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the community that “this is just the way things are here.” This view commands adherence and we find it acknowledged again and again in accounts by different communities in the study. Even if actual practice has changed and is different (e.g., many women claimed some measure of economic independence), and even if many have let go of the norm (men must be the sole providers), the persistent belief—and reality—is that status and respect continue to be governed by the traditional gender norms. These dynamics keep change from happening. The women’s stories explored here in both more and less dynamic communities unrelentingly show that, although many women have higher expectations and more chances to work, to run for elected office, or to engage in community organizations, all too often they must still accommodate their public roles to conservative gender norms. At the same time, other women who have limited or poor opportunities to participate in the public life of their communities may be able to negotiate gender norms in ways that increase their agency, and eventually, some other outcomes, too.
Notes 1. See Fehr and Hoff (2011) for a thoughtful discussion of the literature on circumstances under which norms and preferences may be more malleable than often recognized. 2. Also noted by Duflo and Udry (2003); Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006); and others when looking at household bargaining and female labor force participation. Both studies highlight the impact that beliefs and preferences have on economic behavior and thus economic outcomes. Also see Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) for an example of how traditions surrounding men’s caste-based occupational networks in Mumbai limit young men’s returns from education more than young women’s. 3. Most of the key informants interviewed for each sample community were local officials, elected leaders, or civic leaders, although business leaders and teachers sometimes worked with our teams and completed the surveys, too. 4. This difference is not as stark among older adults in the study. 5. Specifically West Bank and Gaza, the Republic of Yemen, and Sudan, but also Umlazi township A in South Africa, Hyderabad in India, and East Jakarta in Indonesia. 6. Gary Becker (1981) conceives of economic models that account for household specialization of human capital and division of labor. For wider reviews of this literature, see Doss (2011), Alderman et al. (1995), and Dasgupta (2000). 7. See, for example, North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009). 8. In their extensive review of community-driven development programs, Mansuri and Rao (2012) find extensive problems in targeting the poor and meeting performance objectives, but they also mention more promising results from “a couple of recent studies of community-based projects, which provide microcredit, cash grants, and business- or livelihood-related training...” (11). Their review of community-driven development evaluations finds elite capture in communities that are “remote from centers of power, have low literacy, are poor, or have significant caste, race, and gender disparities” (6); and local social capital that “tends to melt away when the [project] incentives are withdrawn” (11). On Norms and Agency • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9862-3