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harmonized definitions of the first four sanctionable practices, as used by all of the five major multilateral development banks (MDBs).39 In 2010, in a move that further expanded the system, the Bank signed a cross-debarment accord with the other four major MDBs,40 allowing for the signatories to cross-debar firms and individuals found to have engaged in wrongdoing in MDB-financed development projects.41 Not only did this agreement establish the first four sanctionable practices as common among the five MDBs (as already noted); it also codified a common standard of proof, namely, the “more likely than not”42 standard.43 The Bank is constantly monitoring the implementation of its sanctions framework with a view to improving its effectiveness and efficiency, in dialogue with all internal actors as well as with the other major MDBs and other IOs. Similarly, the Bank is always looking for inspiration to improve transparency and fairness. This chronological development has been presented without any reference to the infrastructural developments; a few notes ought to be made. The system began in 1998 with relatively few structural due process checks and bal39 See Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption, International Financial Institutions Anti-corruption Task Force (Sep. 2006), available at http:// go.worldbank.org/VVY6KYS720. The agreement includes the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank Group, and the World Bank Group. 40 See News & Broadcast, World Bank, Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up Fight against Corruption (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://go.worldbank.org/B699B73Q00. See also Integrity Vice Presidency Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2008: Protecting Development’s Potential 2 (World Bank INT 2009), available at http://go.worldbank.org/T40HHT3RF0.
41 See World Bank, Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up Fight against Corruption, supra note 40; Integrity Vice Presidency Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2008, supra note 40. See also Stephen S. Zimmermann & Frank A. Fariello, Coordinating the Fight against Fraud and Corruption: Agreement on Cross-Debarment among Multilateral Development Banks, in International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance (Hassane Cissé, Daniel D. Bradlow, & Benedict Kingsbury ed., World Bank 2011). Cross-debarment is permitted for any of the first four sanctionable practices, namely, corruption, fraud, collusion, and coercive practices. 42 See Sanctions Procedures, supra note 4, at Article 8.01(b)(i). See also Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with Recent Sanctions Cases, No. 2010/1 (Nov. 15, 2010), paragraphs 45–51, in the UN Juridical Yearbook 2012 (“The standard of proof is predicated on the same basic considerations that underlay the omission of an explicit mens rea requirement from most of the definitions, namely the administrative nature of the proceedings and INT’s lack of investigative tools. This standard of proof is understood as being equivalent to the ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ essentially the standard to be found in civil cases in most jurisdictions. When this nomenclature was adopted in 2004, it was felt that the phrase ‘more likely than not’ would be more understandable to non-lawyers. However, the ‘more than 50%’ approach may not be the most useful or appropriate either at the EO stage or at the Sanctions Board stage. Firstly, it suggests a formulaic approach to the evidence while . . . the Sanctions Procedures calls for a discretionary approach. [Secondly . . .], the EO’s assessment of the evidence requires special considerations, given that he or she is looking at only one side of the case. The EO is actually charged with assessing the sufficiency of the evidence”), 43 World Bank, Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up Fight against Corruption, supra note 40.