Rafale carries out different complex combat assignments simultaneously. This makes it different from so-called “multirole” or “swing-role” aircraft. Higher systems integration, advanced data fusion, and inherent low observability all make Rafale the first true omnirole fighter. Able to fight how you want, when you want, where you want.
n 16 October, during the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 20th National Congress, President Xi Jinping secured a third term as China’s national leader, making him one of the strongest leaders to hold the post in decades. He has also surrounded himself with loyalists in the Standing Committee and Politburo, making it highly unlikely that there will be any significant change to his policies.
For the Republic of China (Taiwan), this means that at best China’s rhetoric about unification will continue. It is also likely that the Chinese military will maintain their aggressive exercises around Taiwan’s air and maritime borders, as they have been doing for some time. The fate of Hong Kong following the rapid reneging of the “one country, two systems” approach, means that Taiwan’s population are in no doubt that this would also happen to them.
However, the modernisation of the Chinese military will continue, broadly following the three stage strategy laid down in 1997 by President Jiang Zemin. Articulated by the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief Volume: 21 Issue: 6, the three steps that were defined are:
“Step One (1997–2010): streamline and reduce the number of military personnel, establish a more efficient structure, and acquire advanced equipment and weaponry suitable for combat under high-technology conditions.
Step Two (2010–2020): utilise growing defence expenditure to significantly enhance the quality of the armed forces through the development of more advanced equipment and weaponry.
Step Three (2020–mid-century): realise modernisation of national defence and the armed forces “by the century’s mid-point”. [This projects out to 2050].
According to a survey of leading China-Taiwan relations experts conducted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) China Power Project, published on 19 September, the clear majority (84 percent) believe that China is still prepared to wait for unification, although this is not open-ended, with 44 percent believing that the deadline for the reclamation of Taiwan is 2049. Furthermore, over half believe that China will continue to escalate the use of force in the next decade.
There was a unanimous view among those surveyed that China believes that the US would still deploy its military to defend Taiwan, and over half think that the US military would still have an advantage over China. Equally, the experts believed that a declaration of independence by Taiwan would trigger an invasion.
The continual development of the Chinese armed forces, together with a strategy of trying to push the US military - particularly the US Navy - away from what China deems as its ‘back yard’ (South and East China Seas - and beyond), may yet seek to exploit any weakness in the US commitment to Taiwan and the region in general.
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Overcoming the challenge of disrupted communications for special forces operating in contested environments.
On 1 September, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) published its ‘UK Space Power’ Joint Doctrine which outlined some of the challenges facing the Armed Forces in terms of vulnerability to spacebased Global Positioning System (GPS) signals.
As the report described, GPS signals continue to be “susceptible to jamming or deceptive spoofing” in contested areas of operation- something which has been highly prevalent in the ongoing war in Ukraine since Russian forces invaded on 24 February.
The report described how even low power jammers could be easily and quickly deployed to “prevent the receipt
by Andrew Whiteof GPS signals across an area of several square kilometres”.
“There is very limited recourse to nonspace based systems given GPS services are integrated into most land systems from tactical radios to missile systems,” the MoD document explained.
GPS is routinely used by special operations forces (SOF) to support positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) as well as strategic satellite communications (SATCOM) providing high capacity reach back to headquarters often located hundreds if not thousands of miles away.
Between 5-6 October, senior commanders from across the European and North American special operations community gathered in Budapest,
Hungary to discuss the ongoing war in Ukraine and the future of special forces around the world.
One of the most relevant discussions conducted at the GSOF Europe Symposium was that of communications in contested environments, similar to those being experienced first hand by Ukrainian Armed Forces Special Operations Forces (UASOF) in the ongoing conflict in eastern Europe.
Addressing delegates at the event, commander of UASOF, Brigadier General Viktor Khorenko demanded a series of ‘innovations’ for the special operations units under his command. He said that “secure, low visibility and low profile” communications solutions were required which would allow SOF
operators to communicate without being detected or disrupted by Russian Electronic Warfare (EW) units.
UASOF are operating a variety of solutions including L3Harris Technologies’ Falcon III RF-7800 series handheld, vehicular and manpack radio sets. Radios are capable of operating the US Army’s Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) waveform which according to the US Department of Defense (DoD) “provides secure line-of-sight transmissions”.
Critical to the success of special operations conducted by UASOF in Ukraine is command and control (C2) of units across the battlefield, something which requires a robust communications network capable of passing high throughputs of data at low latency for near real-time updates from across the battlespace. More often than not, SATCOM is relied upon to support C2 and common operating pictures.
Lessons learned from Ukraine of SOF operating in potentially GPS-disrupted areas of operation are of particular interest to special forces units around the World which might be seeking to protect operators from similar threats, albeit from different adversaries.
In North America, the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is also grappling with the problem of helping SOF to communicate in contested environments.
At the GSOF Europe Symposium, USSOCOM’s acquisition executive, Jim Smith confirmed communications in contested environments remains a top priority for the Tampa-based command although he conceded the organisation did not yet possess the solution they want.
“We’re not there yet,” he told delegates. “I want our operators to be able to talk without getting detected and have their output get to where it needs to without being altered.”
US SOF are operating a variety of software defined radios including L3Harris’s AN/PRC-163 Next Generation Tactical Communications handheld devices which support a variety of Low Probability of Intercept/ Low Probability of Detection (LPI/LPD) waveforms.
Such trends are being closely observed in the Indo-Pacific arena where the likes Japan and the Republic of Korea
are looking to protect themselves from interference by the People’s Republic of China and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for example, has already been acknowledged by the US DOD as possessing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon systems capable of destroying geostationary satellites equipped with GPS or Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) payloads- critical to enabling efficient SATCOM.
Discussing the problem of assuring real-time C2 in contested environments such as Ukraine at the GSOF Europe Symposium, SOF commanders from across Central Europe considered how to improve the current situation in support of special operations.
Defence sources explained to Asian Military Review how senior leadership from the Composite Special Operations Component Command - a temporarily deployable SOF command featuring Belgian, Danish and Dutch special forces components - had discussed challenges associated with Communications and Information Systems (CIS) in the contemporary operating environment. Similar concerns were raised by Major General Tamás Sándor, Commander, Hungarian SOF (HUNSOF) who called for his organisation and the wider community of European SOF partners to “listen to what our Ukrainian friends are telling us”.
“They can tell us how effective [C2] is in the real world. We had C2 in Iraq and Afghanistan but it is not as available as we thought in this new [operating] environment,” he warned.
“We need to be learning from Ukraine
and come up with a unique solution for SOF for an effective C2. There are also some proposed changes on the conventional side for C2 which will effect SOF,” Sándor added.
Also speaking was Brigadier General Branislav Benka, Commander of Slovakia’s 5th Special Forces Regiment who described how he had just visited Ukraine to speak with the Ministry of Defence to discuss lessons learned from the ongoing war. “We are spending hours and days to set up the network and set up the headquarters and tactical operations centres,” he described. “We are doing something wrong. We need to bring a lot of equipment to set up while the peer to peer conflict is running a different way’, Benka added.
“How do we develop a totally different type of C2 system? We are working on this as of now to develop practices and experiences coming from the ground in Ukraine,” he added before also referring to discussions regarding a SOF-specific C2 solution over recent years.
Thanks to ongoing efforts by the defence industrial base, solutions to overcome GPS and RF-jamming by adversarial EW units continues to become available to SOF around the world.
One of the most relevant solutions is self-forming and self-healing mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) which mesh together dozens and even hundreds of point-to-point nodes across a battlespace without any requirement to network with geostationary satellites. Specialist MANET radios have become incredibly popular across the international SOF community, particularly as they are a
more cost effective solution to expensive, two-channel software defined radios. Examples include Persistent Systems’ handheld MPU5 radio which features the Wave Relay MANET waveform.
According to Steatite Communications, a reseller in the UK, the MPU5 uses Multiple Input, Multiple Output (MIMO) technology to deliver “extremely high bandwidth and extended link distances with up to 100Mbps of actual user throughput, transferring high resolution imagery and HD video allowing for real-time information exchange and comprehensive situational awareness”.
“MIMO’s reliability, versatility and high bandwidth makes it ideal for blasting out necessary real-time information, such as GPS locations, maps, reconnaissance video streams, and voice messages in complex urban, subterranean, and maritime environments,” a company statement confirmed.
Also available and in use with SOF internationally is Trellisware’s family of MANET radios which run the TSM waveform, currently in service with the USSOCOM. Examples include the TW-950 TSM Shadow which according to a company spokesperson, supports “simultaneous voice talk-groups, rapid position location reporting, IP data and video streaming in a compact form factor”.
The other MANET specialist provider which also equips SOF units around the world is Silvus Technologies. Their lightest and smallest form factor handheld MANET radio is the Streamcaster Lite 4200 which also relies upon MIMO technology. Half the size and a third of the weight of its predecessor, the Streamcaster 4200, the Lite variant can support up to 20Mbps in throughput at latency levels down to as low as 28ms, according to a company source.
Before SOF deploy into a contested area of operation, commanders can also use a variety of simulation and modelling tools to assess EW threats including denial and disruption of GPS and GNSS.
Examples include MASS’s Networked EW Training Simulator (NEWTS) which features the ‘Battleye’ EW Mission Support Tool; Communications Exploitation Training Tool (COMETT); and Signals of Interest (SOI) Repository. The company states that the NEWTS is a ‘non-operational, procedural training application which has been designed to be used over LAN and / or WAN architecture.’
MASS also states that “they can be used in isolation for individual training, but when combined they replicate a real-life EW operations intelligence cycle, fulfilling collective training
environments [enabling] a suite of tools that facilitates effective signal intelligence and EW training based in our training facility in Lincoln, or can be purchased for in-house training delivery requirements.”
BATTLEYE’s technology-based mission planning tool could also be used for ‘mission planning of in-field communications to determine the impact of terrain, elevation and power supply requirements - resulting in clear and secure communications for personnel on the ground.’ MASS further explains that: “Due to the tool’s ability to highlight the complexity and range of factors that affect communications, BATTLEYE is often used as an impactful training software that helps to reduce risk.” However, MASS was unable to confirm to Asian Military Review whether NEWTS or BATTLEYE was in operational service with any SOF customers, citing operational security concerns.
Finally, the international SOF community is also paying close attention to emerging capabilities associated with low earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations.
As the UK MoD’s ‘Space Power’ document highlighted, the “majority of UK military capabilities will continue to rely on GPS in the near term, alternative GNSS capabilities are being pursued to improve resilience.”
Consequently, the MoD and partner nations around the world are looking how the potential loss of GPS signals could be mitigated by reducing dependency on legacy geostationary satellites in addition to the development of alternative solutions and services as part of a ‘system of systems’ approach.
LEO satellite constellations, which are made up of hundreds or thousands of smaller, cheaper and expendable
spacecraft compared to larger, much more expensive and cumbersome GEO spacecraft, are able to quickly hand-off connectivity to neighbouring satellites should they detect any disruption in GPS connectivity. Current LEO providers understood to be in discussions with international SOF units include Space-X and OneWeb.
In Ukraine, the armed forces have already employed Space X’s Starlink LEO SATCOM capability at the frontline although this was successfully disrupted by Russian EW units, according to the French Space Command.
One defence source associated with the technology type described AMR how LEO satellite constellations were less susceptible to attack by kinetic ASAT weapons which continue to be developed by China and Russia.
SOF are able to access LEO constellation connectivity through lightweight and compact electronically steerable antenna (C-ESA) solutions (also referred to as flat panel user terminals) which can be integrated on the roof section of tactical ground vehicles. C-ESAs, developed by the likes of Hughes Network Systems, Kymeta, Intellian and countless other providers, can allow SOF teams to not only communicate on-the-pause (COTP) but also on-the-move (COTM), even when travelling at high speed across any terrain type.
Examples include Kymeta’s Osprey
u8 user C-ESA which has been integrated on board Polaris Government and Defense’s MRZR 4x4 vehicle which is in service with the USSOCOM as the Light Tactical All Terrain Vehicle (LTATV).
Weighing 125lb (56.8kg) and measures 90cm x 90cm x 15cm, the Osprey is capable of enabling data throughput up to 195Mbps at latency rates as low as 100ms, according to defence sources.
Hughes Network Systems has designed a 22lb (10kg) Half Duplex C-ESA which can be integrated on board any tactical ground vehicle; in addition to a Full Duplex C-ESA variant for airborne ISR platforms. Finally, Intellian has designed a 9dB/k C-ESA which is small enough in size and weight be carried by a dismounted SOF operator.
Speaking to AMR, OneWeb’s Billy Bingham, head of Government at the company, described how SOF were often required to conduct missions in austere and remote regions, requiring connectivity to maximise their situation awareness and streamline decisionmaking processes.
“Capable of automatically tracking satellites even when on the move, C-ESA technologies must be small, lightweight, cost effective and modem agnostic, allowing operators to connect to commercial and military frequency spectrum bands including Ka and Ku.
“OneWeb supports a range of third party C-ESA user terminals, ideally suited to supporting SOF customers anywhere in the World, at any time,” he added before confirming COTP- and COTM-capable C-ESAs will be available to potential SOF customers in 2023.
SOF also benefit from low profile antennae and LPI/LPD waveforms which allow operators to reduce detection, disruption and interception of radio frequency signals by adversaries, Bingham added.
Special operations in GPS/GNSSdenied environments look set to become increasingly common, particularly in eastern Europe and the Indo Pacific.
As they roll out PACE (primary, alternate, contingency and emergency) communications plans, SOF must identify suitable alternatives to legacy geostationary satellite networks to ensure operators benefit from resilient and secure levels in connectivity, no matter what the operating environment.
Small and agile surface vessels continue to be fielded by Indo Pacific navies and coastguards for a wide variety of patrol tasks close to shore where there is a low level of conventional naval threats. However, they are no less important by ensuring that ‘the first and last mile’ of sea lines of communication (SLOC) remain secure from threats such as maritime terrorism and piracy.
Moreover, enduring concerns such as border and installation protection, economic exclusive zone (EEZ) monitoring and protection, as well as smuggling, human trafficking/illegal immigration and resource exploitation, and environmental pollution have also placed a premium on the resources on regional navies given the limited capacity and firepower of most constabulary organisations.
As such, small patrol vessels and other specialised craft remain relevant for these forces despite their secondary nature, and are ideal for patrolling and securing coastal waters
at an affordable cost. However, platform capability and performance are not sacrificed in the name of affordability. Indeed, several navies have clearly put considerable thought and effort into the design and specifications that have manifested in the form of unique hull forms, propulsion, mission equipment, as well as high operability levels.
State-owned company PT Pindad announced in May 2021 that its ‘Antasena’ Tank Boat prototype had undergone a series of sea and weapon trials in waters off East Java. The 18 metre catamaran successfully fired its 30mm automatic cannon at the Indonesian Navy's (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan LautTNI-AL) Paiton weapons range after having transited there from Banyuwangi.
The company is fronting a local consortium for the Tank Boat programme and is responsible for integration work on the vessel’s weapons systems, as well as domestic
and international marketing. The Tank Boat is based on local shipbuilder PT Lundin’s X18 Tank Boat platform, while PT Len Industri and PT Hariff Daya Tunggal Engineering will supply the communications equipment and battle management system (BMS) respectively.
It is expected that production Tank Boats will eventually meet the TNI-AL’s brown water and coastal security requirements, although the first prototype looks to be headed to the Indonesian Army. The craft is designed to support the Indonesian Armed Forces by conducting patrols along Indonesia's seas, rivers, and coastlines, as well as coast guard operations, said PT Pindad in a statement, adding that the programme is being supported by the Indonesian defence ministry.
According to PT Pindad, the Tank Boat has an overall beam of 6.1m and a draught of only one metre, which enables it to access very shallow waters. It can attain a sprint speed of 40 knots and a maximum range of about 600 nautical miles when cruising at 9kts.
The prototype craft is fitted with a Cockerill 3030 remote turret mounting a Northrop Grumman Mk44 30mm chain gun. It is also armed with two 12.7mm heavy machine guns mounted on separate remote weapon stations (RWS) for close-in fire support.
The design was first unveiled as the Fire Support Vessel (FSV) concept at the 2014 Indo Defence exhibition in Jakarta. It is centred on a 18m x 6.6m wide foil-assisted catamaran hull that is primarily constructed from carbon composite material and is specifically designed to operate in shallow waters.
The Tank Boat is equipped with a pair of 1,200hp MAN V8 engines and MJP450 waterjets that will accelerate it to its top speed, while a 6,000-litre fuel tank supports extended operations. The vessel will be operated by a four-person crew and can accommodate up to 20 troops, as well as launch and recover a rigidhull inflatable boat at the stern.
The company earlier partnered with Belgium’s CMI Defence to include its 105mm low pressure gun as the X18 concept’s proposed main armament, although the resultant prototype design was equipped with the Cockerill Protected Weapon Station Gen 2 turret armed with the 30mm chain gun instead.
The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) has fielded a fleet of around eight stealthy, highspeed vessels called the Specialised Marine Craft (SMC). Introduced quietly in the mid2010s, the SMC has replaced the service's 20 tonne Fast Boat inshore patrol craft. These saw service from 1990 and were subsequently retired in 2008, and are now used to perform inshore and coastal interception of maritime
threat’s as one of the nodes within the country’s multi-layered and networked maritime security architecture.
The existence of the SMC was first acknowledged during the Ministry of Defence’s (MINDEF’s) annual Defence Technology Prize awards, which recognise significant contributions by engineers and scientists in enhancing the country's defence capabilities in 2006. The SMC project team was awarded the 2006 Team Engineering Prize for "the design and development of a highly manoeuvrable and compact marine craft for the Singapore Armed Forces". MINDEF also stated that "the high-speed craft enables the crew to perform a variety of missions across the operational continuum expeditiously and effectively in the busy waters of Singapore."
The SMC is operated by a complement of four crew comprising the commander, coxswain, navigator, and a weapons/ communications specialist. According to the RSN, extensive human-factors engineering has been incorporated to increase crew effectiveness including multifunction and reconfigurable consoles that enable each crew member to access critical information and systems from their respective stations.
However, the RSN has also stated that the SMC can undertake higher end missions such as force protection for other RSN assets as well
as broader maritime security operations with the service’s Littoral Mission Vessels (LMVs). The latter are larger, multirole platforms designed for a broader range of operations including coastal patrols (with a longer endurance compared to the SMCs) and air defence through their VL Mica surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
The RSN first fielded a 22m long x 5.5m wide prototype that served to refine programme requirements as well as acting as a testbed to validate new technologies as development progressed. The prototype is understood to have commenced from around 2003 in partnership with ST Engineering Marine, the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) and DSO National Laboratories. After the first craft entered service it was subsequently evolved through extensive at-sea testing and user feedback into an improved 25m long x 6m wide design which was delivered to the RSN for trials around mid-2014.
According to official specifications released by MINDEF, the SMC is powered by two MTU 16V2000 M94 diesel engines each rated at 2,600hp which power two Hamilton HM651 waterjets that enable the vessel to attain maximum sprint speeds in excess of 30kts, although observers believe that the actual speed is significantly higher given its wave-piercing, speed-optimised hull form. The
craft is also stated to be capable of operating up to a range of 250nm while at 20kts.
The SMC is armed with a forwardmounted Oto Melara Hitrole G stabilised weapon station with a 12.7mm heavy machine gun in a stealthy housing. It is also outfitted with a long-range acoustic device (LRAD) to warn off intruding vessels, while crew situational awareness is enhanced by a mast-mounted electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor turret with an integrated laser rangefinder that has been developed by
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ST Electronics subsidiary STELOP (now Advanced Networks & Sensors, or ANS). In addition there is an extensive communications suite that supports seamless access to the RSN’s common maritime situational picture and can exchange information with other surface assets and shore headquarters.
The Royal New Zealand Navy’s (RNZN’s) Naval Patrol Force currently comprises two Lake-class inshore patrol vessels (IPVs) –HMNZS Hawea and HMNZS Taupo – and two Otago-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) – HMNZS Otago and HMNZS Wellington – which conduct presence and deterrence activities and constabulary tasks, respectively.
The Naval Patrol Force is responsible for ensuring good order at sea in New Zealand’s immediate areas of interest. While the IPVs are mainly deployed for patrols within 24nm of the coastline, they also possess enough range (up to 3,000nm) to deploy on operations around neighbouring Pacific Island countries. In contrast, the OPVs conduct patrols out to the limits of the country’s maritime domain, including the Southern Ocean and Antarctica.
The IPVs have seen only limited service due to chronic manpower shortage and it is understood that the RNZN has only able to fully crew two of the original four vessels since 2012. Two IPVs were decommissioned on 17 October 2019 and being disposed with the longer-term intention of phasing out the remaining two vessels in favour of another OPV as part of its transition towards focusing on missions in the wider Pacific Ocean region under the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) 2019. The document stated that OPVs had proven better suited to New Zealand's needs than the IPVs due to the former’s longer range, greater endurance and ability to support helicopter operations.
In March 2022, Babcock signed an agreement with the New Zealand Defence Force to carry out maintenance and upgrade work on the two decommissioned IPVs that have been subsequently sold to Ireland. The two vessels, ex-HMNZS Rotoiti and exHMNZS Pukaki, were acquired by the Irish Ministry of Defence for the country's naval service in a government-to-government agreement announced on 11 March which was worth $28 million. The acquisition includes a requirement to restore the ships to Lloyds classification standards in New Zealand before being delivered to Ireland in April 2023.
“The scope of work will include an overhaul of the main and auxiliary engines, docking both vessels for hull preservation, propellor and rudder overhaul, inspection, service, and commissioning of all electric, mechanical, hydraulic, and communication systems required to return the vessels to Lloyds class,” stated Babcock, noting that other work on the vessels would include modifications to ensure compatibility with the equipment fit of the rest of the Irish Naval Service's (INS’s) fleet.
The Lake-class IPVs are intended to replace the INS's Peacock-class coastal patrol ships LÉ Orla and LÉ Ciara following their planned withdrawal from service as part of efforts to modernise and rebalance the fleet. The Lakeclass IPVs require less than half the crew complement to operate (20 compared to 44), and can therefore be more readily deployed to conduct patrols in the Irish Sea and southeast coast.
The Philippine Navy recently received a boost to its coastal patrol capabilities with the delivery of the first two missile-capable fast attack interdiction craft built by Israel Shipyards.
The new vessels were christened at the service’s headquarters in Manila on 6 September 2022, spokesperson Commander Benjo Negranza told the state-run Philippine
News Agency (PNA) on the same day.
Once commissioned, the vessels will be known as BRP Nestor Acero and BRP Lolinato To-Ong. Both vessels were launched in Haifa, Israel in June 2022.
The Philippines Department of National Defense (DND) had earlier issued a notice of award (NOA) to Israel Shipyards for eight missile-capable fast craft in February 2021, although it had not disclosed the vessel type that will be procured at that time.
The identity of the new craft only came to light in May when Israel Shipyards announced that it had won a tender to supply Shaldag MkV fast patrol boats to the navy of “an East Asian country” worth around $128 million, including upgrade works at an unspecified Philippine Navy facility.
The Shaldag MkV is all-aluminium attack craft with a displacement of 95 tonnes and an overall length and beam of 32.65m and 6.2m respectively. The type can attain maximum stated speeds in excess of 40kts, and a range of 1,000nm at a cruising speed of around 12kts. It can be equipped with stabilised naval guns and light missile launchers in terms of armament, as well as a suite of EO/IR sights and detection systems.
The Philippine Navy will arm four of the new craft with the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Spike Extended Range (ER) surfaceto-surface missile systems, while the other four vessels will be armed with stabilised automatic cannons and heavy machine guns.
The Taiwan Coast Guard Administration’s (CGA’s) first 600-tonne catamaran-hull fast patrol vessel, Anping (CG601), was launched at shipbuilder Jong Shyn Shipbuilding’s facility in the southern port city of Kaohsiung on 27 April 2021. The vessel is the lead ship of a class of 12 high-speed catamaran patrol vessels for the CGA.
The ships feature a wave-piercing
catamaran hull form measuring 65.4m x 14.8m wide, waterjet propulsion, a low radar cross-section (RCS) design, and can reach a maximum speed of 44.5kts. The class has a hull draught of 2.1m and a standard range of 2,000nm at 12 kts. Each vessel can also embark an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and a medium-sized helicopter.
“The Anping-class is designed for speed and stability given its catamaran-hull, especially in the potentially choppy waters near the island’s coastlines,” a company representative told AMR.
The Anping-class is essentially a coastguard version of the Republic of China Navy’s (RoCN’s) Tuojiang-class stealth missile corvette built by rival shipbuilder Lung Teh, which is armed with the high-subsonic Hsiung Feng II (Brave Wind II, HF-II) and supersonic Hsiung Feng III (Brave Wind III, HF-III) anti-ship missiles (ASMs) and known as Taiwan’s ‘carrier killer’ ship. The RoCN also plans to operate 12 of these vessels.
The coastguard variant will typically be armed with a high-pressure water cannon in place of the Tuojiang’s 76mm Oto Melara main gun, the Zhenhai multiple rocket launcher system with 70mm guided rockets, and two T-75S 20mm remote weapon stations during peacetime operations.
Modifications to the coastguard variant also includes further hull and structural strengthening for anticipated physical impacts at sea, as well as improved berthing spaces and navigation systems intended to mitigate crew fatigue during extended patrols.
However, in wartime the vessel can be pressed into military service and be equipped with a mix of up to eight HF-II and eight HFIII ASMs, complementing the RoCN’s nascent fleet of Tuojiang missile corvettes. The RoCN will be responsible for the installation of the ASM systems, as well as providing trained crew to operate the weapons following conversion to a surface combatant.
CGA vessels often encounter belligerent Chinese fishing activity, with two of its patrol cutters swarmed and attacked by more than 10 Chinese speedboats in the Taiwan Strait in March 2021, resulting in one of the cutters being rammed repeatedly and suffering major damage to its outboard motors.
The Anping-class programme has thus far proceeded smoothly, with Jong Shyn having delivered five vessels to the CGA since the launch of the lead vessel. Second-in-class Chengkung was commissioned in June 2021 – four months ahead of schedule – while the third, fourth, and fifth vessels, Tamsui, Cijin, and Bali were delivered in October 2021, April 2022, and October 2022 respectively. Finally, the sixth vessel, Ji’an, was also launched in the same month.
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India’s biennial land and naval systems exhibition’s homegrown focus also highlights the challenges in India’s military modernisation
by Mike RajkumarThe 12th edition of DefExpo, the biennial Indian land and naval systems exhibition which concluded in October, was a showcase of Indian intentions to grow the nation’s defence industrial base but also provided an insight into the challenges therein. The show itself was witness to a peculiar obsession by India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) to find a new venue every two years. Originally held in New Dehi, DefExpo has been moved to Goa (2016), Chennai (2018), Lucknow (2020) and the latest edition was held in Gandhinagar.
Over the years, DefExpo has also gained a strongly local flavour with a greatly reduced presence from foreign OEMs, except those who already have a large presence in India. The decision to keep foreign firms away is at odds with the Government’s aspirations to grow India’s defence exports and also increase the technology base of Indian firms. The Prime Minister Narendra Modi led Government has set an export target of $4.23 billion (Rupees 350 billion) by 2025.
India’s recently appointed Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, informed attendees at the show that the MoD has already entered into defence contracts worth $7.5 billion (Rupees 620 billion) and orders worth approximately $8.5 billion (Rupees 700 billion) are in various stages of the procurement process with the Indian defence industry.
The only major announcement at the show was the contract awarded to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for 70 HTT-40 Basic Trainer Aircraft worth $822 million (Rupees 68 billion). The Indian Air Force (IAF) is to procure a total of 106 HTT-40s and is to place orders for an additional 36 on operationalisation of the first 70 aircraft. The IAF will be one of very few air forces in the world to operate two basic trainer types, as it already has a fleet of 75 Swiss Pilatus PC-7 MKIIs. HAL also displayed the army and air force versions of its Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) for the first time at the show. It has already
delivered four helicopters to the air force and army, while the LCH on display was due to be delivered by the end of the month. These helicopters are Limited Series Production (LSP) examples with the air force procuring 10 of these and the army five. The IAF inducted its first LCH squadron (143 Helicopter Unit) into service in October at Air Force Station Jodhpur.
The major theme of the show was indigenisation with India’s state-run Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU), showcasing a bewildering range of products. Two things were clear at the show however, the large amount of Russian equipment in the Indian inventory is reflected in the products offered by Indian DPSUs and strenuous efforts are being made to indigenise the components that go into these Russian equipment. According to a 2020 working paper by the Stimson Center, 70-85 percent of India's military platforms are of Russian origin.
Rosoboronexport director general Alexander Mikheev announced prior to
the start of the show, that India’s Korwa Ordnance Factory would be ready to start manufacturing Kalashnikov AK-203 assault rifles by the end of this year. The joint venture Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited, in which Rosoboronexport and Kalashnikov Concern are partners are targeting 100 percent localisation of the assault rifles in India.
The Indian State-owned firm Armoured Vehicles Nigam Limited (AVNL), which was earlier part of the Ordinance Factory Board (OFB) showcased upgrades being offered for the Indian Army’s legacy BMP-II amphibious Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV).
AVNL was showcasing a BMP-2M upgrade with a loitering munition system from Israeli firm Avision along with a 5th Generation SPIKE AntiTank Guided Missile (ATGM) from Rafael. AVNL is also undertaking an armament upgrade for the ICV with an integrated Fire Control System (FCS) with auto target tracking along with a third-generation sighting system for the gunner and commander. A MultiFunction Display (MFD) has also been integrated.
AVNL officials told Asian Military Review, that the BMP-2M will be able to operate in urban terrain, while inflicting minimal collateral damage. The addition of new weapons mean that the ICV crew will be able to independently close the sensor-shooter loop. The addition of the 5th Generation SPIKE ATGM will provide a dramatic upgrade to the combat capability of the BMP which is presently equipped with 2nd Generation Milan-2T and Konkurs ATGMs. The SPIKE ATGM can engage targets out to a range of 3.4 miles (5.5 kilometres) in ground launch mode. The BMP version of Avision’s loitering munition system weighs 26 pounds (12 kilogrammes) and has a 10lb (4.5kg) warhead. It can stay in the air for one hour.
The upgrades also showcase the failure of India’s procurement system to select a modern ICV for the army with a high-level of indigenous content and sourced from India’s private sector defence industry. India’s large BMP fleet is yet to find a replacement, forcing the army to enter into various upgrade programmes for the ICV. It is estimated that more than 2,000 BMP-IIs, across all variants are operational with the Indian Army. An Expression of Interest was issued by the army in September
2020 with the intention to upgrade 811 BMP-II/IIKs with 3rd Generation Thermal Imager (TI)-based gunner and commander sights along with a modernised FCS and automatic target tracking capability. India’s MoD had awarded a contract in June 2020 worth $120 million (Rupees 10 billion) for delivery of 156 new BMP II/IIKs by 2023. The first BMP-II built under license in India, rolled out in 1987 from Ordnance Factory, Medak.
AVNL is involved in the production the T-72 ‘Ajeya’, T-90 ‘Bhishma and homegrown Arjun Main Battle Tanks (MBT), in addition to the BMP-II ‘Sarath’. AVNL indigenised the starter generator, decontamination set, link loading machine assembly, electric Motor for T-90 MBTs and the Gyro Drift Indicator GPK-59 for BMP II, in collaboration with domestic partners in 2021. AVNL has an outstanding order book of $4.4 billion (Rupees 360 billion).
A new Indian 155mm/52 cal Mounted Gun System (MGS) was also on display at DefExpo 2022. The MGS has been designed by the Vehicle Research & Development Establishment (VRDE) in Ahmednagar and the sole prototype of the artillery system was displayed at the show. The new MGS features the indigenously developed 155mm/52cal Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) mounted on a Czechoslovakian Tatra chassis (build under license in India by BEML) and features a customdesigned armoured cabin. VRDE
officials present at the show stated that the MGS is now ready to undergo strength of design trials at the Proof and Experimental Establishment (PXE), which is in Balasore in India’s Eastern state of Orissa. Mobility and performance trials of the 8x8 chassis have already been completed at the National Centre for Automotive Testing (NCAT), located at Ahmednagar in Maharashtra. Standalone firing trials of the armoured cabin have been completed.
The ATAGS artillery system can fire High Explosive Extended Range Full Bore projectiles with (Boat Tail) – ERFB (BT) to a range of over 21 miles (35km) and ERFB Base Bleed (BB) projectiles out to over 21 miles (45km). Rates of fire are quoted at a minimum of three rounds in 30 seconds (burst mode), a minimum of 12 rounds in three minutes (intense mode) and a sustained rate of fire of 42 rounds in one hour. Time-in and time-out of action is quoted at 80 and 85 seconds, respectively. Each vehicle can carry 24 projectiles with appropriate quantity of Bi-Modular Charge System (BMCS).
Other MGS systems in contention for the Army requirement include the Caesar artillery system, offered by L&T and Nexter in 2014 and mounted on an Indian Ashok Leyland Defence 6×6 chassis. The erstwhile OFB had also showcased an MGS in 2018, based on its 155mx45 cal Dhanush (upgraded Bofors 155mx39 cal FH-77B) mounted on a BEML 8×8 Tatra chassis. The Indian Army has a longstanding requirement for an MGS since 2002 and released another Request for Information (RFI) for procurement of
a 155mm/52 cal MGS in April 2021.
Composite Armour ICV Concept
Another new land system on display at DefExpo was an indigenous Indian ICV concept fitted with a composite armour hull. Known as the ICV with Composite Hull (CICV), the vehicle is based on the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) Abhay ICV. Development is being undertaken by the DRDO’s R&DE(E) Research & Development Establishment (Engineers) located in Pune, in the Western Indian state of Maharashtra. R&DE(E) has undertaken the design, development, and fabrication of the CICV, while L&T has undertaken the integration of the composite hull and side armour. “The integration of the composite hull took 3-4 months,” an official present at the stand said.
The composite hull is comprised of monocoque top and bottom parts manufactured in E-glass-epoxy using a Vacuum Assisted Resin Transfer Moulding (VARTM) process. The side walls of the hull feature ceramiccomposite integral armour which offer protection against 14.5mm Armour Penetrating (AP) rounds. DRDO officials at the show said mobility and functional trials which would last 620 miles (1000 km) are currently in progress and need to be completed with no major failures for the programme to proceed. The new composite armoured hull matches the structural and ballistic performance of the previous metallic hull but at 35 percent lower weight. The reduction in weight allows to either improve mobility or use a lower-rated powerplant for improved fuel-efficiency and this will depend on the user requirements, the official said. The Abhay ICV with the metallic hull weighed 20 tonne and featured a 40mm main gun with 7.62mm PKT co-axial machine gun. The CICV at the show featured a representative hull with a 40mm gun but the final hull design could change based on user requirements.
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) announced the creation of an Indian subsidiary for the maintenance of the Medium Range Surface to Air Missile (MRSAM) system, which it has jointly developed with India’s DRDO. The MRSAM is in service with the Indian Army, Air Force and Navy. The new subsidiary, Aerospace Services India (ASI) is located in New Delhi and is
the sole authorised OEM technical representative for the entire MRSAM system. ASI will accept payments in Rupees.
Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) announced at DefExpo that it had completed the delivery of the 200th crown and tail-cone manufactured for Boeing’s CH-47 Chinook helicopter. TASL setup the assembly line in Hyderabad in 2017 and has also delivered crown and tail cone parts for one of the 15 CH-47 Chinooks delivered by Boeing to the IAF. The parts are supplied by TASL to Boeing’s facility in Philadelphia, where it is fitted on the Chinooks.
Garuda Aerospace an Indian drone manufacturer entered into an Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) at the show with Lockheed Martin Canada CDL Systems, to integrate the latter’s advanced Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) software solutions for defence and commercial purposes on the former’s drones. Garuda Aerospace recently commenced its $30 million Series A funding round, with current contract valuations announced as at $250 million.
BAE Systems announced at the show that it was willing to offer its 52-Calibre 155mm barrel for the M777 Ultra-Lightweight Howitzer (ULH) for manufacture in India. This would make India the first customer for the 155mm 52-calibre M777 which will weigh under 5.8 tonnes. BAE Systems also entered into a partnership with Indian firm for manufacture of titanium castings for the 155mm howitzer in India. The first subsystems will be produced by the end of this year and BAE Systems says it plans to progressively manufacture all three of the major structures (saddle, cradle, and lower carriage) that form the basis of the M777. India has 145 M777s on order.
An emerging opportunity is the Army’s urgent requirement for manportable anti-tank guided missiles and very short-range air defence missile systems. All of these will need to be manufactured in India.
DefExpo 2022 highlighted the opportunities and challenges for India’s defence industry. While the Indian Government is committed to domestic production which is a boost for the nation’s yet nascent defence ecosystem, reducing the percentage of Russian origin weapon systems with the Indian armed forces to less than 50 percent will take a decade at the very least.
A recent publication gives the most detailed and comprehensive assessment of the Chinese Army’s electronic warfare posture yet available in the open-source domain.
by Thomas Withington
Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine on 24 February provided researchers with a valuable opportunity to comprehend how her army uses Electronic Warfare (EW) to support its manoeuvre units. Published Russian Army doctrine and EW equipment orders-of-battle can be matched with the reality on the ground. Social media and accounts from those in theatre shed light on Russian Army EW against its Ukrainian foe.
In contrast, the EW posture of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces (PLAGF) are shrouded in mystery. Fortunately, the United States and her allies are not embroiled in open hostilities with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Conflict has a way of showing your rival’s hand, even if your own forces are not involved in the war.
A few clues on how the PLAGF would employ electronic warfare to support its manoeuvre force emerged from the 2021 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China report. Drafted by the US Department of Defence (DOD) this document is submitted annually to the US Congress. We current await the 2022 edition. The report warns that the PLA writ large continues to invest in capabilities and improve competencies in the sea, land, air, space, cyber and EW domains. These efforts are not occurring in service stovepipes. Instead, they focus on ensuring the PLA can fight from a joint perspective.
Electronic warfare forms part of the PLA’s counter-space posture. This wrests on jamming space-to-earth satellite signals to impede satellite communications and navigation. The PRC may also be looking at spacecraft which can attack satellite-to-satellite communications links. The report emphasises that strategic and operational electronic, cyber and psychological
(1) An offensive group advances in preparation for an assault against an enemy mechanised task force that has taken up a defensive position. The offensive group is to annihilate the enemy task force in order to weaken the enemy's overall defensive strength and provide an approach route for follow-on forces. (2) The reconnaissance group deploys in an advance guard position, with orders to reconnoiter enemy defensive positions and identify potential weak points and strong points. (3) Two frontline attack groups comprise the bulk of the main assault. They will fix the enemy and enable actions by the depth attack and thrust manoeuvre groups. (4) The depth attack group is positioned to exploit any weakness in the enemy defences. This group attempts to conceal its axis of advance in order to surprise the enemy. (5) The thrust manoeuvre group consisting of an armour battalion, a mechanised engineer battalion, and a rocket battery. waits in the rear area to exploit the successful attack of the depth attack group. (6) The firepower group, consisting of a heavy howitzer battery and a heavy rocket battery, wait to deliver decisive indirect fire anywhere on the battlefield. (7) IW and EW groups stand by to conduct EW and deception operations, aimed primarily at fooling enemy sensors, deceiving the enemy commander, and suppressing enemy communications.
Norm Wade’s new book on the Chinese Military includes excellent illustrations explaining how the PLAGF would tactically employ electronic warfare. This graphic shows EW used during the assault preparation phase where it would be initially employed for deception and for jamming hostile communications.
warfare capabilities are folded into the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF). The report calls the SSF a “theatre, commandlevel organisation” which centralises the PLA’s capabilities in these areas. EW, cyber and psychological warfare, along
with technical reconnaissance, fall under the command of the SSF’s Network Systems Department.
Why this PLA interest in EW at the operational and strategic levels? The report stresses that China’s armed forces
(1) The enemy commander, deceived into thinking that the main effort is targeting his left flank, commits his reserve in a counterattack against the northern frontline attack group. The latter rapidly transitions to a defensive posture and begins a deliberate retrograde operation, intended to overextend the enemy’s counterattack force and eventually isolate it from its command. (2) The friendly commander, having identified the enemy's centre as vulnerable, commits the depth attack group in a decisive assault. Its objective is to breach the enemy's main defensive line and isolate the two enemy flanks. (3) The other frontline attack group conducts an assault against the enemy’s right flank, fixing the enemy unit and preventing it from reinforcing the group under assault in the centre. (4) The thrust group positions itself to exploit the breach created by the depth attack group. (5) The firepower group conducts a fire assault against the enemy centre in support of the up's assault. (6) The EW group commences its decisive effort, suppressing enemy communications in order to electronically isolate enemy units and confuse response to the main assault. The IW group transitions to information attack operations, attempting to increase enemy units' perception of isolation.
During an attack’s initiation phase PLAGF electronic warfare units will continue jamming hostile communications and performing deception to hamper the red force response. Information warfare units will go on the offensive to amplify the sense of isolation for red force units facing the attack.
see EW as “an integral component of modern warfare (which) seeks to achieve information dominance in a conflict” when coordinated with cyberwarfare. The report expects the PLA to use EW early in a war “as a signalling mechanism to warn and deter adversary offensive action”. A range of hostile electromagnetic and cyber targets inside and outside theatre could be targeted by the SSF. These include satellite navigation systems, radio communications and sensors like early warning radars. During an invasion of the Republic of China (ROC), known as Taiwan, the report envisages these measures would be taken against targets
on the island as part of a larger air and maritime blockade.
The DoD’s report is a comprehensive and reliable assessment of how the PLA sees EW, incorporates electronic warfare into its strategic and operational doctrines, and would use it in wartime. However, the report is less comprehensive on how the PLAGF would use EW to support its manoeuvre force. This has been an area shrouded in mystery and conjecture until now. The Lightning Press, based in Florida, publishes comprehensive military reference books, providing “intellectual fuel for the military” according to its slogan. It’s recent Opposing Forces (OPFOR) publication
on the Chinese Military is an important addition. The book helps us understand the PLAGF’s electronic warfare doctrine and posture. Penned by The Lightning Press’s owner Norm Wade, it is arguably the most comprehensive guide on this subject available in the public domain.
To understand how the PLAGF employs electronic warfare, we must understand how the army organises its manoeuvre elements. The key tactical formation in the PLAGF is the Combined Arms Brigade (CAB). The CAB bridges the tactical and operational levels. CABs are directly subordinate to Group Armies which are in turn subordinated to Chinese geographical theatre commands.
A Combined Arms Brigade possesses organic manoeuvre forces, artillery, air defence, reconnaissance, logistics, engineer, support and communications elements. CABs are deployed in motorised light, mechanised medium and heavy configurations. Light motorised CABs transport infantry in vehicles which do not support the infantry fight while mechanised medium CABs transport infantry in vehicles with organic firepower. The army possesses circa 73 CABs across all these configurations.
Each Group Army has a Service Support Brigade. The brigade has several responsibilities including EW, logistics, communications and Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV) provision. Electronic warfare provision is subsumed into the Service Support Brigade as an EW regiment. Wade says these regiments have several responsibilities. Missions includes traditional electronic warfare along with cyber warfare. The EW regiment performs conventional electronic attack against hostile communications systems and networks. The regiment will also perform electronic support. This most probably includes the collection of operationally and tactically relevant electronic (radar) and communications intelligence. A further regimental responsibility is protecting the manoeuvre force’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum against hostile electronic warfare. This most probably focuses on detecting weak points in brigade spectrum use, remedying these and advising on emissions control. The latter is vital to ensure that hostile forces cannot use the brigade’s radio and radar emissions to find, fix and engage
CAB units. Keeping this tactic in mind, Wade surmises that the EW regiment most probably works closely with brigade artillery and air defence. The regiment will detect hostile platforms and deployments based on their radio and radar emissions. Target details will be passed to the CAB’s artillery to target the sources of these emissions at range, or to the CAB’s organic air defence.
It seems probable that Service Support Brigade’s EW regiment will make electronic warfare assets available to the CABs as and when needed. These are most likely then allotted to the Combined Arms Brigade’s Operational Support Battalions. EW is one of several capabilities deployed in these battalions. This is alongside a CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) protection company, military police and logistics. EW units are deployed at the company level within an Operational Support Battalion.
These capabilities feed into PLA information warfare and information operations doctrines. As Wade notes, information systems like hostile communications networks are “considered to be the senses and brain of a modern force … Destroying or neutralising them is an effective way of neutralising or defeating a stronger enemy”. Attriting the enemy in this regard is intended to ensure the PLA maintains information superiority at the tactical and operational levels. In other words, degrade the enemy’s communications systems while preventing them degrading your own: “Without information superiority, the Chinese believe that they cannot achieve dominance in any other domain, be it land, sea, air or space”.
To this end, the PLAGF embraces what it calls ‘system warfare theory’. This emphasises attacking sensors, communications networks and all the decision-making apparatus of the red force at all echelons. Systems warfare theory is also defensive. It emphasises the need to protect friendly decisionmaking apparatus against similar attacks by the enemy. Information superiority does not exist in a vacuum and nor is it an end in itself. Seizing and holding the initiative in the information domain is as essential as doing the same on the physical battlefield. As Mr. Wade emphasises, a major attraction of
(1) One of the frontline attack groups positions in a support-by-fire position, engaging an enemy unit and fixing it in position. (2) At the same time, the other frontline attack group conducts a limited attack against the enemy's left flank, testing the strength of the enemy defences. These two actions, conducted in concert with one another, are intended to confuse the enemy commander about the location and axis of the main assault forcing him to commit reserves early. (3) Reconnaissance units engage enemy scouts, preventing them from effectively reconnoitering friendly units and ensuring the enemy commander remains ignorant of the location and direction of the main assault. (4) The depth and thrust groups move under concealment to their initial attack positions. As the frontline attack groups conduct their attacks, the offensive group commander develops his understanding of the situation and finalises the axis of the main assault. Combat power is concentrated along this axis. (5) The firepower group conducts a fire assault against the enemy's rear area, disrupting enemy command and communication and causing casualties. (6) EW and IW units conduct electronic and information warfare against the enemy command, with their main effort focused on deceiving the enemy about the location and axis of the main assault.
Electronic and information warfare efforts continue as the manoeuvre force’s attack develops. Their efforts will also focus on the red force command to deceive it regarding the attack’s location and axis.
waging information warfare to achieve information superiority is economic. Non-kinetic means like EW directed against the enemy’s decision-making apparatus is less costly in materiel terms than conventional kinetic attacks. Nonetheless, electronic, cyber and kinetic capabilities will all be brought to bear in the information fight. Sometimes, PLAGF units may perform straightforward jamming of a hostile radio network. Sometimes, it may be more effective to inject malicious code into the network via electronic attack. The intention will be for the code to infect red force battle management systems sharing their data
on the network. Equally, it may be more effective to use fires to physically destroy communications nodes and centres at enemy deployed headquarters. Perhaps even all three vectors will be employed?
The PLAGF employs several electronic and cyberattack tactics. Standard electronic attacks against hostile communications networks and radios may including conventional noise jamming. Electronic reconnaissance will exploit these networks to eavesdrop on tactically or operationally useful traffic moving around them. Electronic deception inserts false, misleading or confusing traffic into these networks, ideally without enemy knowledge.
An offensive group conducts a pursuit attack against a retreating enemy. CA-BNs maintain continuous contact with retreating enemy formations, not allowing then to conduct rearguard or delaying actions, and not allowing them to establish a new entrenched defensive position.
(2) Attack helicopters are well-suited to support pursuit attacks; they continually harass and disrupt enemy units on the move. (3) Reconnaissance elements screen the flanks of the offensive group, ensuring that the enemy cannot mount a surprise attack on the extended friendly line. (4) Other reconnaissance elements maintain contact with the retreating enemy forces. (5) SOF teams in deep areas sabotage roads and bridges, disrupt enemy reinforcement efforts, and conduct deep reconnaissance. (6) The firepower group employs howitzers to attack retreating enemy units and rocket artillery to deploy hasty minefields across probably routes of retreat. (7) The EW group ensures that enemy forces cannot contact possible reinforcements, maintaining their isolation. The IW group concentrates on maximising the propaganda value of the victory, transmitting media of destroyed and retreating enemy units.
The pursuit phase sees EW and information warfare units isolating red forces from other neighbouring formations to prevent them calling in reinforcements. Information warfare concentrates on amplifying the effect of the attack on the red force to demoralise the adversary both within and beyond the theatre of operations.
Wade argues that “the (army) views electromagnetic attack as the centrepiece of most information warfare operations”.
Hostile computer systems and networks can be attacked using preprogrammed viruses loaded into these systems and networks either via the internet or via electronic attack. Likewise, hostile computers and networks can be hacked. Either way, the goal is the same, chiefly to steal or manipulate data without the enemy’s knowledge. Importantly, cyberattacks against hostile land forces may commence before the first shot is fired. This will be done to derive enemy strengths, weaknesses and intentions. Attacks maybe largely covert, with information being stolen, or more overt with viruses and hacking disrupting the
enemy’s use of its computer systems. In peacetime, hacking efforts will take the form of cyber reconnaissance. This effort will seek to understand the architecture of hostile networks, how they can be exploited and their vulnerabilities. The army adopts this posture for the entire panoply of cyber warfare from the strategic level downwards. Of the latter, Wade says the army values tactical cyberattack “to manipulate enemy situational understanding and trick the enemy into behaviour conducive to (PLAGF) tactical operations”.
Although the PLA sees information warfare and information operations as less costly than kinetic attacks, the army does not rule out the latter as part of the wider information battle. At
the tactical level, the army will hit red force command and control centres, communications nodes and sensors. Wade says such kinetic attacks will be performed using manoeuvre, artillery and airpower. Directed energy weapons could also be brought into this battle in the future.
Reconnaissance is imperative to the PLA’s information warfare posture. The army has tightly embraced the concept of electromagnetic reconnaissance. This prioritises the use of strategic, operational and tactical sensors from satellites to airborne signals intelligence platforms and systems at the tactical edge. These will collect electronic, communications and cyber intelligence. Red force sensors will be targeted in this effort along with their telecommunications networks and the traffic they carry. This includes everything from situation reports to social media content. Mr. Wade notes that the army is keenly pushing electronic reconnaissance capabilities all the way down to its lowest tactical echelons.
The People’s Liberation Army Ground Force has fully adopted the doctrine of Electromagnetic Superiority and Supremacy (E2S). Electromagnetic superiority seeks to establish a tactical, operational or strategic condition where the enemy can only sporadically interfere with blue force use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Electromagnetic superiority is the gateway to electromagnetic supremacy. This seeks to prevent altogether any red force attempts to disrupt blue force spectrum use. ES2 is secured through the application of electromagnetic manoeuvre warfare. This branch of manoeuvre warfare seeks to attack and exploit weak points or centres of gravity pertinent to the enemy’s use of the spectrum so as to contribute to overall success. Mr. Wade stresses that the PLAGF fully expects hostile forces to also use electromagnetic manoeuvre to achieve ES2. It “anticipates enemy capabilities will contest its networks and communications capabilities”. For understandable reasons, the army prioritises protecting spectrum use to ensure electromagnetic manoeuvre can be practiced and ES2 secured: “Chinese leaders and units are instructed to train in communications blackout conditions, relying on ingenuity and tactical competency to overcome the effects of
(1) The thrust manoeuvre group conducts the decisive deep assault into the enemy's rear area, targeting command posts, supply areas, artillery units, and potential escape routes. This completes the isolation of enemy units and compromises the enemy's overall defensive position. (2) The thrust manoeuvre group also conducts a hasty attack against the exposed flank of the enemy's counterattack force, ensuring it cannot be redeployed and maintaining its isolation. (3) The frontline attack and depth groups conduct storming attacks against the isolated and depleted enemy units. Local fire support is integrated with maneuver to either destroy or force the withdrawal of enemy units. Assaults are coordinated as much as possible to ensure the enemy cannot reinforce units under attack. (4) Firepower assaults target retreating enemy units, disrupting their movement and ensuring that retrograde actions cannot be mounted. (6) EW and IR groups shift their focus to disrupting adjacent enemy units from reinforcing the now-defeated enemy unit and preventing the enemy’s higher echelon from communicating with the defeated unit.
The annihilation phase will see EW and information warfare units attacking the communications of neighbouring units to sow deception with conflicting situation reports and to prevent them coming to the aid of the attacked formation. A key aspect of this action disconnecting the formation under attack from their higher echelons of command.
communications isolation, and wherever possible, use communications means that are not susceptible to enemy EW efforts”.
One area where we still have much to learn concerns the actual EW systems the PLAGF deploys with the manoeuvre force. Some important work has been performed by Samuel Cranny-Evans, C4ISR research analyst at London’s Royal United Services Institute thinktank. Readers interested to learn more are advised to consult his report entitled Electronic Warfare and the People’s Liberation Army. Much of what we know in the public domain revolves around doctrine and posture. This is undoubtedly useful. For instance, written analysis stresses that the PLAGF sees EW as integral to manoeuvre at the tactical level. To this end, it prises using electronic and information warfare in support of kinetic capabilities in a tightly coordinated fashion. This is something which has seemed to be distinctly lacking in the Russian Army’s use of electronic warfare in the Ukrainian theatre. The PLAGF seems keen to avoid such a tactical and operational debacle. Then again, so did the Russian Army’s electronic warfare doctrine and posture until the cauldron of conflict decided otherwise. Nonetheless, all elements of the PLAGF will be watching the war in Ukraine with interest determined to avoid these errors. We can expect future assessments of the PLAGF’s EW capabilities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to reflect this.
(1) Reconnaissance units carefully assess the surrounded enemy's position in order to discover potential weak points and establish the enemy's disposition. Once the attack commences, these units transition to screening the assaulting force. (2) Engineer units rapidly clear obstacles and minefields that lay along key avenues of approach. These efforts are carefully integrated with reconnaissance in order to develop the best possible course of action for the assault. (3) Frontline attack groups assault isolated and vulnerable forward enemy units. These attacks gradually increase in intensity as the enemy command is destroyed and isolation increases, (4) The depth attack group conducts a penetration into the enemy's centre, destroying the enemy’s command and completing the isolation of remaining enemy units. (5) The firepower group conducts mass fire assaults on the enemy's main body in order to disrupt enemy operations and reduce enemy morale. (6) EW and IW groups conduct electronic and information attacks on the enemy formation in order to amplify the effects of isolation and prevent communications with possible relief forces.
