Rule of Law as a Watermark
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Other notable laws were the Law on Administrative Punishments (1996), the Law on Administrative Supervision (1997), the Implementation Regulations (2004), and the Administrative Licensing Law (2004).8 In ancient China, people beat a drum outside the government offices ( yamen) to start litigation, to petition a visiting imperial envoy, or “to appeal to the emperor” ( gao yu zhuang). As recently as a few decades ago, the petition system had not been standardized. Under Mao, the government developed a comprehensive network of agencies, the xinfang (letters and visits) offices, throughout the county, as well as a petition system (shangfang). These mechanisms were “to petition the government for a redress of grievances by means of letters (xin) or visits ( fang),” according to Isabelle Thireau and Hua Linshan.9 The xinfang system today looks different. Under Mao, only people defined as “legitimate” could express grievances. Nowadays, the xinfang offices must, in principle, allow anyone to exercise his or her constitutional rights. Also, under Mao, the petition system mostly involved the denunciation of enemies and counterrevolutionaries. Now, it aims to maintain social stability by compensating people and solving people’s problems. In May 2005, a principle of “solving problems at the grassroots level” (ba xinfang wenti jiejue zai jiceng) was adopted. For the first time, an individual or organization could not retaliate against petitioners; if it did, it would face legal action. Although there has been an increase in the number of petitioners (12.72 million letters, calls, or visits in 2003, for example) and a growing number of visits, the success rate (in terms of petitioners’ cases being accepted) for these visits has always been low, less than 1 percent, according to unofficial statements. In the wake of Li Maorun v. Langzhong Police Station in 2001, citizens can sue local governments for actions in violation of their rights, including administrative punishments, administrative coercive measures, interference with the operation of enterprises, refusal to take action or perform an obligation, unlawful demands for performance of duties, and violations of individual rights or property rights. Cases commonly involve encroachment by the government on the interests and rights of ordinary citizens, inadequate compensation for land appropriation, illegal land seizures, and expropriation or house demolition. Since the mid-2000s, administrative litigation and landmark cases involving the government have increased as citizens become more comfortable using legal measures to protect their property from government violation. The relationship between the xinfang system and the judicial system remains unclear. In 2011, it is still difficult for the judiciary to give transparent and consistent judgments or efficient enforcement. Judicial review of government action is not permitted in situations of “national defense,” a loosely interpreted concept, or foreign affairs. In addition, judicial review is not permitted for 8 See Chen Jianfu, Chinese Law: Context and Transformation 207–60 (Martinus Nijhoff, Brill Academic 2008). 9 Isabelle Thireau & Hua Linshan, Les ruses de la démocratie: Protester en Chine (Le Seuil 2010).