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Country reports on judicial corruption
Israel’s Supreme Court: still making up its own mind
Legal system: Both civil and common law, adversarial, plural Judges per 100,000 people: 9.01 Judge’s salary at start of career: US $4,1552 Supreme Court judge’s salary: US $6,6123 GNI per capita: US $18,6204 Annual budget of judiciary: US $45.1 million5 Total annual budget: US $62.1 billion6 Percentage of annual budget: 0.07 Are all court decisions open to appeal up to the highest level? Yes Institution in charge of disciplinary and administrative oversight: Effectively independent Are all rulings publicised? Yes Code of conduct for judges: Yes (in final stages of approval) 1 Central Bureau of Statistics (2005) 2 Ministry of Justice (2006) 3 Ibid. 4 World Bank Development Indicators (2005) 5 Ministry of Finance (2006) 6 Ibid.
Although the judicial branch in Israel does not suffer from systemic corruption, isolated cases of judicial impropriety, coupled with the perception that political forces have attempted to influence important decisions, have undermined confidence in the institution.1 According to the ombudsman for judges in 2005, no complaints of corruption have ever been received against members of the judiciary.2 Bribery is rare and there are mechanisms in place to isolate judges from party politics. There are a few limitations to judicial independence, however. First, four of the nine members of the judges’ selection committee are political representatives. Secondly, over the past decade a growing number of politicians have made statements attacking the Supreme Court and questioning its decisions in controversial cases.
Under former Supreme Court president Aharon Barak, the court became known for its proactive stance.3 Under Barak the Court limited the previously unlimited latitude given to police on whether or not to approve demonstrations; forbade the use of physical pressure in the investigation of terrorist activity; and challenged the status of ‘security considerations’. His rulings on the so-called ‘separation fence’ with Palestine obliged the state to change the barrier’s route due to the harm it would cause residents in various communities and terminated the so-called ‘neighbour procedure’ by which the army warned Palestinians of the imminent demolition of their homes by sending a neighbour as messenger. Barak encouraged the state prosecution to apply criminal law in situations of conflict of interest involving senior officials.4
1 Judicial corruption has been the subject of very few studies in Israel. 2 Ha’aretz (Israel), 20 November 2005. 3 For elaboration and examples see Rivka Amado, ‘Checks, Balances and Appointments in the Public Service: Israeli Experience in Comparative Perspective’, Public Administration Review, vol. 61 (5) (2001); and Daphne Barak-Erez , ‘Judicial Review of Politics: the Case of Israel’, Journal of Law and Society, vol. 29 (4) (2002). 4 For a brief summary of Barak’s judicial innovations and most important verdicts, see Ha’aretz (Israel), 1 September 2006; and Yediot Acharonot (Israel), 1 September 2006.