DEBATE SPRING 2010
these facts at this point. Yes, this is a fact in Turkey: that statements may be upsetting to some, but out of selfyou appoint somebody you consider close to you to a respect I must remain true to my political stance. I am key position in public administration. However, this not obsessed with such [religious] structures. I believe was not as blatant in the past. that religious communities and orders are essential for If the notion of the party officer has become domithe promotion of diversity and pluralism in the counnant in public administration, there will be no democtry. I also believe that their presence should be taken racy or rule of law regardless of the bright and brave under constitutional protection and that their rights content of the constitutional amendment you propose. to expression should be guaranteed. This is my sinIf you do this, you will be fooling us. Now I have a 10cere opinion. I have expressed this view in my party page report on the activities of the Gülen movement. conventions and in public gatherings. I strongly You see that they are very influential in the media, edubelieve that this issue should be reviewed with refercation and health sectors. This is no problem at all. You ence to Article 24 of the Constitution, on the freedom may call this a civil society organizaof religion and thought. Therefore, I tion. But let us make a record of this; would suggest that an automatic and It is important, in the let us run an audit of the movement. reactionary stance against religious case of constitutional Let us monitor its activities under the communities is wrong. review and supervision law of associations. This is what I am But is this the case in Turkey? Is the whole issue in Turkey about the proof administrative deci- saying. Of course, it is important, in the case tection of their fundamental rights and sions and actions, not of constitutional review and supervifreedoms? Take the Gülen movement, to mix review by sion of administrative decisions and for example. We have been drawing means of legality and actions, not to mix review by means of attention to this for five years. I believe appropriateness legality and review by means of approthat the political administrations have priateness. And of course the judiciary limited influence in the public adminisshould not act to replace the political administration. tration. The parties in power are changing all the time. But look what the judiciary does: The judiciary does not However, it is essential to maintain a lasting and effecobject to any privatization process; it says it is up to the tive public administration dedicated to serving the peopolitical administration to make decisions on privatizaple of this country. I am of the opinion that the creation tion. It only objects to the privatization of, say, of a public administration system based on merit and Seydiþehir Eti facilities for a payment of $3.5 million seniority is essential for the sake of the achievement of when it is actually worth $3.5 billion. It says you cannot the notion of public service. To this end, I would like to pass the shares of Tüpraþ over to a select group of busirecall that the notion of "party officer" has become nessmen you prefer in one of the rooms of the Ministry dominant in the public administration system in Turkey of Industry and Trade. It says you should not sell Seka in the past few years. facilities to your relatives at a visibly too-low price. Why We all now know that the promotion of public serdo we not make this distinction? I believe that any vants whose spouses do not wear the headscarf is work ignoring these facts would not be reconcilable blocked. It is nonsense to act as if we are not aware of
THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT AND THE CURRENT POLITICAL DEBATE The French say "Les absents ont toujours tort" -- the absentees are always wrong. Among the anti-government criticism of the main opposition party, the CHP, and the secular fundamentalists of Turkey, the Gülen movement has become "l'absent" of the current political debate. The secular fundamentalists prefer to use vague language in their claims about the movement. They rarely refer to the movement by name, and the term they do use ("cemaat," or community in Turkish) in fact covers all religiously motivated non-political movements in Turkey. In a nutshell, in their perception the cemaat is so powerful that it controls the government, controls the police and is even able to manipulate legal processes. Since the claims are never clear cut, they are almost irrefutable, and even if they are clear and open allegations, the Gülen movement does not have an official representative body to refute them other than the advocates of Fethullah Gülen himself. The claims about the Gülen movement and its manipulation of the legal process pertaining to the Ergenekon case have been echoed in some recent English language articles penned by American writers. Dr. Ýhsan Yýlmaz's article "Naming what is going on in Turkey: from a 'for the people despite the people' elitism to a 'for the people with the people' democracy" in this volume (pp. 68-75) presents an academic criticism of these articles.
program. In addition, it should be noted that the party did not go beyond the content of these recommendations. The AKP did the minimum during this process. The political administrations before the AKP, including the coalition government formed between the DSP [Democratic Left Party], ANAP [now ANAVATAN, the Motherland Party] and the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] refrained from fulfilling the requirements to become a full member in the EU. They, too, introduced some packages, but their efforts fell short and they frequently relied on the pretext of preserving the national interest to avoid compliance with EU rules and standards. Conversely, the AKP acted sincerely and tried to achieve the standards set by the EU. However, it did not have an additional program and agenda that go beyond the noble content of EU standards. But we all now appreciate why they did not. The AKP was busy dealing with the coup plans whose details are now being publicized while trying to introduce some bold reforms to facilitate accession to the EU. In other words, the AKP was trying to make sure that other state organs acknowledged its administration while introducing all these reforms. For this reason, some of its practices were inconsistent with democratic standards. This ambivalence between introducing reforms and getting along with the state institutions turned the AKP into a center of contradictions. We now appreciate that this was not a groundless fear. The party had to deal with a coup plan almost every month, and most probably the leadership of the party was aware of these plans. The president as the watchdog of the regime The discussion over the presidency that took place in 2007 was a crucial one. The 1982 Constitution views the president as the protector and watchdog of the regime. The drafters of the Constitution were pretty sure that the president would always be a figure that they would favor and like. For this reason, they expanded the sphere of his authorities. They realized that in the event of losing this post, the institutions of the guardianship system would take over. What was controversial back then was not a debate over Shariah or the headscarf. The presidency is a key for the regime, and those who
with intellectual and political responsibility. Moderator: Thank you very much; I will come back to you and hopefully, we will be discussing why you object to the content of the proposed package of constitutional amendments in the next round. Now I will invite Professor Mithat Sancar to speak. What parts of this package refer to a need in terms of the high judiciary? Mithat Sancar: Why did we come to this constitutional amendment? Is the AKP doing this as part of a democratic project, or are there any other factors motivating the party figures to take this initiative? I would like to elaborate on this subject. Now Mr. Kart argues that the AKP has created its own capital groups and media organs. However, we could actually say that those capital groups have created the AKP. Undoubtedly, there had been some interactions. However, the AKP did not emerge out of the blue. And, of course, a new financial class has emerged. The Feb. 28 process was actually an attempt to stop the rise of this new middle class. The votes the AKP received in the 2002 elections should not be surprising at all. The AKP relied on an existing dynamic. This dynamic took it to power. You may call it its own capital groups or set of communal relations; that does not make any difference. There are a number of different dynamics that played a role in the rise of the AKP. The AKP came to power by promising change in 2002, and because of this promise it received the support of the traditional capital groups. And when it set down the lines of its eagerness for EU membership, the party also attracted the support of big capital groups. In other words, it did not fight the older capital groups. Quite the contrary, it attracted a great deal of support. But I should also note that the AKP did not have a solid democratic program with reference to the issue under discussion. Their program did not set a clear framework for an integrated process of democratization. It included nice words and statements. The AKP's work and efforts at democratization mostly include the recommendations of the EU in fulfillment of the criteria for full membership rather than its own terms in its 51
TÜPRAÞ is Turkey's second-largest taxpayer, and its privatization in 2004 was canceled by the Council of State. TÜPRAÞ was privatized once again in 2005. This time its privatization cost four times more than the initial privatization effort PHOTO: MEHMET GÜLER