EPILOGUE MARCH 2011 by Epilogue Press

INTERVIEW: Diffilculty of Being AMITABH MATTOO

AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT: UNMOGIP: A Political Shrine or Dead Body

J&K'S MONTHLY MAGAZINE

ISSN : 0974-5653

Epilogue Jammu,March 01,2011 / Vol 5 / Issue 03 Price Rs.30 II Postal Regd.No.JK-350.2009IIwww.epilogue.in

NEWS,

CURRENT

A F F A I R S,

SOCIAL

SCIENCES

PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS Is Jammu and Kashmir Headed towards

REAL SELF RULE ? A Comprehensive Pre-Election Review With Statistics, Analysis and Past Accounts

Epilogue because there is more to know

CONTENT Editor Zafar Iqbal Choudhary

PROLOGUE Game Changer Elections

Publisher Yogesh Pandoh

NEWS & CURRENT AFFAIRS Omar talks tough to Army is boy is killed in ambush

Consulting Editor D. Suba Chandran Manu Srivastsa

General Manager Kartavya Pandoh

Epilogue

Research Officer Raman Sharma

Vol 5, Issue 03 March 2011

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CURRENT AFFAIRS

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Difficulty of being Amitabh Mattoo

STRATEGIC THINKING The Kashmir Escalation Effect

LADAKH AFFAIRS

PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS

A journey of a different kind in Ladakh

COLUMN Panchayat Elections Is J&K Headed for Real Self Rule? J&K Panchayat Elections 2001

EPILOGUE EXCLUSIVE UNMOGIP A Redundant Body or Political Shrine

Sufism and Sufi Shrines in Jammu Hills

FEATURES Bearing the brunt of social prejudice and conflict

Game Changer Elections ZAFAR CHOUDHARY

s we argued in our last issue that over 70 mod els formulated, from time to time, for resolu tion of Kashmir issue could not help make any change for lack of understanding of the ground situation, perhaps the best formula was never given a chance! This may sound ridiculous to some readers but, yes, we are talking about grassroots empowerment of people through Panchayati Raj institutions. We have all respect for the 70 odd Kashmir plans and their formulators. Particularly we deeply appreciate the indigenous formulae like Greater Autonomy of National Conference and Self Rule Framework of the Peoples Democratic Party. But instead of making New Delhi concede more powers and autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir our focus should have been on devolution of powers at grassroots levels. And there is no better model of sharing powers with the peoples than the Panchayati Raj institutions. By way of Greater Autonomy of National Conference or Self Rule Framework of Peoples Democratic Party concentrating of powers in few hands is not going to make any difference unless that power is shared with the peoples at the ground. Proposals like Greater Autonomy and Self Rule have their own importance in context of negotiating powers with New Delhi given the historical realities of special status of Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian Union but parties must spell out their plans of empowering the people in groups and at individual level. Parties should not quarrel over the ownership of their proposed resolution models, instead they should identify themselves with the empowering-all models of Panchayats which eventually owned by everyone. Almost all political parties had made a promise in their 2008 election manifesto to hold Panchayat elections at the earliest. Omar Abdullah is lucky in having got that opportunity to live the promise. Present issue of Epilogue presents a comprehensive pre-election analysis on Panchayats.

FEBRUARY 2009 ISSUE

FEBRUARY 2011 ISSUE

N E W S & C U R R E N T A F FA I R S

Kashmir situation better, feels Manmohan NEW DELHI, Feb 1: Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh says that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, which was caught in the turbulent cycle of violence last year, has taken a turn for the better in the last four months due to steps initiated by the Centre and the State Government. "The situation in the State has vastly improved in the last four months following the all-party visit there, the eight-point programme announced by the Government and the measures taken by the Centre and the State Government," Dr Singh said at the Chief Ministersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; conference on internal security. He said the border State, which saw an upsurge of violence and demonstrations, particularly from stone-pelters last year, had taken a turn for the better E

PC reviews security, Congress affairs JAMMU, FEB 3: Union Home Minister P Chidambaram arrives in Jammu on a twoday visit to this winter capital amid tight security arrangements. While he spent a night in Jammu and had meeting with the Governor NN Vohra, on second day of his visit Home Minister visited remote district of Kishtwar where he had a high level meeting to review security scenario. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah accompanied Chidambaram. The Home Minister reached Jammu airport in the evening and was welcomed by the senior Congress leaders. Later he had a meeting with the Congress leaders on party affairs and learnt their opinion on ongoing Kashmir dialogue. He called upon the state unit of Congress to prepare a comprehensive document proposing a set of solution to address the problem of Jammu and Kashmir to help the Centre Government prepare a roadmap to resolve the long pending problem. His suggestion to the Congress leadership came after his separate meetings with two factions of the Congress for over two and a half hours at the State Guest house. The warring factions of Congress, one headed by PCC (I) chief Prof Saif-ud-Din Soz and other by Union Health Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad preferred to meet separately even to the Union Home Minister after sloganeering by some Azad loyalists outside the meeting venue when some of them were initially prevented an entry inside E

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Habibullah heads NCM NEW DELHI, Feb 2: Former top bureaucrat who is widely regarded as an expert hand on Kashmir for his vast service span in the troubled state, Wajahat Habibullah, former Chief Information Commissioner, Wajahat Habibullah is appointed as the Chairperson of the National Commission for Minorities. Besides, Keki N Daruwalla is appointed as a new Member of the national minority body E

Left, other parties pitch for Kashmir dialogue NEW DELHI, FEB 1: A number of political parties, including the Left, today call for an "honest" dialogue with all sections of the society in Jammu and Kashmir to restore normalcy in the State. The parties also demanded withdrawal of security forces from the State, repeal of the "draconian" provisions of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and generation of employment opportunities among other things. CPI-M general secretary Prakash Karat, his CPI counterpart A B Bardhan and LJP chief Ram Vilas Paswan among others were of the view that the Army has become the "face of Indian State" for Kashmiris and this has to be changed. "Everybody feels proud when we showcase our military, their weapons at the Republic Day parade. We tell the world this is our strength. We are giving a signal to the world that don't mess with usâ&#x20AC;ŚBut how will you feel if the same Army with all those weapons and tanks start a parade in front of your house, your village everyday the whole year. You won't find it interesting if the Army conducts flag march in your village every day," Bardhan said. Demanding withdrawal of military forces from the State and revocation of AFSPA, the CPI leader said bullets and tanks were for enemies but it is now used for targetting "our own people". "Kashmir has been called the heaven on earth. But now it has turned hellish and the responsibility squarely rests at the Government's doorsteps," he said, adding that no one can question the patriotism of Kashmiris as it was the community which defended the country when Pakistan invaded the State. "You put the Sher-e-Kashmir (Lion of Kashmir Sheikh Abdullah) in a cage (jail). Mistrust evolved. Then you sent the Army to every village. Due to this, there evolved a sentiment for freedom...You have the tongue to speak then why respond with bullets," he said. The seminar organised by Committee for Promoting Dialogue with Jammu and Kashmir was also participated by Debabrata Biswas (Forward Bloc), Abani Roy (RSP), Shahid Siddique (RLD), Danish Ali (JD-S) and Namo Nageshwar Rao (TDP). Addressing the gathering, CPI-M leader Karat said the Kashmir issue needs to be solved "politically" as there was a "denial of democracy and autonomy" in the State E

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Zanskar residents being ill treated, alleges BJP NEW DELHI, Feb 3: The BJP says it will raise in Parliament the issue of alleged “atrocities and injustices” meted out to the people of Zanskar tehsil of Kargil district by the Jammu and Kashmir Government. A delegation from the border area of Zanskar under the leadership of party Rajya Sabha MP Tarun Vijay met BJP national

president Nitin Gadkari. The delegation also submitted a memorandum on the “atrocious injustices” meted out to them by the state government on “communal basis” jeopardising the national security. Gadkari expressed his strong opposition to the discriminatory policies of the state government against Zanskar’s patriotic

people, reports said. “It is sad to know that in this time and age, the region is still not developed and is cut from the rest of the nation for almost seven months of the year. And the people are surviving in such difficult circumstances,” the BJP president added E

Omar talks tough to Army Tragedy in Kargil is boy is killed in ambush leaves five dead SRINAGAR, Feb 5: Chief Minister Omar Abdullah got tough with the security forces after a student was killed allegedly during an ambush by the Army in north Kashmir’s Kupwara district, following which a murder case was registered today against the unit which carried out the operation. Reacting to the incident, Omar said that it could have been avoided if a suggestion made by him at a meeting of the Unified Headquarters had been implemented. He also visited the family whose son was killed in the ambush. He drove to Handwara to visit the family whose son has been killed in Army ambush. He stayed with the bereaved family for quite some time, ex-

pressed his deep sorrow over the unfortunate incident, showed sympathy and solidarity with the family. "I am here to share your grief and be with you at this movement of great tragedy", he told the bereaved family while consoling them and conveying his heartfelt condolence. Manzoor Ahmad Magray, 22, was shot dead by the troopers of 4 Para of the Army, who had laid an ambush last night in Chogal area of Handwara town in Kupwara district. The killing triggered protests in Chogal as residents demanded arrest of the Army personnel involved in the incident. The family members of the youth alleged that he was taken out of the house by the soldiers and severely tortured, resulting in his death E

Kargil, Feb 6: In a tragic incident, five persons including two of a family were killed and five others sustained severe injuries when two houses came under huge rockslides in a remote village of Batalik sector of this district. Incident took place in remote Garkone area of the Batalik sector during the intervening night of February 5 and 6 at around 1 am when the area was experiencing heavy snowfall. Due to heavy snowfall the rocks slided down and fell on two houses of Tashi Gasu, son of Tashi Tsering and Tsering Norphel, son of Namgyal, resulting into severe injuries to 10 occupants of both the houses. As the tragic incident could not immediately come to the notice of other inhabitants of remote and scattered area, occupants of both the houses remained under debris for around nine hours E

Sofi first SCIC JAMMU, Feb 9: Governor NN Vohra approves name of G R Sofi, Chief Income Tax Commissioner, Amritsar range for appointment as first Chief Information Commissioner (CIC) of Jammu and Kashmir. Sofi’s name was earlier cleared by a selection panel headed by the Chief Minister but the Governor had initially returned the file as it didn't carry mandatory clearance of the Chief Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) for serving officers. Governor’s approval cleared the decks for the government to formally issue the appointment order of Mr Sofi as first CIC of Jammu and Kashmir. He was required to be relieved by the Centre as he was still in the service E

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Thaw in Thumpu: India, Pak agree to talk

n a major breakthrough after Mumbai bombing of 2008, India and Pakistan agree on the need for constructive talks to resolve all outstanding issues after a fresh round of parleys in an attempt to infuse new life to their stalled dialogue process. Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and her Pakistani counterpart Salman Bashir met, on February 6, in the Bhutanese capital for 90 minutes and had "useful and frank" discussions. The meeting on the sidelines of the SAARC meeting of Foreign Secretaries came six months after a failed round of talks between External Affairs Minister S M Krishna and his Pakistani counterpart Shah Mahmood Qureshi in Islamabad.

New Delhi – Islamabad simultaneous statement

eanwhile, unveiling the road-map for resumption of a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan, New Delhi and Islamabad announced on December 10, that the Home Secretaries of the two countries will hold talks on counter-terrorism, including progress on 26/11 trial in Rawalpindi court. The composite dialogue between the two sides were put on hold after 10 Pakistani terrorist carried out coordinated attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, killing 166 people. Before entering into talks with Pakistan again, India wanted the perpetrators of the attack to be brought to justice. In a statement ‘Agreed Outcome of India-Pakistan Foreign Secretarylevel talks in Thimphu’, Ministry of External Affairs said Secretary-level talks on the issues of counter-terrorism (including progress on Mumbai trial); humanitarian issues; peace and security, including CBMs; Jammu and Kashmir; promotion of friendly

exchanges; Siachen and economic issues will be held in the next few months. Discussions on issues such as Wullar barrage or Tulbul navigation project and Sir Creek will be at the level of Additional Secretaries or Surveyors General. The agreed statement was issued simultaneously both in New Delhi and Islamabad. List of issues mentioned in the statement are same as in the Composite Dialogue, that was halted by India after the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The ministry said, “the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan met in Thimphu on February 6, 2011 to carry forward this process. They briefed their respective Governments.” About the schedule of the meetings, the ministry said dates will be fixed through diplomatic channels. In pursuance of the mandate given by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, following their meeting in Thimphu in April 2010, the two Foreign Minis-

ters had met in Islamabad in July 2010 to review the current state of the bilateral relationship and discuss steps to promote trust and confidence between the two countries, the statement further said. “The Foreign Minister of Pakistan will visit India by July 2011 to review progress in the dialogue process with his counterpart. This will be preceded by a meeting of the two Foreign Secretaries,” MEA said. “They have agreed that prior to the visit of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, meetings at the level of respective Secretaries will be convened on counter-terrorism (including progress on Mumbai trial); humanitarian issues; peace and security, including CBMs; Jammu and Kashmir; promotion of friendly exchanges; Siachen; economic issues; Wullar Barrage/ Tulbul Navigation Project; and Sir Creek (at the level of Additional Secretaries/Surveyors General),” the statement said

The upcoming talks to be held ahead of the Pakistani Foreign Minister's visit to New Delhi in July will have to "take cognisance of what has happened in the past in dialogue with India...And the actual ground situation" in Jammu and Kashmir, Bashir said, while addressing a briefing organised by the Diplomatic Correspondents Association of Pakistan. There had been a "resurfacing of the uprising of Kashmiri youth, women and civil society" that was being "increasingly acknowledged by the international community and this cannot be wished away", he claimed. "That has given

urgency to dealing with this core issue," he added. At the same time, the two sides will have to focus on progress made in the past on the Kashmir issue, including confidence-building measures for cross-Line of Control travel and trade, Bashir said in response to questions. "I don't think we should jettison all the good work that was done by predecessors over 60 years, we should also not be lost totally in the archives," he said "We need to approach these things with a great degree of clarity. We should also have clarity in what is doable and not doable and what timeframe is doable," the top diplomat said >>>

Pak puts Kashmir at core

ndia and Pakistan will have to re solve the "core issue" of Kashmir according to the aspirations of the Kashmiri people if they want to give a boost to the peace process that is set to be resumed after an interregnum of over two years, Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir said in Islamabad on February 12. Referring to recent public protests in Jammu and Kashmir, Bashir said that "unless this core issue is resolved satisfactorily in accordance with the aspirations of our Kashmiri brothers and sisters, I don't see prospects in terms of a self-propelling peace process".

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Necessary for both sides

External Affairs Minister S M Krishna said India’s move to resume talks with Pakistan on all outstanding issues was a “conscious decision”. It was “necessary” for both sides to also discuss Afghanistan, he added. Krishna said: “We will have to sort out all the outstanding issues between our two countries.” “We are hopeful the talks between the foreign secretaries will go in a direction that is positive and pave the way for a bigger meeting (between the foreign ministers) whenever that will be,” he added. Krishna was talking to reporters in New York. Responding to why India was now agreeing to talks, Krishna said, “Nothing is static in relationships between countries.” The minister, however, stressed that New Delhi still expected Islamabad to act expeditiously on the Mumbai attacks. “India expects that Pakistan will take continue to take steps to bring to justice all those perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks,” he said. “Having taken that position it is necessary for our two countries to engage on various other issues where we will be able to come to reasonable agreements, which will be beneficial to the people for both the countries,” he added. E

BJP wants Assembly seats reserved for PaK refugees JAMMU, Feb 11: The BJP says it will raise the issue of reservation of Jammu and Kashmir Assembly seats for refugees of Pakistan administered Kashmir in the state Assembly session, beginning February 28. "BJP will raise the issue of PoK reservation in Assembly," leader of the BJP legislative party in JK Assembly Chaman Lal Gupta told reporters. He alleged that the ruling NC-Congress has failed to explain why the refugees from Pakistan, mostly lower castes and families belonging to backward classes, have been denied citizenship rights even after 63 years of their stay in the state. It may be mentioned here that Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly has kept 24 seats reserved for areas under administration of Pakistan E

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Some troops may go but consensus eludes on AFSPA

omplimenting the ongoing pro cess of interlocution the Centre is plan ning to withdraw nearly 10,000 paramilitary personnel from Jammu and Kashmir this year as it feels that the State can do with less Central forces. In a major shift in the internal security structure, the forces withdrawn from Jammu and Kashmir are likely to be deployed in Naxal hit states. It also said that amendments to the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) are still on the table and hopes the committee of the Unified Headquarters in the State declares some areas in the State as "not disturbed" to make the controversial law redundant in those parts. "There is scope of reduction of troops is the Home Ministry’s view. There are more than adequate forces in Kashmir and it can do with less Central forces," Union Home Secretary G K Pillai said recently. When asked how many personnel are being pulled out from the State, he said in 2009, the Centre pulled out 10 battalions (10,000 men) from the State. Last year, it did not take out any because of the agitation from June to September. "I think this year, we can easily take out 10 battalions if not more. Irrespective of the situation, I can take out 10 battalions and it would not have any impact. "We have about 70 battalions in Kashmir and we have 62 battalions in seven Left-wing affected States which are big States.... I think if I can take out, I will try to pull out as many as I can," he said.

Omar confidant

he amendment in the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which is major demand in Kashmir, still continues to be a political issue. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and National Conference President Farooq Abdullah recently said that ‘Centre and State were reading from the same page on AFSPA’ as they indicated that amendments to make law soft were very much on cards. Chief Minister said I am thankful to the Prime Minister, UPA Chairperson, Home Minister and Defense Minister for their fullest support to his government on the issue of gradual easing of provisions of AFSPA in the areas where there is no requirement of such powers. “We are very keen to roll back the Disturbed Areas Act in the areas where it is not required”, he said adding that the Center and State Governments are reading from the same page in this regard. However, he asserted “changes to the provisions of the act cannot be done without thorough examination and due preparations”. Home Minister P Chidambaram has rarely been speaking on the issue publically but Home Secretary GK Pillai’s mind reveals some positive thinking in Delhi. “This (AFSPA) is an issue which has to be decided politically”, says Pillai. "But OK, even if it is not done I think you can move forward and say some parts of Kashmir need not be declared disturbed”. Pillai said that if there was no change being made in the AFSPA then the area can be denotified (as disturbed) and the law will not be applicable there. "You keep the Act as it is which is what the Army says don’t meddle with the Act but if you want me (Army) to act, I need that Act... You see law and order situation in Srinagar has improved. Anyway, Army is not in Srinagar. They are not operating in Budgam. "You say remove it from there.... That area is no longer disturbed. This is a notification of the State Government not a State notification by Central Government," the Home Secretary said. He said the proposals for amendments in the AFSPA were before the Cabinet Committee on Security. The Home Secretary allayed fears that violence may return in the Kashmir valley, saying several major steps have been taken post-September last year.>>>>

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Antony differs, Mehbooba aghast

Terming the latest statement of Defence Minister A K Antony dismissing revocation of AFSPA as unfortunate, Peoples Democratic Party president Mehbooba Mufti today said the people of the state can’t be held hostage to unilateral opinion of security agencies.

owever, despite Omar’s assertions that Centre and State were working on gradual removal of AFSPA and Home Secretary Pillai nearly endorsing the viewpoint, the Defence Minister AK Antony and top brass of Army continue to differ on the issue. On February 18, Antony once again dismissed demands for the withdrawal of AFSPA saying infiltration attempts were still continuing and terrorists could not be given any "opportunity to succeed" there. "Militancy has come down substantially but at the same time our feedback is not giving us comfort. Attempts for infiltration are still continuing... We cannot take any step that will give an opportunity for militants to succeed there," he said. Stressing on the need for armed forces to be careful, Antony said, "Inimical forces across the border are trying to send people to Jammu and Kashmir 24x7." Observing that the situation in the state was fast improving "because of various reasons", he said the security forces cannot relax and have to be vigilant. Terming the latest statement of Defence Minister A K Antony dismissing revocation of AFSPA as unfortunate, Peoples Democratic Party president Mehbooba Mufti today said the people of the state can’t be held hostage to unilateral opinion of security agencies. Antony had yesterday rejected any concession on the law that was enacted at a time when the state was bristling with armed fighters whereas all government agencies are now unanimous that only a few hundred militants are operating in J&K. Mehbooba said of particular concern was the remark of the defence minister that “he did not want any public debate” on the subject. She reminded Antony of debate and discussion being the fundamental principle of democracy and said it was sad that a senior leader of UPA and the country should convey such a shrill and negative message to the people of a state that acceded on the basis of shared democratic ideals. “Nothing could be more unfortunate and antithetical to our democratic system than Antony’s rejection of even a public debate on this subject of life and death for residents of the state” she said. Mehbooba said security forces have done their job in the civilian domain of the state and it was time to relieve them of this additional burden E

Interlocutors ready with interim report

he government-appointed inter locutors on Jammu and Kashmir are expected to submit in two weeks the 'initial document' spelling out the contours for a political settlement of the Kashmir issue. 'We will submit our initial document on the contours of the political settlement of Kashmir in the next two weeks,' journalist Dileep Padgaonkar, who heads the three-member team, told reporters during a tour to the state. Padgaonkar and his two colleagues, academician Radha Kumar and economist M.M. Ansari, leave for Srinagar Wednesday afternoon. This is their fifth visit to the state since they were appointed by the central government last October. The interolocutors, who have spoken to a cross-section of people in the state, have got sufficient inputs to draw the 'contours of the political settlement', Padgaonkar said. Undeterred by the initial rejection of their talks offer by the separatists,

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the chief interlocutor said that they were ' willing to meet the separatists at any time at any place'. The separatists have so far not responded to their invitation for talks. The interlocutors had sent formal invitations to separatist leaders, particularly Syed Ali Geelani, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Yasin Malik and Shabir

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Shah. Supporters of Geelani, who heads the hardline faction of the Hurriyat Conference, have said the matter would be discussed once their leader returns from New Delhi. The hardline separatist leader has been asked by Delhi Police not to leave the national capital as he is to be quizzed in a money laundering case E

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THE HOUSE IN SESSION

xpected to be stormy, the bud get session of Jammu and Kash mir Legislature beginning February 28 is likely to see intense political debates on nature of conflict in Kashmir and vision of political parties on its resolution. Besides the ruling National Conference, the principal Opposition parties Peoples Democratic Party and Bhartiya Janta Party have prepared bills and resolutions for discussion in assembly. The ruling partner Congress is, however, not much excited in discussing the politics of conflict in Kashmir. According a provisional calendar there will be 25 sittings of the entire Budget Session. The session begins February 28 with the Governorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Address and will conclude on April 9. The Budget will be presented on March 7. There will be Government Business from March 1 to March 23 and Appropriation Bills will be taken on March 24. The Private Members Resolutions will be taken on April 2 and 6 whereas Private Members Bills will be taken on April 5 and 7. There will be holidays from March 25 to 31. Perhaps, for the first time, grants of 28 Departments would be debated in budget session

of the Legislative Assembly to ensure that the MLAs get time to speak on the performance of each and every Department held by different Ministers. At the onset of spring when all fingers are crossed over stability of coming summer in Kashmir, the political parties are bracing up for debates in assembly on how to achieve peace in Kashmir. Though the contours of debates are likely to veer around party lines but summers of discontent and violence in Kashmir is likely to top the agenda. The ruling National Conference will move a resolution seeking the resolution of the Kashmir issue at the earliest. The main opposition Peoples Democratic Party has held rallies and raised a pitch over the resolution of the Kashmir issue. 'The resolution of the Kashmir issue is our core issue,' PDP president Mehbooba Mufti declared at a meeting of her party workers in Jammu Feb 14. The National Conference has been saying that though it stands for autonomy for the state, if better suggestions come, it would be willing to embrace these. The NC had in 2000

moved and got passed in the state legislature a resolution seeking greater autonomy for the state - a position where the state had all the control over its affairs, barring in the communication, defence and external affairs. It would be for the first time that an NC member of the state assembly, Saifullah Mir, who was also a member of the house when the autonomy resolution was passed, would move a resolution seeking an early solution to the Kashmir issue by involving all the stakeholders, particularly separatists. Saifullah Mir, one of the most articulate members in the house, has told a newspaper that his intent was to get the stakeholders on board so that an early solution to the problem could be found. All Kashmir-centric parties have a common agenda of highlighting Kashmir as a major problem in the Indian subcontinent and want its resolution by bringing Pakistan on board. This issue has become their prime focus, especially after last year's summer unrest in Kashmir in which over 100 people were killed, mostly in clashes with security forces E

Fingers crossed for Kashmirâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s summer February 24: Asserting that Jammu and Kashmir passed through a difficult time last year, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh said the government was keeping its 'fingers crossed' this summer while remaining vigilant. Reply to the Lok Sabha Debate on Motion of Thanks on President's Address, Dr. Singh said: "With regard to Jammu and Kashmir, we have passed through a difficult time, particularly the last summer. But since then the situation has improved. But we keep our fingers crossed." "Come this summer, I hope we will be vigilant enough to ensure that the unfortunate events that took place in the last summer in parts of Jammu and Kashmir do not take place. Our approach to the problems of Jammu

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and Kashmir is that we will give no quarters to secessionist elements," he added. Further assuring all support to the Jammu and Kashmir Government, Dr. Singh said: "We will do everything in our power to strengthen the hands of the State Government to provide a fairer deal to the youth of Jammu and Kashmir, to provide avenues for gainful employment. I have appointed a Group under Dr. Rangarajan to workout a plan for providing 50,000 to one lakh jobs to the Kashmiri youth. That Report is now nearly ready." "I hope that once we start implementing them, these are precise proposals where the Indian industry commits itself to employ Kashmiri youth and if we can create jobs for a lakh of students

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from the Valley and other parts of Kashmir, I dare say it will change the mental make-up or the mindset of the Kashmiri people. It is an obligation of all the political parties to do nothing which will disturb the peaceful atmosphere that now prevails in Jammu and Kashmir," he added. E

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Concerns over survival of Indus Water Treaty

Ayub and Nehru signing the Indus Water Treaty on Spetember 16 1960 in Karachi 1960. American negotiator David Lilienthal looks on

ith an increase in demand for water and energy resources in both India and Pakistan, a US Congressional report has questioned the long-term effectiveness of the Indus Water Treaty, which has been successfully implemented for more than six decades between the two South Asian neighbours. "While the IWT has maintained stability in the region over water, experts question the treaty's long-term effectiveness in light of chronic tensions between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region, where a significant portion of the Indus River's headwaters originate," it said adding that as the existing agriculture system becomes more water-intensive and, in some areas, more inefficient, water may prove to be a source of instability in South Asia. The report, "Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central Asiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Growing Importance for Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan" sheds light on the drivers of water scarcity in Central and South Asia and provides recommendations for how the US should strategically approach water-related issues, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Written by the majority staff of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the report draws attention to the growing problem of water scarcity in Central and South Asia and how it has the potential to exacerbate existing regional conflicts and lead to new ones. "While much of our focus currently rests on Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must also consider the interests in the shared waters by India and the neighbouring five Central Asian countries Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan," John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said in a statement. "In addition, others question whether the IWT can address India's growing use of the shared waters and Pakistan's increasing demand for these waters for agricultural purposes," said the 28-page report. "Signed in 1960, the IWT is considered as the world's most successful water treaty, having remained relatively intact for 50 years and having withstood four Indo-Pak wars," it added. The report said the drive to meet energy demand through hydropower development is occurring in India and Pakistan, two countries that lack sufficient access to energy. This is particularly true with respect to India, which faces a rapidly expanding population, growing economy and soaring energy needs. To meet growing demand and cope with increasing electricity shortages, the government has developed plans to expand power generation through the construction of multipurpose dams. "India has 33 projects at various stages of completion on the rivers that affect this region," the report said adding that the number of dams under construction and their management is a source of significant bilateral ten-

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sion. "Currently, the most controversial dam project is the proposed 330megawatt dam on the Kishenganga River, a tributary of the Indus. While studies show that no single dam along the waters controlled by the Indus Waters Treaty will affect Pakistan's access to water, the cumulative effect of these projects could give India the ability to store enough water to limit the supply to Pakistan at crucial moments in the growing season," the report said. "In the difficult 60-plus year bilateral relationship, water has not yet been used in this way. However, staff met with some experts that argue the treatyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s long-term stability is threatened by a lack of trust between these two countries. Any perceived reduction in water flows magnifies this distrust, whether caused by India's activities in the Indus Basin or climate change," it said. According to the report, US cannot expect this region to continue to avoid "water wars" in perpetuity. "In South Asia, the Indus Waters Treaty has been the primary vehicle for resolving conflicts over the shared waters between India and Pakistan. It is a prescriptive agreement that has recently been criticized for its inflexibility to adjust to changes in water levels," it said. >>>

Epilogue, March 2011

N E W S & C U R R E N T A F FA I R S

>>> "Experts are now questioning whether the IWT can adapt to these changes, especially when new demands for the use of the river flows from irrigation and hydroelectric power are fuelling tensions between India and Pakistan.

A breakdown in the treaty's utility in resolving water conflicts could have serious ramifications for regional stability," the report said.

Pak IWT team surveys new project

s Jammu and Kashmir Government embarks on an ambitious artificial lake project on Tawi, a tributary of Chenab River which is covered under Indus Water Treaty, a Pakistani panel recently surveyed the project and sought evidence from Indian authorities that the plan does not violate provisions of Indus Water Treaty. The project is coming up on outskirts of Jammu City. The team also inspected the 420-Mega Watt Salal hydro power project in Reasi district of Jammu and Kashmir. The three-member panel, which was allowed to conduct the inspection to dispel any apprehensions about violation of provisions of IWT, surveyed the artificial lake project on river Tawi in Jammu city and surveyed the main heads of Ranbir and Partap canals over Chenab besides Munawar Tawi river in Jammu district. "We needed some evidence from the Indian side affirming that the lake was not violating the Indus Waters Treaty," Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Commissioner for IWT Sheeraz Jameel told reporters in Jammu after the three-member team made first round of inspection. The Pakistan panel, headed by Jameel, also sought details from the state authorities regarding the size, dimensions and water storage capacity of the lake. However, Indian authorities tried to play down the visit of Pakistani team. Indian IWT commissioner C Ranganath, who was accompanying the team, said, "It is a routine affair... It has nothing extraordinary. Indian team goes to Pakistan to see their projects; they come us to see our projects. What is extraordinary it it?" Jammu and Kashmir is constructing a two km-long artificial lake by erecting a check dam on river Tawi near Jammu for promotion of tourism and providing water supply to dry areas of the city. The state government is hopeful that the visit will help dispel any apprehension about violation of

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Pakistan's IWT Commissioner Sheraz Menon inspecting the Tawi Barrage artificial lake site on outskirts of Jammu City, (below) project in progress

provisions of Indus Water Treaty. Minister for Public Health Engineering, Irrigation and Flood Control Taj Mohi-ud-Din, the driving force behind the project, said though Pakistan has not raised any objection so far regarding construction of the lake "but they wanted to satisfy themselves after visiting the site and the place where the ''bundh'' (embankment) is being raised on the Tawi bed." "They may have doubts regarding violation of Indus Water Treaty signed between the two countries but we have car-

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ried out work within the permissible limits of the pact," Taj said, adding, "no violation has been committed in the design of the lake or even in the water storage." The work on the lake project is in full swing and is expected be completed in one year. The project will not only attract more tourists to Jammu, but will also help in irrigation, officials said. Meanwhile, the team led by the Commissioner of Pakistan for IWT, Sheraz Jameel Menon, and his Indian counterpart G Rangarajan >>>>

Epilogue, March 2011

N E W S & C U R R E N T A F FA I R S

>>> drove to JoytiPorum in Reasi district, 64 kms from Jammu, the winter capital of J&K. The panel conducted survey of the 420 MW Salal Project, its dam, water discharge and water storage setup, official sources said. They held discussion with officials of Salal Project on various aspects of the

dam and discharge and storage of water from the project, they said. They raised a point of less discharge of water from the dam, to which the Indian officials explained that water level in River Chenab decreases during winters. The water level increases during summer due to melting of snow in upper reaches of

Kishtwar and Himachal Pradesh. The Pakistani panel earlier inspected main heads of Ranbir and Partap canals over river Chenab at Akhnoor. Ranbir and Partap canals were built during erstwhile Dogra rule in 1880 for irrigation in Jammu district

Milking waters, getting rich

o make optimum use of the huge hydro resources, the Jammu and Kashmir Government has started raising bills for the power generation companies, a proposal which is likely to fetch state additional annual revenue of Rs 913 Crore. Legislation to this effect was passed by the state Assembly during last yearâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s autumn session and rules have already been notified. Minister for Water Resources (PHE, Irrigation) Taj Mohiuddin says that notices are being served on NHPC run Hydel Power projects and others to apply for license from the State for the usage of river water and pay the tax as per the tariff fixed by a team of experts (Chief Engineers) of J&K. Water Tax Regulatory Commission will monitor the usage and engineers from the department will assess the usage of water at each dam. Six months time has been given to them for applying and obtaining license. Minister said that the companies have started responding and getting cleared their queries in this connection. Water Regulatory Act has been made effective from November 11, 2010 and billing process has been started. So far bills worth over Rs 37 crores have been sent to these project authorities. In case of delay 12 per cent interest will be charged. Notices are being served to them and they will have to comply, otherwise there are so many provisions in the Act up to the limit of stopping flow of water and many more.

Taj further said that after the commissioning of Kishan Ganga and UriII hydel projects, the revenue generation from water tax will reach up to Rs 1500 crores which will be a great financial support to the State and may constitute one fourth of its total budget. He said the State was expecting a revenue collection of one fourth of the total (Rs 913 crore) till ending March this year. He further disclosed that water tax for domestic users may be doubled from April this year and department has decided to go for electronic metering in the houses and other places for use of drinking water from next financial year. However, no target has been fixed for the completion of the task

High incidence of stomach cancers seen in Kashmir

ising incidence of cancers of the upper digestive tract in Kashmir Valley, and a lack of comprehensive research data on the disease, are causing concern, according to scientists. The trend is "a matter of concern for both doctors and the authorities in Kashmir," Munemasa Ryu, former director and chief surgeon of the National Cancer Centre of Tokyo, Japan, said at a meeting on cancers of the alimentary canal held in Srinagar on February 1. Sameer Naqash, a gastroenterologist at the Sher-e-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences (SKIMS), Srinagar, said the conference was convened after a study on 8,000 patients, conducted between 2007 and 2010 at

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SKIMS, showed increasing incidence in cancers of the oesophagus and stomach in southern Kashmir. "Kashmir has a gastric malignancy incidence of 50 to 60 out of 100,000, and 63 per cent of these malignancies occur in southern belt of Kashmir," Naqash said. But the incidence of cancers of the upper digestive tract is significantly higher, members of the team led by Showkat Ali Zargar, professor at the department of gastroenterology at the SKIMS, told SciDev.Net. SKIMS records over the past three years show that 1,217 out of 8,056 cancer cases in the hospital had to do with the stomach and oesophagus. Studies by Zargar's team in the 1990s had already shown a "significantly

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higher" incidence of cancers of the upper digestive tract in Kashmir, compared with other parts of India. In contrast, a SKIMS study, conducted from 2005 to 2006 and involving 212 patients, indicated that, as with the rest of India, new cases of cancers of the lower digestive tract, or colorectal cancer, stood at a significantly lower 3.65 per 100,000 each year. Scientists at the February meeting called for comprehensive research and data collection on cancers in the region. According to Nazir Ahmad, a professor in the department of biochemistry at Kashmir University, Srinagar, studies conducted so far are sketchy and insufficient. "We don't have a cancer register, nor do we have any classified data," he said E

Epilogue, March 2011

C U R R E N T A F FA I R S

Difficulty of being

Amitabh Mattoo

enowned academician and eminent strategic thinker, Prof Amitabh Mattoo surprised all on February 4 when he announced to withdraw from the post of first Vice Chancellor of the Central University of Jammu. Mattoo's name for the post was cleared by the President of India barely a month ago. He conveyed to Union Human Resource Development Minister Kapil Sibal his inability to accept the post of Vice-Chancellor, citing personal reasons for his decision. A Padmashri awardee, Mattoo reportedly met Sibal and informed him that he cannot accept the post of Vice-Chancellor due to some personal reasons. He is presently working as Professor of Disarmament Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University and is all set to take a prestigious assignment at a top US University. In this interview to Epilogue, Mattoo gives some insight to what mattered in his appointment as Vice Chancellor and what influenced his decision to pull out of prestigious assignment. Here are excerpts:

You weathered a huge political storm last year as some groups in Jammu opposed your appointment as first Vice Chancellor of yet to come up Central University of Jammu so much so that the Divisional Administration also overstepped its brief to put an unpleasant note. Despite all that the HRD and the President of India cleared your name. What do you think weighed in your favour? I think despite much cynicism about the Indian system, and about due process, it worked. You cannot hang someone without evidence. The search committee, of some of the most eminent academics in the country, had selected my name from amongst a list of hundreds on the basis of my academic background and administrative experience. I was awarded the Padma Shri for my contribution to Education. The former Governor, the Chancellor, Gen S.K. Sinha, with whom I worked for five years, wrote several pages in his recent book about the outstanding work that I had done as VC of Jammu University. Do I then need a certificate from political hawkers? In other words, my contribution could not be rubbished on the basis of street politicians making unsubstantiated alle-

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Divisional Commissioner suggesting that terrorism or extremism do not threaten the state but the mere appointment of a Kashmir Pandit as a VC in Jammu will do so. But there was no question, it was important for the President to approve my name to vindicate my credentials, and it did happen. It was a fitting response to the lumpens, the so-called Jammu Jihadis, who thought that they could get their way by their petty politics of divide and rule and who represent only vested interests. The idea of India is about celebrating diversity, respecting differences >>>

gations without a shred of evidence. We are living in a democratic India not Hitler's Germany where lies repeated many times would become the truth or where a Jew could be exterminated only because of his religion or ethnicity. The delay was caused by the foolish letter written by an incompetent chief secretary, who should rightfully have been dismissed for presiding over the worst crises in the state in recent years. Imagine a Chief Secretary forwarding a report by a

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I also thought that given the politics of Jammu today, I would be constrained in my role as VC to help build peace. It was important for the President to approve my name, but I was sure for the last six months that I didn't want the job.

Epilogue, March 2011

C U R R E N T A F FA I R S

>>> and not smothering dissent. And then, within a month after clearance of your appointment you declined to take the assignment. What influenced your decision to withdraw and why you took nearly a month to announce that? It took some time because I was thinking about all the consequences of my decision and I consulted all my friends and well-wishers. Finally, I decided I did not want to get further into the vortex of petty politics and chauvinism that we have witnessed on the issue over the last year. I know these are fringe groups, but they are being encouraged by sections within ALL mainstream parties of Jammu. There are few people in public life willing to take a firm stand and the moral fiber has weakened, hopefully not beyond repair. Privately, nearly every major politician would call me and express his support and promise to organize a rally of thousands once I came to Jammu. And publicly, they would encourage the worst sectarian tendencies. And that is why I thanked Omar Abdullah on Twitter. I may differ with him on a 1000 issues, but he privately and publicly rejected the politics of regional chauvinism which is not easy to do in today's Jammu. But I also know that I have disap-

As Vice-chancellor of the University of Jammu, I emphasized the importance of infrastructure, ensuring that the University of Jammu competed with the best institutions of higher education, nationally and internationally. There was no Internet even on campus before my tenure. We were responsible for building a magnificent world-class auditorium in Jammu University, which also hosts an art gallery and a museum

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CENTRAL UNIVERSITY

Omar, Mattoo tweets unknot saga behind V-C post decision Peerzada Ashiq peer.mushtaq@hindustantimes.com

SRINAGAR: When Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) professor Amitabh Mattoo declined to take over as the vice-chancellor of a Central university in Jammu, it surprised. But tweets from Mattoo and Chief Minister Omar Abdullah have unraveled the mystery. "Great relief to get out of this central university mess. Now, the freedom to take on those responsible for destroying peace (in J-K)," tweeted Mattoo on Monday evening. Mattoo, in the first week of February, had written to hrd minister Kapil Sibal and expressed his unwillingness to be the V-C of the Jammu Central University. He was appointed on December 21 last year. The appointment, however, attracted opposition from political parties in the state because "they wanted someone from the region". Mattoo, a Kashmiri Pandit, avoided naming those who were responsible for destroying peace in J-K. "With the support of the media, we should be able to expose the invisible and visible hands," tweeted Mattoo to a journalist. Mattoo's tweets inferred that his decision to join as the

â&#x2122;Ś

V-C could have impacted dissemination of his opinion over the Kashmir issue. Mattoo teaches at JNU's International Studies School. Mattoo's tweet elicited a quick response from Omar. "For the record, I'm very sorry you withdrew your name for V-C JCU, great pity," tweeted Abdullah. To which, Mattoo explained: "Thanks so much for your support. At your convenience, I will explain reasons in person". The tweets attracted attention of many of Mattoo and Abdullah's followers. "(You) mean a V-C can't be a PEACEMONGER?" asked a follower to Mattoo. Mattoo replied: "Thought about it carefully. Believe me it was a hard decision".

A clipping from Hindustan times

pointed many of my supporters. I also thought that given the politics of Jammu today, I would be constrained in my role as VC to help build peace. It was important for the President to approve my name, but I was sure for the last six months that I

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didn't want the job. I finally had asked myself: Did I really want to spend the next five years - hopefully the most productive of my working life - building a new university, important as it is? Or would I rather do something, without a position of power/author>>>

Epilogue, March 2011

C U R R E N T A F FA I R S

>>> ity that could be more meaningful for me, personally, and more lasting in terms of public service? My inner voice told me that it was the latter. After all, I spent six years building Jammu University - almost brick by brick - but where is the public memory of that contribution? Or will the silent majority always get away by remaining silent? How would you like to tell us about your contributions as Vice Chancellor of the University of Jammu, both in terms of academics and infrastructure? Please look back at the University in 2002 and its transformation by 2008. The University of Jammu truly emerged as a centre of academic and extracurricular excellence. NAAC gave it an A grade, the highest it awards any institution Earlier we were the first to get an ISO-9001certification. Our team gave the University a new profile with the institution entering into academic collaboration with a host of top international institutions. The quality of research and teaching improved tremendously and increasingly academicians from the University of Jammu were being called to articulate the Indian perspectives on various issues in prestigious institutions in India and abroad. As Vice-chancellor of the University of Jammu, I emphasized the importance of infrastructure, ensuring that the University of Jammu competed with the best institutions of higher education, nationally and internationally. There was no Internet even on campus before my tenure. We were responsible for building a magnificent world-class auditorium in Jammu University, which also hosts an art gallery and a museum. Leading artists of India, including Jogen Chaudhary, have donated their work to the gallery. Take a look at The Law School, the Biotechnology School or the hostels, the guest houses, the hostels…and you will begin to remember the contribution. We got nearly 500 new teach-

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ing and non-teaching positions and filled nearly 1000 positions. We made Jammu University a shining example of how a public institution can become a centre of excellence. As a thinker you are often spotted at prime time television discussions on Kashmir, your writings on IndoPak relations have been often taken as reference. During campaign against your appointment as CU Vice Chancellor one major allegation that was made out in Jammu was your projection as pro-separatist, anti-India and a promoter of Pakistan's agenda in Kashmir. Would you like to say something on this; more importantly on what you think about Kashmir? This was a campaign run by vested interests and a section of the me-

dia. I am believer in peace and reconciliation between Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh as well as between India and Pakistan. I believe the full potential of the state and the subcontinent, as the PM has also stated, can only be achieved if there is such a grand reconciliation. Since you pulled out of Central University, there are rumours about your joining politics, may be Congress party. Some other reports suggest that you are about to take a prestigious academic assignment abroad. Would you like to tell us what is next? I am taking a prestigious academic assignment abroad, but will be back in the state soon E

My contribution could not be rubbished on the basis of street politicians making unsubstantiated allegations without a shred of evidence. We are living in a democratic India not Hitler's Germany where lies repeated many times would become the truth or where a Jew could be exterminated only because of his religion or ethnicity. The delay was caused by the foolish letter written by an incompetent chief secretary, who should rightfully have been dismissed for presiding over the worst crises in the state in recent years. Imagine a Chief Secretary forwarding a report by a Divisional Commissioner suggesting that terrorism or extremism do not threaten the state but the mere appointment of a Kashmir Pandit as a VC in Jammu will do so.

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Epilogue, March 2011

S T R AT E G I C T H I N K I N G

WIKIWRECKS

The Kashmir Escalation Effect Resolution of the Kashmir question in the context of documents released by WikiLeaks

RADHAVINOD RAJU

Terror training camps, though not di rectly run by the Pakistan government, continue to operate along the IndiaPakistan border creating potential for conflict with India and instability in the region, according to secret diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks.' 'Terrorist organisations, like alQaeda, have begun using these camps as recruitment centres. After additional training... recruitees are then poised to commit terrorist activities,' a senior British Foreign Office official Laura Hickey is reported to have told American diplomats. 'Expressing Britain's concern over what is described as the "Kashmir escalation effect", Ms. Hickey reiterates the British view that a resolution of the Kashmir dispute would take away one of the main planks of extremist groups.' After spending billions in Afghanistan in the last nine years, and having lost over a thousand of its soldiers, the US is nowhere near the goal that it set for itself in Afghanistan, and is now looking at ways to end the conflict, and get an honourable exit from there. In this effort, there are voices in the US and the UK that ask India to go the extra distance to 'help' Pakistan to concentrate on their bad lands bordering Afghanistan, so that the US and NATO forces can effectively tackle the Taliban. Why does Delhi get upset over such remarks? Even if India agrees to settle the Kashmir issue with Pakistan, is there a guarantee that terrorists based in Pakistan will stop their anti-India actions? Consider the following narrative. It will be clear that organizations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba have different ideas about executing jihad in India. Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists caught by J&K police in Jammu's Doda district in late 1999 have disclosed during interrogation that for them Kashmir is only the first step to going further deep into India. Hafeez Saeed, the chief patron

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of the Lashkar, is on record that the process of dialogue between India and Pakistan has no bearing on the ongoing jihad against India, and that even after Kashmir got liberated, the jihad would continue in the other parts of India. The Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad continued their terrorist attacks not only in Kashmir, but other parts of India, even after 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror. The attack on the J&K Assembly took place on the 1st of October, 2001. The attack on the Indian Parliament took place on the 13th of December, 2001. Several murderous attacks have taken place in Delhi and Mumbai in which hundreds of innocent Indians have been killed by these mad men, one of the worst being India's 26/11. Bangalore, Varanasi, Ahmedabad, Pune and Jaipur have witnessed terrorist attacks. So these threats of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and its patron are not idle threats, they are real threats. Ajmal Kasab, the lone L-e-T terrorist arrested in the 26/11 case, has given details of the training he got in the L-e-T camps and the directions given by Hafiz Saeed. David Headley, the American of Pakistani origin, has given details of the training he received from L-e-T handlers and the ISI officers during his India visits to prepare the ground for the 26/11 attacks, to the FBI and NIA officers. The nearest Pakistan has come to admitting the Pak establishment's connection with the 26/11 terrorists is to say that rogue elements of the ISI could be involved in the attacks. The L-e-T dreams of establishing a Caliphate from Spain to the Philippines that includes India. And the Pakistani establishment considers this group its strategic asset to check India. India has, nevertheless, walked the distance with Pakistan through the Track II medium to try and resolve the Kashmir issue. Pakistan's foreign minister of the day Khurshid

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Mahmud Kasuri has admitted that the two countries were close to agreeing on a final solution to the intractable problem. It is Pakistan which is now going back on this understanding. India called off the Track II talks only after the Mumbai attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists. For the first time, one of the terrorists was caught alive, and the world in general, and Pakistan in particular, had to acknowledge that these terrorists were launched from Pakistani soil to cause death and destruction in Mumbai. India showed tremendous restraint in the aftermath of this attack. Had such attacks taken place in Israel or the United States, the response of their governments would have been swift and deadly. India has only asked that the perpetrators of this dastardly attack be brought to book. The manner in which Hafiz Saeed, the principal conspirator of the Mumbai terrorist attacks struts about in different cities of Pakistan, spewing venom against India, and the snails progress in the court against a few minor actors in the 26/11 attacks, indicates the patronage that these terrorists have in Pakistan. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has clearly indicated the extent to which India is prepared to go to solve the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. He has ruled out any re-drawing of the boundaries on communal lines, but has shown willingness to make borders between the two Kashmirs irrelevant. That appears to be the only way forward for India and Pakistan to resolve Kashmir. This appears to be the position reached by the Track II group as mentioned recently by the former Pakistan Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri during his India visit. Can the US and UK nudge Pakistan to take the final steps on the lines recommended by the Track II group, destroy the terrorist infrastructure in that country, and resolve this long pending problem with India? [IPCS]

Epilogue, March 2011

S T R AT E G I C T H I N K I N G

TOWARDS AN INDO-PAK NUCLEAR LEXICON

Credible Minimum Deterrence TANVI KULKARNI Why Credible Minimum Deterrence? India's nuclear weapons policy is identified with the posture of Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence (CMD). The principle entails quite a different interpretation than that understood in the western nuclear lexicon in that western theories and constructs, particularly from the Cold War, cannot be applied effectively to the Indian context. K Subrahmanyam has defended the CMD doctrine by stating that it has been adapted to suit India's requirements and thinking on nuclear weapons. Bharat Karnad defines it as a selfexplanatory, moderate, limited, reasonable and legitimate posture that justified India's nuclear weapons and missile capabilities after the 1998 tests. The CMD doctrine highlights that India does not seek an open-ended nuclear arsenal and pillars other postures like the second-strike capability and no first use. Both terms, credible and minimum, are important individually and their equation makes for the credible minimum nuclear deterrence policy. What is the Indian understanding of credibility? Odd as it seems, as a key feature of nuclear deterrence, 'credibility' is a dynamic, ambiguous and controversial concept. A theoretical understanding of credibility often embroils into a political and technical debate and its definition then depends on which decision-making community, school of thought and context one chooses to represent. The Indian nuclear doctrine looks at credible deterrence as a politicalpsychological concept and serves as a prime means of communicating to

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potential adversaries that India maintains the will and capability to inflict unacceptable punishment through retaliation with nuclear weapons. An effective second strike capability and survivability become important elements of credibility. Credibility must be maintained by robust command and control systems, safety and security of arsenal, operational force preparedness, planning and training of forces, research and development and effective conventional military capabilities. The doctrine lends dynamism to the credible deterrent by making it responsive to India's strategic environment, national security and technological imperatives. A state's approach and policy towards strategic weapons as well as the concepts and ideas that define them are affected by the internal politics of the state's decision-makers. In India, strictly speaking, the political leadership, military and scientific communities do not share the same approach to credible deterrence. The difference is however, to use the words of Professor Rajesh Basrur, a matter of 'political-technical perspective'. In an interview to the Hindu newspaper on 29 November 1999, the then Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh stated that "credibility lies in the possibility of retaliation and not its certainty." The political leadership in India maintains that deterrence credibility lies in its psychological impact on the adversary and on oneself. This neither suggests that the Indian political leaders are averse to sanction new technological developments, nor that the debate within the political class is monolithic. But from the political perspective, credibility has more to do with the effective communication of the threat of retaliation to the adversary

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- a sentiment echoed in the nuclear doctrine - than with the quality and quantity of weapons. The psychological approach does not go too comfortably with the Indian military. As a professional entity and the end-user of weapons systems, the military seeks credibility through technical parameters. The size, structure, level of technology, targeting philosophy, degree of acceptability of damage, time component and the temporal and physical reach of weapons systems are factors that decide how credible the deterrent is. The contentious Cold Start Doctrine, which enjoys little political support, is nevertheless reflective of the Indian Army's understanding of credibility in the operational sense. In a September 2009 television interview, General VP Malik suggested that India's inability to acquire requisite weapons and missile technology had eroded deterrence. In another USI Journal article in 2008, Gen Malik, who oversaw the Pokhran II tests as the Army Chief, wrote that a credible Indian deterrent would require allaying doubts about India's thermonuclear weapons capability, fissile weapons policy and the nuclear triad. A similar conception of 'credible' runs into a technical debate amongst the Indian nuclear scientific community. Debates on the partial success of the thermonuclear device and the need for further testing, which became even more pronounced against the backdrop of the Indo-US nuclear deal, have divided Indian nuclear scientists. Many scientists may not be as vocal as Dr. K Santhanam, but they would cast doubts on the credibility of India's nuclear deterrent based on a technical

Epilogue, March 2011

S T R AT E G I C T H I N K I N G

TOWARDS AN INDO-PAK NUCLEAR LEXICON and technological yardstick. Credible nuclear deterrence as a policy allows a range of diverse interpretations under the conceptual flexibility it provides. There is thus scope for a difference of interpretations among members of a country's strategic community. In the Indian nuclear strategic community, experts like K Subrahmanyam - a nuclear pragmatist, according to Professor Kanti Bajpai would strongly advocate the politico-psychological approach towards nuclear weapons as a credible deterrent. On the other, Bharat Karnad - often termed a nuclear maximalist by the pragmatists - argues for a capability credible enough to deter China as the principal adversary. The context of nuclear deterrence presents us with yet another parameter to assess credibility. Does the level of credibility differ for deterrence against China and Pakistan? Opinions differ. To gauge it technically or politically would also depend on what kind of confrontation is to be deterred, what is to be communicated to the adversary and with what aspect of the adversary's nuclear identity does one associate the deterrent (a mutual no first use policy with China or the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal?). How we choose to define credibility further affects the size of the nuclear arsenal and therefore affects the 'minimum'. This commentary on the interpretations of 'credibility' is hoped to be followed by another which would look at how the minimum is debated within India. The number-game is perhaps the most complicated debate for nuclear weapons states.

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Pakistani Perspective SADIA TASLEEM

redible Minimum Deterrence is a highly loaded term, often used to sug gest a state's intentions with regard to its nuclear posture. Combined, the three words, 'Credible', 'Minimum' and 'Deterrence' present a complex paradox. Credibility, for instance, is an essential prerequisite for deterrence. Why then use the word 'credible' as a prefix to Deterrence or Minimum Deterrence? Yet, another challenge arises from the apparently convoluted nature of messages that 'credible' and 'minimum' convey. While 'minimum' suggests "the least required to deter the adversary;" adding 'credible' to it blurs the whole idea. Since credibility largely depends upon the adversary's perception of our capabilities and intentions, there is always the possibility of incorrectly assessing our credibility in the adversary's calculations. Caution in such circumstances may necessitate preparation for the worst possible scenario, thus raising the 'minimum' bar. As a result what would appear credible might not be 'minimum'. Why do then states opt to use terms that send across obscure signals? What shapes their particular choice of terms? And what do they actually mean by these terms? These are important questions to be addressed while we strive to untangle the complexities of a common lexicon. This paper attempts to explain possible causes behind the idea of prefixing both 'minimum' and 'credible' to deterrence. (Identifying the right causes for a state might also help us clearly define what a state means by minimum and credible). Why 'minimum'? i. To set a ceiling out of sheer sense of moral responsibility ii. A genuine commitment to keep the arsenal low (either because it is cost- effective or because a state cannot afford anything more than that) iii. Imitation/Emulation iv. Satisfying the international community and pacifying their concern regarding proliferation Why 'credible'? i. Psychological comfort ii. Adds ambiguity iii. Provides leverage to move towards arms build-up iv. Imitation CMD as Pakistani nuclear policy: Tracing its history and identifying the causes While deterrence has been an integral part of Pakistan's nuclear policy since its inception, 'minimum' and 'credible' entered Pakistan's nuclear lexicon a little later. These two terms were endorsed in February 1999 in the then prepared (publicly unannounced) Nuclear Doctrine of Pakistan. (Interview with Brigadier (Retd.) Naeem Salik, 28 January 2011). The initial enthusiasm for minimum deterrence was essentially a consequence of Pakistan's economic condition with a well-pronounced conviction to keep the arsenal low in numbers. The question remains, why was there a need to add an additional qualifier (i.e. credible) to 'Minimum Deterrence'? Brig (Retd.) Naeem Salik stated that this was done in order to have the psychological comfort of knowing that Pakistan was not dependent on a bare minimum that poses the challenge of having to lower the nuclear threshold. Interestingly, one finds a number of occasions where 'minimum' or 'credible' were either replaced with some alternative 'qualifier' (e.g. defensive) or taken out altogether from public speeches made by the country's top leadership. If anything, it illustrates that the issue of understanding Pakistan's nuclear

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Epilogue, March 2011

S T R AT E G I C T H I N K I N G

TOWARDS AN INDO-PAK NUCLEAR LEXICON lexicon is complex. It also suggests that quite often we might attribute too much to the rather less thought out choice of terms. It is less because these terms are used as disguises or are intentionally misleading, more because hardly any attention has been paid to the idea of developing nuclear jargon. There is no evidence that suggests open sessions of discussions and deliberations purely dealing with the question of a lexicon. Few would, for instance, have an answer to why we opted for the word 'credible' or why President Musharraf's idea of 'defensive' deterrence did not receive a huge following. Pakistani Perspective of CMD It has been reiterated time and again that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are meant to deter security threats posed by India. It is clear that threats to the very survival of the state would invoke the need to use nuclear weapons. Ambiguity nonetheless remains on what exactly would be the nature of 'other' threats that could compel Pakistan to use nuclear weapons. Red lines, defined by General Kidwai in one of his interviews, have been quoted and misquoted repeatedly. These lines leave many more confused than clear. It seems that there is a conscious effort to maintain existing ambiguity. Policy-makers in Pakistan feel convinced that this ambiguity serves deterrence well. Therefore, at this point in time, it is hard to move further on this question. Next is the issue of prefixes. 'Minimum' Deterrence in Pakistan is largely seen as a dynamic concept. The then Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, while speaking at a seminar in November 1999 at ISSI, Islamabad, elaborated, "Minimum cannot be quanti-

fied in static numbers. The Indian build up would necessitate review and reassessmentâ&#x20AC;Ś.but we shall not engage in any nuclear competition or arms race." Some however find mere 'minimum' a little disturbing. They suggest that 'minimum' may not fully serve the purpose at times of an adversary's nuclear build-up. It might send the wrong signal and develop within the enemy over-confidence and a temptation to opt for aggression. Credible would in such circumstances help keep a psychological check on the adversary. Also, it would provide the protagonist an additional cushion of comfort. [Interview: Brig (Retd.) Salik] A natural question that follows is how then is the Pakistani idea of CMD different from India's CMD? Brig (Retd.) Salik asserted that the objective of Pakistan's CMD posture is very clear and specific, i.e. vis-Ă -vis India. Therefore it inherently has a limitation. On the contrary, India's CMD is an open-ended concept! The point to note is that given these perceptions, would CMD, even in theory, remain a part of India-Pakistan nuclear policies over a long period of time or would it get washed away in the currents of mistrust, antagonism and sometimes over-emphasis on the technical details of deterrence? Recently, a marked departure has been noted in a public pronouncement of Pakistani nuclear policy, from 'Credible Minimum Deterrence' to 'Credible Deterrence' (NCA Statement, 14 December 2010). The question was raised in two different forums and the speakers held contradictory positions. One speaker argued that it appears to reflect a shift in Pakistan's policy based on its current threat assessment. A senior government official, on the contrary, suggested that it was used in a given context and should be understood with reference to the complete statement issued by NCA. The emphasis on the word 'credible' was meant to reinforce the importance of credibility. It does not suggest a shift from Minimum Deterrence.

Indian Perspective ALI AHMED

he Army Chief wrote the epitaph on Cold Start, stat ing, "There is nothing called 'Cold Start'." But it must be acknowledged that in its short shelf life of seven years it had spawned a cottage industry of commentators on it. Like the proverbial 'blind men of Hindoostan', they inspected Cold Start and found it viable or otherwise, depending on their avian nature as hawks or doves. That Cold Start is no more is to be mourned since it did enliven strategic commentary, helped create a strategic culture and brought the Indian political and security establishment to see the military, finally, as a potentially usable instrument. Yet, that the doctrine remained untested owes to India's grand strategy, characterized lately as 'strategic restraint'. Strategic restraint is a coming to terms with limitations of force, brought on by things such as the economy and the nuclear backdrop. The term 'Cold Start' for India's conventional doctrine was conjured up in a media briefing by a 'source' on the sidelines of the Army Commander's conference in the summer of 2004. The doctrine had been discussed in that

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conference but was adopted in the next conference in autumn that year. It was a culmination of the changes in the Army brought on by the lessons of the two preceding crises, the Limited War in Kargil and the subsequent exercise in coercive diplomacy, Operation Parakram. Incidentally, even as military analysts made their careers dissecting it, the government in the form of the Ministry of Defence, took care never to refer to it. This suggests that it was a legacy of the previous government, with an image of being more defence-friendly. The NDA dispensation had taken care to bring out the nuclear doctrine while in power, tying India down to its expansive formulation of 'massive' nuclear retaliation against India or its forces 'anywhere'. The threat was to create the space necessary to operationalize a proactive conventional war doctrine. 'Cold Start' was a limiting description of the doctrine. Cold Start refers only to the kind of capability the Army gave itself, of going into conventional operations from a standing start. This owed to its embarrassment in hav

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Epilogue, March 2011

S T R AT E G I C T H I N K I N G

TOWARDS AN INDO-PAK NUCLEAR LEXICON

ing taken three weeks to mobilize after the parliament attack, thereby seemingly losing an opportunity to administer punishment and thereby instill caution in Pakistan. The doctrine envisaged a series of limited thrusts across a wide front into Pakistan by divisional sized forces. These served to capture territory, seize the initiative and provide a launch pad for strike corps to deepen the penetration. Enemy reserves would thus be forced to react and expend themselves. Attrition from the air would enable whittling down the Pakistani Army, seen as the center of gravity. The Army, suitably degraded, would be displaced from power post-conflict in Pakistan, enabling a democratic peace to ensue unlike the last time round post 1971. The doctrine had much to recommend it. It brought India's military advantage back into the reckoning despite nuclearization. It enabled taking the first tier of defences when they were unheld or relatively underdeveloped. This would have saved India from casualties, particularly in the mountains. This would have helped prevent the development of an attrition match as had occurred in the earlier wars. It would be a war fought on Pakistani territory, thus sparing India of the effects of the increasing lethality of war. Making early gains, India could call for early war termination on its terms. Since the nuclear threshold was to be respected, there would be no call for Pakistan to resort to nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the doctrine had its criticism. It was seen as narrowing the opportunity for crisis management and conflict avoidance through diplomacy. It would set South Asia a short fuse vulnerable to any passing bunch of self-interested jihadis. A default military reaction in real time would place the two states at odds with each other, playing into the hands of non-state actors who would expect to gain from the resulting instability in Pakistan. It was deemed to be too deterministic about the location of the Pakistani nuclear threshold. It was taken as high, enabling operations to a limited depth. This was to be unmindful of the influence of a conflict environment on decision-making. It was politically na誰ve in its belief that knocking down the Pakistani Army would result in democratic forces prevailing. The jihadis could instead have come to the fore. This could be due to Pakistan using them in an Iraqi style asymmetric war against Indian conventional forces in Pakistani territory. Lastly, it was seen as part of the inter-Service rivalry, with the Army trying to set the agenda as the lead service, in reply to the Air Force's intent of an 'air alone' strategy in an indigenous version of 'Shock and Awe'. The Cold Start period was India's third doctrinal tumult. The first was a defensive one subsequent to the 1962 and the 1965 Wars in which the lessons of Ichogil canal were replicated across the front. The second was one of mechanized warfare, led by Sundarji. Cold Start therefore was long over due, since the Sundarji doctrine had been overtaken by overt nuclearization.

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'Cold Start' was a limiting description of the doctrine. Cold Start refers only to the kind of capability the Army gave itself, of going into conventional operations from a standing start. This owed to its embarrassment in having taken three weeks to mobilize after the parliament attack, thereby seemingly losing an opportunity to administer punishment and thereby instill caution in Pakistan. The doctrine envisaged a series of limited thrusts across a wide front into Pakistan by divisional sized forces. These served to capture territory, seize the initiative and provide a launch pad for strike corps to deepen the penetration. Enemy reserves would thus be forced to react and expend themselves. Attrition from the air would enable whittling down the Pakistani Army, seen as the center of gravity. The Army, suitably degraded, would be displaced from power postconflict in Pakistan, enabling a democratic peace to ensue unlike the last time round post 1971. Thinking beyond the limitations of Cold Start is the direction of India's fourth and forthcoming doctrinal tryst. Cold Start can be expected to be reckoned in history as a necessary bridge between India's war-waging and wardeterring military. (IPCS)

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Epilogue, March 2011

S T R AT E G I C T H I N K I N G

REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR INDIA

A Charm Offensive to Win the Hearts and Minds

D SUBA CHANDRAN Given the social inequalities and political instability, India is likely to face a neighbourhood, which is either failing or with substantial ungovernable spaces in its backyard. Though India is not involved in the internal problems in its neighbourhood, the possibility that regimes that emerge out of the instability blaming India, remains high. Even now, anti-Indian sentiments seem to have become an ideology that could unite the different groups within, and even provide some legitimacy to unpopular regimes. In South Asia, according to the latest annual report on the Failed States Index (2010), published by the Fund for Peace, except for India, Bhutan and Maldives, other countries figures highly on the list of potential failed states. While Pakistan and Afghanistan figure amongst the top ten, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka figure in the top 30 among a list of 177 countries. Cleary, India is in the midst of a region, with states surrounding it facing state failure. India is, in fact, surrounded by a ring of fire. What can New Delhi do about this? How can India ensure, that instability in its neighbourhood, does not spill into its own borders? How can India protect its own territory from instability, and secure its interests in the region? Recently, the Brookings Institution has undertaken a study, on how the US could manage global insecurity and protect its interests. India should also look into, how it could manage the regional insecurity in South Asia and protect its own interests.

I-THE RING OF FIRE If India's neighbourhood is troubled today, the future is likely to be even more troublesome. Failure of the State and its delivery mechanisms is likely to make the region conflict prone and violent. Political Institutions, like Parliament, legal institutions and the bureaucracy face serious problems of credibility. The recent reports of Transparency International on the performance of these institutions highlight the increasing problems of governance in India's neighbourhood. India's neighbourhood has serious ethnic or provincial fault lines, which results in their blaming "foreign hand" (read India) for their internal problems. Violence in Karachi, suicide terrorism in Pakistan, Baloch insurgency

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and problems in sharing the Indus Waters between its four provinces - always result in India being blamed for mischief. The same is true of Nepal and Sri Lanka; failure of nation building processes, due to faulty policies adopted by successive governments and regimes, are routinely blamed on India. Ironically, both the Maoists and nonMaoist political groups in Nepal blame New Delhi for the domestic instability. In Sri Lanka, both the Sinhalese and Tamils are apprehensive regarding the role played by New Delhi; while the Sri Lankan Tamils feel, that they have been "backstabbed" in not being supported by New Delhi, the Sinhalese fear that New Delhi is secretly supporting the Tamils. Bangladesh is a classic example of how anti-Indian sentiments have

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India's neighbourhood has serious ethnic or provincial fault lines, which results in their blaming "foreign hand" (read India) for their internal problems. Violence in Karachi, suicide terrorism in Pakistan, Baloch insurgency and problems in sharing the Indus Waters between its four provinces

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REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR INDIA become a national pastime, with Bangladeshi believing that India cannot and will never do anything positive vis-a-vis Dhaka. Worse, even if the regimes take any decisions on merits, they will be suspected of being either pro-Indian or worse, an Indian stooge. This hardening of public sentiment, prevents governments in Dhaka from pursuing any policy that is even remotely perceived as being pro -Indian. In short, this is the regional problematique which India is facing today and is likely to face in the foreseeable future. Worse, India is likely to face not merely a hostile neighbourhood, but also a with a serious democratic deficit and increasing influence of the radical groups. Besides India is also likely to deal with an increasing governance deficit in its borders. These two deficits democratic and governance, along with ethnic fault lines and the failure of political institutions is likely to result in their security forces, especially the armed forces and the intelligence organisations playing an important role. With the polity divided, the armed forces remain the only monolithic organisation in countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh. Whenever the political parties and institutions fail to deliver, leading to a crisis situation, people automatically look to the security forces for providing an alternative. The ruling elite have also been attempting to gain more power, leading to the democratically elected leadership exhibiting signs of dictatorship. Hence India is likely to face an unstable neighbourhood, with a predominantly anti-Indian attitude.

II-A REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR INDIA: EXPLORING OPTIONS What are India's options? What can India do about, of the security the region? The geostrategic reality is, India cannot escape from its neighbourhood For that matter, . no country in this world has the luxury of choosing its neighbours. Option 1: Look Inwards, Isolate and Quarantine: India seems to have pursued this strategy; it has built a long fence against Pakistan and Bangladesh. But, the harsh truth is,

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that these fences cannot prevent the movement of either militants or migrants across borders. In fact, ranging from the Great Wall of China to the technologically monitored US-Mexican border, there is no physical barrier in history that has successfully prevented the movement of people. Isolating itself through border fencing has neither

India seems to have pursued this strategy; it has built a long fence against Pakistan and Bangladesh. But, the harsh truth is, that these fences cannot prevent the movement of either militants or migrants across borders. In fact, ranging from the Great Wall of China to the technologically monitored US-Mexican border, there is no physical barrier in history that has successfully prevented the movement of people. Isolating itself through border fencing has neither prevented the illegal movement of people nor the goods. Clearly, an isolationist strategy - trying to prevented the illegal movement of people nor the goods. Clearly, an isolationist strategy - trying to insulate India from its neighbourhood will not work. India will have to work with its neighbours to secure the region and protect its own interests. While, there is a serious problem across the border, it is time, to look inwards also to see whether India could improve the situation. . Unfortunately, New Delhi (and the rest of India, ) has been obsessed with Pakistan, but has overlooked its smaller neighbours; It has spent over a bil-

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lion dollars in Afghanistan. How much has it spent in its other neighbours? Option 2: Look Outwards and Engage the Neighbours: India could pursue an engagement strategy, which could further be divided into either a confrontational strategy to weaken its neighbourhood or a positive engagement, by using a charm offensive to win hearts and minds (WHAM). Will a confrontational strategy serve India's interests? There have been several criticisms within Pakistan, blaming India for their ethnic problems in Balochistan and Sindh. In fact, a section even blames India for supporting the Taliban against Pakistan's interests, in the FATA and Khyber Paktunkwa. There have been reports, including several statements by their Interior Minister that India has instigated the multiple suicide attacks carried out by the Taliban! A section within India also suggest that India should go ahead and actively assist the Balochi insurgents and Sindhi nationalists to break up Pakistan. A similar strategy should be pursued in SriLanka, Bangladesh and even Nepal, to support groups, with the objective of breaking them up. However, this strategy is unlikely to benefit India over the longer run. India did assist the breaking up of Pakistan in 1971 and the creation of Bangaldesh; however, this has not stabilized the situation. In fact, Bangladesh is equally hostile towards India, and many infrastructural projects to link Northeast India and Southeast Asia are being held hostage to Bangladesh's reluctance to provide transit facilities to India.

III-PLAN B: A CHARM OFFENSIVE TO WIN THE HEARTS AND MINDS IN SOUTH ASIA There are two sets of strategies that India will have to pursue to establish a stable neighbourhood. First, measures that India should pursue, that would help it to secure its neighbourhood; and second, internal measures, that India should pursue to strengthen domestic actors, decentralising some powers and reworking certain policies. The following questions need to be addressed, or at least debated, to frame a regional strategy to secure India's interests vis-a-vis its immediate neighbours: How to create and sus-

Epilogue, March 2011

S T R AT E G I C T H I N K I N G

REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR INDIA tain a pro-Indian constituency in the neighbourhood? One of the biggest problems that India faces in its neighbourhood is the public hostility vis-a-vis New Delhi. Even, if India wants to make a positive contribution in its neighbourhood, it is perceived with suspicion. In fact, there is a powerful anti- Indian lobby, in almost India's entire neighbourhood, with Bhutan and Maldives being perhaps the exceptions. Is there a political hostility amongst the leading political parties, leading to creating an anti-Indian opinion amongst the common people, or, is there an antiIndian public sentiment in India's neighbourhood, which is reflected and encashed by the political parties and other organisations? The primary issue before India is, how to create a pro-Indian constituency? More importantly, how to sustain it? A cursory examination will reveal that, besides the political parties, there are other actors, shaping public opinion (for or against India), which includes the media, think tanks/ research organisations, and academic institutions. While the political parties try to utilize the prevailing public sentiment, the other three actors shape public opinion. Hence, if India has to address the anti-Indian streak amongst the political parties, it will have to create a positive impact among those other actors who mould the public opinion. Besides these three actors - media, think tanks/ research organisations, and academic institutions- - business groups and religious organisations also play a role in creating and sustaining anti-Indian sentiments. While India may not be able to address each and every group/actor, strategies could be evolved towards influencing the first three actors, to win their hearts and minds, and create a constituency favourable to India. How could India use its Soft Power to influence its neighbourhood? A cursory look at the Chinese image in India'sneighbourhood will reveal the stark differences between Beijing and New Delhi. Unfortunately, except for Bhutan and to an extent the Maldives, India does not have many friends in the other countries of South Asia. On the contrary, China is seen as a saviour and beneficial power. Irrespective of its true relationship military and economic-- China has been hugely successful in projecting its soft power.

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How has China managed to win hearts and minds? Can New Delhi learn from Beijing? India's Bollywood is generally seen as a great entertainment industry, , immensely popular, and with a huge reach in India's neighbourhood. Besides Indian educational institutions - from the JNUs, to the IITs, including the numerous business schools, are an inspiration in these

A cursory analysis of India's economic strategy visa- vis Southeast Asia and India's neighbourhood will reveal the lack of coordination between the Ministries in India in terms of reaching out to the neighbourhood. Ideally, there should be a single window clearance, instead of different Ministries being involved in the decision making process; the latter makes India's foreign relations seem anarchic, from the neighbourhood's perspective. However, the real problem here seems to lie in convincing the neighbours, that it is in their economic interests to work closely with India. countries. So are the medical facilities available in India. While, numerous other factors, constitute India's soft power, to WHAM in the region,, these should include Indian democracy, secular culture and so on, but the former three aspects of educational and technical institutions and medical facilites would provide a good beginning. How to integrate the regional economies into India? It is extremely unfortunate, to notice that SAARC has become the most ineffec-

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tive regional organisation. Instead of blaming Pakistan and other countries for the problems of SAARC, India needs to pursue alternative strategies to integrate the economies of the region. A cursory analysis of India's economic strategy visa- vis Southeast Asia and India's neighbourhood will reveal the lack of coordination between the Ministries in India in terms of reaching out to the neighbourhood. Ideally, there should be a single window clearance, instead of different Ministries being involved in the decision making process; the latter makes India's foreign relations seem anarchic, from the neighbourhood's perspective. However, the real problem here seems to lie in convincing the neighbours, that it is in their economic interests to work closely with India. Unfortunately, political perceptions spill over into economic decision making; the best example is the case of Bangladesh and the issue of transit facilities to India. Perhaps, it would be useful to find alternate ways, to convince the neighbourhs of what serves their own best interests; one such strategy could be to use India's sub-regions as the base. How to make India's sub-regions as the engines of regional growth? India could learn from China on how to utilize its peripheries as centers of sub-regional growth along our borders. In China, cities like Kashgar, Kunming and Chengdu - the capitals of Xinjiang, Yunnan and Sichuan provinces, are world class cities. More than the growth in urban centers of these provinces, what is amazing, is the policy space - domestic and foreign, that these regions enjoy vis-Ă vis Beijing. Three primary reasons could be identified for this transformation. First, a deliberate policy by Beijing, with a long term vision, backed by adequate investment at the ground level. Beijing has over the years made huge investments in its provincial cities, with the object of making them , the engines of provincial growth. Second, Beijing has also allowed these provinces to develop as centres of regional growth. In terms of economic investment and foreign policy, the provinces have been given the space to pursue what is in their best interests, as long as they do not affect the overall policy of Beijing. Thereby, the provinces,

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REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR INDIA

could attract foreign direct investment and even pursue independent strategies vis-à-vis their neighbouring regions outside China. For example, both Sichuan and Yunnan were given a greater degree of freedom to work with the countries of Southeast Asia. Today, the Chinese foreign policy vis-à-vis Myanmar and the Mekong region, are being pursued by these two provinces. Third, and more importantly, the provinces grabbed the opportunity both vis-à-vis Beijing and the neighbouring regions. Both Yunnan and Sichuan have been extremely successful in improving their infrastructure, attracting foreign direct investment, and more importantly, working with Myanmar and the Mekong region. The Kunming initiative, for example, was the brainchild of Yunnan province, and Sichuan wants to improve its relations with Myanmar, Bangladesh and India's Northeast. Not only in terms of infrastructure and foreign policy, but also in terms of intellectual investment, these provinces have gone far ahead. Their Universities have specialized centers to study South and South East Asia, economic interactions, and the Silk Route. The Sichuan University, also has a programme on Pakistan, which none of the Indian Universities have ! J&K, India's Northeast and South India should become the engines of regional growth vis-à-vis Xinjiang and Tibet, Bangladesh and Southeast Asia, and Sri Lanka and Maldives respectively. Unfortunately, the intellectual investments in these regions has been minimal, resulting in low returns in terms of contribution to India's foreign policy. How to make use of Media, Think Tanks and Research institutions as Un-official Ambassadors to promote India's External Relations in the Neighbourhood? India has a strong media and well established think tanks and research institutions. Unfortunately,their inputs into the Indian foreign policy making or becoming un-official ambassadors of India's foreign policy are minimal, because the establishment is reluctant to use their potential. If the media in India's neighbourhood is avowedly anti-Indian, the media in India, especially the electronic me-

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dia, is unnecessarily jingoistic. Remember the case of Verinder Sehwag, missing a century by one run, in a one day match held in Dambulla, Sri Lanka in August 2010? True, the Sri Lankan player bowled a no ball that resulted in Sehwag missing the century but the Indian media went beserk

Unfortunately, the intellectual investments in these regions has been minimal, resulting in low returns in terms of contribution to India's foreign policy. How to make use of Media, Think Tanks and Research institutions as Un-official Ambassadors to promote India's External Relations in the Neighbourhood? India has a strong media and well established think tanks and research institutions. Unfortunately,their inputs into the Indian foreign policy making or becoming un-official ambassadors of India's foreign policy are minimal, because the establishment is reluctant to use their potential. in accusing Sri Lanka of complicity.The Sri Lankan High Commissioner in New Delhi was asked to explain the situation by one of the leading TV channels, on what was essentially a sporting event, played in an unsportsmanlike manner by a single player. While the initial reaction in the Sri Lankan media was critical of its own conduct, the subsequent India media campaign turned public sentiment I within Sri Lanka to become defensive and anti-Indian. Besides the Indian media, think tanks and research institutions could also play a major role in building the relationship, thereby creating a positive environment. Unfortunately, there is not enough funding support to these

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organisations to build a network, and thereby create a community of South Asian scholarship that would think beyond national boundaries. Worse, the visa procedures of India are restrictive; hence, the academic community in India's neighbourhood finds it a nightmare to get a visa to enter India. The Indian High Commissions in the neighbourhood are seen as highly bureaucratic, inefficient and rude. In most cases, the opinion makers in the media - both print and electronic, in India's neighbourhood, are the real image destroyers of India, through their columns in news papers and magazines, and interviews in TV channels. In most cases, the hard reality is that their interaction and understanding of India is through their experience in the Indian embassies. This is where, by better interactions and increased communications; Indian think tanks could build a network among the academic community. How to use the NDMA to alleviate the pain of disasters in our neighbourhood? Culturall y and psychologically, the neighbourhood is similar in terms of perceiving those who help them, when help is most needed . Especially, in a disaster situation, when there is little possibility of local governments or the international community providing timely assistance. Physically and geographically, India's neighbourhood faces natural disasters periodically; from tsunami, floods, earthquakes and cyclones. Unfortunately, the disaster management authorities in our neighbourhood are either dysfunctional or absent. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in India is the largest and best prepared compared to similar organisations in the region. While the NDMA has the mandate to address "national" disasters, it could become an excellent foreign policy tool, at the regional level to WHAM in our neighbourhood. These questions need to be debated, in reworking and re-framing New Delhi's regional strategy to achieve its larger national interests and secure its objectives in the neighbourhood. By Arrangement: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies New Delhi

Epilogue, March 2011

IN FOCUS PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS

Panchayat Elections Is J&K Headed for Real Self Rule? EPILOGUE BUREAU

If a recent decision of Omar Abdullah's Cabinet is any guide to go by then Jammu and Kashmir is all set for a major political transformation -a transformation of hearts and minds at grassroots level. Ten years after last such exercise, the government has decided to go for Panchayat elections this spring, which is definitely ahead of summers -the season most feared in Kashmir Valley. And if the government is able to keep its spring deadline for Panchayat elections the coming summer in Kashmir will definitely be a better season than last three years.

f many problems that plague Kashmir, free flow of democracy at the grassroots levels is a most serious one. Legitimacy of the institutions of democracy and involvement of the peoples in decision making process has remained a highly contested issue till the assembly elections of 2002. As argued in our previous issue, the public confidence in democracy shattered by malpractices of 1987 elections was restored to great degree of significance by transparency and fairness of 2002 elections. That was a defining movement in the recent conflict history of Jammu and Kashmir which marked a constant decline in the incidents of militant violence in the subsequent years. The decline in militant violence year after year is mainly attributed to the lack of local support to the militant groups and quite evidently this trend can be further attributed to restoration of public faith in democracy. In the last assembly elections, held in 2008, there was a huge participation of not only voters but also of the election contestants. As many as 1353 candidates contested elections for 87 seats to the state Assembly. While few were the serious contenders for a seat in the coveted House, hundreds of others stood in elections in giving vent to their feelings, for highlighting the local issues and for proving that they have an

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agenda for the common good and they have enough people supporting them. What drew as many people to the 2008 elections was the promise of fairness held out by 2002 elections and lack of enough opportunities of democratic competitions at local levels. Panchayat elections, therefore, offer an opportunity of political engagement at the grassroots level, a role to the people in smaller decision making process and possibly some help in ending alienation. The Panchayati Raj system, if implemented correctly, is perhaps the best way to connect the existing structures of governance in the state of Jammu and Kashmir to the aspirations and choices of the people. Conducting peaceful and fair elections to the Panchayats is a necessary, but not sufficient first step in actualising that process. In the melee of many political packages and conflict resolutions models floated for Jammu and Kashmir -the notable indigenous among them self rule and autonomy -the Panchayati Raj system perhaps offers the best model of ending alienation by involving people in the system. Devolution of powers at the grassroots by making duly elected Panchayats as legitimate stakeholders in the process can also help in ending the regional and sub-regional grievances against the top heavy power structure. What fuels regional

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dissension in Jammu and Kashmir is the institutional denial of power to the peoples and lack of there proper role in the decision making process. As top political leadership hardly cares to address this problem, the dissension continues to bottle up at the regional level. Jammu and Kashmir represents a worst picture of mutilation of democracy, in any Indian state, by institutional suppression of local institutions of governance: the Panchayati Raj system as

As all fingers are crossed for the upcoming summer of 2011, the Omar Abdullah government has promised to hold elections in spring. If free flow of democracy holds an answer to alienation and unrest, the Panchayat elections may well be a solution to most of the problems. Success of this spring may change the contours of coming summer -a haunted season in Kashmir

Epilogue, March 2011

IN FOCUS PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS

well as urban local bodies. Three years after Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah came back to power in the state, all elected Panchayats, Municipal Corporations and Committees were suspended in 1978 on the pretext of incorporating reservations for women and weaker sections of the society. Since then the complete mechanism of decision making rests in the hands of state government with no role of people at the grassroots level to make any suggestion in their development matters. This large gap between government and the people have systematically contributed in introducing and increasing the alienations in many ways. There have been widespread protests in the decades of 1980s and 1990s for restoration of the local institutions of governance but the government at all occasions refused to share power with the people. This phenomenal denial of role to the people at grassroots level in the decision making process has continuously been engineering frustration at regional and sub-regional level. It was in 2001 that the state government succumbed to the peoples' pressure and announced to conduct elections to the Panchayats and local bodies. The urban local bodies elections, however, were deferred but the

District

Jammu Samba Kathua Udhampur Reasi Doda Kishtwar Ramban Rajouri Poonch Srinagar Ganderbal Budgam Anantnag Pulwama Kulgam Shopian Bandipore Baramulla Kupwara Leh Kargil

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Panchayat elections saw a huge response from the people. Despite mounting militant threats the voluntary response of the people towards Panchayat elections was historic in nature. The level of Participation was much higher than any elections held in Jammu and Kashmir after 1977. What was more interesting about the 2001 Panchayat elections was the tremendous participation of women even in the face of a clear militant diktat to the fairer sex to keep off the political process. At four places, ears and noses of some women contestants were chopped off by militants to scare rest of the lot away but that did not deter the determined women. This was the level of women participation even though no seats had been reserved for them. The elections were conducted on a non-party basis in an atmosphere highly charged with the militant activities. During the Panchayat polls of 2001, very few Sarpanch and Panch constituencies in Kashmir Valley actually went to poll. Polling took place in 208 of a total of 2348 constituencies in Baramulla, 152 of 1695 constituencies in Kupwara and 53 of 759 constituencies in Srinagar. No poll was held in any of the 1022 constituencies of Badgam. This is explicable due to the extremely high level of militant violence in the

Rural Development Blocks 8 4 8 7 4 8 8 4 6 9 1 4 8 7 5 5 1 5 12 11 9 9

In the melee of many political packages and conflict resolutions models floated for Jammu and Kashmir -the notable indigenous among them self rule and autonomy the Panchayati Raj system perhaps offers the best model of ending alienation by involving people in the system. Devolution of powers at the grassroots by making duly elected Panchayats as legitimate stakeholders in the process can also help in ending the regional and sub-regional grievances against the top heavy power structure state at that time, and the fear invoked due to the calls by the Hizbul Mujahideen and the Hurriyat Conference to boycott the polls. The 2001 elections, however, evoked an enthusiastic response in the Jammu and Ladakh regions with these two regions recording more than 75 percent voter turnout. What followed later was a blatant betrayal at the hands of politicians who held powers from time to time. Credit though goes to

Sarpanch Constituencies

Panch Constituencies

Electorate

298 100 244 204 147 232 134 124 189 295 10 103 283 297 186 159 103 114 365 356 93 95

2156 726 1644 1544 1014 1428 838 832 1540 2028 79 744 2155 2054 1350 1060 763 869 2906 2716 605 659

566723 176231 327733 279075 160810 NA 213375 148690 316527 247119 15061 121522 335604 401968 263398 193034 134318 151089 437431 330905 62504 71765

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Epilogue, March 2011

Farooq Abdullah of National Conference for conducting elections in 2001 but he owes an answer to those volunteered to risk their life at his calling and contest elections despite militant threat. Farooq remained in power for a year and half after the Panchayat elections but he neither constituted nor notified the Panchayats leaving the elected representatives as a laughing stock of their voters. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's government between November 2002 and November 2005 continued to adopt a similar silence on the issue. Mufti took many pathbreaking decisions and provided people one of the best governments in many decades. He also enjoys the credit of holding urban local bodies elections in 2004 but he could never explain why he dithered on empowering Panchayats. Over 2200 elected members of Panchayats continued to look towards him but there was no reward for them. During Mufti's time his Cabinet decided at least at three occasions to devolve powers to the Panchayats but on every next occasion decision was deferred for unexplained reasons. Mufti's successor Ghulam Nabi Azad also took some historic decisions like increasing the number of districts from 14 to 22 but grassroots level empowerment of people through Panchayat elections could never become an item on his agenda. It during Azad's regime that Panchayats of 2001 exhausted their term without having played their rightfully due role even for a day. During 2008 assembly elections, holding of Panchayat elections returned to the agenda of all major political parties. Congress, National Conference and the Peoples Democratic Party listed Panchayat elections as their top priority. The government that returned to power after 2008 elections is a coalition of National Conference and the Congress headed by Omar Abdullah. On becoming Chief Minister, Omar had listed Panchayat elections among his first top priorities. However, elections could not be held during first two years for apparently valid reasons of Lok Sabha elections in 2009 and the following unrest that year and later the turmoil of 2010 summer. Rumours for holding these elections have gained a lot of momentum since

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IN FOCUS PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS

2009, with many dates floated - and discarded - in the last few months. There were differences within the ruling coalition, with the Congress party objecting to holding the elections under the Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act, 1992. These differences seem to have been resolved with an agreement between the two ruling partners to commence holding these polls under the Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act 1992, and implement 73rd Amendment in due course of time for subsequent phases of elections. This means that along

Three years after Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah came back to power in the state, all elected Panchayats, Municipal Corporations and Committees were suspended in 1978 on the pretext of incorporating reservations for women and weaker sections of the society. Since then the complete mechanism of decision making rests in the hands of state government with no role of people at the grassroots level to make any suggestion in their development matters with lowering age of the candidates to 21 years, a State Election Commission and a Finance Commission are likely to be constituted in the state soon. As all fingers are crossed for the upcoming summer of 2011, the Omar Abdullah government has promised to hold elections in spring. If free flow of democracy holds an answer to alienation and unrest, the Panchayat elections may well be a solution to most of the problems. As per the decision of state Cabinet, the Panchayat elections will be completed by May. Despite loud protestations for not incorporating the amendments in Act, all major parties will go ahead and participate in these polls. In fact, the public stance of the political parties

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won't count for much in the end because these polls are not held on party lines. This means that no party symbols are issued to the candidates. Bar a threat of violent retribution by the militants, the grassroot workers of almost all mainstream political parties, and even organisations like the Jamait-e-Islami and the Hurriyat Conference, are likely to participate in these elections in their individual capacity. If conducted successfully, and in a visibly fair manner, the holding of these polls will lead to reinvigorating the political climate at the grassroots in the state. It will create a new strata of local leadership which will be a stakeholder in the political system. The successful conduct of the Panchayat polls is however only the first step. The real challenge will be to build the institutions and empower them to leverage the maximum benefits from this model of local selfgovernance. These Panchayats would have to be meaningfully empowered through massive transfer of resources as well as administrative powers. When coupled with a grassroots level approach of participatory planning whereby the developmental programmes are identified and implemented through the Panchayats, these institutions can emerge as effective agencies for the implementation of developmental programmes. Unlike other states of the country which have the three-tier Panchayat structure as per the provisions of the 73rd Amendment to the Constitution of 1992, Jammu and Kashmir has its own Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act of 1992, which is at variance with the 73rd Amendment. As per the final electoral rolls prepared by the state's Chief Electoral Officer, the total number of electorate for these elections is 50,78,268 in the state - 25,18,639 in 12 districts of Kashmir division including Ladakh, and 25,59,629 in 10 districts of Jammu region. Out of these, nearly two lakh voters will be exercising their franchise for the first time. Following the updation of the electoral rolls, there are 77 Blocks, 2164 Panchayats and 15960 Panch constituencies in Kashmir, while the figures for the Jammu region are 143, 4131 and 29710 respectively.

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IN FOCUS PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS

Trends of Candidate participation in last four assembly elections Constituency

2008

Gurez

2002 5

1996 7

Wachi

Shopian

1987

Bandipora

Bani

Sonawari

Basohli

Nubra

Kathua

Leh

Billawar

Kargil

Hira Nagar

Zanskar

Noorabad

Surankote

Kulgam

Mendhar

Homshali Bugh

Poonch Haveli

Anantnag

Kangan

Devsar

Ganderbal

Dooru

Nowshera

Kokernag

Darhal

Shangus

Rajauri

Bijbehara

Kalakote

Pahalgam

Karnah

Kishtwar

Kupwara

Inderwal

Lolab

Doda

Handwara

Bhaderwah

Langate

Ramban

Uri

Banihal

Rafiabad

Hazratbal

Sopore

Zadibal

Sangrama

Eidgah

Baramulla

Khanyar

Gulmarg

Habba Kadal

Pattan

Amira Kadal

Chadoora

Sonawar

Badgam

Batamaloo

Beerwah

Samba

Khan Sahib

Vijaypur

Chrar Sharief

Nagrota

Gulab Garh

Gandhi Nagar

Reasi

Jammu East

Gool Arnas

Jammu West

Udhampur

Bishnah

19 0

Chenani

R.S. Pura

Ram Nagar

Suchet Garh

Tral

Marh

Pampore

Raipur Domana

Pulwama

Akhnoor

Rajpora

Chhamb

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Epilogue, March 2011

29 IN FOCUS PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS

J&K Panchayat Elections 2001 (Reconstructed from a report of Planning Commission) Despite inhospitable security environment and desperate attempts from many to thwart the attempts of the Government to hold Panchayat elections, the State Government succeeded in conducting Panchayat elections during the first quarter of 2001 after a very long gap of 22 years. The election to the 2700 Sarpanch and 20500 Panch constituencies was conducted in a staggered electoral process by the State Election Authority on non-party basis and with a high degree of transparency, impartiality and fairness .

Source : Reconstructed from the information received from Directorate of Rural Development, Srinagar/Jammu

Source : Reconstructed from the information received from Directorate of Rural Development, Srinagar/Jammu .

No. of Sarpanc h electe d

District SC Jammu Kathu a Poonc h Udhampur Dod a Raj ouri TOT AL

57 11 17 12 06 103

S T O ther s

14 223 03 168 52 63 24 171 14 190 45 109 152 924

Table I

No. of Panches e lec ted Total

ST Ot hers

Total 2443 1391 1026 1792

294 182 115 212

682 181 270

127 1634 83 1127 425 601 268 1254

216 160 1179

155 64 1352

164 1379 465 835 1532 6830

1698 1364 9714

Source : Reconstructed from the information received from Directorate of Rural Development, Srinagar/Jammu.

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The analysis in Table I reveals that there are 1470 panchayats in Kashmir Division against 1230 in Jammu Division. It is very interesting to note that there are 952 Panchayats out of total of 1470 in Kashmir Division against 55 out of 1230 in Jammu Division which are yet to be notified by the Govt. Similarly there are 428 Sarpanch vacancies in Kashmir Division against 34 in Jammu Division. More interestingly, Kashmir Division has 5303 Panch vacancies out of a total of 10458 against 376 out of 10090 in Jammu Division. As such it does not present an encouraging picture particularly for Kashmir Division where more than 50 per cent panch seats are vacant. The Jammu Division seems to be much more comfortably placed. An analysis of the information given in Table III.100 in respect of Jammu Division reveals that the picture in respect of women candidates elected is quite dismal, ranging from 0.5 per cent in respect of Sarpanches to 1.70 per cent in respect of panches. As far as election of SC/ST candidates is concerned, there are 29.68 per cent of them elected as Panches from SC/ST category against 21 per cent Sarpanches (Table III). It makes a strong case for reservation of women and SC/ST in panchayats.

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Information regarding Panchayat Election J&K, 2001 Table II Number of women elected Sarpanches & Panches (Jammu Division) Table III Number of SC/ST elected Sarpanches & Panches (Jammu Division)

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The information collected through informal sources reveals that panchayats are not at all in a comfortable state of affairs on various counts. These, among others, include: A number of panches and sarpanches have become target of militancy and lost their lives, thus spreading a fear psychosis among others. In Kashmir Division more than 50 per cent panch seats are vacant and those in place hardly function. The panchayats as such are starved of funds and development schemes continue to be implemented by departmental functionaries. The devolution and delegation of power and authority to panchayats has not taken place, keeping them in a dysfunctional state of affairs.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES The Panchayati Raj in Jammu & Kashmir presents a number of challenges inherent in them are the opportunities. These are: 1.

Functional devolution There are two major aspects of functional devolution viz., administrative and financial. (a) Administrative: The concept of self-governance cannot be understood unless the conflict between the developmental role now performed by the administrative machinery and the role envisaged for panchayats under the State Act is resolved. If panchayats are assigned a developmental role and greater autonomy, it would be necessary to introduce changes in the pattern of field administration. Many statutory powers now exercised by the field level bureaucracy may have to be transferred to the panchayats. (b) Financial : Local self-government carries no substance if the panchayats do not have at their command adequate resources to discharge various functions. Autonomy is closely related to economic independence. Panchayats have meagre incomes. No institution of self-government can perform any meaning-

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ful activity with such meagre resources. This is all the more necessary for a State like Jammu & Kashmir, where resources are scarce and they have to be spent in such a way, which will create a favourable impact on the development scenario in general and on the quality of life of the people in particular. 2. Panchayats as Institutions of Local Self-Government An analysis of the State Act reveals that panchayats may emerge more as quasi-government institutions rather than instruments of vigorous local selfgovernment. The supersession of halqa panchayat under Section 9 of the Act and removal of the chairperson and members of Panchayati Adalat under Section 52, relegates them to a subordinate position. The question arises as to what the parameters of competency are and why they are left to the opinion of the government. Why not let people or a higher tier of panchayat decide on such matters? Similarly, not a single member of the District Development Board is directly elected. The government nominates the chairperson while MPs and MLAs are ex-officio members. Others include chairpersons of Block Development Councils, Town Area Committees and Municipal Councils. The impression one gets is that this important tier of Panchayati Raj at the district level is more like an extension of the government machinery than a real local selfgovernment institution. To add credence to the institution of local selfgovernment a provision can be made for the conduct of the election of the chairperson of DPDB.

The Village Level Worker (VLW) has not only been made secretary to the halqa panchayat but also secretary of the Panchayati Adalat. On the one hand, the Act envisages the transfer of a number of development activities for planning and implementation to the halqa panchayat, but on the other there is hardly any planning apparatus available at the halqa panchayat level except in the person of the allin-one VLW. There is a provision under Rule 83 of the J&K Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996, for formation of committees comprising a panch and a professional departmental officer to advise and guide with regard to matters specified by the panchayat. The advice and guidance does not replace the main planning functioning. Therefore, there is a need to strengthen the planning apparatus at halqa panchayat level on one hand and to reduce the workload of the VLW on the other. 2. POVERTY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN J&K

4. Multiple role of the VLW

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT- A RETROSPECT Rural India encompasses threefourth of the country's population and is characterized by low-income levels and social and economic deprivation. Through the launching of Community Development Programme in 1952, rural transformation was given a direction in favour of increasing levels of production, distributing the gains of economic development more equitably and initiating institutional and attitudinal changes in favour of modernization. "The main focus of rural development in India in 1950s was on institution building in the form of cooperatives, panchayats etc. Cooperatives were thought to be the vehicle of socio-economic change. Promotion of agriculture, development of education and health, the principles of self-help, self-reliance and community spirit were the main elements of Community Development Programme (CDP)."1 It was soon realized, however, that covering the entire coun

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Epilogue, March 2011

3. Provision of nomination by the State Government One fails to understand the necessity of retaining nomination quotas in the Act. Reservation of seats for marginalized groups has proved very successful throughout the country. If this is local self-government, why not leave it to the wisdom of the people to choose their representatives rather than impose government-nominated people?

try under CDP was not possible through shortage of funds and personnel. Hence, as recommended by GMFIC, the National Extension Service (NES) was launched in October 1953 with a reduced number of personnel and financial provisions so that development work proceeded essentially on the basis of self-help. After three years, the blocks covered under NES were converted into CDP blocks. The State of Jammu & Kashmir joined the rest of the country in introducing these programmes. With the introduction of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 1950, the State had already created a conducive structural environment for a major development intervention. It was expected that all these processes of change would lead to higher levels of living, especially of the poverty groups and in the general improvement of their quality of life. All these development initiatives received a setback with the summary dismissal of the State Government in 1953. However, the programmes continued to be implemented and raised a lot of expectations. It is true that CDP was the first comprehensive programme for socio-economic transformation of rural areas. It is also a fact that it succeeded in establishing, for the first time an organized administrative set-up at the national, state, district, block and village levels for implementation of development programmes. It is equally true that the objective of self-reliance and people's participation could not be achieved for CDP also did not pay adequate attention to the objective of developing responsible and responsive leadership. In the State of Jammu & Kashmir, implementation of CDP gave rise to a new rural political elite who took full advantage of this development intervention. CDP was considered as an extension arm of the Government. As the Balwantrai Mehta Committee reported in 1959, CDP was a government programme with people's participation and not vice versa.

CDP TO IADP- A PARADIGM SHIFT

The crises in the economy in the

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early 1960s and lagging agricultural production necessitated a shift in emphasis in rural development from a comprehensive rural development as advocated under Community Development Programme to enhanced agricultural production. The result was the adoption of the Intensive Agricultural Development Programme (IADP) in 1960-61 and Intensive Area Programme (IAP) in 1964.2 This also marked a shift in the IRD strategy from institutional dimension to technological dimension. As a result, food production of the country increased tremendously and India became selfsufficient in food. In the state of J&K, IADP was adopted in selected districts along with other states in the country, although it had to face its own peculiar problems in the adoption of new technology and subsequent mechanization of agriculture. "Agriculture in the State was practised on conservative lines. There were no real and serious efforts on the part of the cultivators to adopt new methods of cultivation or even to use high yielding varieties of seeds. The State Government's Agriculture Department introduced a scheme of 'improved agriculture implements' in the mid-sixties. It was realized that improved agriculture implements, machines and tools designed elsewhere in the country could not be adopted in local conditions without necessary modifications. In this connection, a number of such implements were brought from outside the State. It thus became evident that a rationale approach to the problem of designing and developing the improved implements suitable for the rugged topographical conditions of the State, is to develop the implements and machines incorporating the good features of those designed elsewhere and the indigenous ones if they had any".3 The correctness of the approach was established when the first few improved implements developed on these lines, for instance, Shalimar Plough, Shalimar Puddar and Arched Ladders gave encouraging results. "Thereafter, a number of implements, tools and machines were designed, developed, tested at Govern-

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ment Agricultural Implements Workshop, at Shalimar in Srinagar. The highly undulating topography, crop growth, soil condition and management system demanded a careful designing of the implements as most of the conditions were different from other parts of the country. All these efforts to a large extent succeeded in meeting basic objective of increasing the agricultural production. As a result, the production of food grains in 1972-73 touched 9.2 lakhs tons. The area under high yielding varieties reached 2.57 lakhs hectares and the area under horticulture 57,000 hectares in 1972-73".4 The constraints of topography and small holding size, landlord-tenant relationship and other factors stood in the way of rapid advances in the sector and the benefits of modern technology, like improved variety of seeds, fertilizer and mechanization, could make their impact only in some areas. Further, the small and middle farmers could not take full advantage of the green revolution technology. The consequences were widening inequalities and a rising poverty incidence. Further, agricultural prosperity could not trickle down to disadvantaged groups of society. It called for a target group approach to developmental intervention. "It is claimed that the target group oriented policies introduced during the Fourth Five-Year Plan period (196974) were in fact the pace setter of the equity oriented rural development policies of the seventies and the eighties"5 . FROM TARGET GROUP TO EQUITYORIENTED APPROACH The beginning of the 1970s therefore, witnessed in J&K the introduction of the Marginal Farmers and Agriculture Labourers Development Agency (MFAL) and the Small Farmers Development Agency (SFDA) programmes to provide credit and other technical assistance to the disadvantaged groups. This was followed by the Food For Work (FFW) programme in 1977, Integrated Rural Development Programme in (1978) National Rural Employment Programme (1980), Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas

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(DWCRA), Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme, Training of Rural Youth in Self Employment (TRYSEM), etc. All these were initiated and run in the state of J&K to improve the socio-economic conditions of various disadvantaged groups and backward areas. Poverty PANCHAYATI RAJ - A RETROSPECT The Panchayati Raj is an indigenous and time-honoured concept in our country. The form may vary, but the spirit has always been part of our socio-cultural ethos. Its origin can be traced back to ancient ages where community spirit was the main force not only to keep village communities united but to help them manage local affairs independently. Sir, Charles Metcalfe characterized them as small "republics having nearly everything that they want within themselves". In the villages the different sections of the community helped and depended on one another and this mutual dependence was reinforced by age-old customs and traditions. Mobility was limited and so were their needs and aspirations. Since most of these village communities were self-sufficient for their day-to-day needs, the system of self-governance helped them remain intact and self-contained. These village bodies were the lines of contact with higher authorities on all matters affecting the villages. Despite many political changes in cities and towns during the medieval period, the system of local government or the panchayats in the villages continued undisrupted1 . The State of Jammu & Kashmir has its own unique history as far as Panchayati Raj is concerned. THE JAMMU & KASHMIR VILLAGE PANCHAYAT REGULATION ACT, 1935 During the British period, while as in the rest of the country the Panchayati Raj system passed through various phases, in the State of J&K it was only in 1935 when the first Village Panchayat Regulation Act No. 1 was promulgated by the then Maharaja Hari Singh. The preamble of the Act, states, "it is expedient to establish in Jammu & Kashmir State the village panchayats to assist in the administrative, civil and criminal justice and also to manage the sanitation and other common concerns of the vil-

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lage", it clearly showing that the essence behind the promulgation of this Act was not to promote Panchayati Raj in the State in letter and spirit but to use panchayats as an extended arm of the Government for judicial and civil administration. This Act was limited in its objectives and elitist in nature. There was no semblance of a democratic character. The Act made provisions for the elections of panches numbering 5-7 by simple show of hands. One among the panches was expected to be nominated by the panchayat officer (Wazire-e-Wazarat). Besides, but the panchayat officer was empowered to evolve rules and regulations for the conduct of the election of panches. This Act also laid down tough qualifications for the voters and for the candidates seeking election to the panchayats2 . These include that a person seeking election to the Panchayats should: be a hereditary state subject be a resident of a rural area not be insane be not less than 21 years of age be paying at least Rs. 5/as revenue tax o own property worth Rs. 1000/ have an annual income of at least Rs. 700/ be a minimum matriculate or the equivalent thereof. The State of Jammu & Kashmir at that point of time was in the grip of economic and educational backwardness. Keeping literacy level and economic well-being of the voter as the yardstick for participation in panchayat elections only helped the rural elite owing allegiance to rulers to use these institutions to their advantage. An analysis of the main functions assigned to the panchayats reveals that out of a total of 58 provisions of the Act, 47 dealt with judicial functions. The non-judicial functions of the panchayat mainly included supervision, construction and maintenance. The supervisory functions mentioned in the Act were related to supervision of village schools, su-

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pervision of village officials and labourers, etc., and supervision of public lands and buildings. The basic idea behind the supervision was to maintain some vigilance over village affairs on behalf of the government. Very little attention was paid to nonjudicial functions which, among others, included improvement of public health, and maintenance of public wells and tanks3 . One of the interesting features of this Act was that the Department of Revenue was given the responsibility for establishing panchayats. In 1936, a Department of Panchayat and Rural Development was established and affiliated to the Revenue Department. The main function of this department was to supervise the functioning of the panchayats apart from providing necessary funds. It was under this department that "DehatSudhar Committees" (Village Reforms Committees) were organized, ostensibly to advise panchayats but in effect to keep them under the control of the ruling class. Due to the nondemocratic nature of the panchayats, people seemed to lose faith in the panchayat institutions and, as a result, the Act remained more or less dysfunctional.

AMENDED ACT 1941

The Act of 1935 was amended in 1941. The amended regulation covered a wide range of subjects. The Panchayats were delegated the power to maintain all public roads, movable and immovable public properties and other structures in the villages. They were also given powers to levy taxes and generate resources for the development of the village, besides constructing and maintaining public roads, bridges, wells, ponds, water reservoirs, etc. Regulation of sites of slaughter houses and examining and inspecting weights and measures was also brought under the Panchayat's control. Under this Act a person was disqualified from seeking election to Panchayat if: He were a full-time Government employee, A competent court had declared him insolvent, He were convicted of any offence and subjected to any punish

Epilogue, March 2011

ment by a criminal court. POST - 1947 SCENARIO The post-1947 period witnessed many new developments in the State. The National Conference came to power in March 1948. At that point of time, the development scenario of the State was characterized by economic stagnation and educational backwardness. The Jagirdars and Chakdars had accumulated large chunks of land through manipulation. The majority of the people were impoverished. In view of this situation, abolition of landlordism became the top priority of the Government. It resulted in the introduction of Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 1950. This was a landmark in the history of J&K as it was the first experiment of its kind in land reforms in the subcontinent. The introduction of this Act brought about appreciable changes in the socio-economic scenario of the State. In quantitative terms, 4.5 lakh acres of land held in excess of 22.7 acres (excluding orchids) were expropriated from as many as 9000-odd land owners. Out of this ownership, rights of over 2.31 lakh acres of land were transferred to the cultivating peasants. All these measures created a conducive environment for reactivation of the Panchayati Raj system in reshaping the rural economy in the State4. Realizing this, the Government replaced the Panchayat Act of 1935 (as amended in 1941) with Act-V of Samvat 2008 (corresponding to year 1951). The main features of this Act were: Majority of the panchayat members were to be elected on the basis of adult franchise; Panchayats were to perform administration, developmental, civic and judicial functions; Introduction of concept of Halqa Panchayat comprising 5-7 villages; Introduction of panchayat board at each Tehsil; and Identification of sources of revenue for panchayats. The Act provided for administrative, developmental, civic and judicial functions by the Panchayat. "By March 1951, 540 Panchayats had

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been established in the State. By March 1954 this figure has risen to 751, covering 4,774 villages"5 . On the one hand the Government was busy materializing the objectives set for democratic decentralization through Panchayati Raj; on the other hand, the State Government joined rest of the country in introducing community development programme throughout the State in 1952. Local self-government entered a long period of dormancy before it could be revived.

THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR VILLAGE PANCHAYAT ACT - 1958 The introduction of community development programme (CDP) and the National Extension Services (NES) occupied the full attention of the Central and the State Governments during most of the 1950s. Towards the end of the decade, it was realized that the expectations raised by these programmes were not getting fulfilled and that one of the main reasons was lack of people's participation in the planning and execution of these development schemes. At the national level, it was the study team on Community Development and National Extension Services headed by Balwant Rai Mehta (1957) which expressed concern about the lack of people's participation and made a strong plea for devolution of power to lower levels through panchayats. Before the Panchayati Raj system could be introduced in the whole country, the Jammu & Kashmir State took a lead by passing the Jammu & Kashmir Village Panchayat Act of 1958 and repealing the earlier Acts. This Act of 1958 did not differ much from 1951 Act. Although the Act was passed primarily to make better provisions for the administration of Village Panchayats in J&K State, the manner of its implementation made it open to manipulation by various vested interests. For example, "under this Act any Panch, Sarpanch or Naib-Sarpanch could be removed from office in case his conduct in office was 'undesirable' or his removal (was) desirable in the interest of the public"6 . "The Act also provided for estab-

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lishment of 'Panchayat Adalats' apparently to decentralize administration of justice â&#x20AC;Ś.. The Government could remove any member elected to the Panchayat Adalat if he was found to be either guilty of mis-conduct in the discharge of his duties or incapable of performing any of his duties7". The Act also talked about the prescribed authority who were to determine the number of Panchs to be elected and/or nominated. The number of Panchs to be fixed from time to time as determined by the competent authority which could have been less than 7 and not more than 11. In the earlier Acts, the stipulations for the right to vote or to contest elections for the office in the Panchayat had made the power base of the panchayat inevitable preservation of selected beneficiaries of autocratic rulers; in 1958 Act, the removal of Panchs and Sarpanchs by the Government presumably in public interest served as similar performance. Therefore, the story of Panchayati Raj in the State remained more or less the same. No endeavour was made to evaluate the possible problems and shortcomings so that suitable remedial action could have been taken up.

SINGLE-LINE ADMINISTRATION MODEL The Government introduced an innovative developmental strategy, "the single line administration model" in the mid-1970s. The panchayats as a local institution of self-government remained dysfunctional over a long period of time. Wherever they existed, they were at the village level only without any functional linkages with the developmental institutional structures that existed at the block and district level. It took almost two decades for the State Government to realize that without people's participation, the developmental process could not achieve desired objectives. The decentralization of planning process was new upcoming developmental slogan at that point of time. The State Government took a bold step by introducing an innovative concept of 'Single Line Administration', to

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secure the participation of the people through their representatives in the developmental process. "The twin objectives of the Single Line Administration was to secure a mechanism for developing the planning process at the district level to take full account of the resource endowments the potentialities and needs structure and also to initiate a process of equitable development of various areas within the district"8 . The introduction of this innovative developmental strategy in the mid1970s could not reinvigorate the Panchayati Raj system and in the absence of any linkage to other institutional framework, it remained dormant. Almost no endeavour was made to evaluate the possible problems and shortcomings so that suitable remedial action should have been taken . However, the implementation of this innovative model led to the realization that "human potential which is available at the grassroots level should be mainstreamed into the movement of development to purvey a sound and strong basis to the democratic structure. It was in this context that the desire to have a sound institutional framework to give a definite and positive role to the community in the matter of self-governance has provided a sense of urgency for restructuring the institutional framework of Panchayati Raj" 1 0. This realization led to the introduction of Jammu & Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act, 1989. THE JAMMU & KASHMIR PANCHAYATI RAJ ACT, 198911 The Jammu & Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act, 1989 was introduced in the J&K assembly in April 1988 and passed in March 1989. The Governor gave his assent to the bill in July 1989. For the first time an Act was named a "Panchayati Raj Act" rather than a "Village Panchayat Regulation Act". The former implies the promotion of Panchayati Raj in the State (at village, block and district levels) whereas the latter was confined to panchayats at the village level alone. This is certainly a very positive development.

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The preamble of the 1989 Act states: "Whereas it is expedient to promote and develop Panchayati Raj in the State as an instrument of vigorous local self-government to secure effective participation of the people in the decision making process and for over-seeing implementation of development programmes". The salient features of the Act are: a) reduction of voting age from 21 to 18 years; b) holding of elections within six months of supersession of a panchayat; c) direct election of the Sarpanch (Chairperson); d) constitution of Panchayati Adalat (Panchayat Courts) comprising five members who shall be nominated by the prescribed authority out of the panel prepared and recommended by the halqa panchayat; e) empowering panchayats to prepare plans and implement schemes for poverty alleviation and employment generation, agriculture and allied activities, rural industrialization, health, universalisation of elementary education, etc.; f) no bar on holding elections on party lines. THREE-TIER MODEL The Act provides for a three-tier system consisting of halqa panchayat1 2, Block Development Council and District Planning and Development Board. In addition, the Act provides for a Panchayati Adalat for every halqa. HALQA PANCHAYAT The Act provides for a halqa panchayat for every halqa. The halqa panchayat shall comprise of such number of panches not less than seven and not more than eleven including the Sarpanch as the prescribed authority may fix from time to time. The panches shall be elected from the constituencies delimited by the prescribed authority. While the Naib-Sarpanch shall be elected by the panches of the halqa panchayat from among themselves, the Sarpanch shall be elected directly by the elec-

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torate of the halqa panchayat. The halqa panchayat shall continue to function for a period of five years from the date of its constitution. If it is dissolved for any reason before this period, elections will be held within six months. A Sarpanch or Naib-Sarpanch can be removed by a vote of no-confidence passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of panches of the halqa panchayat. The other features of the Act in respect of halqa panchayats include: If the prescribed authority is of the opinion that women are not adequately represented in the halqa panchayat, it may nominate such number of women to be members thereof, as it may deem fit. Provided further that their number does not exceed 33 per cent of the total number of panches. The village level worker (VLW) shall be the Secretary of the halqa panchayat. If, in the opinion of the Government, a halqa panchayat is incompetent or persistently makes default in the performance of duties imposed on it by or under the Act, the Government may by notification supersede such a halqa panchayat. The Act provides for such powers and functions to the halqa panchayat which can enable it to become the cutting edge of all the development efforts, but all this is subject to availability of funds as its disposal. There is hardly any development activity left out which does not fall within the purview of the halqa panchayat.

BLOCK DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL The Act provides for the constitution of Block Development Councils consisting of: (i) a Chairperson, (ii) all Sarpanches of halqa panchayats falling within the block, and (iii) Chairpersons of Marketing Societies within the jurisdiction of the block. However, if the prescribed authority is satisfied that women or scheduled castes or any other class are not

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represented in the Council, it may nominate not more than two persons to be the members of the Block Development Council. The Block Development Officer shall be the Secretary of the Block Development Council. The main functions of the Block Development Council include construction, maintenance and supervision of an inter-halqa panchayat communication system. It will also provide administrative and technical guidance to the halqa panchayats and supervise and monitor planning and implementation of various development programmes. The Act proposes to constitute a Block Development Council Fund comprising grants made by the government on per capita basis and revenue assigned by the District Development and Planning Board. One of the important features of the Block Development Council under the Act is that the chairperson shall be elected by the electoral college comprising elected panches and sarpanches. No member of the State Legislature or Parliament can hold any office in the Block Development Council. DISTRICT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD Further, the Act provides for the constitution of a District Planning and Development Board (DPDB) comprising: (i) Chairpersons of the Block Councils of the District; (ii) Members of Parliament representing the area; (iii) Members of the State Legislature representing the area; (iv) Chairperson of the Town area Committee at the District; and (v) President of the Municipal Council (if any) The chairperson of the DPDB shall be nominated by the Government from amongst the members of the DPDB. The vice-chairperson shall be elected by the members from amongst themselves. The District Development Commissioner shall be the Chief Executive of the Board to be assisted by district level Heads. The main functions of the Board shall be to: (i) consider and guide formulation of development plans for the

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IN FOCUS PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS

district and indicate priorities; (ii) review progress and achievements periodically; (iii) formulate and finalize the plan and non-plan budget for the district; (iv) lay down policy guidelines and approve budgets of the Block Development Councils; and (v) undertake special measures for alleviating poverty and employment generation and extending assistance to halqa panchayats in this behalf. All the development assistance meant for the development of the district will flow through the District Planning and Development Board. The DPDB shall set up committees to handle specialized jobs. The number and manner in which they shall be constituted shall be decided by the DPDB.

PANCHAYATI ADALAT The idea of Panchayati Adalat is an innovative one, particularly at the grassroots level. As per the provisions of the Act, the Adalat shall comprise five members to be nominated by the government out of the panel prepared and recommended by the halqa panchayat out of its electorate. The person so recommended for a term of five years shall be literate, shall have attained the age of 30 years, not be a Sarpanch or a Panch and not be in the employment of the government or local body or corporation. The members of a Panchayat Adalat shall elect any member from amongst themselves as the chairperson. The Secretary of the halqa panchayat shall serve as the judicial clerk to the Panchayat Adalat. Every member of the Adalat including chairperson shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Ranbir Penal Codes1 3 Samvat 1989 (corresponding to year 1940). The Panchayati Adalat shall not be competent to impose on any person convicted of an offence tried by it, any sentence other than a sentence of fine not exceeding one thousand rupees. The chairperson and members of the Panchayati Adalat will be entitled to a sitting fee as may be decided by the government from time to time. The government may remove the chairman or any member of a Panchayati Adalat after giving him the opportunity of being heard, or after

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such enquiry as the government may deem necessary if such chairman or member in the opinion of the government has been guilty of misconduct or neglect or refusal to perform or is incapable of performing the functions of the Panchayati Adalat.

JURISDICTION OF PANCHAYATI ADALAT The Panchayati Adalats enjoy both criminal and civil jurisdictions. The criminal jurisdiction is extensive and covers a substantial range of offences under the Ranbir Penal Code, Samvat 1989 as well as the special statutes. Civil jurisdiction is confined to claims of the value of Rs. 3,000 involving suits for ascertained sums, for damages for breach of contract not effecting immovable property, and compensation for wrongly taking or injuring immovable property. A Panchayati Adalat shall not be competent to impose on any person convicted of an offence tried by it, any sentence other than a sentence of fine not exceeding one thousand rupees. The government is empowered to enhance the jurisdiction in civil cases up to Rs. 2,000. The constitution of Panchayati Adalat at halqa level is a very welcome development, 13 The Ranbir Penal Code is the equivalent of the Indian Penal Code and applies only to J&K State. provided other measures are taken to make it instrumental. No doubt, these Adalats will provide great respite to the rural poor from running from pillar to post in hostile townships, but it is equally important that they should also provide impartial justice. In order to achieve this, the following questions will have to be addressed (i) What measures are envisaged to train Panchayati Adalat members in administering justice according to the law? (ii) Is there a need for legal literacy programmes to be organized for the general masses so that they can take full advantage of these Adalats? (iii) Is it fair to load the secretary of the halqa with the additional responsibility of secretary of Panchayati Adalat?

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EPILOGUE EXCLUSIVE UNMOGIP: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT

UNMOGIP A Redundant Body or Political Shrine

he United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan is a unique international body attached to the history of Kashmir issue right from beginning. This second oldest peacekeeping mission of the United Nations, the UNMOGIP has been nearly rendered redundant after Shimla Agreement as India stopped reporting to it post 1972, Pakistan though continue to report. Even as India many times and Pakistan too has admitted that UN Security Council resolution has outlived its importance in Kashmir but for Kashmiri separatists the UNMOGIP headquarters, situated at the beginning of posh and power street of Gupkar in Srinagar, still remains a political shrine. The presence of UNMOGIP in Srinagar is the last symbol of any international dimension of Kashmir issue which Pakistan and separatists harp on. A former officer of UNMOGIP and now an active peace worker, Beersman Paul of Germany was recently at Epilogue office during his annual field trips and interactions with government representatives and civil society members in Jammu and Kashmir. He narrated several interesting stories of his career which promoted us to share the UNMOGIP history with our readers. Upon our request, Mr Paul has sent us chapter on this UN body written by him for a book 'peacekeeper of Kashmir' by Pauline Dawson, Few would know in Jammu and Kashmir that like the biennial Darbar Move of state government between Jammu and Srinagar, the UNMOGIP also shuttles twice a year between Srinagar and Islamabad. Following few pages give a historical account of the UNMOGIP:

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Mission facts Location: The ceasefire line between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir Headquarters: Islamabad (November-April) / Srinagar (May-October) Duration: January 1949 to present

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37 EPILOGUE EXCLUSIVE UNMOGIP: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT

United nations military observer group in India and Pakistan BEERSMAN PAUL

Introduction A chapter dealing with the group of UN Military Observers in Jammu and Kashmir which is called UNMOGIP is a must in this book. I have some fundamental reasons for this: They are the only neutral observers who are able to operate on both sides of the LoC and can give a neutral, balanced report of the events; they are the eyes of the world; This mission of the UNO is too often forgotten and I do not want to be an accessory by making the same mistake; Belgium, my native country, played an important role in the history of the setting up of UNMOGIP; the first CMO was a Belgian general; Belgium had officers within UNMOGIP on duty as UN Military Observer from the start in 1949 until 2005. In addition, I myself served one year as UN Military Observer in this group. The mission of the members of UNMOGIP is very delicate: because of the fact that they are operating on both sides of the LoC they know all the details of the deployment of the Indian and Pakistani forces who are at a stone's throw from each other. At the beginning of their duty the UN Military Observers have to take an oath that they will not misuse this knowledge and that they will only use this in the framework of UNMOGIP. I also made this oath and I will strictly respect this convention. UNMOGIP is, save one, the oldest peacekeeping mission of the UNO. The first group of observers came into being in the middle of 1948, in Palestine: the 'United Nations Truce supervision Organisation' (UNTSO). This group is still active in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt and several Belgian officers were serving as observer here also. After UNTSO and UNMOGIP, many

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other peacekeeping operations of the UNO followed. They all broadly diverged from each other regarding their functioning, their mission and their numerical strength, ranging from missions consisting of a limited group of unarmed observers of some twenty officers to a fully armed force with several thousands troops. All of them were, and still are, composed of military personal with an unusual role: to bring peace not by making use of weapons but by means of political knowledge, tact, diplomacy and extreme impartiality. The jurisdiction for the deployment and the control of peacekeeping missions rests with the UN General Assembly and is derived from a mandate given by a resolution allowing this operation. The UN Secretary-General is responsible for the execution of the resolution. He designates a HOM: for UNMOGIP this is at the same time the CMO, who is usually a Lieutenant-General or a Major-General. The UN Secretary-General delegates the general political and military charge of the peacekeeping mission to a 'Deputy Secretary for Special Political Affairs' and the administrative and logistic support to the UN Field Operations Service. The HOM receives clear-cut instructions based on the resolution allowing the peacekeeping operation. Taking

into account these directives, the so-called Terms of Reference, the HOM-CMO can draw up his own operational directives and the general procedure of functioning. In general, every UN peacekeeping operation is characterised by the following aspects: it must be totally impartial; it can be deployed in a country only with the authorisation and the co-operation of the competent authorities; the co-operation of all concerned parties is necessary in order to be able to execute the mission, and the aim is to stabilise the situation in a conflict in anticipation of a diplomatic or political solution. The military personal of a UN peacekeeping mission is put at the disposal by countries, member of the UNO, who are prepared to do so. In no way can force be used to oblige or to convince a country to participate. On the other hand no country has any right to claim participation in a peacekeeping mission. Countries who put personnel or a contingent at the disposal of the UNO have the right to stop their participation at any time.

'That the Kashmir dispute, during its first 25 years, did not have even more serious consequences is largely due to the efforts of one of the United Nations' first peacekeeping missions - the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan'

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EPILOGUE EXCLUSIVE UNMOGIP: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT

Unmogip: setting up, organisation, functioning On 21 April 1948 the UN Security Council already agreed on sending UN Military Observers to Jammu and Kashmir. Nevertheless it would take until January 1949 before the first observers arrive in the mission area. As long as fighting was going on and as long as both parties refused to accept a cease-fire there was no job for a peacekeeping observer. In the middle of August 1948 there was enough optimism among the members of UNCIP to request the UN Secretary-General to put at their disposal some twenty UN Military Observers in view of an approaching ceasefire. But this initiative turned out to be premature. The cease-fire would only take effect from 1 January 1949, exactly one year after India went to the UN Security Council with the intention to hear Pakistan condemned for aggression in Jammu and Kashmir. After the establishment of UNCIP, on 20 January 1948, the Belgian Lieutenant-General Maurice Delvoie was the military advisor of this commission. On his shoulders rested the heavy task of working out the practical aspects of the cease-fire, of setting up and of organising the functioning of this group of military observers. The cease-fire agreement between India and Pakistan stipulated that the troops had to remain on the positions they occupied on the 1 January 1949. However, exact information on this deployment was lacking - especially in the Northern Areas - and this remained a permanent source of discussion between the two parties. Taking this into account the first priority was to draw the CFL on a map. UNCIP invited the two governments to designate qualified representatives and to send them to Karachi (at that moment still the capital of Pakistan) in order to fix, under the guidance of Lieutenant-General M. Delvoie, the exact position of the CFL and the details on the maximum deployment of troops allowed. It was agreed that this was only a military matter and that this did not signify any political, diplomatic or juridical recognition of the claim on Jammu and Kashmir of one of the parties. By splitting up the competencies in this manner - military on the one hand, diplomatic-political on the other this group of military observers would follow its own way of living. Later on, after the replacement of the UNCIP by a UNRIP, the UN Military Observers would be able to continue their mission as an independent group without problems of diplomatic or organisational character. In 1951 the name UNMOGIP was introduced for this group of observers. To a certain extent, this denomination is surprising and should have been 'United Nations Military Observer Group in Jammu and Kashmir' as the observers were executing their mission in Jammu and Kashmir. As

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Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India it became a state of the Indian Union and was not an independent state anymore. Consequently it should have read 'United Nations Military Observers in India'. Of course, Pakistan would not accept this and eventually it became 'United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan'. On 27 July 1949 Lieutenant-General Delvoie succeeded in his efforts to demarcate the CFL and to make this line accepted by the representatives of India and of Pakistan. On 29 July 1949 the Indian Government enforced this agreement. Pakistan did the same a day afterwards. Nevertheless, it would take until November 1949 to realise the CFL in reality on the ground. Other priorities of our brand-new HOM-CMO were the setting up, the composition and the organisation of the group of UN Military Observers. Initially the number was fixed at some forty observers but in June 1949 the number was already increased to sixty. Belgium, Canada, Mexico, Norway and the United States of America were prepared to put officers at the disposal to be member of the observer group. A first batch of seven American officers arrived in the mission area on 24 January 1949 and was replenished slowly by officers coming from the other participating countries to reach 41 in November 1949. Table 5 gives a view of the evolution of the number of observers within UNMOGIP. Table 5: EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS

If we consider the participating countries we can determine that Belgium is the only country which, from

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the beginning and uninterruptedly until 2005, has put observers at the disposal of UNMOGIP. From the originally participating countries Canada would cease co-operation in 1979, Mexico participated only one year, Norway would not send observers between 1953 and 1956 and has given up completely since 1994 and the United States have not been accepted anymore by India since 1954 because of too close ties with Pakistan. Since Belgium decided in 2005 to stop participation within UNMOGIP, due to a political game between the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence regarding the financial aspects of this participation what ministry has to pay the bill? - the last of the originally participating countries has left UNMOGIP. In order to keep up the number of observers other countries were requested to fill in the gap if the need arose: since 1950: Sweden and Chile, to replace Mexico; since 1951: Denmark; since 1952: Australia - up to 1985 -, Ecuador till 1953 -, New-Zealand - up to 1976 - and Uru guay; since 1961 Italy; since 1963: Finland; since 1994: South Korea; since 2002: Croatia. To recapitulate, at the end of 2005, the military observers, forty-five in total, are coming from Belgium (2 but not replaced after the end of their term), Chile (2), Croatia (8: 6 plus 2 as replacement for the leaving Belgians), Denmark (6), Finland (5), Italy (7), Republic of Korea (9), Sweden (7) and Uruguay (1). The Belgian Lieutenant-General M. Delvoie would be succeeded as HOM-CMO at the end of 1949 by the Canadian Brigade-General H.H. Angle who would die a few months later in an plane crash. Then it would be Australia's turn to send a HOM-CMO, General Nimmo, who would remain in this function until his death in 1966. In 1953, Belgium would again send a HOM-CMO, this time an 'Acting' HOM-CMO, Major-General De Ridder, during the absence of General Nimmo due to serious illness problems. From 1966 till 1978, the Chilean General Tassara would be the head of UNMOGIP. After him Canada, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, Italy, Uruguay, South Korea, Chile (again), Hungary, Finland and Italy (again) would send a HOM-CMO or an 'Acting' HOM-CMO. In October 2005, Croatia would send for the first time a HOM-CMO, Major-General Dragutin Repinc The human rights organisation Human Rights Watch accused the Chilean Brigadier Sergio Espinoza Davies, HOM-CMO from 27 March 1998 on, having committed human rights violations. In 1973 he was supposed to have been guilty, at that time being Captain in the Chilean army during the Pinochet-regime, of illegal executions and torture. Human Rights Watch was of the opinion that these human rights violations, for which there was hard evidence, made him incapable of being at the head of a UN organisation like UNMOGIP. In a reaction

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to the allegations of Human Rights Watch, the Chilean Government promoted Brigadier Sergio Espinoza Davies to Major-General and withdrew him from UNMOGIP in December 1998. The number of officers put at the disposal of UNMOGIP by each country depends on the goodwill of the country concerned. Initially, Belgium, for example, sent five officers, and over the years many reserve-officers participated in the mission. Through the years this number has systematically been decreased to the figure of two and eventually to zero in 2005. For the period the United States participated in UNMOGIP (1949 till 1954) we can conclude that this country had a lot of goodwill. In the beginning half of the observers were American officers and they even formed an informal sub-group known as 'United States Military Observers in Kashmir' (USMOK). There is also a lot of goodwill in Northern-Europe: the participation of all the Scandinavian countries is striking. However, Norway would break this Scandinavian unity and solidarity by withdrawing its participation in 1994. The professional or reserve officers designated by the respective countries have to meet a number of conditions and criteria: as the usual language is English, internally in UNMOGIP as well as during the contacts with the Indian and Pakistani military authorities, a good knowledge of this language is required; an observer must possess a perfect physical condition: mountain climbing above 5,000 m and long daily marches are regularly on the menu; an observer must know about tactics and have experience in the deployment of combat units, especially infantry. Included in these conditions was that officers of the air force or the navy could not be taken into consideration. However, from 1994 onwards, Belgium, followed by other countries would also accept officers belonging to the air force or the navy. From 2003 onwards, Croatia will send female officers as a token of equality of gender. In the beginning, Lieutenant-General Delvoie asked for officers of thirty to forty years old and having the rank of at least captain to lieutenant-colonel. His successor, General Nimmo, went even further: in 1951 - six years after the end of the Second World War - he was of the opinion that an observer should have war experience. On the other hand, he also found it desirable not to have too many colonels: officers of this rank were mostly older and less active with the result that the younger officers had to take the larger part of the burden on their shoulders; an observer must have a very good knowledge of military equipment - especially of heavy equipment like armoured vehicles, tanks, artillery, mortars, etc. - in order to be able to identify the observed and used equipment; an observer must be gifted with a good deal of common sense, patience, tact and diplomatic skills. In principle the term of duty for an observer within UNMOGIP is for an uninterrupted period of one year. This term can be prolonged on condition that there is an agreement of all the sides concerned: in the first place the ob-

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server himself, then the Indian and the Pakistani authorities, next the HOM-CMO - as representative of the UNO and finally the national authorities. In general, the national authorities are the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The designation of an observer is done on a completely voluntary basis and goes through a complex procedure. Usually, this procedure is as follows: the first step is taken by the General Staff of the armed forces sending a notice to all the officers offering to introduce their candidature for a one year term within UNMOGIP; after the screening of the candidates, the selected candidate is designated temporarily and his name is transferred by the Minister of Defence to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. His services will examine the proposal of the Minister of Defence; if the Minister of Foreign Affairs accepts the candidature of the proposed officer he will start the procedure of acceptance by the UNO; the UNO will, on condition that the candidate is accepted, have to ask for the clearance of the Indian and the Pakistani Government. After this procedure has been concluded and on condition that all the authorities involved gave the green light, the observer-to-be can start the preparation of his mission. He must: study in depth the origin of the conflict, the evolution and the actual situation; prepare, complete and adapt his personal equipment in order to be as operational as possible; undergo medical examination and receive different injections. After having concluded all this the observer can start his one year term of duty and he will go as bachelor to Jammu and Kashmir. The family, if there is one, may accompany the observer, at his own expenses, but this is discouraged strongly: when the observer is operating along the LoC for a longer period of time, the family stays behind alone in Rawalpindi or Islamabad. Due to the actual tense situation in the Kashmir-Valley the families cannot go to Srinagar anymore during summertime; in case of emergency a quick evacuation of the families could pose serious problems; a new phenomenon is the insecure situation due to fundamentalist-terrorist activities which are posing an additional threat. During the whole period of his duty the officer is attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while retaining all his rights concerning promotion and legal and social aspects. This department also pays him. The special expenses linked to this mission are compensated partly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and partly by the UNO. From the very beginning, when the observers started arriving in the mission area in January 1949 the logistic aspects had to be organised: transport and communications, accommodation for offices and lodging, food, spe-

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cial UN equipment, furniture, medical support, administrative aspects, recreation, etc. The logistic support in its turn had to be adapted to the general concept of the organisation and the functioning of UNMOGIP: because the mission consisted of controlling the execution and respecting of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan, mobile observers had to operate along the Indian side and the Pakistani side of the CFL as well. The general functioning had to be guided and co-ordinated from static headquarters. From the very beginning it was a first priority of LieutenantGeneral Delvoie to underline the impartiality of UNMOGIP: the number of observers on each side of the CFL had to be spread equally and the headquarters of UNMOGIP had to operate alternatively from the Indian and the Pakistani side. The latter meant that the headquarters had to shift every six month from the Indian to the Pakistani side and vice versa, which was not an easy job. On the Pakistani side, Rawalpindi, situated in the north-eastern part of Pakistan, was chosen for the establishment of the headquarters. Although Rawalpindi was not within the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, it is situated at a reasonable distance and as the General Headquarters of the Pakistani armed forces were located there, this facilitated the contact with the Pakistani military authorities. On the Indian side Srinagar was chosen for the setting up of the headquarters. Although this was inside the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, this location had the disadvantage of being far from New Delhi, the location of the General Headquarters of the Indian armed forces. In order to remedy this handicap to a certain extent, a Liaison Office, manned by an observer, was opened in New Delhi and a superior officer of the Indian armed forces was detached to UNMOGIP, serving as Liaison Officer between both. In May 1958 General Nimmo wanted to change this system and he moved with his headquarters to New Delhi in order to be near the General Headquarters of the Indian armed forces, as was the situation on the Pakistani side while being with his headquarters in Rawalpindi during wintertime. In doing so he was more than 600 km away from the area where his observers were operating. General Nimmo made this experiment only once: the practical disadvantages and problems created by this situation did not counterbalance this token of total impartiality and equal treatment. In order to do their job properly and at the same time to prevent losing too much precious time on movements along difficult and dangerous roads, the observers had to be positioned in advanced positions along the CFL, the so called Field Stations. This approach also brought along specific problems on the organisational and logistic level. From the very beginning, the Indian and Pakistani armed forces made an important contribution in order to make possible the functioning in the field of UNMOGIP: they put 4X4 vehicles with driver at the disposal of UNMOGIP, they gave transmission equipment in order to realise radiocommunication between the headquarters

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EPILOGUE EXCLUSIVE UNMOGIP: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT

and the Field Stations, they gave shelter, they gave food rations or the possibility to take the meals in the nearby Officers Mess and they lent local staff to UNMOGIP (cook, sweeper, batman, etc.). In the beginning all this was rather rudimentary. In February 1950, an observer made the following report on the living conditions in a Field Station: 'The rations of this brigade are very limited. Food is very rare and of bad quality. Meat is not available. We received one provisioning by air and this consisted of corms and turnips of bad quality. There is no bread. Milk is only available in tin and strictly rationed. Fuel for heating is not available in sufficient quantities. On rare occasions wood is supplied but this is so wet that it is impossible to light it without petrol, an item that is not available or rationed'. Luckily the situation was not that bad everywhere and when it became more and more clear that UNMOGIP would be operating for a longer period, improvements were applied and the infrastructure was increased. However, all this went very slowly. A report, written in 1952, gives the following details on the different Field Stations: On the Pakistani side of the CFL, from South to North: Sialkot: bungalow with electrical power. This Field Station is not situated in Jammu and Kashmir but on Pakistani territory West of Jammu-City. Bhimber: two mud huts and one concrete Kashmiri hut. Kotli: 'dak bungalow' - this is a concrete construction built for touring officials and members of the civil service. Rawalakot: tinplated hut. Domel, in the vicinity of Muzaffarabad: 'dak bungalow'. Astor, high in the mountains in the Northern Areas: tents. Manned only in summertime; Skardu, also high in the mountains in the Northern Areas: like Astor, tents and manned only in summertime. On the Indian side of the CFL, from South to North: Jammu, opposite Sialkot: house. Rajouri, opposite Kotli: tents. Poonch, opposite Rawalakot: some rooms in the earlier palace of the Maharaja. Baramulla, opposite Domel: 'dak bungalow'. Kargil, high in the mountains: one mud hut and one stone hut. Manned only in summertime.

Map 7 - - gives a view of the location of the Field Stations

In order to be able to keep in close contact with the commanding officers and their staff in the disputed territory, the location of the Field Station was chosen in such a way that they were situated in the vicinity of military control centres, usually brigade or division headquarters, but sometimes even of a higher formation. The location of the Field Station, as described above, only underwent minor changes in the course of time: Astor moved to Gilgit, which is now manned permanently and Kargil is closed tempo-

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rarily. The buildings were adapted and improved: tents and huts were replaced by concrete buildings. In each Field Station there is electrical power and in the event the main power drops out electrical generators would provide solution. Furniture and equipment of the Field Stations was replenished and improved: kerosene stoves for heating, fans for cooling, cooking stoves on gas, refrigerators on kerosene, etc. In most of the Field Stations the office is now equipped with air-conditioning. An own transmission network has been set up in order to be independent from that of the Indian or Pakistani armed forces. In recent years high technology and electronics were also introduced: communication through satellite and computers are used in order to keep track of the deployment of the forces and of the situation along the LoC. The problems with the supply of food are solved: purchase in the local market and modest food rations provided by the Indian and Pakistani military authorities are supplemented by regular food supplies, called 'the milk-run', from the headquarters in Rawalpindi where a 'PX-post-store' can provide imported food products. The time of pioneer, with all its hardships, certainly belongs to the past and a minimum of comfort is now guaranteed, which of course is not a luxury after some fiftyseven years of UNMOGIP. Together with 'the milk-run', the observer receives his personal mail. This is the only way of communication he has, from somewhere in the mountains of distant Jammu and Kashmir, with the home front. There is no need to mention here that receiving mail on a regular basis has a positive influence on the morale of the observers. General Delvoie split up his static headquarters into a military-operational and an administrative-logistic component. The number of observers in the military-operational component was limited to the strict minimum in order to be able to deploy as many observers as possible along the CFL. His staff consisted of a chief of staff, a kind of second in command, one officer-observer in charge of the military-administrative aspects and at the same time the aide-de-camp of the HOM-CMO, one officer-observer in charge of the aspects regarding intelligence, one officer-observer in charge of the co-ordination of the operations and the posting of the observers and finally one officer-observer in charge of the organisation of the military logistic. The purely administrative-logistic tasks were assigned to the personnel of the UN 'Field Operations Service' - some 21 international civilian personnel and some 45 local civilian staff under control of a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). A 'Finance Officer', a 'Chief Signal Officer', a 'Transport Officer', radio-operators, clerks, secretaries, mechanics, and so on assist the CAO. For the administrative movements UNMOGIP has a fleet of UN vehicles of the type 'wagoneer' at its disposal. As transportation by road takes a lot of time and sometimes is even impossible especially in the monsoon season - UNMOGIP has had also a small aircraft of the type 'short take off and landing' (STOL) at its disposal. In the beginning - from 1949 till 1954 - this aircraft was put at UNMOGIP's disposal by

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the United States. After the United States it was the turn of Italy - from 1957 till 1963 -, of Canada - temporary enforcements and from 1974 till 1975 - and of Australia - from 1975 till 1978 - who put an aircraft type Caribou or Twin Otter at UNMOGIP's disposal. During the war of 1965 between India and Pakistan, a Canadian Caribou would be destroyed on the airfield of Srinagar by the Pakistani air force. During the next war, in 1971, the Indian air force would destroy a Canadian Twin Otter on the airfield of Chaklala, Islamabad. During the periods that no countries were prepared to put an aircraft at the disposal of UNMOGIP, efforts were made to conclude contracts with civil companies. Due to budgetary restrictions there is no aircraft anymore since the last few years: no need to say that this does not facilitate the functioning of the observers. In the past, this aircraft has more than proven its utility especially for flying 'the milk-run', for transportation of equipment and observers to their Field Station and for urgent missions of the HOM-CMO. In the beginning, only a few Field Stations could be reached by air but this number increased over the years. Currently, the following Field Stations are located in the neighbourhood of an airfield, although this does not have any relevance, for the time being, for the above mentioned reason: On the Pakistani side of the LoC: Sialkot, Bhimber (helipad), Rawalakot, Domel/Muzaffarabad, Gilgit and Skardu; On the Indian side of the LoC: Jammu, Rajouri, Poonch, Srinagar and Kargil. For many years, the bi-annual move of the headquarters of UNMOGIP - at the beginning of May from Rawalpindi to Srinagar and at the beginning of November from Srinagar to Rawalpindi - was arranged by the Canadian air force, who supplied a C-130 Hercules aircraft. Now this is done by road by own means. As mentioned before, the initial reason for this move was to respect impartiality. In addition, this move has a beneficial side effect: the winter months are spent in Rawalpindi, which has a comfortable climate at that period while it can be very cold in Srinagar. The summer months are spent in Srinagar, in that period a paradise on earth while it is sweltering in Rawalpindi. Since violence started in the Valley, there is only a restricted move of the headquarters to Srinagar: only the officers belonging to the operational component are moving from Rawalpindi to Srinagar taking only the strictly necessary equipment with them. Family members are not allowed to follow the move and have to stay behind in Rawalpindi or Islamabad. Thus far, I have offered a concise overview of the setting up and the general organisation of UNMOGIP. I know very well that this overview is far from complete. Nevertheless it gives a good general impression of how UNMOGIP came into being and how General Delvoie and his successors organised and adapted to the changing circumstances and requirements of this UN mission. The actual organisation can differ slightly from the description above as their is a constant need for adaptation and reorganisation depending on these permanent changing circumstances and requirements. Now we still have to look into the most important aspect, that is to study

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closely the functioning of the observers on the ground. Initially, the functioning of UNMOGIP was stipulated in the 'Field Regulations Manual' and afterwards in the 'Standing Operating Procedures'. This manual is the bible of the observer operating in the field and specifies his missions, his rights, his duties and the procedures to follow. A copy of this manual has been handed over to the Indian and Pakistani military authorities in order to inform them about what they can expect from the observers and why they are acting as they do. The 'Standing Operating Procedures' manual also stipulates the statute of the observer: 'On appointment, observers work exclusively for the UNO, and, although recognised as military personnel of their respective countries, are assigned for service with the UNO. The observer must be completely objective in his attitude and judgements. He must maintain a thorough neutrality as regards the political issues in the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. He represents the UNO and not his own government'. The 'Standing Operating Procedures' manual describes the missions of the observers as follows: execute pre-emptive inspections - 'field tasks', 'field visits' and 'field trips' - of the positions, the underground shelters and the bunkers along the LoC in order to check if both concerned parties respect the agreements concerning the strength of the troops and the equipment present in the field. Both military authorities agreed that the troops would occupy the positions they held on 1st January 1949, that these positions would not be advanced and that the military power should not be improved by augmenting the number of troops, by the supply of more military equipment or by improving the defensive positions. Possible identified violations of this agreement are reported to the headquarters. Taking into account the tense situation since 1990 and the resulting overabundance of complaints of violations of the LoC introduced by Pakistan, the observers are no longer able to execute pre-emptive inspections due to lack of time. Only if the situation normalises can there be a change in this approach. From 2003 onwards India built a barbed-wire fence along the international border and the LoC in order to prevent or at least to reduce infiltration from the other side of the LoC. manning observation points: observe the LoC during at least three hours from a certain point, during day or night time, in order to observe activities in the sector and to disclose possible violations of the LoC. in case of a complaint, undertake on the spot investigation in order to check the validity and to designate the possible culpable party. Every complaint, however minor, receives a case-number and is investigated thoroughly. In giving a case-number the complaint obtains an official status and this makes it easy to monitor the progress of the investigation, to follow up the given consequences and finally to notify the results to both sides. A bi-monthly list of cases is produced and transmitted to the headquarters on a certain prescribed and printed form. The procedure for dealing with complaints is stipulated in a separate manual: 'Operations Instructions for Handling Complaints and Investigations'. Since 1990 and as long as the actual situation does not improve drastically this has remained the main mission of

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the observers. organising 'crossings': the LoC is not an open border, but in order to facilitate the movement of the observers, several crossing points of the LoC were made available. This is the case between Domel/Muzaffarabad and Baramulla, between Rawalakot and Poonch and between Sialkot and Jammu. It has to be pointed out that due to the actual tense situation the crossing point between Rawalakot and Poonch is not operational. The crossing point between Domel/Muzaffarabad and Baramulla has been closed between 1990 and June 2005 but has been reopened since, not only for the UN Military Observer but also for civilians. In the framework of CBMs between India and Pakistan this crossing point has been opened for civilian traffic under certain strict conditions. Without these crossing points the observers would have to make a long detour to go from one side of the LoC to the other side up to the first official border crossing between India and Pakistan, situated between Amritsar and Lahore or travelling by road would have to be replaced by travelling by air. organising 'meetings': sometimes it is useful or even necessary to contact or to consult the observers posted on the opposite side of the LoC. The possibility to be able to arrange meetings between them often results in a considerable gain of time and a reducing of the complicated administrative procedure because the problems can be discussed and cleared in a straightforward manner. Organising meetings is very useful when it comes to dealing with the investigation of a complaint: the declarations of the one side can be checked immediately against the declarations of the other side. It is not rare that during this 'confrontation', officers of the opposing positioned troops are present in order to give their testimony of the facts. execute 'road recce's': Since the signing of the Shimla-agreement in July 1972 the original CFL was renamed in LoC which, with minor deviations, followed the same course as the CFL established by the Karachi Agreement in 1949. India took the position that the mandate of the UNO and UNMOGIP, since it related specifically to the CFL under the Karachi Agreement. Pakistan did not accept this position. Given this disagreement the Secretary-General's position has been that UNMOGIP could be terminated only by a decision of the Security Council. Nevertheless, up to now India has not introduced an official demand to withdraw UNMOGIP. The Indian military authorities have lodged no complaints since January 1972 and have restricted the activities of the UN Military Observers on the Indian side of the LoC to executing 'road recce's'. Executing pre-emptive inspections - 'field tasks', 'field visits' and 'field trips' - of the installations and positions along the LoC is not allowed anymore. However India continued to provide accommodation, transport and other facilities to UNMOGIP. offer 'good services' and play a mediating role: these missions are not specified in detail. The most important element is the good common sense of the observer. They prove to be of great importance in special or exceptional situations: exchange of prisoners, returning of lost civilians, returning of cattle that dare to cross the LoC, receiving petitions transmitted by the local popu-

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lation, etc. report all other observations: this mission is also not specified in detail and appeals in a large sense the good common sense of the observer. All other observations can be: the condition of the roads, movement of troops and military exercises, important works on the infrastructure, etc. At a first glance the impression is given that all these missions are not that difficult to execute. The reality though is totally different: A first aspect is the limited number of observers. In theory there are some forty-five observers to do the job, but in reality only some thirty-five observers are available. Of the number of forty-five, at least five occupy a function in the headquarters and some are not available because they have not been replaced after their departure, or are in the phase of initial instruction, or are in preparation of their departure, or are in 'compensatory time off'. The latter can not be considered as real leave, but as compensation for the uninterrupted duty in the Field Station, 24 hours on 24 hours, consisting of some days off per month. So, the remaining thirty-five observers are responsible for executing the missions on both sides of the LoC having a length of some 765 km - the total length of the border is some 1,075 km: 765 km LoC, 200 km international border and 110 km actual ground position line on the Siachen glacier - in a mainly very difficult terrain. In wintertime the situation is a little bit better: in wintertime the northern 'summer station' Skardu on the Pakistani side of the LoC - is closed due to the climatologic conditions and so the observers normally posted there in summertime can be transferred to the other Field Stations. A second aspect is the very difficult terrain in which one has to operate. Whereas in the southern part, the positions and fortifications are relatively accessible this becomes a very difficult task the further north one goes. It is here that the daylong marches and mountaineering, sometimes above 5,000 m, are on the menu. On the one hand, these marches and climbing in this magnificent, unspoilt, fierce landscape are unforgettable moments and experiences for the observer. On the other hand, they are a highly time-consuming activity. A third aspect is the contact with the population and the military personnel. The civil population and the military also are extremely hospitable and kind, and this has nothing to do with the intrusive friendliness which tourists have to face so often and which in reality only has everything to do with the main aim, of 'doing business'. In Jammu and Kashmir the hospitality comes straight from the heart. During the 'field tasks' the observers are expected to have a cup of tea with the elder of the villages they are coming through. In every village there is at least one inhabitant who worked several years abroad, mostly in one or other oil exporting country, and who as a result speaks very good English. This person sits next to the village elder and translates what is said. Depending on the duration of this tea ceremony slowly, slowly the circle grows and after a while almost the whole village is sitting there - only men, no women - listening to what is said and sometimes also making their contribution to the discussion. Children are allowed to assist from a respectful

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distance and are watching and listening very attentively. In far off villages I often wondered where all these people came from so suddenly and I was surprised at the huge number and diversity of the goodies and sweets that surfaced as if by magic. Out of courteousness, one is obliged to at least taste everything that is offered. At the arrival in the location of a military formation that has to be inspected, the reception is no less hospitable. Here also the best food is offered, although the means one has in the far-off areas are sometimes very limited and primitive. During the meals, the best dishes are presented to the guest and here also it is expected from the observer that he tastes from every dish. This is a unique occasion to learn to appreciate the real Kashmiri kitchen, although there can be surprises: some kind of preparation of goat or sheep is always on the menu and this is very tasty but when I was offered a dish of goat eyes I had some difficulty remaining polite. Yet, after having tasted a small piece, I thought it was not that bad at all. All these experiences are unforgettable and heart-warming but consume a lot of the already so scarcely available time. In order to avoid getting too attached to a certain region or to persons with whom one has contacts, resulting in a possible reduction of impartiality, here also the principle is applied that the observer has to change on a regular basis from Field Station and from side of the LoC. This happens, in principle, every three months. On the other hand, this movement of observers also has the advantage that one has the possibility and the occasion to discover other parts of Jammu and Kashmir and to have again and again new experiences with human contacts. Without doubt, these experiences are the origin and the basis of the attachment and the connection I still feel for Jammu and Kashmir and its population. Notwithstanding these different aspects, the observers have succeeded in doing a very good job. They could not prevent the two wars that erupted between India and Pakistan, the first in 1965, the second in 1971 - and besides this is not their mission -, but they could observe signals that something was in the offing. In September 1964 General Nimmo sent a report to the UNO-Headquarters in New York stating as follows: 'It is no exaggeration to say that an undeclared war is going on in Jammu and Kashmir'. In January 1965 General Nimmo would repeat his concern over the deterioration of the situation. In order to have more or less an impression of the number of alleged and real violations of the CFL/LoC Table 6 -- gives an overview of the period from 1949 till 2004. The total number of introduced complaints does not necessarily match with the total number of the violations by India, by Pakistan or the non-violations: some complaints were introduced by both India and Pakistan but were related to the same violation whereas other complaints were sometimes withdrawn in a later phase of the procedure. The big number of non-violations does not necessarily mean that the violations did not take place: a violation by one of the parties is only recognised as such if there is irrefutable evidence.

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Table 6: VIOLATIONS OF THE CFL/LoC 1949-2004

From 1972 onwards India would make no further complaints This overview of the functioning of UNMOGIP would not be complete without mentioning the accidents that took place during the almost 57 years of existence of UNMOGIP and the victims of these accidents. Notwithstanding the difficult and dangerous circumstances under which one has to work, this balance remained limited. Apart from a small number of injured members there have been ten fatalities to be mourned: four - Brigade-General Angle, Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, Lieutenant-Colonel Mayfield and Field Service Officer Major died in an air crash in 1950 and the five others - two observers, two international civilian staff and two members of the local recruited civil staff - died in different road accidents. Some observers had to say farewell to UNMOGIP before ending their tour of duty due to the fact that they caught one or the other tropical disease. The benefit, the worth or not of UNMOGIP and the maintenance of this UN mission is extensively discussed in circles who have to decide on this question. The efforts that are demanded from UNO, who have to supply the financial means - the appropriation for 2005 was fixed at US $ 8.37 million, for 2004 this was US $ 7.25 million , from the contributing countries who have to send the observers and therefor have to withdraw officers from their normal duties, and last but not least, from the observer himself who has to leave his family for one year and who has to reduce his comfort to a great extent, should indeed not be underestimated. Having myself been an observer I agree fully with the conclusion of Pauline Dawson in her book 'The Peacekeepers of Kashmir' which reads as follows: 'A strong case for the removal of UNMOGIP can indeed be made. But it is difficult to escape the nagging feeling that if there is even the remotest chance that its (UNMOGIP) being there will contribute in any small way to the maintenance of peace, it would be unwise for UNMOGIP to be withdrawn'.

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L A D A K H A F F A46I R S

STRUGGLING AGAINST ODDS

A journey of a different kind in Ladakh KUNZANG DOLMA From being an ordinary girl growing up in Ladakh to being a committed social activist working for the cause of the disabled in this mountainous region has been a long walk. One that has been spurred by personal insights as well as the stark social reality of the disabled and their fight for a life of equal opportunities and dignity

t has been a long journey for me, growing up in Ladakh and having all the aspirations of any ordinary girl who wants a happy life. Not for a moment did I imagine that I would find this happiness amongst the disabled people in Ladakh, those who struggle not only with the hard life in this icy desert terrain but with their own compromised abilities seeking a life of dignity which so many of us take for granted. The turning point as I can now see was my participation in a training programme by a disability organisation around 10 years ago. It was essentially an exposure and sharing of information about the disability sector of which I had knowledge. As I watched, the hall where it was being held slowly became filled with so many people; many of them on wheel chairs and some of them walking with the support of crutches. As I observed them, I gradually realized that many amongst them were unable to speak; some who could spoke in a garbled way. Suddenly the world that is inhabited by disabled people became a reality for me, an uncomfortable reality. I was amongst them, yet not part of them. And frankly, in those initial moments, I was terrified, inexplicable but that was the dominant emotion in me. It is as if I was confronting an ugly reality not outside but within, a reality that everyone outside me could see . The beginning of the session started with a prayer, which because of all these thoughts churning inside me, I was unable to recite. All I could do was close my

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eyes and listen and follow the hum of the recitation, which was happening in unison of voices around me. Then suddenly it stopped and there was absolute silence. In that silence I came to an understanding. In a flash, it came to me, that it is not they who are disabled. It was I who was mentally disabled, clouded by my own prejudices, by an unfounded fear and perhaps a misplaced sense of what constitutes perfection. It was clear that I had a long way to go in my own evolution, beginning now! That was the day that I, a young girl decided to devote my life to the cause of disability in my region, Ladakh Over the last ten years, I have made an attempt to understand the issues related to disability and started working closely with the people. I have realized that the rest of the world has closed their doors and hearts to the disabled people. I started to understand their capabilities and they have the potential to do all the work that the able-bodied people can do. Given an opportunity, they are capable of achieving everything in their lives. My journey, my search was greatly enriched by like- minded group and individuals with great commitment and vision to create a world of equal opportunities, of dignity of the disabled. I was associated with the Namgyal Institute for Research on Ladakhi Art and Culture (NIRLAC) which had a unit to promote disability issues. But gradually many of those who were concerned with issues of the disabled felt that a rights-

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based approach needs to be adopted. One that would treat facilities and special provisions for the disabled not as a favour or largesse by the government but by virtue of inalienable rights granted under our Constitution and the rights framework formulated by national and international conventions. Under 'PAGIR', People's Action Group for Advocacy and Rights, we regrouped to begin our work for being treated at par with all others in terms of opportunities. The work took me to remote villages in Ladakh. It is during this that I realized that the discomfort I had initially felt in that hall surrounded with people of varying disability was an emotion that was widespread. People were hiding their disabled children and I realized it is because of social stigma attached to it. Disabled people hardly ventured out of their houses, again circumscribed by these prejudices in society. It was in the midst of this that we launched a village to village awareness campaign on disability, talking to people, disabled and abled alike and encouraging them to share their views and discuss. Gradually people opened up, questioning the very social mores that kept the disabled in a shroud of shame and secrecy. This was the beginning then of not only my own personal transformation but of a social transformation. Since then with time and effort, the disabled started participating in the mainstream activities in the villages. This did not happen overnight. It took more than six to seven years. But it gave us the en-

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OPINION

ergy to take the issue to another level, one that could effect change in the ground situation. After all, there are a whole slew of issues that need to be addressed by those in authority to enable a life of selfreliance, of equal opportunities and dignity for the disabled. We began to do advocacy with the government authorities on education, health and employment issues related to disabled in Ladakh. This meant at the level of the LAHDC or the Ladakh Hill Development Council which is the 'Executive' looking into all matters of governance and policy at the local level. At the state level, we needed to have links and direct our advocacy efforts at the J&K state government in Srinagar. Gradually, a momentum has been built up and people from across sectors have begun to recognize the movement. Still the road ahead is a difficult one. Public buildings in Ladakh are not built with access structures to facilitate movement of wheelchairs. Many laws only remain on paper. I have over time realized that the problem is basically in the mind-set . It is something that I too had and struggled to overcome. If society or at least some people begin to view the disabled differently instead of a bias, then it will naturally follow that they will be treated with dignity and at par. So something fundamental needs to ch a n ge i n t h e hearts and minds of the Ladakhi people. If we create space there, then in the same way we take care of our children and old people in our families, the world will open out to accept disabled people and ensure their full participation in society. (This article has been produced with support of Charkha Communication and Development Network, New Delhi)

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Issues of Common Interest across LoC STANZIN DAWA

iversity is the law of the nature, and respect for diversity ensures peace within and between the communities and regions. While celebrating and nurturing the diversity across the region we must identify the common areas of interest. At present the region is facing many, often overlapping, crisis including financial, security, environmental and other socioeconomic challenges hindering the development across the regions. Considering what we have achieved and lost over the decades, I believe that peace and development are the two most common interests across the LoC. Our political standpoints may differ, but we share many common interests which are extremely important to ensure sustainable peace and development in the region. The areas we need to work collectively and are of common interest across the LoC are peace, development, education, employment, health, infrastructure, trade and commerce, environment, cultural diversity, democracy and good governance, and gender equity. While working for the long term political goal we should also make the best use of present opportunities while overcoming the challenges in a more democratic and participatory way. The greatest challenge for the current leadership is to ensure meaningful engagement of people for building a culture of peace and development across the LoC. Peace comes from being able to contribute the best that we have, and all that we are, toward creating a region that supports everyone irrespective of differences. But it is also securing the space for others to contribute the best that they have and all that they are. Respect for others, their belief, religion, political ideology, culture, brings an inner peace and tranquillity instead of anger and resentment. The previous dialogue confer-

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ences condemn terrorism of all forms and by any means; it also reaffirmed the significance of dialogue at different levels. This is crucial as the current phase of conflict and potential for development across the regions needs a strong mechanism for regional understanding and cooperation more than ever. Peace and development are directly proportional to each other; one cannot exist without the other. Thus, without peace, development cannot be sustained. For instance, Kashmir used to be the paradise on earth, where people from every corner of the world loved to spend their holidays. The valley was peaceful and people were prosperous. Today we have an altogether different scenario there in Kashmir, it is turbulent and boiling with conflicts of all kinds, neither peace nor development. Our experience in the valley over the last couple of decades make us realized that without development peace cannot be restored. This is a critical time to channelize our energies, resources and wisdom towards the holistic development of the region to ensure peace and prosperity. As we know there are many common areas of interest but the challenge is how to address these issues of common interest. Keeping this in view I would like to propose the following recommendations to ensure sustainable peace and development across the region: Recommendation 1 The regions have almost similar developmental constraints; in order to deal with such constraints the government should develop long term Regional Development Goals for next 20 years. It will help people across the regions to work collectively to achieve our common goals and vision. It will ensure sustained economic growth that generates employment and sources of live-

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OPINION

lihood. Development strategies should be bold enough to meet the RDGs targets by 2031. All policies and programmes should be aligned with the RDGs. The RDG-based strategies should facilitate the scaling up of public investments, capacity building, state resource mobilization, and international development assistance. It should also provide a framework for strengthening governance, promoting human rights, engaging civil society, and promoting the private sector. The RDG-based development strategies should: 1. Focus on rural and urban productivity, health, education, tourism, gender equality, water and sanitation, environmental sustainability, science and technology, and innovation in governance and development. 2. Focus on women's and girls' health and education outcomes, access to economic and political opportunities, right to control assets, and freedom from violence. 3. Promote mechanisms for transparent and decentralized governance both at state and local level. 4. Ensure greater involvement of civil society organizations and private sectors in decision-making and service delivery, and provide resources for monitoring and evaluation. 5. Outline a private sector promotion strategy and an income generation strategy for meaningful engagement of young people in economic development of the region. 6. Be tailored, as appropriate, to the special needs of regions such as Ladakh which is different from other regions. Recommendation 2 The Government should increase official development assistance to support the Regional Development Goals. The government should mobilize international donors to intervene and scale up development assistance fund in the region on multifaceted development projects in collaboration with governments and civil society organizations. Aid should be oriented to support the RDG-based development strategy, rather than to support donor-driven projects. Recommendation 3 The regional development

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should be supported to identify, plan, and implement high-priority cross border infrastructure projects (roads, railways, universities, hospitals, watershed management). The Government should strengthen the coordination of government agencies, funds, and programs to support the RDGs, at block, district and state level.

Hasnan from Baltistan, a young Balti scholar that people in Baltistan are desperate to learn and preserve Bhoti language, as they have realized the significance of their language in promoting social solidarity and in maintaining their own identity and culture. The scholars in the regional Languages should be provided grants for doing research..

Recommendation 4 The surface of the region is covered with a thin gray layer of democratic fabric. Women are still not admitted as full and equal partners in the government democratic set up. The state government and autonomous development council should ensure 33 per cent reservation for women. Appropriate democratic structures can offer an effective means for the peaceful handling of deep-rooted conflict through inclusive, just and accountable frameworks. Democracy provides the foundation for building an effective and lasting settlement to internal conflicts. Therefore building appropriate democratic structures in region is crucial in building a culture of peace and ensuring sustainable development.

Recommendation 7 Youth stands for energy, enthusiasm, adventures, and spirit of taking risk. It's a stage in which an individual is most active and productive. We need youth, their strength, enthusiasm and idealism, to help us make right what is wrong. Time and again their energy has been poorly utilized or wrongly utilized for various purposes. Nothing is more important to the health of our democracy than the active engagement of young people in representative government at the different levels. Participation is a fundamental right. It is one of the guiding principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that has been reiterated in many other Conventions and Declarations. Through active participation, young people are empowered to play a vital role in their own development as well as in that of their communities. To participate effectively, young people must be given the proper tools, such as education about and access to their civil rights. Educated unemployment is becoming a major challenge across the LoC; the government should have a clear policy on youth employment. The Government across the LoC cannot afford to see the sufferings of youth. It can learn from the past experience that unemployment in the border areas is a loop hole in the government policy on border security. Unemployment could be a threat for breaking the internal peace and security. The government should come up with innovative ideas to generate employment opportunities for youth.

Recommendation 5 School shapes the attitude and personality of an individual. Education being a state subject, the destiny of children and youth in across the region will be determined by the quality of education we are providing in the school. The education must be reformed in order to make to it more relevant. Peace education should be included in the school curriculum as a compulsory subject. Government, civil society and educational institutions should jointly launch a massive programme for building a culture of peace in the region through meaningful engagement of young people in peace building process. Recommendation 6 The government should include Bhoti language in the 8th schedule. Common language facilitates better understanding that helps in strengthening the relationship. I came to know from my friend M.

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Recommendation 8 Music is the language of the heart and the language of the heart transcends the barriers of religion, region, sex, caste and colour. Preservation and promotion of traditional music and arts can play a significant

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REPORTS

role in creating an enabling environment for peace. The traditional songs and dramas carry meaningful stories about people, culture, and nature. The government should organize inter regional friendship festivals, in which artists across the region can perform on the same platform. This will help in creating an enabling environment for peace. Recommendation 9 Â&#x201E; I believe that people in the long run are going to be more informed and interested to promote peace and development. I have met with people from Pakistan on a People to People contact programme in year

2005 at Jalandhar. I was amazed to see the aspirations and enthusiasm of people of both the countries for peace and development. The local government, NGOs and religious intuitions should promote People to People contact programme across the LoC. Spiritual leaders, educationist, students and professionals can visit each other's region. They can learn from each other system of governance, culture, people, institutions, families, arts and folk. The region has tremendous economic potential, the talent of its people is unparalleled, and its cultural diversity is unique. It can, and must, become a model of real em-

powerment of the people and comprehensive security across the region. If this happens, region will be the epitome of unity, peace and prosperity in diversity. Through Dialogue and Mutual Understanding, we can promote the ideals of peace, development, respect for human rights and solidarity across generations, cultures, and religions. This dialogue process will be a significant milestone in the history of the region and we need many more such dialogues in the future. Such dialogues will significantly help us in transforming the Line of Control, into Line of Communication and Line of Cooperation.

J&K figures lowest in watershed implementation Kargil has better performance than Leh TSEWANG RIGZIN

aving seen the chaos and con fusion over the implementation of watershed programs in the district in the past few years, the Hill Council Leh invited the Director, Desert Development Program, Department of Land Resources, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India Mr V.M. Arora to conduct a daylong workshop on February 10 at Leh for all concerned stakeholders - Councilors, District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) and other departmental officials and NGOs involved in the implementation of Integrated Watershed Management Programme (IWMP). The daylong workshop was a very meaningful one as much of confusion prevailed surrounding the implementation of IWMP was clarified on spot

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by Mr Arora. It came to fore that several projects approved by the Government of Indian under Hariyali scheme for the district some 5 years back are still not their half way through. The excuse earlier with the DRDA was that the Government of India had not released installments of due payments which led to the held up of these projects. Thanks to Mr. Arora who made a startling revelation by informing that the Government of India had not received any Utilization Certificates other updates such as the Progress Reports on these projects from DRDA Leh. While giving a detailed PowerPoint presentation about the implementation of the watershed programs throughout the country, Mr Arora noted that Jammu & Kashmir has

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been the poorest performing state in the country. He said that no information regarding progress of 729 projects sanctioned for Leh and Kargil up to 2006-07 had been received by the Ministry of Rural Development even after writing as many as 36 letters to the concerned Principal Secretary in Jammu & Kashmir government by the ministry. One important thing to note is that in the state of J&K these projects are implemented only in Leh and Kargil districts as Desert Development Program is extended only for the development of hot and cold desert areas in the country. The chief executive councilor, LAHDC, Leh, Sh Rigzin Spalbar, who chaired the workshop, in a strong worded caution to the DRDA other

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concerned agencies warned that henceforth he was ready to listen from Government of India saying that it has gain not received progress reports from Leh on projects being implemented in the district. He also asked the department of DRDA if it had any technical and other shortcomings which may have led to such an unusual backlog of implementation of programs in the recent few years. However, as the Project Director of the DRDA kept changing frequently recently, Mr. Lobzang Thinles, who took over as the PD about two months back, didn't have answers to all delays and confusions caused by

REPORTS the department. The only officer, who could have explained reasons for delays, is Mr. Ali Raza as he had worked as the PD from September 2007 till August 2010. The CEC requested the Government of India to provide technical supports to the DRDA Leh such as for uploading progress reports of programs on the internet and also to conduct training and exposures for the officials of the district outside the state. Since the watershed development programs are implemented through Program Implementing Agencies (PIA), both Government and NonGovernment Organizations, which

are not fully equipped with technically trained personnel in different aspects of watershed development/management, the Ministry of Rural Development has initiated a one-year Diploma Course on watershed management for rural youth in association with and through the Indra Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) with an aim to develop human resource and also to provide basic understanding of various activities undertaken during watershed development. Mr V.M. Arora promised that about 50 students from Leh duly approved by LAHDC Leh will be considered for the diploma course this year which will

Since the watershed development programs are implemented through Program Implementing Agencies (PIA), both Government and Non- Government Organizations, which are not fully equipped with technically trained personnel in different aspects of watershed development/management, the Ministry of Rural Development has initiated a oneyear Diploma Course on watershed management for rural youth in association with and through the Indra Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) with an aim to develop human resource and also to provide basic understanding of various activities undertaken during watershed development. Mr V.M. Arora promised that about 50 students from Leh duly approved by LAHDC Leh will be considered for the diploma course this year which will be sponsored by the Ministry of Rural Development.

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REPORTS

be sponsored by the Ministry of Rural Development. It is pertinent to mention here that since 1995-96 Department of Land Resources has been implementing three programs called Drought Prone Areas Program (DPAP), Desert Development Program (DDP) and Integrated Wastelands Development Program (IWDP) on watershed basis. However DPAP, DDP and IWDP have been integrated into a single modified program - Integrated Watershed Management Program (IWMP) with effect from 26 of February 2009. Under IWMP there are dedicated Institutions with multi-disciplinary ex-

perts at different levels. They are the State Level Nodal Agency (SLNA), Watershed Cell cum Data Centre (WCDC), Project Implementing Agency (PIA) and Watershed Committee (WC) at State, District, project and the village levels respectively. Cost norms for plain and hilly areas are also different. In the plains areas it is Rs. 12,000/ per hectare, whereas in difficult/hilly areas the cost norms is Rs. 15,000 per hectare. The funding from the Center Government is 90 percent and the State share is only percent. IWMP is an ideal program for

places like Ladakh where a plenty of barren land is available and that could be brought under cultivation by constructing water reservoirs and irrigation canals from the village streams. This could be big step forward towards the development of agriculture, plantation, horticulture and pasturelands in the region. Until 2006-07, watershed development programs in the district moved quite smoothly and several projects executed by some reputed local NGOs had been rather exemplary in some rural areas.

Dish TV cheats consumers in Leh

henever any customer sends a query to Dish TV Costumer care, it promptly replies saying: "We value your association and assure you of our commitment to serve you with a smile." Switch to the DISHTV's own channel, it says: "Don't pay anything over and above the subscription amount. Ensure that full payment is deposited to DISHTV." Well, that actually sounds great. However, all of the above statements by the company seem to be working in reverse in Leh as subscribers often have to make extra payments to renew services. It is normally very simple to get the package of your TV channels recharged through the easy Scratch cards, just like how you recharge your mobile phone accounts. It costs nothing extra for you. However, in Leh the story is a bit different and worrisome, a case fit for a consumer court. Some Dish TV dealers in Leh charge customers with some extra money. This has been happening in Leh for more than a year now. Such dealers don't keep the easy scratch cards and consequently a subscriber to renew Dish TV package has to go a dealer shop to write down the Dish

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VC Number and pay some money to get the service activated. For instance, I own a Dish TV connection and on January 28 I paid an amount rupees 300 to a dealer to renew the services, but the actual amount that

Ensure that full payment is deposited to DISHTV." Well, that actually sounds great. However, all of the above statements by the company seem to be working in reverse in Leh as subscribers often have to make extra payments to renew services. It is normally very simple to get the package of your TV channels recharged through the easy Scratch cards, just like how you recharge your mobile phone accounts. has been received by the Dish TV is only rupees 210. If your mobile number and the email ID are registered with the DISHTV, the company acknowledges you of the receipt of the

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payment through an sms and an email. I always brought receipts of the payments I made in Leh and I noticed the difference between the receipts I got from the dealer shops and the actual receipts emailed to me by the Dish TV costumer care. The company doesn't receive the correct amount we pay here at some shops. On contacting the Dish costumer care, the company regrets the inconvenience caused and apologises for the problem faced by its customers. The company also clarified that what was happening in Leh was completely illegal. Dish TV subscribers across Ladakh are in thousands. Most people keeping a silence over such issues also indicates that in a landlocked place like Leh many illegal activities can go unreported because of consumers being ignorant and indifferent. Thus the Dish TV incident may be the tip of the iceberg of a larger consumer right issue in Leh. When any of us notice such obnoxious practices taking place around us, we need speak up, educate many more and bring such cases before the notice of authorities for appropriate action, so that they are not repeated. - Tsewang Rigzin

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Sufism and Sufi Shrines in Jammu Hills PROF: JIGAR MOHAMMED

ufism entered India in the 12th century as a new socio-religious trend. Almost all leading Sufi Silsilas, coming to India, made the Punjab region as their halting place. The Chishti, Suhrawardi, Qadri and Naqshbandi Silsilas flourished in the Punjab first, afterwards they trvelled to the different parts of India. From Usman Hujwiri to Baqi Billah all the sufis irrespective of their Silsilas found favourable atmosphere in the Punjab for the performance of their sufistic activities. Since Jammu region was closely associated with the Punjab in terms of its boundary, culture and climate, the sufis extended their activities to Jammu . It is important to mention that during the medieval period twenty two principalities existed in the modern Jammu region. Hutchison and Vogel put all these pricipalities under the Punjab hill states.1 The Mughal sources such as the Ain-i-Akbari and Kulasat-utTawarikh also show the most of the states of the Jammu hills were either parts of the Suba of Lahore or Suba of Multan.2 Moreover, under Maharaja Ranjit Singh almost each part of the modern Jammu and Kashmir states were part of the Lahore Darbar. The socio-economic and geographical affiliation of Jammu region to the Punjab led to cultural exchange between these regions. Different routes from Punjab to Kashmir passed through the Jammu region. It was an established practice of the Sufis to send their desciples to the different regions for the propagation of the sufism. Consequently, the different areas of the Jammu hills witnessed the arrival of the sufis during the medieval period and this process continued till the nineteenth century. Like Punjab, Sufism entered Kashmir during the fourteenth century. Sayyid Sharfuddin, popularly known as Bulbul Shah, came to Kashmir in the early 14th century. At the time of his arrival Kashmir was ruled

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by the Damra dynasty and Suhadeva was the contemporary ruler. Sayyid Sharfuddin was a Suhrawardi sufi and came to Kashmir from Turkistan. The Kubrawiya Silsila was introduced in Kashmir by Mir Sayyid Ali Hamdani, in Kashmir, popularly known as Shahi-Hamadan, during the second half of the 14th century. Sayyid Hilal, a Naqshbandi Sufi, came to Kashmir and settled there in the beginning of the 15th century. Similarly, Shaikh Niamatullah Qadri also visited Kashmir for short period. His disciple Shaikh Mirak Mir settled in Kashmir

Like Punjab, Sufism entered Kashmir during the fourteenth century. Sayyid Sharfuddin, popularly known as Bulbul Shah, came to Kashmir in the early 14th century. At the time of his arrival Kashmir was ruled by the Damra dynasty and Suhadeva was the contemporary ruler. Sayyid Sharfuddin was a Suhrawardi sufi and came to Kashmir from Turkistan. and introduced the Qadri Silsila there. More importantly, in Kashmir an indigenous sufi Silsila, known as Rishi Silsila emerged during the 15th century. Since the Jammu hill states were the bordering state of Kashmir, it seems that the Sufism of Kashmir influenced the social life of the Jammu region.3 The modern Jammu region is divided into six districts: Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur, Doda, Punch and Rajouri. All these districts consist of several sufi shrines. As far as the sources of the history of the sufis and their shrines in the Jammu hills are concerned, most of the shrines have

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no contemporary record. It is either the present Sajjadanashin or oral traditions which speak the history of these shrines. Some nineteenth century sources such as the Gulabnama of Diwan Kirpa Ram, Rajdarsani of Ganeshdas Badehra and some travel accounts also contain some information regarding the role of the sufis and their shrines in the socio-economic life of the Jammu hills. However, it is confirmed that like other parts of the Punjab and Kashmir the sufis of the different orders settled in the Jammu hills.The Sufis such as Peer Roshan Shah Wali, Pir Lakhdatta, Baba Budhan Shah , Pir Mitha, Pir Zahiri Wali Shah, Pir Shahan Shah Wali, Pir Muhabbat Ali Shah, Baba Sher Khan Pathan, also known as Sanjha Pir, Faqir Baba Faiz Bakhsh Shah Bukhari, Qutub Zaman Hazrat Baba Jiwan Shah, and Baba Barkat Ali Shah etc came to Jammu and settled in the different areas such Jammu proper, Satwari, Akhnur, Kunjwani and Rihari.4 Shaikh Faridud-din Qadri, Hazrat Muhammad Asrar-ud-din, Hazrat Muahmmad Akhyar-ud-din,5 Shaikh Zain Alla Din, Baba Latif-ud-din Rishi and Zain-uddin Rishi settled in Kishtwar.6 Baba Pir Shah Tode settled at Kathua district of Jammu and Kashmir state. Mustafa or Nua Baba, Pir Baba Karam Shah, Hazrat Nadir Ali Shah Baghdadi, Pir Wali Shah settled in the different parts of modern Udhampur district. Pir Sayyid Ghulam Shah Badshah settled at Shahdara Sharif of the modern Rajouri district.7 Similarly, Baba Sain Lal Din settled in Rajouri. Hazrat Nadir Ali Shah Baghdadi settled at Ram Nagar of Udhampur district. Pir Lakhdatta founded his residence at Banni (in Tahsil Basoli, district Kathua). Alla pir settled at Punch. Hazrat Kasim Shah and Hazrat Haji Muhammad Akram settled at Dera Mehta in Doda district and Doda proper respectively. Panch Pir settled at Jammu, Basoli,

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Rajouri, Purmandal and Ramnagar. Hazrat Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani settled in Punch.8 Several other shrines of the sufi saints exist in Punch, Rajouri, Doda, Udhampur and Jammu districts. The philosophical backgrounds, in terms of the Silsilah, of the most of the sufis of Jammu hills are not known. Since the information regarding the life and works of these Sufis are based on hagiographical traditions, the present Sajjadanashins or Gaddi Nashins (controllers of the sufi shrines) narrate the miracles, social activities and the social support of the sufis. But there were sufis whose identity in terms of Silsilah is well established. In Kishtwar majority of the sufis belonged to either Qadiri Silsilah or Rishi Silsilah. Hazrat Shaikh Zain-ud- din and Hazrat Baba Latif-ud-din belonged to the Rishi Silsilah, originated in Kashmir.9 Sayyid Farid-ud-din, Israr-ud-din, Shah Abdal, Sayyid Bahauddin Samani, Darwish Muhammad and Yar Muhammad of Kishtwar belonged to the Qadiri Silsilah.10 It is important to mention that the geneological history, philosophy, activities and social contacts of the Qadiri sufis are recorded in a Malfuz manuscript, entitled Rauzat-ul-Arifin, written by Hafiz Zia-ud-din Hafiz Nasruddin of Kishtwar. Baba Jiwan Shah of Jiwan Shah Muhalla, distirict Jammu belonged to the Chishti Silsilah. He is known to be from the family of Shaikh Farid-ud-din Ganj-i-Shakar of Ajodhan. From their regional background point of view, the sufis of Jammu hills can be divided into four categories: 1. Sufis coming from Punjab and making their setttlement in Jammu, 2. Sufis coming from Kashmir, 3. Sufis coming from foreign lands and 4. Indigenous sufis of Jammu hills. The hagiographical traditons show that majority of sufis of Jammu hills came from Punjab. Pir Lakhdatta, Baba Buddhan Ali Shah, Baba Jiwan Shah of Akhnur, Baba Rah, Baba Jiwan Shah of Jiwan Shah Muhallah, Pir Baba Tode Shah, Pir Wali Shah, Mustafa Baba or Nau Baba, Sain Lal, Pir Ghulam Badshah came to Jammu from the different parts of

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Punjab. Some of the sufis either came from Kashmir or intiated into sufism by the sufis of Kashmir in Jammu hills, particularly in Kishtwar, Doda, Badhrawah, Punch and Rajouri. According to the oral tradition such types of the sufis were initated into the sufism either by Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani or Shaikh Nur-ud-din Rishi. Hazrat Miskin Shah Kishtwari, Hazrat Sayyid Abu Sikandar Ali, Zain-ud-din Rishi and Latif-ud-din etc. were the products of Kashmir sufism and came to the different areas of the modern Doda district. The arrival of some sufis in the Jammu hills is associated

From their regional background point of view, the sufis of Jammu hills can be divided into four categories: 1. Sufis coming from Punjab and making their setttlement in Jammu, 2. Sufis coming from Kashmir, 3. Sufis coming from foreign lands and 4. Indigenous sufis of Jammu hills. with some foreign countries also. Pir Roshan Ali or Nau Gaza Pir, Hazrat Shah Muhammad Ghazi, Pir Mitha, Faqir Baba Faiz Bukhari, Baba Barkat Ali, Hazarat Nazar Ali Shah etc. came from Mecca, Baghdad, Iran, Arab and Kazakistan. Some of the natives of Jammu hills also got intiated into the Sufism. Hazrat Shawan Sarkoti, Pir Muhabbat Ali, Pir Wali Shah and Baba Sain Lal Din belonged to the Jammu hills.11 Even there were some indigenous sufis who first accepted Islam and then got initiated into the Sufism. Majority of such types of the Sufis belonged to the Rishi order of Kishtwar.12 The geographical background of the Sufis of Jammu hills shows that the Jammu hills had potentialities of the social discourses among the sufis and common people

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of hetrogenous character. It also shows that Jammu hill states were well connected with different parts of India and foreign countries. The emergence of the Sufism in the Jammu hills can be traced from the 13th century. The process of the coming of the sufis to the Jammu region and their settlement continued till early 20th century. It is believed that Pir Roshan Wali Shah was the earliest Sufi who came to Jammu from Mecca in the first half of the 13th century (1242). According to the hagiographical traditions, majority of the medieval sufis came to Jammu from 15th to 19th century. Pir Lakhdata, Pir Buddhan Ali Shah,Hazrat Zain-ud-din Rishi, Baba Latif-ud-din Rishi, Pir Mitha, Pir Zahir Wali Shah, Sanjha Pir or Sher Khan Shah Pathan and Baba Karam Shah belonged to the 15th century. A large number of the sufis came from Punjab during the late 18th century and 19th century. The Sufis like Baba Jiwan Shah, Baba Rah, Qutub Zaman Hazrat Jiwan Shah, Mustafa or Nau Gaza Baba etc. came to Jammu from the Punjab during the 19th century. It is important to mention that the sufis who came from Punjab either during the 18th century or 19th century, it was the period of the political crisis. For example during the period of Ahmad Shah Abdali's invasion Punjab faced law and order problem and political instability became the dominant trend of the region. Whereas, Jammu region remained a peaceful region. According to Ganesh Das Badhera, the author of Rajdarshani, Ranjit Dev(1733-83), the king of Jammu state, had enforced law and order very effectively and Jammu was called Dar-ulAman(Abode of Peace) during his period.13 It seems that Sufis found congenial atmosphere in the Jammu region for the propagation of their philosophy and serving the people. Similarly, majority of the 19th century sufis of Jammu came from Punjab after the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh i.e. 1839. It is an established fact that after the death of the Maharaja Ranjit Singh political chaos and law and order problems cropped up on large scale due to the

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occurance of the struggle for throne among the successors of the Maharaja. Whereas, in Jammu hills Maharaja Gulab Singh (1846-57) established security very effectively. Consequently, again several sufis of the Punjab understood the Jammu hills more suitable than Punjab for their mysctic activities. They came and settled in the Jammu. Thus the growth of the Sufism in the Jammu hills was also associated with the political stability of the areas concerned. The Sufis of the Jammu were addressed with the different terms. These terms varied from from period to period. The most popular term used for the Jammu hills sufis was the Pir. The Pir term was or is used mostly for the sufis of the period from 13th to the 17th century. Pir Roshan Ali Shah, Pir Mitha, Pir Lakhdata, Pir Zahir Wali Shah, Pir Shahan Shah Wali were the famous sufis of the Jammu hills for whom the term Pir is used from medieval period onwards. The Shah term was also very much used for the Sufis. Bargad Ali Shah, Pir Ali Shah, Fazal Shah, Mangal Shah, Pir Bukhar Shah, Pir Sufi Shah, Qasim Shah and Khaki Shah and Sayyid Shah Ghulam Badshah were the prominent Sufis who were addressed with the term Shah. The term Sayeen was used by some of the famous sufi saints of the Jammu hills. The terms Shaikh, Sayyid, Baba and Qalandar were also used for the sufis of Jammu hills.13 It has already been mentioned that some of the sufis of Kishtwar used the Rishi term as symbol of their identity in terms of their Silsila. However, the terms Pir, Shah, Sayeen, Shaikh, Sayyid, Baba and Qalandar etc. were used for the sufis in general term. These terms had nothing with the Silsila identiy. From the 13th century onwards sufism became one of the popular philosophies in the Jammu hills and the activities of the Sufis received tremendous social support. The sufis performed different types of the activities. Most of the Sufis of the Jammu hills performed miracles (Kashf wa Karamat). It is said that the king of Jammu was so much impressed from the miracles of Pir

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Roshan Ali Shah that he came to meet the sufi. About the Pir Mitha it is famous that once he tied his horse nearby his hut and went out of his home.From the 13th century onwards sufism became one of the popular philosophies in the Jammu hills and the activities of the Sufis received tremendous social support. The sufis performed different types of the activities. Most of the Sufis of the Jammu hills performed miracles (Kashf wa Karamat). It is said that the king of Jammu was so much impressed from the miracles of Pir Roshan Ali Shah that he came to meet the sufi. About the Pir Mitha it is famous that once he tied his horse

From the 13th century onwards sufism became one of the popular philosophies in the Jammu hills and the activities of the Sufis received tremendous social support. The sufis performed different types of the activities. Most of the Sufis of the Jammu hills performed miracles (Kashf wa Karamat). nearby his hut and went out of his home. After some time the horse felt thirtyness, there was nobody to provide water to the horse. But suddenly a fountain was raised and two trees sprang up. The horse drank the water and ate the leaves of the trees and met his both thirstyness and hunger. Several such types of miracles are associated with the almost all the sufis of the Jammu hills. But these miracles had great significance in terms of the popularity of the sufis. A large number of the persons became the followers of the sufis. Several persons became the

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disciples(Murids) of the Sufis. The sufis of Jammu also worked for the spread of the philosophy of Unity of Being. They popularised the concept of living together and inclusiveness. They concentrated only on those social activities which were meant for the welfare of the people. It is known that the Sufis not only organised discourses among the persons of different religious background, but they also organised langar(free kitchen). Some of the sufis are also known to have contact with Sikh Guru Nanak. They not only derived legitimacy from the Sufism, but, more importantly, they also sought legitimacy from Guru Nanak. It is said that Pir Mitha came to Jammu from Multan. But When he was at Multan, once Guru Nanak came to Multan along with his disciple Mardana. Pir Lakhdatta met the Guru. He was very much impressed from the personality of the Guru. He presented some grains for the Guru so that he could cook and eat it. Though the Guru accepted the offering of the Pir, he did not eat it himself and gave it to Mardana. The Pir understood that the Guru did not eat grains. Therefore, he offered some milk to him. Again the Guru gave it to Mardana. The Pir was very much surprised and understood that since the Guru was a non-Muslim, he did not accept anything from the hands of a Muslim. The Guru understood the suspicion of the Pir. He called him and taught him the spirituality. Afterwards, the Pir concentrated only on the social services. Similar association between Buddhan Shah and Guru Nanak is said to have existed. Thus, the sufis of Jammu hills respected the sentiment of others and established that every opinion deserved to get the attention of people. They became a source of dialogue among he persons of different religions and other social background. Their Khanqah and shrines acted as the meeting places of the different religions. In the words of Mridu Rai, these sufis were instrumental in the spread of the concept of"regions pray together and stay together."14 The Sufis of the Jammu hills also worked to maintain ecological bal-

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ance. They taught the people that tree plantation was the pious work. Many of the Sufis participated in the plantation of trees. Similarly, they also founded the water sources, particularly the baolis. The trees planted by the sufis and the water sources founded by them had medicinal values. The leaves and fruits of these trees and water of the sources cured certain deseases. Pir Lakhadata is famous for the plantation of such trees and foundation of water resources. It is also said that Shah Ghulam Shah Badshah of Rajouri planted a tree which became everlasting tree, known as Sadabahar. It still survives. It produces a type of fruit throughout the year. It is prohibited to pluck the fruit. Only those can be used which comes down the tree naturally. It is known that whosoever gets the fruit and eats it, his or her prayer is granted. The uniqueness of this fruit is that it never perish. It is also known that the use of the leaves of this tree is also very useful in getting a child.15 Since both the trees and water were sources of the livelihood of the hill people, the sufis participation in these works made them sacred works and discouraged the cutting of the trees and pollution of water. It is important to mention in both Islam and Hinduism tree plantation of trees is treated a pious work. The social services of the sufis were very much appreciated and supported by the people of the Jammu hills. The extent of the people's affiliation with the sufis can be estimated from the fact that the shrines of these sufis are well protected by the people generation after generation. Still the a large number of people visit these shrines on every Thursday and offer sweets and flowers. The Sajjadanashin or Gaddi Nashin organised and continue to organise annual urs in the memory of buried sufis. It may be mentioned that not only the common people of Jammu hills works together in terms of protecting the shrines and propagation of the teachings of the sufis, but the Maharajas of Jammu from Maharaja Gulab Singh onwards worked for the preservation of these shrines. It is known that Gulab Singh, as a jagirdar

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of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, requested the Maharaja for the grant of land to the shrine of Shah Ghulam Badshah, situated in Rajouri district. Maharaja accepted the request and granted land for the expenses of the shrine.16 Similarly, Maharaja Gulab Singh granted fifty Kanal lands to the shrine of Pir Wali Shah at Katra in Udhampur district.17 Both Maharaja Ranbir Singh (1857-85) and Maharaja Pratap Singh extended financial support and renovated a number of the sufi shrines of Jammu hills. More importantly, Jai Singh, the king of Kishtwar, accepted Islam under the influence of Sayyid Farid-ud-din Qadiri during

The location of the sufi shrines are also the symbol of the identity of the area concerned. Even some of the localities of the Jammu hills are known in the name of the sufi of the area. The localities such as Pir Mitha, Lakhdata Bazar and Jiwan Shan are some instances in this regards. the 17th century and received the title of Bakhtiyar Khan. The location of the sufi shrines are also the symbol of the identity of the area concerned. Even some of the localities of the Jammu hills are known in the name of the sufi of the area. The localities such as Pir Mitha, Lakhdata Bazar and Jiwan Shan are some instances in this regards. Thus, the sufis of Jammu hills not only brought the people together during medieval period, but their shrines inspire the people to work together in contemporary period. Even some of the shrines are maintained by the Sikhs and Hindus. The sufis contributed to making the Jammu region as the meeting place of the different opinions, religious trends and people of different classes. Pluralism was both propagated and practised by them. They received tremendous social support in the intensification of the concepts of peace and non-violence. They also initiated the process of the dialogue between indigenous

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and non-indigenous culture and established that association of both of them was a long lasting source of social security and economic progress of the region. The existence of the sufi shrines almost in all localities of Jammu region in contemporary period, irresective of topography and nature of population, is a certificate of the everlasting influence of their philosophy and practice on social life of Jammu region.

Notes and References

1. J. Hutchison and J.P. Vogel, History of Punjab Hill States, Delhi 1993, pp. 2. Abul Fazl, Ain-i-Akbari, Vol.II, Eng. Tr. by Jarret, Corrected and further annotated by Sir J.N.Sarkar, Delhi, 1994, pp. 3. A.Q.Rafiqi, Sufism in Kashmir, Srinagar, 2003, pp. 19, 35-154 4. Shiv Nirmohi, Duggar Ke Darvesh(Hindi), Udhampur, 2005, pp. 44-146 5. Shivji Dhar, Tarikh-iKishtwar(Persian), Jammu, 1962, pp.36-37 6. Rafiqi, Sufism, p. 191 7. Mirza Zafarullah Khan, Tazkirah-i-Bemisal, Rajgan-iRajour(Urdu), Jallandhar, p. 137 8. Shiv Nirmohi, Duggar ke Darvesh, p. 154 9. Rafiqi, Sufism, p. 191 10. Molvi Hashmatullah Lakhnavi, Mukhtasar Tarikh-i-Jammu wa Kashmir(Urdu), Jammu, 1992, p. 166. G.M.D.Sufi, Kashir,Vol.I, Delhi, 1974, pp. 66, 115-16 11. Shiv Nirmohi, Duggar ke Darvesh, pp. 44-163 12. Sadullah Sad Faridabadi, Shah Farid-ud-din Baghdadi (Urdu), Doda, 2000, pp. 94-96 13. Shiv Nirmohi, Duggar Ke Darvesh, pp. 44-163 14. Mridu Rai, Islam, Rights and History of Kashmir, Muslim Subjects, Delhi, 2004, pp. 76-77 15. Khush Dil Maini, Ziarat-ISayyid Baba Ghulam Shah Badshah, Shahdara Sharif(Urdu), Jammu, 2000, pp. 3-4 16. Shiv Nirmohi, Duggar Ke Darvesh, p.117 17. Ibid.,p. 105 18. Molvi Hashmatullah, Mukhtasar Tarikh, p. 167.

Epilogue, March 2011

FEATURES

GENDER BIAS IN KASHMIR

Bearing the brunt of social prejudice and conflict ZEENAT ZEESHAN FAZIL All is not well with the women of the 'paradise on earth'. Kashmiri society continues to be repressive towards the fair sex who are burdened with discrimination and even in extreme cases violence. Over the last two decades of conflict, issues of security and physical attacks have been superimposed on the women already struggling with a raw deal in society. All this needs to change to which the larger society and polity must take onus

he killing of two young women in Sopore has drawn the ire of many in Kashmir's multi-layered society and polity. The last few months have been a period of relative quiet after the spiral of violence last summer and killings that have now erupted are once again a reminder of how tenuous this peace may be. The incident is no doubt horrific and highly condemnable, but it also depends on the lens one is looking at such acts of violence. Is it only an incident triggered by a particular set of circumstances at a particular time or is it symptomatic of a larger malaise affecting society in Kashmir, that of degradation of women in many spheres of life and in the larger society and polity? Yes, many aspects of normal civilian life are compromised in Kashmir, as in any area of conflict. But in Kashmir, there is an overlay of this reality with another one; of women being treated with insensitivity, callousness and being subjected to all manner of discrimination, and in extreme cases- violence. There is an inherited tapestry of Kashmir's societal norms which are discriminatory, that are then exacerbated by the over two decades of conflict Whatever the provocation for this incident and the steps to prevent such

In Kashmiri society, women are generally repressed. The region over the decades has witnessed tremendous change with the processes of industrialization and modernization ushering in enhanced levels of economic prosperity and education. The traditional role of women in society has also changed but it has also brought about new areas of stress within the old mould. Pre-conflict, the suicides amongst women can be said to reflect this but there has been an alarming rise of suicides over the last two decades with some 12000-18000 persons committing suicide. According to leading sociologist, Dr. Bashir Ahmed Dabla suicides amongst women are more. He cites the ongoing conflict as the major underlying factor.

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attacks in the future, the fact still remains that women in pre-conflict Kashmir have suffered in different ways. The problem is deep-rooted, pervasive. Social prejudices reinforce the woman's identity as being subordinate to the male. Domestic violence is more widespread than is reported. Dowry is an ugly reality with ceaseless demands leading to a high degree of stress. According to Dr. Mushtaq Margoob, well-known psychiatrist in the Valley "Women's physical and mental health is often permanently damaged or impaired. In some cases there can be fatal consequences as in the case of dowry deaths." In Kashmiri society, women are generally repressed. The region over the decades has witnessed tremendous change with the processes of industrialization and modernization ushering in enhanced levels of economic prosperity and education. The traditional role of women in society has also changed but it has also brought about new areas of stress within the old mould. Pre-conflict, the suicides amongst women can be said to reflect this but there has been an alarming rise of suicides over the last two decades with some 12000-18000 persons committing suicide. According to leading sociologist, Dr. Bashir Ahmed Dabla suicides amongst women are more. He cites the ongoing conflict as the major underlying factor. It is not always easy to discern how

Epilogue, March 2011

FEATURES

GENDER BIAS IN KASHMIR

the existing patterns of societal norms and attitudes towards women, reach a point of conflagration but they feed each other. A woman who has been abused either at home or has been a victim of attack, molestation or worse rape by any of the players operating in the conflict zone finds it difficult to register her complaint with the authorities. She finds very little support from the family or society and often carries a stigma for a wrong that has been done to her. The Minister for Social Welfare, Sakina Itoo agrees with this view and holds the police accountable for negligence in registering their complaints. "Hundreds of women have informed me that police refuse to register their complaints of domestic violence," states Itoo. The environment for women in Kashmir is far from conducive and the fall-out of the conflict has taken a huge toll not only on the physical security of women but their psychological well-being, mental peace. People anywhere in the world exposed to benumbing violence in any situation of armed conflict are prone to developing psychological disorders and this is equally true for Kashmir where the incidence of Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD) has grown. According to Dr. Margoob, "Women constitute more than 55% of the patients seeking treatment at Kashmir's only mental health hospital in Srinagar. Most are suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD)." Margoob says women are more prone to PTSD than men. Whether this is a reflection of the odds stacked against them or their coping mechanisms can be debated but there are no simple answers. The atmosphere of conflict pervades all of society and within that what women endure, what are the points of breakdown, what are the factors both underlying and immediately provocative, which lead to their suffering and in a sense their marginalisation? The answers need to be urgently sought. Margoob believes that hundreds of women do not approach medical help because of illiteracy and social taboos attached to the mental health hospitals. "They continue to suffer silently," he says. Abdul Rashid Hanjoora, a committed social activists says, "Women are often caught in a vicious circle of economic dependence, a sense of insecurity, a lack of awareness about their rights" These factors effectively keep a woman trapped in circumstances that maybe harmful to her physical or mental health but the shroud of privacy or so-called sanctity of a home often stops outside agencies from knowing about let alone acting upon the problem. Hanjoora also reiterates the belief that it is social stigma that prevents many cases of domestic violence being reported thus giving a false picture of the situation. He says "We need to ponder on how degradation of women can be stopped. It needs support from all quarters, be it government, NGOs and women themselves," What could signal hope is that the police acknowledges that violence against women gets 'least' attention and seeks to correct its image as being negligent by taking firm action. Says the state's police chief, Khuldeep Khoda "We are aware about most cases not getting registered in police stations not only because our administration mechanism is weak but other reasons as well. " He says increasing the number of women's police stations was a step in the direction " In order to control crime against women, we have established two women police stations - one in Jammu and another in Kashmir, exclusively headed by women officers. These have helped police a lot in controlling the crimes against women. Our target is to establish women's police stations at all district headquarters of J&K" That women have got a raw deal over the ages in Kashmiri society is now being accepted as a credible view within enlightened sections. It is vital that in the larger ramifications of seeking solutions for the region's way forward politically, economically and culturally, this is not ignored. (This article has been produced with support of Charkha Communication and Development Network, New Delhi)

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The environment for women in Kashmir is far from conducive and the fall-out of the conflict has taken a huge toll not only on the physical security of women but their psychological well-being, mental peace. People anywhere in the world exposed to benumbing violence in any situation of armed conflict are prone to developing psychological disorders and this is equally true for Kashmir where the incidence of Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD) has grown. According to Dr. Margoob, "Women constitute more than 55% of the patients seeking treatment at Kashmir's only mental health hospital in Srinagar. Most are suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD)." Margoob says women are more prone to PTSD than men. Whether this is a reflection of the odds stacked against them or their coping mechanisms can be debated but there are no simple answers.

Epilogue, March 2011