continue providing care is also a major concern: “There is a real danger of unpaid informal caregivers becoming overloaded and feeling compelled to move their elderly family members to an institution” (Chawla, Betcherman, and Banerji 2007, 34) Such caregivers will need to be provided with support. Looking after other persons, raising children, and performing housework are the main reasons women give for staying out of the labor force or working part time. A recent Eurostat survey finds that women are “held back from working full-time by the work that they carry out raising children, looking after other persons, or housework; this was the single largest reason (36.0 percent) for women working less than 30 hours per week in 2007, in contrast to the proportion (5.0 percent) of men for whom this was the reason that they worked less than 30 hours per week” (European Commission 2010, 27) (figure 2.16). Innovation in policy design is needed to avoid unwanted substitution effects between raising fertility rates and discouraging female labor force participation. In Romania, the child allowance benefit is a monthly cash transfer for a parent who stays at home to take care of a child. It is equivalent to 85 percent of the average income earned by the par-
Figure 2.16
Reasons Men and Women Work Less Than 30 Hours a Week, European Union, 2007 percent of responses
Housework, looking after children or other persons Do not want to work more Cannot find a job for more hours Number of hours in all jobs are considered as full time Personal illness or disability Undergoing education or training Other reasons 0
10
20 Women
30 Men
40
ent over the past 12 months and is available until the child is 2 years old (box 2.4). This type of policy does not specify which parent should stay at home to receive the benefit, though it is more likely that mothers will. This raises the question of whether this policy will have the same impact as a maternal leave policy. Answering this question would require significant national dialogue, but also thorough consideration of the entire range of family policies, such as the maternity leave, so as to be consistent, gain efficiency, and foster accurate targeting. The enrollment rate in childcare facilities among under-3-year-olds is lower, on average, in Europe and Central Asia than the observed average rate in se-
Box 2.4: Family Policies in Romania The state child allowance is a monthly cash transfer to all children age 0 to 18 (or more if the child is still in school), with differentiated benefit levels for all children 0 to 2 years old (RON 200), children 2 to 18 years old (RON 42), or children with disabilities who are 0 to 3 years old (RON 200) or 3 to 18 years old (RON 84). The value of the benefit has been raised five times since it was implemented. The child-raising benefit is a monthly cash transfer for a parent who stays home to care for a child. It is equivalent to 85 percent of the average income earned by the parent over the previous 12 months. The value ranges from a minimum of RON 600 to a maximum of RON 4,000. It is granted until the child turns 2 years old or 3 if the child is disabled. On January 1, 2011, the parameters of the program were modified. A parent who opts to participate in the program for two years receives a monthly allowance equivalent to 75 percent of the average income earned by the parent over the previous 12 months. The value of the benefit ranges from a minimum of RON 600 to a maximum of RON 1,200. A parent who opts to participate in the program for one year receives a monthly allowance equivalent to 75 percent of the average income earned by the parent over the past 12 months. The value of the benefit ranges from a minimum of RON 600 to a maximum of RON 3,400. Parents who opt for the one-year program and return to work before the end of the program are eligible for a back-to-work bonus of RON 500 per month for the second year upon their return to work. These programs have resulted in a modest increase in fertility rates at the expense of a reduction in labor force participation among parents of childbearing age. These programs may be revised in light of further analysis to achieve the same goals in a more efficient and simpler way. The overlap in the programs increases costs, allows room for error and fraud, and could be eliminated or reduced through simplification and coordination with other family and social programs. Source: World Bank (2011c).
Source: European Commission (2010).
Women in the Labor Market
59