Top-down control slows Czech judicial reform
Brozˇová, was reportedly interested in acquiring the post of Supreme Court judge (and possibly chairperson), which Brozˇová opposed.8 Brozˇová appealed against the decision to the constitutional and supreme administrative courts and, according to a preliminary decision in the former, may ultimately prevail. With regard to the institutional balance between judiciary and executive, the ruling was definitely a good sign for the Czech Republic. Political representatives may also attempt to interfere with judicial decisions. The Czech Republic retains a model of judicial administration based on a prominent role for the Justice Minister, who appoints and dismisses individual court chairpersons and can remove the heads of state prosecutors’ offices. This prerogative is subject to insufficient constraints and can be abused as it allows the minister to appoint protégés who may informally exert influence on their subordinates’ decisions. Criticism has also been directed at bankruptcy proceedings where there have been instances of collusion between judges and administrators at the expense of creditors and debtors due to inadequate legislation.9 Current bankruptcy legislation lacks transparency criteria for the appointment and removal of bankruptcy administrators by judges. One well-known case involves Usti nad Labem regional court judge Jiri Berka who in April 2005 was arrested and charged with criminal conspiracy and other acts as part of a bankruptcy-fraud ring responsible for asset stripping a number of companies.10
The work of police investigators and prosecutors in pursuing corruption-related cases is also far from ideal: official statistics show only a moderate rise in the number of convictions.11 More important, there are indications that politicians systematically thwart the investigation of serious economic crimes and political corruption.12
EU criteria do not include independent judiciaries Neither the Maastricht Agreement nor the Copenhagen Criteria explicitly mention judicial reform as a pre-condition for EU accession, but since the domestic judiciaries of member states are expected to cooperate with the EU Court in Luxembourg and to apply EU law in specific cases, it is no surprise that the EU pays close attention to judicial reform in candidate states.13 In the Czech Republic’s case, the EU accession process had a relatively limited impact on the reform of the judiciary, the chief exception being the creation of a new career system. This was developed in collaboration with German judges and promises a solid ground for future reform.14 Other aspects of cooperation with the EU included expert visits and reports, capacitybuilding events and investment in court equipment. In its monitoring report on the Czech Republic’s preparations for membership, the European Commission criticised the length of judicial proceedings. Otherwise, it concluded: ‘Access to justice is satisfactory, however not all citizens may be fully aware of their entitlement.’15
8 MF Dnes (Czech Republic), 1 March 2006. 9 See Global Corruption Report 2005. 10 Czech Business Weekly, 14 August 2006; US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005’. 11 Ministerstvo vnitra CˇR, The Report on Corruption in the Czech Republic and on Fulfilment of the Updated Governmental Programme on Combating Corruption in 2004 (Prague: Ministerstvo vnitra Cˇ R, 2005). 12 MF Dnes (Czech Republic), 30 May 2006. 13 Ivo Sˇlosarcˇík, Reforma soudního systému CˇR a vstup do Evropské unie (The Reform of the Judiciary and EU Accession) (Prague: Europeum – Fórum pro evropskou politiku, 2002). 14 Ekonom (Czech Republic), 24 November 2005. 15 See www.evropska-unie.cz/cz/file_system/folder.asp?folder_id 18.
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