CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS
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EXTERNAL STRESS RE
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VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY
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EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES
Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink Drawing on lessons from national reformers
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eadership actions to restore confidence of stakeholders and citizens in collective capacities for change are a crucial first step in moving away from the brink of violence. As chapters 2 and 3 described, the trust that the population and stakeholders have in state institutions to deal with violence can become shaky when insecurity is rising, or in the aftermath of repeated bouts of conflict. Knowledge about effective ways to restore confidence in countries affected by violence is limited. This chapter thus expands ideas explored in the policy and academic worlds, with lessons drawn from the WDR background papers and country consultations, including the views of national reformers involved in efforts to lead their countries away from the brink.1 Analysis of country cases reveals a variety of pathways away from the brink—but also suggests two common elements. The first lesson is the importance of building inclusive-enough coalitions and identifying the signals and commitment mechanisms2 that can galvanize support for change. Second, national reformers have delivered results on the ground to build confidence in citizen security, justice, and economic prospects.
In both elements, successful transitions made astute use of supplemental capacity beyond government: from the private sector, from traditional institutions, and from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This chapter considers what makes coalitions “inclusive-enough” and the signals, commitment mechanisms, and early results that can help achieve momentum for later institutional transformation.3 These pathways away from violence have been analyzed in the literature. Stedman and Nilsson suggest that pacts to end violence need not be all-inclusive—they can promote peace if they are minimally inclusive at the beginning.4 Fearon, Keefer, Azam and Mesnard examine why some conflicts may be more intractable because of distrust and how commitment mechanisms (ways to ensure that promises will be difficult to reverse) can be designed to solve those problems; examples include peace agreements, power-sharing arrangements, and security sector reform.5 Societies use these and other commitment mechanisms to suit conditions on the ground. More important than the form of these mechanisms is their adaptability to changing conditions over the course of multiple transitions. The lessons explored in this chapter build on this research through practical country examples and cross-country lessons.