Sample Lesson by Simon Mould

Unit 7: Analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Lesson 7: The Return of the Taliban & Al Qaeda

Lesson Plan: 7.07

Unit 7 Objective: Analyze American foreign policy in the 21st Century. Objectives

Lesson 7 Objective: ď&#x201A;ˇ Understand the nature of the problems with regards to the resurrection of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ď&#x201A;ˇ Note factors contributing to the failure of nation building attempts. Captivate Attention: Start with the quote by the journalist, Rashid, depicting the dire situation that has been unfolding in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Input & Taxonomy: This lecture will present a sense of urgency among students to rethink the common perception that the war in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban after 9/11 was predominantly concluded successfully. We will note how militant groups have staged a comeback and are poised on the edge of power in this region, threatening the present stability and future liberty.

Content

Biblical Worldview: The short term need for the South Asia region is security so that the long term need of nation building can flourish. From a biblical perspective the institutions of a culture must work together, rather than apart, in their responsibilities to the people. Government provides security (Rom. 13) and the church and family provides the context for education (Dt. 6, Mt. 20). In this context, the role of nation building must involve the key input of missions based Non-Governmental Organizations that cooperate with government in the task of rebuilding the institutions of government, education, business, healthcare, etc. Comprehension & Discussion Questions: How do you think the Scripture Matthew 12:44-45 applies to the situation in Afghanistan? Conclusion: Present a vision for discovering how one might prepare to minister/serve in such a country through the provision of humanitarian assistance and nation building.

Assessment

Instructions: Read the statement by Dr. Cordesman before the House Armed Services Committee. If you were a member of that committee: 1. What might some additional questions be that you would ask Dr. Cordesman and why? 2. As a member of the House Armed Services Committee having heard this presentation, how might you bring about your concerns and solutions to the Administration? Recommended Reading: Ahmed Rashid. Descent into Chaos. (2008). Ch. 12: Taliban Resurgent.

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Unit 7: Analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Lesson 7: The Return of the Taliban & Al Qaeda

Introduction “In the region that spawned al Qaeda and in which the United States had promised to transform after 9/11, the crisis is even more dangerous. Afghanistan is once again staring down the abyss of state collapse…The Taliban have made a dramatic comeback, enlisting the help of al Qaeda and Islamic extremists in Pakistan, and getting their boost from the explosion in heroin production that has helped fund their movement.”1 Ahmed Rashid. Pakistani journalist. In Lesson 7.02 that dealt with the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the undermining of Al Qaeda operations, the lesson ended by identifying a number of issues in the 2001/2002 military campaign that later contributed to the growing problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan that have come to an apex in 2009.2  The CIA and Department of Defense power struggle: initially resulted in conflicting priorities and plans as the war in Afghanistan began to be developed in the shadow of 9/11.  Department of Defense delay in getting into Afghanistan: The DoD did not have an advance plan of attack for Afghanistan and therefore missed crucial early opportunities in pursuing vital targets.  Pakistan’s intelligence duplicity:3 The U.S. became reliant on questionable Pakistani intelligence to provide assistance in cutting off essential supplies to the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters.  Open borders with Pakistan: Al Qaeda and Taliban forces slipped through the poorly guarded border into Pakistan during the fighting in the mountains at Tora Bora. From approximately 2005 onwards the Taliban in Afghanistan and in Pakistan began to make serious attempts to regroup and interfere in the emerging democracy in Afghanistan and took advantage of growing instability in Pakistan. By 2008 the situation was dire, as depicted by Rashid, the Pakistani journalist, in the title of his book Descent into Chaos. This lesson will focus on understanding the dilemmas that faced Afghanistan and Pakistan, given the resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and will evaluate the course of action that the U.S. debated and acted upon in late 2008 and into 2009 as the Obama administration began its work.

Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. London: Penguin Books, 2008. Print. XXXVIII. 2 See Lesson 7.02, Sweeping Afghanistan of the Taliban & Al Qaeda. 3 Rashid 78. 1

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Unit 7: Analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Lesson 7: The Return of the Taliban & Al Qaeda

II.

Post 9/11 Al Qaeda Influence Following the initial campaign to disrupt the Al Qaeda network in 2001 and 2002 it seemed initially that its organizational infrastructure had been significantly undermined and its base of operations in Afghanistan had been effectively shut down. Yet it must be considered that militant groups such as Bin Laden’s operate with a tremendous amount of patience, allowing them sufficient time to gradually restructure and rebuild with the potential of striking later, when the perception of urgency has lessened. Over two years lapsed from the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the Khobar towers bombing of 1995 in Saudi Arabia, and then three years later the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, and then 2000 with the U.S.S. Cole bombing. It was not possible to estimate how long it would be would be before the inevitable attack upon Western interests would resume, such as the Madrid bombing in 2004, and the London bombings of July 7, 2005. Drawing on lessons from history, classical historian Victor Davis Hanson wrote the day after the London bombings, “Terror is the signature of the Islamist: hit, back off; hit, back off — hoping in a few years to erode the will and nerve of affluent and leisured Western countries.”4 While here in America there have been no further successful attacks, the most dramatic attacks that have been successful were the Madrid and London bombings, inspired by al Qaeda, that sought to disrupt the normal life of innocent people going about their daily lives. A. The Madrid Bombings (March 11, 2004) An Al Qaeda inspired Spanish terrorist cell conducted a series of ten coordinated bombings on the Spanish commuter railway system in Madrid killing 191 people and injuring 1800. It was widely believed that the motivation for the attacks was the Spanish cooperation with the Bush administration in providing assistance in the war in Iraq.5 The attacks were mounted three days prior to important Spanish elections were the incumbent Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar was defeated by the Socialist, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. This was the first time

Hanson, Victor Davis. “The Same Old Same Old. An Anatomy of the London Bombing.” The National Review 2005. Web. 29 May 2009. <http://article.nationalreview.com>. 5 Al-Qaeda Madrid Claim. BBC 14 Mar. 2004. Web. 26 Sept. 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3509556.stm>. 4

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Unit 7: Analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Lesson 7: The Return of the Taliban & Al Qaeda

terrorist action had directly impacted the democratic process. Even the left-center San Francisco Chronicle reported that the Spanish had rewarded the “mass murderers by electing [a] Socialist.”6 A Washington Times article expressed that the view that the spirit of appeasement was running rampant, having seen that “al Qaeda has just bagged its first Western government.”7 B. The London Bombings (July 11, 2005) In what was the deadliest attack on London since the Battle of Britain, Muslim suicide bombers detonated three bombs on the underground within 1 minute of each other, and another bomb on a London bus within the hour. The bombings took the lives of 52 people and injured 700. In comparison to New York and Madrid, it was a miracle that there were not more casualties. Given the ghastly 1995 Tokyo subway attacks where domestic terrorists used sarin gas, it was a relief that more serious terrorist methods were not used prompting The Times (London) columnist to brazenly pose the question “Is this the best they can do?” 8 Despite the seeming lack of coordinated attacks on the scale previously seen before, Al Qaeda should still be taken very seriously as real security threat in the West. Audio tapes released by top Al Qaeda leaders still continue unabashed in their call for targeting Western nations.9

Saunders, Debra J. “Spanish Voters Elect Violence.” San Francisco Chronicle 16 Mar. 2004. Web. 29 May 2009. <http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/03/16/EDGVQ5JUK21.DTL>. 7 Lindberg, Todd. (2004, March 16). “Democracy and Terrorism.” The Washington Times 16 Mar. 2004. Web. 29 May 2009. <http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20040315-082150-7769r.htm>. 8 Baker, Gerard. “Simple 20th-Century Techniques in the Service of 14th-Century Fanaticism.” The Times 8 Jul. 2005. Web. 29 May 2009. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,19269-1684948,00.html>. 9 “Al Qaeda No. 2: Attacks on Western Nations in Works.” CNN 2 Apr. 2008. Web. 4 Apr. 2008 <http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/04/22/zawahiri.targets.ap/index.html>. 6

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Unit 7: Analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Lesson 7: The Return of the Taliban & Al Qaeda

III.

The Afghanistan Situation: A. The failure of nation building Decades of conflict, first by the Soviets, then followed by the destruction wreaked by the Taliban had left a nation void of any effective civil structure and basic services. The removal of the Taliban, while an occasion for great hope was met with the somber reality of a failed state that could easily again become the breeding ground for extremist movements and hard-line political tyrants. Successful nation building is predicated upon an environment of stability where a nation’s vital institutions have the capacity to develop, mature and become viable. Experts have noted that, “Advancing reconstruction, development, good governance, and counternarcotics efforts and building effective police and justice systems in Afghanistan will require many years of relative peace and security.”10 It must be remembered that the European reconstruction plan, the Marshall Plan of 1948, brought about a significant comprehensive aid and redevelopment program to war-torn Western Europe, and a guaranteed security for forty years. This ultimately prevented the Soviet Union from expanding further into Germany. Rashid in his book Descent into Chaos presents the problem the U.S. faced at that time. The State Department faced pressure from all over the world to ensure that the rebuilding effort was substantial, but the U.S. government lacked an agency through which it could carry it out.11 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was reluctant to commit the Defense Department to the task since its efforts were stretched enough in a global war on terror. “The American failure to rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq or to move Pakistan and Central Asia toward reform and democracy made it almost impossible for Muslim moderates to support the West’s struggle against Islamic extremism.”12 B. The resurgence of the Taliban The London-based International Council on Security reported that what the Taliban had been experiencing was something of a “renaissance,” increasing its permanent presence from 54% in November of 2007 to 72% by December 2008.13 Many have even reported that the Taliban have sometimes placed themselves close to the capital city of Kabul, creating fear by threatening to disrupt trade and those travelling around the country.

Rubin, Barnette R. and Ahmed Rashid. “From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Foreign Affairs 87.6 (2008): 30. 11 Rashid 173. 12 Rashid LVII. 13 “Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance.” The International Council on Security and Development. London: MF Publishing, 2008. Web. 14 May 2009. <http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/Struggle_for_Kabul_ICOS.pdf>. 10

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Unit 7: Analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Lesson 7: The Return of the Taliban & Al Qaeda

The report cites two reasons in particular for the emboldened position of a renewed Taliban14:  The use of asymmetric measures and tactics that undermine the otherwise superior power of NATO forces. The war on terrorism began with the most profound asymmetric use of violence which would continue to be effective in their fight against the West.  Failure of the West to help rebuild Afghan institutions to the preconceived expectation. Although Western aid was substantially poured into Afghanistan, it could never be sufficient in light of the promise that life would improve under a democratic system, which clearly was taking a lot longer than had been hoped. C. The future of the Afghan government The ability of the Afghan government to maintain its hold on power throughout the different factions of the nation was and still is critical not only to the ongoing future stability of the nation but will also determine whether nation building efforts will have the chance to succeed. The incoming Obama administration recognized in early 2009 that putting pressure on Afghanistan to deal with government corruption would bring about a greater degree of legitimacy. The U.S. continues to commit itself to working with the local and national governments in providing civilian assistance to this end.15

Afghanistan’s President Harmid Karzai.

In addition, if the Taliban are not stood up to, it will communicate that a prevailing atmosphere of weakness produces a conducive political environment for the Taliban to take advantage and regain further influence in Afghanistan. Former U.S. statesman, Henry Kissinger, wrote in early 2009 that “the stakes are high. Victory for the Taliban in Afghanistan would give a tremendous shot in the arm to jihadism globally.”16

Ibid 15. “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.” The White House 27 Mar. 2009. Web. 27 Mar. 2009. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf>. 16 Kissinger, Henry. A Strategy for Afghanistan. Real Clear World 26 Feb. 20009. Web. 27 Feb. 2009. <http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/02/a_strategy_for_afghanistan.html>. 14 15

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Unit 7: Analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Lesson 7: The Return of the Taliban & Al Qaeda

IV.

The Rise of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan: The Taliban in Pakistan consisted of members of the Pashtun tribes and various elements that had fled from coalition forces in Afghanistan in December 2001. Six years later in December 2007, they announced their existence as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Students' Movement of Pakistan) based in the North West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that shares a common border with Afghanistan’s mountainous region. Their stated objectives are to17:  Resist the Pakistani army  Enforce Sharia law  Assist in resisting NATO forces in Afghanistan According to Steve Coll, President of the New America Foundation, the Pakistani Taliban can be described as “a younger generation of more violent radical leaders who are in a hurry and have no patience with compromise with the state.”18 They eliminated around 200 of the other tribal elders in the FATA territories and put themselves in a position where the Pakistani government was forced into acknowledging their hold on power in these regions. Rashid believes that the Taliban was confidently engaging in brutality and “terrorizing the population” from 2004 onwards.19 The Taliban plays on the high anti-Western sentiment among the vast majority of Pakistanis, portraying the state government as a legacy of the old colonial regime of the British. Some argue that Pakistanis are demanding the Islamization of the country and that the only ones who are attempting to resist this are the pro-British elite who have ruled since Pakistan was created in 1947.20 The softness towards the Taliban is partly due to the fact that Pakistan has mildly supported the Taliban in Afghanistan as a means of countering the Afghan government of Hamid Karzai who tends to lean on Indian

Bajoria, Jayshree. “Pakistan's New generation of Terrorists.” Council on Foreign Relations 7 Oct. 2009. Web. 29 May 2009. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/15422/pakistans_new_generation_of_terrorists.html>. 18 Coll, Steve. Cited in Bajoria, “Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists.” 19 Rashid, Ahmed. (2009, April 28). “Ahmed Rashid Discusses the Re-emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Failure of the US and Allies to Reign in the Warlords.” National Public Radio 28 Apr. 2009. Interview. 20 Qazi Hussain Ahmad. “The Dawn of an Islamic Revolution is Around the Corner.” MEMRI Special Dispatch - No. 2331. 29 Apr. 2009. Web. 17

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Unit 7: Analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Lesson 7: The Return of the Taliban & Al Qaeda

support. What makes this more complicated is that India and Pakistan’s are arch rivals for supremacy on the Asian sub-continent. In addition, it is argued that the U.S. only expected Pakistan to see Al Qaeda as the real enemy that needed to be dealt with rather than the Taliban.21 By December 2007, the U.S. government was acknowledging that Al Qaeda and the Taliban were operating with some degree of unified operations within Pakistan.22 V.

U.S. Attempts to Address the Situation: In early 2008 it was becoming increasingly evident that the significant problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan that needed addressing were due to the resurgence of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. A number of experts weighed into the argument, identifying causes and proposing solutions, which given the fact that the Bush administration was entering its final months, would largely have to be dealt with by the new U.S. administration. At the request of Congress the United States Government Accountability Office brought to the forefront the fact that the U.S. had not met its national security goals in the FATA areas in Pakistan and was relying heavily on Pakistani military in its attempt to facilitate security.23 The two most obvious options that lay before the U.S were not attractive:  Invasion into FATA which was contrary to the Pakistani desires and would likely stir up vehement hatred towards the U.S. among the Pakistani population.24  Hoping the Pakistani army is up to the challenge of dealing with Taliban militants.25 However, given the recent success of the “surge strategy” in Iraq, some analysts were calling for a third option that would dramatically increase U.S. troops in Afghanistan and secure the major cities from Taliban incursions. The idea was based upon what was seen in Afghanistan as similar elements that the U.S. was facing in Iraq such as gangsterism, sectarian violence, and militant Islamic insurgencies.26

Rashid, Ahmed. “I No Longer Say That There's a Creeping Talibanization in Pakistan – It's a Galloping Talibanization.” MEMRI Special Dispatch – No. 2348. 8 May. 2009. Web. 22 Gates, William. “Comments by Sec. of Defense Concerning Al-Qaeda Shifting Focus to Pakistan.” The Department of Defense 21 Dec. 2007. Web. 29 May 2009. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4113>. 23 “The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.” Government Accountability Office Apr. 2008. Web. 17 Apr. 2008. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08622.pdf>. 24 Biddle, Stephen. “Afghanistan, Iraq, and US Strategy in 2009. Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee.” Council on Foreign Relations 12 Feb. 2009. Web. 27 Mar. 2009. 25 Innocent, Malou. “A Model for Modern Insurgency.” Armed Forces Journal August 2008. Web. 14 May 2009. <www.cato.org/pubs/articles/malou_innocent_model_insurgency.pdf>. 26 Ibid. 21

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Unit 7: Analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Lesson 7: The Return of the Taliban & Al Qaeda

A. Do we negotiate? With the Obama administration now in place, many have been wondering if the President’s more diplomatic and multi-lateral approach to foreign relations might also be extended in the U.S. relationship with the Taliban by making a distinction between hardliners (a.k.a. terrorists) and moderates who have only aligned with militants out of economic necessity and do not share the same the shared philosophical values. Some believe that many among the Taliban can be bought off through negotiation with the softer elements of the Taliban. Others argue that the entire concept of the “war on terror” must be redefined so not as to pit two sides against one another. According to Rubin and Rashid (2008), such terms are mere rhetoric that “thwarts sound strategic thinking by assimilating opponents into a homogenous “terrorist” enemy.27 As a result the authors call for a shift from the great game strategy that engages military options to secure objectives and instead move towards a new grand bargain of cooperation with all parties. Such thinking is based upon the assumption that a deal with the Taliban that resulted in their disapproval of Al Qaeda would undermine Al Qaeda. However, such disapproval does not separate the two groups from fellowshipping over their extremist religious views. An agreement with the Taliban does not bring the Taliban onto the side of the West, it communicates to Al Qaeda that the Taliban could be successful in negotiating some terms while remaining faithful to its beliefs that still unite the two groups. At the height of the debate, the Council on Foreign Relations interviewed six experts on whether diplomatic engagement with the Taliban should be sought. Hilary Synnot, from the acclaimed International Institute for Strategic Studies actually said “lasting peace and stability will not be, and never has been, brought about by force alone.”28 One should not forget 1945 when there were there were no negotiations with Germany and Japan, only terms of surrender. Following up the comments from Synnot were equally shocking remarks from Michael Semple, former Deputy to the EU Representative for Afghanistan who said, “the best way for the United States to address the Pakistan insurgency would be to reach an accommodation with the Afghan Taliban and bury the notion that there is a jihad in Afghanistan.”29 One of the few academic experts, who has actually had significant experience as a journalist on the ground in this region, is Peter Bergen, a correspondent for CNN and professor of South Asian studies at John Hopkins University. He explains why any such deals with the Taliban are dangerous and ill-conceived30: Rashidand and Rubin 32. Synnot, Hilary. Cited in “Six Experts on Negotiating with the Taliban.” Council on Foreign Relations 20 Mar. 2009. Web. 29 May 2009. 29 Semple, Michael. Cited “Six Experts on Negotiating with the Taliban.” 30 Bergen, Peter. “Deals with the Taliban Could be Dangerous.” CNN 13 Mar. 2009. Web. 20 Mar. 2009. 27 28

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Unit 7: Analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Lesson 7: The Return of the Taliban & Al Qaeda

 Negotiations would have to take place bi-laterally between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, since Afghanistan is a sovereign state. However, it is also weak and would possibly have to concede territory and principles.  The Taliban has not shown interest in meetings but only interest in attacking U.S. and NATO forces.  The Taliban is fanatical about its cause thus difficult to do deals with.  The Taliban sees itself as winning therefore has no interest in a deal now when a better one might come about later.  The majority of the Taliban leadership is in Pakistan, therefore a deal with Afghanistan would be undermined from the Pakistan Taliban.  In past “deals” between Pakistan’s military and the Taliban, it has generally resulted in the Taliban taking greater amounts of territory.  Those Taliban leaders who were deemed “reconcilable” have already reconciled with the Afghan government.  Al Qaeda and the Taliban are more fused together than before 9/11. Would we ever consider negotiating with Al Qaeda? Then why negotiate with the Taliban also? B. The new Obama policy: The Obama administration has avoided the controversy over whether or not to engage in negotiations with the Taliban since the Taliban have not yet proven their interested in diplomacy. Given the tough stance of the Taliban, the Obama administration has found new justification in engaging Afghanistan with renewed military efforts, initially forwarding an additional 20,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan to secure its efforts. In addition, the administration communicated clearly to all parties that it sees both the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan as integrally related when it announced the appointment of Richard Holbrooke as Special Representative for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. After a thorough policy review, the U.S. government published its new policy objectives for the region31:  Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.  Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support. 31

“White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.” The White House 27 Mar. 2009. Web. 27 Mar. 2009. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf>.

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Unit 7: Analyzing U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Lesson 7: The Return of the Taliban & Al Qaeda

ď&#x192;ł Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance. ď&#x192;ł Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan. ď&#x192;ł Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN. While the U.S. has stepped up its military presence in Afghanistan, the Pakistan government broke off official diplomatic relations with the Taliban and launched a new military offensive in the SWAT areas to undermine Taliban control. (At the time of publishing this curriculum, the outcome of these operations is not yet known and would be the appropriate subject for further lessons.)

The President attends a National Security briefing in the situation room of the White House.

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