SP's Land Forces April-May 2011

April-May 2011

SP’s

Volume 8 No 2

AN SP GUIDE

R

`100.00 (India-based Buyer Only)

P U B L I C AT I O N

ROUNDUP

WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET

IN THIS ISSUE

T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

PAGE 4

>>

Future Trends To be successful in a full spectrum conflict, there is a need to modernise, have a balanced profile and upgrade our defence industry to achieve a reasonable degree of indigenisation thereby enhancing our capabilities in a two-front war.

Major General P.K. Chakravorty PAGE 6

COV E R STO R Y

‘Modernisation would depend on the pace of acquisition of guns and financial outlays provided for induction’

Safe, Secure & Reliable The project for TCS for the Indian Army has been undertaken under the “Make Procedure” category. TCS is expected to become operational by 2014.

PHOTOGRAPHS: SP Guide Pubns

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor PAGE 7 Defence Allocation Up, GDP Share Down This year’s defence budget allocation represents an 11.59 per cent growth over the previous year’s budget. It is only 1.83 per cent of the GDP, while last year, the defence budget was 2.12 per cent of the GDP. Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor PAGE 8 China’s Rising Defence Budget Cause for Alarm At a time when China’s ambition for power projection has considerably increased, a double-digit growth in China’s defence budget promises to impact adversely the regional security dynamics.

Sanjay Kumar PAGE 10 Making Every Mission Possible A common platform for a light armoured vehicle (wheeled) which could fulfill the role of all the functions required to be carried out in conventional and asymmetric conflicts would be desirable.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor PAGE 12 For Strategic Tasking We need to integrate our Special Forces and optimise their potential to face the 21st century challenges in requisite manner.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch PLUS Vulnerabilities Manifold Interview with General Peter Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army

9 14

Interview with Major General Alan Howard, Deputy Commander, Canadian Army

15

Employ Skillfully

16 18 19

First / Tecknow News in Brief

Artillery constitutes a major war-winning component of the Indian Army and has performed brilliantly in every conflict fought by the Indian Army since independence. In an interview with SP’s Land Forces team comprising Editor-inChief Jayant Baranwal and Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor, the Director General, Artillery, Lt General Vinod Nayanar, spoke about Artillery’s future concepts and roles, modernisation plans, equipment profile and training.

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): Conceptually within Artillery you now speak of degradation and destruction rather than neutralisation. What are the reasons for this change in concept?

Lt General Vinod Nayanar (DG): The shift in concept from neutralisation to degradation and destruction has come about with the enhanced capability of the Artillery in terms of delivery of larger calibre and more lethal munitions, enhanced precision systems as also greater battlefield transparency in depth. With the above enhancements, Artillery will be able to strike deep with precision and thus will be able to degrade and destroy the targets effectively.

Our earlier weapon systems with lighter

shells and lower terminal velocity could only neutralise and destroy the targets to a limited extent. The shift, thus, is due to the planned modernisation of Artillery.

SP’s: What are the other modernisation plans of Artillery which are likely to fructify in the near future or in the long run? What is likely to be the ratio of guns, rockets and missiles in the Artillery?

DG: The modernisation plans of Artillery envisages the following: l Mediumisation of all guns to 155mm calibre. l Enhanced battlefield transparency by introduction of cutting edge ground based, aerial and space based sensors.

l

Integrated and synergised utilisation of firepower and surveillance and target acquisition resources through automated systems i.e. Artillery combat command and control system (ACCCS) and battlefield surveillance system (BSS).

SP’s: What is the new equipment being inducted in the field of surveillance and target acquisition (SATA)?

DG: In the field of SATA, in addition to the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), battlefield surveillance radar (BFSR) and long-range reconnaissance and observation system (LORROS), new equipment being inducted include the electronic theodolite, inertial navigation system, sound ranging system

2/2011

SP’s LAND FORCES

1

COV E R STO R Y The security threats and challenges facing India have increased enormously. While the old adversarial threats due to unresolved borders remain, new threats and challenges like terrorism and insurgencies have been added to the old inventory.

Thus, Indian military stresses the need to prepare itself for the full spectrum of warfare. The dilemma is only regarding the extent of emphasis that should be laid to acquiring each type of capability.

Unfortunately, the Indian military also continues to be besieged by a mindset regarding the viability of conventional wars in the future despite the Kargil experience in mid-1999 wherein they did not even cross the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir for fear of escalating the conflict. Later on, consequent to the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, Operation Parakram was launched wherein the entire Indian military got deployed and postured for a possible conflict on the Western front against Pakistan. However, after remaining at the borders for 10 months, the forces

E

D I T O R I A L

>>

pulled back. Senior military officers often express their opinion that State to State all-out wars are a phenomenon of the past and are least likely to occur, yet our planning reflects that we are still stuck in the quagmire of conceiving and war-gaming scenarios of conventional wars as was done in the past. The only difference is that we now call such conventional conflicts as “limited wars”. But the reality is that all the wars that India has fought till date since independence were limited wars and therefore our thinking and our concepts have not really changed.

Additional capabilities to cater for current and future challenges, including an out of area reach, require induction of new technologies and force multipliers which are highly cost intensive propositions. For example, what would be the cost of a network-centric force like an infantry division? A Stryker brigade (fully networked) costs $1.5 billion in the US Army. Even if our ambitions are much lower, it would be worthwhile costing the transfor-

mation of the Army into a network-centric force.

Will our current level of budgeting suffice?

Our planners need to seriously re-examine and review the entire issue in light of the delays which keep occurring with tiresome regularity in our procurement system. Moreover, the delay in procurements will keep increasing the backlog when future requirements come up for consideration thus creating a catch-22 situation.

This issue of SP’s Land Forces is focused on Artillery, Special Forces, India and China’s defence budgets, apart from certain miscellaneous issues.

and indigenous weapon locating radar (WLR) system.

training to enable multi-tasking. We are also working on training the trainers. This is the essence of training in the Artillery. Artillery has to be dynamic and vibrant to meet enhanced future requirements. Therefore, we are incorporating modern methods of training including enhanced use of simulators that will go a long way in meeting our training requirements.

SP’s: What is the philosophy for induction of UAVs? DG: The importance of UAVs in the world over is immense in terms of its potential for operational surveillance in conventional operations as also in counter-insurgency/ counter-terrorism operations. It is also of importance in disaster management roles. Our philosophy towards this is to have a credible capability of various UAV systems to ensure battlefield transparency across the frontage.

SP’s: Why has the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) not been able to design a new gun for the Artillery? Do we have the capability in our country to design and manufacture modern guns? Has the private sector shown any interest in this field?

DG: DRDO has been successful in developing the Pinaka Rocket System in collaboration with partners from the private sector. I do believe that the DRDO and the private sector have the ability to design and manufacture modern guns too and they are showing considerable interest.

SP’s: Is the Army interested in inducting any unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAVs)?

DG: The standoff capability to carry out surgical strikes in depth has been demonstrated effectively in various conflicts across the globe. The induction of UCAVs will be carried out in the best interest of national security.

SP’s: What are the basic parameters for the modernisation of Artillery?

DG: The basic parameters for modernisation of Artillery are enhanced surveillance capability, increased range, precision, mobility and lethality of firepower assets. Modernisation, however, would depend on the pace of acquisition of guns and financial outlays provided for induction. Indigenous production capability is another important parameter for sustained modernisation.

www.spslandforces.net

SP’s: Artillery technology is undergoing transformation rapidly. What changes do you propose in the existing plans to conform to the latest trends in technology? Which are the new technologies in which the Artillery is interested?

DG: Development in technology is an ongoing process. Acquisition plans for the three Services ensure that they keep pace with the latest technologies available in the world market. Every acquisition plan has a built-in system to ensure any new additions based on emerging technologies.

The latest technologies in precision such as sensor fuzed munitions, enhanced range such as the VLAP, sensors of the future including nano technology, and loitering missile system are the fields of interest of Artillery.

SP’s: What has been the result of fielding the ACCCS in the field formations?

DG: The ACCCS equipment is being fielded in the Artillery in three phases. The first phase has been completed and the second phase is going on. The fielding of ACCCS equipment has been quite satisfactory.

SP’s: As part of the battlefield management system (BMS), is every artillery weapon platform going to be a ‘situational awareness platform’ or is this going to be done at the battery level?

2

SP’s LAND FORCES

2/2011

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

SP’s: Has the concept of Artillery Divisions been successful? What are the advantages of grouping Artillery in a division level organisation?

DG: The concept of Artillery Divisions evolved essentially from the requirement of optimal utilisation of the plethora of weapon systems and upgraded surveillance systems that we have now and plan to have in our inventory. An organisation was needed for command and control, coordination, logistics and communication functions for these. It is a significant value addition in the ‘strike corps scenario’. The Artillery Division effectively coordinates the degradation battle and synergy of all available fire resources. The concept has been successful and it is visualised that in the future there may be a need to have Artillery Division in each theatre.

DG: For the present, the BMS is planned to be done at the battery level. This may, however, change with the induction of autonomous weapon systems.

SP’s: Based on the new technologies being inducted in the Artillery, how is the training being modified to enable the soldiery to grasp the new technologies?

DG: Keeping the rapid modernisation of Artillery involving large number of new generation equipment like missiles, rockets and surveillance and target acquisition systems, there is definitely a requirement to modify training to enable soldiers to grasp the new technologies. Keeping this in mind, specialist courses/cadres for soldiers are being planned based on new equipment being inducted. The expertise to train is being developed in the School of Artillery

and Regiment Centres, for sustained training. For this, timelines for various courses based on equipment induction schedule have been identified and accordingly course structures are being modified. Similarly, emphasis is on enhancement of technical levels as well as personality development in recruits. We are laying focus on dual trade

We are incorporating modern methods of training including enhanced use of simulators

SP’s: How popular is the selection of Artillery officers for the General Cadre? Do all the officers selected, opt for this option without reservations or do they prefer to serve in their own corps? How many officers are selected for General Cadre in every course, and what is the policy in this regard?

DG: Ours being a command oriented Army, selection to the General Cadre is a matter of professional pride for any ‘other arms officer’, and as such is highly popular in the Artillery as well. Thus a large proportion of officers do opt for General Cadre, depending upon their personal choice and the stage of career at which this is offered to the officer.

The process and policy for selection of other arms officers to General Cadre is well established and depends on merit and experience of the officer. Selection of officers for General Cadre is not vacancy based, though a reasonable percentage of officers are offered General Cadre every year.

singulier et associés - Photo : Getty Images - Flickr

TURN YOUR ARTILLERY INTO PINPOINT WEAPONS

Sagem m Artillery Solu Solutions tions S agem g Sagem gives ives yyour our aartillery rtiller y systems systems tthe he latest latest ssensor ensor to to shooter shooter ccapabilities, apabilities, from from optronic optronic target target designation designation to to fire fire control control and and iinertial nertial navigation navigation systems. systems. O ur ssolutions olutions tturn urn your your artillery artiller y into into precision precision weapons weapons combining combining high high efficiency, efficiency, quick quick operation operation Our aand nd e ase of of u se. M ore than than ttwenty wenty armies ar mies h ave already already o pted ffor or these these solutions, solutions, as as either either original original equipment equipment or or upgrades. upgrades. ease use.

More have opted Wh en you you cchoose hoose Sagem’s Sagem’s sspecialized pecialized solutions, solutions, you you maximize maximize your your firepower. firepower. w ww.sagem-ds.com When www.sagem-ds.com

>>

ARTILLERY

Future Trends To be successful in a full spectrum conflict, there is a need to modernise, have a balanced profile and upgrade our defence industry to achieve a reasonable degree of indigenisation thereby enhancing our capabilities in a two-front war PHOTOGRAPH: US Army

n MAJOR GENERAL P.K. CHAKRAVORTY

M

ODERn TEChnOLOGICAL ADVAnCEMEnT AnD revolution in military affairs has necessitated a transformation in strategic thinking with a paradigm shift in conduct of operations. As a consequence, military doctrines, force structures and weapon systems are also under constant review. Accordingly, the vision of the Indian Army for the 21st century has been to have a well-equipped and optimally structured force, enabling it to respond effectively to varied situations and demands while continually adapting to meet future challenges.

In the current battlefield environment, artillery plays a predominant role by providing firepower in a combined arms battle. The present milieu focuses on accurate standoff strikes in a network-centric arena against a nuclear backdrop.

(WLR), sound ranging system and long-range reconnaissance and observation system (LORROS). In addition, we would need modern survey equipment which would comprise electronic theodolites, inertial navigation systems (InS), differential global positioning systems (DGPS) and laser range finders (LRF).

Induction of modern technology with suitable equipment profile would meet our operational needs.

Nexter’s Caesar offers enhanced firepower through quicker response, longer range and improved accuracy.

Weapon Profile

Requirement of New Generation Weapon Systems The Artillery needs to be well-equipped and optimally structured to meet the challenges of future battlefield. The requirement of new generation weapon systems in our context emerges from the following: l Potential target areas and fieldworks are heavily reinforced with concrete fortifications. l Expansion of mechanised forces underscores the need for large calibre self-propelled artillery systems with higher rates of fire. l Development of better roads and tracks in mountains will enable employment of towed artillery. l The Artillery will also be needed to cater to airborne /helicopter-borne operations and out of area contingencies. l Upgraded acquisition capability is required for detection, identification and location of a target so as to indicate the best suited weapon coupled with the most effective means for target destruction. l Domination and degradation of enemy in depth with beyond the horizon kill capability of long-range rockets and missile systems assumes importance. l Standardisation of calibre is important to ensure ammunition compatibility and reduce logistic complexities.

www.spslandforces.net

Future Gun Systems In view of the above, 155mm gun systems should meet our requirements. however, it is essential to have a judicious mix within the calibres to suit diverse terrain conditions, operational requirements and to cut down dependence on a single source. hence, certain variants of 155mm guns have been planned for induction to suit local terrain conditions. Earlier the 155mm calibre was referred to as a medium gun, but now it is planned to have this as the standard calibre.

Mediumisation of artillery will improve the overall firepower qualitatively. The various aspects of qualitative improvement are discussed below: Increase in gun densities: Longer ranges are a derivative of mediumisation and this will also improve the gun densities. It will also enable regiments to be deployed in a concentrated manner and yet cover the required frontage and depth.

Depth and degradation capability: Mediumisations of artillery coupled with availabil-

4

SP’s LAND FORCES

2/2011

ity of long-range rockets will result in viable degradation in-depth areas, which would assist in reducing enemy combat potential.

Consequently, the enemy’s comb power during contact battle would be proportionately reduced.

Enhance lethality: heavier weight of shell will improve lethality. Enemy defences which hitherto fore could not be destroyed by smaller calibre shells which will now be tackled more effectively.

Logistics capability: A standard calibre would result in standardised ammunition system for all guns. Our operational logistics will be simplified. Moreover, the 155mm family of ammunition is also available in a palletised form.

Flexibility in engagement: Increased range due to larger calibre will enhance flexibility to engage targets by concentrated fires.

Mortars: In future, though major portion of artillery will be based on 155mm guns. however, it is desirable to retain mortars in the inventory due to their high angle capability, ability to engage targets on reverse slopes and flexibility of deployment, especially in the mountains and in other difficult terrain conditions. They can also be transported on mules and by helicopters. In order to make them more effective, it would be worthwhile to have long-range mortars with versatile ammunition.

Missile and Rocket Systems BrahMos missile, Smerch and Pinaka rocket system have been introduced recently in our equipment. BrahMos is a supersonic and a highly accurate missile. This offers the advantage of virtually no collateral damage, thereby obviating any negative repercussions.

The rocket systems introduced have very high accuracy and low dispersion when equipped with special ammunition. Smerch is a longrange and accurate, multi-barrel rocket system which is ideal for engagement of targets in the intermediate zone which are beyond the capability of conventional artillery. Its long-range and lethality, effectively covers the tactical and operational depth of the tactical battle area.

Battlefield Transparency Ensuring battlefield transparency and having effective surveillance and target acquisi-

tion capability will have a huge impact in future conduct of operations. Thus dedicated surveillance (svl) resources for each fmn are desirable to assist the decision support system of the formation commanders. Each formation such as a division or corps has therefore a requirement of a tailor-made unit with the correct mix of SATA resources.

These resources need to be scaled as per their operational roles i.e. mountains, plains, holding, strike and so on. Resources like weapon locating radars (WLR) and sound ranging systems are primarily employed for locating targets which are to be engaged by guns. Other sensors like UAVs, battlefield surveillance radars (BFSR) and LORROS are also used for target acquisition. however, these sensors essentially provide inputs for battlefield transparency. To that extent, it can be said that SATA units are not only performing artillery related tasks but are also employed to provide surveillance for the entire formation. A major qualitative upgrade is being undertaken for purposes of improving battlefield transparency.

Future Technological Challenges Technological challenges for modernisation relate to platforms, munitions and SATA equipment. Weapon platforms are concerned with characteristics such as enhanced range, autonomous capability, high rate of fire, automatic laying system, the ability to shoot and scoot as also the capabilility for firing tactical nuclear munitions. The scope for ammunition is to reach a maximum range of about 40 km and have a greater variety of munitions.

In addition, we need ammunition which has a high degree of precision; which could be trajectory corrected, terminally guided (or designated) and sensor fuzed munitions.

While guns could cover ranges of about 30 to 40 km, which would be in the tactical space, we would need rockets to cover the operational battle space between 40 and 120 km and missiles to cover the strategic space from 90 to 300 km. Thus there is a need for SATA equipment to provide surveillance for these ranges. In this we could consider unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and aerostats for longrange surveillance which at some point of time could be supplemented with low earth orbiting satellites. For the contact battle we would need BFSRs, weapons locating radars

The Artillery equipment needs to be correctly profiled in accordance with terrain and operational role of the concerned formation to which it is affiliated. According to the current technical and operational needs, Indian Army has decided that 155mm would be the basic calibre for their Artillery. Variants such as self propelled (SP) (track), SP (wheeled), mounted gun systems (MGS), ultra-light howitzer (ULh) and mortars would be inducted in formations based on their roles and the terrain conditions in which they are required to function. While all these gun systems would serve as close support weapons, there would be a need to reinforce them with rockets and missiles.

Force Multipliers Our force multipliers in the field of SATA devices have been optimised. We have stabilised our UAV platforms comprising of heron and Searchers which are playing a stellar role in the field of spot surveillance.

Our BFSRs and long-range reconnaissance and observation system (LORROS) are operationalised. For our SATA regiment, we shall also require intermediate-range and longrange sensors. This will include weapon locating radars (WLR), sound ranging systems, aerostats and UAVs for which procurement process has been initiated. These systems will also require some other support equipment like electronic theodolites, inertial navigation system, etc, the procurement of which is also in the pipeline.

Operationally, we are always trying to achieve first salvo effectiveness. An accurate meteorological (Met) system is an essential ingredient of the same. Our digicora Met systems have been provided with SATA units to ensure that accurate Met data is available to ensure that the first round lands on the target. The biggest force multiplication which has commenced in recent past has been the introduction of Artillery combat command and control system (ACCCS) which has automated the computation and passage of data from the observation post officer to the command posts up to the Corps level.

Destroying Opponent Artillery is the primary provider of firepower and needs to have state-of-the-art guns, rockets and missiles to deter our adversaries from undertaking any misadventure. Further, our SATA equipment must provide us surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition to destroy the opponent’s war waging capabilities. Induction of variants of 155mm gun system and new generation surveillance systems will add to the capabilities of artillery. If modern technology is inducted quickly and suitably, the lethality of artillery fire will change the dynamics of warfare.

The writer is currently the Additional Director General of Artillery at the Integrated Headquarters of the MoD (Army)

ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE.

It’s what they need in their integrated communications system.

It’s what Harris delivers.

Integrated vehicle and platform systems

C4ISR systems

Tactical ISR systems

Soldier systems

Our prepackaged systems provide a custom solution—but without the cost, risk, or time. Drawing on more than a half-century of experience as the leading global supplier and innovator in tactical communications, we can quickly integrate our field-proven products and help deploy and support your systems in the field.

Customers in more than 150 countries trust Harris to bring it all together, for system performance that really stands out.

Wide area network systems

Homeland and border security systems

harris.com

Count on us for all of your critical communications needs: Harris.com/Confidence RF CommunicationsÊÊUÊÊ ÛiÀ i ÌÊ Õ V>Ì ÃÊ-ÞÃÌi ÃÊÊUÊÊ À >`V>ÃÌÊ Õ V>Ì Ã

>>

C O M M U N I C AT I O N S

Safe, Secure & Reliable The project for tactical communication system (TCS) for the Indian Army has been undertaken under the “Make Procedure” category. TCS is expected to become operational by 2014. In the first instance, it is likely to be established in the Strike Corps and later with the Pivot (Holding) Corps.

PHOTOGRAPH: SP Guide Pubns

n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

I

n MILITARy COMMUnICATIOnS, A tactical communications system (TCS) is generally employed within or in direct support of tactical forces. It is designed to meet the requirements of changing tactical situations and varying environmental conditions, and provides secure communications, such as voice, data, and video, among mobile/static users to facilitate command and control within, and in support of tactical forces. It usually requires short installation times, in order to meet the requirements of frequent relocation.

l

www.spslandforces.net

TCS in the Indian Army In the Indian Army, TCS is planned to replace Army radio engineering network (AREn) system currently being used. The current AREn system uses radio relay equipment (commonly referred to as RR equipment) to connect Brigade level headquarters to Division and Corps level headquarters on the battlefield. Based on the type of mobility required, the RR equipment of offensive formations, of Strike Corps, whose missions invariably lie across the border is generally mounted on high mobility wheeled or tracked vehicles while those of defensive formations are based on normal wheeled lorries. Rear of the Corps headquarters, up to the Regional Commands and to Army headquarters, the communications acquire a more static configuration, relying more on fibre optics and satellite links and less on radio.

TCS being designed now will cover the entire communication system from Corps headquarters down to Battalion/Regiment level in the Army and hence it is the most vital communication project for the Indian Army. The new radio relay (RR) equipment envisaged in the TCS system will be of much higher capacity as compared to the old RR sets. The new RR sets will have a capacity of about 34 Mb/s as compared to about 1 Mb in the old sets. The RR communications will comprise of mobile cellular communications for each entity at the corps, division, brigade and at the battalion/regiment level.

The entire communication will be mobile, achieved through base transmitting stations (BTS) which would be mobile. At the unit level, high capacity Internet protocol radios (IP radios) are planned to be given which would be capable of both data and voice communications. In the final stage, software defined radios (SDRs) would replace the IP radios.

In the rear of the Corps headquarters, the backbone communication will be provided by the Army Static Communication nodes (ASCOn). Currently, Phase 3 of the ASCOn project is functional. When ASCOn Phase 4 combined with fibre optics laid countrywide becomes operational, there would be enough capacity for all types of communication required by the network centricity planned by the Army and within the three Services.

Network Enabled Warfare Capability The advances in the field of communications, computers, command and control, information and interoperability [C4I2] have provided military capabilities to view the battlespace as one composite whole and thus be tackled jointly or singly by any weapon of any service which is within range. Interop-

6

SP’s LAND FORCES

2/2011

l

l

Mobile Base Transceiver Station

erability will be the essence for the different C4I2 systems of the three services (Army, navy and the Air Force). C4I2 system together with the tactical communication system will allow network enabled warfare, connecting sensors, shooters and decisionmakers at all levels.

Battle Management System (BMS) and F-INSAS This system is being planned at battalion/regiment and forward of it to companies, platoons, sections and forward of that would be the future infantry soldier as a system (F-InSAS) which would take the communications down to the individual infantry soldier. These systems would be applicable for all arms and services of the Army. The communications at this level will be based on IP radios currently, and later software defined radios (SDR) and the system will comprise of a tactical hand-held computer with individual soldiers and tactical computers at Battle Group headquarters and combat vehicles. Computers will be integrated employing application and database servers connected on a data enabled communication network. The system will enable generation of common operational picture by integrating inputs from all relevant sources within a battle group by integrated use of geographic information system (GIS) and global positioning system (GPS). The BMS will be a highly mobile system which is able to network itself by integration of components and provide high data rate. The communications systems will optimally utilise the bandwidth available for military communications involving voice and data including video streaming and imageries. It

should be scalable to ensure its availability to all elements and range from being manportable to being fitted in combat vehicles.

l

Status of the TCS Project The project for tactical communication system for the Indian Army has been undertaken under the “Make Procedure” category.

Integrated Project Management Team (IPMT) was instituted a few years ago, which is likely to complete its work by the end of April 2011. The choice of vendor will be left to the Defence Production Board after studying the report submitted by the IPMT. After completion of vendor selection, the Expression of Interest (EOI) is likely to be issued and the development agencies will be identified and selected for production of the prototype and for testbed evaluation. After this stage one of them will get selected for the manufacture and development work. This process is expected to galvanise the foreign manufacturers for forming joint ventures (JVs) with Indian companies. TCS is expected to become operational by 2014. In the first instances, it is likely to be established in the Strike Corps and later with the Pivot (holding) Corps.

l

l

Some Global Manufacturers of TCS, C4ISR and Associated Equipment Some of the global enterprises dealing with the TCS systems are as follows: l Bharat Electronics Ltd, India, based in Bangalore is a customer focused, globally competitive company, in defence electronics and in other chosen areas of professional electronics, through quality, technology and innovation. l Ultra Electronics TCS is a world class sup-

l

plier of software defined high capacity radios. Based in Montreal, Quebec, the company is a Division of Ultra Electronics Canada Defence Inc. and specialises in the provision of area communication systems, transmission subsystems and LOS radio products for tactical military deployment.

Tacticom, USA has been designing, manufacturing and supplying military ground tactical communications equipment to government and industry since 1981. They specialise in the supply of accessories, components and connectors related to military manpack radios, vehicular radios, and telephone equipment.

BAE Systems develops and produces a range of tactical communications systems. Under Joint Vision 2020, the commanders must be able to exploit real-time voice, data and video communications in a network with highly extended forces.

BAE mobile networks make this possible now. This technology, which needs no fixed-field infrastructure, provides a highly flexible, mobile, wireless, highthroughput, real-time voice and data radio extension. Their tactical radios, forces can exchange data, voice, and video in real time over an extended range, making them more flexible, more mobile, and less vulnerable to enemy interruption. harris Corporation at Rochester, new york, is an international communications and information technology company, providing secure interoperable networked communications to both armed forces and law enforcement for safety and security missions.

Media reports indicate that Rolta and Selex Communications, a Finmeccanica company, have signed a strategic partnership teaming agreement for the Indian tactical communication system (TCS) programme, in the frame of which the companies will collaborate to provide comprehensive tactical military communications solutions to Indian Army.

Under this agreement, Selex Communications will undertake transfer of its state-of the-art technology for radio relay systems, switching systems and field wireless systems, etc to address the TCS programme needs.

US defence major Raytheon Company has inked a pack with Precision Electronics Limited (PEL), an Indian firm, in March 2010, to forge strategic alignments to jointly develop and provide superior communications technology for India’s military forces.

The Boeing Company and Argon ST have announced that they have entered into an agreement for Boeing’s acquisition of Argon ST. The agreement to acquire Argon ST, a leading developer of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and combat systems, advances Boeing’s growth strategy and expands the company’s capabilities to address the C4ISR, cyber and intelligence markets.

AT Electronic and Communication International is a global wholesale manufacturer and distributor of communication equipment including tactical transceivers and rugged C3I systems.

UNION BUDGET

<<

Defence Allocation Up, GDP Share Down The defence budget over the last three decades has generally varied between two to three per cent of the GDP, which corresponds to 13-17 per cent of the Central Government expenditure. This year’s allocation represents an 11.59 per cent growth over the previous year’s budget. It is only 1.83 per cent of the GDP, while last year (FY 2010-11), the defence budget was 2.12 per cent of the GDP. PHOTOGRAPH: SP Guide Pubns

T-90 tank

n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

Key Statistics of Defence Budget 2010-11 and 2011-12

B

UILDInG A MILITARy CAPABILITy is a long-term exercise. In the Indian context, it involves formulation of the 15-year long-term integrated perspective plan (LTIPP) by headquarters Integrated Defence Staff in consultation with the Service headquarters (Indian Army, Indian navy, and Indian Air Force (IAF)). The five years capital acquisition plan and the annual acquisition plans are derived from the LTIPP and form the basis of working out the capital budget for all major procurements during a year. The capital budget requirement of each service added to the revenue budget constitutes their overall budget demand during the year.

The security threats and challenges facing India have increased enormously. While the old adversarial threats due to unresolved borders remain, new threats and challenges like terrorism and insurgencies have been added to the old inventory. Thus India needs to prepare itself for the full spectrum of warfare ranging from low intensity conflict involving counter-insurgency and counterterrorist operations to conventional conflicts under the nuclear shadow on two widely separated fronts on its western and eastern flanks. The dilemma is only regarding the extent of emphasis that should be laid to acquiring each type of capability. Thus the requirements of the services are vast and wide-ranging.

The defence budget over the last three decades has generally varied between two to three per cent of the GDP, which corresponds to 13-17 per cent of the Central Government expenditure. The Union Budget 2011-12, presented to the Parliament on February 28, 2011, shows increased defence allocation of up to `1,64,415.49 crore ($36.50 billion).

The annual increase in the budget has varied from as low as three per cent to a high of 34

Defence Budget (` in crore) Growth of Defence Budget (%) Revenue Expenditure (` in crore) Growth of Revenue Expenditure (%) Share of Revenue Expenditure in Defence Budget (%) Capital Expenditure (` in crore) Growth of Capital Expenditure (%) Share of Capital Expenditure in Defence Budget (%) Share of Defence Budget in GDP (%) Share of Defence Budget in Central Government

2010-11

2011-12

1,47,344

1,64,415.49

3.98

11.59

87,344

95,216.68

0.57

9.01

59.28

57.91

60,000

69,198.81

9.44

15.33

40.72

42.09

2.12

1.83

13.29

13.07

Expenditure (%) Source: IDSA

per cent as witnessed in Fy 2009-10. This was due to the substantial increase in the revenue expenditure to cater to the enhanced pay and allowances sanctioned in the Sixth Pay Commission report. This year’s allocation represents an 11.59 per cent growth over the previous year’s budget. This year’s defence budget is only 1.83 per cent of the GDP, while last year (Fy 2010-11) the defence budget was 2.12 per cent of the GDP. The defence budget was accompanied by the usual remarks from the Finance Minister that “any

The Union Budget 201112 shows increased defence allocation of up to `1,64,415.49 crore ($36.50 billion)

additional requirement for the security of the nation will be provided for.”

The increase in the defence budget has resulted in an additional allocation of `17,071.49 crore over the previous budget of which `7,872.68 crore increase is in the revenue expenditure and the balance `9,198.81 for capital expenditure. Thus revenue expenditure has grown by 9.01 per cent to `95,216.68 and the capital expenditure by 15.33 per cent to `69,198.81 crore. From this capital outlay, the Army has got `18,986 crore, navy `5,688 crore, naval Fleet `7,320 crore and Air Force `30,699 crore. Assuming that 60 per cent of the capital acquisition budget goes for committed liabilities, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will have around `27,680 crore ($ 6.15 billion) to pay for new acquisitions.

This year, the ‘big-ticket’ items include the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) for the IAF, strategic lift transport aircraft like C-17 Globemaster for IAF, light observation

helicopter and advanced light helicopters for the Army and the IAF, 145 ultra light howitzers for the Army and patrol vessels for navy; are some of the items that are likely to be finalised this year. notwithstanding the above, the fact remains that we are way behind in our modernisation and procurement process. Moreover, merely allocating the budgetary resources will not make any difference as long as we continue with our archaic, lengthy, bureaucratic procurement procedures which are neither transparent nor efficient. There are more brakes than accelerators in our procurement procedure.

Given the size of Indian armed forces, no country in the world can provide India’s requirements at a short notice, while our indigenous production agencies and our Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) cannot cater to our needs currently. At a time when the IAF does not have adequate number of fighter aircraft; the Indian navy does not have a credible carrier borne task force or an effective submarine force; and the Indian Army does not have modern artillery, is night blind, and does not even possess modern weaponry for the infantry, the above assurances by the Finance Minister are mere conciliatory noises. Thus 1.83 per cent of GDP may be considered adequate by some. however, our view is that unless our buy and make procedures are radically streamlined and faster, and induction of new equipment and new technologies is ensured, the armed forces will not be ready to face their adversaries in future conflicts. no one is impressed by our claim of being a rising military power anymore and hence our adversaries are getting bolder by the day. Asymmetric wars waged against the nation are a result of the lack of military deterrence against such wars. We neither have the hardware nor the software, or indeed the political will to deter.

2/2011

SP’s LAND FORCES

7

>>

BUDGET

China’s Rising Defence Budget Cause for Alarm At a time when China’s ambition for power projection has considerably increased, a double-digit growth in China’s defence budget promises to impact adversely the regional security dynamics. The growing asymmetry between the defence budgets of China and India is alarming, especially in view of the flawed relationship between Asia’s two rising powers. n SANJAY KUMAR

Defence Budget (2000-09): China and India

www.spslandforces.net

I

n RECEnT yEARS, DEFEnCE budget of no other country has been discussed, debated and speculated as widely as the defence budget of the People’s Republic of China. China’s official defence budget which stood at $14.6 billion (`65,700 crore) in 2000 has risen by well over 500 per cent to reach the staggering figure of $91.5 billion (`4,11,750 crore) in 2011. At the present rate of growth, China will cross over the psychological barrier of $100 billion (`4,50,000 crore) defence budget the next year. By contrast, India’s defence budget has grown meagerly by 129 per cent over the same period, from $15.9 billion (`71,550 crore) in 2000 to $36.6 billion in 2011. It is significant to mention here that China and India have both managed to achieve impressive GDP growth over the past decade, averaging 12.8 and 7.7 per cent respectively (IMF estimates). While China’s defence budget has grown consistently well over the country’s GDP average over the past two decades, India’s defence budget has hardly kept pace with the GDP growth. The growing asymmetry between the defence budgets of China and India is alarming, especially in view of the flawed relationship between Asia’s two rising powers.

China’s defence budget for 2011-12, announced on March 4, 2011, shows again a remarkable increase of 12.6 per cent over last year’s budget. Announcing the defence budget, Chinese spokesman Li Zhaoxing echoed Beijing’s previous assertions that the increase was justified, and China posed no threat to anyone.

Li further stated that China’s defence spending is relatively low by world standards. however, Beijing’s stereotype defence of its defence budget does not cut much ice with the international community. It is widely accepted that China’s spiraling defence budgets go well beyond its claims that such level of spending is needed for territorial defence. Scaling new heights every year, China’s defence budgets, however, lead to cascading effects on defence expenditures by other countries, especially those countries which share adverse relationships with Beijing.

The burgeoning defence budget of China needs to be viewed not only in terms of increased capabilities but also from the perspective of Beijing’s recent assertiveness with regard to territories contested by China with her neighbours. Last year, China’s Defence Minister Liang Guanglie said the country was preparing for conflict “in every direction” and would use its rapidly growing economy and technological capabilities to speed up military modernisation. Countries lying at China’s periphery that are already facing heat from her recent assertiveness have a reason to feel concerned over the latest increase in China’s defence budget. Beijing is unlikely to keep its defence budget trimmed down for any considerable length of years, specifically in view of a number of modernisation programmes which are currently under way for China’s military.

The exponential growth of China’s defence budget over the past two decades is

8

SP’s LAND FORCES

2/2011

Figures in billions USD, constant for the calendar year 98.8 China India

86.2 77.9 68.8 59 53.1 48.5 44.4 38.4

36.6 32.3

31.2 26.7 21.8 2000

22.6 2001

22.5 2002

28.2

28.4

28.8

23 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Source: SIPRI

largely perceived as a red flag in a region which is fast gaining in notoriety due to increased muscle flexing by major powers with their eyes on the region’s vast natural resources, share of markets and key trading routes.

China, however, cannot escape the responsibility for fuelling militarisation in a region which is relatively low in terms of human development. The unwarranted growth of China’s military power (China faces no threats to her sovereignty, real or perceived) is however leading other countries, especially India, to take away much needed resources required for social spending on health, education and poverty-related programmes, etc, towards procurement of expensive weapon systems which cost billions in terms of foreign currency. Incidentally, China and India both figure in the medium category of countries listed on the human Development Index (UnDP 2010), and are ranked 69 and 119 respectively, in a list of 169 countries. China has allocated a staggering 22.5 per cent of its planned Central Government expenditure for 2011-12 on security alone which includes 10.7 for national defence and 11.5 per cent planned central expenditure for police, state security, armed civil militia, courts and jails. Incidentally, internal security budget is pegged higher than national defence in China’s latest budget.

It is, however, believed that official estimates of China’s defence budgets are generally fudged so as to avoid international censure, making the defence budgets appear more palatable to the Western audience. Lack of transparency in China’s defence budget has often led to speculative estimates, drawn up by different agencies. It is widely perceived

Lack of transparency in China’s defence budget has often led to speculative estimates, drawn up by different agencies

that China’s official defence budget does not account for expenditures incurred by the second Artillery (nuclear forces), foreign acquisitions, military’s space programmes, asymmetric warfare, and research and development. Defence budget to GDP ratio at 1.4 per cent, as reiterated by the Chinese spokesman is again a gross understatement.

The western estimates of China’s defence budget in terms of GDP ranges from three to five times the official estimates. By some estimates, China’s defence budget is already one quarter of the US defence budget and the gap is narrowing down further, especially with Washington mulling to reduce its defence budget over the next five years. however, it is the growing asymmetry between the defence budgets of China and India which has caused considerable concern in India’s strategic circles in recent years.

Adding a further edge to China’s military build-up is the fact that China has succeeded considerably in reducing its dependence on foreign weapons over the years, especially with maturing of its local industry. So far as China’s indigenous arms production is concerned, availability of cheap labour gives the PLA an added advantage vis-à-vis defence budgets. In other words, China manages to get more bangs for every buck it spends when compared to a country like India which imports hardware to the tune of 70 per cent of military’s total arms requirements, paying hard-earned foreign currency through its nose. India’s inadequate defence budget for modernisation thus does not go far enough.

Revenue expenditure which constitutes 60 per cent of the defence budget does not auger well the military which is striving hard to transform itself into a technology driven force. Defence procurement procedures in India, which are at times too cumbersome, result often in military paying extra bucks for equipment/projects which generally tend to fall short of delivery schedules. Added to this complex are the defence deals, struck usually towards the end of financial years due to bureaucratic sluggishness, resulting at times in military not getting exactly the same equipment it would have preferred. In addition, defence budget in India gets rarely utilised to the last buck, considered by many a cardinal sin especially in view of the meager budgetary

allocation for defence. India’s defence budgets thus suffer from several procedural lacunas directly or indirectly. The Ministry of Defence, however needs to be complimented for exhausting its budget thoroughly last year.

The budgetary allocation at $36.6 billion for India’s military in 2011-12, an increase of 11.5 per cent over last year, does not stand testimony to the establishment’s view of future two-front war scenario, especially in view of the glaring holes that exist in the defence budget of India.

China has significantly increased its military power over the years, her efforts largely supplemented by the weakening US appetite to retain its stronghold in the region. Scaling down of important modernisation programmes by the US military over budgetary constraints would indirectly help China in reducing parity with the US military. China, however, is reaching out to new heights in military power year upon year. Flight-testing of a stealth fighter (prototype) carried out recently by the PLA, many years ahead of schedule, has surprised many Western analysts. Pentagon fears that China has already acquired capabilities to strike at key US military installations in South Korea and Japan.

The anti-ship ballistic missile developed by China can become a game-changer and pose serious challenges to the US and other navies.

Beijing has running territorial disputes with a number of countries in the region including India. China views that a military victory against a major country in the region will give her legitimacy to claim global power status. It is increasingly evident from Beijing’s recent coercive postures in her dealings with neighbours that she is running out of patience to stake that claim. Coupled with that, there is a growing world view that Beijing could be urged by its own internal dynamics to engage in conflicts with her neighbours, possibly as a means to deflect the attention of local population from rising political dissent, inflation, growing rich and poor divide, and corruption at the official levels within the country.

At a time when China’s ambition for power projection has considerably increased, a double-digit growth in China’s defence budget promises to impact adversely the regional security dynamics, and especially India’s. Against the backdrop of Beijing’s increased assertiveness in recent times, the massive military infrastructure put up by the Chinese all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is quite worrisome. Sustained flow of funds remains the prerequisite for military modernisation in India, keeping in view especially the growing Chinese threat on India’s borders. India’s economy which is projected to grow well over nine per cent in the mediumterm does, however, provide necessary cushion against benchmarking higher committed allocation over a longer period for better strategic planning. India possibly needs to take a cue from Australia in this regard which has effectively integrated defence budgeting with long-term planning.

The writer is a senior researcher and military analyst

T EC H N O LO GY

<<

F I R ST O F A SE R I ES O F A RT I C L ES TOWA R DS A C Y B E R SECU R I TY ST R AT EGY

Vulnerabilities Manifold It may be said that vulnerabilities to cyber attacks in India is no different from the rest of the world. What makes us more vulnerable is the fact that despite our technological and knowledge prowess including in the field of software development, we continue to import bulk hardware and critical software and have no facilities to check malware and embedded vulnerabilities. n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

C

yBER ATTACKS ARE A common phenomenon today but have become more and more complex.

Erstwhile cyber mischief generally centred on hackers attacking e-mails, wiping out contact lists and data, engineering hoax messages and the like.

They either established a link to the web to deliver malicious payload or used an infected attachment. however, the web has changed all that. Today, the web is a hacker’s paradise providing a wide-range of options and has become the ideal vector for cyber attack. A host of vulnerabilities exist in web browsers and browser add-ons that provide back doors enabling systems to be infected with key loggers, password-stealing trojans and other forms of malware. Advertisements can be designed to exploit vulnerabilities in web browsers and browser add-ons and distributed via advertising networks across numerous websites. Internet Explorer itself has had scores of vulnerabilities in recent years. no website can be considered truly safe. Even popular, established and generally trusted websites can be compromised and used as malware delivery vehicles without knowledge of the site owner. During the last three years, thousands of websites including over a hundred top global websites were found either compromised or contained links to other malicious websites. Embassies, Fortune 500 and Fortune 1000 companies, celebrities, defence and security agencies were all targeted, compromised and used to steal data by unsuspecting visitors.

Automation and digitisation in the information age has revolutionalised both warfare and industry. Organisation in distribution of correct information in exact scale and timing is essential.

Cyber Threats India Faces Cyber threats are multidisciplinary particularly since there are endless vulnerabilities.

The attacker has the advantage as there are no limitations and boundaries. he has many tools for attack and can practically achieve most of his goals. The instantaneous nature of cyber attacks makes defence against them very difficult. Once the attacker discovers vulnerability and wants to exploit it, there is very little that can be done. The ratio of tools available for cyber attacks compared to vulnerabilities heavily favours the former. Worms and trojans can do endless damage. Attacks can be sudden and horrific and such tools can be injected, made to lie dormant and activated at the critical time. Automated tools like Internet worms exploit vulnerabilities and can continue replicating themselves endlessly from systems to systems.

Originators of cyber attacks could be states or their arms (like intelligence agencies–both military and civil), defence forces or hackers employed as information and cyber warfare actors/warriors to inflict disruption, map adversary’s capabilities and assess own capacity to attack whenever conflict situations arise. Besides industrial espionage in cyber space that has been ongoing for several decades, cyber attacks can also be politically motivated. Cyber attacks can be of many types with different objectives. These could

range from attack on critical infrastructure to subvert the supply chain, hit power distribution, railways, air traffic, manipulate radio signals, and use radio frequency transmission to disrupt unprotected electronics and the like. Objectives of some attacks could purely be information gathering–military, economic, industrial. Many options exist for mischief hackers as well as terrorists albeit the attackers too get exposed in the process. The Internet and broadband have increased the vulnerabilities manifold.

It may be said that vulnerabilities to cyber attacks in India is no different from the rest of the world. What makes us more vulnerable is the fact that despite our technological and knowledge prowess including in the field of software development, we continue to import bulk hardware and critical software and have no facilities to check malware and embedded vulnerabilities. We appear to be impervious to Symantec figures of ‘bot’ infected computers in India that are multiplying every year at an alarming rate. neither have we defined a cyber security strategy/policy, adopting an ostrich approach instead to avoid facing the gigantic task of cyber security, wishing that all should continue to be well. This is despite almost daily attacks on our networks (both military and civil) including serious ones like the Stuxnet attack on InSAT 4B. If we permit extension, our unenviable label of ‘soft state’ to cyberspace, we will multiply our cyber vulnerability and encourage our adversaries to mount more and more cyber attacks.

Towards a Required Strategy The first thing that needs to be done is to bring together the knowledge that different parts/organisations of the government, the research and development (R&D) of both defence and civil, the industry and academia who are dealing with cyber and network security. This will ensure availability of the best technical experts while we set course to cope with intricacies of cyberspace by providing strategic advice and technological expertise to ensure the integrity of systems and secure transfer of data. It may be prudent to establish a Task Force (TF) or a Project Management Group (PMG) on cyber security that could be directly under the national Security Advisor (nSA), having parallel links with the Ministry of Telecommunications, Cyber Society of India and organisations like the national Talent Research Organisation (nTRO). This TF/PMG should take into account the cyber threats that we face/are likely to face in holistic manner, based on which the cyber security strategy should be evolved. Such strategic planning should also define required Indian responses when subjected to cyber attack, plus addressing the difficult issue of building requisite intelligence in order to understand where the cyber threat are emanating from and what are the motives for such attacks. Counter-intelligence operations against hackers (including State-sponsored ones) will need to be addressed. Integrating early warnings, possible indicators, periodic net assessment in short-, medium- and long-term of likely cyber threats will need to be thought of. A decision support system perhaps will need to be developed to arrive at the required response–what type of counter strike? net-

work security is vital both in a civilian and military context especially with cyberspace having become essential to our way of life.

Cyberspace is an area where hostile states, terrorists and criminals can equally threaten us. The TF/PMG on cyber security will need to mull over the organisation needed at various levels to cope with cyber threats. Besides layered national structures, private industry would need to be mobilised against cyber attackers, on lines of ‘civil defence’. Veteran experts and hackers would need to be synergised into the effort. Cyber security organisations of foreign countries, including China, would need to be examined, analysed and deductions drawn for what will suit us.

Absolute cyber defence being a misnomer, there is no other way to defeat cyber attacks and ensure strategic defence other than building adequate deterrence through developing offensive cyber warfare capabilities. If we want to deter adversaries from attacking us in cyberspace then we must have following abilities with respect to our adversaries/potential adversaries–stop them from accessing and using our critical information, systems and services; ability to stealthily extract information from their networks and computers including vulnerabilities, plans and programmes of cyber attack/war, forethought and prior assessment being vital since it only takes 300 milliseconds for a keystroke to

Defining a cyber security strategy at the national level is an urgent and vital requirement travel halfway around the world; ability to penetrate their networks undetected and stealthy insertion of dormant codes, to be activated at opportune time for thwarting cyber attack; ability to manipulate and doctor radio transmissions; ability to destroy their computer networks, if and when necessary; ability to manipulate their perceptions, which should be achievable considering the ongoing global research on the issue.

The cyber security strategy should cater to ‘hardening’ our critical infrastructure and establishing active cyber security measures incrementally pan India, duly prioritised.

Concurrently, we would need to develop ‘stealthy’ offensive cyber security capabilities to establish credible cyber deterrence, which though meant for covert use, may have to be selectively demonstrated in order to establish capability. An important adjunct would be the incorporation of deception measures to lead the adversaries/hackers effectively down the garden path. We not only need to continuously monitor cyberspace, more importantly, our cyber security strategy should ensure the government, military, economy, industry, business and citizenry enjoys full benefits of a safe, secure and resilient cyber space. We must accord requisite national priority to cyber security and leverage our manpower resources in building adequate cyber security set up to enable India progress effectively. We need a proactive cyber security strategy with fair share of offensive capabili-

ties to protect India from cyber attacks. In respect of cyber war, defence by itself is a dead issue. Offence has to be part of the cyber security strategy if we want our cyber defence to be credible. Additionally, we must cash on the importance of public-private partnership and awareness-raising with respect to cyber security. Due emphasis must be accorded to control the risk to information technology (IT), particularly in protecting critical infrastructure and to develop technology paced with IT developments like cloud computing, mobile devices security and the like. At the government level, efforts are already under way to join hands with like-minded nations and allies to collectively address cyber security, regulating use of cyberspace, building collective safeguards and counter-intelligence operations against hackers, need to be accelerated and strengthened.

Develop Foolproof Mechanisms Without doubt cyberspace will occupy prime space in future battlegrounds. Targets of cyber war will include critical infrastructure, equipment and weapon system disruptions, web vandalism, penetrative data gathering, cyber espionage, distributed denial-of-service attacks, compromised counterfeit hardware and the like, aimed at gaining information superiority and supremacy over adversaries. A current objective of our adversaries in all probability is ‘web mapping’-to gather information and test vulnerabilities of our networks and infrastructure in order to identify cyber warfare targets and refine attack techniques for use at opportune time to paralyse our critical infrastructure. The power to take control/interfere with the adversary’s networks not only affects the latter’s defence potential but can actually cripple a nation, bringing almost everything to a standstill. We must be able to prevent cyber attacks and if these happen, contain them and effect swift recovery. Malware embedded in both software and hardware including at manufacturing stage can prove grave risks to national security. We must develop foolproof mechanisms to check our system for malware, a capability that is non-existent in the country today.

Evolving a cyber security strategy should essentially begin with threat assessment and having defined and understood the threats, arrive at a strategy to mitigate those threats.

The assessment of threats should include both the military and civil domain and cover the short, medium- and long-term threat scenarios. These will need to be periodically reviewed since fast paced technological developments are unpredictable. We need to rapidly harden our critical infrastructure plus networks across the board systematically. Coupled with pro-active defensive measures we need offensive cyber capabilities to have the required deterrence in cyberspace. As a nation, we must accord due strategic importance to cyberspace. Defining a cyber security strategy at the national level is an urgent and vital requirement.

Creation of a national level Task Force/Project Management Organisation for Cyber Security should be an essential first step.

Creation of a national Cyber Command to include a Tri-Service Cyber Command would be a natural follow up.

2/2011

SP’s LAND FORCES

9

>>

PROCUREMENT

Making Every Mission Possible A common platform for a light armoured vehicle (wheeled) which could fulfill the role of all the functions required to be carried out in conventional and asymmetric conflicts would be desirable n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

O

nE OF ThE MAJOR weaknesses of the Indian Army is the lack of availability of a suitable light armoured vehicle (wheeled) in its equipment profile for a plethora of vital functions to be performed on the battlefield. At present, these functions are performed by unarmoured light vehicles which have an open configuration and a canvas covering. They offer no protection even against small firearms. The current vehicles do not have the requisite mobility, firepower or protection to survive on the battlefield in any type of terrain. Some anti-mine vehicles have been procured for formations and units including Rashtriya Rifles functioning in insurgency areas. however, these vehicles do not cover all types of tasks and missions that have to be performed in conventional conflicts or in low intensity conflicts like the counter-insurgency environment existing in Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeast. hence a common platform for a light armoured vehicle (wheeled) which could fulfill the role of all the functions required to be carried out in conventional and asymmetric conflicts would be desirable.

Expected Missions/Tasks All formations and units would be interested in a common platform of light armoured vehicle (wheeled) which could fulfill most of their missions/tasks. Some of these tasks are: l Command and control vehicles which would be fitted with radio sets and high power antennas and would be used by

l

l

l l l l

l l

commanders and staff officers for radio communications and for liaison duties.

Reconnaissance and surveillance vehicles which may be fitted with various types of sensors for route, terrain and enemy reconnaissance and surveillance.

Weapon carriers fitted with light and medium machine guns, up to 30mm cannons and anti-tank missiles.

Mortar carriers.

Ambulance vehicles.

Carriage of Special Forces/infantry/ engineer reconnaissance teams Could be employed as an air defence vehicle by fitting a turret for firing air defence missiles or guns.

Carrier of small arms ammunition.

Could be modified as a light recovery vehicle.

Carriage of forward observation officers and their communication equipment. l Air portability for airborne and helicopter-borne operations.

Considering the above tasks, the major characteristics of such vehicles are safety, endurance, firepower, reliability, and adaptability to terrain and the role to be performed. l

Design The design should be such that they have a compact profile, to the extent possible, and are transportable by aircraft, helicopter, and truck and by rail for rapid deployment.

Their body armour should be so designed that it enables rapid exit of the crew when required. Amphibious capability would be desirable.

Optional Equipment

One of the major weaknesses of the Indian Army is the lack of availability of a suitable light armoured vehicle (wheeled) in its equipment profile for a plethora of vital functions to be performed on the battlefield

Depending upon the role and tasks envisaged, optional equipment may include electrical self-recovery winch, nuclear, chemical and biological (nCB) protection kit, infrared driving lamps, smoke grenade dischargers, night-vision-goggle-compatible (nVG) glazing, fire suppression system, night-vision periscopes for driver and commander and daytime periscopes for driver and commander.

Armament Depending upon the roles and tasks, various types of weapon stations and turrets incorporating 7.62mm or 12.7mm machine guns, 40mm automatic grenade launcher or cannons up to 30mm calibre can be adapted to such vehicles. Sight systems with night vision capability or thermal imaging could also be made available.

www.spslandforces.net

Two US Army Stryker infantry carrier vehicles drive into a C-5 Galaxy aircraft

AM General’s Humvee is a high mobility multipurpose wheeled 4WD vehicle for military use

10

SP’s LAND FORCES

2/2011

“The Indian Army is looking at the procurement of light armoured vehicles designed to meet the requirements of the reconnaissance troops and platoons of armoured regiments and mechanised infantry battalions.”

Lt General D.S. Siddhu, Director General Mechanised Forces

Self-protection The structure of the hull should be so optimised that the vehicle has a low silhouette and optimised for increased survivability.

Run-flat tyres are a standard feature, allowing the vehicle to continue its mission with deflated tyres. The hull should provide all-round protection against small arms fire and artillery shell splinters. The vehicle should also provide protection against anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and indigenous explosive devices (IEDs). Add-on armour kits and additional composite flooring can be provided, if

PROCUREMENT

<<

The Global Market - Some Examples of LAVs

required, to increase the protection of crews.

Propulsion Such vehicles should be powered by turbo diesel engines which have power to weight ratio in excess of 30 to give the vehicle a good

General Dynamics Land Systems Canada built LAV-25 is an eight-wheeled amphibious reconnaissance vehicle used by the US Marine Corps

to nine. The Tiger is ballistic and mine blast protected, with various add-on armour options and is designed with a spacious, versatile cabin and large payload capacity allows the Tiger to be tailored to many missions.

The Oshkosh mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicle (M-ATV) is an armoured vehicle with improved mobility. In June 2009, Oshkosh Corporation received an initial order to deliver 2,900 M-ATVs to the US Armed Forces for deployment in Afghanistan.

The M-ATV is based on the Oshkosh medium tactical vehicle replacement (MTVR) platform and is fitted with patented TAK-4 independent suspension system for

cross country performance. A four-six-wheel design with automatic transmission and electronically controlled, would be an advantage.

Such vehicles, depending upon the terrain, could have a maximum road speed of 100 kmh and a cross-country speed of 40 to 50 kph. The maximum range without refueling

utmost mobility and survivability.

The Cobra family of light armoured vehicles is manufactured by Otokar Otobus Karoseri Sanayi in Turkey. The Cobra designs incorporate the mechanical components of the hMMWV vehicle from AM General of the USA. The high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (hMMWV or humvee) is a military 4WD motor vehicle created by AM General. Primarily used by the United States Armed Forces, it is also used by numerous other countries and organisations and even in civilian adaptations. The hummer series was also inspired by the hMMWVs.

should be in excess of 400 km across country and more than 700 km by road.

Common Platform The vehicle should form a common platform, which can be adapted for various roles and missions. In addition, we could also think of

using the same platform for a turreted vehicle for 12.7mm machine gun, 30mm cannon, and anti-tank guided missiles or surface-toair missiles. There is an urgent need to finalise a suitable platform for the Army so that a family of vehicles can be developed to fullfil all the requirements of the Army.

The Oshkosh mine-resistant ambushprotected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicle (M-ATV) is an armoured vehicle with improved mobility

PHOTOGRAPHS: AM General, US Navy and US Marine Corps

The LAV-25 is an eight-wheeled amphibious reconnaissance vehicle used by the United States Marine Corps. It was built by General Dynamics Land Systems Canada and is based on the Swiss MOWAG Piranha I 8x8 family of armoured fighting vehicles.

Stryker is a family of eight-wheel drive combat vehicles, transportable in a C-130 aircraft, being built for the US Army

by General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)-Canada (formerly General Motors Defense) and General Dynamics Land Systems Division of USA. Stryker is based on the GDLS Canada LAV III 8-8 light armoured vehicle, in service since early 2001. The LAV III is itself a version of the Piranha III built by Mowag of Switzerland, now part of GDLS, Europe.

The Australian light armoured vehicle (ASLAV) is a highly mobile, amphibious eight-wheeled armoured vehicle that is ideally suited to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

General Dynamics Canada worked with General Dynamics Land Systems - Canada (GDLS-C) to supply the Canadian Army with light armoured reconnaissance vehicles (LAV Recce). This vehicle, designated by the Army as the “Coyote”, is the first to be fitted with such an integrated surveillance system and is regarded as the baseline capability against which modern armed forces will evaluate their requirements for future armoured reconnaissance vehicles.

Oshkosh Defense and General Dynamics Land SystemsCanada teamed for the TAPV programme, which will replace the 4_4 RG-31 mine protected armoured patrol vehicle (APV) and the light armoured vehicle LAV-2 6_6 Coyote reconnaissance vehicle.

Textron Marine & Land Systems, an operating unit of Textron Systems, a Textron Inc. company, and MDT Armor Corporation, a division of Arotech Corporation have announced a teaming agreement to market, design and manufacture the Tiger light protected vehicle. Based on a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Dodge RAM 5500 platform, the Tiger is a cost effective, light protected class all terrain vehicle with proven, highly reliable armour for a crew of six

2/2011

SP’s LAND FORCES

11

>> S P E C I A L F O R C E S

For Strategic Tasking Special Forces have a major role to play in coping with asymmetric and non-traditional threats. We need to integrate our Special Forces and optimise their potential to face the 21st century challenges in requisite manner. Initiatives in this regard need to be taken both by the government and the military.

PHOTOGRAPHS: SP Guide Pubns, Indian Army

n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

I

nDIAn SPECIAL FORCES ARE over three decades old. however, their transborder employment awaits outbreak of a conventional war. This is an archaic concept, ill suited to present-day nontraditional challenges especially when both China and Pakistan are subjecting us to serious asymmetric threats. We have a large number of Special Forces that need to be integrated and their combat potential optimally utilised by using them proactively. This will also require defining a national policy for employing Special Forces and providing them the highest command and control framework for strategic tasking.

Nature of Conflict Recent years have witnessed a paradigm shift in the nature of conflict, irregular and asymmetric forces having emerged with greater strategic value over conventional and even nuclear forces, with geographical boundaries rendered irrelevant. Sub-conventional conflicts characterised by intrastate strife, have gained ascendency over traditional conflicts, which used to be mostly conventional inter-state wars. The transnational nature of these threats and the increasing involvement of state actors in using sub-conventional conflicts have increased their complexity. non-state actors have added a new dimension to low intensity conflicts and they are increasingly acquiring conventional capabilities that were earlier exclusive preserve of nation states. Technology empowers the terrorist to cause severe damage through cyber, financial and kinetic attacks. Likelihood of them acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a major concern. The spectrum of conflict could, therefore, range from conflicts between states to conflict with non-state actors and proxies. Conventional conflict could either be preceded in conjunction or succeeded by a period of irregular conflict, which would require low intensity conflict and stabilisation operations.

www.spslandforces.net

Threats & Challenges India borders the Afghanistan-Pakistan region in the seat of global terror where ideological fuel and wholly religious motivating platform for extremism is centred. There is increasing evidence of radicalisation in Pakistan. Circumstances of assassinations of Governor Salman Taseer, Minister Shahbaz Bhatti and the aftermath provide further proof. Feeble calls within Pakistan to strengthen democracy indicate the stranglehold of the ISI-Military combine in governing Pakistan, which is unlikely to loosen.

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) being the covert arm of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), its nexus with Al-Qaeda is significant. Wikileaks reinforce Pakistan’s duplicity and unwillingness to act against Pakistani terrorist organisations operating into Afghanistan and India.

Focus of the US, EU, nATO and the world in general on Al-Qaeda, Taliban and not on Pakistan per se encourages Pakistan to continue a devious policy including covert support to Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Erstwhile Afghan refugee camps along the international highway have been converted to terror havens hitting nATO supply lines. Future US thinning out in Afghanistan embolden Pakistan more.

A stronger Taliban will look further into Afghanistan, CIS countries and India.

12

SP’s LAND FORCES

2/2011

having advised Pakistan more than half a century back to raise a militia force to fight India, China now provides tacit support to Pakistan in its jihadi strategy including direct protection at Un as part of her own strategic ambitions to keep India in check.

Chinese strategic footprints in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), support, training and arming of insurgent groups in India’s north-east (ULFA and nSCn(IM) in particular), claims to Arunachal Pradesh and increased belligerence coupled with the unholy China-Pakistan nuclear nexus bodes more evil. Their increasingly discernable efforts to establish links with the Maoist insurgency in India through Maoists of nepal, insurgents in north-east and radicals in Kerala are a cause for worry. nepal’s Maoist insurgency having been spawned by China, what future turn it takes requires monitoring. nepal and Myanmar have taken a turn for the better in recent months but continue to be unpredictable. Assumption of power by Maoists in nepal can have direct bearing on the Maoist insurgency in India.

Bangladesh is clamping down on terror but the JeI, the JMB and the harkat-ul-Jihad-alIslami Bangladesh, currently dormant, need watching. The LTTE in Sri Lanka may be defeated but is not dead. Within India, there are some 30-odd terrorist organisations, the Maoist insurgency having developed into the largest fault line with our adversaries’ intent on exploiting all of them.

Faced with multifarious threats and challenges related to terrorism, border man-

agement and maritime security, demographic assault from failed/failing states aside from conventional and nuclear threats, India is already amidst asymmetric wars waged by our adversaries. There is an urgent need to address these non-traditional challenges. The scope of these scenarios is large with limitless employment possibilities for Special Forces. In our case, conventional wars will overlap ongoing asymmetric wars.

Though windows of conventional conflict remain under the nuclear backdrop, conventional wars will be subject to intense global pressure for early termination fearing nuclear breakout. Both the attack on the Indian Parliament and 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks indicated that India is at distinct disadvantage, relying merely on conventional response coupled with politico-diplomatic manoeuverings rather than creating requisite deterrence to asymmetric threats.

Our Special Forces Indian Special Forces came into being from year 1965 but there is considerable confusion in some cross sections including in the military between ‘Special Forces’ and ‘Special Operations Forces’. Wikipedia lists out some 20 odd Special Operations Forces in India, all of whom get generally categorised as Special Forces by the media. Indian Special Forces actually comprise Special Forces of the three Services (Army being the major contributor), Special Action Groups (SAGs) of the national Security Guard (nSG) and Special Groups (SGs) of the Special Frontier

Force (SFF). The SAGs and SGs are manned completely by army personnel on deputation. Ignoring the four globally acknowledged Special Forces truths (humans are more important than hardware, quality is better than quantity, Special Forces cannot be mass produced and competent Special Forces cannot be created after emergencies arise), we have gone in for rapid expansion diluting their combat potential including manning, equipping and training. non-Special Forces Colonel of the Parachute Regiment in the past have managed to prevail upon Service Chief ’s to convert more and more Parachute units into Special Forces units–in one case four units worth Special Forces were created within a span of just three years. Post-26/11, the nSG has expanded many times albeit with much less contribution from the Army, particularly against enormous demand of provisioning additional officers. In contrast, the expansion has been very deliberate in case of foreign Special Forces. Post-9/11, the US expanded its Special Forces only by 750. UK went in only for an addition of a 650-strong “Special Forces Support Group”. Pakistan has added a fourth SSG unit only recently.

Even during peak period of Special Forces deployment in Iraq, only 90 x Operation Detachments Alpha (ODAs) were actually used (each ODA is 10-12 strong). Incidentally, SOCOM is only 13,000 strong of which Psychological Operations Teams and Civil Affairs Teams are not fighting men.

A peculiar situation exists in our Army, wherein, the Parachute (Special Forces) units and regular parachute units are clubbed into the same regiment. This aberration at times leads to senior Paratrooper officers, who have never served in Special Forces, holding appointments dealing with Special Forces issues. They merely concentrate to somehow establish parity between the tasking of Special Forces and normal Parachute units, example being the current efforts to assign Parachute units role of independent small team actions, guerrilla warfare, sub-conventional operations in unconventional scenario and hostage rescue, significantly discarding their primary role of ground holding. Such pseudo specialisation efforts leads to Parachute units clamouring for the Special Forces allowances and insignia rather than concentrate on their own primary task. The Special Forces Concept relevant to Special Forces gets sidetracked. The fact that Parachute units, which are Infantry units with airborne capability, must continue to be mandated with tasks that are in support of a formation in their ground holding role strangely gets obfuscated periodically.

Employment Patterns historically, Indian Special Forces have been used for direct action type of roles during conventional wars. The hierarchal understanding of trans-border employment of Special Forces in India is short distanced physical or direct type of actions executed on a unit/sub-unit basis to achieve battlefield victories. There is no concept of their being used abroad other than conventional war.

While globally Special Forces are employed to nip asymmetric threats at the source, we are content to use this strategic force domestically for counter-insurgency and counterterrorism only, roles that can well be accomplished by regular infantry as well. Other than limited trans-border employment during conventional war the only overseas

S P E C I A L F O R C E S <<

www.amgeneral.com

employment other than Un missions was of the then three Special Forces units being employed with the IPKF in Sri Lanka. Talking of Un missions, India is perhaps the only country that sends whole Special Forces units on Un missions rather than deploying these forces abroad for strategic surveillance.

What a shame that New York Times has to tell us that 11,000 Chinese are working on 14 projects in PoK. Special Forces should actually be central to our asymmetric response, which does not imply operating in units/subunits. In fact, such response through employment of Special Forces does not automatically imply physical attack. A physical attack is only the extreme and potentially most dangerous expression of asymmetric warfare. The key lies in achieving strategic objectives through application of modest resources with the essential psychological component. Pakistan’s SSG has been operating in Jammu & Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iraq, nepal and Bangladesh. They understand that Special Forces do not create resistance movements but advice, train and assist resistance movements already in existence.

What the Chinese Special Forces are up to is anybody’s guess but considering that Chinese use the PLA for development projects like road construction and PLA is spearheading the massive cyber warfare programme of China, covert presence of Chinese Special Forces including by proxy in PoK, nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and even India should not be ruled out. Apprehension of Chinese nationals with fake Indian pan cards may actually be the tip of the iceberg.

If China aims to stir up the nSCn(IM), ULFA and Maoist insurgencies and claims Arunachal, how can one rule out involvement of their intelligence agencies and Spe-

cial Forces. Ideal response to asymmetric threats is adoption of a proactive strategy ensuring prevention of an attack. Asymmetric war is dirty war, to which conventional response is inadequate. Special Forces have wide application across the entire spectrum of conflict, more so as a controlled response along the escalatory ladder in the emerging strategic environment.

Concept of Employment The concept of Employment of Special Forces in the Indian Army instituted in 2001 says that “Special Forces should be employed to continuously ‘shape the battlefield from conventional wars in nuclear backdrop to asymmetric and fourth generation wars.

Their employment should be theatre-specific and as force multipliers to complement tasks performed by conventional forces, entailing high risk, and high gain missions having minimum visibility with desired effect”.

Shaping the battlefield is a continuous process covering the entire spectrum of conflict including asymmetric war that implies shaping in peace time as well and virtually every conceivable task is possible under ‘covert operations’, ‘special missions’ and ‘special operations’. Our Special Forces are potent tools that possess the ‘strategic punch’ to achieve our security objectives.

They must primarily look beyond our borders (with exception of the nSG) to nip asymmetric threats in the bud and to control the fault lines of our adversaries. Such a concept can well suit all Indian Special Forces but the million-dollar question is why the Army has not implemented it? The reasons are many, ranging from absence of a national doctrine or philosophy for employment of Special Forces despite 36 years of

existence of Special Forces in the country, no integrated Special Forces set up, little joint training and no institutionalised network for real time national intelligence. More significant is the question of national/political will and military will as well, voids of which have led to the failure of defining a national Security Strategy and national Security Objectives even 64 years after independence.

Flawed policies of total reliance on technical intelligence (TEChInT) over the years have

We have a large number of Special Forces that need to be integrated and their combat potential optimally utilised by using them proactively. This will also require defining a national policy for employing Special Forces and providing them the highest command and control framework for strategic tasking.

dried up human intelligence (hUMInT) completely. Whether we fight China or Pakistan individually or together, we will definitely be combating asymmetric forces concurrently. hence, the importance to muster national will to go for proactive Special Forces employment. It should be a matter of grave national concern to us that the organisations like LeT and JeM conduct open meetings with complete state support in Pakistan, that individuals like hafiz Syed (LeT) and Masood Azhar (JeM) continue to be at large after causing tremendous damage in our country, that China is fuelling dissent in our north-east and in the Maoists with apparent intentions of preparing grounds for a full-fledged fourth generation war in the Indian heartland.

Optimising Potential Lack of integration of Indian Special Forces has not permitted optimisation of their potent combat capabilities including in creating a deterrent against irregular/asymmetric warfare. Belonging to different organisations with different chains of command, there is little commonality by way of ethos, training, equipping and capabilities.

Our areas of strategic interests need to be kept under surveillance including through hUMInT, to which Special Forces can be major contributors. The fact is that there is an urgent need to establish an Integrated Special Forces Command (ISFC). Options are to either establish the ISFC under the CDS (COSC in the interim) with a Strategic Special Forces Cell (SSFC) in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) or establish it directly under the existing Tri-Service Strategic Continued on page18

2/2011

SP’s LAND FORCES

13

>>

INTERVIEW

‘We still need a force that can be very kinetic when required’ The US Army has evolved to become one of the world’s most experienced practitioners in modern counter-insurgency. According to General Peter Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, after nearly a decade of military intervention in the Middle East and Central Asia, many hard-earned lessons have been learnt and applied in relation to tactics, operations, transformation, training, coalition interoperability and modernisation. n SERGEI DESILVA-RANASINGHE

T

hE COnFLICT In IRAQ has been a defining experience for the US Army, which has markedly transformed its approach to counterinsurgency war fighting. “Since the Iraq conflict we have totally reshaped the force from a division centred force that was at the time built around a Divisional headquarters,” explained General Chiarelli.

“I was one of the last Divisional Commanders with the 1st Cavalry Division to deploy to Iraq with all my organic brigades.

I had three Manoeuvre Brigades, an Artillery Brigade that we made into a Manoeuvre Brigade (a fourth Manoeuvre Brigade). We also had an Aviation Brigade, an Engineer Brigade and separate battalions for Military Intelligence, Signals and even an Air Defence Battalion. That is how we were constructed,” he said. “In contrast, today, the Brigade Combat Team is the centrepiece of the US Army,” he added. Another example of the US Army’s process of transformation has been the growing cooperation with the US Government agencies to achieve non-kinetic objectives as demonstrated by the whole-ofgovernment approach.

“The whole-of-government approach is absolutely critical today and that is a huge lesson we have learnt from these conflicts. In counter-insurgency, it is not just the armed forces that are needed. The whole government needs to be involved with a team of professionals who are available to an operational commander that goes in and looks at non-kinetic effects that can be applied. These are critical to winning the trust and confidence of the people. I always say ‘trust and confidence’ as opposed to ‘hearts and minds’. Trust and confidence is what we try to gain,” he said. “however, we still need a force that can be very kinetic when required. The application of combat power in any war is going to be constant. There are going to be times when that is exactly what has to be done,” he added. he added, “We see that probably in a larger extent in Afghanistan today than even at the height of fighting that was witnessed in Iraq. Combat power is always constant and leaders always have a responsibility to make sure their soldiers use force when required.”

www.spslandforces.net

Strategy in Afghanistan In recent years, the US Army’s contribution to Afghanistan has been increasingly significant, playing a major role in expanding the authority of the nATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), by escalating operations against the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan.

“In the last six months, conditions have improved in Afghanistan. The ‘surge’ of additional forces has played a role, which has allowed us to live with and protect the population, and give the opportunity for non-kinetic effects to take hold. That is an important move in the right direction in Afghanistan today. The capacity for the US Army to tap into and mobilise more troops, previously culminated in Iraq and now more recently in Afghanistan with the ‘surge’

14

SP’s LAND FORCES

2/2011

strategies, which provided additional forces for offensive operations and reconstruction related tasks. In addition, the increased troop strength has provided greater flexibility to field commanders who are intend on accelerating the training and expansion of the Afghan security forces,” he said.

“In Iraq, the increasing capability of the Iraqi Army was critical to the force reductions in coalition troops that we have seen today. The ability of the Iraqi Army to provide security for its people is much greater than our ability. In Afghanistan the campaign takes on a whole-of-government approach. One of those non-kinetic effects is training the Afghan Army. In fact, there are huge contributions being made by Australia and other nations in training the Afghan Army and Police. We cannot separate both the increase in forces (actual boots on the ground) from what we have done to build up the Afghan Army. The major reason for the success we are having today is our ability to train and deploy both the Afghan Army and Police. They are the two critical institutions that are going to help provide security for the Afghan people,” he added.

The Importance of Reserves In order to augment troop strength for the ‘surge’ strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of the burden was shouldered by the US Army, particularly its reserve units, which have made an important contribution.

“Key to our ability to increase troop strength has been our capacity to operationalise our reserve components. The US Army has about 5,69,000 active component soldiers, but this increases to over 1.1 million when we count our reserve components. If there is anything we have come to rely on it is our operationalised reserve component, which we can turn to for enablers. I do not mean necessarily combat formations, although we have combat formations in the national Guard, the vast majority of our reserve component enablers are aviation, engineers and other specialities.

“The reserve component training system has been increased significantly because of multiple deployments. It is not uncommon now to find a reserve component soldier either from the Army national Guard or the Army Reserve that has been deployed on three or four tours or units that have deployed overseas more than once,” he explained.

“As a consequence, what we have is a much more highly trained force than we ever had before. Earlier there was only 39 days of training every year and a lot of that was spent on state missions. State missions are still important which is why the reserve component still continue to play a key role in their individual states particularly in disaster relief, but their contribution to the wars both in Iraq and Afghanistan remains significant,” he added.

“Today when units deploy they have upwards of 30 days additional training, sometimes even more depending on the mission. In fact, depending on the mission it can be anywhere from 15 days to 60 days additional training. They are now an extremely well-trained force with the extra investment in training, plus the combat experience they

Coalition Interoperability

have gained. They are usually deployed for a total mobilisation of 12 months. But we are trying to get them to the point where they are five years at home before they are redeployed again.” said the General.

“We want to increase that to a ratio of 1:5 which would be 60 months at home. We are trying to get the active component of the force to a ratio of 1:3 and we will not call on them as much, but we still need their services and special capabilities as we have invested in many of those capabilities in the reserve components. A large majority of our engineering forces are in the reserve components which makes a lot of sense because many of them undertake engineering type jobs in civilian life and bring those same skills to their formations,” he added.

The General further affirmed, “As someone who has been in the Army for 38 years, I never again want to see training levels to go back to where they were before because it allows quick and ready access when we need them with very little time required for preparation and additional training before they are deployed. Our force is amazingly resilient. Basically, we have asked less than one per cent of our population to fight two wars for 10 years. Today, our retention and recruiting rates have gone right through the roof. In fact, 99 per cent of the recruits we have in the US Army are high school graduates. Wavers are very uncommon,” he said.

“Even though we are involved in a campaign overseas, support for the American military at least at home has never been higher. In my opinion, it is absolutely essential that we maintain the readiness that we have gained over the last decade of conflict and ensure we have an operationalised reserve. We need to have the ability to call on a very professional and well-trained force and have ready access to that reserve component depending on wherever our national security interests may take us in the future.

Today we like to talk about it as the ‘One Army’, which includes the reserve components, national Guard, army reserve and the active component,” he added.

A major aspect of the campaign in Afghanistan has been the requirement to manage coalition partners that have deployed troop contingents in support of the US alliance. In this context, the US Army also has a key supporting role in mentoring and training multinational coalition forces. “For example, with IEDs, the US Army helps to prepare coalition forces to come up against a threat that they have never previously experienced.

We also have helped them with tactics, techniques and procedures, and with different kinds of equipment and enablers,” said General Chiarelli.

“There have been times when those who have joined in the alliance with us have asked for assistance. I remember, in Iraq, night vision was considered a key piece of equipment for many of our allies, which we often provided. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is another thing where we have had a quantitative and possibly qualitative edge for a while, and the product of that ISR is something that we have provided to the alliance whenever possible. however, there are huge interoperability issues among coalition forces which we have identified and tried to address. Inside the nATO framework there are conferences and forums that allow us to address many of the interoperability issues. The real thing is to identify the issues and then agree to a timetable to get them fixed,” he stated.

“Too often they become lessons learnt, which implies that those lessons are truly going to be learnt and acted upon. One of the areas, at least from my experience, is in command and control. Unity of command is a critical issue and the ability to share information is essential in major conflicts,” he added.

Modernisation The US Army is at present engaged in a process of modernisation and transformation with the introduction of the revolutionary concept known as ‘The network’, which streamlines and disseminates electronic intelligence from the tactical to the strategic level, and vice versa, in real time.

According to General Chiarelli, when we speak of The network we are just not talking about the tactical and operational level of forces during combat. It will be a network that is not only found in theatre with individual soldiers, both at the tactical and operational and even strategic level, but when they are training back home to be deployed.

“It is that complete network that would allow a soldier at the national training centre to see a similar picture as the soldier who is actually on the ground, involved in theatre operations and be able to see that real time and utilise that in training to prepare to relieve that same soldier who is deployed. To me, this is the future,” he added.

“Everything revolves around that and the capability it brings both to the individual soldier and the collective formation. In getting The network down to ‘The Edge’, to the individual soldier, is really the centrepiece of the Army’s modernisation,” he stated.

The author is a senior analyst at Australianbased strategic think tank Future Directions International.

INTERVIEW

<<

PHOTOGRAPH: US Army

‘Ultimately it is the Afghan people who have to defeat the Taliban’ After a sustained and difficult deployment which originally commenced in early 2002, the Canadian Army is now in the process of drawing down its military commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)- led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. According to Major General Alan Howard, Deputy Commander, Canadian Army, the de-escalation and handover to US troops by the end of this summer leaves in its wake a credible Canadian war effort.

n SERGEI DESILVA-RANASINGHE

O

VER ThE yEARS ThE Canadian Army’s approach to counter-insurgency gradually developed through the hard fought campaigns against the Taliban in the war-ravaged Kandahar Province, which killed 154 Canadian soldiers and wounded close to 1,900.

“When we first arrived in 2006, we were almost the only military force that was in the whole province. now there are literally thousands more. We have seen a large surge of Americans into southern Afghanistan so now there are more nATO soldiers serving than ever before,” he said.

“In Kandahar Province the new regional Command headquarters is American. There is good synergies and agreed approach on how things are done. In a counter-insurgency campaign, the principal aim is to win local support and that can only be done by the soldiers on the ground. It is not so much about fighting; rather it is more about creating the conditions for security and development and for the Afghan people to take command. We have learnt that as a military we need partners, as we can only do so much of it. Specialists that have expertise in governance and development are absolutely essential. If they are not there, we will be unable to progress on key issues,” the General added. he said, “The idea of winning over the local population is very much shared between us. The willingness to share risks and live among Afghan population is not embraced by all Western nations, but it is embraced by Canada and the US.” “Canadian soldiers have earned a lot of respect from the local population in Kandahar and have improved the security situation in Kandahar Province. We are trying to ensure that the Taliban do not re-establish

their presence,” the General explained and added, “We have learnt that in a counterinsurgency environment the key is to be adaptable on a daily basis, because the Taliban have been very adaptable and have tried many different things against us.”

The nATO-led counter-insurgency and exit strategy is heavily dependent on the sustainment of viable proxy-Afghan security forces, such as the Afghan Army and Police which are deployed in increasingly larger numbers against the Taliban.

“Building capacity is the ultimate solution here, and not deployment of more nATO troops. What we want to see is more Afghan security forces in Kandahar province. We are seeing increasing capacity of the Afghan Army as it grows in size. Its position and respect among the Afghan population is quite high. There is a lot of work being done to develop the Afghan Police as well,” he said.

“Although the insurgents think that the people are unhappy and that they can provide better solutions, we have to show them that the Afghan Government has better solutions. In this context, the three pillars that work hand-in-hand are governance, development and security. The three are interrelated in order to defeat an insurgency.

After all, ultimately it is the Afghan people who have to defeat the Taliban,” he added.

Conversely, while counter-insurgency operations are steadily intensifying in 2011, Canada will commence a phased process of troop withdrawals, which by the end of this summer will effectively end its expeditionary force commitment to the nATO-led war effort in Afghanistan.

“The Canadian Government have told us that Canadian troops will be withdrawing from Kandahar this year. however, at present, our focus is on current operations and we have a long winter period where we can

still work. During periods of reduced insurgent momentum, we take advantage to consolidate and intensify the training that we are providing to the Afghan Army and Police.

This is a cyclical thing as we tend to have the ability to do more work in training, development and governance over the winter months. We are going to take advantage of that before we leave to gain momentum by the end of the summer,” he said.

New Priorities As Canadian troops gradually disengage from Kandahar, the Canadian Government has also recently announced its intention to reinforce the nATO Training Mission— Afghanistan to help in training the Afghan Army and Police. In this capacity, a contingent of around 900 personnel of the Cana-

dian Forces will continue to operate in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future in a mentoring and training role. however, sizeable troop numbers will also be returning to Canada and focusing on duties related to homeland security and other roles such as humanitarian relief, disaster management and peacekeeping operations. According to Major General howard, “Taking care of things at home and prioritising domestic crises are the key aspects on our list.” he added, “The sovereignty of Canada is important, which is why we have adopted ‘Canada First’ as our strategy to make sure that our homeland defence is secure and that our sovereignty is maintained on all fronts.”

“We have set up architecture—Canada Command—that has a regional head-quarters and the ability to respond. If someone tells us to go up north, we need to be ready to do that in a limited capacity. When natural disasters and humanitarian calamities overwhelm first responders, such as flooding, we need to be able to respond. For example, we recently had a hurricane and the Army responded by building three bridges and transporting drinking water.” having developed capabilities for medium-weight expeditionary operations, the Canadian Army, which has considerable experience in counter-insurgency operations, is emphatic about retaining its force projection capacity.

“We need to look to the future to ensure that our training and readiness levels, which will involve humanitarian, peacekeeping and combat operations are exactly what Canada requires,” stated Major General howard.

“We want to make sure that we preserve our capabilities and that we do not become too specialised. For a small army that we are, this provides the greatest range of options for the Canadian Government,” he affirmed.

2/2011

SP’s LAND FORCES

15

>>

SEMINAR

Employ Skillfully At the two-day seminar on “Special Forces: Challenges and Opportunities,” organised by SP Guide Publications and CENJOWS on March 10 and 11, Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik underlined the urgency of strengthening the Special Forces in the country as asymmetric warfare by transnational elements is on the rise.

PHOTOGRAPHS: SP Guide Pubns

n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

T

hE TERM SPECIAL FORCES (SF) has been explained in the Army Training Command Manual of “Fundamentals, Doctrines and Concepts of Indian Army”. The explanation reads, “SF is a body of highly trained specialised troops, suitably equipped with a capacity to operate across all levels of conflict. These troops are selected, trained, equipped and organised to operate in hostile territory, isolated from the main combat forces. They can be inserted by land, sea and air and operate in hostile environment to accomplish the assigned special missions.

They may act discretely at strategic level, but more often operate in concert with other forces and agencies at the operational and tactical levels.”

The manual goes on to explain that when Special Forces operate with the main combat forces, they are best employed in support of the main effort either to enable main forces to achieve a decision or to extend the capability of these forces and hence SF should be considered as a force multiplier rather than a decisive force in itself.

Operations by SF are invariably joint operations, with the involvement of the Air Force and the navy, in specific forces. Joint activity expands the scope and complexity of operations.

The SF of the Indian Army with their present organisational structure, training, equipment, are designed to carry out a limited number of roles and tasks. In essence, they are being employed as ‘elite infantry’ or ‘super-infantry’ units. While their ability to conduct direct action, attrition oriented offensive operations such as raids, ambushes and surprise assaults is admirable as well as trustworthy, they are neither organised nor trained nor equipped for a variety of other tasks assigned in special operations, which they may be required to undertake in future.

This may include partisan warfare, espionage, special reconnaissance, sabotage, psychological operations, civil affairs, counter nuclear proliferation and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), sensitive politico-military operations and other strategic and operational level tasks which require a wide range of skills and a different organisational pattern with equipment and skilled personnel to complement the variety of additional tasks that they may be required to undertake.

www.spslandforces.net

International Seminar A two-day seminar on “Special Forces: Challenges and Opportunities” was organised jointly by SP Guide Publications and the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CEnJOWS), a think tank of headquarters Integrated Defence Staff of the Ministry of Defence, on March 10 and 11 in new Delhi.

The major outcome of the seminar was that a national vision is imperative with regard to the structuring, employment and deployment of the Special Forces in the country and the Indian model had to be its own based on our strategic needs and the operational environment currently and in the future.

Considering the number of roles they would be required to perform in the future, some felt that the current strength would have to be increased substantially and their skills upgraded to match the requirements.

16

SP’s LAND FORCES

2/2011

Jayant Baranwal with Chief of the Air Staff and Chairman COSC, Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik (Top) and with Vice Admiral D.K. Joshi, Chief of Integrated Defence Staff

Another option for improving their effectiveness and efficiency is to organise all SF of the Army, navy and the IAF under a Special Operations Command, headed by a Commander-in-Chief (Army Commander status) for equipping, training, preparing and launching special operations. Such a structure would increase India’s strategic flexibility and options for dealing with future settings.

l

l

Differences Between Special and Conventional Operations A wider understanding of Special Forces Operations requires a person to understand the differences between special operations and conventional operations. Some key differences are as under: l Special operations can be described as para political. The ultimate objective is political and the political stakes and risks are frequently very high. They will generally not involve a declared state of war. They represent diplomacy conducted by other means and are subject to strict political or military control at the highest levels. l They are frequently described as unorthodox or unconventional. however, the distinction between special and conventional military operations becomes less clear as the tempo of conflict approaches general war and the military component of the conflict increases. yet even in conventional war, special operations remain qualitatively

l l

l

different, by virtue of the scale, sensitivity and potentially decisive nature of the mission and the specialised nature of the assigned forces.

Special operations are usually covert or clandestine. To ensure that they remain so, they are frequently small scale and limited in objective. Economy of force is the operative principle.

Successful special operations are characterised by simplicity, enhanced by innovation, imagination and subtlety. Some may be direct but most follow the strategy of “indirect approach”. They rely on skill, speed, flexibility and deception.

They may involve use of violence but such use of violence is selective.

Military or civil personnel may be employed on special operations. They may come from the initiating country or they may be recruited elsewhere. They may be acting legally, extra-legally or illegally in the target country.

These operations require intelligence assets and support of the highest quality.

Highlights of the Seminar Special Forces experts from the country and outside who participated in the seminar were categorical that terror threats in India were on the rise and the model to deal with such asymmetric threats had to be totally “home-grown” with learning from the experiences of other countries.

Setting the tone for the conference, the

Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal P.V. naik underlined the urgency of strengthening the Special Forces in the country as asymmetric warfare by transnational elements is on the rise. he said that it was not a question of giving a licence to kill but more about the capability to kill. Realities in today’s context were more threatening and required special assets for specialised missions. Special Forces fell into this category of being able to achieve disproportionately large outcomes with relatively much smaller forces thus fulfilling the tenets of fourth generation warfare. he stressed the need to preserve autonomy of such forces and ensure their unconventional use as that was the essence of their employment. he felt that Indian armed forces had to plan to face the full spectrum of challenges. It implied a full range of capabilities to fight conventional wars under the nuclear shadow on the one hand to low intensity conflict including counter-terrorism on the other. Thus Indian armed forces had to have the ability to swing dynamically between the two ends and this is where highly trained Special Forces could be employed skillfully. Inaugurating the seminar, he said both the political and military leadership have to understand that there would be “fewer wars and more conflicts” and only a well-trained and thinking force could deal with such threats. he said that today’s warfare blurs the line between war and politics, military and civilian targets, peace and conflict, battlefield activity and fratricide and hence the military is facing a big challenge because special operations require integration between a large number of agencies of the government. The Air Chief called for a national vision with regard to deploying the 10,000 plus Special Forces in the country. Calling for integrated joint operations base of the three Services, the Air Chief opined that once decided there has to be extensive training. “Special Forces capabilities cannot be built overnight, political will can be,” he said.

Vice Admiral Devendra Kumar Joshi, Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, said that the overriding requirement of Special Forces would be interoperability and fitness and coordination of individual components. he advocated a Special Operations Command structured to serve the Indian needs. he felt that it was important for the SF to have a mindset to overcome overwhelming odds. They have to have a “junoon” (fanatical kind of mindset) to serve in the Special Forces. The force has to be “lean and hungry”, fleet-footed and above all dynamic.

Proposing the vote of thanks for the inaugural session, the Publisher and Editor-inChief of SP Guide Publications, Jayant Baranwal said that considering the unfolding threat scenario within the country, it was imperative to draft a national policy at the earliest. There has to be a national preparedness and hoped that the seminar would offer insights into strengthening internal security.

Experts from the UK, Germany, France and Israel gave insight into how the Special Forces operated in their countries, while all of them endorsed that India had to have its own model of Special Forces based on its requirements.

Lt General (Retd) Graeme Lamb, UK, Colonel Commandant of the SAS, brought out that a significant paradigm shift had already occurred. The maxim “find, fix and

SEMINAR

<<

Lt. General (Retd) Sir Graeme Lamb, British Field Army

Colonel Landicheff Philippe, French Air Force

Brigadier General Eyal Eizenberg Israel Defense Forces

Brig General (Retd) Hans-Christoph Ammon, German Army Special Forces

strike” had been completely turned on its head. In the 21st century all three aspects of the maxim had become inherently more complicated with terror groups capable of employing industrial level violence anywhere they desired. he gave the example of the Sarin attack on the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995, which was an act of domestic terrorism perpetrated by members of Aum Shinrikyo. he said that so far we were familiar about attacks on land, sea and in the air, but now we would have to contend with attacks in space, cyber and communications also. he added that suicide terrorism has added a new dimension to the power of an individual to inflict fear and mayhem in the society. he emphasised that with a large number of failed and failing states, the governments could not control the reactions of the people who were

disaffected and angry and hence the transnational and sub-national had increased substantially. he felt that now more than ever before, there is a need for Special Forces comprising of “lean and hungry” soldiers with special skills, who could tackle unconventionally vastly different threats and challenges.

Brigadier General Eyal Eizenberg, Commander, Gaza Division, Israel Defence Forces, said that the need to understand the behavioural pattern of the enemy helped substantially in countering terrorism. The Special Forces in Israel were trained in this. however, he said that the difficulty in defining the enemy from the crowd had increased and hence the need to have thinking force. nowadays, it was easy to buy arms without any difficulty and one of the routes has been the Internet.

Colonel Landicheff Philiippe of the French Air Force said that it was increasingly becoming difficult to control information as the terrorists used different modes such as SMS, Internet, satellite phones, etc. The use of Special Forces, he said, was a politico-military decision and the latter should impress upon the political leadership the mode and manner of employment and deployment of the Special Forces.

Lt. General P.C. Katoch, former Director General Information Systems, Indian Army, spoke about how cross-border terrorism was state-sponsored and needed to be dealt with firmly. he also mentioned about the nexus between terrorists across the border, the Somali pirates and the LTTE and their movements should not only be monitored but also curbed.

Lt. General (Retd) h.S. Lidder, former

Chief of Integrated Defence Staff; Air Marshal L.K. Malhotra, Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Operations); Major General (Retd) O.P. Sabharwal, former GOC, six Mountain Division, Indian Army; Air Commodore Rajesh Isser, Principal Director, Operations (helicopters), Indian Air Force; Vice Admiral Shekar Sinha, Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff; Commodore R.S. Dhankhar, Principal Director of Special Operations and Diving, Indian navy, were among the speakers who underscored how Special Forces would play a key role in determining fourth generation warfare.

Lt. General Amarjit Singh Kalkat, Director Emeritus, CEnJOWS and Major General K.B. Kapoor, Director, CEnJOWS said that the recommendations from the seminar to strengthen the internal security environment would be submitted to the government.

SP’s T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

READ SP’s LANDFORCES MAGAZINE AS eBOOK!

WATCH EXCITING VIDEO FOOTAGES!

CATCH THE LATEST VIDEOS

BROWSE LATEST NEWS UPDATES!

JOIN US ON

ARE INDIA’S SPECIAL FORCES AT PAR WITH THEIR FOREIGN COUNTERPARTS?  Yes

 No

 Don’t Know

Join the poll & comment

2/2011

SP’s LAND FORCES

17

>> SPECIAL FORCES PHOTOGRAPH: US Army

F I R S T

dier and the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, weighs less than 700 grams. The idea is to strategically disperse the systems throughout small, dismounted units, to get maximum protective coverage for platoons, squads and other units on the move.

According to US Army sources, over the next 12 months, the Army plans to field up to 1,500 IGDs per month. The US Army in the future plans to integrate this technology with its Land Warrior and nett Warrior systems. These are network-situational-awareness systems for dismounted units, complete with a helmet-mounted display screen that uses GPS digital-mapping-display technology.

Swift Detection The US Army in Afghanistan to get individual gunshot detector

T

hE US ARMy WILL soon begin receiving the first of more than 13,000 gunshot detection systems for the individual dismounted soldier in Afghanistan.

The individual gunshot detector (IGD) made by QinetiQ north America consists of four small acoustic sensors worn by the individual soldier and a small display

screen attached to body armour that shows the distance and direction of incoming fire.

The small sensor, about the size of a deck of cards, detects the supersonic sound waves generated by enemy gunfire and instantaneously alerts soldiers to the location and distance towards the hostile fire.

The IGD system, procured by PEO sol-

T E C K N O W

Multipurpose Strike Hellfire II Romeo completes proof-of-principle flight tests

PHOTOGRAPH: Lockheed Martin

T

hE US ARMy JOInT Attack Munition Systems (JAMS) Project Office and Lockheed Martin recently fired the multipurpose AGM114R hellfire II Romeo missile with a live warhead and penetrated a brick-over-block target in its sixth proofof-principle (POP) test.

The flight test, at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, demonstrated Romeo’s enhanced software capability and superior performance in a military-operations-in-urban-terrain scenario. The new Romeo’s multipurpose warhead design enables the missile, with a designator spot laser, to seek out and defeat hard, soft and enclosed targets with outstanding success. The initial fielding of the hellfire II Romeo is scheduled for late 2012.

Engineers ground-launched the single hellfire II Romeo missile in a lock-on-after-

launch mode, simulating the missile being fired from a rotary-wing platform. The

short-range (2.5 kilometre) high-speed impact shot penetrated the brick-over-block target and successfully detonated with the specified fuze delay.

This was the final POP test for this nextgeneration precision missile. The Romeo’s advanced fuze technology and new warhead design performed flawlessly in test flights, proving reduced risk through system performance. Additionally, Lockheed Martin’s joint-air-to-ground missile (JAGM) incorporates the same warhead technology and fuze design that is present in the hellfire II Romeo. new design features on the hellfire II Romeo include a three-axis inertial measurement unit, which enables properly equipped launch platforms to engage targets to the side and behind them without having to manoeuver the aircraft into posi-

tion. The missile can be launched from high or low altitudes due to its enhanced guidance system and improved navigation capabilities, optimising the missile’s impact angle for enhanced lethality.

The hellfire II Romeo integrates with all hellfire II-compatible platforms, and can be launched autonomously or with remote designation. The rotary-wing platforms include the Apache, Kiowa Warrior, Cobra and Seahawk, as well as the Tiger Armed Reconnaissance helicopter for Australia and the Tiger helicoptere d’Appui Destruction for France. The hellfire has also been demonstrated on ground-based tripods, ground vehicles and boats.

With multi-mission and multi-target capability, hellfire is the primary air-toground missile system for the US Armed Forces and many allied nations.

PHOTOGRAPH: Indian Navy

www.spslandforces.net

Continued from page 13 Forces Command with SSFCs in the PMO and Office of the nSA. yet another option is to establish the ISFC directly under the PMO. Establishment of a SSFC functioning as the ‘brain’ in PMO is vital. In the emerging explosive strategic environ-ment, the requirement is to develop both publicised overt capabilities and deniable covert capabilities in order to create necessary deterrence against irregular/asymmetric, fourth generation warfare launched by our adversaries. Strategic deployment and strategic tasking of Special Forces will require the express sanction of the PM, akin to the President’s sanction in countries like the US and Pakistan. The SSFC in PMO will also be central to evolving and implementing the national Philosophy/Doctrine for Employment of Special Forces. The main difficulty in establishing the ISFC will be the reluctance of organisations and agencies currently controlling them viz the Services, MhA, Cabinet Secretariat but this is an essential exercise, akin to ongoing effort to integrate our nine major intelligence agencies. We need integration of our Special Forces for better response to modern-day challenges. A central agency must oversee their strategic tasking, capacity building, manning, equipping, training, consolidation, operations, intelligence inputs, interagency synergy and the like. Military Special Forces and the SFF must primarily look across borders in response to transnational asymmetric/fourth generation threats and for strategic surveillance. Diplomacy and conventional capability by itself cannot contend with asymmetric wars of Pakistan and China. Fortressing one’s house

18

SP’s LAND FORCES

2/2011

While globally Special Forces are employed to nip asymmetric threats at the source, we are content to use this strategic force domestically for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism only, roles that can well be accomplished by regular infantry as well Marcos in action

is no answer either and actually amounts to cowardice besides earning the label of a ‘soft state’. We need a well thought out coordinated proactive approach. Develop-ment of national will can perhaps also be assisted by factors like appointing a CDS, setting up of an institutionalised body within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for strategic thinking, appointing a national Security Advisor with Service background, true integration of hQ IDS with MoD unless of course if the hierarchy gets jolted with major enemy action/acceleration of asymmetric/ irregular war. Today’s asymmetric wars are laced with unprecedented treachery, deceit and denial. On the question of proactive employment of Special Forces, the fear of being labeled aggressor is fallacious and amounts

to covering up the lack of strategic thinking especially since coping with non-traditional challenges does not equate automatically to physical attack. Special Forces provide us the tools to address non-traditional challenges to our security by providing a silent but effective medium. We need to develop the necessary political will to contend with emerging strategic challenges. Their tasking should include asymmetric warfare, unconventional/fourth generation warfare, special operations, strategic reconnaissance, psychological operations and the like. We need to get a handle on the fault lines of our adversaries in order to achieve requisite deterrence. There is a need to go proactive on the issue least we permit our economy and security to be weakened.

Coping Asymmetric Threats The security situation surrounding us is volatile with complex non-traditional threats that can turn ugly at the drop of a hat. not only do we need to monitor the areas of strategic interests, we also need to develop deterrence against expanding asymmetric threats. In order to deter our opponents from exploiting our fault lines, we need to get hold of the fault lines of our adversaries. Special Forces have a major role to play in coping with asymmetric and non-traditional threats. We need to integrate our Special Forces and optimise their potential to face the 21st century challenges in requisite manner. Initiatives in this regard need to be taken both by the government and the military.

News in Brief SOLDIER TEMPERATURE CONTROL

munitions that can penetrate superior armour, as well as a 7.62mm coaxial

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

in the US security assistance. According to defence analysts, Israel spends about $17 billion per year on defence, of which US military assistance accounts for $3 billion, according to the Wall Street Journal. “Israel will have to accept the Obama Administration proposal to resume US-mediated talks with Palestine in order to seek additional military aid,” Barak added.

INDIA’S ARMED FORCES TRIBUNAL

Thermal management is an increasingly important issue for soldiers on the battlefield. Soldiers are increasingly required to carry more and more equipment, including radio communications devices, electronic navigation and guidance systems, night vision sensors, laser target designators and batteries. To minimise the strain of carrying all this equipment it must be small and rugged and highly fuel efficient. Masking the thermal management of a soldier is also a critical issue and new technologies are being developed, many focusing on the materials soldiers wear or that equipment such as backpacks are made from.

machine gun and a 12.7mm machine gun.

The tank, powered by a single multi-fuel diesel engine, will officially replace the existing Russian-made T55 main battle tanks. An advanced variant of the Arjun main battle tank, Arjun mkII, will begin serial production in 2014 having undergone 90 upgrades.

US ARMY TO PURCHASE ABRAMS VEHICLE FROM GD

INDIAN ARMY DEPLOYS FIRST INDIGENOUS TANK The Indian Army has deployed its first indigenous main battle tank (MBT), Arjun, with the Army’s 75 Armoured Regiment at Jaisalmer, Rajasthan. Indian Army’s General Officer Commanding in Chief of Southern Command Lt General A.K. Singh has said that the deployment of the new tanks would strengthen the Army’s desert operations capabilities. The Arjun features a 120 mm main gun with indigenously developed

>> SHOW CALENDAR 17-20 April International Symposium on Air Defense 2020+ Air Defense Forces Institute, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia www.isad2020.org.sa 19-20 April Counter Terror Expo Grand and national hall, Olympia, London, England, UK www.counterterrorexpo.com 26-29 April SPIE Defense Security and Sensing Orlando World Center Marriott Resort & Convention Center, Florida, USA http://spie.org/x6765.xml 10–13 May IDEF’11 (International Defence Industry Fair) Tuyap Fair, Convention and Congress Center in Istanbul/Turkey www.idef11.com 30 - 31 May Homeland Security Summit India Le Méridien, new Delhi, India www.homelandsecurity-india.com 6-9 June ArmorCon Military Armor Conference Sheraton Premiere at Tysons Corner, Vienna, USA www.ArmorConExpo.com 7-10 June Soldier Technology 2011 Olympia Conference Centre, London, UK www.soldiertechnology.co

Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) has been established with its principal bench at Delhi and regional benches at seven locations, namely, Jaipur, Chandigarh, Lucknow, Guwahati, Kolkata, Chennai and Kochi. It has also been decided to set up another bench at Mumbai.

The provision for circuit benches in the scheme of AFT is expected to take care of any problems relating to accessibility of the Tribunals to the Servicemen and Ex-servicemen.

IF HALL OF FAME The Army War College honoured a distinguished member of the Class of 2001 with an induction into the International Fellows hall of Fame on March 11. The Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, General Vijay Kumar Singh became the 33rd International Fellow to receive the honour. Singh was voted for induction by the fellow members of his USAWC class and the ceremony took place in front of the current USAWC class.

DHANUSH & PRITHVI LAUNCHED General Dynamics Land Systems has been awarded a firm-fixed-price contract for the purchase of up to 21 Abrams M1A2 system enhancement package version two (M1A2 SEP V2) upgrade tanks. M1A2 SEP V2 is a technologically advanced digital tank that features improved displays, sights, auxiliary power and a tank-infantry phone. The vehicle is capable of accommodating future technology improvements to ensure compatibility with the US Army future combat systems.

Work under the $59 million contract will be carried out at the company’s facilities in Ohio, Florida, Alabama, Pennsylvania and Michigan, with an estimated completion date of June 30, 2013. The US Army TACOM LCMC Army Contracting Command will be the contracting agency.

TAIWAN TO SLASH TROOPS LEVEL Taiwan is planning to reduce the number of its troops by 9,200 this year, but the cut will be offset by more advanced weaponry, an official said. The reduction is part of a five-year plan aimed at cutting the size of Taiwan’s armed forces by 60,000 from the present level of 2,75,000 troops, according to Agence France Presse. Taiwan Defence Ministry acting spokesman Lo Shau-ho said the defence capability of the region would not be undermined as it seeks more high-tech and powerful weapons. “The era of maintaining a huge number of forces has gone. Defence capability is no longer determined by the number of troops,” he added.

ISRAEL COULD BOOST MILITARY SPENDING Israel will need to boost its military spending to manage future possible threats originating from the recent political upheavals in Middle East nations, Defence Minister Ehud Barak has said. “The issue of qualitative military aid for Israel becomes more essential for us. It might be wise to invest another $20 billion to upgrade the security of Israel for the next generation or so,” he added. The minister also said that the country would have to increase its spending over the longterm and may seek an additional $20 billion

Ship launched Dhanush missile was successfully test fired from the Indian naval Ship “InS Suvarna” off the coast of Orissa on March 11, 2011. Dhanush is a ship launched missile against surface and sea targets. All the radars and electro optical systems located along the coast have tracked the vehicle and monitored all the parameters.

The surface-to-surface Prithvi (P-II) missile was successfully flight tested at Interim Test Range, Chandipur within one hour of Dhanush Missile test. The trajectory of the missile was also monitored by all the telemetry, radars and electro optical systems all through the flight. Prithvi (P-II) reached the designated target with accuracy of few meters, which can be achieved by very few missiles in the world.

MTL Group awarded “V Hull” contract for Foxhound vehicle MTL Group a major European Defence manufacturing specialist has been awarded a significant contract from Force Protection Europe to supply a serial production run of fabricated armoured “V” hulls for the prestigious UK Foxhound project. MTL Group has also supported Force Protection Europe and Ricardo on this project though its Design for Manufacture service. This DFM service provided an opportunity to select the optimum materials and influence the design for volume production.

FDI IN INDIA’S DEFENCE SECTOR The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) has circulated a discussion paper suggesting raising foreign direct investment (FDI) cap in defence manufacturing sector to 74 per cent or more from the existing 26 per cent. This issue is under inter-ministerial consultations and a final decision will be taken by Government thereafter. Government has a policy of moving towards greater self- reliance in Defence Production. To this end, it seeks to encourage indigenous research, development and design of equipment/weapons system within the country.

This information was given by Minister of State for Defence M.M. Pallam Raju in the Lok Sabha.

Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia Sr. Copy Editor & Correspondent Sucheta Das Mohapatra Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Administration & Coordination Bharti Sharma, Survi Massey Senior Art Director Anoop Kamath Design Vimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia Head Vertical Sales: Rajeev Chugh Assistant Manager: Abhay Singh Thapa SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers.

Printed in India

by Kala Jyothi Process Pvt Ltd © SP Guide Publications, 2011 Annual Subscription Inland: `600 • Overseas: US$180 Email: subscribe@spguidepublications.com Letters to Editor editor@spslandforces.net For Advertising Details, Contact: guidepub@vsnl.com neetu@spguidepublications.com rajeev.chugh@spguidepublications.com SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD POSTAL ADDRESS Post Box No 2525, New Delhi 110 005, India Corporate Office A 133 Arjun Nagar, Opp Defence Colony, New Delhi 110 003, India Tel: +91(11) 24644693, 24644763, 24620130 Fax: +91 (11) 24647093 Regd Office Fax: +91 (11) 23622942 Email: guidepub@vsnl.com Representative Offices BENGALURU, INDIA Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey 534, Jal Vayu Vihar, Kammanhalli Main Rd, Bangalore 560043, India.

Tel: +91 (80) 23682534 MOSCOW, RUSSIA LAGUK Co., Ltd, Yuri Laskin Krasnokholmskaya, Nab., 11/15, app. 132, Moscow 115172, Russia.

Tel: +7 (495) 911 2762, Fax: +7 (495) 912 1260 www.spguidepublications.com www.spslandforces.net RNI Number: DELENG/2008/25818

2/2011

SP’s LAND FORCES

19

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. NOW FOR EVEN MORE SITUATIONS. DRS Technologies, which has a long heritage of providing solutions to military forces worldwide, has developed C4ISR and RSTA tools for gathering, integrating and delivering real-time battlefield data. Which means leaders in the field can make highly informed decisions and keep warfighters safe.

Enhanced Situational Awareness: Thatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Go To. DRS.com/GoTo