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such as codes and standards. While programs in the West have been extensively evaluated and modified based on these evaluations, there has been much less monitoring and evaluation of codes and standards programs in developing countries. This is in part because these programs are younger, but also because the programs are stretched to deal with enforcement, and monitoring may drop in the list of priorities of a poor country. There is very little World Bank documentary evidence on the success or failure of the codes and standards components of Bank projects. Monitoring and evaluation of this kind of effort cannot end with project closure, but requires tracking of standard adoption and implementation. Aside from the Thai project, there is very little evaluation of the energy and emission There is little results of the codes and standards. The documentary evidence Thai labels, for example, have reduced regarding the success of annual electricity consumption by the codes and standards 1,200 GWh. For most projects, there is components in Bank no information on the estimated CO2 projects. emission reductions from the standards, labeling, and/or building energy code components. Calculating these emission reductions is relatively easy once the energy savings are determined, given information about the source of electric power. The lack of documentary evidence is most likely linked to financing: the codes and standards work received only a fraction of the financing in any given project, and was thus not the priority of assessments at project close. The lack of evidence on the results of these project components also makes it difficult to learn from them. One point that does come through from the documentary evidence is that funding for the codes and standards components was reduced in several cases. This is true in both Uruguay and, to a certain extent, Brazil. There is no reason given for the funding reduction in the Uruguay project. In Brazil, overall, the testing, In several cases, funding certification, and labeling component for the components was of the project was given greater reduced. emphasis when the project was 72
restructured. However, a subcomponent most closely linked to code and standard development was canceled: the problem was a poor-quality report prepared by a consultant. In the case of the Jamaica DSM project, the Jamaica Bureau of Standards had initially requested a higher level of funding for testing and building capability to handle the country’s new appliance standard program, but ultimately this was not considered a priority for DSM. The Project Appraisal Document also mentions a concern that the Jamaica Bureau of Standards might not be able to test equipment for the DSM program fast enough; the project contingency plan for handling this risk was to test equipment in the United States. The Jamaica DSM project did build some lasting capacity and testing capabilities at the Jamaica Bureau of Standards, but the country was clearly willing to go farther during the project. The designers of the Vietnam DSM project actually considered including a component on codes and standards, but this was not part of the final project design. The Project Appraisal Document notes: The project considered additional efforts to support the codes and standards work initiated under the SIDA-supported first phase. However, given the very low demand for energy efficiency equipment at present, combined with the limited government capacity to test and enforce national standards, it was determined that an initial focus on creating greater market demand for energy efficiency equipment would be a more appropriate priority at this stage. As the program and markets develop further, the appropriateness for national standards and codes would improve as well as the prospects for successful introduction and implementation. This excerpt reflects the view that codes and standards are unlikely to transform markets. Experience from around the world indicates that this is not the case.