow, it could lead to a potentially destabilizing situation in an already complicated Nile regime framework. South Sudan also has to deal with the degradation of the Sudd, the biggest freshwater swamp in the Nile basin, where pollution due to the long civil war conflict in Sudan and the evaporation of a large volume of the wetland waters are a serious concern for local authorities. Moreover, in September 2011 South Sudan sought membership in the NBI thus justifying Egyptian fears of a new rival for the Nile waters share. Thus, the emerging hydro-political powers of Ethiopia and Kenya and an expanding NBI’s framework challenged Egyptian hegemony over the Nile and set Egyptian authorities into an emergency mode. Crisis, both internal and external, is indeed a possible scenario: the dam

construction in Ethiopia will decrease the Nile flow to Egypt by 30% thus exacerbating the water deficit already imacting its economy; and the firm Egyptian resistance to amendments in existing treaties makes cooperation unlikely. Even if Egypt was to cooperate, it has already undermined its stronghold position among NBI’s fellow parties. It has spent enormous time and efforts in arguing that the signing of the CFA is not legitimate. The unwillingness to engage in a constructive debate could potentially undermine their economic goals in other African states. Becoming more cooperative could help Egyptian authorities maximize the outcome of a revised Nile management provisions. For instance, collaboration between Ethiopia and Egypt, the two states with the highest stakes in the dispute, could bring about a win-win outcome for all parties concerned. Since Ethiopia has much bigger water resources that Egypt, it needs the technological and engineering know-how to develop them; by engaging its foreign policy with Ethiopia’s hydropower development, Egypt will contribute towards employment in exchange for cheaper food imports. At the same time, the country will send a strong signal to the rest of the riparian states that it is ready to uphold a development strategy for the Nile basin to the benefit of all. Ultimately, non-cooperation could turn out to be much more costly than teamwork; as John Nyaro, Kenya’s director of water resources says, "Where there is no rule of law, the rule of the jungle does not provide peace”3. Water scarcity sharpens the interests of all Nile riparian states, but most importantly it sharpens their sensibilities to rejection. Egypt’s longtime refusal to bring about the equal utilization the Nile River makes the possibility of a Viktoriya Kerelska is a graduate student at PSIA, studying International Energy. TESFAYE Aaron, “The political economy of the Nile basin regime in the twentieth century”, The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008, p. 59 2 South Sudan and the hydro-politics of the Nile basin, http://www.waterpolitics.com/2011/05/07/ south-sudan-and-the-hydro-politics-of-the-nilebasin/ 3 East Africa seeks more Nile water from Egypt, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8682387.stm 1

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The Ambassador of All An extraordinary woman’s journey and her exemplary work in Africa through the eyes of Avi Cohen

PHOTO: AFRICA CENTRE, BGU, ISRAEL

"There is a raw and elemental energy in Africa that does not seem to exist anywhere else in the world. It may have something to do with the fact that Africa is the birthplace of all humanity. For all humans, to go to Africa is to go home". - Lyall Watson, “LIGHTENING BIRD”

o better quote fits so adequately the admirable life of the late Dr. Tamar Golan, my mentor, a true inspiration and a legend during her life and most certainty after. It is almost impossible to summarize a life so eventful and dynamic, such as the life of Dr. Golan. Nevertheless, I will try to share with you the story of a woman who was larger than life itself.

I met Dr. Golan in 2009, as an undergraduate student at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. Dr. Golan was a well-known figure among academics and students, mostly for her unique teaching methods and the annual African dinner she hosted for students at her home. Those who were lucky to attend this event got the chances to see Tamar's beautiful museum of African art, taste African cooking and hear stories that left them yearning for more. I was instantly charmed by her charismatic personality and found myself eager to learn more about the fascinating person who later was to become the greatest influence in my life. Tamar was born in 1933 in Haifa. As a socially aware teenager she became deeply involved in a local youth movement, Hashomer Hatzair, which shaped many of her values and ideology. She later arrived at Kibbutz Lahav, a remote peripheral collective community. In a short time this place would become for her a home and

its people her family. On the Kibbutz, Tamar met her husband, Avihu and in 1961 they travelled together to Ethiopia on an educational mission at the Agricultural College in Harar City on behalf of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was Tamar's first encounter with Africa, but it was also her hardest. During this trip, Avihu was killed by a truck in a hit and run accident, in front of his beloved wife. At the age of 25, Tamar found herself a widow and in much pain. Since that awful day, Tamar wore only white, a symbol of mourning in African tradition.

rights. A year ago, Tamar showed me the note Malcolm X gave her, a dedicated personal message which read, “Only those who have already experienced a revolution within themselves can reach out effectively touching others”.

She returned to Israel to continue her educational work, this time in Haifa with Muslim minorities, becoming the first Jewish teacher in an Arab school.

This period in 1967, after the Six Day War, was a crucial year for Tamar’s professional future. In New York she met Mr. Ido Decenchek, editor at the Israeli Maariv daily newspaper who offered her a position as the newspaper’s Africa correspondent. Her freelance status also allowed her to report for the BBC’s African Service, the British Observer and the Israeli Army station. Her frequent reports and writing identified her as a symbol of uncompromising ethics, a rare type of brave journalism that brought forth true stories of 1970s Africa.

In the mid 60’s, Tamar went to Columbia University in New York to obtain a PHD, focusing on Congo’s history. At Columbia, Tamar met people who left an indelible impact on her, one of whom was Malcolm X. Tamar was moved by the African-American fight for equality and

During her journalistic work in Zaire she came close to being murdered by food poisoning in 1967, not just because of her presence as an Israeli reporter but also due to her personal relationship with a Nigerian prince, the son of the Emir of Kano, who at the time was serving as Nigeria’s InFocus 35

DOSSIER tablished the Israeli Embassy in a country that was still embroiled in a civil war and worked hard under impossible conditions. She gradually became one of the most recognized names in Luanda. In her coauthored book “Gorillas and Diplomacy” (2006) it is written: “In our story, just as Angola itself, there is in a mixture, life and death, war and peace, children without childhood and adults yearning for their lost innocent childhood; women and men, tough fighters who suddenly discover the softness and warmth of their souls, a betrayal in tradition and the return to it”.

PHOTO: AFRICA CENTRE, BGU, ISRAEL

With President Houphouet Boigny and Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Geneva 1990

Ambassador to Zaire. Fearing for her life, Tamar escaped Zaire to Congo Brazzaville in an overnight operation that resembled a scene from a Hollywood movie. The Nigerian Prince was removed from his diplomatic position and made to return to his country. Alone, Tamar then stationed herself at Abidjan, a departure point to different parts of Africa. Tamar’s travels in African countries often entailed stories one could only imagine. She covered the Nigerian-Biafran War and almost died from malaria in Côte d’Ivoire. And of course, her encounterswith African tyrants. Tamar, equipped with a red-head’s chutzpah, used her abilities as a reporter to confront them in news conferences. One such tyrant was Mobutu, Zaire’s infamous ruler, on whom Tamar wrote in her must-read book Africa Africa (1988), “Even the terrible Mobutu, who had many reasons to dislike me, was still accustomed to my presence, and if his spirit was good upon seeing me would say, ‘Madam, you are still here, always on the guard, ha?’ and then would even reply to my questions”. But this bonhomie did not last, especially when Tamar confronted Mobutu with straightforward questions on the current situation of political prisoners in Zaire. Tamar feared no one, even if it meant confronting the then Israeli President Hertzog who visited Mobutu during the 1980s and was furious with, in his opinion, Tamar’s unacceptable 36 InFocus

behavior. Committed to the truth, Tamar showed the world that human rights in Africa should be a top priority. Very few know about Tamar’s central role in the re-establishment of formal relations between Israel and African countries, including the meeting between two of her closest friends, the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the late Côte d’Ivoire and African leader Félix (“Papa”) Houphouët-Boigny. Papa Houphouët and Tamar formed a true friendship, one that became an important factor in Tamar’s stand among African leaders. She was fond of Léopold Sédar Senghor, Senegal’s first President, who regularly sent his poems to Tamar before offering them to French periodicals. In 1973 Tamar moved to Paris where her apartment became a meeting point for African political oppositionists or current leaders, Israeli and Arab policy makers, Paris’ elite society and her close friends from the Kibbutz. It was during this time that Tamar formed a unique friendship with Baron Eric de Rothschild, first on the basis of mutual interest in the Namibian War of Independence and later through joint support of the advancement of Bedouin students in Israel and the establishment of the Africa Centre. In 1994, PM Rabin appointed her as the first Israeli Ambassador to Angola, a role she fulfilled for seven years. She es-

Upon completing her diplomatic service in Angola in 2001, Tamar was asked by her close friend Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos to head the National Commission for Landmine Action. The Commission worked for the removal of landmines in Angola, which at the time had the largest number of active landmines in the world. Tamar returned to Israel in 2002 but her heart remained in Africa. She began her academic career at Ben-Gurion University by leading the formation of an African Studies department and the first Africa Centre in Israel. Her classes were unforgettable and incomparable experiences. She began every first class by gifting her students Belgian chocolate and a quick history lesson, saying, “My dear

“Very few know about Tamar’s central role in the re-establishment of formal relations between Israel and Africa

”

countries

“You will not save Africa; but you will benefit incredibly from this informal and bi-cultural experience. You

!”

will get the Africa bug

With her BGU students

DOSSIER

students, this chocolate is bitter sweet, since the story behind it is filled with bitter history. These coco beans are African, most likely from Côte d’Ivoire”. Then Tamar would explain, “I will not provide you with much data, but with a lesson on awareness on the suffering of the people of Africa; To understand what tolerance is.”

after Avihu was killed?” she would reply, “When your life crashes you can stand still and drift into nostalgia, or you can go forward. Precisely to Africa, I had to prove to myself that I am not a racist. I will not blame Africans for the death of my loved one. Since that day my heart has never weakened for Africa”.

Tamar was no ordinary teacher, nor was she an ordinary person. She saw in her students the same passion she had when she was younger. “As the young generation, you all have the hunger for change, and together you can become one fist,” she would argue. When her students asked, “Why did you go back to Africa

Her way of continuing the connection to Africa was by launching a flagship volunteering program called “The Africa Initiative”. By using the force of motivated students she sent an annual delegation of students to various African countries to volunteer in local villages and communities. She insisted that the students go to areas that received little attention from the West, NGOs and international organizations. I was privileged to work on this project at the Africa Centre with Tamar. We successfully sent out delegations to Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Ghana, Cameroon and Angola. Tamar’s emphasis to the students was, “to learn as much as you can from the African culture and people. You will not save Africa,” she would laugh, “but you will benefit incredibly from this informal and bi-cultural experience. You will get the Africa bug!” On March 30th 2011, Tamar Golan passed away at the age of 78. A woman who had possessed strength like no other, a veritable human database on Africa, who always replied, when faced with numerous requests for assistance with Africa-related issues, “As long as it is for Africa.”

PHOTOS TOP AND BOTTOM: AFRICA CENTRE, BGU, ISRAEL

With Avihu, her beloved husband

I learned an immeasurable amount from Tamar, both professionally and personally. I respect her courage, persistence and unusual character which reflected the person she was. Tamar was many things: a journalist, a human rights advocate, Mama Golan, the woman in white, a noble lady, a political activist, an inspirational lecturer, a friend, a colleague and the ambassador of all. She lives in my heart as a beautiful image, an image that inspired me greatly. Her eternal presence is my very own Africa, the home that I return to. Avi Cohen is a first year graduate student at PSIA in International Development and Global Economic Policy.

InFocus 37

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TUNISIA: Back to the Streets Tunisia’s post-revolutionary reality as captured by Krista Moore

first visited Tunisia in fall 2008 during a university semester abroad, choosing the destination on a whim. After obtaining my Bachelor’s degree in 2010 I took a year off and found myself eager to return to Tunisia, so I secured a position as an office assistant with an American study abroad program. When I booked my ticket last fall I was excited to see how Tunisia had changed but I never expected these changes to be revolutionary. Watching the January 14 revolution unfold on every news channel from my home in the United States was surreal. When I studied abroad three years ago, well-wishers asked me how things were going in Morocco or Tanzania. Now everyone knows Tunisia. Fortunately by March of this year the security situation had improved enough for me to board a plane to Tunis.

I do not claim here to present an expert analysis of the Tunisian Revolution, despite having studied the country. These are not just new roads being travelled; these are roads just now being drafted onto a map. I also acknowledge my own position. Despite passing the spring in Tunisia and developing close friendships there, I 38 InFocus

would never claim that I truly know what it is like to live in a post-revolutionary society. After all, when curfews returned or demonstrators were tear-gassed in Tunis, I knew if necessary I could leave with a quick phone call to Lufthansa. Yet by acknowledging my position as an outsider I do not intend to undermine my observations. Indeed the chance to live in Tunisia in two completely different époques highlighted many changes for me. It showed me how what feels ‘normal’ can evolve. I hope the snapshots presented here give insight into a moment of history that still lacks easy description or categorization. A moment equally and palpably full of chaos and jubilation, determination and confusion. A moment in which decades of sociopolitical norms were abruptly peeled away, and what was underneath continues to evolve even as I write this. Even as you read this. I lived in Tunis and its suburbs, where visible changes surrounded me. I will never forget my first arrival in 2008. Driving down an empty highway at night after leaving the airport, I saw billboard after billboard of the same face: that of now ex-president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. These billboards seemed to watch every move. I had hoped to include a photo here for context, before realizing I had none; three years ago I was not allowed to take photos of his portrait. These omnipresent eyes are gone now. When I returned to Tunis in March they were in tatters and by the time I left they

were gone altogether. In their wake they left empty frames as new canvas for political graffiti. Some simply said “votez.”

Canvases took many forms. One was a train station in Sidi Bou Saïd, a gorgeous, seaside tourist magnet then aching for tourists to return. The wall along the train platform featured a drawing titled “Yes We Did.” This one particularly resonated with me as an American: the last time I was in Tunisia the U.S. was in the middle of the presidential election and the “Yes we can” phenomenon. Diverse graffiti also cov-

ered downtown Tunis. One block would call for Ben Ali’s party to leave or, to use the term that become a phenomenon itself, dégage. Another stretch of white wall: “Thank you Facebook” or “La femme tunisienne est libre, et elle restera libre.” Although much had been cleaned away since January, walking around Tunis was still like reading a cheat-sheet of revolutionary slogans.

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“She told me with a bittersweet air of triumph that now these people, many of whom she had met decades earlier, were finally

”

unafraid to be connected to her.

other performer held up a portrait of expresident Ben Ali, only to throw it to the ground and stomp on it. A fleeting second of shocked silence rippled through the crowd before it erupted again into cheers. Even through my jet-lagged haze, I could see that Tunisia was experiencing unforgettable and unanticipated changes. The changes in the security situation in particular were uncertain this spring and have continued to vacillate. Avenue Habib Bourguiba in Tunis remained the facsimile of the Champs Élysées it had been three years previously. That is, if one ignored the barbed wire and tanks that had taken up residence. Nevertheless, cafés refilling with patrons had arranged their tables up to the wire barrier. Coffee and tea were, to my eyes, enjoyed with scarcely a second glance.

As for less visual changes, in 2008 it was taboo to discuss politics or criticize the government, much less act upon these inclinations. This spring, discussion was everywhere. Cafés. Homes. Taxis. Supermarkets. Conversations tended to end up on the subject, whether they began on the topic of upcoming elections or what to have for dinner. Indeed, a mere hour after my arrival I was whisked away to a pro-revolution rally. A sea of Tunisians waved their national flags, as well as a few Egyptian and Libyan ones in solidarity. The rally featured a performance by the rapper El Général, in prison a few months earlier for his songs criticizing the government. It was these tunes that belted out from cars and homes throughout this spring. An-

It would be remiss to ignore here the things I could not capture in photos: the people who shared their insight and experiences with me. Newly idealistic and

InFocus 39

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PHOTOS: KRISTA MOORE

determined young people who had quit lucrative careers or postponed their educations abroad to return to Tunisia, so as to try and find their own voices in their country’s new chapter. Older men and women, longtime activists whose harassment by the old regime had become a fact of life. They told me they breathed a bit easier now. Among them was my former host mother, a decades-long activist for human rights and democracy who has faced her share of police intimidation and surveillance: she is, in my opinion, a woman too formidable to adequately describe here. I therefore restrict her to a single anecdote. One evening, I overheard her softly laughing as she sifted through her huge number of Facebook “friend requests.” She told me with a bittersweet air of triumph that now these people, many of whom she had met decades earlier, were finally unafraid to be connected to her. The 14 January revolution may have been galvanized by frustrated youth and accelerated by their innovative use of social media, but its core desires reverbate across generations. 40 InFocus

Revolution, or the “democratic transition” as it is at times euphemistically called, is not always full of smiling faces and quotable exclamations of joy. Sometimes it is, but of course. We have all seen this recently in the moving images of celebration splashed across televisions and newspapers. Images of Tunisia. Of Egypt. Of Libya. Yet other times one’s eyes or ears or camera cannot help but remark on something else, a sense that the inroads being drafted today are being determinedly written and rewritten in pencil, with the hope that something feels right and lasting before the eraser wears through the paper. It is my hope that through these captured slivers of time, I was able to convey a sense of this new, complicated ‘normal’. And I accept, that at times, regardless of snapshots and snippets of conversations, the most impactful observations might be the hardest to convey.

“Revolution, or the ‘democratic transition’, is not always full of smiling faces and quotable exclamations of joy. Sometimes it is, of course. We have all seen this recently in the moving pictures of celebration splashed across TVs and newspapers... Yet other times one’s eyes or ears or camera cannot help but remark on

Krista Moore is a first year graduate student at PSIA in International Security.

”

something else...

CURRENT AFFAIRS

T URQUIE e t M OY E N- O R I EN T:

Le jeu politique d’Ankara à la lumiere des revolutions arabes Pierre FALCONETTI

Les visites du Premier Ministre turc, Reccep T. Erdogan, en Tunisie, en Libye et en Egypte durant le mois de septembre attestent de la volonté turque d’affirmer sa présence diplomatique dans la région, et de conforter son image de soft power qu’elle s’est construite durant la dernière décennie. La politique du « zéro problèmes avec nos voisins », dont Ahmet Davutoglu (ministre des Affaires Etrangères turc depuis 2009 après avoir été conseiller du Premier Ministre depuis 2003) est considéré comme le principal constructeur, a permis à la Turquie de se fabriquer une assise régionale en normalisant nombre de ses relations parfois très tendues avec ses voisins (Grèce, Arménie, Israël notamment). Depuis le début des années 2000, le renouveau de la puissance turque inquiète autant qu’il force l’admiration au MoyenOrient. Les récents événements, qui redistribuent les cartes du jeu régional, ont forcé Ankara à approfondir cette politique en établissant des relations cordiales avec les nouveaux régimes, mais cela après avoir du temps réagir, notamment concernant les questions syrienne et libyenne. La diplomatie « tous azimuts »2 de la Turquie à l’égard des régimes issus des révolutions arabes s’inscrit donc dans la continuation de sa politique depuis le début des années 2000, qui vise à l’établir comme un acteur incontournable du jeu régional dans les années à venir. Comprendre les réalisations de cette politique et les insérer

dans la perspective de la nouvelle donne moyen-orientale, c’est comprendre les trajectoires possibles du rôle que pourrait jouer la Turquie dans ce nouveau MoyenOrient qui se dessine depuis le printemps dernier. Le renouveau diplomatique turc : une politique « tous azimuts » Durant la Guerre Froide, la politique extérieure de la Turquie dans le camp oc-

conflits importants du début des années 1990 (première guerre du Golfe, guerres de Yougoslavie notamment). En revanche, la Turquie était vue par les puissances occidentales comme un vecteur de « récupération » et de démocratisation des espaces post-soviétiques d’Asie Centrale et du Caucase, à populations majoritairement musulmanes, et dont la potentialité conflictuelle et déstabilisante était crainte par le camp des

Ahmet Davutoglu, donnant une conference en septembre 2010, où il met l’accent sur le rôle des puissances émergentes dans les relations internationales contemporaintes.

PHOTO: MARTIN STEINBAUER/WIKICOMMONS/CC

En s'affichant aux côtés des acteurs du printemps arabe, [la Turquie] apparaît (…) comme une force de changement dans la région et comme le seul défenseur actif des libertés et des institutions démocratiques qu'il reste à construire ». L’entretien que Bertrand Badie, professeur à Sciences-Po, donna au Monde le 28 septembre dernier1 met l’accent sur un aspect de la politique étrangère d’Ankara qui ne manque pas d’interpeller les observateurs depuis que les révolutions démocratiques du « printemps arabe » secouent le Moyen-Orient.

cidental (membre de l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord, ou OTAN, depuis 1952) était soumise aux impératifs décidés par l’Alliance Atlantique, et en premier lieu par les Etats-Unis. De par sa position géographique privilégiée, la Turquie interdisait a l’URSS l’acces a la mer Mediterranee (par les detroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore), et servait de base de lancement a des missiles balistiques de moyenne portée avant la Détente des années 1970. Après la chute du camp socialiste, la Turquie a perdu cette importance stratégique et s’est retrouvée en marge des relations régionales et internationales. Ankara n’a pas imposé sa présence lors des

«vainqueurs». Le modèle dit «kémaliste» proposé par la Turquie, à la fois laissant une place à l’islam comme religion historique et dominante du pays tout en prônant la laïcité et la démocratie, avait de quoi plaire à l’OTAN pour stabiliser ces régions. Les initiatives turques pour prendre pied dans l’ancien espace soviétique d’Asie Centrale furent donc soutenues par l’Alliance, dans les années 1990. Le cheval de bataille d’Ankara était l’histoire commune de ces peuples turciques, qui, après avoir été «séparés», se retrouvaient et pouvaient construire une « union turcique », autour de la Turquie bien évidemment. Malgré l’échec assez rapide de ce processus (les sommets des InFocus 41

CURRENT AFFAIRS

“La diplomatie « tous azimuts » de la Turquie: la continua-

tion de sa politique depuis le début des années 2000, qui vise à l’établir comme un acteur incontournable du jeu régional dans les années à venir

”

chefs d’Etat turcophones, censés être organisés sur une base annuelle, ne connurent que huit occurrences entre 1992 et 20¬¬10)3, la Turquie ne se désengagea pas de l’Asie Centrale, où les échanges universitaires, les universités turcophones et le commerce fleurissent malgré l’échec d’une union supranationale4. La Turquie était donc considérée comme un modèle démocratique satisfaisant par les occidentaux, modèle dont il fallait favoriser l’exportation dans certains pays du monde Arabe afin qu’il puisse jouer un rôle de stabilisateur. C’est principalement pour cette raison que, dès le début des années 2000, la politique d’apaisement et de « zéro problèmes avec nos voisins » jouée par la Turquie ne rencontra pas d’opposition occidentale, au vu des résultats plus que satisfaisants dans la résolution ou la minoration de certains conflits diplomatiques entre Ankara et plusieurs de ses voisins. L’amélioration des relations avec la Grèce, l’établissement de relations diplomatiques cordiales (quoique conflictuelles au sujet du génocide arménien) avec l’Arménie ou Israël, sont des succès de la diplomatie turque du début des années 2000. On impute souvent la construction de cette politique étrangère d’apaisement à Ahmet Davutoglu (universitaire, chercheur en Sciences Politiques et auteur de l’ouvrage Profondeur Stratégique, où il expose sa vision de la géopolitique moyenorientale en général et turque en particulier), qui fut proche du pouvoir depuis 2003 et qui devint ministre des Affaires Etrangères depuis 2009. Dans son essai, ce diplomate établit la priorité, selon lui, pour la Turquie, de pacifier son espace régional afin de favoriser son rayonnement économique, culturel et diplomatique. C’est une politique étrangère basée sur le compromis et la négociation, afin de faire contre-poids à l’Iran, rival de toujours, qui opte pour un rassemblement des mécontentements et pour une politique moins conciliante. 42 InFocus

Ses résultats sont cependant mitigés aujourd’hui. Certains observateurs se demandent si la Turquie a les épaules lui permettant de jouer un rôle de leader régional. D’autres louent la diplomatie innovante d’Ankara en rappelant cependant que les Etats-Unis entendent garder un rôle pivot dans la région. En outre, le blocage des négociations d’adhésion à l’Union Européenne (UE), qui était un des objectifs de l’AKP (parti conservateur majoritaire au pouvoir depuis 2002), peut être considéré comme un échec de la politique de Reccep T. Erdogan, le Premier Ministre. Enfin, on observe depuis le début des années 2000 une émancipation de la diplomatie turque du carcan imposé par Washington. Le refus, en 2003, du Parlement d’ouvrir l’espace aérien à l’US Air Force (qui souhaitait ouvrir un second front au Nord de l’Irak) a provoqué l’ire des Etats-Unis ainsi qu’un regain de popularité au Moyen-Orient pour un pays qui était vu comme le « cheval de Troie des Etats-Unis ». Le piétinement du processus d’adhésion à l’UE, ainsi que les bouleversements récents induits par les révolutions arabes récemment, entraînent un désintérêt des turcs pour la question européenne. En outre, les critiques virulentes

et répétées envers l’ancien allié, Israël5, font de la Turquie un acteur de plus en plus légitime aux yeux des populations arabes. Ces différents processus font que la Turquie est en position de force face aux changements apportés par le « printemps arabe » de 2011. Erdogan et les « printemps arabes » : un tour de force ? Les mouvements démocratiques en Tunisie, Egypte, Libye, et en Syrie, ont attiré l’attention du monde entier. La Turquie n’est pas en reste puisque, dès septembre, Mr. Erdogan a effectué une tournée triomphale en Egypte, en Tunisie (où il a devancé les occidentaux) et en Libye. En outre, le soutien (quoique tardif, et un peu forcé au vu des masses de réfugiés aux frontières) au mouvement syrien apporte encore un peu plus de crédit à Ankara dans sa promotion des principes démocratiques au Moyen-Orient. On peut toutefois objecter que la passivité bienveillante des Occidentaux dans l’offensive diplomatique turque au ProcheOrient est mue par les mêmes principes qui avaient présidé à l’expansion du réseau turc en Asie Centrale et dans le Caucase après la chute de l’URSS : un manque de légitimité occidentale, alliée à une crainte d’attiser les extrémismes musulmans, encouragent l’Alliance à laisser à la Turquie le champ libre. Mais la configuration est très différente du début des années 1990 : la politique étrangère turque s’est émancipée, et elle est mue non par une volonté de plaire à l’UE ou à l’OTAN, mais bien par un principe de consolidation de l’image et

Les chefs d’Etat au sommet du G8 en 2009 en Italie; le Premier Ministre Recep Erdogan tient à ce que la Turquie fasse partie des “grands”

PHOTO: PETE SOUZA/WIKICOMMONS/CC

CURRENT AFFAIRS

En se posant comme le « champion de la démocratie », et cela en accord avec une tradition musulmane séculaire, la Turquie donne l’impression de jouer les bonnes cartes. Surtout, la dégradation de ses relations avec Israël, ancien allié au titre de la politique de « zéro problèmes avec nos voisins »6, qui a abouti au renvoi de l’ambassadeur israélien d’Ankara (en septembre dernier), permet à la Turquie d’augmenter sa légitimité aux yeux des nouveaux régimes. En effet, ces derniers, assez critiques envers Israël, à commencer par l’Egypte (le 9 septembre, le Premier Ministre égyptien avait déclaré que le traité de paix entre Israël et l’Egypte de 1979 pourrait connaître des modifications7), voient d’un bon œil la nouvelle position de la Turquie vis-à-vis de Tel-Aviv. Tout cela sur fond de négociations pour la reconnaissance d’un Etat Palestinien à l’ONU. L’assise régionale de la Turquie semble donc pour l’instant en bonne voie de consolidation

la crise chypriote. Crise qui connaît un nouveau rebondissement, avec la lancée d’une mission d’exploration gazière turque au large de Chypre pour répondre à une initiative similaire de Nicosie8. Ces deux différends prennent une dimension plus large lorsqu’ils dégradent le processus d’adhésion d’Ankara à l’UE (la république Chypriote est membre de l’Union, et la reconnaissance du génocide arménien en tant que tel est une condition posée à l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’UE). La Turquie a beau se détourner pour l’instant de l’UE, aujourd’hui enfoncée dans une crise institutionnelle et économique à relier à la situation grecque, l’option européenne ne peut souffrir d’un abandon de perspectives par Ankara au vu de sa situation géopolitique ; une politique étrangère uniquement tournée vers le Proche-Orient ne satisfera pas les politiques turcs, voyant, à raison, la Turquie comme un pont entre Orient et Occident.

à fait brillantes, laissent entrevoir une possibilité pour la Turquie de s’imposer comme acteur régional majeur. Encore lui faudra-t-il pour cela régler certaines crises avec ses voisins, et peut-être retourner vers l’Europe, si l’Union de son côté prend conscience de l’avantage qu’elle aurait à accepter (si ce n’est par une adhésion pleine et entière, du moins par une collaboration plus rapprochée qu’aujourd’hui) un pays dynamique économiquement, ouvert sur le Moyen et Proche-Orient, et qui consolide sa position de soft power dans cette dernière région.

Pierre Falconetti is a first year graduate student at PSIA in International Public Management.

Les perspectives de la politique étrangère turque, si elles ne sont pas tout

“Les critiques virulentes et répétées envers l’ancien allié, Israël, [dont la violente dispute entre Recep Erdogan et Shimon Peres pendant le forum économique de Davos en 2009 sert d’exemple] font de la Turquie un acteur de plus en plus légitime aux yeux des populations arabes, [surtout] face aux changements apportés par le « printemps arabe. »

Il faut cependant toutefois nuancer cette vision idyllique d’une Turquie en très bons termes avec ses voisins. Certes, la crise diplomatique avec Tel-Aviv sert plus les intérêts turcs qu’elle ne les dessert, au vu de l’isolement croissant d’Israël sur la scène internationale. Mais d’autres conflits latents minent la position turque, à commencer par la question de la reconnaissance du génocide arménien, qui se trouve dans une impasse. A relier à cela peut-on aussi voir les relations turcogrecques, qui, même si elles ont vu un regain de dynamique depuis le début des années 2000, restent embourbées dans

http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/09/28/ bertrand-badie-onu-palestine-obama-est-k-o-debout_1579183_3232.html 2 Kazangicil, Ali, La diplomatie tous azimuts de la Turquie : émergence d’une puissance moyenne en Méditerranée, L'Harmattan, Confluences Méditerranée N° 74, 2010/3, pp 109-118 3 Raptopoulos, Nikolaois, La famille des langues turques et le défi de la création d’une communauté turcophone en Eurasie : le rôle assumé par Ankara, in Revue internationale de politique comparée, Vol. 14 (2007/1), Boeck Université, pages 131-150. 1

Ibid.

PHOTO: Monika Flueckiger/FLICKR/CC

de la puissance turques au Proche-Orient.

Lors de l’invasion de Gaza en 2008, puis lors de la mort de 9 ressortissants turcs lors de l’arraisonnement du Mavi Marmara en 2010. 6 Une alliance stratégique fut conclue en 1996. Elle sembe très compromise aujourd’hui, après l’annulation par Ankara de manœuvres aériennes entre l’OTAN et Israël en 2009. 7 http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/09/15/ pour-le-premier-ministre-egyptien-le-traite-avecisrael-n-est-pas-sacre_1573012_3212.html 8 http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2011/09/26/ la-turquie-contre-chypre-et-lance-ses-explorationsgazieres_1577796_3214.html 5

InFocus 43

CURRENT AFFAIRS

EU ROP E an d L NG : Overplaying the Economic Hand?

f energy is the heartbeat of economic activity, then natural gas can be regarded as Europe’s aorta. It is an essential source of its heat and electricity needs. Europe’s gas requirements are met in three ways – ‘domestic’ production, pipeline gas imports and imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). LNG is natural gas that is not transported through pipeline but instead liquefied to a temperature of minus 160 degrees Celsius, which allows for marine transportation. Although historically relying on domestic production and pipeline imports from its immediate neighbors, e.g. Russia and Algeria, Europe is increasingly viewing LNG as a means of supply source diversification. In this light, LNG is not only an economic but above all a strategic asset for the European market. Even more so as gas is bound to play an ever more important role in the near future, accord-

Timon DUBBELING ing to the IEA1. European buyers face increasing competition from Asia, where much higher prices are offered for LNG. Although this endangers Europe’s ability to acquire LNG supplies, European companies continue to emphasize low prices over security of supply – a strategy worth reconsidering.

the rapid growth of countries like South Korea and Japan in the 1970s. The 1973 oil crisis painfully confronted Asian countries with their reliance on oil imports and they have put enormous emphasis on stable LNG imports ever since. This is reflected by the high prices Asian utilities are willing to pay for their LNG.

The market for natural gas is a peculiar one. Transporting gas traditionally required large pipeline infrastructures, which in turn necessitated the existence of a reliable long-term buyer to underpin the enormous upfront investment. Consequently, markets for natural gas only emerged in specific well-endowed regions, notably in North America and Europe. Eastern Asia, however, did not have regional reserves. For the Pacific market, LNG became the silver bullet solution to their unfortunate starting position. In the form of LNG natural gas could underpin

Both in Europe and Asia prices for natural gas and LNG have traditionally been linked to the price of oil. The main reason is that oil and gas used to be substitutes in power generation, so their relative prices determined which one was more attractive to generate power with. In the United States and the United Kingdom, however, prices for LNG imports were established on the basis of gas-to-gas competition with domestically produced reserves. Thus two different price regimes existed alongside of each other – one based on market fundamentals and the other more

BP STASTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 2011

44 InFocus

CURRENT AFFAIRS European Pipeline and LNG Import Flows 2008 (bcma)

However, market dynamics were toppled around 2008 by two developments: first, the financial crisis slowed down economic activity across the globe and led to a slump in gas demand. Second, there was a stark rise in gas supplies as technological innovations allowed American companies to extract gas reserves that had been previously unattainable2. A large gas glut emerged as supply was now much larger than demand. Even worse, many of the capacity extensions decided upon before this radical overhaul were still to enter the market, further sustaining the gas glut. The market price of gas plummeted as a result. As North America’s LNG import needs evaporated, competition for LNG supplies was suddenly limited to the European and Asian markets. In the UK, market dynamics quickly translated into lower gas prices. Many buyers in Asia and Continental Europe, however, were still locked into oil-indexed gas contracts, which had now suddenly become very expensive. At this point business strategies between Asian and European importers started to diverge. In Asia, where no real alternative to LNG existed, the relatively expensive oil-linked gas prices were hardly contested. In Continental Europe, however, companies observed to their dismay that their UK neighbors were importing LNG for prices much lower than their own oil-linked contract prices. These companies started advocating marketbased pricing of LNG, which the producers clearly opposed. The pivotal point is that as economies of scale make it easier for suppliers to ship their LNG to ever more remote markets at a competitive price, competition between European and Asian buyers is bound to

BP, LNG GAS SHEET, 2009

At the turn of the century the United States and the United Kingdom witnessed stark declines in domestic production and both markets turned to LNG to fill the ensuing gap. Simultaneously demand in Europe maintained a steady growth while the emergence of China and India as importers provided prospects of lasting and intensified demand growth in the Pacific market as well. Consequently the LNG industry grew rapidly, with both producers and buyers undertaking enormous capacity investments to underpin this development. Rising gas prices made such investments financially viable. increase. Qatar, the world’s largest LNG producer, can simply redirect its cargoes to Asia if it deems the European prices are too low. This ‘price arbitrage’ will make it harder for European utilities to call for low market-based gas prices if the gashungry Asian markets are willing to pay much more. Therefore, there is a discrepancy between the economic rationale of European companies and the political consequences of their behavior. Whereas countries on the Continent are jealously looking West to the lower gas prices in the UK and the US, their competitors are to the East. With their current call for market-based pricing, these companies are increasing the polarity that exists between them and producers, who increasingly favor the security of stable demand and high prices they are being offered in Asia. Although price signals will remain the essential driver for LNG trade, politics and customer relations also play a role in deciding the final destination of LNG shipments.3 With their current cost-driven business strategies European companies might acquire economic gains in the cur-

rent market context. When the market reassumes the tight nature it had before the sudden ‘double development’4, however, this economic success might have come at the cost of losing out on future LNG supplies. As a consequence, European buyers might see their dependence on traditional pipeline imports from countries like Russia and Algeria increase – something that the increased reliance on LNG was meant to avoid in the first place.

Timon Dubbeling is a first year graduate student at PSIA in International Energy. IEA (2011), Are we entering a golden age of gas?, World Energy Outlook 2011 Special Report, Paris. 2 For an extensive report on this ‘unconventional gas revolution’, see Stevens, P. (2010), The ‘Shale Gas Revolution’: Hype and Reality, Chatham House, London 3 Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP) 2008, The Gas Supply Outlook for Europe, The Hague: p. 6 4 Rogers, H. V. (2010), LNG Trade-flows in the Atlantic Basin: Trends and Discontinuities, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford. 1

ASIA MARKET LNG IMPORTS 1995-2008

BP, GAS & LNG TRADE FLOW DATA, 2009

focused on long-term security of supply.

InFocus 45

CURRENT AFFAIRS

Anat omy of I n t e r- Ko r e a n Relat i on s

hree and a half year of frozen relations in the Korean peninsula, driven by the South Korea's Conservative leadership and North's continued notorious brinkmanship, has led to further escalation of mistrust between the two conflicting Koreas. This year, contrary to the preceding years, has been more dynamic in the progress towards the peace rhetoric displayed by both neighbours. The year began on a serious note with military and naval exercises between South Korea and the United States, in response to the drowning of South Korean Chaenon (naval) vessel and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. While North's betrayal of trust over the secret summit supposed to be held in April that later took place in Beijing in May also marred the spirit of negotiation when it declared the list of South Korean officials allegedly begging the North for talks. The tensions created between the two Koreas could not be resolved due to a lack of trust. Further, North's behaviour of inattention to the stance taken by South Korea’s government is due to the looming 2012 elections in the latter state, which might catapult the opposition Liberals back to the foreground. This might in turn see the possibility of more engaging poli-

cies with North Korea emerge again.

Regime survival: North Korea

Although, it is also worth observing that recently North has stopped demonising Lee Myung-bak and labeling him as 'gangster' or 'puppet'. The recent major project deal between Russia and South Korea to build a pipeline to bring Russian gas via North Korea, is not only an important indicator of the acknowledgement of Russia's increasing interest in the stability of Korean peninsula, but has also helped broker a change from political impasse to negotiation between the two.

An important factor that has been haunting the peninsula conflict stakeholders is the fear of regime collapse in North Korea. The economic condition inside the country has been in a deplorable condition since the collapse of Soviet glasnost and the ending of massive aid from its chief ally, China. North Korea has been severely famine-struck and malnutrition runs high. Under its juche ideology, the priority to militarise the country and selfsufficiency has led to a crippled economy and complete global isolation. The matter that concerns the international community also lies in the illegal means of earning foreign exchange employed by North Korea which have been uncovered time and again, for instance counterfeiting US currency and uranium enrichment technology share to ‘rogue’ countries.

Despite all odds, the two Koreas hope to make an effort to better relations. Recently there have been steps towards resuming talks, albeit for vested interests.

With a legacy of noncooperation behind them, can the two neighbours at long last make an effort towards better relations?

Fire damage on Yeonpyeong Island after North Korea bombardment in Nov, 2010

PHOTO: WOONGJAE SHIN/WIKICOMMONS/CC

Vaagisha

However, if the matter of regime collapse is to be addressed, Kim Jong-Il explicitly indicates towards the continuation of dynasty politics by preparing his son Kim Jong-Un as his successor, in opposition to the will of the people. The Arab Spring has also had a significant impact on the North Korean leadership vis-à-vis suppression of any kind of covert protest movement. Similar speculation about the regime collapse was rife during the early 1990s, but on the contrary North Korean leadership under Kim Jong-Il was strengthened and embarked on brinkmanship and crisis diplomacy. Indeed, the regime survived all odds after the demise of the country’s founding father Kim IlSung and the power transfer to Kim JongIl, The two Koreas: hot and cold relations During the Sunshine Era (1998-2007), South Korean leadership consistently endeavored to emerge as the balancer in the Korean peninsula conflict, rivaling with China to maintain its position. Consequently, North Korea, along with China, Japan and the U.S., has been brought to the negotiating table to discuss nuclear and unification agendas, despite its bellig

46 InFocus

CURRENT AFFAIRS

North Korea has always created a crisis or threat to the stability of the peninsula to extract massive aids to support its ailing economy in return of maintaining peace. Also, South Korea had, during this era, delineated from the stance of its ally, the U.S., of treating North Korea as a direct threat and instead created engaging foreign policies with the nation as part of confidence building measures. The Six Party Talks were convened in Beijing between the two Koreas, Japan, the U.S., China and Russia, but the idea for negotiation was borne out of South Korea’s engagement policies. However, North Korea continued to abstain and showed reluctance from participating in the SPT, finally turning it into a deadlock due to its rigid stance over nuclear disarmament. Even though both Koreas endorse the idea of complete denuclearisation of the peninsula, both also retain belief in the continued threat theory. Pyongyang, in particular, has time and again conducted nuclear tests and test-fired ballistic missiles, thereby challenging various stakeholders involved. Since 2008, the Grand National Party (Conservative) led by Lee Myung-bak, has represented South Korea. His cabinet instantly took a departure from the nordpolitik of its predecessors and severed all relations until the North unconditionally agreed to denuclearise completely. Moreover, South Korea developed much closer ties with the U.S., adopting an anti-North foreign policy, turning the conflict further intractable. Last year, both nations were brought to the brink of war, with the sinking of Cheonan and refusal of North to take responsibility and the killing of a South Korean tourist. In 2011 more scandals created distrust between the two, especially when North Korea divulged information about the secret summit to take place between the North and South and the use of bribery to lure the North officials into talks. At home, Lee’s harsher tactics have not received welcome; Liberals have been campaigning for more engaging interKorean relations. Sensing a change of administration soon, the North is thus not likely to comply with current demands. The unification is of more importance today than in the past decade, when the

The 4km wide DMZ, a buffer zone that is anything but demilitarized

PHOTO: YEOWATZUP/FLICKR/CC

erent activities.

issue was dominated by nuclear disarmament. Given the economic condition of the North, the unification would prove to be an expensive project for the South. One of the potent problems that South Korea faces is the continuous flow of refugees from the North legally and illegally. This is also why South Korea has returned to the legitimacy tussle of regime with the North and underlining South’s superiority. Though on hindsight, a problem like this further indicates a prime reason for South Korea to resume its economic engagements with North Korea so that any future unification would be more equal, instead of mud-slinging. The road ahead The recent oil pipeline project between South Korea and Russia and the railroad linking project towards Europe both via North Korea are a few but strategic economic plans for both nations. These projects will directly benefit South Korea through reduced trading costs with Europe under the pretext of renewed inter-Korean trade. However, despite Lee’s harsher tactics, the industrial complex installed to the north of the Demilitarised Zone continue to function, in the fear of facing tougher competition from North’s ally China. As for North Korea, its brinkmanship survives on the small nuclear arsenal that it does not refrain from displaying time and again. Although both China and the U.S. have acted as buffers, given North

Korea’s strategic location (vis-à-vis developing economic links with Europe), it is even more important for the South to maintain and manage tensions with the North. In the past few months North–South officials have met twice in Pyongyang and there is an emphasis on the resumption of the Six Party Talks which was abandoned in 2007. In addition, as the South Korean election draws closer, it is almost certain that Lee’s policies won’t survive even if the Liberals do not win, since even his 2012 successor has been against them. The economic conditions all over the world have been volatile; thus the relations between both the Koreas are bound to mutate accordingly. The future leadership of South Korea must create a foreign policy towards the North based rather on consensus than personal ideology. And North Korea needs to be made to trust its southern counterpart instead of China, so as not to end up a destitute country with a strong military power, making unification an increasingly elusive and expensive quest.

Vaagisha is a freelance writer, with a special interest on the East and North-east Asia security issues. She will be receiving her degree in MSc Comparative Politics (Asia) from London School of Economics in December. InFocus 47

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