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indus WATER TREATY

4 th

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YEARS OF

nalism ur

Jammu, September 1 ,2010 / Vol 4 / Issue 9 | Price Rs. 30 | Postal Regd. No. JK-350/2009-11 | www.epilogue.in

Epilogue

Epilogue because there is more to know

CONTENT

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Editor Zafar Iqbal Choudhary Publisher Yogesh Pandoh Consulting Editor D. Suba Chandran Manu Srivastsa

Art Editor Keshav Sharma Research Officer Raman Sharma

Printed and Published by Yogesh Pandoh for Epilogue NewsCraft from Ibadat House, Madrasa Lane, Near Graveyard, Bathindi Top, Jammu, J&K - 180012 and Printed at : DEE DEE Reprographix, 3 Aikta Ashram, New Rehari Jammu (J&K)

Current Affairs The Problem of Kashmir and Problem in Kashmir

Opinion In Search of a ‘Starting Point’

Ashok Bhan

Features Not the only Problem in Kashmir

Shagufta Wani

Volume 4, Issue 9, September 2010

I N FOCUS 50 Years of Indus Water Treaty

Ladakh Affairs A Midnight Cloudburst and Loneliness of Ladakh

Rinchen Dolma

Irreparable Loss

Tashi Morupp

21 22

The Indus Water Treaty 1960 Navigating the Indus Waters Building a Community from the Treaty

Where lies the Problem ? “Letter and Spirit” of “Letter vs Spirit” Understanding Pakistan’s Games Plan : What and Why What needs to be done ? Keep the IWT away from the composite dialogue Effective Sharing the Indus Waters : From Treaty to Community “Indus Water Treaty Between India and Pakistan has been one of the triumphs of the UN system : BG Vergheese” Epi-Wiki-Logue Chronology (Compiled from various sources)

D. Suba Chandran

Phones & email Office : +91 191 2493136 Editorial: +91 94191 80762 Administration: +91 94191 82518 subscriptions : +91 90188 87136 editor@epilogue.in subscription@epilogue.in

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Epilogue Bureau

Associate Editors Irm Amin Baig Tsewang Rigzin Zorawar Singh Jamwal General Manager Kartavya Pandoh

Contributors to this Issue Prologue Letters

24 26

27 29

Around J&K Other Conflicts Along the J&K Border 46 The Uyghurs in Xinjinag Bhavna Singh

Exclusive Stories The contrasting fortunes of the flanks : 49 Ladakh and Gilgit Rakesh Ankit

Column Ladakh in the Persian Literature of the Mughal Empire

Prof. Jigar Mohammad

The Dual Existence in Kashmir

Manisha Shobarjani

Disputes, if any, subject to jurisdiction of courts and competitive tribunals in Jammu only. RNI : JKENG/2007/26070 ISN : 00974-5653 Price : Rs 30 www.epilogue.in

Vol. 4, Issue 2

Epilogue, February 2010

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Ankit, Rakesh; (Forgotten History p49) is a young historian from Bihar. As a Rhodes Scholar recently he studied various missing links in the making of Kashmir conflict. Based on his first hand study, he is contributing exclusive series to Epilogue Bhan Ashok (In Focus, P10 ) is former Director General of Jammu and Kashmir Police Chandran, D Suba; (In Focus, p21) is Deputy Director at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Author of many books and an acclaimed expert on Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations, he is Consulting Editor of Epilogue Magazine Dolma, Richen; (Ladakh Affairs, P15) is a Ladakhi Journalist, Editor of Reach Ladakh, based at Leh

Mohammed, Prof Jigar; (History, p52) is professor of History at the University of Jammu. He is associated with Epilogue since inception as Editorial Advisor on History of Jammu and Kashmir Morupp Tashi (Ladakh Affairs, P20.) is a journalist based in Leh. Singh Bhavna (Around J&K P46) is with Institute of Peace of Conflict Studies, New Delhi. Sobhrajani, Manisha (Features, P54), is a Delhi based independent researcher working on the various aspects of Kashmir conflict. She divides her time between Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir Wani Shagufta (Features P13) is a researcher based in Srinagar.

Malhotra, Pia; (Water Woes, P29) is a Research Officer with Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Readers' requests for getting in touch with the authors, for feedback, comments and further discussions on their subjects of interest, are welcome. Since all authors/contributors are not interested in taking mails directly, the readers are requested to send us interview requests at editor@epilogue.in for passing on to the authors

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Vol. 4, Issue 9

Epilogue, September 2010

PROLOGUE

From the Editor

IWT At 60 ZAFAR CHOUDHARY

orget Kashmir water is the real bone of contention between India and Pakistan! This is what the analysts are saying of late but we don't quite agree with this opinion. Water sharing is a trouble everywhere, a more serious of the kind within Pakistan but the way both countries have shared the Indus Basin Rivers over last fifty years is exemplary, to the say the least. Accusations and counter accusations of stealing waters notwithstanding, water, the most potent weapon of triggering war between India and Pakistan was not put to use even during wars. Some may call it a patriotic statement but India being the upper riparian State deserves the credit for keeping waters away from other troubles between both countries. Ironically, it is also this status of India (upper riparian) which puts the country under lens of suspicion whenever Pakistan runs through water shortage. As September of 2010 marks 50th years of Indus Water Treaty, the present of issue of Epilogue is a tribute to the agreement which withstood all tests of times. It gives us an opportunity to look back and look forward. To say that everything in the past quite a normal water sharing affair would be an overstatement and to say that Indus Water Treaty would continue to be a guiding principle for future would be too optimistic a statement. The treaty is already stressed out and there are some genuine concerns which need to be addressed. For example, India needs to take Pakistan in confidence before planning any hydel project and Pakistan needs to keep India informed about its end usages. There are water sharing tussles within provinces of Pakistan where neither the treaty nor India can help any resolution. Pakistan government's water agencies (eg WAPDA) have always remained in the eye of storm for inefficiency. Closer home, there are some serious concerns within the state of Jammu and Kashmir, from which three rivers flow to Pakistan. In the local political circles, the Indus Water Treaty is now being increasingly seen as discriminatory against Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian leadership which inked the treaty with Pakistan cannot be fully absolved of the charges of discrimination against Jammu and Kashmir but the state's

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MARCH 2007 leadership will have to look inside as well. Before asking the Government of India to compensate against losses it suffered over last 50 years, J&K Government will have check whether the available potential, after foregoing share to Pakistan, has actually been harnessed. Absolutely not. After years of discrimination rhetoric it was only recently that present Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has asked for report on available water potential and the share used so far. Only after a reality check, J&K should present its case before New Delhi. Scrapping or redrawing of Indus Water Treaty will not help if the problem lies in inefficiency. Feedback : zafarchoudhary@epilogue.in

Vol. 4, Issue 9

Epilogue, September 2010

Letters

Readers Write Bridge the trust deficit in Kashmir

A galaxy of ideas Dear Editor We normally follow one particular set of ideas and base our opinion on that. Most of the times that presents only one side of the coin. In fact unless both sides of the coins are not seen there can't be any conclusion. The Civil Society response to the present unrest in Kashmir (The Seminar, Epilogue, August 2010) was a wonderful attempt to bring together a galaxy of ideas from Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan administered Kashmir and rest of India and Pakistan. Most of the participants who shared their ideas were top of the line people from their areas of interest and reading them was actually like reading the situation in Kashmir. One may disagree with some of the viewpoints but none of them could be dismissed. It is hoped that such a series is carried every month on a variety of subjects so that we make ourselves aware of different perspectives PAWAN SHARMA University of Jammu

Dear Editor There are many reasons for the current spate of turmoil in Kashmir Valley. There are historical blunders which have apparently become unmanageable at this juncture but there is no denying the fact that people in Kashmir are suffering. General public in Kashmir is fed up with violence and wants durable peace. Every child is brought up amidst the atmosphere of fear, shutdowns, protests and military over-presence resulting in antinational feelings. Kashmiri population traditionally blames India for this unrest and is therefore accumulating deep rooted anger which is a source of conflict. Only talks with separatist groups will not solve the real problem. So government's topmost priority should be to reach out and satisfy the civil society. Government must reach to the common masses with various programmes to convince and change the mindset of people so that trust deficit could be bridged.

Dear Editor Before August 6, Epilogue topped the minds of many in Ladakh for its special coverage before the tragedy struck this region. After coming out of the initial shock we were delighted to see an exclusive issue on Ladakh but the good things your contributors talked about in the issue had changed by that time. It would be very useful if you please consider bringing out yet another special in Ladakh in coming few months focusing on the life after destruction. D NAMGYAL Leh

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VIKRAM CHOWDHARY Via email

Vol. 4, Issue 9

Epilogue, September 2010

Letters

Readers Write A Noble Act

uslims in Anantnag Kashmir on Saturday (August 25) performed the last rites of a non resident Hindu priest. Babu Ram, 80, originally hailing from West Bengal, had been putting up in the township alone for the past many years. He breathed his last on Friday night. As the word about his death spread local Muslims reached there and managed to keep his body in the mortuary. Early, in the morning Babu's body was taken to Mattan, 8 kms from Anantnag, where he was cremated. There was nobody to perform the funeral. We were saddened by the death of a person who had no one to look after. We gathered and performed his last rites, said Adil Khurshid, a resident. All the arrangements including the bringing of sandal wood and later dropping the ashes of the body into the river were made by the Muslims while the Sikhs too offered a helping hand. AHMED HUSSAIN

V I A

F A C E B O O K

China has outpaced India in both economic and military power. I think India needs to move away from Pakistan centric focus and think more seriously on how to balance the Chinese spreading influence in the region. I think (China) they have even succeeded in exporting, to some extent, their cultural, political and economic hegemony to the core of India. With the exit of Soviets, the space has been occupied by the stable and hegemonic China. We are again moving to a bipolar world soon. …and if not physically, but ideologically through Maoists, China is spreading tentacles in the India's poverty ridden states. On the other hand, they are already inching deeper in India's North and North East. This all and the aggressive postures of Chinese have a subtle message for the Indian strategic analysts. I always wonder why India is very mute and reconciliatory to China's unfriendly overtures and frequent snubs while they are very vocal and aggressive to slightest provocations from other neighbors. SHAKEEL ROMOSHO

Wonder why India is so silent on the issue of Aksai Chin (China annexed region of Kashmir), though yet we get to hear about PoK. We hardly have a portion of J&K in reality and proudly live with the myth, just confidently drawing lines on paper claiming complete J&K which virtually exists. …and worst is in news...In a quiet move, China has deployed about 11,000 troops in the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in the Occupied Kashmir to take de-facto control of the key area, where a rebellion is simmering against the Pakistani rule. VIDISHA KHARE

A bigger bully always bullies the smaller bullies. In sixties Pandit Ji's (Jawaharlal Nehru) non-alignment and Panjsheel went for a six when China gave a push. Pandit Ji ran to Americans for help. Now China is preparing for another push to cut the emerging Super Power to size! MOHAMMAD ASHRAF

Ironically, India reiterates one china policy with Tibet as its part whereas China maintained Kashmir as disputed area because of vested interests. India needs to come out of era of rhetoric Gandhism and Nehruism. India has to seriously resolve its border dispute with china sooner with some flexibility. God forbid what will happen if 1962 repeats? India will again be found wanting because of poor infrastructure at Macmohan line. ANKUSH HANS

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Epilogue, September 2010

PREVENT WATER BORNE DISEASES LIKE :-

t Gastroenteritis t Diarrhoea

t Typhoid t Dysentery

By adopting following simple measures :1. Use boiled cooled water for drinking purposes. 2. Chlorine tablets for domestic use are freely available in all Health Institutions. 3. Store water in clean utensils and keep them covered. 4. Donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t eat stale, uncovered eatable items exposed to dust and flies. 5. Wash vegetables and fruit thoroughly with clean water before use. 6. Keep the food items covered so that flies do not contaminate the food. 7. Always wash hands with soap and water after going to the toilet and before eating food. 8. Avoid defecation near the source of water supply. 9. In case of loss of body fluids, use oral rehydration solution (ORS). Dissolve one packet of ORS in one litre of boiled cooled water and use it within 24 hours and prepare fresh one for next use. 10. Patients suffering from any of the above mentioned diseases should report to the nearest Health Institution for prompt diagnosis and treatment.

Adopt A Healt hy Life St yle

No. : DIP/J-5838

t Jaundice

HEALTH EDUCATION BUREAU DIRECTORATE OF HEALTH SERVICES, JAMMU OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER, DRUG AND FOOD CONTROL ORGANISATION, J&K JAMMU SUBJECT : Strict implementation of provision of Drugs and Cosmetics Rules in respect of manufacture and sale of Oxytoxin, which id reported to be used clandestinely by daily owner and farmers growing vegetables - reg. Reports have appeared in the press as well as electronic media regarding the misuse of Oxytoxin Injections by the farmers to increase the size of vegetables. Similar reports were earlier received in respect of the clandestine use of Oxytoxin by the dairy owners to extract milk from cows and buffaloes. The Oxytoxin Injection is required to be packed in single unit blister pack only for sale and is required to be dispensed on the prescription of a Registered Medical Practitioner only. It is therefore impressed upon all the dealers/manufacturers to strictly follow the Provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and Rule 1945. The Department shall initiate stern Administrative Action against offenders indulging in misuse of Oxytoxin injection like cancellation of Licenses granted for carrying out sale/manufacturing. Besides legal action as warranted under Rules shall follow Administrative Action. The general public through the mode of this notification is appealed to share information related to misuse of Oxytoxin Injection by Dairy owners and farmers to grow vegetables with the Department on following helpline number : 01912538527, 01912538626, 01912597445, 01942471191, 9419180734. The complainants can also mail their complaints on following email address : controllerdrugsfood@yahoo.in

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current affairs

Kashmir Unrest

The Problem of Kashmir and Problem in Kashmir EPILOGUE BUREAU

As Kashmir heads towards end of an unusually hot summer, the signs of approaching autumn show hardly any promise of tempers cooling down. The death count is just going up but enough is not literally proving enough. During Amarnath land row agitation, the bloodiest unarmed agitation of 20 years, 64 civilians had died. This year, 65 have already been laid down in graves, many are battling in hospitals and thousands are still firm on streets in direct confrontation with agencies of the State.

hough belated, many political moves and administrative measures have failed to cut ice. New Delhi is dropping hints of an unprecedented political package to address grievances of Kashmiris but precondition is that Valley must pave for a dialogue. Kashmir's separatist leadership wants the process to take shape on ground before it agrees to call off agitation. In earlier years of separatist movement the gun would force parties to settle down for dialogue, this time thousands of angry youths on the streets is a massive rallying power for the separatists to invite international attention to Kashmir issue. Where is Kashmir headed for? No one has a clue to this question. There is a problem of Kashmir and there is a problem in Kashmir. The problem of Kashmir can be handled only when the problem in Kashmir is settled, which is not a visible possibility.

The Problem of Kashmir Whatever bitter it may sound, the problem of Kashmir is that a visible and audible majority in the Valley has left hardly any doubt in the public mind that it does not want to stay with India. It would be difficult to technically quan-

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tify and qualify that the majority in Kashmir wants independence but as long as there are no voices contrary to this sentiment, the demand of Azadi can be concluded as what today reigns supreme in Kashmir. Combined with the voter participation of Jammu and Ladakh regions the public opinion is always confused with the claims that 62

Count the number of parties in Kashmir and they will suggest you as many solutions. The parties in Kashmir blame New Delhi for not talking to them but the fact is that they have never had a dialogue among themselves percent of electorates stood for Indian democracy in 2008 assembly elections. This claim can prove useful only when the pro-India mainstream political parties like ruling National Conference and the opposition Peoples Democratic Party are able to mobilize even a single procession in the streets of Srinagar or Anantnag countering the separatist campaign of Azadi. Far from countering sepa-

Vol. 4, Issue 9

ratist movement, these mainstream parties have in fact surrendered to the Azadi campaign. A beleaguered Chief Minister Omar Abdullah is going to the town with soothing statements that he is making New Delhi to agree on a political solution for Kashmir problem. “I am the first Chief Minister who said in front of Prime Minister that Kashmir is a political problem and it needs to addressed by political means”, said Chief Minister at least at three occasions in July and August while referring to his speech in presence of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in October 2009 in Anantnag. Pushed to a corner by a large army of stone throwers, Omar is trying to be different from his father Dr Farooq Abdullah who as Chief Minister would describe the separatist violence as Pakistan sponsored law and order problem to be countered by strong security measures. Therefore, Omar is sounding less annoying and trying to draw a familiar line with the common angry man on Kashmir's streets. Before coming to power in 2009 he was more articulate in declaring Kashmir as dispute. Today's his job is toughest of all politicians –defending India in Kashmir while sounding as advocate of Kashmir in Delhi. The

Epilogue, September 2010

current affairs Kashmir Unrest

main opposition Peoples Democratic Party is almost on the right side of Kashmir's current agitation, demanding dialogue but making no major effort in creating a conducive atmosphere for it. Given a chance the opposition leaders would participate in a pro-Azadi rally rather than taking out a counter procession. The problem of Kashmir gets further compounded on two accounts. One is that the angry Kashmiri is not asking for anything less than Azadi and wants the beginning of a political process from India agreeing that Kashmir is a disputed territory. This stand is just hardening with the day as the popular separatist agitation is today much wider and deeper than one could have imagined in Kashmir and the sustained trouble of last three years has taken it to the rural areas involving common Kashmiris. Until recently the major demands in Kashmir were pulling out of Army and other forces from civilian areas and roll back of harsh security regimes like Armed Forces Special Powers Act. Now these demands are being treated there as a starting point to initiate a dialogue with the Government of India which Kashmiris say, should conclude at freeing Kashmir from India. Syed Ali Shah Geelani, the chairman of his own faction of Hurriyat Conference may be condemned as a leader who is keeping Kashmir on boil but he has been able to mobilize the Kashmiri public opinion his

Geelani draws this strength from the breakdown or absence of dialogue between New Delhi and Kashmiri moderates which allowed the hardliners to take a lead role.

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OPINION

In Search of a 'Starting Point' ASHOK BHAN Kashmir is caught in a whirlpool of violence. While the Central and State Governments have shown their concern over the situation, it has been impossible to break the vicious cycle. Every death will naturally bring more violent protests. So should one wait for violence to end or subside before remedial measures are taken? Home Minister P Chidambaram while addressing the conference of Police Chiefs has shown his concern over the situation. He is optimistic that over the next few days the Government will be able to find the elusive 'starting point'. The intent of the Government has further been elucidated by the Home Minister by adding that once a start is made, efforts will be made to reach out to the protestors, reassure them of their rights and dignity, restore peace and order, redeem the promises made, and restart the process of dialogue that will lead to a solution. The Home Minister has set a substantial agenda for the future. In very unambiguous terms, the Government has conceded the existence of a problem, which needs to be solved through a political dialogue. An assurance has been given that the promises made will be met. The biggest challenge would be to find the 'starting point' to break the impasse and put a stop to the cycle of violence. No individual or party can be blamed for the present situation. It is collective failure of a system of which every mainstream political party is a part and parcel. All these parties have suffered losses in the form of killing of their leaders and activists in the last two decades. Any further continuance of uncertainty will be detrimental to the very existence of each one of them. Let them not further shrink the political space by washing their dirty linen in public. Additionally, the ongoing media wars will only benefit the adversary. There is no scope for factionalism and group rivalry within political parties. Every one should set aside personal differences and prejudices and pool in their resources to find this 'starting point'. The Chief Minister, his three predecessors, and many political leaders still enjoy sizeable influence. Their coming together, even with the limited agenda of working towards peace and mitigation of hardships being faced by the people, can make a difference. The mainstream parties must revitalize their party cadres, reach the aggrieved and apply a soothing balm on the wounds of those who have lost their near and dear ones. The colossal loss to education due to hartals and curfews has become unbearable now. The academic year has to be saved, as it will cause irreparable damage to the careers of the youth. Parents and teachers are fed up but do not dare to raise their voice in fear of retaliation. Resuming the proper functioning of educational institutions cannot wait anymore. A time frame becomes necessary to break the impasse.

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current affairs Kashmir Unrest

It can be assumed that emissaries of the Governments at the Centre and in the State must have established the necessary lines of communication to find the 'starting point.' The progress needs to be monitored on day-to-day basis. Any process of resolving a conflict involves give and take. The interlocutors must work with a clear mandate or else this preparatory work will end up in exchange of pleasantries alone. One or more confidence building measures from the Government's side will go a long way in making a beginning. Needless to say, sufficient groundwork needs to be done before any announcements are made. A very productive CBM can be an assurance to withdraw 'Disturbed Areas Act' and as a consequence, the AFSPA starting from the city of Srinagar. This would require putting in place sufficient Police arrangements in the city of Srinagar. Thereafter, depending on the ground situation, the phased withdrawal in the remaining state can be considered. Another CBM can be the setting up of a Committee to screen all cases of detainees and release of those not involved in heinous offences. Many other similar measures can help break the impasse so that there is forward movement on steps enumerated by the Home Minister. There is less than a fortnight left for the Holy Eid festival. Can the intervening period be used by all stakeholders, to work towards the elusive 'starting point'? It is within the realm of possibility. Let this coming Eid festival be the harbinger of peace in the state. The Home Minister's statement brings lot of hope to all those who want peace to return. (IPCS)

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own way. When he announces conditions for engaging in dialogue with Government of India, he is sure of his ability to agitate the Kashmiri youth on those lines. Geelani draws this strength from the breakdown or absence of dialogue between New Delhi and Kashmiri moderates which allowed the hardliners to take a lead role. However bitter it may sound in Kashmir, no impartial wisdom on earth would expect India accepting such demands. With a promise of dialogue, India has always declared Kashmir as its integral part and a climb-down from its position is the last thing to be expected. India has grown stronger over the years and most of the powers in international community endorse New Delhi's stand on Kashmir. In fact, it is a proof of India's clout in international community that US and UK have of late been ticking off Pakistan and patting India. When Geelani calls upon the international community to convince India on accepting Kashmir a dispute, he misses a point that now there are not enough ears to hear this. The international community certainly wants a peaceful resolution of Kashmir issue but not exactly the way Geelani suggests. Sympathizing with the agitating Kashmiris is one thing but ground realities of real politick can't be ignored. The problem of Kashmir is complex and agitations of three summers may not be enough to see a solution round the corner.

The Problem in Kashmir To say that India should sit over the status quo would be like oversimplifying the Kashmir issue. Having put above the separatist sentiment as it exists, even the mainstream parties would like to move beyond the status quo and go for some creative solutions of Kashmir issue. On the Indian side of Line of

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Control, Jammu and Kashmir divided into three parts â&#x20AC;&#x201C;Jammu, Kashmir Valley and Ladakh. There are unique problems in Jammu and Ladakh but none in common with Kashmir. A solution for Kashmir may, therefore, not be acceptable in Jammu and Ladakh. Some sort of regional census can be achieved only when there is a party or leader with equal clout in the three regions. There is none. There are Kashmir based parties with Kashmir centric vision, there is one Jammu based party with Jammu centric vision and there are two national parties with a blurred vision of Jammu and Kashmir. That is where the 'problem in Kashmir' comes as a stumbling stone on handling the 'problem of Kashmir'. Count the number of parties in Kashmir and they will suggest you as many solutions. The parties in Kashmir blame New Delhi for not talking to them but the fact is that they have never had a dialogue among themselves. Who should New Delhi talk to? Why should New Delhi believe that Geelani's referendum or Omar's autonomy or Mufti's self rule is the way forward? This idea will have to come from Kashmir itself but Kashmiris are not talking to each other; they are in fact playing a competitive politics against each other. In recent weeks

However bitter it may sound in Kashmir, no impartial wisdom on earth would expect India accepting such demands. With a promise of dialogue, India has always declared Kashmir as its integral part and a climb-down from its position is the last thing to be expected.

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current affairs Kashmir Unrest

some voices coming out from New Delhi have been quite promising, if seen through the Kashmiri perspective: Prime Minister Manmohan's assertion in his Independence Day speech, “I believe that India's democracy has the generosity and flexibility to be able to address the concerns of any area or group in the country” and Home Minister P Chidambram's statement in Rajya Sabha that “Kashmir needs unique solution” revealed Delhi's mindset of engaging in some creative solutions. Any out of box solution can't be sold separately to different leaders to satisfy their individual egos and address their party standpoints. New Delhi is aware of the internal bickering and fragmented constituencies in

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The international community certainly wants a peaceful resolution of Kashmir issue but not exactly the way Geelani suggests. Sympathizing with the agitating Kashmiris is one thing but ground realities of real politick can't be ignored. The problem of Kashmir is complex and agitations of three summers may not be enough to see a solution round the corner.

Kashmir. Morally Kashmiri leaders should not blame Delhi for not talking

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to them. They can accuse Delhi at personal level of not talking to an individual but as far as dialogue is concerned the lead should be taken by the Kashmiri leadership to engage with New Delhi only after firming up a consensus among them. A consensus within Kashmiris is far more important that an agreement between Kashmir and Delhi. Instead of asking Delhi to resolve Kashmir, a solution should come from Kashmir itself which has been endorsed by the separatists and the mainstream political parties. If mainstream parties are not in a position to sit across with separatists, they should honestly sit across other side of the fence and counter the separatist movement

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features

Notes on Life

Not the only Problem in Kashmir SHAGUFTA WANI

The spectre of fear and violence has descended like a dark cloud on the Kashmir valley. This has compounded the problems of those who led a life of peace and security. But there are others who even in normal times are denied this. For the vast numbers of widows, a large chunk having lost their husbands to militancy, life is grim. The apathy of the government to their travails makes it worse.

ashmir is burning as probably never before. The unrest, uncertainty, sense of insecurity stemming from the current environment of violence seems to have spiraled out of control. For the ordinary people across this pristine and beautiful vale whether they are' stone-pelters' or pacifists, life has become ominous and peace elusive. The struggle is a basic one, for most people. To remain alive, safe and healthy in an environment fraught with tension, danger, through endless hartals, curfews and altercations on the street. Yes it is a tortuous time for the people in the valley and for those who are outside, highly disturbing. Lost somewhere in the midst of this angst, this outpouring of rage is perhaps the memory of how things were. How people lived, what they had, before this present crises engulfed the valley. This could be the clue or the trigger to set forth a process of normalcy, a security of life and limb which no doubt all yearn for. Let us not forget that shadow of conflict has loomed large in this region which has seen two decades of militancy. Lives have been lost, property destroyed and in its wake,

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livelihoods of people, education of children and a whole slew of activities part of the developmental process, compromised. The situation of widows in a sense is the human face of the long drawn conflict. According to some estimates, one lakh people have been killed during the period of militancy, mostly men. Natural deaths apart, in Kashmir there are bludgeoning figures of widows due to deaths during these years There would then be close to 50,000 widows even going by a conservative figure. Policies would then need to cater to this particular situation, meet the needs of the countless women and their dependents to not only survive but build a life of dignity or peace. Shamali from Hanjipura village in the border district of Kupwara lost her husband Ramzan Dar a few years ago leaving behind six children, of whom only one son goes for work. But he is married and has his own family to look after including a four year old disabled daughter whom Shamali has to take care of. A local NGO's Help Foundation working on welfare programmes for rural poor, stepped in to donate a cow. Shamali is able to survive and feed her family selling the milk it produces.

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“She is our only asset, and our only occupation. No government official has ever visited or helped us or that little disabled child. Don't we have a right to a dignified life? Don't we have a share in our government?” she asks. According to Nighat Shafi Pandit who heads Help Foundation. “NGO's like ours become relevant in the context of the non-performance of government schemes on the ground” She says there are a number of schemes for protection and welfare of widows and children but r e m a i n o n l y o n p a p e r. The Rehabilitation Council set up by the J&K government has a plethora of such schemes which only adorn the shelves of the concerned department without ever reaching women like Shamali. Jannati Bi of Hanjipura, has not been as fortunate as Shamali in terms of getting a means of livelihood. She recounts her tragic tale “ Ten years have passed since my husband Akbar Wani's death. I had seven children, five of whom died due to acute shortage of means. I could not feed them nor treat them when they fell ill. I couldn't have done anything to stop their death, so I did what I could; I wept my eyes out. “Perhaps as a result of grief and lack of access to health services, Jannati Bi

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features

Epilogue

Notes on Life

because there is more to know

lost her eyesight. She is bitter, having visited the Social Welfare Department, Kupwara but to no avail. “Let alone getting a financial aid, they refused to fill even my form.” This apathy by the authorities rankles deep for those who have lost their loved ones and face an uncertain and frightening future. Sarah another young widow faces a different set of challenges. She has an old mother to look after apart from her children. The family does not get any help from the government except Rs. 200 per month from the Social Welfare Department for the mother. She is frustrated and also anxious “One can imagine, in such times, how you can run a family in just Rs. 200?” Her young school-going son needs to work to support himself which breaks his mother's heart. “Can anyone work as a labourer and also continue with school? If he could spend this time and energy in his studies, he could become a good citizen? I heard that scholarships are given to students from the government? Why my son is not getting it? “ The life of a widow is connected with others who she supports or maintains, often young children or the elderly. She has to struggle with not only personal tragedy but the loss of often the sole earning member in the family. This loss is not being addressed in any substantial way by the government. Admittedly it has its hands full with the present situation but surely its responsibilities lie in reaching the benefits of good governance to the remotest part of Kashmir, to those who remain excluded from it? There are many schemes for orphans and widows by the state government, but the very people, who are entitled to it and need it the most, are least aware of it. Why are these people on whose name schemes exist left out in the cold, why cannot they access them? Why do government officials not reach out with the existing facilities to the people in time of distress? In fact they could take the initiative to popularise these schemes by bringing out a list and making copies available to civil society organizations working on the ground. This would be an excellent method of dissemination and raising awareness. This is one way; there could be many others. It is less about form than about intent. If the government takes its job seriously, then the channels would open up. After all, governance is not just about damage control but a commitment to the people of the region to better their lives no matter what. (Charkha)

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ladakh affairs

Disaster & After

A Midnight Cloudburst and Loneliness of Ladakh RINCHEN DOLMA

With thousands of tourists making it their preferred second home, Ladakh had just started enjoying the newly assumed status of being the most happening place in Himalayas. A midnight cloudburst has shattered all those imaginations. Close to 200 lives have been lost, mostly in sleep, and sleeping again is not without nightmares

ess than a month ago the word 'Ladakh' evoked images of a spectacular wind-swept land of an unmatched beauty nestling amongst the great Himalayan and Karakoram mountain ranges and the upper Indus River Valley. Equally evocative were the images of tourists from far corners of the world seeking out the unique cultural heritage and the breathtaking trekking trails amidst the nature at its best. On the night of August 6, everything changed when the nature's fury was unleashed as never before in living memory here. Cloudburst occurring on an open land, or mountains will largely invite academic interest. It will not have the destructive ramifications as in a populated area, particularly, in an ecologically fragile zone, of undulating mountains and rocky terrain like Ladakh. Here the ensuing mudslides gobbled up everything in its path, buildings, tress, human beings and animals leaving a trail of destruction, death in a region illprepared for such a calamity, on a gentle, warm-hearted people who were looking forward to yet another tourist season which brings livelihoods and prosperity. The priority, undoubtedly, is speedy and appropriate relief and rehabilitation before the onset of a long and bitter win-

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ter in this high altitude terrain. But it's a mammoth task. Equally pertinent, albeit in a reflective sense is the question of Ladakh's links within and with the outside world, not only in times of disaster but in normal times. We need to ask ourselves, how much does the average reader or viewer of mass media really knows about this region besides the stereotypical images which have suddenly been demolished by the cloudburst in the wee hours of August 6? Also how effective or widespread are media links within the region, knit-

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ting people together, sharing information, views and opinions about the region and the world beyond? Ladakh's journey in this Information Age lies rooted in its history. Its distinct ethnicity and culture and perhaps the most defining aspect, its remoteness from the rest of the country, exacerbated during a time of crisis when the only two road links via Manali and Srinagar are disrupted. Since time immemorial, the people of this region of the country have remained secluded from the rest of the country. Most of the rural areas are inac-

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ladakh affairs Disaster & After

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Epilogue, September 2010

ladakh affairs Disaster & After

cessible, mountainous, remote and isolated. There are pockets within Leh district (Ladakh has two districts, Leh and Kargil), which remain cut off for six to seven months in a year during winter when the snow sets in. This remained the situation till the 1970's when the region was opened to tourism which created new and lucrative sources of income for the local people. But that was not all. It brought in a plethora of information and new ideas linking this isolated mountainous region instantly to the fast-paced progress of the developed world. Exposure to technology was one thing. Interaction with perhaps the best and brightest from across the globe was quite another! Academics, scientists, writers, artists came to Ladakh in a different capacity-as tourists and left their imprint on the region, on the minds and hearts of people. It was the first 'opening' of links ever since trade routes to Central Asia and Tibet were closed in early 1960s, following Chinese' Cultural Revolution. Some of the visitors got involved with local issues of social and environmental concern, organized interest groups, even triggered the setting up of civil society organizations, local NGOs. Gradually the public domain in Ladakh grew making a quantum leap from a secluded, isolated community to one engaging more and more within itself and with the outside world. All this through communication which simply did not exist in this form. The benefits have been tremendous. Breaking the barriers of physical and situational differences and creating a forum for interaction and exchange of information has been the natural outcome. Today, around 50,000 tourists return with various different impressions to share with others through Internet, blogs multiplying manifold the horizon of the information on Ladakh. "Connectivity

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Epilogue, September 2010

ladakh affairs Disaster & After

Reasons for Leh disaster

ased on detailed analysis of weather data of last five years in Leh, Ladakh, scientists have attributed the recent cloudburst in the region to prolonged winters, which may be due to climate change. "After going through the sequence of events of the weather that led to the cloudburst on August 6, it has been reinforced that the catastrophe was due to prolonged winters being witnessed in the region," sources in Leh-based Defence Institute For High Altitude Research (DIHAR) said. The analysis by the research institute under the Defence Ministry was done to look into the reasons that triggered the cloudburst in Ladakh which is usually considered unnatural because it is a rain shadow area. On condition of anonymity, he said at a recent meeting on "Evaluation of climate change in Ladakh sector and causes of Cloud Burst in Leh," the scientists led by DIHAR director Sashi Bala had analysed the weather data of the last five years in terms of monthly temperature, rainfall, humidity and snowfall. The study indicated that increased temperature and hot summers in the plains lead to increased evaporation and subsequent cloud formation in the hills. "This in turn, led to increased duration of snowfall in Ladakh when compared to previous years. "The winters in Ladakh were found to be prolonged," the experts concluded though they felt the phenomenon could not be directly associated with climate change given the short range of data. The region was witnessing unusual phenomenon of bright sunshine in the June and July months causing melting of snow and high relative humidity (72%) as compared to previous years (50%), the scientist said. Tracing the change in weather on the basis of the data available, he pointed out that "since snow absorbed the latent heat also, the monthly maximum and minimum temperature remained low and did not shoot up as compared to previous years (2006). "The low temperature and high relative humidity lead to formation of dense low clouds in the valley. Since the vapour content in the clouds were high and on trying to cross the glaciers, the vapours further

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condensed. "The clouds could not retain the water droplets that lead to the cloudburst. Since the rainfall was absent on 3rd, 4th and 5th August and was negligible on 7th, 8th and 9th August the theory of occurrence of a cloudburst in Leh due to prolonged winters may be reinforced," the meeting said on the sequence of event. The cloudburst, which led to flash floods and mudslides, claimed about 180 lives and injured about 400 people, besides causing widespread damage to public and private property. The Defence establishment has also initiated research towards preventing soil erosion in case of heavy rains in the area in future in view of climate change. Meanwhile, Russia will help in building high altitude 'green houses' in cities like Leh in Ladakh for providing fresh vegetables for the jawans and civilians in remote mountain areas. A Memorandum of Understanding to this effect was signed on Moscow by the visiting director of Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) Pramod Shukla and Alexander Demidov of the Russian Science Academy's Main Botanical Garden named after N V Tsitin. "Under this MOU, high altitude Green Houses will be set up using Russian expertise in Indian cities like Leh in Ladakh, as well as the two organisations will in the field of bio-diversity, bio-engineering and bio-technology," Shukla said. Initially three Green Houses would be built with the support of Russia's M/s Stroi Project. The environmentally controlled Green House will also help to develop variety of cold-tolerant, vegetables. "These Green Houses will have large collections of rare plants, flora & fauna, which could be used in medical, health promotion and other useful technologies. These joint research projects would not only benefit our soldiers working at high attitude but also the civilian population," he underscored. DRDO has also signed another MoU with Moscow State University for joint research activities in the sustainable eco-friendly agro technologies suitable for Himalayan region.

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ladakh affairs Disaster & After

has brought Leh really into total churning of the world" says local educationist E S Gergan. Yet we need to ask ourselves-is this enough? Which brings us to the home truth of a glaring absence of the print media in Ladakh. There are no newspapers or magazines published from this region. The only newspapers from outside, largely English are flown in every few days. All news thus turns stale before it reaches Ladakh. "Over the years communication has developed rapidly in Ladakh in the form of Internet, radio, television and mobile technology but there is great risk of misusing these mediums that may cause harm to our religious and cultural views and practices. However, I feel that a newspaper or magazine published locally would result in a more transparent flow of communication", says Dr. Sonam Wangchok, a leading research scholar in Buddhist Studies. At a time like this when Ladakh is in the throes of probably the worst natural calamity in decades, it may seem far-fetched to talk of the benefits of the print media. Indeed mediums like the radio and television lend itself well to knit the people together, provide relevant even crucial information and updates on health facilities, road links, missing persons and relief measures. It is an old adage that the media plays a critical role in the democratic process. It fosters an interchange of views, ideas and opinions on social, educational, cultural, economic issues which enhanced participation and awareness, the cornerstone of democracy. Yet all this is sorely missing in Ladakh. According to Tsewang Rigzin, former Executive Councillor (Education) at the Ladakh Hill Council, presently Councillor Nubra constituency is in another capacity the "Ladakh is undergoing a period of transition and a powerful medium of communication like a local newspaper or magazine is the need of time." Rigzin is equally a journalist of repute and currently the Associate Editor of this Magazine. According to Charkha Features, it is then time that Ladakh breaks out of its shell, both to integrate local communities within its natural boundaries and beyond to share current news and perspectives with the rest of the country. Yes, the immediate need of the hour is to address the aftermath of the terrible natural calamity that has shaken this region from its serenity. But there is a larger message that should not be missed which is of creating in Ladakh, an informed and discerning public opinion that would be pro-active in sifting out its developmental priorities and taking collective action.

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WHERE IS MP?

Hassan Khan disappoints Leh

n this hour of crisis, something which Ladakh had never witnessed in its history, Ladakh's representative in Parliament (MP) Hassan Khan remained almost a silent spectator. It was his obligation to be with the affected people in Leh and communicate their difficulties to the Government of India from time to time. But unimaginably his conscience seemed to have allowed Mr Khan to remain silent over the crisis and also to remain away from the flood victims and affected villages of the district. Such attitudes of vested interests always create an unnecessary gap between the people of Leh and Kargil districts. At the same time I want to place on record my heartfelt appreciation and thanks to the people of Kargil headed by their social, religious and political heads, who very generously arranged to send volunteers to help the affected people of Leh during those hard, gloomy and mourning days. It is not for the first time, Hassan Khan is giving a stepmotherly treatment to Leh; he has always ignored the area and hurt the sentiments of the people of Leh time and again. To cite a few examples: Hassan Khan has never toured Leh district ever since he got elected to the Lok Sabha. Being the MP from Ladakh, Mr Khan is a member of the General Council meetings of the LAHDC Leh also, but he has never bothered to attend any General Council meeting of the Hill Council Leh so far which clearly shows the kind intention of this leader towards an equitable development of Ladakh region. Those people and leaders, who had helped to ensure the victory of Hassan Khan, by creating unnecessary division among the masses with the use of all undemocratic means, must regret now for his deeds. Dear Mr Khan, where is all the MP-LAD funds? We need them for the reconstruction of Leh. Today there are hundreds of Ladakhi and non-Ladakhi people and organistions, who are trying to help the flood victims through generous donations. On the other hand, MP-LAD funds which available at your disposal is due for us. Hassan Khan should understand that he is the MP for the whole Ladakh region. â&#x20AC;&#x201C; TSEWANG RIGZIN

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ladakh affairs Disaster & After

Irreparable Loss TASHI MORUPP

round midnight of August 6 deafening sounds of thunder with lightening constantly woke up everybody to run for their lives as those frightening moments was something unbelievable for the people of Leh. Within minutes cloudbursts and thundershowers wreaked havoc destroying innumerable residences, commercial outfits, govt. offices and killing some 200 people by flash floods from Shagshaliung valley in Leh town and Sabu-Choglamsar valley. Other adjoining and far off valleys mainly falling on North bank of the Indus River too experienced similar cloudbursts and flashfloods leading to a devastation never witnessed in the written history of Ladakh. The sheer force of the water ripped apart steel shutters of shops, smashed trucks and cars to become heaps of mangled scraps, uprooted tens and thousands of trees, washed away crop fields, roads, bridges, houses causing absolute mayhem and a loss irreparable in the next â&#x20AC;&#x153;hundred yearsâ&#x20AC;? as one resident of Sabu put it in his interview to local TV. For days people stayed in tents on hills as dark clouds continued to linger with sporadic rainfall and thunders. Nightmare didn't end with days getting clearer; the aftermath of such devastation would be no less panicky. Flashfloods have rendered hundreds of people homeless who are living in tents for now, but they cannot continue in this

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manner as winter months are approaching. The greatest challenge falls on the district administration to provide them alternative accommodation even as many civil society organizations are actively working towards that as well. Prime Minister has announced 1.25 crore rupees for reconstruction and rehabilitating the displaced people; it would be imperative to ensure that no one remains bereft of supports needed in the crises time. It is important to highlight that there are innumerable houses filled with mud, and owners are apprehensive that their cases could be treated as normal overlooking the grave situation due

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to cracks developing in the walls indicative of eventual collapse. And the next important issue or challenge before the govt. is how to compensate the loss of thousands of acres of fields washed or damaged in flash floods. With many crops destroyed there could be food shortage also in coming winter months. Finally, the immense restoration works lying ahead must be done carefully with the involvement of experts and people alike so as to avoid such large scale damage in future. Here is also an opportunity to learn from the mistakes as well as there is a need to go back to the past deriving inspiration from ancestral knowledge about buildings and settlements.

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in focus

50 Years Of Indus Water Treaty

The Indus Water Treaty 1960 PREAMBLE The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, being equally desirous of attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilisation of the waters of the Indus system of rivers and recognising the need, therefore, of fixing and delimiting, in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, the rights and obligations of each inrelation to the other concerning theuse of these waters and of making provision for the settlement, in a cooperative spirit, of all such questions as may hereafter arise in regard to the interpretation or application of the provisions agreed upon herein, have resolved to conclude a Treaty in furtherance of these objectives and for this purpose have names as their pleni-potentiaries : The Government of India : Shri Jawaharlal Nehru Prime Minister of India, and The Government of India Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, HP., H.J., President of Pakistan; Who having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers and having found them in good and due to form, have agreed upon the following Articles and Annexures : JUMP TO PAGE 38 TO 45 FOR FULL TEXT OF TREATY

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Epilogue, September 2010

in focus 50 Years Of Indus Water Treaty

Navigating the Indus Waters Building a Community from the Treaty D. SUBA CHANDRAN

ifty years ago, in September 1960, India and Pakistan signed a historic agreement on sharing the waters of the Indus Rivers. It was no mean achievement; it was a result of a protracted negotiations; Gulati in his book on the Indus Waters explains this painful negotiations brokered with enormous assistance from the World Bank. Equally important has been the adherence of this treaty for the last five decades. Though under strain for the last few years, until the 1990s, both countries pursued the Indus Waters treaty. Elsewhere, at the global level, the Indus Waters treaty has been projected by the international community as the only effective understanding that has withstood numerous wars and insurgencies between the two countries. True, if there could be one party that could violate the treaty, it is India. India being an upper riparian, and Pakistan being a lower riparian, if there is one party that could violate the treaty, it would be India. The credit for keeping this treaty should primarily go to India; however, Pakistan's contribution should be considered as well, given the provisions of the treaty. Pakistan could complain about the Indian projects and seek for an independent arbitration, as it did in the Baglihar project and is likely to do in the Kishen Ganga project. The IWT provides for an independent arbitration, which is time consuming and costly. Pakistan could have raised every project independent arbitration, if it did not want to cooperate. If India has to reap the credit for keeping the IWT intact, one should recognize Pakistan's inputs as well. At least, till the 1990s. Since the 1990s, Pakistan's game plan vis-Ă -vis the Indus Waters is changing. Though Baglihar and Kishenganga appear to be the main problems today, there are other fault lines, internal, bilateral and multilateral, which are straining the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). The IWT is likely to come under larger stress in the near future and it is imperative, that people living along the Indus River understand the gravity of issues, and look beyond their national and regional prisms. This is where it is important to analyse the IWT and its performance in the last fifty years and forecast, what is likely to happen in the next fifty years. Since water is considered to be the life line and has the potential to evoke emotional responses and at times, even jingoistic feelings, it is imperative to look into the social, economic and political changes that is taking place today, and their likely impact on sharing the Indus Waters in the next fifty years. Also, we need to prepare for the next fifty years.

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Epilogue, September 2010

in focus 50 Years Of Indus Water Treaty

Where Lies the Problem? “Letter and Spirit” or “Letter vs Spirit”

here is a problem in sharing the waters in India and Pakistan – at bilateral levels and also within each country at State/provincial levels. Haryana, J&K, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab have series issues in sharing the waters in North India, while Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu have similar problems. Within Pakistan, all four provinces – Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP have been fighting for decades on sharing the waters. So are the issues of water between Nepal, India and Bangladesh. Since the focus of this essay is on exclusively on the Indus, other water issues shall not be focused here. While India and Pakistan have signed Indus Waters Treaty, towards sharing the Indus river waters in 1960, and the four provinces of Pakistan have signed an agreement (Inter-Provincial Water Apportionment Accord) in 1991 to share the waters within themselves. Both the agreements intra-state and inter-state have been extremely painful and reached after an arduous n e g o t i a t i o n . U n d o u b t e d l y, t h e negotiating parties deeply felt, that there is a need to work together, which enabled them to reach an understanding. Both agreements are clear and unambiguous. In short, there was a clear spirit that guided them to reach an agreement in writing. Why are the parties fighting then today? That too, ironically over what constitutes the letter and spirit?

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Consider the following issues. The Indus Waters Treaty was negotiated between India and Pakistan in the 1950s; the book authored by ND Gulati sketches the painful to and fro of points, counter points, positions and counter positions. Finally the treaty was signed in 1960. The World Bank did a great service by brokering this treaty; had it not been for its pressure, it is doubtful, India and Pakistan would have agreed to such a treaty. However, this should not take the credit from India and Pakistan; both countries ensured that the treaty was adhered to, even during the wars and proxy wars. To d a y, o n e o f t h e m a j o r accusations of Pakistan has been centered on India not adhering to the letter of Treaty, in terms of water flow, prior intimation of projects, and construction beyond what is provided by the IWT. India's counter accusation is centered on Pakistan not following the spirit of the IWT, and acting as a spoilsport in delaying India's projects, either by not responding or taking them to the neutral expert. Pakistan considers neutral expert is provided by the IWT, hence there is nothing wrong in making use of that provision in case of a difference. India on the other hand considers, that provision should be the last option and not recourse for each and every project that India proposes. The reference does cost time, money and efforts, in terms of delaying the project, thereby

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increasing the cost of not only construction, but also related expenditure in not making use of the hydro potential. Within Pakistan, Sindh prefers to strictly adhere to the 1991 Agreement, which is a consensus document amongst the four provinces. Any construction of major dam (like Kalabagh) or canals (like Greater Thal and ChashmaJhelum), Sindh fears will benefit only the Punjab, but at the cost its own. Punjab, on the other hand wants to see the 1991 Agreement as politically beneficial, that would provide space for better management of water resources. Punjab's conviction is centered on the fact any such construction will greatly help its own agricultural and industrial sectors, without affecting smaller provinces of Balochistan, NWFP and Sindh. What should be the primary focus of water governance between the parties? Should it be the letter or spirit? It is unfortunate, that between India and Pakistan, and between the four provinces of Pakistan, that the issue has become letter vs spirit instead of letter and spirit. This is not a unique situation between the above mentioned actors. Unfortunately, this is also the case between numerous inter-state and intra-state actors in South Asia. As of today, as mentioned above, within India there are similar conflicts between Punjab and Haryana, Karnataka Tamilnadu and Kerala over the sharing

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of water resources. Not only the institutions that are dealing with water management are weak, even other institutions – especially legal and political, also are equally fragile. In certain cases, States create a separate tribunal, to deal with water disputes between the provinces and keep away from the purview of regular legal institutions. Given the pace and inordinate delay associated with the courts in South Asia, one could easily conclude, even if they are referred to the regular institutions, they are unlikely to fast and effective. Unfortunately, the tribunals at national level, and arbitration at international level, not only take time, but also cannot effectively ensure the implementation of its verdict, in accordance with the letter, and more importantly, the spirit behind

Understanding Pakistan's Game Plan: What and Why The idea of a 'water war' between India and Pakistan is being deliberately drummed up. In this regard, Pakistan is likely to pursue the following three strategies at national (within Pakistan), bilateral (with India) and international levels.

Today, one of the major accusations of Pakistan has been centered on India not adhering to the letter of Treaty, in terms of water flow, prior intimation of projects, and construction beyond what is provided by the IWT. India's counter accusation is centered on Pakistan not following the spirit of the IWT, and acting as a spoilsport in delaying India's projects, either by not responding or taking them to the neutral expert.

PAKISTAN'S STRATEGY 1: Blame India for Pakistan's Water problems Internally, there is a serious problem in sharing the Indus Waters between the four provinces of Pakistan. This is made worse by the failure of two institutions - Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and Indus River System Authority (IRSA) inside Pakistan. WAPDA is in charge of managing the waters and power sectors; many have questioned its efficiency to handle the growing challenges relating to energy and water. The IRSA, which is the apex body to share waters between the four provinces in Pakistan, is highly divided. The current debate, problems and perceptions within the IRSA, and how the provinces see this institution, will highlight the internal divide. Sindh has been accusing Punjab of water theft; and is also against the Indus Waters Treaty(IWT). The government of Sindh has passed resolutions repeatedly in its Provincial Assembly (in most cases unanimously) against the IWT. These internal problems have an important impact on the IWT and Pakistan's demand on the Indus Waters. The smaller provinces, though in principle are against the IWT, their real problems are against Punjab in terms of sharing the waters. This is why NWFP and Sindh (along with Balochistan) are against the construction of Kalabagh dam by Pakistan.

the verdict, and the original spirit behind the earlier water agreement itself. Clearly, legal recourse will not enforce the letter and spirit, either at the national and international levels. Worse, both parties (as in the case of verdict given by Baglihar neutral expert) will interpret the verdict as a vindication of their point of view. The issue is political, hence resolved politically. There is a need to invoke the “spirit” argument; this needs to be done at multiple levels – governmental and societal. Pursuing an independent “letter” approach will get a “judgment” but not necessarily “justice”. It should be letter and spirit, with an extra emphasis on the latter. The State alone will be unable to address this basic issue, which is essential in building trust about the other.

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Pakistan, (read Punjab), is likely to accuse India for their internal woes in sharing the Indus Waters. 'Blame India for Pakistan's water woes' project, Islamabad thinks, will considerably bring down the internal problems in sharing waters, and even unite the provinces. Besides the sincere doubts and apprehensions of the lower riparian; one can see a deliberate orchestration of water theft by India by certain mainstream and vernacular news papers, and jingoist talk shows by certain anchors. Will the smaller provinces fall for this? Their primary problem will remain Kalabagh and not Baglihar. In other words, the primary concerns of smaller provinces in Pakistan will be the sharing of waters within, than the accusation of India stealing waters. Like Kashmir, IWT will remain a Punjabi obsession. This does not mean the smaller provinces will support India indirectly; they are against the IWT in principle and consider the signing of the Treaty as the original sin.

PAKISTAN'S STRATEGY 2: Object to each and every Indian Project At the bilateral level, Pakistan is likely to object to every Indian project, whether there is merit or not in their case. To be fair to Pakistan, one should understand the concerns and fears of lower riparian regions, which are universal. Beyond the trumped up feelings of India 'stealing' Pakistan's waters, there is a genuine fear, that Pakistan will run dry. With an increasing population and the emphasis on agriculture remaining

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high, water is their most important concern. There is also a genuine fear within Pakistan, that India is not sharing all information that it could (in good faith) and it should (under the IWT obligations). For the above mentioned real and imagined reasons, Pakistan is likely to object to each and every project, which India is likely to pursue on the western rivers. This would serve the following purposes; first, it would delay the project, thereby forcing India to respond to its objections and share more information. Second, this would address the

Like Kashmir, IWT will remain a Punjabi obsession. This does not mean the smaller provinces will support India indirectly; they are against the IWT in principle and consider the signing of the Treaty as the original sin. internal audience within Pakistan; Pakistan cannot complain to its own people that India is the real culprit, without Islamabad making a formal complaint. The expectation is that India cannot afford to delay the projects; the political, energy and economic implication of delaying these projects will cost India dearly.

PAKISTAN'S STRATEGY 3: Internationalize the Water Issue and Replace 'Kashmir Issue' with 'Water Wars'

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Finally, Pakistan is likely to flash the water issue at the international level, as 'the' most important issue b e t w e e n I n d i a a n d Pa k i s t a n , threatening the latter's very existence. Pakistan would not hesitate to take the differences in sharing the Indus Waters to the neutral expert, as provided by the treaty. Though, this will delay the project and increase its economic cost in the long run, this is what P a k i s t a n w a n t s p r e c i s e l y. Irrespective of any negative verdict, Pakistan would not mind referring to the neutral expert, for the impact it will have on India. Consider the case of Baglihar on Chenab; how much time it took for India to get the verdict finally? And how much has the delay increased its cost, in terms of construction and also the energy production? Pakistan is also likely to take the water issue at the international level and project it as having the potential to start the next round of war between the two countries. A Water War between India and Pakistan is already being discussed within Pakistan; unfortunately, today one finds references even in mainstream newspapers, on the possible use of nuclear weapons, if India denies Pakistan's share. This (linking water and nuclear weapons) will catch the international attention, to pressurize India and Pakistan to work together. What Pakistan is likely to do is to replace the Kashmir issue (for which there is not much interest today at the global l e v e l ) w i t h w a t e r, t o g a i n international attention

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What needs to be done? Keep the IWT away from the Composite Dialogue

uring the recent months, there have been an increased shrill from Islamabad vis-à-vis the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), in terms of India not violating the treaty. There have also been an increased emphasis from the Pakistani side, to include the waters issue into the composite dialogue. Will this be a better strategy to discuss the water issue, than the present one? Or will this prove counterproductive? India at the outset is apprehensive and in fact has rejected the idea of including water issue from discussing in the composite dialogue. While the primary reasons for New Delhi's rejection is its cautious approach – that it does not want one more issue to be added to the Composite Dialogue. Also it does not want one more contentious issues, whose weight will pull down the composite dialogue. The more pertinent question is – will including the water issue in the composite dialogue help India and Pakistan to achieve better results? Unlikely, for the following reasons. First, so far, India and Pakistan have been discussing water issues in a separate platform – Indus Waters Commission, which is historically older than the composite dialogue. Article VIII of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) signed in 1960 provides for a permanent Indus Wa t e r s C o m m i s s i o n a n d t w o Commissioners in India and Pakistan.

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The IWT also ensures that these two Commissioners “meet regularly at least once a year, alternatively in India and Pakistan” and “undertake, once in every five years, a general tour of inspection of the Rivers for ascertaining the facts connected with various developments and works on the Rivers.” Besides, the IWT provides that “the Commission shall also meet when requested by either Commissioner.” In terms of the appointment of the commissioner, the IWT says, the Commissioner should be a high ranking engineer, competent in the field of hydrology and water use.” What the IWT provides, are the following: competent and specialist engineers, who will meet annually (and more, if there is a requirement) and undertake a general inspection of the Rivers. Thus the treaty provides for permanency, specialists, regular visits and meetings. Compare this with the other important issues, which are discussed as a part of the composite dialogue from J&K to nuclear stability. In terms of regular meetings and relative success no other issues can claim a similar positive output, as that of the Indus Waters Commission meetings. Second, the composite dialogue is not only a recent phenomenon, but also highly dependent on the nature of regimes, leadership and events of importance. There is no need to repeat,

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that the change in regimes, at times even governments affect the nature and intensity of the composite dialogue. Issues such as terrorism and sub conventional wars (like those on Kargil conflict, terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament and Mumbai) derail the composite dialogue. In short, composite dialogue is unreliable, in terms of sustenance and seriousness. Third, composite dialogue also suffers from a huge disadvantage in terms of its failure to insulate from forward or backward movement on one issue. In most cases, all the eight issues that form the composite dialogue are discussed over a period of three to five days, in the same venue by different groups. If there is no forward movement on the first issue discussed on the first day, it has a domino effect on the other issues. As a result, failure to find a forward movement on the first issue, affect the progress of other issues. Fourth, the water issue is no more a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. There are serious differences within each country; for example, in J&K, there are numerous complaints from the people of across the Line of Control (LoC) on the sharing of waters. While J&K on the Indian side has been upset about the IWT, for not allowing to exploit the water resources, especially in terms of power generation, both the administrative units across the LoC in Muzaffarabad and Gilgit have been

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equally upset with the IWT. The AJK government has been complaining about the Mangala dam, especially in terms of the environmental impacts and also the nonsettlement of people who have been displaced due to this dam, there are numerous problems vis-àvis the Diamer-Basha dam, for which Gilgit-Baltistan have raised substantial objections. Besides the two parts of Kashmir across the LoC, the smaller provinces of Pakistan, especially NWFP and Sindh have been extremely upset with the government of Pakistan. They complain that the internal sharing of Indus Waters within Pakistan is beneficial to Punjab, at the cost of Sindh and NWFP. In fact, the last few years, there have been numerous discussions in the Sindh provincial assembly and have repeatedly emphasized that the Indus Waters Treaty is not in their favour. Given the above complications, it would be useful and beneficial to keep the IWT out of the composite dialogue, to keep it productive and meaningful. In fact, one should learn from the IWT and split the composite dialogue in numerous smaller insulated and regular processes.

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Effective Sharing the Indus Waters: From Treaty to Community

rom New Delhi's perspective, it is important to realise that internal political and emotional situation regarding the sharing of waters in Pakistan and in J&K is likely to have a negative impact on the IWT as a whole. Experts like BG Verghese have already pitched for an Indus Water Treaty-II, which is important from New Delhi's perspective to look into and prepare for. The objective should be to prevent any water wars – internal and bilateral, and also to improve water governance. The following issues in particular have the potential to become a crisis, straining the IWT further. First, there is a clear divide between Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on the one hand and the central government on the other, on the nature and use of IWT. The people and government of J&K, where the Indus and most of its important tributaries flow through, are against the IWT, as they feel it is against their interests. A resolution was passed in J&K Legislative Assembly in 2002, calling for annulling the IWT. A section inside J&K even considers the IWT as an Indo-Pak conspiracy against the Kashmiris. Kashmiri grievances are based on emotional and economic issues; for Kashmiris, water and land have always been an emotional issue. Second, J&K also considers the IWT as an economic liability. The majority in J&K consider that the IWT discriminates against Kashmiris by not letting them tap the potential of the Indus and its tributaries in terms of using the

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waters for agriculture, transport and energy. It is believed that the losses that the IWT cause to J&K are around Rs.80 billion annually. Third, the people of Northern Areas in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) also consider the IWT against their interests. The controversy over the construction of Diamer-Basha dam highlights the tensions between Northern Areas and Islamabad on sharing the Indus waters. Many in Northern Areas feel that Islamabad has not provided any political status to the region, precisely to exploit them over the Indus waters. They argue that had Northern Areas been a political entity, Pakistan then would have to share the waters and royalty. Worse, a section also believes, that while the Basha dam will submerge parts of its land and result in displacement, the royalties will go to the NWFP. Fourth, PoK has a serious problem with the rest of Pakistan on the Mangala dam. Muzaffarabad feels exploited by the rest of Islamabad over the dam and the construction in Mirpur has dislocated the entire city, with the benefit going to the rest of Pakistan. Islamabad is too sensitive about any water-related issues involving PoK and the Northern Areas. A government official was suspended for writing a book on the Mangala dam; subsequently all his books were banned during 2002-04 and he was accused of “an attempt to promote nationalist feelings amongst Kashmiris.” Fifth, the four provinces of Pakistan

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are deeply divided within, in terms of sharing the Indus waters. The controversy over the construction of Kalabagh alone will amplify internal problems relating to the water conflict. While Punjab wants to build the dam at any cost, leaders of Sindh have warned Islamabad to choose between Kalabagh and the federation, meaning that construction of the dam will result in Sindh walking out of the federal structure. Sixth, South Asia as a whole has a serious deficit relating to water governance. None of the countries in SAARC use water judiciously; as a result, there is huge water wastage. Besides, despite knowing that water is precious commodity, South Asia has failed to evolve alternate modes of irrigation; canal and river irrigations are the most preferred in South Asia. Methods like drip irrigation and crop rotation to better use the available water, are yet to be effectively evolved. South Asia as a whole, wastes water. Finally, studies on the Himalayan glaciers highlight the possibility of a decline in water flow in the Indus and its tributaries. With expanding populations and growing energy and economic needs in the region, any decline in water flow will only increase the stress on the IWT. Given the inter-state and intra-state political and emotional issues along the Indus river basin, the possibility of water scarcity resulting in water wars between the states and within them, cannot be completely ruled out.

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Ü There is a clear divide between Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on the one hand and the central government on the other, on the nature and use of IWT. The people and government of J&K, where the Indus and most of its important tributaries flow through, are against the IWT, as they feel it is against their interests. Ü J&K also considers the IWT as an economic liability. The majority in J&K consider that the IWT discriminates against Kashmiris by not letting them tap the potential of the Indus and its tributaries in terms of using the waters for agriculture, transport and energy. Ü the people of Northern Areas in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) also consider the IWT against their interests. The controversy over the construction of Diamer-Basha dam highlights the tensions between Northern Areas and Islamabad on sharing the Indus waters. Ü PoK has a serious problem with the rest of Pakistan on the Mangala dam. Muzaffarabad feels exploited by the rest of Islamabad over the dam and the construction in Mirpur has dislocated the entire city, with the benefit going to the rest of Pakistan. Islamabad is too sensitive about any water-related issues involving PoK and the Northern Areas.

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It is imperative, that India, Pakistan and their sub-regions work together to address the growing concerns and avoid any future conflict over the sharing of waters. IWT has an inbuilt provision to rework its sections. India, Pakistan and their local governments, at track-I level, should work together towards creating Indus Water Treaty-II, addressing the issues mentioned above. IWT-II could very well be a conflict prevention measure relating to water issues along the Indus river basin. At the track-II level, India and Pakistan should allow the Indus Basin Communities – from Himachal to Sindh, including Kashmiris (across the LoC), Punjabi (across the international border), Pashtuns, Balochis and Sindhis to interact at a regular level to understand each other's requirements, fears and threat perceptions. India and Pakistan will not be able to achieve much, unless, there is a community feeling among those who share the Indus. Each community should see the other as co-habitant and codependent on the Indus waters, instead of someone who steals and loot the water. Between track-I and track-II levels, there should be serious cooperation, especially on scientific and technical issues relating to climate change, especially in terms of its implications to the Himalayan belt and the Indus basin. (Sections of the above essay, have been published by the IPCS, in its website)

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50 Years Of Indus Water Treaty

â&#x20AC;&#x153;Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan has been one of the triumphs of the UN system: BG Vergheeseâ&#x20AC;? BG Vergheese, leading water expert of the region, speaks to Pia Malhotra, in an exclusive interview for the September 2010 Special issue of EPILOGUE PM: What are the emerging water issues between India and Pakistan?

the Western Rivers, which India has not even utilized so far.

Vergheese: There are three factors to the water issues between India and Pakistan. First is the easy option for exploitation that is building dams like Mangla, Tarbela etc. and these have been exploited. Second factor is the growing water stress in India and Pakistan because of growing demand of water, wasteful use of water and inter provincial quarrels in the countries. Third factor is climate change. There are changes in the hydrological cycle and these changes are evident not only in the Himalayan glaciers melting, but also in the changes in Tibet. Tibet is the source of water for both India and Pakistan and increasing Chinese presence, whether in the form of industrialization or increased grazing, is having adverse effects on the region. The Indus Water Treaty between the countries has been one of the triumphs of the UN system. It has governed relations successfully between India and Pakistan for many years now. Pakistan has started complaining about India's hydroelectric projects but according to the treaty India is allowed 3.6 MAF of storage on

PM: Why is Jammu and Kashmir against the IWT?

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Verghese: Jammu and Kashmir in India complains that this treaty has been unfair to them because they could have got more storage then the current amount given to them but there needs to be a realization that right now the storage in India is nil. If the storage capability has not been utilized at all so far, there is no point in claiming for more. Similarly, according to the IWT, 1.3 million acres of land can be irrigated from the waters of the other side but Jammu and Kashmir has only used a fraction of it, so far.

PM: Why do India and Pakistan quarrel over the Western Rivers, given to Pakistan, under the IWT? Verghese: On the Pakistani side, the problem has been the inability of the state to utilize optimally, the water given to them from the western Rivers. Pakistan's problem mainly arises in the lean season when the flow of water drops. To fight this problem, Pakistan must store water in the Monsoon season but that has not been

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The Indus Water Treaty between the countries has been one of the triumphs of the UN system. It has governed relations successfully between India and Pakistan for many years now. Pakistan has started complaining about India's hydroelectric projects but according to the treaty India is allowed 3.6 MAF of storage on the Western Rivers, which India has not even utilized so far. Epilogue, September 2010

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In future collaboration, China would have to be included as well. It is not only the Himalayas and the Karakoram that are melting but also the Tibetan plateau. The changes in the Tibetan plateau are being caused, to an extent, by China. China has increased yak grazing in Tibet and that has caused a loss in the top cover. In turn, this has resulted in changing the soil and temperature and has indirectly led to the melting of the permafrost in the Tibetan plateau. done. Storage dams like Kalabagh have been embroiled in a dispute between the provinces for a long time now. Pakistan also lacks enough storage sites. They have the Diamer Basha and Mangla dams and the Neelum Jhelum dam has been proposed and leaving these, it has no more storage sites. On the Chenab, they have no site for storage. The headwaters are in India and by the time the water reaches Pakistan, it is in the plains and then it cannot be stored. On the Indian side, there is some storage capability on the Western rivers that has been permitted by the IWT, but due to conflicts with Pakistan, it has never been realized. Pakistan also objects to any Project by India. The eastern Rivers have been completely given to India but even from these Rivers, water flows to Pakistan which is not utilized by them.

PM: IWT has some provisions for cooperation between India and Pakistan. What are the areas of potential cooperation? Verghese: Article VII of the

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IWT provides for future cooperation between the countries. India and Pakistan need to cooperate because, for instance, on the Western rivers, Pakistan can't make any storage dams and India can't either because of Pakistan's intransigence. Hence, they both lose opportunity for water management. By cooperating, they can envisage joint projects which would be beneficial for both of them. In future collaboration, China would have to be included as well. It is not only the Himalayas and the Karakoram that are melting but also the Tibetan plateau. The changes in the Tibetan plateau are being caused, to an extent, by China. China has increased yak grazing in Tibet and that has caused a loss in the top cover. In turn, this has resulted in changing the soil and temperature and has indirectly led to the melting of the permafrost in the Tibetan plateau. The permafrost affects the entire Indus River basin and therefore cooperation with China has to be included in any water talks.

institute called ICIMOD, the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, and they work on preserving the various river water basins in the South Asian region and also on climatic changes. They work with many countries in the region and globally on these issues. India has never cooperated with them which is not very helpful. Similarly, Siachen can be declared as a peace park and established as a global centre for glaciological and water balance studies. The problem is not with the IWT but with the countries. India and Pakistan can start sharing information in a credible manner. Joint cooperation between the countries is imperative, instead of constantly putting the blame on the IWT and using it as a scapegoat.

PM: What can India do to mitigate water disputes with Pakistan? Verghese: The IWT has been functioning smoothly and India should not abrogate it. Instead, efforts must be made to build on it. Attempts should be made towards joint structures, joint management of water with Pakistan and making borders irrelevant through cooperation on water. On the Chenab, since India has storage capability, it can store water and then give to Pakistan for a price. The countries can split the costs of the construction. The countries can also have joint hydrological stations. In Kathmandu, Nepal, there is an

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Siachen can be declared as a peace park and established as a global centre for glaciological and water balance studies. The problem is not with the IWT but with the countries. India and Pakistan can start sharing information in a credible manner

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50 Years Of Indus Water Treaty Epi-Wiki-Logue

Chronology (Compiled from Various Sources)

ORIGINATING in the Himalayan Mountains in Jammu and n Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh, the Indus System of Rivers is comprised of three Western Rivers –the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab –and three Eastern Rivers –the Beas, the Ravi and Sutlej. Flowing through arid states of India and Pakistan, converging in Pakistan before emptying into Arabian Sea south of Karachi, the Indus System of Rivers feeds largest irrigated area of any river systems in the world. l The history of interstate water conflicts over Indus System dates back to over a century l Before 1935, the British India had authority to resolve water conflicts by executive order l 1935: Government of India makes water a subject of provisional jurisdiction unless asked to intervene by states l Oct 1939: Province of Sind formally requests Governor General to review new Punjabi irrigation project and potential detriment to Sind. l Sep 1941: Indus Commission established. l July 1942: Commission submits report suggesting that withdrawals, by Punjab would cause 'material injury to inundation canals in Sind, particularly during the month of September. Incidentally called for management of the river system as a whole Report found unacceptable to both sides. l 1943-45: Chief Engineers of both states meet informally, finally producing a draft agreement – provinces refuse to sign. Dispute referred to secretary of state for India in London early 1947. l Aug 15: 1947: Independent of states of India and Pakistan established. Eastern Punjab becomes part of India, western Punjab and Sind become part of Pakistan. Conflict becomes international, British role now irrelevant; Chair of Punjab Boundary Commission suggests that Punjab water system to be run as joint venture – declined by both sides.

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AN essential source of irrigation, the plentiful Indus Waters became a source of contention and conflict upon partition of British India putting the newly formed states at odds against each other. What added to the troubles was the geography of partition which was such that the sources of rivers of the Indus basin were in India. l Dec 10, 1947: Standstill Agreement negotiated by chief engineer of west and east Punjab, freezing allocations at two points until 31 Mar 1948.

THE dispute over sharing of Indus waters came to fore immediately after partition because the existing canal headworks of Upper Bari Doab Canal UBDC and Sutlej Valley canals fell in India State of East Punjab, while the lands being irrigated by their waters fell in Pakistan West Punjab and Bahawalpur State. In order to maintain and run the existing systems as before partition, two Standstill Agreements were signed on 20 December 1947 by the Chief Engineers of East Punjab and West Punjab. These interim arrangements were to expire on 31 st March 1948, after which East Punjab started asserting its rights on its waters. It was on 1 April 1948 that the East Punjab Government in control of the head works at Madhopur on the Ravi and at Ferozpur on the Sutlej, cut off water supplies to the canals in Pakistan fed by these head works, after the Standstill agreements expired on 31 March 1948.

n PAKISTAN felt its livelihood threatened by the prospect of Indian control over the tributaries that fed water into the Pakistani portion of the basin. Where India certainly had its own ambitions for the profitable development of the basin, Pakistan felt acutely threatened by a conflict over the main source of water for its cultivable land.

n THE Inter-Dominion Accord of Mar 4, 1948 apportioned the waters of Indus between India and Pakistan in initial years of partition. The Accord had provided that India releases sufficient waters to the Pakistani regions of the basin in return

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for annual payments from the government of Pakistan. The accord was meant to meet immediate requirements and was followed by negotiations for a more permanent solution. Neither side, however, was willing to compromise their respective positions and negotiations reached a stalemate.

n FROM the Indian

point of view, there was nothing that Pakistan could do to prevent India from any of the schemes to divert the flow of water in the rivers. Pakistan's position was dismal and India could do whatever it wanted. Pakistan wanted to take the matter to the International Court of Justice but India refused, arguing that the conflict required a bilateral resolution. l June 16, 1949: Pakistan sends a note to India expressing displeasure with agreement. The note calls for a conference to resolve the 'equitable apportionment of all common waters, and suggesting giving the World Court jurisdiction on the application of either party. India objects to third party involvement suggests judges from each side might narrow dispute first. Stalemate results through 1950.

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F A C T S H E E T

The Indus Basin

he Indus system of rivers comprises of the main river Indus, Known as the river Sindhu in Sanskrit, and its five Tributaries from the east, the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and the Beas, and three tributaries from the west, the Kabul, Swat and the Kurram rivers. The great Indus river is 2880 Kms. long and the length of its tributaries as mentioned above is 5600 Kms. Historically, India has been named after this great river-Indus. The main Indus river rises in the Kailas range in southwestern Tibet. In Ladakh, it is joined by its first tributary, the Zanskar river and continuing for about 150 miles the Indus is joined by the Shyok river. Then Shigar, Gilgit and other streams join the river. The Shigar joins the Indus near Skardu in Baltistan. The Gilgit stream joins it farther down at Bunji. Some miles further downstream, the Astor river joins the Indus, which then crosses the Kashmir territory and enters Pakistan. The Kabul river which is joined by the waters of Swat in Peshawar valley, joins the Indus just above Attock. The Indus then receives from the east, the river of Punjab - the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi and the Sutlej. The river Jhelum originates in Verinag in the valley of Kashmir and after flowing through Jammu province enters Pakistan. The Chenab river rises in Lahoul in Himachal Predesh State of India and after flowing through Jammu province enters Pakistan. The Ravi river rises near Kulu in Himachal Pradesh and flowing thorugh Punjab before entering Pakistan. River Beas rises in Himachal Pradesh and flows wholly within India. After receiving the waters of the Punjab rivers, "the Indus becomes much larger and during JulySeptember, it is several miles wide". According to a study made in Pakistan, the Indus river carries about 144 billion cubic yards, which is more is more than half of the total supply of water in the Indus River system." Whereas the Jhelum and Chenab combined carry roughly onefourth, the Ravi, Beas and the Sutlej combined constitute the remainder of the total supply of the system that is nearly one-fourth. Though the Indus basin is known to have practised irrigation since ancient times, it were the British who developed and elaborate network of canals in the Indus system of rivers. However, their emphasis was that lands belonging to the Crown received such irrigation so that the British Indian government would earn revenue from water cess as well as from the sale of crown waste lands. In this manner, the Indus system water were used to irrigate annually about 23.4 million acres in the Indus plains and 2.6 million acres above the rim stations before partition.

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Epilogue, September 2010

in focus 50 Years Of Indus Water Treaty

INDUS water sharing appeared to be a major crisis between India and Pakistan in early 1950s. By 1951, the two sides were no longer meeting and the situation seemed intractable. The Pakistani press was calling for more drastic action and the deadlock contributed to hostility with India. As one anonymous Indian official said at the time, "India and Pakistan can go on shouting on Kashmir for all time to come, but an early settlement on the Indus waters is essential for maintenance of peace in the sub-continent" (Gulati 16). Despite the unwillingness to compromise, both nations were anxious to find a solution, fully aware that the Indus conflict could lead to overt hostilities if unresolved.

n IT was in the early years of 1950s that David Lilienthal, formerly the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, visited the region to write a series of articles for Colliers magazine. Lilienthal had a keen interest in the subcontinent and was welcomed by the highest levels of both Indian and Pakistani governments. Although his visit was sponsored by Colliers, Lilienthal was briefed by State Department and executive branch officials, who hoped he could help bridge the gap between India and the United States and also gauge hostilities on the subcontinent. During the course of his visit, it became clear to Lilienthal that tensions between India and Pakistan were acute, but also unable to be erased with one sweeping gesture. l 1951: David Lillenthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, invited to India as Prime Minister Nehru's guest He later publishes an article with his suggestions, which captures the attention of Eugene Black, president of the World Bank.

LILIENTHAL wrote in his Journal: "India and Pakistan were on the verge of war over Kashmir. There seemed to be no possibility of negotiating this issue until tensions abated. One way to reduce hostility . . . would be to concentrate on other important issues where cooperation was possible. Progress in these areas would promote a sense of community between the two nations which might, in time, lead to a Kashmir settlement. Accordingly, I proposed that India and Pakistan work out a program jointly to develop and jointly to operate the Indus Basin river system, upon which both nations were dependent for irrigation water. With new dams and irrigation canals, the Indus and its tributaries could be made to yield the additional water each country needed for increased food production. In the article I had suggested that the World Bank might use its good offices to bring the parties to agreement, and help in the financing of an Indus Development program.

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LILIENTHAL'S idea was well received by officials at the World Bank, and, subsequently, by the Indian and Pakistani governments. Eugene R. Black, then president of the World Bank told Lilienthal that his proposal "makes good sense all round". Black wrote that the Bank was interested in the economic progress of the two countries and had been concerned that the Indus dispute could only be a serious handicap to this development. India's previous objections to third party arbitration were remedied by the Bank's insistence that it would not adjudicate the conflict, but, instead, work as a conduit for agreement.

BLACK also made a distinction between the "functional" and "political" aspects of the Indus dispute. In his correspondence with Indian and Pakistan leaders, Black asserted that the Indus dispute could most realistically be solved if the functional aspects of disagreement were negotiated apart from political considerations. He envisioned a group that tackled the question of how best to utilize the waters of the Indus Basin - leaving aside questions of historic rights or allocations.

n BLACK proposed

a Working Party made up of Indian, Pakistani and World Bank engineers. The World Bank delegation would act as a consultative group, charged with offering suggestions and speeding dialogue. In his opening statement to the Working Party, Black spoke of why he was optimistic about the group's success:

n ONE aspect of Mr. Lilienthal's proposal appealed to me from the first. I mean his insistence that the Indus problem is an engineering problem and should be dealt with by engineers. One of the strengths of the engineering profession is that, all over the world, engineers speak the same language and approach problems with common standards of judgment. Black's hopes for a quick resolution to the Indus dispute were premature. While the Bank had expected that the two sides would come to an agreement on the allocation of waters, neither India nor Pakistan seemed willing to compromise their positions. While Pakistan insisted on its historical right to waters of all the Indus tributaries, and that half of West Punjab was under threat of desertification the Indian side argued that the previous distribution of waters should not set future allocation. Instead, the Indian side set up a new basis of distribution, with the waters of the Western tributaries going to Pakistan and the Eastern tributaries to India. The substantive technical discussions that Black had hoped for were stymied by the political considerations he had expected to avoid.

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Epilogue, September 2010

in focus 50 Years Of Indus Water Treaty

l Aug

1951: Black invites both Prime Ministers to meeting in Washington Both accept, agree on outline of essential principles. l Jan-Feb 1952: Meetings continue, Black finds 'common understanding,' atleast that neither side will diminish supplies for existing uses. l May 1952: First meeting of working party in Washington of engineers from India, Pa k i s t a n , a n d B a n k e n g i n e e r s . Agreement to determine future supply and demand; calculate available and desired data; prepare cost estimates and construction schedule 01 necessary infrastructure. l Nov 1952 and Jan 1953: Meetings continue in Karachi and Delhi without agreement. Bank suggests each side submit its own plan l Oct 6, 1953: Plans submitted with proposed allocations and sources for each state. Agreement on available supplies, not on allocations.

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F A C T S H E E T

Tulbul Navigation Project/ Wullar Barrage

he Tulbul Navigation Project which is known as Wullar barrage in Pakistan was planned by India at the mouth of the Wullar lake in Jammu and Kashmir. The project was conceived in 1980 and work began in 1984. The project envisages regulated water release from the natural storage in the lake to maintain a minimum draught of 4.5 feet in the River upto Baramulla, during the lean winter months. This is to ensure year round navigation from Anantnag to Srinagar and Baramullah, a distance of over 20km. Perspectives: India and Pakistan There has been an ongoing dispute between India and Pakistan since 1987 with Pakistan stating that the project violates the Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan raised four objections to the Project. First, it would reduce the flow of water into the River Jhelum, which flows into Pakistan. Second, it would adversely affect Pakistan's agriculture. Third, after the barrage is constructed, India would be able to control the flow of water into the Jhelum, giving India the ability to create drought and flood situation in Pakistan. Lastly, Pakistan stated that the project would affect its own triple-canal project linking Jhelum and Chenab with the Upper Bari Doab Canal. India states that the Project is designed to be a control structure, aimed at improving navigation in the Jhelum during winter to enhance connectivity between Srinagar and Baramullah. It would help in transporting fruits and timber. India also states that instead of reducing the flow of waters to Pakistan, it would regulate the water flow to the Mangla Dam and help in controlling floods. It would also increase Pakistan's capacity for power generation at Mangla. India states that the suspension of the project is only harming people in Jammu and Kashmir and also in Pakistan of irrigation and power benefits from the regulated release of water. The Way Ahead No progress has been made so far on the Project and it has come to a standstill. Pakistan had brought the case to the Indus Water Commission in 1986 but was unsuccessful in proving its case. India then went ahead with the construction of the project. Since then, more than ten rounds of talks have been held on the issue, but not much progress has been made on the issue. Both the parties had decided to take the issue further in future talks but the banner water issue between India and Pakistan currently is the Kishenganga Hydroelectric Power Project. PIA MALHOTRA

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Epilogue, September 2010

in focus 50 Years Of Indus Water Treaty

n THE World Bank soon became frustrated with this lack of progress. What had originally been envisioned as a technical dispute that would quickly untangle itself became an intractable mess. India and Pakistan were unable to agree on the technical aspects of allocation, let alone the implementation of any agreed upon distribution of waters. Finally, in 1954, after nearly two years of negotiation, the World bank offered its own proposal, stepping beyond the limited role it had apportioned for itself and forcing the two sides to consider concrete plans for the future of the basin. The proposal offered India the three eastern tributaries of the basin and Pakistan the three western tributaries. Canals and storage dams were to be constructed to divert waters from the western rivers and replace the eastern river supply lost by Pakistan.

WHILE the Indian side was amenable to the World Bank proposal, Pakistan found it unacceptable. The World Bank allocated the eastern rivers to India and the western rivers to Pakistan. This new distribution did not account for the historical usage of the Indus basin,or the fact that West Punjab's Eastern districts could turn into desert, and repudiated Pakistan's negotiating position. Where India had stood for a new system of allocation, Pakistan felt that its share of waters should be based on pre-partition distribution. The World Bank proposal was more in line with the Indian plan and this angered the Pakistani delegation. They threatened to withdraw from the Working Party and negotiations verged on collapse.

IN December 1954, the two sides returned to the negotiating table. The World Bank proposal was transformed from a basis of settlement to a basis for negotiation and the talks continued, stop and go, for the next six years.

ONE of the last stumbling blocks to an agreement concerned financing for the construction of canals and storage facilities that would transfer water from the eastern Indian rivers to Pakistan. This transfer was necessary to make up for the water Pakistan was giving up by ceding its rights to the eastern tributaries. The World Bank initially planned for India to pay for these works, but India refused. The Bank responded with a plan for external financing supplied mainly by the United States and the United Kingdom. This solution cleared the remaining stumbling blocks to agreement and the Treaty was signed by the Prime Ministers of both countries in September 1960. l May 1959: Black visits India and Pakistan. Suggests that India's share be a fixed cost, rather than by facility, and that the Bank would arrange for additional financing. India agrees, and accepts a 10-year transition period. l Sep 1960: Bank arranges an international Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement, Raises $893.5 million. l Sep 19, 1960: Indus Water Treaty signed in Karachi. Provisions calls for an Indian engineer to constitute the permanent Indus Commission, which will meet at least once a year to establish and promote cooperative arrangement.

BUT neither side could afford the dissolution of talks. The Pakistani press met rumors of and end to negotiation with talk of increased hostilities; the government was ill-prepared to forego talks for a violent conflict with India and was forced to reconsider its position. India was also eager to settle the Indus issue; large development projects were put on hold by negotiations and Indian leaders were eager to divert water for irrigation. l Feb 5, 1954: Bank puts forth own proposal, essentially suggesting dividing the western tributaries to Pakistan, and the eastern tributaries of India. The proposal also provided for continued deliveries to Pakistan during transition period. l Mar 25, 1954: India accepts proposal. Pakistan is less enthusiastic it would have of replace existing facilities. l July 28, 1954: Pakistan delivers a qualified acceptance of proposal

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Vol. 4, Issue 9

Epilogue, September 2010

in focus 50 Years Of Indus Water Treaty

T HE treaty gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of the Eastern Rivers and their tributaries before the point where the rivers enter Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan has exclusive use of the Western Rivers. Pakistan also received one-time financial compensation for the loss of water from the Eastern rivers. The countries agreed to exchange data and co-operate in matters related to the treaty. For this purpose, treaty created the Permanent Indus Commission, with a commissioner appointed by each country.

THE agreement set up a commission to adjudicate any future disputes arising over the allocation of waters. The Permanent Indus Commission has survived two wars and provides an on-going mechanism for consultation and conflict resolution through inspection, exchange of data, and visits. The Commission is required to meet regularly to discuss potential disputes as well as cooperative arrangements for the development of the basin. Either party must notify the other of plans to construct any engineering works which would affect the other party and to provide data about such works. In cases of disagreement, a neutral expert is called in for mediation and arbitration. While neither side has initiated projects that could cause the kind of conflict that the Commission was created to resolve, the annual inspections and exchange of data continue, unperturbed by tensions on the subcontinent. The Indus Waters Treaty is the

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F A C T S H E E T

Kishenganga Hydroelectric Power Project

ishenganaga is a tributary of the Jhelum, which was given to Pak, under the Indus Water Treaty. The issue that is fast becoming potential Baglihar-II is India's planned project on the river Ganga, the 330MW Kishenganga hydroelectric project. The project plans to dam the Kishenganga in the Gurez Valley creating a large reservoir from which a channel and a 27km tunnel dug south through the North Kashmir mountain range, will re-direct the Kishenganga waters to the Wular Lake at Bandipur, where a hydro-electric project will be built at the Wular barrage. Perspectives: India and Pakistan Pakistan has three major objections to the Project. First, the diversion of the river Ganga in India, called Neelum in Pakistan is not allowed under the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) and hence would mean violating the principles of the Treaty by India. Second, it will cause a 27 per cent water deficit in Pakistan when the project gets completed. Third, it will obstruct Pakistan's own plans for constructing a hydroelectric project on the river Neelum; the proposed Neelum-Jhelum power project. As far as the first issue of diversion is concerned, India maintains that although the IWT prohibits India from obstructing flows of water in Pakistan's rivers, it still allows the upper riparian to construct projects that do not disrupt or reduce waters to the lower riparian However, Pakistan responds that even the initial filling of the dam would reduce the flow of water to Pakistan. With regards to the second claim of the reduction in water in Pakistan by 27 per cent, India maintains that this reduction is largely due to climatic changes. Water availability in Pakistan might have reduced dramatically but that is also a consequence of mismanagement of water and tardiness in water conservation. Regarding Pakistan's third grievance about Kishenganga interfering with its own proposed Project, India again refers to the IWT. The IWT specifies that the country that completes a project on a shared river first, has the rights of use to that river. India claims that it started the Project before Pakistan and also intimated Pakistan about the same. The Kishenganga Project was started by India in the 1980s, and at that time there was no use of the waters by Pakistan. The Way Ahead The Water and Power Ministry along with the Indus Water Commission in Pakistan have served a legal notice to India, to bring the Kishenganga issue before the WB's court of arbitration, a mechanism that has never been used before. . India and Pakistan have nominated their experts. Both countries have agreed that the Chairman would be nominated by the UN Secretary General. India tried to persuade Pakistan to settle the case outside the Court of Arbitration as it is a very long drawn out process and is also considerably expensive. It would also stall India's Project and negatively impact its energy needs. This issue interestingly, might not end up being Baglihar-II because this time Pakistan also has a stake in this Project. If it remains embroiled in a dispute, it would affect its own Neelum-Jhelum Project which it is hugely depending on, for its water starved nation. PIA MALHOTRA

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Epilogue, September 2010

in focus 50 Years Of Indus Water Treaty

longest agreement that has been faithfully implemented and upheld by both India and Pakistan.

n The Indus Waters Treaty is the only agreement that has been faithfully implemented and upheld by both India and Pakistan. Although its negotiation was often arduous and frustrating for the World Bank and for the Indian and Pakistani delegations, the final outcome was amenable to all parties. While the World Bank may have underestimated the political impediments to technical debate and agreement, Eugene Black's desire to "treat water development as a common project that is functional, and not political, in nature . . . undertaken separately from the political issues with which India and Pakistan are confronted" suggests possibilities for future a re a s of I n d o- Pa k i sta n i cooperation.

n Although,

it is doubtful whether "functional" areas of cooperation are ever devoid of political considerations - the will to agree, the will to accept ideas put forward by outside mediators, the will to change positions - these considerations might be met when cooperation is vital. The Indus waters are the life blood of Pakistan and much of western India; functional cooperation was necessary for both sides to survive and prosper. The example of the Indus Waters Treaty suggests that cooperation between India and Pakistan is possible in cases where the benefits of agreement are plentiful and pressing, overwhelming the political hedging that prevents other forms of reconciliation.

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F A C T S H E E T

Baglihar Hydroelectric Power Project

aglihar Hydroelectric Power Project is a 450MW run-of-the-river power project on the Chenab River, in the Doda district in Jammu and Kashmir. The project was completed in 2008, although it was originally conceived in 1992. The construction of the Project began in 1999 and since then Pakistan has disputed this Indian Project. Perspectives: India and Pakistan Pakistan accused India of violating the Indus Water Treaty (IWT). The IWT gave Pakistan the western Rivers, Chenab, Indus and Jhelum and India, the eastern Rivers of Sutlej, Beas and Ravi. The treaty, however, contained provisions for India to construct run-of-the-river projects on the western Rivers with limited reservoir capacity and flow control required for power generation. Baglihar was constructed, availing this provision but Pakistan objected to it. Pakistan raised three objections. First, the design parameters provided India with leverage to accelerate, decelerate or block the flow of water to Pakistan, thus giving India strategic leeway in times of war. Second, Pakistan objected to the initial filling of the dam by India as it claimed that the diversion of the Chenab reduced the flow of water to Pakistan which affected its crop yield massively. According to the IWT, the onetime filling of a newly constructed reservoir such as Baglihar is allowed at a specific time (21 June-31August) when the monsoon is at its peak. As against India's claims of filling the dam between 21 June and 31 August, Pakistan claims, the filling continued till 5 September. Third, Pakistan objected to the height and gated spillways of the Project. After several rounds of failed talks, Pakistan brought the issue to the World Bank in 2005. The WB appointed Professor Raymond Lafitte, a Swiss civil engineer as a neutral expert to resolve the 'difference' between the two sides. Lafitte declared his verdict in 2007 and he upheld some minor objections of Pakistan stating that the pondage capacity and the height of the dam be reduced and the power intake tunnels be raised by 3 meters to limit the capability to control the flow of water. He, however, rejected the Pakistani objections of height and gated control of spillway declaring these conforming to the IWT. The Way Ahead Recently, on 1 June 2010, India and Pakistan resolved the issue relating to the initial filling of the dam with Pakistan deciding to not raise the matter further. The decision was arrived at the talks of the Indus Water Commissioners, who regularly meet to discuss water related issues between the two countries. (PIA MALHOTRA)

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Epilogue, September 2010

in focus DOCUMENTS : Full Text of IWT

ARTICLE I

As used in this Treaty

he terms of “Article” and “Annexure” mean respectively an Article of, and an Annexure to, this Treaty Except as otherwise indicated, references to Paragraphs are to the paragraphs in the Articles or in the Annexure in which the reference is made. The term “Tributary” of a river means any surface channel, whether in continuous or intermittent flow and by whatever name called, whose waters in the natural course would fall into that rive,r e.e.g a tributary, a torrent, a natural drainage, an artificial drainage, a nadi, nallah, a nai, khad, a cho. The term also includes any sub tributary or branch or subsidiary channel, by whatever name called, whose waters, in the natural course, would directly or otherwise flow into that surface channel. The term “The Indus”, “The Jhelum”, “The Chenab”, “The Ravi”, The Beas” or “The Sutlej” means the names river (including connecting lakes, if any) and all its Tributaries : Provided however that Ø None of the rivers names above shall be deemed to be a Tributary; Ø The Chenab shall be deemed to include the river Panjnad; and Ø The river Chandra and the river Bhaga shall be deemed to be Tributaries of the Chenab. The term “Main” added after Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, Beas or Ravi means the main stem of the names river excluding its Tributaries, but including all channels and creeks of the main stem of that river and such connecting lakes as form part of the main stem itself. The Jhelum Main shall be deemed to extend up to Verinag, and the Chenab Main up to the confluence of the river Chandra and the river Bhaga.

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The term “Eastern Rivers' means the Sutlej, The Beas and the Ravi taken together. The term “Western Rivers” means the Indus, The Jhelum and The Chenab taken together. The term “The Rivers” means all the rivers, The Sutlej, The Beas, The Ravi, The Indus, The Jhelum and The Chenab. The term “Connecting Lakes” means any lake which receives water from, or yields water to, any of the Rivers; but any lake which occasionally and irregularly receives only the spill of any of the Rivers and returns only whole or part of that spill is not a Connecting Lake. The term “Agricultural Use” means the use of water for irrigation, except for irrigation of household gardens and public recreational gardens. The term “Domestic Use” means the use of water for : Ø Drinking, Washing, Bathing, Recreation, sanitation (including the conveyance and dilution of sewage and of industrial and other wastes), stock and poultry and other like purposes; Ø Household and Municipal purposes (including use for household gardens and public recreational gardens); Ø Industrial purposes (including mining, milling and other like purposes); But the term does not include Agricultural use or use of the generation of hydro-electric power. The term “Non-Consumptive Use” means any control or use of water for navigation, floating of timber or other property, flood protection or flood control, fishing or fish culture, wild life or

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other like beneficial purposes, provided that, exclusive of seepage and evaporation of water incidental to the control or use, the water (undiminished in volume within the practical range of measurement) remains in, or is returned to the same river or its Tributaries; but the term does not include Agricultural Use of use for the generation of hydroelectric power. The term “Transition Period” means the period beginning and ending as provided in Article II (6) The term “Bank” means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The term “Commissioner” means either of the Commissioners appointed under the provisions of Article VIII (I) and the term “Commission” means the Permanent Indus Commission constituted in accordance with Article VIII(3) The term “interference with the water” means : Ø Any act of withdrawal therefrom; or Ø Any man-made obstruction to their flow which causes a change in the volume (within the practical range of measurement) of the daily flow of the water; Provided however that an obstruction which involves only an insignificant and incidental change in the volume of the daily flow, for example, fluctuations due to afflux caused by bridge piers or a temporary by-pass, etc. shall not be deemed to be an interference with the waters. The term “Effective Date” means the date on which this Treaty takes effect in accordance with the provisions of Article XII, that is, the first of April 1960.

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in focus DOCUMENTS : Full Text of IWT

ARTICLE II

Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers

ll the waters of the Eastern Rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of India, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Article. Except for Domestic Use and Non-Consumptive Use, Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let flow, and shall not permit any interference with, the waters of the Sutlej Main and the Ravi Main in the reaches where these rivers flow in Pakistan and have not yet finally crossed into Pakistan. The points of final crossing are the following : (a) near the new Hasta Bund upstream of Sleimanke in the case of Sutlej Main and (b) about one and a half miles upstream of the siphon for the B-R-B-D Link in the case of the Ravi Main. Except for Domestic Use, Non-Consumptive Use and Agricultural Use (as specified in Annexure B), Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let flow, and shall not permit any interference with, the waters (While flowing in Pakistan) of any Tributary which in its natural course joins the Sutlej Main or the Ravi Main before these rivers have finally crossed into Pakistan. All the waters, while flowing in Pakistan, of any Tributary which, in its natural course, joins the Sutlej Main or the Ravi Main after these rives have finally crossed into Pakistan shall be available for the unrestricted use of Pakistan; Provided however that this provision shall not be construed as giving Pakistan any claim or right to any releases by India in any such Tributary. If Pakistan should deliver any of the waters of any such Tributary, which on the Effective Date joins the Ravi Main after this river has finally crossed into Pakistan, into a reach of the Ravi Main upstream of this crossing, India shall not make use of these waters; each Party agrees to establish such discharge observation stations and make such observations as may be necessary for the determination of the component of water available for the use of Pakistan on account of the aforesaid delivers by Pakistan, and

Pakistan agrees to meet the cost of establishing the aforesaid discharge observation stations and making the aforesaid observations. There shall be a Transition Period during which, to the extent specified in Annexure H, India shall Ø Limit its withdrawals for Agricultural Use, Ø Limit abstractions for storages, and Ø Make deliveries to Pakistan from the Eastern Rivers. The Transition Period shall begin on Ist April 1960 and it shall end on 31st March 1970, or, if extended under the provisions of Part 8 of Annexure H, on the date up to which it has been extended. In any event, whether or not the replacement referred to in Article IV (1) has been accomplished, the Transition Period shall end not later than 31st March 1973. If the Transition Period is extended beyond 31st March 1970, the provisions of Article V(5) shall apply. If the Transition Period is extended beyond 31st March 1970, the provisions of paragraph (5) shall apply during the period of extension beyond 31st March 1970. During the Transition Period, Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use the waters of the Eastern Rivers which are to be released by India in accordance with the provisions of Annexure H. After the end of the Transition Period, Pakistan shall have no claim or right to releases by India of any of the waters of the Eastern Rivers. In case there are any releases, Pakistan shall enjoy the unrestricted use of the waters so released after they have finally crossed into Pakistan; Provided that in the event that Pakistan makes any use of these waters, Pakistan shall not acquire any right whatsoever, by prescription or otherwise, to a continuance of such releases or such use.

ARTICLE III

Provisions Regarding Western Rivers

akistan shall receive for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers which India is under obligation to let flow under the Provisions of Paragraph (2) India shall be under an obligation to let flow all the waters of the Western Rivers, and shall not permit any interference with these waters, except for the following uses, restricted (except as provided in item (c)(ii) of Paragraph 5 of Annexure (C) in the case of each of the

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rivers, the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab to the drainage basin thereof'; Ø Domestic use; Ø Non-Consumptive use; Ø Agricultural Use, as set out in Annexure C; and Ø Generation of hydro-electric power, as set out in Annexure D. Pakistan shall have the unrestricted use of all waters originating from sources other than the Eastern Rivers which are delivered by Pakistan into the Ravi or

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The Sutlej, and India shall not make use of these waters. Each Party agrees to establish such discharge observation stations and make such observations as may be considered necessary by the Commission for the determination of the component of water available for the use of Pakistan on account of the aforesaid deliveries by Pakistan. Except as provided in Annexures D and E, India shall not store any water of, or construct any storage works on the Western Rivers.

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in focus DOCUMENTS : Full Text of IWT

ARTICLE IV

Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers & Western Rivers

akistan shall use its best endeavours to construct and bring into operation, with due regard to expedition any economy, that part of a system of works which will accomplish the replacement, from the Western Rivers and other sources, of water supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan which, on 15th August 1947, were dependent on water supplies from the Eastern Rivers. Each Party agrees that any NonConsumptive Use made by it shall be so made as not to material change, on account of such use, the flow in any channel to the prejudice of the uses on that channel by the other Party under the provisions of this Treaty. In executing any scheme of flood or flood control each party will avoid, as far as practicable, any material damage to the other Party, and any such scheme carried out by India on the Western Rivers shall not involve any sue of water or any storage in addition to that provided under Article III. Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as having the effect of preventing either Party from undertaking schemes of drainage, river training, conservation of soil against erosion and dredging, or from removal of stones, gravel or sand from the beds of the Rivers; Provided that Ø In executing any of the schemes mentioned above, each party will avoid, as far as practicable, any material damage to the other Party; Ø Any such scheme carried out India on the Western Rivers shall not involve any use of water or any storage in addition to that provided under Article III; Ø Except as provided in Paragraph(5) and Article VII(1)(b), India shall not take any action to increase the

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catchments area, beyond the area on the Effective Date, of any natural or artificial drainage or drain which crosses into Pakistan, and shall not under take such construction or remodeling of any drainage or drain which so crosses or falls into a drainage or drain which so crosses as might cause material damage in Pakistan or entrail the construction of a new drain or enlargement of an existing drainage or drain in Pakistan; and Ø Should Pakistan desire to increase the catchment area, beyond the area on the Effective Date, of any natural or artificial drainage or drain, which receives drainage waters from India or, except in an emergency, to pour any waters into it in excess of the quantities received by it as on the Effective Date, Pakistan shall, before undertaking any work for these purposes, increase the capacity of that drainage or drain to the extent necessary so as ot to impair its efficacy for dealing with drainage waters received from India as on the Effective Date. Pakistan shall maintain in good order its portions of the drainages mentioned below with capacities not less than the capacities as on the Effective Date ; i) Hudira Drain j) Kasur Nala k) Salimshah Drain l) Fazilka Drain If India finds it necessary that any of the drainages mentioned in Paragraph (4) should be deepened or widened in Pakistan, Pakistan agrees to undertake to do so as a work of public interest, pro-

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vided India agrees to pay the cost of the depending or widening. Each party will use its best endeavours to maintain the natural channels of the Rivers, as on the Effective Date, in such condition as will avoid, as far as practicable, any obstruction to the flow in these channels likely to cause material damage to the other party. Neither party will take any action which would have the effect of diverting the Ravi Main between Madhopur and Lahore, or the Sutlej Main between Harike and Suleimanke, from its natural channel between high banks. The use of the natural channels of the Rivers for the discharge of flood or other excess waters shall be free and not subject to limitation by either party, and neither party shall have any claim against the other in respect of any damage caused by such use. Each party agrees to communicate to the other party, as far in advance as practicable, any information it may have in regard to such flood flows as may affect the other party. Each party declares its intention to operate its storage dams, barrages and irrigation canals in such manner, constituent with the normal operations of its hydraulic systems, as to avoid, as far as feasible, material damage to the other party. Each party declares it intention to prevent, as far as practicable, undue pollution of the waters of the Rivers which might affect adversely uses similar in nature to those to which the waters were put on the Effective Date, and agrees to take all reasonable measures t6o ensure that, before any sewage or industrial waste is allowed to flow into the rivers, it will be treated, where necessary, in such manner as not materially to affect

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those uses provided that the criterion of reasonableness shall be the customary practice in similar situations on the rivers. The parties agree to adopt, as far as feasible, appropriate measures for the recovery, and restoration to owners, of timber and other property floated or floating down the Rivers, subject to appropriate charges being paid by the owners. The use of water for industrial purposes under articles II(2), (II(3) and III (2) shall not exceed : Ø In the case of an industrial process known on the Effective Date, such quantum of use as was customary in that process on the Effective Date; Ø In the case of an industrial process not known on the Effective Date : Ø Such quantum of use as was customary on the Effective Date in similar or in any way comparable industrial processes; or Ø If there was no industrial process on the Effective Date similar or in any way comparable to the new process, such quantum of use as would not have a substantially adverse effective on the other party. Such part of any water withdrawn for Domestic Use under the provisions of Articles II(3) and III(2) as in subsequently applied to Agricultural Use shall be accounted for as part of the Agricultural Use specified in Annexure B and Annexure C respectively; each party will use its best endeavours to return to the same river (directly or through one of its Tributaries) all water withdrawn there from for industrial purposes and not consumed either in the industrial processes for which it was withdrawn or in some other Domestic Use. In the event that either party should develop a use of waters of the Rivers which is not in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, that Party shall not acquire by reason of such use any right, by prescription or other wise to a continuance of such use. Except as otherwise required by the express provisions of this Treaty, nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as affecting existing territorial rights over the waters of any of the Rivers or the beds or banks thereof, or as affecting existing property rights under municipal law over such waters or beds or banks.

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ARTICLE IV

Financial Provisions

n consideration of the fact that the purpose of part of the system of works referred to in Article IV(1) is the replacement, from the Western Rivers and other sources, of water supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan which, on 15th August 1947, were dependent on water supplies from the Eastern Rivers, India agrees to make a fixed contribution of Pounds Steeling 62,060,000 towards the costs of these works. The amount in Pounds Sterling of this contribution shall remain unchanged irrespective of any alteration in the par value of any currency. The sum of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 specified in Paragraph (1) shall be paid in ten equal annual installments on the Ist of November of each year. The first of such annual installments shall be paid on Ist November 1960, or if the Treaty has not entered into force by that date, then within one month after the Treaty enters into force. Each of the installments specified in Paragraph (2) shall be paid to the Bank for the credit of the Indus Basin Development Fund to be established and administered by the Bank, and payment shall be made in Pounds Sterling, or in such other currency or currencies as may from time to time be agreed between India and the Bank. The payments provided for under the provisions of Paragraph (3) shall be made without deduction or set-off on account of any financial claims of India on Pakistan arising otherwise than under the provisions of this Treaty ; Provided that this provision shall in no way absolve Pakistan from the necessity of paying in other ways debts to India which may be outstanding against Pakistan. If, at the request of Pakistan; the Transition Period is extended in accordance with the provisions of Article II (6) and of Part 8 of Annexure H, the Bank shall thereupon pay to India out of the Indus Basin Development Fund the appropriate amount specified in the Table Below :Table Period of Aggregate Extension Payment to India of Transition Period India One Year £Stg. 3,125,000 Two Year £Stg. 6,406,250 Three Years £Stg. 9,850,000 The provisions of Article IV(1) and Article V(1) shall not be construed as conferring upon India any right to participate in the decisions as to the system of works which Pakistan constructs pursuant to Article IV(1) or as constituting an assumption of any responsibility by India or as an agreement by India in regard to such works. Except for such payments as are specifically provided for in this Treaty, neither Party shall be entitled to claim any payment for observance of the provision of this Treaty or to make any charge for water received from it by the other Party.

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ARTICLE VI

ARTICLE VII

Exchange of Date

Future Co-operation

he following data with respect to the flow in, and utilization of the waters of the Rivers shall be exchanged regularly between the Parties : Ø Daily (or as observed or estimated less frequently) guage and discharge data relating to flow of the Rivers at all observation sites. Ø Daily extractions for or releases from reservoirs. Ø Daily withdrawals at the heads of all canals operated by government or by a government agency (hereinafter in this article called canals), including link canals. Ø Daily escapages from all canals, including link canals. Ø Daily deliveries from link canals. These data shall be transmitted monthly by each Party to the other as soon as the data for a calendar month have been collected and tabulated, but not later than three months after the end of the month to which they relate : Provided that such of the data specified above as are considered by either Party to be necessary for operational purposes shall be supplied daily or at less frequent intervals, as may be requested. Should one Party request the supply of any of these data by telegram, telephone, or wireless, it shall reimburse the other party for the cost of transmission. If, in addition to the data specified in Paragraph (1) of this Article, either Party requests the supply of any data relating to the hydrology of the Rivers, or to canal or reservoir operation connected with the Rivers, or to canal or reservoir operation connected with the Rivers, or to any provision of this Treaty, such data shall be supplied by the other party to the extend that these are available.

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he two parties recognize that they have a common interest in the optimum development of the Rivers, and to that end, they declare their intention to co-operate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest possible extent. In particular : Ø Each Party, to the extend it considers practicable and on agreement by the Other Party to pay the cots to be incurred, will at the request of the other party, set up or install such hydrologic observation stations within the drainage basins of the Rivers, and set up or install such meteorological observation stations relating thereto and carry out such observations thereat, as may be requested, and will supply the data so obtained. Ø Each Party, to the extend it considers practicable and on agreement by the other party to pay the costs to be incurred, will at the request of the other Party, carry out such new drainage works as may be required in connection with new drainage works of the other Party. Ø At the request of either party, the two parties may, by mutual agreement, cooperative in undertaking engineering works on the Rivers. The formal arrangements, in each case, shall as agreed upon between the Parties. If either party plans to construct any engineering work which would cause interference with the waters of any of the Rivers and which, in its opinion, would affect the other party materially, it shall notify, the other Party of its plans and shall supply such data relating to the work as may be available and as would enable the other party to inform itself of the nature, magnitude and effect of the work. If a work would cause interference with the waters of any of the Rivers but would not, in the opinion of the Party planning, it affect the other party materially, nevertheless the party planning the work shall, on request, supply the other party with such data regarding the nature, magnitude and effect, if any, of the work as may be available.

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ARTICLE VIII

Permanent Indus Commission

ndia and Pakistan shall each create a permanent post of Commissioner for Indus Waters, and shall appoint to this post, as often as a vacancy occurs, a persons who would ordinarily be a high –ranking engineer competent in the field of hydrology and water-use. Unless either Government should decide to take up any particular question directly with the other Government, each Commissioner will be the representative of his Government for all matters arising out of this Treaty, and will serve as the regular channel of communication on all matters relating to the implementation of the Treaty, and, in particular with respect to Ø The furnishing or exchange of information or data provided for in the Treaty; and Ø The giving of any notice or response to any notice provided for in the Treaty. The status of each commissioner and his duties and responsibilities towards his government will be determined by that government. The two Commissioners shall together form the permanent Indus Commission. The purpose and functions of the Commission shall be to establish and maintain co-operative arrangements for the implementation of this Treaty, to promote co-operation between the Parties in the development of the waters of the Rivers and in particular, Ø To study and report to the two governments on any problem relating to the development of the waters of the rivers which may be jointly referred to the Commission by the Two Governments; in the event that

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a reference is made by one Government alone, the Commissioner of the other government shall obtain the authorization of his Government before he proceeds to action the reference ; Ø To make every effort to settle promptly, in accordance with the provisions of Article IX(1), question arising thereunder : Ø To undertake, once in every five years, a general tour of inspection of the rivers for ascertaining the facts connected with various developments and works on the rivers. Ø To undertake promptly at the request of either Commissioner, a tour of inspection of such works or sites on the Rivers as may be considered necessary by him for ascertaining the facts connected with those works or sites; and Ø To take, during the Transition period, such steps as may be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of Annexure H. The Commission shall meet regularly at least once a year, alternately in India and Pakistan. This regular annual meeting shall be held in November or in such other month as may be agreed upon between the Commissioners. The Commission shall also meet when requested by either Commissioner. To enable the Commissioners to perform their functions in the Commission, each Government agrees to accord to the Commissioner of the Other Government the same privileges and immunities as are accorded to representatives of member states to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations under Sections 11, 12

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and 13 of Article IV of the convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations (dated 13th February, 1946) during the periods specified in those sections. It is understood and agreed that these privileges and immunities are accorded to the Commissioners not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves but in order to safe guard the indendent exercise of their functions in connection with the Commission; consequently the Government appointment the Commissioner not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its Commissioner in any case where, in the opinion of the appointing government; the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is accorded. For the purposes of the inspections specified in paragraph (4) (c) and (d), each Commissioner may be accompanied by two advisers or assistants to whom appropriate facilities will be accorded. The Commission shall submit to the Government of India and to the Government of Pakistan, before the first of June of every year, a report on its work for the year ended on the preceding 31stof March, and may submit to the two governments other reports at such times as it may think desirable. Each government shall bear the expenses of its Commissioner and his ordinary staff. The cost of any special staff required in connection with the work mentioned in Article VII (1) shall be borne as provided therein. The Commission shall determine its own procedures.

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ARTICLE IX

ARTICLE X

Settlement of Difference and Disputes

Emergency Provision

ny question which arises between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty or the existence of any fact which, if established, might constitute a breach of this Treaty shall first be examined by the Commission, which will endeavour to resolve the question by agreement. If the Commission does not reach agreement on any of the questions mentioned in Paragraph (1), then a difference will be deemed to have arisen, which shall be dealt with as follows : Ø Any difference which, in the opinion of either Commissioner, falls within the provisions of Part I of Annexure F shall, at the request of either Commissioner, be dealt with by a Neutral Expert in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of Annexure F. Ø If the difference does not come within the provisions of paragraphs (2) (a), or if a Neutral Expert, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraphs 7 of Annexure F, has informed the Commission that, in his opinion, the difference, or a part thereof, should be treated as a dispute, then a dispute will be deemed to have arisen which shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) Provided that, at the discretion of the Commission, any difference may either be dealt with by a Neutral Expert in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of Annexure F or be deemed to be a dispute to be settled in accordance with the provisions of Paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) or may be settled in any other way agreed upon by the Commission. As soon as a dispute to be settled in accordance with this and the succeeding paragraphs of this Article has arisen the Commission shall, at the request of either Commissioner, report the fact to the two Governments, as early as practicable, stating in its report the points on which the Commission is in agreement and the issues in dispute, the views of each Commissioner on these issues and his reasons therefore. Either Government may, following receipt of the report referred to in Paragraph (3) or if it comes to the conclusion that this report is being unduly delayed in the Commission, invite the other Government to resolve the dispute by agreement. In doing so it shall state the names of its negotiators and their readiness to meet with the negotiators to be appointed by the other government at a time and place to be indicated by the other government. To assist in these negotiations, the two governments may agree to enlist the services of one or more mediators acceptable to them. A court of arbitration shall be established to resolve the dispute in the manner provided by Annexure G. Ø Upon agreement between the parties to do so; or Ø At the request of either party, if, after negotiations have begun pursuant to paragraphs (4), in its opinion the dispute is not likely to be resolved by negotiation or meditation; or. The provisions or paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) shall not apply to any difference while it is being dealt with by a Neutral expert.

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Vol. 4, Issue 9

f, at any time prior to 31st March 1965, Pakistan should represent to the Bank that, because of the outbreak of large-scale international hostilities arising out of cause beyond the control of Pakistan, it is unable to obtain from abroad the materials and equipment necessary for the completion, by 31st March 1973, of that part of the system of works referred to in Article IV(1) which relates to the replacement referred to therein, (hereinafter referred to as the “replacement element”) and if, after consideration of this representation in consultation with India, the Bank is of the opinion that. Ø These hostilities are on a scale of which the consequence is that Pakistan is unable to obtain in time such materials and equipment as must be procured from abroad for the completion, by 31st March 1973, of the replacement element, and Ø Since the effective date, Pakistan has taken all reasonable steps to obtain the said materials and equipment and, with such resources of materials and equipment as have been available to Pakistan both from Pakistan and from abroad, has carried forward the construction of the replacement element with due diligence and all reasonable expedition. In Bank, shall immediately notify that of the parties accordingly. The parties undertake, without prejudice to the provisions of Article XII (3) and (4) that, on being so notified, they will forthwith consult together and enlist the good offices of the Bank in their consultation, with a view to reaching mutual agreement as to whether or not in the light of all the circumstances then prevailing, any modifications of the provisions of this Treaty are appropriate and advisable and, if so, the nature and the extent of the modifications.

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ARTICLE XI

General Provisions It is expressly understood that Ø This Treaty governs the rights and obligations of each party in relation to the other with respect only to the use of the waters of the Rivers and matters incidential thereto; and Ø Nothing contained in this Treaty, and nothing arising out of the execution thereof, shall be construed as constituting a recognition or waiver (whether tacit, by implication or otherwise) of any rights or claims whatsoever of either of the Parties other than those rights or claims which are expressely recognized or waived in this Treaty. Each of the parties agrees that it will not invoke this Treaty, anything contained therein, or anything arising out of the execution thereof, in support of any of its own rights or claims whatsoever or in disputing any of the rights or claims whatsoever of the other party, other than those rights or claims which are expressly recognized or waived in this Treaty. Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed by the parties as in any way establishing any general principle of law or any precedent. The rights and obligations of each party under this Treaty shall remain unaffected by any provisions contained in, or by anything arising out of the execution of, any agreement establishing the Indus Basin Development Fund.

ARTICLE XII

Final Provisions

his Treaty consists of the preamble, the articles hereof and Annexure A to H hereto, and may be cited as “The Indus Waters Treaty 1960”. This Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications into force upon the exchange of ratifications and will then take effect retrospectively from the first of April 1960. The provisions of this treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments. The provisions of this Treaty, or the provisions of this treaty as modified under the provisions of paragraph (3) shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments. In Witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed their seals. Done in triplicate in English at Karachi on this Nineteenth day of September 1960. For the Government of India : (Sd) Jawaharlal Nehru

For the Government of Pakistan : (Sd) Mohammad Ayub Khan Field Marshal, H.P., H.J. For the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development For the purpose specified in Articles V and X and Annexures F, G and H : Sd) W.A.B. Iliff.

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Vol. 4, Issue 9

Epilogue, September 2010

around J&K

The China Factor OTHER CONFLICTS ALONG THE J & K BORDER:

The Uyghurs in Xinjiang BHAVNA SINGH

injiang's (Xinjiang Uyghur A u t o n o m o u s Re g i o n ) g e o strategic location makes its ties with India highly important. It shares a border with India's Ladakh, Balti and Kashmir and has had close historical ties with these regions. The two regions of Xinjiang and Kashmir have been historically known to be independent kingdoms brought into the larger political frameworks only since the functioning of modern-nation states. Physical proximity between the two regions had led to establishment of massive trade routes in the region, for instance the Silk Route, which have been however, abandoned in the last few decades and are not accessible to the local people or traders and officials any more. With renewed opportunities available in terms of trade and energy resources, the two countries need to reconsider the situations at hand. Xinjiang's geographical location also places it at the center of Asian dynamics. Its development as a region has far and wide implications on political, economic and cultural aspects of its neighbouring territories, which is why it is a major source of concern for the Chinese government. First, the increasing demand for transparent governments in Central Asia leads to similar demands in Xinjiang, falling short of which there is growing radicalization of Uyghur separatism. Second, large Uyghur presence in neighbouring countries like Kyrgyzstan,

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creates a potential terrorist risk to the vast network of expansive infrastructure (e.g. road, railway, pipeline) that China has put in place. Third, the ties with the neighbouring countries in terms of Islam like Pakistan can in the long run promote secessionist tendencies in the region. Fourth, China has not yet devised any policy perspective of engaging the Indian state which experiences similar problems related to religious extremism and terrorism in Kashmir. China's strategy to eliminate risks is reflected in its increasing pursuit of the strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a regional organization to provide a safety valve against Muslim fundamentalism in the member states. It has also resorted to a string of antiterrorist exercises with its neighbours to reduce threats from Uyghur terrorism. It has emphatically focused on the 'go-out' strategy in the Central Asian Region and the SCO is also seen as the key organization for reviving the old 'silk route'. Nonetheless, the SCO is not devoid of its own set of problems and socio-political developments in the region are a source of grave concern to Chinese authorities. Though China has managed to get the Uyghur refugees in the SCO countries to be driven back to Xinjiang, the larger implications of Xinjiang in Central Asian politics have forced China to increase its presence in form of CPC leaders visiting in the

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region and looking out for support elsewhere. China's interactions with its southern neighbours, India and Pakistan, are thus, arranged within the ambit of containing terrorism in this region. The joint exercise with Pakistan in 2003 in Xinjiang was an effort in the direction of pruning radical elements in the two countries. It was in October 2003 that the Pakistan military killed ETIM leader Hasan Mahsum in an army operation, there has since been a rise in cooperation between the two countries given their physical proximity and similar nature of problems encountered by them. Most recently, Asif Ali Zardari's visit to Beijing in July 2010 has furthered an understanding on weeding out terrorism from their adjoining territories. Zardari emphatically endorsed China's policies on Xinjiang and said- “We are glad that the situation in Urumqi has been brought under control. We believe that China's policy of social harmony and development is producing great results for all Chinese people.” He further announced that “Pakistan appreciated the fact that life and property of Muslims of China are fully protected and their rights including the right to worship fully safeguarded”, and that “Pakistan is most impressed by the philosophy of Chinese leadership to promote harmonious society and a harmonious world.” China on its part recognized that Pakistan had played a key role in

Epilogue, September 2010

around J&K The China Factor

dissuading certain Muslim countries from taking the issue of violence in China's Xinjiang region to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and saved Beijing from embarrassment. However, these gestures of support are induced more due to the economic benefits that Pakistan can derive from the Chinese authorities instead of a sincere effort to weed out terrorism. President Zardari in his recent visit to china also urged China to accelerate plans to introduce a railway line between the two countries, after a spate of problems have plagued the Karakoram Highway, which runs from China's Xinjiang region to Pakistan and is the only strategically-significant land link between the two countries. Zardari also discussed long-pending plans for China and Pakistan to establish railway connectivity between Xinjiang and Havelian. Since most of his observations are economically driven instead of empathy for fellow Muslims in Xinjiang, Zardari's comments on the Xinjiang issue have led to his severe unpopularity within Pakistan. China understands the nature of this reciprocal communication and hence has had and continues to have difficulties with Pakistan on the issue of the latter's ability to crack down on terrorism aimed at China. In the above context of limitations in Sino-Pak cooperation, India's presence along the border is crucial for the Xinjiang conundrum. The visit by the Xinjiang governor in 2004 was indicative of the huge potential for the two regions to work together on areas like agriculture and food processing, traditional medicine and herbs, energy and oil production as well as tourism and the more significant aspect of the border links with India's Ladakh region. In the security realm, the eastern part of Ladakh which is the disputed Aksai

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Chin area that China occupied in the 1962 war and through which it had built a road in the early 1950s to logistically connect Tibet needs to be take into account. The idea mooted for the development of a Free Trade Agreement at the meeting of the Indian Prime minister and the Chinese Premier in April 2005 did not fructify into anything substantial. Proposals of opening direct flights between New Delhi and the Xinjiang capital of Urumqi did not take off. The proposal to have gas pipelines from Xinjiang's rich Tarim gas reserves to supply the needs of Ladakh and Kashmir and eventually those of other Indian areas has also been red-taped largely due to the feeling that the proposed pipelines run through the disputed territory of Aksai Chin and hence would involve questions of border demarcation of the captured territory. There are however, many areas on which both countries could learn from each other's experiences. Under the Indian constitution Kashmir enjoys an autonomous status and Xinjiang being an autonomous region of China enjoys several privileges. Both have substantial Muslim populations which generate issues at the levels of identity formation and ethnic-based concerns for their respective states. China's Western Development Strategy outlined in 2000 has tried to incorporate the region into the mainstream and thereby find solutions to the secessionist movements operating in Xinjiang. India has similarly been investing heavily into Kashmir with massive budgetary incentives annually. The Indian government's efforts in allowing the local languages to flourish and not attempting to outweigh the Kashmiri language has helped the government unlike the Chinese attempts at discrediting local language

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and introducing the minkao han education replacing the minkao min education. The problems emanating from Han-Uyghur ethnic discrimination policies in Xinjiang can be sorted out by increasing space for bilingual education in the province. Similarly, India's dilemma about social divisions in Kashmir can be reduced through adequate promotion of employment and educational opportunities. Kashmir on the one side and Xinjiang on the other can also attempt to renew historical connections, including the development of ancient trade routes as tourist options. Collective endeavours in educational and research institutions in both regions can help in generating good-will and research work aimed at solving similar problems in both states. Several informal trade exchanges still take place at the regional level though in an illegal manner, legalizing such trade opportunities could open up new vistas for the local people. Cooperation between these regions can also be developed in the areas of technology sharing particularly in the areas of desert irrigation and horticulture. The two countries can also avoid the mistakes committed by the other by looking into policy perspectives. China had largely abandoned the promise of religious and cultural autonomy to integrate the region into the mainstream and has witnessed the backlash thereof. A switch to hard options by India will yet again generate similar discontent amongst the Kashmir population and fuel militant activities. China's vulnerability and need for stability in the region can help India find an opening to the border settlement issue as well. Both countries can build together anti-terrorist mechanisms which can help in mitigating the terrorist threat which they believe

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around J&K

ZONAL HEADQUARTERS CRIME BRANCH JAMMU

The China Factor

emanates from externally funded movements (the ETIM in Xinjiang and Islamic fundamentalist movements in Kashmir). It should be recognized that the manner in which China deals with Xinjiang's ethnic and terrorist threats would affect the larger context of Asian security environment. On the one hand, China's strategy in Xinjiang and Central Asia could place within its grasp an unprecedented opportunity to extend its power and influence into the Central Asian region. On the other hand, it holds the potential to destabilize the entire Chinese state. There is some speculation that any mishandling of the Xinjiang question could lead to break up of China in a manner similar to that of the USSR. And since most of the infrastructure and energy projects are grounded in this region any disturbance in the area could create potential havoc for the Chinese economy. This region is also extremely important with regard to China's greater periphery concept and its grand strategy of 'peaceful rise' since the way it operates in Xinjiang leads to international responses of either questioning its approach or supporting its larger agendas in the region. It is imperative that China finds a lasting solution to its Uyghur problem and India to its problems in Kashmir. The Urumqi crisis of 2009 is only one such violent manifestation of the resentment caused by the misinterpretation of local cultural and political desires and the recent violence witnessed in Kashmir is indicative of a similar turn of events in the Indian territory. Though the massive derailment of China's peace initiative in the region should have led to a reassessment of its policies, post-Urumqi developments do not reflect a serious appraisal by the Chinese government. In continuing with its repressive policies, the government is yet again perpetrating a legitimacy crisis for itself and adding fuel to the disgruntlement of the Uyghurs. India on its part can evince prescience and avoid such mis-governance. Prioritizing one facet over the other will not provide any lasting solutions to the current situations in Xinjiang or Kashmir; development based singularly on an economic agenda or only in tune with the ethnic aspirations would only intensify the cleavage between the haves and have-nots. Hence, there is a need for collectively devising a strategy to overcome security threats in these adjacent regions. If effectively utilised, the cooperative endeavours on Xinjiang and Kashmir could lay down framework for future cooperation in other arenas as well.

Scams target you Protect yourself Most scams need you to do something before they can work like providing your personal information or sending money. DON’T RESPOND Scammers fool you by : Ü Making promises of great prizes or easy money. Ü Pretending to be legitimate banks banks and businesses. Ü Using leaflets, letters and web sites that look like the real thing. Ü Asking you to send money, personal details or fees before delivering anything. Ü Asking you to keep the deal or offer a secret. Ü Floating ads in newspapers for admission to professional courses. 1.

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PROTECT YOURSELF Avoid ripoffs. Treat all unsolicited promises and requests for your details carefully. STOP. Don’t respond. Check to see if the request is legitimate and research the person, company and offer. GET independent advice if the offer involves money, time or commitment. NEVER respond to out of the blue requests for personal details. DON”t use contact details provided in offers or request find them independently. CHECK your credit report at least twice a year.

Fight the Scammers. Don’t Respond! Report them to Crime Branch Jammu on Phone No. : 0191-2578901

Issued in public interest by CRIME BRANCH, JAMMU No. : DIP/J-5119

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Vol. 4, Issue 9

Epilogue, September 2010

exclusive Series

New Research on Kashmir THE CONTRASTING FORTUNES OF THE FLANKS :

Ladakh and Gilgit RAKESH ANKIT

Ladakh

ometimes called the “Little Tibet”; at others the “Last Shangri-La” – Ladakh is marked by mountains and monasteries and offers some spectacular treks to lakes and forts. Spread over 80 thousand sq. kms. and 10 thousand feet above sea-level, this north-western part of Jammu & Kashmir has a picturesque geography and a, largely, peaceful history barring the 1962 war with China. Ladakh remained an autonomous state in its own right till mid-1840s and was always a source of wondrous curiosity for the merchants and military-men of the expanding East India Company before that. William Moorcroft and party were the first Englishmen ever to set foot in Ladakh when they reached Leh in September 1820. Ladakh then was being eyed covetously by both the East India Company – for largely commercial reasons and the powerful Sikh ruler, Maharaja Ranjit Singh – for largely strategic reasons. Moorcroft took the hasty liberty of signing a completely unauthorized 'commercial treaty' in Leh on behalf of the 'British merchants' which was equally hastily retracted by Calcutta. An abject apology to Ranjit Singh followed for Moorcroft's transgression. An uneasy ally since the treaty of 1809, the East India Company were anxious to avoid giving offence to Lahore, particularly on Ladakh as they knew that the Maharaja looked upon it

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as within his 'sphere of influence'. This existence of Ladakh ended in 1842 when Gulab Singh (on behalf of Lahore), Lama Gurusahib (on behalf of Lhasa) and a Chinese representative (on behalf of Peking) signed a treaty which brought Ladakh, along with Aksai Chin, within the J & K State area. Over the next 5 years, attempts were made to demarcate the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet which were given up by 1847 as both sides agreed to adhere to 'ancient arrangement'. So while no actual demarcation was made on the ground, maps were prepared on both sides on the basis of old usage and convention with both sets claiming different alignments. This state of affairs continues today – reflected in the rival claims of New Delhi and Beijing. Throughout the Great Game, Ladakh served as a valuable strategic

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outpost abetting the old Silk Route and aiding the monitoring over Sinkiang, Tibet and Central Asian Republics. Tibet then was an autonomous state, friendly to British India and within its sphere of influence – though London and Calcutta were careful to formally recognise Chinese suzerainty. However, Lhasa was directly dealt with and every effort was made to bolster its autonomous status and independent entity. Of course, it helped that Peking was too weak to do anything then. The guiding principle as 19th century closed for the British Indian government remained the same, namely, to prevent Tibet from falling into the hands of any potential enemy – it was then the Tsarist Russia; next it would be the Bolshevik Russia and finally, in the 1940s, Mao. Much of this concern flowed from the vagueness of the Sinkiang-Ladakh-

Epilogue, September 2010

exclusive Series New Research on Kashmir

Tibet border. The Simla Convention of 1914 was a step in the direction of fixing frontiers. But nothing much happened on ground as 1914 turned into 1941 wherein our story is set (based on a report preserved in the Oriental and India Office (OIOC) collections of the British Library (BL), London along the series MSS Eur D 862). By this time, the international situation was once again on the boil and, unlike the Great War of 1914-18, this time much closer home. Even before the Japanese onslaught in the Asia-Pacific rim, from the time of its invasion of China in early 1930s, the old Silk Route, along the banks of the Oxus and southward over Gobi was seeing a new era, new conditions and even a new name – the Red Highway. Political intrigue and propaganda stopped trade and traffic between Chinese Turkistan, Ladakh and Central Asian Republics. In August 1941, news reached Srinagar that thousands of Muslim brigands from Sinkiang – while harrying against Tibetan troops – were poised to drive into Ladakh creating a security situation which worried the authorities there and in New Delhi. Accordingly, the 6th Infantry of the J & K State troops led by Major Abdul Majid Khan was dispatched to Demchuk in Ladakh to meet the brigands. Demchuk was a small village 200 miles south-east of Leh beyond Shushal. It was the last village on that route which traversed through the terrain at 17, 500/18, 000 feet above sea level. It took 9 days – in those days – to reach Demchuk from Leh. Major Khan had 2 platoons, 65 rifles and 2 light-machine guns with him and he arrived in Demchuk in the last week of September 1941. On 8 October 1941, the troops engaged the brigands when the latter attacked. The ensuing skirmish left 6 of the attackers dead and 1 wounded. 7 Russian rifles were captured by Major Khan's men. Only then it transpired that what had been thought of as brigands was

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actually a group of Kazak tribes. It was a biggish party. There were about 4000 men, women and children in all. They had 3000 ponies, 1500 camels, 500 yaks and about 5000 sheep. Sensing the potential of large civilian casualties, the Wazir of Ladakh and Major Khan decided to hold talks with them. The Kazaks agreed to disarm in exchange of a free passage. However, remote from the spot, New Delhi decided to intervene and weigh against such a settlement. Srinagar was told to either turn back the Kazaks to Tibet or drive them to Sinkiang. Failing either they were to be held in Ladakh. The wise Wazir and the wily veteran Abdul Majid realised these options to be impossible and bravely ignored them. They agreed to the Kazak's request and disarmed them – in the process achieving a yield of 250 Russian rifles. They gave them free passage through Ladakh in return for no looting and no Tibetan prisoners. They accompanied the Kazaks through this trek across Ladakh and reached Leh on 3 November 1941. It now slowly emerged out of the Kazaks that they had come from the area north of the Caspian Sea and Lake Aral. It had taken them 5 years and the impulse had been the famed peace and prosperity of India. They had resolved to make India their home when they set out from the Kazak Republic. Of course, formally speaking, they remained the subjects of the former USSR. During this time and process, they fought their way through the former Turkistan, northern Sinkiang and had reached Tibet where – according to the Tibetan State authorities – they wrecked havoc and looted some 1, 00, 000 head of live stock! From Gartok in Tibet they decided to move southwards and enter British India by the Almora (present Uttarakhand) route but met resistance and faced repulsion at the hands of the police force present there. With their passage to India blocked and a hostile Tibet on their back, in despera-

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tion, they entered Ladakh and engaged the State troops. Once beaten by Major Khan and his men and with the realisation that they were very short of ammunition, they grasped the offer to talk with joy and relief. Maharaja Hari Singh's government decided to hurry the Kazaks through and beyond the Zoji La pass before it was blocked by snow. The party left Leh on 5 November and moved along purposefully. The civil administration in Leh as well as the State troops helped them with food and fodder. Considering the number of animals that the Kazaks had with them, it appears that it was decided to abandon any that were not able to keep pace. One platoon from Leh accompanied the Kazaks to Kargil and from there the State police escorted them. The tough Kazaks – initially understood as a security risk of a different kind – were thus met, engaged and escorted in an operation which earned the civilian authorities in Leh and the military response from Srinagar respite and reputation both. In difficult terrain with limited intelligence against mounted men Major Abdul Majid Khan led his men very well on the ground and then bettered that effort by showing foresight and independent judgment in the cause of peace. He won the conflict and its resolution both. Prompted by this incident, over the next five years, attempts were made to occupy and stabilize the frontier in Ladakh. Of course, postindependence and accession in 1947 in the Indian sub-continent and Mao's victories in 1949 (mainland China) and 1950 (Tibet; later consolidated in 1959), Aksai Chin came firmly in the Chinese possession. The Yekcheng-Gartok road – also called the Sinkiang-Tibet highway – was completed in September 1957. The road entered the old J & K State territory in the south near Sarigh Jilganang Lake and ran north-west before leaving the State territory near Haji Langer, in the north-west corner of Ladakh.

Epilogue, September 2010

exclusive Series New Research on Kashmir

GILGIT While the upheavals of 1947-48 left Ladakh virtually untouched, the same was farthest from truth when it came to the exact opposite side of the State frontiers, namely, the famed Gilgit Agency. Much like the events of August-September 1947 in Poonch, happenings in Gilgit at the same time were important preludes to the gathering storm of the October raid. Similar to Poonch, they have been appropriated and denied; mutilated and sanitized, respectively in the rival, competing versions of history. The Gilgit agency which had been taken care of by the British from 1880s onwards, given its strategic significance, came back to Srinagar's jurisdiction in July 1947. Brigadier Ghansar Singh Jamwal, OBE was appointed as Governor on 20 July. He had earlier been Brigadier General (Staff) of the J & K State forces. Jamwal, along with his boss, General Henry Lawrence Scott – Maharaja Hari Singh's Chief of Staff – arrived in Gilgit on 30 July where they were received by Lt. Col. Bacon. Major Brown – Commandant, Gilgit Scouts – visited him the same evening to apprise him of the situation in the agency.

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Later, Subedar-Major Babur Khan of Gilgit Scouts led a delegation of other JCOs to Jamwal and informed him that they all wanted to serve Pakistan. Less than a week later, over 3-4 August 1947, the so-called Yasin Revolution began in Gilgit. Towards the end of the troublesome months of August and September, Jamwal lost the patronage of General Scott on 29 September. Scott was succeeded by General Kashmir Singh (son of the Janak Singh – successor of Ramachandra Kak – PM from mid-August to mid-October). It was a most imprudent decision by any yardstick. Jamwal was arrested by Major Brown, Lt. Haider Khan and SubedarMajor Babur Khan at 2 AM on 1 November. A provisional government was formed. Other prominent players were Subedar Rais Khan, Captain Ihsan Ali and Captain Hussain Sayed. By then, the raid on valley was 10 days old; Hari Singh had acceded to India; Indian troops had saved Srinagar and Mountbatten and Auchinleck had flown to Lahore to parlay with Jinnah and General Gracey, respectively. Jamwal was to languish in prison – cut off from rest of the Kashmir – till 15 January 1949.

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Jamwal ruminated long and hard on the main causes for the fall of the Gilgit Agency during his imprisonment and held concrete conclusions. They can be read at the OIOC, BL, London under the file no. MSS Eur Photo Eur 394. Jamwal held first and foremost the weakness of the J & K State troops' brigade as a reason for the quick capitulation. There were only two companies of the 6th Infantry stationed in Gilgit where were not adequately re-inforced later as State troops were thinly spread in the tense months of August-September in the south and south-east. Second, matters were complicated by the active part played by the two British officers (Brown and Scott) commanding the Gilgit Scouts. They were helped by other British officers and the Muslim officers serving in the Agency. Third, the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar were proPakistan. Finally, there was a strong element of discontent among civil and military employees against Maharaja's maladministration. This mention of maladministration as well as the predominantly 'Hindu' nature of the civil and military administrative apparatus rears its head in the memoirs of another high official – this time civilian. John Shattock served as Joint Commissioner in Ladakh between 1942 and 1944 and then moved to Srinagar as First Assistant Resident. He too felt that 'the Muslims were generally hostile to the state administration, Kashmiri Brahmins and Hindu rulers. They were divided into two camps – the first was led by Sheikh Abdullah, supporter of the Congress Party who wished in 1947 for accession to India and later an independent Kashmir with tenuous attachment to India; the second was anti-Abdullah, pro-Pakistan group'. Shattock's papers, MSS Eur F 226/27, too are to be had at the OIOC, BL (London).

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COLUMN

History

Ladakh in the Persian Literature of the Mughal Empire PROF JIGAR MOHAMMAD

he processes of historical changes in Ladakh from ancient to medieval period show that Ladakh has been a region of synthesization of different cultures. Persons of the different racial backgrounds such as Tibetan, Indian and Central Asian lived together from ancient period onwards. The sense of living together still exists in Ladakh in better way than in any part of the modern world. In religious terms Bon-pa, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam flourished in Ladakh with out occurrence of any religious conflicts. There is hardly any region on earth except Ladakh which maintains religious tolerance throughout the ages. Though the Buddhism has been most popular religion of Ladakh, the Christianity and Islam continue to get due importance. The immigration of the people from Tibet, Central Asia and parts of India to Ladakh remained a continuous process during ancient and medieval periods. The mingling of the persons of different races remained the dominant cultural trend of Ladakh throughout historical period. When Fredrick Drew visited Ladakh in the second half of the nineteenth century, he found large similarity between the Ladakhis and Central Asians in terms of their physique and habits. Ladakh routes to different parts of Central Asia, China, Tibet and India enabled the people of different social backgrounds to make cultural exchange at a common place. It is evident that Ladakh, despite being one of the highest inhabited areas on earth, succeeded

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in maintaining socio-economic contacts with the different parts of the world. It is known that Francois Bernier, a French doctor and traveller, came to India in the second half of the seventeenth century. Though he never visited Ladakh, he collected some information in Kashmir pertaining to the history of Ladakh. Janet Rizvi rightly calls Ladakh as criss-crossed by trade routes to south and central Asia. In the process of empire building the Mughals made a policy to establish their authority in most part of the Himalayan region and the areas situating on the route between India and Central Asia. Since Ladakh was well connected with Central Asia during the 16th and 17th centuries in terms of trade routes, the Mughals in Central Asia and India showed their concern with Ladakh's affairs. Mirza Haider Dughlat was the first Mughal who attacked and conquered Ladakh in 1532. After the conquest of Ladakh he acquired the knowledge of the routes from Ladakh to Yarkand, Khotan Charchan, Lob, Katak and Sarigh Ulghur. Similarly he also discovered the routes from Ladakh to other parts of India. He also showed interests in the socio-economic activities of the persons of the different social background. His Tarikh-i-Rashidi is one of the most valuable source of the History of the 16th century Ladakh. However, it was the Mughal emperor Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar(1556-1605) who formulated a definite policy to towards Ladakh and Balistan. According to Abul Fazl (Ain-i-Akbari), the term

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Tibet Kalan(Great Tibet) was used by the Mughals for Ladakh and Tibet-i-Khurd (Little Tibet) was used for Baltistan. Akbar was very much impressed from the qualities of the Buddhist Lamas. Akbar also encouraged commercial contacts with Ladakh. The Mughal emperor Jahangir(1605-27) tried to establish his sovereignty in Ladakh, but failed. However, he protected the trade routes between the Mughal empire and Ladakh. In his memoirs Jahangir appreciates economic importance of Ladakh and writes that the best quality of raw wool for the Kashmiri shawls came from Ladakh and Tibet. The literary sources of the Mughals incorporated the historical heritage, events and the life and conditions of the people Ladakh in their own manner. Since Ladakh was an unique region in terms of its topography, social formation and historical changes, the authors of the Mughal empire found various themes of their interests which they did not witness in other parts of the Indian subcontinent. Consequently, they made Ladakh as one of the components of their literary works. It was the Mughal emperor Akbar who directed his official historian Abul Fazl to depict the cultural identities of the various regions of his empire so that these identities were to be given due representation in the sociopolitical life of the empire. The Ain-i-Akbari is an important Mughal source of the sixteenth century, which contains some useful materials pertaining to society and culture of medieval

Epilogue, September 2010

COLUMN History

Ladakh. It was written by Abul Fazl in Persian in 1595. It has been translated by H. Blochman and Colonel H.S. Jarret into English. Basically, the Ain-i-Akbari is concerned with the administrative institutions, socio-economic developments, and the Mughal emperor Akbar's policies relating to the different subjects of the Mughal empire. It is an established fact that Ladakh was an independent kingdom during the reign of Akbar (15561605). It is also true that Abul Fazl never visited Ladakh. But he was a historian who was ever willing to learn and record the historical events of the different parts of the world. It was his unending desire of the acquisition of knowledge which prompted him to include the available historical events of Ladakh and Tibet in his Ain-i-Akbari. The Ain-i-Akbari provides information regarding the geographical features, gold, horses and Lamas of Ladakh. It uses the term Tibet-i-Kalan for Ladakh. It mentions a place called Lar, which was situated on the border of Ladakh. He gives some interesting information regarding a mountain and some springs of Lar. He writes, “To its (Lar) north is a lofty mountain which dominates all the surrounding country, and the ascent of which is arduous. At its foot are two springs, two yards distant from each other, the waters of one being extremely cold and those of the other exceedingly hot. They are considered sacred and the bones of bodies are reduced to ashes, the bones and ashes of the dead body are cast into a lake on the mountain and this ceremony is regarded as a means of union with the Divinity. If the flesh of an animal falls into it, a heavy fall of snow and rain ensues.”32 Abul Fazl praises the purity of water of Sind river very much. Appreciating the quality of the water of Sind he remarks, “The river called Sind which rises in Tibet, and wholesome to drink and is so clear that the fish in it are visible. They strike them with iron

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spears and catch them also in other ways.”33 This shows that the water of Sind was used for drinking purpose in medieval Tibet and Ladakh. Abul also mentions Dachchhinpara and Maru Adwin bordering areas of Ladakh (Great Tibet). The Handu of Maru Adwin was of the best bread and large in size.34 Abul Fazl records the availability of the gold in abundance in the northern mountains of India including Tibet. It was obtained through the process of the washing of the soil of Sind river. Abul Fazl uses the term Salony for soil washing process of obtaining gold.35 He also records the use of garment by the Mughal emperor Akbar fashioned on Tibetan pattern. He mentions a cloth called Kapardhar as a Tibetan stuff . Akbar invented a new term 36 for it, called Kapurnur. These facts shows that both the gold and some cloths were imported from Tibet and Ladakh to the Mughal empire during Akbar's period. Abul Fazl mentions that some merchants brought horses of good quality from Tibet to the Mughal empire. About the yaks of Ladakh Abul Fazl writes, “In the neighbourhood of Thibet and Kashmir, the Kutas or Tibetan yak occurs, an animal of extraordinary appearance.”37 The Ain-i-Akbari contains some interesting observations of its author regarding the social life of the Buddhist Lamas. Its description of Lamas shows that Abul Fazl was knew them very closely. The Mughal emperor Akbar also liked the way of life of these Lamas and the latter influenced some practices of the emperor. Expressing his views about the Lamas Abul Fazl writes: “…in Tibet there were now a class of Lamas, or Mongolian devotees, recluses, and hermits, that live two hundred years, and more. For the reason His Majesty (Akbar), in imitation of the usage of these Lamas, limited the time he spent in the harem, curtailed his food and drink, but especially abstained from the

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meat. He also shaved the hair of the crown of his head, and let he hairs at side grow, because he believed that the soul of perfect begins, at the time of death, passes out by the crown (which is the tenth opening of the human body) under a noise resembling thunder, which the dying man may look upon as a proof of his happiness and salvation from sin and as a sign that his soul, by metempsychosis, will pass into the body of some grand and mighty king.”38 This analysis of Abul Fazl shows that the Mughal emperor Akbar had some social interaction with the Buddhist Lamas. It is an established fact that Akbar believed in the policy of Sulh-i-Kul (peace with all) and applied the same concept in the formulation of the state policies. He also tried to encourage the composite culture in the different parts of the empire. Abul Fazl's remarks about the influence of the Lamas on the social life of the Mughal emperor Akbar establishes that the emperor not only respected the sentiments of the Buddhists, but more importantly by imitating some practices of the Lamas he ensured the freedom of religious practices to the Buddhist and intensified the process of the cultural synthesis. This also confirms that the popularity of the Lamas was not confined to Ladakh, but they were also popular at the Mughal palace and court. The mentions of Abul Fazl regarding the historical developments of Ladakh show that Ladakh was not only the region of attraction for the indigenous population, but the people of literary backgrounds living far from Ladakh also treated it as a source of widening the scope of their works. It is well established fact that the Mughal emperors of India believed in the multi-culturism. They made it point to acquire the knowledge of the cultural identities of Ladakh and propagate them through their literary works.

Epilogue, September 2010

COLUMN

Random Notes

The Dual Existence In Kashmir MANISHA SOBHRAJANI

magine a scenario where there is a state-imposed curfew; the streets are deserted but for the heavy presence of security forces; schools and colleges are closed and the only visitors to these places are stray dogs and birds; offices, shops and places of public gathering remain shrouded in deathly silence which is only broken by the piercing sounds of bullets and bombs. Just that people living in the Valley don't need to imagine the scenario: they have been living it for almost a month now. And over the years, having lived through such circumstances many times over, have gotten used to it (if it is possible to get used to 'disharmony' in every possible sense of the word). In the midst of such an existence, what happens if a family runs out of cooking gas or some basic amenity like milk, sugar or vegetables? What if there is an electric short-circuit in the house, but since there is a curfew, the household cannot expect the services of an electrician (assuming there is power supply in the Valley!)? What if a family needs to travel urgently for whatever reason? What if there is some bank work which is of utmost importance? What if there is no fodder for the animals? And what if there is a medical emergency? The last question on the list can be dealt with thus (these are true incidents which happened very recently in the Valley). A person goes out to visit an ailing family member in the hospital (who must have been in hospital prior to the curfew). He is stopped by the security forces, and told that he cannot go. He insists on going because according to him,

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it is imperative to make that visit. What if the family member needs something? The security forces are adamant, and when the man does not seem to heed their advice, he is beaten up. And he is beaten up so brutally that he has to be admitted in the same hospital himself. Whether he is then able to meet with his family member is anybody's guess. On the other hand, there is a family which is divided (physically, in terms of distance and proximity): part of it is settled in the Valley and part of it is in Bangalore. The mother in the family falls ill. Since there is a curfew in the city, it is impossible to get a check-up done, followed by various investigative medical tests. So the family decides to take the mother to Bangalore (making the most of the few relaxed hours in the curfew, when it is permissible to move around). All check-ups and investigations done, and a treatment and medicines prescribed, the mother returns to the Valley. Good for the family, especially the mother, that they were able to afford this exercise without any mishaps. Ordinary people in the Valley are not so lucky. In the course of a 'normal' life, a person would have an idea of what he or she is likely to do over the span of the next few days. The more enthusiastic and organised would perhaps maintain a diary of their engagements and a list of 'things to do'. But for those living in the Valley, this game, too, is played differently. One is not sure how an individual's personal diary might read in the times of curfew and no-movement, but there is a different kind of 'public' schedule which is

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handed over to them. The Hurriyat, I am told, prepares a weekly schedule which is passed on through newspapers, the internet, and in some cases through individual distribution. This schedule reads something like this: Monday â&#x20AC;&#x201C; A dharna by the students' association to protest against the brutality by the security forces; Tuesday -- Idgah chalo; Wednesday â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Women to protest against rising prices... and so on. According to latest reports, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq has asked the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) to intervene in Jammu & Kashmir to ensure that the state's Muslims are not stopped from attending Friday prayer congregations. No mass prayers have been allowed in the past month at the old city's Jamia Masjid. As an outsider (a non-Kashmiri, who feels that Kashmir is her 'calling' in life), one wonders what can be done while witnessing the various acts of this play called 'Kashmir' unfold. I am reminded of these lines penned by Rajmohan Gandhi in a play called 'Dara Shukoh' (soon to be published by Westland/ Tranquebar) where the Mughal prince Dara talks to his wife, princess Nadira: Take our Peri Mahal Mist-veiled, in Srinagar That monument ethereal Which overlooks the Dal from a spur. Within the lake's placid waters Murders take place by the minute. Fish eat fish; are eaten by others. Violence marks every thing in it.

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COLUMN Random Notes

Living in between...

ecently, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in his opening remarks while addressing the meeting of all-party delegation from Jammu & Kashmir, said: 'I am convinced that the only way forward in Jammu and Kashmir is along the path of dialogue and reconciliation ... But I recognize that the key to the problem is a political solution that addresses the alienation and emotional needs of the people. This can only be achieved through a sustained internal and external dialogue. We are ready for this. We are willing to discuss all issues within the bounds of our democratic processes and framework.' I would like to draw the attention of the Prime Minister to those villages in border districts in Jammu & Kashmir which are sandwiched between the Line of Control (Loc) and the Army fencing. These villages have long been neglected, and in the outer world (outside J&K), not many know that there are areas which are part of Indianadministered-Kashmir but lie outside the 'protective' fencing painstakingly built by the Army over many years and cost unfathomable amounts of money. Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Indian Kashmir led to the Indian Army's decision to build a fencing along the 734 kilometres of the 742-long LoC between India and Pakistan. Started in the year 2003, the fencing was built at a cost of Rs 35 lakh per kilometre. The fencing comprises 12-feet high Y-shaped pillars, connected with barbed wiring, and with concrete flooring and flood lights fitting. The total cost of erecting the fencing was a whopping Rs 351 crore. According to the Army, the fencing has enhanced the Army's capability to detect and intercept infiltration and

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exfiltration attempts, and is acting as an effective deterrent against terrorists. However, Pakistan has, from time to time, claimed that the fencing activity undertaken by India along the International Border (IB) and LoC is in violation of the Simla Agreement and the December 1972 Agreement on the delineation of the LoC. When I first chanced upon the Army fencing during my initial years of working in J&K, my naive mind mistook it as the elusive LoC itself! To me, it was unimaginable that the formidable, ugly, fierce-looking fencing could be anything else other than the LoC. This was in the Nowshera sector of district Rajouri, Jammu region. Since then, I have been to many such areas where a number of villages lie outside the Army fencing. The decision to start fencing was based on practical considerations. The fencing had to follow natural topography and strategic considerations. The construction work had begun before the 26 November 2003 ceasefire between India and Pakistan, and thus, the jawaans involved in the construction of the fencing were direct targets of Pakistani firing. The area to be fenced was marked keeping in view the fact that the soldiers would get the necessary cover in the form of small geographical features like hills to avoid casualties. For reasons such as these, the fencing does not exactly coincide with the LoC. As a result, there is a distance of approximately 2 - 3 kilometres (at certain points, the distance is more) between the fencing and the LoC. And sandwiched between the two lines are about 30 odd villages, which practically

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fall on the Indian side, and not in 'No Man's Land'. The fact that these villages are outside the Army's 'protective' fencing has given rise to immense problems for the locals belonging to these villages â&#x20AC;&#x201D; since their land has been divided by the fencing, they have to traverse long distances just to till one piece of land; the fence can be crossed only at proper gates on roads, which are located at a distance of 500 metres to a kilometre; the gates open and close at fixed times; and the villagers have to keep their ID cards on their person all the time. There is severe checking at the various gates, and only after several rounds of checks are the villagers allowed to move about. Naturally, this is extremely inconvenient and humiliating for the people. Also, there is an overwhelming fear in the locals that if there is a settlement of Kashmir between India and Pakistan, India will give away these villages outside the Army fencing to Pakistan. This, of course, is a source of great anxiety and worry for them. Some villages which fall outside the Army fencing: Makri, Seri, Manika Maha Dev, Laam, Kalsian, Jhangar and Bhawani in the Nowshera sector of Rajouri district Sekhlu area (which has been bifurcated by the LoC), Haveli Assembly segment and Shahpur Panchayat of Poonch district Hathlanga, Chiranda and Silikut villages of Uri sector of Baramulla district Chatkadiyan village (which has been bifurcated by the LoC) in the Tangdhar Valley There is a need not just to understand but also to address the social, cultural, political, and economic hardships the villagers face in their day-to-day lives. It is no surprise that the people living in these areas feel alienated, discriminated against, and left to fend for themselves.

Epilogue, September 2010

J&K Government, Department of Information & Public Relations

No. : DIP/J-5479-P

Greetings on 64th Independence Day

Help Rebuild Leh

Can We Afford Leaving The Land of Moon And Its Innocent People in Pain and Ruins? No. Donate Generously to Deputy Commissionerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Relief Fund

Account # 0069040500001019 (J&K Bank, Branch Leh)

Swift : JAKAINBBSRG

IFSC : JAKAOPRIEST

Together in Pain

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