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Thomas J. Prusa
Box 9.1. Antidumping Template
Box 9.2. Countervailing Duties Template
A. Antidumping actions disallowed B. Antidumping actions allowed, but with no specific provisions C. Antidumping actions allowed, with specific provisions 1. Mutually acceptable solution 2. Different de minimis dumping margin 3. Different de minimis dumping volume 4. Lesser-duty rule 5. Different duration of antidumping duty 6. Regional body or committee a. Conducts investigations and decides on antidumping duties b. Reviews or remands final determinations c. Other
A. Subsidies: Export subsidies on agriculture prohibited B. State aid: Incompatible if it distorts competition C. Countervailing duties 1. Disallowed 2. Allowed, but with no specific provisions 3. Allowed, with specific provisions a. Mutually acceptable solution b. Regional body or committee • Conducts investigations and decides on countervailing duties • Reviews or remands final determinations • Other
Box 9.3. Global Safeguards Template
There are differing views on the impact of this specific provision. Using a time dummy to control for the pre-PTA versus post-PTA effect, Jones (2000) finds a statistically significant reduction in both U.S. antidumping filings against Canada and Canadian antidumping filings against the United States after NAFTA took effect. Blonigen (2005), however, incorporates information on actual panel activity and finds no evidence that binational reviews under Chapter 19 of NAFTA affected the frequency of U.S. filings or affirmative determinations against Canada and Mexico. The fact that the United States has refused to include a similar provision in any subsequent PTAs suggests that U.S. policy makers believe that the binational panels have altered the pattern of protection. Countervailing duties. In contrast with the provisions on antidumping, which address key statutory criteria, the provisions concerning countervailing duties include very few substantive rules (see box 9.2). As previously discussed, this absence is probably related to the lack of limits on state aid and subsidies in PTAs. Two provisions regarding countervailing duties appear noteworthy. First, some PTAs specify a series of steps that members are first required to take to try to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome before the countervailing duty investigation begins. Such provisions might lead to fewer disputes, although to date there is no empirical evidence regarding their impact. Second, provisions giving regional bodies the ability to conduct countervailing duty investigations or to review and remand final determinations have received significant attention, and there is some empirical support for the hypothesis that they do reduce the number of disputes. Global safeguards. Provisions that allow PTAs to exclude members from global safeguard actions have received considerable attention. Imports from PTA members may be
A. Rights and obligations under GATT Article XIX/ Safeguards Agreement retained B. PTA members excluded from global actions under defined conditions 1. Grounds for exclusion a. Imports from the other party do not account for a substantial share of total imports b. Imports from the other party do not contribute to serious injury or threat thereof 2. Definitions a. Substantial share • Imports are among the top five suppliers during the most recent three-year period • Exports jointly account for 80 percent of the total imports of the importing country b. Contribute importantly to serious injury • Growth rate of imports from a party is lower than the growth rate of imports from all sources
excluded from a global safeguard action if those imports do not account for a substantial share of total imports and if they do not contribute to serious injury or the threat thereof (box 9.3). Most PTAs describe very precisely what is meant by “substantial share” of total imports and “contribute importantly to serious injury.” For example, a number of PTAs state that imports from a PTA partner do not constitute a substantial share of total imports if that partner is not among the top five suppliers during the most recent three-year period. Similarly, imports from a PTA partner do not contribute importantly to serious injury or threat thereof if the growth rate of those imports during the period of serious injury is appreciably lower than the growth rate of total imports from all sources. The WTO Appellate Body has repeatedly rejected safeguard actions from which PTA partners are excluded. As noted earlier, these exclusions are highly contentious and have prompted non-PTA members to file multiple WTO