to complement the existing results framework and to infuse IFC’s strategic and operational decisions with greater attention to development results. After two years of piloting, two of the IDGs (Health and Educational Services and Financial Services) will go live in FY13. The six IDGs are— 1:
Increase or improve sustainable farming opportunities.
2:
Improve health and education services.
3a:
Increase access to financial services for micro/individual clients.
3b: Increase access to financial services for SME clients. 4:
Increase or improve infrastructure services.
5:
Contribute to economic growth (value added).
6:
Reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The IDGs have three notable features. First, data are taken from existing M&E systems wherever possible, using existing indicators. Second, IDGs are ex ante indicators based on reach from new—not existing—projects. Third, they are based on expectations at entry, with initial targets expressed over five years. Another difference between expected reach numbers and IDGs is the application of a “contribution rule.” IFC is interested in measuring the incremental reach in relation to its financing. For example, if IFC’s equity investment is 10 percent or more of project cost, 100 percent of incremental reach is attributed to IFC, but if it is less than 10 percent, then a prorated, incremental reach is counted. Although the introduction of corporate goals based on a development footprint is important, there are several issues in IDGs. •
Implicit targets are volume driven. There may be a bias toward large-scale projects that generate large IDG numbers, or toward projects in populous countries and regions without reference to beneficiaries’ poverty levels.
•
They are weak in attributing reach to IFC’s contribution. Several IDGs use IFC’s share in financing as a rule of attributing to IFC. Although there is an emphasis on taking conservative numbers, it does not have sufficient grounds to claim IFC’s role in achieving client companies’ reach.
•
There is no reference to counterfactuals (what conditions would be without IFC intervention); thus, they are not indicating impacts to the society.
•
Quality control of data is more important, especially when the IDGs are now linked to management incentive systems.
•
Given the strong emphasis on IDGs in IFC’s business decisions, there is a risk that they lead to misalignment of incentives. For example, staff might focus on measuring large reach numbers for IDGs rather than paying attention to delivering meaningful impact that IFC projects could bring to people and society.
Monitoring and Evaluation in IFC and MIGA
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