the-impact-of-sea-level-rise-and-maritime-zone1

THE IMPACT OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE DELIMITATION OF MARITIME ZONES

By Lorenzo CROCE, member of the Geneva Bar, LL.M.

INTRODUCTION The archipelago of Tuvalu, a small country in the South Pacific whose average altitude is no more than 3 meters, risks being definitively wiped off the map in the next decades due to global warming1.

According to the latest estimates by experts, the rise in temperatures will generate a rise in sea level of more than 1 meter by the year 21002. Experts at NASA are even talking of 2.25 meters!3 While the Kiribati Islands are seriously contemplating moving their inhabitants on to floating islands constructed on the model of giant oil platforms4, numerous legal issues are raised. Among them that of determining the consequences of rising ocean levels on baselines and, more generally, on the delimitation of maritime zones.

This problem may appear insignificant compared to the humanitarian challenge but it is of undeniable importance since it brings in its wake a whole series of geopolitical and economic consequences, especially in the current context where natural resources are becoming increasingly rare.

In this article our intention is to present the implications of global warming for maritime boundaries and attempt to outline solutions to remedy this problem that, surprisingly 1

L’EXPRESS.FR, Tuvalu: victime du réchauffement climatique, article of 12 March 2008, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/tuvalu-victime-du-rechauffement-climatique_471056.html.

2 LEMONDE.FR, Le niveau de la mer augmenterait d'un mètre d'ici à 2100, article of 23 May 2011, http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2011/05/23/le-niveau-de-la-mer-augmenterait-d-un-metre-d-ici-a-2100_1 525867_3244.html.

3 VEDURA, Inondations des zones côtières par la montée du niveau des mers, http://www.vedura.fr/environnement/eau/inondations-zones-cotieres-montee-niveau-mers.

4 LEMONDE.FR, Des îles artificielles pour contrer la montée des eaux, article of 13 September 2011, http://ecologie.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/09/13/des-iles-artificielles-pour-contrer-la-montee-des-eaux/.

enough, has been rather neglected by legal commentators. It should already be mentioned that at present there is no international convention that expressly regulates the issue or any consensus among the states.

This presentation requires a brief preliminary summary of the different types of maritime zones and their baselines.

I)

MAIN CONCEPTS

According to the United Nations Convention of 10 December 1982 on the law of the sea (hereinafter “UNCLOS”), maritime zones can be divided mainly into six areas: -

The internal waters: these are located on the landward side of the baselines and comprise the maritime waters adjacent to the land territory of the coastal state (article 8 § 1 UNCLOS). These waters are subject to the full sovereignty of the coastal State5.

-

The territorial sea, with a breadth of 12 nautical miles from the baseline, is the zone of sea adjacent to the internal waters (articles 2 § 1 and 3 UNCLOS). It represents the seaward limit of the coastal state’s sovereignty and concerns its airspace, bed and subsoil (article 2 § 2 UNCLOS). Foreign ships only have a right of innocent passage (articles 17 et seq. UNCLOS) and are bound to respect the national legislation of the coastal state (regulation of maritime traffic, fiscal, immigration and environmental protection laws and regulations, marine scientific research, etc.) (article 21 § 1 UNCLOS).

-

The contiguous zone is a belt of sea contiguous to the territorial sea stretching for 24 nautical miles from the baseline. Within this zone, the coastal state does not exercise its full sovereignty but has, notably, policing powers in relation to its customs, fiscal, sanitary and immigration laws and regulations (article 33 UNCLOS).

-

The exclusive economic zone (hereinafter “EEZ”) adjacent to the territorial sea, is no more than 200 nautical miles wide (article 57 UNCLOS). The coastal state has sovereign rights on this zone in respect to environmental protection, scientific research, exploration and use of natural resources (article 56 § UNCLOS). The other states have the freedom to overfly, navigate, lay cables and pipelines on it (article 58 § 1 UNCLOS).

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PANCRACIO Jean-Paul, Droit de la mer, 1

ère

édition, Dalloz (2010), p. 128-129.

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-

The continental shelf constitutes the submerged prolongation of the coastal state’s land territory and stretches for 200 nautical miles from the baselines when the outer edge of the continental margin is less, or up to 350 nautical miles (or 100 nautical miles from the 2500 metre isobath) if it is wider (article 76 UNCLOS). The coastal state has sovereign rights over this area in respect to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources (article 77 § 1 UNCLOS). Other states benefit from the freedom of the high seas on the continental shelf6.

-

Finally, the high seas, which are not subject to the sovereignty of any state and which are located beyond the external limit of the EEZ, that is to say at a maximum of 200 nautical miles from the baselines (article 86 UNCLOS).

It emerges from the above that it is the baselines that serve to delimit the maritime zones7.

Two situations need to be considered when drawing these baselines: Firstly, when the coast is relatively straight, the baselines are drawn from the low-water mark, that is to say the line to which the water at the lowest tides of the year recede, as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state (article 5 UNCLOS). It results from this situation that the delimitations of the territorial sea and the other zones will be perfectly parallel to the coast8.

Secondly, when the coast is too irregular to allow relatively straight baselines to be drawn (for instance fjords) or that there is a fringe of islands along the coast (inhabitable or not), international law authorizes the state to draw straight baselines based on the outermost points of the coast, such as caps or coastal islands (article 7 § 1 UNCLOS). As a result, there is a widening of the territorial sea and the internal waters9.

The straight baselines must not, however, depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast and the sea area located within them must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters (article 7 § 3 UNCLOS).

It should be noted that if two states have adjacent or opposite coasts, the principle of equidistance from the baselines of each is applied when delimiting the respective territorial seas and contiguous zones, unless the states come to an agreement otherwise.

6

VINCENT Philippe, Droit de la mer, Larcier (2008), p. 125.

PANCRACIO Jean-Paul, op. cit., p. 155. HOUGHTON Katherine J., VAFEIDIS Athanasios T., NEUMANN Barbara and PROELSS Alexander, Maritime boundaries in a rising sea in Nature Geoscience, Vol. 3, Issue: 12, Nature Publishing Group (2010), p. 813.

8 PANCRACIO Jean-Paul, ibid.

9 VINCENT Philippe, op. cit., p. 26.

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Historical titles or other special circumstances can also be taken into account (article 15 UNCLOS).10 As regards the determination of the EEZ and continental shelf, the principle of an equitable solution is applied (article 74 §1 UNCLOS).

Archipelago states (for instance, Indonesia, the Maldives, the Philippines, etc.) may, in certain conditions, draw so-called archipelagic straight lines linking the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago (article 47 §1 UNCLOS).

Within these lines, a special system applies with a specific maritime zone referred to as « archipelagic waters » (article 74 § 1 UNCLOS).

The low-tide elevations are not islands or rocks according to the definition of article 121 § 3 UNCLOS. They are defined as natural elevations of land surrounded by sea, alternatively uncovered and submerged by the tides (article 13 § 1 UNCLOS). The Convention specifies that straight baselines may be drawn to and from low-tide elevations if lighthouses or similar permanently uncovered installations have been constructed on them or that there has been international recognition of the drawing of such lines (article 7 § 4 UNCLOS a contrario).

Also, when they are located, partly or fully, at a distance from the continent or an island not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea (12 nautical miles), the low-water mark on these elevations can be taken as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. Thereby, the extent of the territorial sea (only) can be enlarged significantly by the presence of low-tide elevations, constructed or otherwise, within this11. On the other hand, when a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own. (article 13 § 2 UNCLOS).

The UNCLOS Convention defines an island “as a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide” (article 121 § 1). The islands belonging to a state, whether they are isolated or in an archipelago, within the territorial sea or otherwise, have the possibility of drawing their own baselines. This implies that they can have their internal waters and their territorial sea (article 121 § 2 UNCLOS). On the other hand, only the rocks that can sustain human habitation or economic life of their own have the right to claim an exclusive zone or continental shelf (article 121 § 3 UNCLOS a contrario).

10 11

VINCENT Philippe, op. cit., p. 46 et 86.

VINCENT Philippe, op. cit., p. 30.

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It should be noted that in the case of atolls or islands with fringing reefs, the baseline from which the width of the territorial sea is measured is the seaward low-water line of the reef (article 6 UNCLOS).

Finally, we note that an artificial island cannot, under any circumstances, claim a territorial sea, an exclusive economic zone or a continental shelf of its own (article 60 § 8 UNCLOS).

II)

CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISING SEA

Due to global warming, the face of the earth, as we know it today, will be substantially modified in the future.

Indeed, the rise in sea level due to the dilation of the oceans’ water under the effect of heat and the melting of land ice will generate an acceleration of coastline erosion and flooding of extensive low-lying coastal areas12. Moreover, islands will disappear and others will become uninhabitable, forcing exile on numerous populations.

Of course, these effects will not be the same throughout the globe and some regions will be more affected than others, such as South-East Asia due, in particular, to the presence of numerous deltas (Mekong delta, Chao Praya delta), low-lying coastal areas (the north of the Java and Sumatra coasts and the south coasts of Kalimantan will be the most affected) and low-altitude islands (Tuvalu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tokelau, etc.).13 These considerable changes will have a significant impact on the delimitation of the maritime zones.

In fact, as we have seen, maritime borders are established on the basis of baselines which are themselves drawn on the low-water line. Thus, there is no doubt that a rise in sea level will lead to a modification to the contour of the baselines. Consequently, the maritime zones will no longer necessarily cover the same maritime areas as before.14

12

VEDURA, op. cit..

LUSTHAUS Jonathan, Shifting Sands: Sea Level Rise, Maritime Boundaries and Inter-state Conflict, Politics (2010), vol. 30(2), p. 115-116; SOONS A.H.A., The Effects of a Rising Sea Level on Maritime Limits and Boundaries, Netherlands International Law Review, 37, (1990), p. 208.

14 LUSTHAUS Jonathan, op. cit., p. 114; RABUTEAU Yann, Zone Economique Exclusive et changement climatique..., article of 19 March 2009, http://envmar.blogspot.com/2009/03/zone-economique-exclusive-et-changement.html; SOONS A.H.A., op. cit., p. 216.

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Likewise, the fact that low-tide elevations will be permanently submerged by the waters will lead to a significant reduction in the extent of the territorial sea and the internal waters of a coastal state15.

Also, the total disappearance of an island or the loss of its possibility of sustaining human habitation or its own economic life - as this is defined by article 121 § 3 UNCLOS - will deprive it of the right to claim respectively a territorial sea or an EEZ 16.

The continental shelf should not, however, be concerned (see article 76 § 9 UNCLOS)17.

Finally, as regards the atolls and islands bordered by fringing reefs, the extent of the territorial sea and internal waters of the latter will be reduced by the submergence of the reefs18.

It is impossible to explain in detail here all the economic and geopolitical consequences that this will imply. We can, however, imagine the following: the loss of part of the sovereignty of a coastal state resulting from a reduction in the extent of its internal or archipelagic waters or territorial sea; the modification or disappearance of an EEZ generating a loss of exploitation of the coastal state’s natural resources (fish, minerals, oil, etc.); or even the modification of the rules governing passage through different maritime zones (for instance when a zone part of the territorial sea where the right of innocent passage applies becomes part of the EEZ where freedom of navigation and overflight applies). 19 It goes without saying that these modifications will lead to political tensions, in particular as regards the freedom of navigation and access to maritime resources 20. As an example, we can easily imagine the political consequences of a rise in the level of the sea on the passage of warships in the China Sea. III) A LACUNA IN THE LAW How does the UNCLOS take global warming into account?

There is a legal vacuum here. In fact, UNCLOS contains practically no provision on the consequences of the sea level rise on the baselines, islands and low-tide elevations. In 15

DI LEVA Charles, MORITA Sachiko, Maritime Rights of Coastal States and Climate Change: Should States Adapt to Submerged Boundaries?, World Bank Law and Development Working Paper Series No. 5, http://siteresources.worl dbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/L&D_number5.pdf, p. 16; LUSTHAUS Jonathan, op. cit., p. 115.

16 DI LEVA Charles, MORITA Sachiko, op. cit., p. 17; LUSTHAUS Jonathan, op. cit., p. 114 and 116; SOONS A.H.A., op. cit., p. 217-218.

17 SOONS A.H.A., op. cit., p. 218-219.

18 DI LEVA Charles, MORITA Sachiko, op. cit., p. 16; LUSTHAUS Jonathan, op. cit., p. 115-116.

19 SOONS A.H.A., op. cit., p. 220-222.

20 HOUGHTON Katherine J., VAFEIDIS Athanasios T., NEUMANN Barbara and PROELSS Alexander, op. cit., p. 813.

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particular, the Convention leaves open the fundamental question of whether the maritime zones are shifting. 21 Most legal commentators however reply in the affirmative 22. They base their reasoning on two provisions of the Convention: According to article 76 § 9 UNCLOS, “The coastal State shall deposit with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations charts and relevant information, including geodesic data, permanently describing the outer limits of its continental shelf.” [Our highlighting] Moreover, article 7 § 2 UNCLOS stipulates that “Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions the coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water line and, notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line, the straight baselines shall remain effective until changed by the coastal State in compliance with this Convention.” [Our highlighting] Scholars, based on an a contrario interpretation of these two provisions, consider that insofar as the Convention only permanently fixes the outer limits of the continental shelf and the baselines of deltas, the borders of the other maritime zones (the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the EEZ) can be shifted23.

It results from the above that if baselines shift, these maritime zones will also shift. The same applies if an island or a low-tide elevation disappears following the rise in the level of the waters.24 However, this position appears to us to be open to criticism: In fact, in addition to the costs that the coastal states must bear to adjust and correct their baselines, there is veritable legal insecurity in systematically modifying maritime borders25. The rise in the ocean level is, moreover, not a one-off event but, on the contrary, a long process. Ships will therefore have difficulty in determining exactly in which zone they are and to which rights they are subject (fishing rights, right of innocent passage, etc.).

21

CARON David D., When Law Makes Climate Change Worse: Rethinking the Law of Baselines in Light of a Rising Sea Level, Ecology Law Quarterly 17 (1990), p. 634; DI LEVA Charles, MORITA Sachiko, op. cit., p. 17.

22 CARON David D. (1990), ibid; DI LEVA Charles, MORITA Sachiko, op. cit., p. 17; REED Michael W., Shore and Sea Boundaries, The development of international maritime boundary principles through United States practice, vol. 3, 2000, p. 185.

23 CARON David D. (1990), op. cit., p. 635.

24 DI LEVA Charles, MORITA Sachiko, op. cit., p. 15.

25 CARON David D. (1990), op. cit., p. 644-645 et 646-647.

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Moreover, there is no doubt that this will lead to conflicts between countries concerning the exploitation of natural resources, especially between those with adjacent or opposite coasts26. The states at the “losing end” will not hesitate to spend billions to attempt to maintain the statu quo and defend by all means their baselines, islands and rocks 27. In this connection, we can cite the examples of Indonesia that is planning to construct giant dikes around twelve islands in order to protect its territorial sea28 or the case of Okinotorishima Island where the Japanese are spending colossal sums to prevent its erosion and thus claim an EEZ29.

However, to our knowledge no court has, to date, specifically ruled on this issue at international level.

Nevertheless, it appears obvious to us that if such a case is referred before the International Court of Justice, it will apply the principle of equity as it has always done and did again recently in the case of Nicaragua v/Honduras (2007) where it used the method of drawing a bisecting line (instead of the equidistance line) due, notably, to the changing nature of the coast. Thus, in the field of maritime delimitation, it is indeed the search for an equitable solution that takes precedence and there is no reason for the courts to modify this approach in the future.30 Finally, we can legitimately wonder, in view of the legal incertitude that currently reigns and the costs that would be involved, whether a state really has an interest in modifying its baselines. We can be skeptical on this score. Moreover, in the vast majority of cases it would result in a reduction in the size of the coastal state’s maritime zones and not only in a simple shift.

We can, however, imagine situations where a country, other than the one directly concerned, would have such an interest. We can, in particular, think of cases where a country (the United States and China, in particular) would demand total freedom to navigate in a particular zone or that a state would see its territorial sea or EEZ increase due to the receding of the flat coast of another adjacent or opposite state.31

26

CARON David D. (1990), op. cit., p. 640-641.

CARON David D. (1990), op. cit., p. 639-640; SOONS A.H.A., op. cit., p. 222-223.

28 COURRIER INTERNATIONAL, « Des îles qui servent de frontières », article of 27 May 2011, http://www.courrierinternational.com/breve/2011/05/27/des-iles-qui-servent-de-frontiere.

29 HOUGHTON Katherine J., VAFEIDIS Athanasios T., NEUMANN Barbara and PROELSS Alexander, op. cit., p. 815; KOTANI Tetsuo, A new maritime dispute? Japan’s Okinotorishima policy and its implications, Dokdo Research Journal (2010), vol. 11.

30 DI LEVA Charles, MORITA Sachiko, op. cit., p. 25-26; PANCRACIO Jean-Paul, op. cit., p. 270-271.

31 DI LEVA Charles, MORITA Sachiko, op. cit., p. 21.

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Concerning this last point, we note that although today many coastal countries have signed, sometimes but not always following decisions of the International Court of Justice, bilateral or multilateral agreements delimiting their respective maritime borders, it is doubtful that these will resist future climatic changes. Admittedly, article 62 § 2 let. a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which specifies that “a fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty if the treaty establishes a boundary” would lead us to consider that a line delimiting maritime zones between countries signatories of conventions is definitive, but there is no certainty that this rule will persist in the special context of rising sea levels, in particular, in the event where the disappearance of whole islands or low-tide elevations is involved.32 We are consequently of the opinion that current treaties are based on fragile principles and that legal uncertainty contributes to maintaining tensions between states.

Admittedly, we could always count on the mechanisms of the UNCLOS for settling disputes (part XV and appendices V to VIII UNCLOS), but will this be sufficient in this specific context?

IV)

WHAT SOLUTIONS?

In view of the above, would it not be wiser to delimit once and for all the maritime zones?33 In this way the states could focus their efforts on the protection of the marine environment and humanitarian problems, in particular those of climatic refugees. In addition, this solution would offer the advantage of reducing the costs of adjusting maritime borders and avoiding legal insecurity. Finally, it would allow the current allocation of ocean resources to be retained and would be fairer and more equitable for the populations insofar all states will not be equally affected by the climatic changes.34 This solution, although appealing, raises a certain number of problems.

Firstly, from the legal standpoint, there is not, at the present time, any legal basis at international level for freezing the limits of maritime zones.

32

For a contrary opinion, SOONS A.H.A., op. cit., p. 227-229.

HOUGHTON Katherine J., VAFEIDIS Athanasios T., NEUMANN Barbara and PROELSS Alexander, op. cit., p. 816.

34 CARON David D., Climate Change, Sea Level Rise and the Coming Uncertainty in Oceanic Boundaries: A Proposal to Avoid Conflict (2008), p. 14 ss.

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We could, admittedly, broadly interpret article 7 § 2 UNCLOS but the “travaux préparatoires” appear to rather indicate that this provision was intended to apply only to deltas35.

Undoubtedly a better solution would consist in amending UNCLOS. However, this procedure would require the convening of a conference accepted by at least half the states party to the Convention and an agreement by consensus (article 312 UNCLOS).

Moreover, certain states, of which the United States, have still not ratified it.

Alternatively, it would be possible to develop a new international custom. It would, nonetheless, be subject to the conditions of the practice of relevant states and the opinio juris, but once established it would have the merit of settling the issue definitively and uniformly.36 Another hypothesis would consist in allowing the states to claim historical rights on the relevant maritime zones. This so-called “historical waters” theory allows a state to declare that a maritime area is part of its internal waters if it has exercised its sovereignty over it clearly, effectively and without interruption during a considerable period of time with the consent of the international community 37. Thus, in the case at bar, it would mean extending this rule to the other maritime zones (notably the territorial sea and the EEZ) in order to ensure for the States the persistence of their rights over these marine areas. This solution has, however, been widely criticized by legal commentators notably due to the fact that it is intended to apply only exceptionally in special situations and, unlike a new international custom, risks leading to unequal treatment if used on a global scale.38 Finally, a last possibility would be the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral treaties between the coastal states expressly providing for the immutability of maritime zones 39.

From a more practical point of view, the freezing of maritime zones also poses difficulties:

35

CARON David D. (1990), op. cit., p. 634-635; WEI David, DAWES Ruth, MAXWELL Lain, FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, Receding maritime zones, uninhabitable states and climate exiles, How international law must adapt to climate change, 2011, http://www.field.org.uk/files/climate_exiles_dw.pdf, p. 2-3.

36 SOONS A.H.A., op. cit., p. 225-226.

37 ANNUAIRE DE LA COMMISSION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Régime juridique des eaux historiques, y compris les baies historiques, vol. II, 1960, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/french/a_cn4_143.pdf.

38 SOONS A.H.A., op. cit., p. 223-225.

39 DI LEVA Charles, MORITA Sachiko, op. cit., p. 21; WEI David, DAWES Ruth, MAXWELL Lain, FIELD, op. cit., p. 4.

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Firstly, many states have not yet published and filed with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the maps of their maritime zones showing the straight baselines, the archipelagic baselines and the outer limits of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf (articles 16 § 2, 47 § 9, 75 § 2 and 84 § 2 UNCLOS) (On 13 November 2012 only 56 states signatories of the Convention UNCLOS had done this.40) Also developing countries often do not have the enough resources for conducting the surveys and necessary scientific studies.41 Finally, there are today numerous disputes between certain countries concerning the current delimitation of their maritime borders. For instance we can cite the case of the Spratly Islands that are claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines42 or the Sino-Japanese conflict in the South China Sea43. These are all problems that must be solved before a consensus can be found on the freezing of maritime spaces.

CONCLUSION We have seen that the rise in sea level, due to global warming, will generate major frictions between states concerning the delimitation of maritime zones. More than half a century of negotiations on the law of the sea is thus in jeopardy today. Undoubtedly, the best alternative would be to retain current maritime boundaries. But for this, changes need to be made, notably on the judicial front. Indeed, only dialogue between the states can allow a common position to be adopted. However, considering the recent escalade in tensions between states concerning the exploitation of marine resources (for instance in relation to the Arctic or the China Sea), it is doubtful that countries are ready to take the step. However, it is urgent ….

40

DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (DOALOS), Maritime Space: Maritime Zones and Maritime Delimitation, state on 13 November 2012, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/depositpublicity.htm.

41 DI LEVA Charles, MORITA Sachiko, op. cit., p. 26 et 29.

42 CLARK Helen, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Vietnam-China Spratly Islands dispute threatens to escalate, article of 16 June 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2011/0616/Vietnam-China-Spratly-Islandsdispute-threatens-to-escalate; HOUGHTON Katherine J., VAFEIDIS Athanasios T., NEUMANN Barbara and PROELSS Alexander, op. cit., p. 815-816.

43 NIQUET Valérie, Mer de Chine: la guerre menace, article in the newspaper LE MONDE.FR of 24 September 2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/09/24/mer-de-chine-la-guerre-menace_1764594_3232.html.

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•

DI LEVA Charles, MORITA Sachiko, Maritime Rights of Coastal States and Climate Change: Should States Adapt to Submerged Boundaries?, World Bank Law and Development Working Paper Series No. 5, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/L&D_number 5.pdf.

•

CARON David D., Climate Change, Sea Level Rise and the Coming Uncertainty in Oceanic Boundaries: A Proposal to Avoid Conflict, Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes and the Law of the Sea, (Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon M. Van Dyke eds., Brill, forthcoming 2008).

•

CARON David D., When Law Makes Climate Change Worse: Rethinking the Law of Baselines in Light of a Rising Sea Level, Ecology Law Quarterly 17 (1990), p. 621-653.

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COURRIER INTERNATIONAL, « Des îles qui servent de frontières », article du 27 mai 2011, http://www.courrierinternational.com/breve/2011/05/27/des-iles-qui-servent-defrontiere.

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CLARK Helen, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Vietnam-China Spratly Islands dispute threatens to escalate, article of 16 June 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2011/0616/Vietnam-ChinaSpratly-Islands-dispute-threatens-to-escalate.

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HOUGHTON Katherine J., VAFEIDIS Athanasios T., NEUMANN Barbara and PROELSS Alexander, Maritime boundaries in a rising sea in Nature Geoscience, Vol. 3, Issue: 12, Nature Publishing Group (2010), p. 813-816.

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KOTANI Tetsuo, A new maritime dispute? Japan’s Okinotorishima policy and its implications, Dokdo Research Journal (2010), vol. 11.

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L’EXPRESS.FR, Tuvalu: victime du réchauffement climatique, article of 12 March 2008, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/tuvalu-victime-du-rechauffementclimatique_471056.html.

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LEMONDE.FR, Des îles artificielles pour contrer la montée des eaux, article of 13 September 2011, http://ecologie.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/09/13/des-iles-artificiellespour-contrer-la-montee-des-eaux/.

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LEMONDE.FR, Le niveau de la mer augmenterait d'un mètre d'ici à 2100, article of 23 May 2011, http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2011/05/23/le-niveaude-la-mer-augmenterait-d-un-metre-d-ici-a-2100_1525867_3244.html.

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LUSTHAUS Jonathan, Shifting Sands: Sea Level Rise, Maritime Boundaries and Inter-state Conflict, Politics (2010), vol. 30(2), p. 113-118.

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SOONS A.H.A., The Effects of a Rising Sea Level on Maritime Limits and Boundaries, Netherlands International Law Review, 37, (1990), p. 207-232.

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VEDURA, Inondations des zones côtières par la montée du niveau des mers, http://www.vedura.fr/environnement/eau/inondations-zones-cotieres-monteeniveau-mers.

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VINCENT Philippe, Droit de la mer, Larcier (2008).

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WEI David, DAWES Ruth, MAXWELL Lain, FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT,

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Receding maritime zones, uninhabitable states and climate exiles, How international law must adapt to climate change, 2011, http://www.field.org.uk/files/climate_exiles_dw.pdf.

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