members’.1236 Curaçao has indicated that these recommendations will be addressed in an upcoming revision of the relevant ordinance, but so far, the risks identified are still present.1237 On the positive side, because MOT employs civil servants, the general rules on rights and obligations of civil servants apply. Thus, for example, employees cannot perform extra duties without the written approval of the minister of finance.1238 Also, MOT, in its supervisory capacity, has the sole authority to sanction non-compliance.1239 As of 2010, MOT’s head and personnel also enjoy specific legal protection, similar to the legal protection provided to the board and staff of CBCS.1240
Independence (practice) Score: 50 TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE SUPERVISORY INSTITUTIONS (PRIVATE SECTOR) FREE FROM UNDUE EXTERNAL INFLUENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR WORK IN PRACTICE?
Ever since the change of constitutional relations, both boards of CBCS have been under severe external pressure. There are no indications that this went hand in hand with any undue influence over CBCS’s supervisory activities. There are no indications of any undue influence over MOT’s supervisory activities. There are indications that GCB’s operational independence is at risk due to undue influence of the gaming sector. Ever since its newly-acquired status as Central Bank of Curaçao and Sint Maarten, it has been questioned whether CBCS is able to operate free from undue external influence. This question gained prominence against the background of increasingly strained relations between its long-time board of executive directors – whose president was appointed more than 22 years ago – several members of the Bank’s newly-appointed supervisory board and the governments of the two new countries, as well as strained relations within the supervisory board and between the two new countries. (Also refer to Accountability, below.) Thus, for example, in May 2011, CBCS’s president and the then prime minister of Curaçao publicly accused each other back and forth in such a way that the integrity of the president of the Bank – and that of several ministers – was called into question.1241 (Also refer to Chapter VII.2 Executive.) Specifically, questions were raised about transactions in connection with the president’s pension provisions and on the proper use of authorities related to (a repurchase facility for) bonds issued in both Curaçao and Sint Maarten.1242 In the period that followed, there were repeated calls for a thorough inquiry into the accusations, both by Parliament and the Executive – which also
1236
Cf. CFATF, June 2012: 81 and 91. CFATF, October 2012: 32. 1238 Country ordinance regulating the legal and material rights and obligations of civil servants (Landsverordening Materieel ambtenarenrecht), Appendix f, Official Curaçao Gazette 2010, No. 87, Article 52. Cf. CFATF, June 2012: 87. 1239 Country ordinance Reporting unusual transactions, Chapter VIa and similar provisions in the Country ordinance Identification when rendering services. 1240 Country ordinance Reporting unusual transactions, Article 8. 1241 See Commissie onderzoek Curaçao, Do it yourselves (Doe het zelf) (S.l.: Commissie onderzoek Curaçao: 30 September 2011), September 2011. 1242 ARC, Report supervision Central Bank of Curaçao and Sint Maarten (Rapport toezicht Centrale Bank van Curaçao en Sint Maarten) (Willemstad: October 2012a), p.29; Commissie onderzoek Curaçao, September 2011. Also refer to an official press statement of the Bank, 2012/02, ‘Successful emission ‘corporate bond’ for harbor development St Maarten’ (Succesvolle emissie ‘corporate bond’ voor havenontwikkeling St Maarten), 14 February 2012. This press notice also mentions another plan for a bond loan for the Curacao road fund, later denied by the Curaçao government. 1237
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NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CURAÇAO